Black Monday (1987)

649:, who has made the argument that several of these institutional and market factors exerted pressure in an environment of general anxiety. Feldstein suggests that the stock market was in a speculative bubble that kept prices "too high by historic and sustainable standards". The real economy was doing well, profits and earnings were rising, but stock prices were rising faster than the underlying profits would warrant. These capital gains created high price-earnings ratios that were unsupportable. There was a common perception that the market was overpriced, and that a correction was certain to occur. At the same time tight monetary policy and a market expectation of continued tightening were driving up interest rates. Bad trade figures from August were announced in October. This created an anticipation that the Fed would raise interest rates again. With the stock market appearing overextended and interest rates rising, a switch from stocks to bonds began to appear increasingly attractive. Yet investors were also hesitant to make this move: "...everybody knew the market was overpriced, but everybody was greedy and didn't want to miss out on a continuation of the wonderful rise that had been going on since the beginning of the year. But they were very, very nervous". As a final catalyst, there was also concern that portfolio insurance would greatly accelerate any drop into an avalanche whenever it began. A return to equilibrium was thus inevitable, but when the bubble burst, the combination of portfolio selling, and significant market nervousness brought a sharp crash. 656:. International investment in the US stock market had expanded significantly in the prolonged bull market. However, trade and budget deficits were bringing both downward pressure on the dollar and an expectation of higher interest rates. These factors and others motivated the industrialized nations (and in particular, the US, Japan and West Germany) to reach the Louvre agreement with several related goals in mind, one of which was to keep a floor beneath the value of the dollar while holding exchange rates within a specified band or reference range of one another. However, the market had limited confidence in the willingness of governments to abide by these agreements. The central banks of Japan and West Germany had been vocal about their fears of rising inflation; this created an expectation that these countries would raise interest rates to reduce liquidity and quell inflationary pressures. If those countries raised their rates, then in order to keep all countries within the agreed range of each other, the US would be expected to raise rates as well. When the Bundesbank followed through on its remarks and took steps to raise short-term interest rates, 326:; after the market's plunge, these were about ten times their average size and three times greater than the highest previous levels. Several firms had insufficient cash in customers' accounts (that is, they were "undersegregated"). Firms drawing funds from their own capital to meet the shortfall sometimes became undercapitalized; 11 firms received margin calls for a single customer that exceeded that firm's adjusted net capital, sometimes by as much as two-to-one. Investors needed to repay end-of-day margin calls made on October 19 before the opening of the market on October 20. Clearinghouse member firms called on lending institutions to extend credit to cover these sudden and unexpected charges, but the brokerages requesting additional credit began to exceed their credit limit. Banks were also worried about increasing their involvement and exposure to a chaotic market. The size and urgency of the demands for credit placed upon banks was unprecedented. In general, 529:

York markets on their next trading day and fearing steep drops or total collapse of their own exchanges, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Committee and the committee of the Futures Exchange announced the following morning that both would be closed. Their closure lasted for four working days. Their decision was motivated in part by the high risk that a market collapse would have serious consequences for the entire financial system of Hong Kong, and perhaps result in rioting, with the added threat of intervention by the army of the People's Republic of China. According to Neil Gunningham, a further motivation was brought on by a significant conflict of interest: many of these committee members were themselves futures brokers, and their firms were in danger of substantial defaults from their clients.

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the world. In many countries, large institutional investors dominate the market. Their principal motivation for futures transactions is hedging. In Hong Kong, the market itself, as well as many of its traders and brokers, was inexperienced. It was composed heavily of small, local investors who were relatively uninformed and unsophisticated, had only a short-term commitment to the market, and whose goals were primarily speculative rather than hedging. Among all parties involved, there was little or no expectation of the possibility of a crash or a steep decline or understanding of the consequences of such a fall. In fact, speculative investing that depended on the bull market to continue was prevalent among individual investors, often including the brokers themselves.

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Investors vary between seemingly rational and irrational behaviors as they "struggle to find their way between the give and take, between risk and return, one moment engaging in cool calculation and the next yielding to emotional impulses". If noise is misinterpreted as meaningful news, then the reactions of risk-averse traders and arbitrageurs will bias the market, preventing it from establishing prices that accurately reflect the fundamental state of the underlying stocks. For example, on October 19 rumors that the NYSE would close created additional confusion and drove prices further downward, while rumors the next day that two Chicago Mercantile Exchange clearinghouses were insolvent deterred some investors from trading in that marketplace.

540:. In Hong Kong, the approach to credit involved a system of margins and margin calls plus a Guarantee Corporation backed by a guarantee fund. Although on paper the Hong Kong exchange's margin requirements were in line with those of other major markets, in practice brokers regularly extended credit with little regard for risk. In a lax, freewheeling and fiercely competitive environment, margin requirements were routinely cut in half and sometimes ignored altogether. Hong Kong also had no suitability requirements that would force brokers to screen their customers for ability to repay any debts. The absence of oversight creates an imbalance of risk due to 544:: it becomes profitable for traders with low cash reserves to speculate in futures, reaping benefits if they speculate correctly, but simply defaulting if their hunches are wrong. If there is a wave of dishonored contracts, brokers become liable for their clients' losses, potentially facing bankruptcy themselves. Finally, the Guarantee Corporation was severely underfunded, with capital on hand of only HK$ 15 million (US$ 2 million). That amount was inadequate for dealing with any large number of clients' defaults in a market trading around 14,000 contracts a day, with an underlying value of HK$ 4.3 billion. 189: 714:; they no longer could be relied upon to inform traders of the direction or degree of stock market expectations. This had harmful effects: it added to the atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion at a time when investor confidence was sorely needed; it discouraged investors from "leaning against the wind" and buying stocks since the discount in the futures market logically implied that investors could wait and purchase stocks at an even lower price; and it encouraged portfolio insurance investors to sell in the stock market, putting further downward pressure on stock prices. 627:. The first searches for exogenous factors, such as significant news events, that affect or "trigger" investor behavior. The second, "cascade theory" or "market meltdown", attempts to identify endogenous internal market dynamics and interactions of systemic variables or trading strategies such that an order imbalance leads to a price change, this price change in turn leads to further order imbalance, which leads to further price changes, and so on in a spiralling cascade. It is possible that both could occur, if a trigger sets off a cascade. 733:...reflecting the natural linkages among markets, the selling pressure washed across to the stock market, both through index arbitrage and direct portfolio insurance stock sales. Large amounts of selling, and the demand for liquidity associated with it, cannot be contained in a single market segment. It necessarily overflows into the other market segments, which are naturally linked. There are, however, natural limits to intermarket liquidity which were made evident on October 19 and 20. 420:, Mexico and New Zealand), and three by more than 40 percent (Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore). The least affected was Austria (a fall of 11.4 percent) while the most affected was Hong Kong with a drop of 45.8 percent. Out of twenty-three major industrial countries, nineteen had a decline greater than 20 percent. Worldwide losses were estimated at US$ 1.71 trillion. The severity of the crash sparked fears of extended economic instability or even a reprise of the Great Depression. 36: 840:. Its intent was already being defeated by market forces as early as April of that year. Then the response of the Reagan administration to the crash was to deliberately let both interest rates and the value of the dollar fall to provide liquidity. They later resumed some interventions on behalf of the dollar until December 1988, but eventually it became clear that "international currency coordination of any kind, including a target zone, is not possible." 6101: 429: 474:, the initial market break was severe: the Tokyo market declined 14.9 percent in one day, and Japan's losses of US$ 421 billion ranked next to New York's $ 500 billion, out of a worldwide total loss of $ 1.7 trillion. However, systemic differences between the US and Japanese financial systems led to significantly different outcomes during and after the crash on Tuesday, October 20. In Japan the ensuing panic was no more than mild at worst: the 6113: 383:

on the evening beforehand. This was all done in a very high-profile and public manner, similar to Greenspan's initial announcement, to restore market confidence that liquidity was forthcoming. Although the Fed's holdings expanded appreciably over time, the speed of expansion was not excessive. Moreover, the Fed later disposed of these holdings so that its long-term policy goals would not be adversely affected.

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misinterpretations. This "extraordinary" announcement probably had a calming effect on markets that were facing an equally unprecedented demand for liquidity and the immediate potential for a liquidity crisis. The market rallied after that announcement, gaining around 200 points, but the rally was short-lived. By noon the gains had been erased and the slide had resumed.

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the crash with only minor casualties, the crisis in Hong Kong has resulted, at least in the short term, in the virtual demolition of the Futures Exchange." Finally, in the interest of preserving political stability and public order, the then British colonial government was forced to rescue the Guarantee Fund by providing a bail-out package of HK$ 4 billion.

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The markets were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. China did not have major stock

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When the futures market opened while the stock market was closed, it created a pricing imbalance: the listed price of those stocks which opened late had no chance to change from their closing price of the day before. The quoted prices were thus "stale" and did not reflect current economic conditions;

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Other factors often cited include a general feeling that stocks were overvalued and were certain to undergo a correction, the decline of the dollar, persistent trade and budget deficits, and rising interest rates. According to Shiller, the most common responses to his survey were related to a general

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The worst decline among world markets was in Hong Kong, where share values dropped by 45.8 percent. In its biggest-ever single fall, the Hang Seng Index of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange fell by 420.81 points, eliminating HK$ 65 billion' (10 percent) of its share value. Noting the continued fall of New

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The Fed's key action was to induce the banks (by suasion and by the supply of liquidity) to make loans, on customary terms, despite chaotic conditions and the possibility of severe adverse selection of borrowers. In expectation, making these loans must have been a money-losing strategy from the point

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had a further negative impact on the value of the US dollar while pushing interest rates upward and stock prices downward. As the day continued, the DJIA dropped 95.46 points (3.81 percent) to 2,412.70, and it fell another 57.61 points (2.39 percent) the next day, down over 12 percent from the August

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Although the stock exchange was in distress, structural flaws in the futures exchange, which was then the world's most heavily traded outside the U.S., were at the heart of the greater financial crisis. The structure of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange differed greatly from many other exchanges around

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of the entire nation. This rapidly pushed the federal funds rate down by 0.5 percent. The Fed continued its expansive open market purchases of securities for weeks. The Fed also repeatedly began these interventions an hour before the regularly scheduled time, notifying dealers of the schedule change

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publicly clashed with the Germans, making remarks that were interpreted as a threat to devalue the dollar. Even under normal circumstances, a weaker dollar would tend to make US stocks look less attractive to foreign investors. These remarks, however, created shock and panic among investors outside

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Holding onto a disinflationary stance, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand declined to loosen monetary policy – which would have helped firms settle their obligations and remain in operation. As the harmful effects spread over the next few years, major corporations and financial institutions went

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The crash initially left about 36,400 contracts worth HK$ 6.7 billion outstanding. As late as April 1988, HK$ 800 million had not been settled. According to Neil Gunningham, the accumulative impact was nearly fatal to the Hong Kong futures market: "Whereas futures exchanges elsewhere emerged from

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and prevent the crisis from expanding into other markets. It immediately began injecting its reserves into the financial system via purchases on the open market. On October 20 it injected $ 17 billion into the banking system through the open market – an amount that was more than 25 percent of

234:

groups had procedures that enabled customers to easily redeem their shares during the weekend at the same prices that existed at the close of market on Friday. The amount of these redemption requests was far greater than the firms' cash reserves, requiring them to make large sales of shares as soon

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found the influence of "other investors—mutual funds, broker-dealers, and individual shareholders—was thus three to five times greater than that of the portfolio insurers" during the crash. Numerous econometric studies have analyzed the evidence to determine whether portfolio insurance exacerbated

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This strategy became a source of downward pressure when portfolio insurers whose computer models noted that stocks opened lower and continued their steep price decline. The models recommended even further sales. The potential for computer-generated feedback loops that these hedges created has been

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surveyed 889 investors (605 individual investors and 284 institutional investors) immediately after the crash regarding several aspects of their experience at the time. Only three institutional investors and no individual investors reported a belief that the news regarding proposed tax legislation

828:

After Black Monday, regulators overhauled trade-clearing protocols to bring uniformity to all prominent market products. They also developed new regulatory instruments, known as "trading curbs" or "circuit breakers", allowing exchanges to temporarily halt in instances of exceptionally large price

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has suggested that while noise theory is "supported by substantial empirical evidence and a well-developed intellectual foundation", it makes only a partial contribution toward explaining events such as the crash of October 1987. Informed traders, not swayed by psychological or emotional factors,

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to control the total shares of stock and exert moral suasion on the securities industry. An example of the latter occurred when the ministry invited representatives of the four largest securities firms to tea in the early afternoon of the day of the crash. After their visit to the ministry, these

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The crash of the New Zealand stock market was notably long and deep, continuing its decline for an extended period after other global markets had recovered. Unlike other nations, moreover, for New Zealand the effects of the October 1987 crash spilled over into its real economy, contributing to a

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is closely connected to the prices of its counterpart in both the futures and options market. Prices in the derivative markets are typically tightly connected to those of the underlying stock, though they differ somewhat (as for example, prices of futures are typically higher than that of their

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made a brief statement: "The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation's central bank, affirmed today its readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system". Fed sources suggested that the brevity was deliberate, in order to avoid

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is often referred to as one form of "noise trading", which occurs when ill-informed investors " on noise as if it were news". A significant amount of trading takes place based on information which is unquantifiable and potentially irrelevant, such as unsubstantiated rumors or a "gut feeling".

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Although arbitrage between index futures and stocks placed downward pressure on prices, it does not explain why the surge in sell orders that brought steep price declines began in the first place. Moreover, the markets "performed most chaotically" during those times when the links that index

574:. Deregulation in particular suddenly gave financial institutions considerably more freedom to lend, though they had little experience in doing so. The finance industry was in a state of increasing optimism that approached euphoria. This created an atmosphere conducive to greater 582:

in the stock market and real estate. Foreign investors participated, attracted by New Zealand's relatively high interest rates. From late 1984 until Black Monday, commercial property prices and commercial construction rose sharply, while share prices in the stock market tripled.

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and delays. Of the 2,257 NYSE-listed stocks, there were 195 trading delays and halts that day. Total trading volume was so large that the computer and communications systems were overwhelmed, leaving orders unfilled for an hour or more. Large funds transfers were delayed and the

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using it as a lever, and he just actually wants the dollar to go down, then there is no stability. And if he isn't clear whether it is one or the other of those, then he doesn't understand his own system and his own business, and we'll have a problem of

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markets, the largest one-day percentage drop in the history of the DJIA. Significant selling created steep price declines throughout the day, particularly during the last 90 minutes of trading. Deluged with sell orders, many stocks on the NYSE faced

247:(NYSE) opened on October 19, 1987, there was pent-up pressure to sell. When the market opened, a large imbalance arose between the volume of sell and buy orders, placing downward pressure on prices. Regulations at the time allowed designated 3824:

Miller, M; Hawke, J; Malkiel, B; Scholes, M (1989). Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry appointed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to Examine the Events surrounding October 1987. The Black Monday and the Futures of Financial Markets

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Index returned to its pre-crash levels after only five months. Other global markets performed less well in the aftermath of the crash, with New York, London and Frankfurt all needing more than a year to achieve the same level of recovery.

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All of the twenty-three major world markets experienced a sharp decline in October 1987. Stock markets crashed worldwide, first in Asian markets other than Japan, then Europe, then the US, and finally Japan. When measured in

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dropped on the day of the crash. Stocks then continued to fall, albeit at a less precipitous rate, until reaching a trough in mid-November at 36 percent below its pre-crash peak. Stocks did not begin to recover until 1989.

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and uncertain market, investors worldwide were inferring information from changes in stock prices and communication with other investors in a self-reinforcing contagion of fear. This pattern of basing trading decisions on

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to achieve an inflation rate no higher than 2 percent by 1993, interest rates were volatile, with multiple increases. The combination of these contributed significantly to a long recession running from 1987 until 1993.

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Several events have been cited as potential triggers for the initial fall in stock prices. One of these was a proposed tax change that would make corporate takeovers more costly. However, Nobel-prize winning economist

207:(DJIA) rose from 776 in August 1982 to a peak of 2,722 in August 1987. The same bullish trend propelled market indices around the world over this period, as the nineteen largest enjoyed an average rise of 296 percent. 137:. Another explanation for Black Monday comes from the decline of the dollar, followed by a lack of faith in governmental attempts to stop that decline. In February 1987, leading industrial countries had signed the 235:

as the market opened on the following Monday. Finally, some traders anticipated these pressures and tried to get ahead of the market by selling early and aggressively on Monday, before the anticipated price drop.

3935: 251:(or "specialists") to delay or suspend trading in a stock if the order imbalance exceeded the specialist's ability to fulfill in an orderly manner. The imbalance on October 19 was so large that 95 stocks on the 790:, for example, found that markets with a greater prevalence of computerized trading (including portfolio insurance) actually experienced relatively less severe losses (in percentage terms) than those without. 227:

25 all-time high. On Friday, October 16, the DJIA fell 108.35 points (4.6 percent). The drop on the 14th was the earliest significant decline among all countries that would later be affected by Black Monday.

141:, hoping that monetary policy coordination would stabilize international money markets, but doubts about the viability of the accord created a crisis of confidence. The fall may have been accelerated by 3936:"The Hunt for Black October: With the Anniversary of the Worst One-Day Decline in US Stock Market History Approaching, Matthew Rees Set Out To Find Its Cause. And Determine Whether It Can Happen Again" 782:

the crash, but the results have been unclear. Markets around the world that did not have portfolio insurance trading experienced as much turmoil and loss as the US market. More to the point, the cross-

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of noise-induced-volatility has been cited by some analysts as the major reason for the severe depth of the crash. It does not, however, explain what initially triggered the market break. Moreover,

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out of business, and the banking systems of New Zealand and Australia were impaired, contributing to a "long recession". Access to credit was reduced. In fact, because of legislation requiring the

230:

Though the markets were closed for the weekend, significant selling pressure still existed. The computer models of portfolio insurers continued to dictate very large sales. Moreover, some large

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The Fed's two-part strategy was thoroughly successful, since lending to securities firms by large banks in Chicago and especially in New York increased substantially, often nearly doubling.

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New Zealand's stock market fell nearly 15 percent on the first day. In the following three-and-a-half months, the value of its market shares was cut in half. By the time it reached its

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on Monday, October 19, 1987. Worldwide losses were estimated at US$ 1.71 trillion. The severity of the crash sparked fears of extended economic instability or even a reprise of the

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to prevent debt defaults among financial institutions, and the impact on the real economy was relatively limited and short-lived. However, refusal to loosen monetary policy by the

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of their properties, partially to help offset their share price losses, and partially because the crash had exposed overbuilding. Moreover, these firms had been using property as

536:

The key shortcomings of the futures exchange, however, were mismanagement and a failure of regulatory diligence and design. These failures were particularly grave in the area of

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and specialists. This possibility first loomed on the day after the crash. At least initially, there was a very real risk that these institutions could fail. If that happened,

914:... substantial undervaluation of equities when inflation is high, as in the early 1980s. The bull market.. in part a correction from this previous level of undervaluation." 470:

In Japan, the October 1987 crash is sometimes referred to as "Blue Tuesday", because of the time zone difference, and its effects were relatively mild. According to economist

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Huang, Bwo-Nung; Yang, Chin-Wei; Hu, John Wei-Shan (2000). "Causality and Cointegration of Stock Markets among the United States, Japan and the South China Growth Triangle".

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stated, "From our perspective on the Brady Commission, Black Monday may have been frightening, but it was the capital-liquidity problem on Tuesday that was horrifying."

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suggested that the greatest economic danger was not events on the day of the crash itself, but the potential for "spreading collapse of securities firms" if an extended

668:, or even the collapse of the dollar, an anonymous senior Reagan administration later summarized the fear and uncertainty in investor's minds after Baker's statement: 3319: 777:

argues against this interpretation, suggesting that the impact of portfolio hedging on stock prices was probably relatively small. Similarly, the report of the

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mindset of investors at the time: a "gut feeling" of an impending crash", perhaps driven by excessive debt. This aligns with an account suggested by economist

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they were generally listed higher than they should have been (and dramatically higher than their respective futures, which are typically higher than stocks).

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the market is rising or falling. Thus, it is an example of an "informationless trade" that has the potential to create a market-destabilizing feedback loop.

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that motivated nervous banks to lend to securities firms alongside its moves to reassure those banks by actively supplying them with liquidity. As economist

5477: 4414: 255:(S&P) opened late, as also did 11 of the 30 DJIA stocks. Importantly, however, the futures market opened on time across the board, with heavy selling. 3831: 1425:, pp. 151–153 "... in conversations, Federal Reserve officials repeatedly stressed that they did not use the discount window during the crash". 6012: 3542:(3, Papers and Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana January 3–5, 1992): 851–877. 6178: 5997: 5974: 2872: 2828:

Blume, Marshall E.; Mackinlay, A. Craig; Terker, Bruce (September 1989). "Order Imbalances and Stock Price Movements on October 19 and 20, 1987".

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Discussions of the causes of the Black Monday crash focus on two theoretical models, which differ in whether they emphasise on variables that are

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Headrick, Thomas E. (October 1992). "Expert Policy Analysis and Bureaucratic Politics: Searching for the Causes of the 1987 Stock Market Crash".

211: 3697:

MacKenzie, Donald (2004). "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and the Performativity of Economics".

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In this account, the result was a punishing selloff that started in Asia and spread to Europe and the US as markets opened up across the world.

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Ito, Takatoshi (2016). "The Plaza Accord and Japan: Reflections on the 30th anniversary". In Bergsten, C. Fred; Green, Russell A. (eds.).

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A second explanation for the crash lies in a crisis of confidence in the dollar created by uncertainties regarding the viability of the

5943: 5803: 5702: 4623: 3988: 765:. Specifically, they buy when the market is rising, and sell as the market falls, without regard for any fundamental information about 5810: 5653: 5286: 3763:

Markham, Jerry W.; Stephanz, Rita McCloy (1988). "The Stock Market Crash of 1987 – The United States Looks at New Recommendations".

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Feldstein, Martin; Modigliani, Franco; Sinai, Allen; Solow, Robert (1988). "Black Monday in Retrospect and Prospect: A Roundtable".

2913: 1392:, p. 31 "the Fed has performed its role of lender of last resort so admirably in the recent stock market crash episode..." 6163: 5967: 5884: 5854: 5737: 5730: 5674: 5667: 5535: 5224: 448: 6041: 5660: 4913: 4834: 657: 3219:

Gunningham, Neil (Winter 1990). "Moving the Goalposts: Financial Market Regulation in Hong Kong and the Crash of October 1987".

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such as a sharp limit on price movements of a share of more than 10 to 15 percent; restrictions and institutional barriers to

451:(FTSE 100) had fallen 296 points, a 14 percent drop. It was down 23 percent in two days, roughly the same percentage that the 5528: 5441: 5190: 5182: 4052: 3889: 3615: 75:

Dow Jones Industrial Average falls 508 points (22.6 percent), the largest one-day drop by percentage in the index's history.

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Seyhun, H. Nejat (1990). "Overreaction or Fundamentals: Some Lessons from Insiders' Response to the Market Crash of 1987".

2980: 362:; persuading banks to lend to securities firms; and in a few specific cases, direct action tailored to a few firms' needs. 223: 5876: 5145: 4596: 4420: 3837: 3672:"Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash" 3258: 5905: 4554: 4524: 4496: 4454: 4327: 3968: 3814: 3671: 3626: 3524: 3447: 2894: 624: 4512:

Panic on Wall Street: A Classic History of America's Financial Disasters – With a New Exploration of the Crash of 1987

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The effects of the worldwide economic boom of the mid-1980s had been amplified in New Zealand by the relaxation of

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Stock markets crash worldwide, first in Asian markets other than Japan, then Europe, then the US, and finally Japan

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The degree to which the stock market crashes spread to the wider (or "real") economy was directly related to the

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Possible explanations for the initial fall in stock prices include a nervous fear that stocks were significantly

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Malliaris, Anastasios G.; Urrutia, Jorge L. (1992). "The International Crash of October 1987: Causality Tests".

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Contemporaneous causality and feedback behavior between markets increased dramatically during this period. In a

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The decoupling of these markets meant that futures prices had temporarily lost their validity as a vehicle for

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Quennouëlle-Corre, Laure (2021). "The 1987 Stock Exchange Crash in Historical Perspective: A Crisis Denied?".

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Meltzer, Alan H. (1989). "Overview". In Kamphuis, Robert W.; Kormendi, Roger C.; Watson, J. W. Henry (eds.).

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Kleidon, Allan W.; Whaley, Robert E. (1992). "One Market? Stocks, Futures, and Options During October 1987".

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Schaede, Ulrike (1991). "Black Monday in New York, Blue Tuesday in Tokyo: The October 1987 Crash in Japan".

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had sharply negative and relatively long-term consequences for both its financial markets and real economy.

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Rebuilding Wall Street: After the Crash of'87, Fifty Insiders Talk about Putting Wall Street Together Again

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Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1987–1988). "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations".

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in February 1988, the market had lost 60 percent of its value. The financial crisis triggered a wave of

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Several of Japan's distinctive institutional characteristics already in place at the time, according to

6091: 5912: 5817: 5623: 5301: 5064: 3765: 2914:"From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis" 106:

in some parts of the world due to time zone differences) was the global, severe and largely unexpected

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Ritter, Jay R.; Warr, Richard S. (2002). "The Decline of inflation and the Bull Market of 1982–1999".

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discussed as a factor compounding the severity of the crash, but not as an initial trigger. Economist

672:...wait a minute. If is using it as a lever and we believe it won't work, there is no bottom. If he 6153: 6027: 5951: 5723: 5206: 4609: 3518: 3156: 2858: 874: 567: 5198: 5688: 5351: 5323: 5160: 4484: 3410: 2958: 880: 594:

with significant macro-economic consequences. Investment companies and property developers began a

3647: 6138: 6063: 5981: 5485: 5388: 4989: 4358: 3653: 2985: 941: 937: 890: 830: 244: 3627:"Ten Years After: Regulatory Developments in the Securities Markets since the 1987 Market Break" 3249: 2860:

A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response

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Bates, David S. (1991). "The Crash of '87: Was It Expected? The Evidence from Options Markets".

722: 6056: 5758: 5153: 5004: 4997: 4949: 4935: 4651: 3534: 2713: 816: 761:(for example, stocks or futures) in reaction to changes in market price rather than changes in 557: 486: 188: 4317: 3603: 3520:

The Evolving Nature of the Financial System: Financial Crises and the Role of the Central Bank

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approach included issuing a terse, decisive public pronouncement; supplying liquidity through

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Fuerbringer, Jonathan (January 27, 1991). "World Markets; A Warning Flag Over New Zealand".

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Harris, Lawrence (1988). "Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash".

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of view of the banks (and the Fed); otherwise, Fed persuasion would not have been needed.

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in various stock market conditions) or a self-reinforcing contagion of fear.

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technique which seeks to manage risk and limit losses by buying and selling

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Bulls, Bears and Elephants: A History of the New Zealand Stock Exchange

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List of largest daily changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average

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Arguably, a second consequence of the crash was the death of the

394:(who was later to become Chairman of the Federal Reserve) wrote: 322:

The source of these liquidity problems was a general increase in

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particular cash stock). During the crisis this link was broken.

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by domestic and international traders; frequent adjustments of

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arbitrage program trading creates between these markets was

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have room to make trades they know to be less risky.

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They raised the prospect of a 5855:2013 Chinese banking liquidity crisis 5811:2010–2014 Portuguese financial crisis 5287:Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975 4605: 4505: 4463: 4336: 3855:American Economic Policy in the 1980s 3852: 3602:Leland, Hayne E. (October 14, 1992). 3248:Hale, David D. (August 17–19, 1988). 3148: 2884: 2800: 2710: 2602: 2538: 2195: 2147: 2003: 1927: 1911: 1514: 1377: 1026: 963: 690:De-linked markets and index arbitrage 606:of lending institutions was damaged. 330:increased as the creditworthiness of 159:each nation pursued in response. The 6149:Economic crises in the United States 5885:Russian financial crisis (2014–2016) 5738:2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis 5731:2008–2009 Ukrainian financial crisis 5696:2000s U.S. housing market correction 5536:1998–2002 Argentine great depression 4631: 4354:"Exorcising Ghosts of Octobers Past" 4159:Shieber, Jonathan (March 16, 2020). 4152:National Bureau of Economic Research 4061: 3933: 3908:Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 3804: 3644: 3513: 3409: 3376:Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 3366: 3247: 2694: 2487: 2207: 2023: 2007: 1979: 1958: 1942: 1923: 1702: 1627: 1615: 1502: 1361: 1125: 1014: 721:traders who tried to profit through 439:(June 19, 1987, to January 19, 1988) 224:United States Department of Commerce 43:(June 19, 1987, to January 19, 1988) 6042:2023–2024 Egyptian financial crisis 5877:Puerto Rican government-debt crisis 5870:2014–2016 Brazilian economic crisis 5243:1963–1965 Indonesian hyperinflation 5146:Shanghai rubber stock market crisis 4835:Dutch Republic stock market crashes 4421:Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 4352:Browning, E.S. 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Index arbitrage, a form of 13: 5848:2012–2013 Cypriot financial crisis 5752:2008–2014 Spanish financial crisis 5724:2008–2009 Russian financial crisis 5717:2008–2009 Belgian financial crisis 5412:1988–1992 Norwegian banking crisis 4907:British credit crisis of 1772–1773 4592:CNBC Remembering the Crash of 1987 4337:Bozzo, Albert (October 12, 2007). 4308: 4134:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03719.x 3548:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03997.x 3525:Federal Reserve Board of Governors 3311:10.1111/j.1467-9930.1992.tb00088.x 3233:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1990.tb00274.x 3197:"Group of 7, Meet the Group of 33" 2842:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02626.x 2727:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03775.x 2063:Blume, Mackinlay & Terker 1989 684: 14: 6190: 6035:2023 United States banking crisis 5841:2011 Bangladesh share market scam 5529:1998–1999 Ecuador economic crisis 5493:Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994 5419:Japanese asset price bubble crash 5360:Souk Al-Manakh stock market crash 5110:Australian banking crisis of 1893 4914:Dutch Republic financial collapse 4565: 4386:Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 3320:"A More Sober DOW Nears Its Peak" 2404:Macey, Mitchell & Netter 1988 2328:Macey, Mitchell & Netter 1988 423: 19:For a list of Black Mondays, see 6111: 6099: 4892:Amsterdam banking crisis of 1763 4464:Maley, Matt (October 16, 2017). 4391:Library of Economics and Liberty 4211:Journal of Economic Perspectives 3610:. 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(1996). 2639:Bernhardt & Eckblad 2013 2500:Malliaris & Urrutia 1992 2192:Bernhardt & Eckblad 2013 1110:Bernhardt & Eckblad 2013 1098:Malliaris & Urrutia 1992 897: 823: 517: 238: 205:Dow Jones Industrial Average 192:Timeline compiled by the US 7: 5929:2017 Sri Lankan fuel crisis 5595:2003 Myanmar banking crisis 5588:2002 Uruguay banking crisis 5508:1997 Asian financial crisis 5435:1991 Indian economic crisis 5427:Rhode Island banking crisis 5397:Cameroonian economic crisis 5183:Early Soviet hyperinflation 4796:Crisis of the Third Century 4182:Shiller, Robert J. (1988). 4141:Shiller, Robert J. (1987). 3711:10.1080/0308514042000225680 3155:. Wellington, New Zealand: 2885:Cohen, Benjamin J. (2007). 2599:Shleifer & Summers 1990 2078:Markham & Stephanz 1988 1618:, p. 20 (table 1), 21. 893:- released in December 1987 858: 779:Chicago Mercantile Exchange 612:Reserve Bank of New Zealand 578:taking including increased 354:to counter the crisis. Its 173:Reserve Bank of New Zealand 10: 6197: 5960:Sri Lankan economic crisis 5818:Energy crisis in Venezuela 5797:2009 Dubai debt standstill 5647:2007–2008 financial crisis 5302:Latin American debt crisis 5065:Paris Bourse crash of 1882 4339:"Players replay the crash" 4316:Blakey, George G. (2011). 4188:NBER Macroeconomics Annual 4064:Financial Analysts Journal 3766:The Georgetown Law Journal 3048:Gaffikin, Michael (2007). 3029:Funabashi, Yōichi (1989). 2887:Global Monetary Governance 2807:NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2769:. Federal Reserve History. 2703: 2020:Reddell & Sleeman 2008 1992:Reddell & Sleeman 2008 1947:Reddell & Sleeman 2008 1669:, pp. III-22, III-16. 843:The crash of 1987 altered 746:Portfolio insurance hedges 555: 521: 463: 350:(Fed) began to act as the 284:Margin calls and liquidity 199:During a strong five-year 87:institutes rule regarding 18: 6051: 6028:2022 stock market decline 6020:Pakistani economic crisis 6006:2021–2023 inflation surge 5952:Lebanese liquidity crisis 5921:Venezuelan hyperinflation 5913:Brexit stock market crash 5862:Venezuela economic crisis 5784: 5634: 5624:Zimbabwean hyperinflation 5334: 5252: 5223: 5207:Wall Street Crash of 1929 5170: 5047:2nd Industrial Revolution 5045: 4981: 4881:1st Industrial Revolution 4879: 4806: 4784: 4639: 4231:Sornette, Didier Sornette 4041:Roberts, Richard (2008). 3471:10.1080/13619469908581518 3157:Victoria University Press 2857:Carlson, Mark A. 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The 875:Wall Street Crash of 1929 618: 568:foreign exchange controls 66: 56: 48: 33: 16:Global stock market crash 6144:1987 in economic history 5689:Subprime mortgage crisis 5352:Brazilian hyperinflation 5324:Brazilian hyperinflation 5161:Financial crisis of 1914 4869:Mississippi bubble crash 4597:Black Monday photographs 4280:Toporowski, Jan (1993). 3180:Federal Reserve Bulletin 3174:Greenspan, Alan (1987). 2959:Eastern Economic Journal 2515:King & Wadhwani 1990 881:Black Monday (TV series) 459: 338:Federal Reserve response 6064:List of economic crises 5982:2020 stock market crash 5975:Financial market impact 5944:Turkish economic crisis 5559:9/11 stock market crash 5515:October 1997 mini-crash 5486:1994 bond market crisis 5478:Yugoslav hyperinflation 5389:Savings and loan crisis 4990:European potato failure 4479:Martin, Justin (2000). 4359:The Wall Street Journal 3963:. 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Cunningham 735: 679: 558:Economy of New Zealand 440: 401: 360:open market operations 299:began to threaten the 196: 163:of the United States, 6134:1987 in New York City 5382:Black Saturday (1983) 5236:Kennedy Slide of 1962 4808:Commercial revolution 4076:10.2469/faj.v44.n5.19 3604:"Portfolio Insurance" 3397:on September 18, 2020 3206:. December 26, 1987. 3067:10.14453/aabfj.v1i1.1 2589:, pp. 9, 10, 17. 2152:Feldstein et al. 1988 2136:Feldstein et al. 1988 2124:Feldstein et al. 1988 2112:Feldstein et al. 1988 1810:, pp. 14–15, 43. 1762:, pp. 18–19, 40. 1167:, p. 8, note 11. 759:financial instruments 731: 670: 658:US Treasury Secretary 563:prolonged recession. 437:London Stock Exchange 431: 414:United States dollars 396: 352:lender of last resort 191: 167:, and Japan provided 6159:Stock market crashes 5936:Ghana banking crisis 5766:European debt crisis 5551:Dot-com bubble crash 5463:Cuban Special Period 4922:Copper Panic of 1789 4827:The Great Debasement 4819:Great Bullion Famine 4547:Simon & Schuster 4491:. pp. 171–186. 4449:. pp. 104–110. 3987:(Technical report). 3367:Hunt, Chris (2009). 2278:, pp. 851–852; 572:banking deregulation 524:Economy of Hong Kong 218:. Unexpectedly high 5892:2015 Nepal blockade 5602:2000s energy crisis 5500:Mexican peso crisis 5405:Black Monday (1987) 5265:1970s energy crisis 5225:Post–WWII expansion 4899:Bengal bubble crash 4694:Financial contagion 4257:2003PhR...378....1S 3699:Economy and Society 3324:The Washington Post 2750:10.1093/rfs/3.1.133 2605:, pp. 273–274. 2541:, pp. 273–274. 2502:, pp. 362–363. 2418:, pp. 155–156. 2394:, pp. 154–156. 2318:, pp. 859–860. 2306:, pp. 851–852. 2114:, pp. 337–339. 2095:, pp. 292–293. 1705:, pp. 182–183. 1368:, pp. 146–147. 1321:, Study VI, p. 71; 886:Black Monday (2020) 763:market fundamentals 751:Portfolio insurance 507:Ministry of Finance 499:margin requirements 445:Great Storm of 1987 297:securities industry 143:portfolio insurance 30: 5154:Panic of 1910–1911 4998:Great Irish Famine 4936:Panic of 1796–1797 4775:Stock market crash 4549:. pp. 36–49. 4489:Perseus Publishing 4381:David R. Henderson 4223:10.1257/jep.4.2.19 3677:Cornell Law Review 3277:Cornell Law Review 3261:. pp. 167–173 3203:The New York Times 3014:The New York Times 2476:Miller et al. 1989 2452:Miller et al. 1989 2376:Miller et al. 1989 1874:, pp. 15, 17 1553:, pp. 13–14; 1485:, pp. 29–30; 845:implied volatility 441: 197: 108:stock market crash 61:Stock market crash 28: 6087: 6086: 5968:COVID-19 pandemic 4853:Tulip mania crash 4844:Kipper und Wipper 4821:(c. 1400–c. 1500) 4423:. pp. 79–120 4377:"Program Trading" 4054:978-1-86197-858-5 3891:978-0-19-264395-7 3617:978-1-56159-041-4 3499:10.1093/rfs/3.1.5 2943:(Winter): 48–53. 2685:, pp. 92–95. 2673:, pp. 92–95. 2617:, pp. 3, 10. 2490:, pp. 29–30. 2442:, pp. 83–84. 2428:Brady Report 1988 2378:, pp. 12–13. 2352:Brady Report 1988 2282:, p. 55, 57. 2280:Brady Report 1988 2198:, pp. 64–65. 2178:, pp. 50–51. 1693:, pp. 42–45. 1681:, pp. 53–54. 1667:Brady Report 1988 1529:, pp. 17–18. 1489:, Study VI, p. 73 1487:Brady Report 1988 1337:, pp. 12–13. 1325:, pp. 12–13. 1319:Brady Report 1988 1281:, Study VI, p. 73 1279:Brady Report 1988 1266:, pp. 29–30. 1196:Brady Report 1988 1153:Brady Report 1988 1053:, pp. 29–30. 805:market psychology 638:Robert J. Shiller 356:crisis management 328:counterparty risk 317:Robert R. Glauber 309:spillover effects 303:and viability of 260:futures exchanges 253:S&P 500 Index 216:leveraged buyouts 97: 96: 6186: 6154:Financial crises 6116: 6115: 6104: 6103: 6095: 6080: 6073: 6066: 6059: 6044: 6037: 6030: 6023: 6015: 6008: 6001: 5991: 5984: 5977: 5970: 5963: 5955: 5947: 5939: 5931: 5924: 5916: 5908: 5901: 5894: 5887: 5880: 5872: 5865: 5857: 5850: 5843: 5836: 5829: 5821: 5813: 5806: 5799: 5775: 5768: 5761: 5754: 5747: 5740: 5733: 5726: 5719: 5712: 5705: 5698: 5691: 5684: 5677: 5670: 5663: 5656: 5649: 5627: 5619: 5612: 5605: 5597: 5590: 5583: 5576: 5569: 5562: 5554: 5546: 5538: 5531: 5524: 5517: 5510: 5503: 5495: 5488: 5481: 5473: 5466: 5458: 5451: 5444: 5437: 5430: 5422: 5414: 5407: 5400: 5392: 5384: 5377: 5370: 5363: 5355: 5341:Great Regression 5336:Great Moderation 5327: 5319: 5312: 5305: 5297: 5289: 5282: 5275: 5268: 5245: 5238: 5216: 5209: 5202: 5194: 5186: 5163: 5156: 5149: 5141: 5134: 5127: 5120: 5112: 5105: 5098: 5090: 5082: 5074: 5067: 5060: 5038: 5030: 5023: 5016: 5007: 5000: 4993: 4974: 4967: 4960: 4953: 4945: 4938: 4931: 4924: 4917: 4909: 4902: 4894: 4872: 4864: 4856: 4848: 4838: 4830: 4822: 4799: 4777: 4770: 4763: 4754: 4747: 4740: 4733: 4726: 4724:Liquidity crisis 4719: 4712: 4703: 4701:Social contagion 4696: 4689: 4682: 4675: 4668: 4661: 4654: 4647: 4633:Financial crises 4626: 4619: 4612: 4603: 4602: 4588: 4586: 4584: 4560: 4544: 4530: 4502: 4475: 4460: 4432: 4430: 4428: 4394: 4389:(1st ed.). 4371: 4348: 4333: 4303: 4276: 4250: 4248:cond-mat/0301543 4226: 4205: 4203: 4178: 4155: 4149: 4137: 4128:(5): 1363–1388. 4116: 4097:10.2307/41166649 4079: 4058: 4037: 3992: 3974: 3955: 3930: 3928: 3926: 3905: 3895: 3876: 3849: 3847: 3845: 3840:. pp. 23–32 3826: 3820: 3801: 3782: 3759: 3722: 3693: 3666: 3650: 3641: 3639: 3637: 3631: 3621: 3598: 3579:10.2307/41166528 3559: 3528: 3517:(May 18, 2006). 3510: 3484: 3474: 3453: 3434: 3406: 3404: 3402: 3396: 3390:. Archived from 3373: 3363: 3342: 3340: 3338: 3314: 3299:Law & Policy 3293: 3270: 3268: 3266: 3256: 3244: 3215: 3199: 3191: 3170: 3145: 3119: 3118: 3114: 3112: 3102: 3079: 3069: 3044: 3025: 3008: 3005: 3003: 3001: 2975: 2952: 2931: 2908: 2881: 2879: 2867: 2865: 2853: 2824: 2822: 2797: 2770: 2761: 2730: 2721:(3): 1009–1044. 2698: 2692: 2686: 2680: 2674: 2664: 2658: 2652: 2646: 2636: 2630: 2624: 2618: 2612: 2606: 2596: 2590: 2584: 2578: 2572: 2566: 2560: 2554: 2548: 2542: 2536: 2530: 2524: 2518: 2512: 2503: 2497: 2491: 2485: 2479: 2473: 2467: 2461: 2455: 2449: 2443: 2437: 2431: 2425: 2419: 2413: 2407: 2401: 2395: 2385: 2379: 2373: 2367: 2361: 2355: 2349: 2343: 2337: 2331: 2325: 2319: 2313: 2307: 2301: 2295: 2289: 2283: 2273: 2267: 2261: 2255: 2249: 2243: 2233: 2227: 2217: 2211: 2205: 2199: 2185: 2179: 2173: 2167: 2161: 2155: 2145: 2139: 2133: 2127: 2121: 2115: 2109: 2096: 2090: 2081: 2075: 2066: 2060: 2054: 2048: 2039: 2036:Fuerbringer 1991 2033: 2027: 2017: 2011: 2001: 1995: 1989: 1983: 1977: 1962: 1956: 1950: 1940: 1931: 1921: 1915: 1909: 1903: 1897: 1891: 1885: 1879: 1869: 1863: 1853: 1847: 1841: 1835: 1829: 1823: 1817: 1811: 1805: 1799: 1793: 1787: 1781: 1775: 1769: 1763: 1757: 1751: 1745: 1736: 1730: 1721: 1715: 1706: 1700: 1694: 1688: 1682: 1676: 1670: 1664: 1658: 1652: 1643: 1637: 1631: 1625: 1619: 1613: 1602: 1592: 1586: 1580: 1574: 1564: 1558: 1548: 1542: 1536: 1530: 1524: 1518: 1512: 1506: 1496: 1490: 1480: 1474: 1468: 1462: 1456: 1450: 1444: 1438: 1432: 1426: 1416: 1410: 1404: 1393: 1387: 1381: 1375: 1369: 1359: 1353: 1347: 1338: 1332: 1326: 1316: 1310: 1304: 1298: 1288: 1282: 1276: 1267: 1261: 1255: 1245: 1239: 1233: 1227: 1221: 1215: 1205: 1199: 1193: 1187: 1181: 1168: 1162: 1156: 1150: 1144: 1138: 1129: 1123: 1117: 1107: 1101: 1087: 1081: 1075: 1066: 1060: 1054: 1048: 1042: 1036: 1030: 1024: 1018: 1012: 1003: 997: 988: 982: 971: 966:, p. 1363; 961: 945: 933: 927: 921: 915: 908: 865:2010 Flash Crash 853:volatility smile 647:Martin Feldstein 466:Economy of Japan 375:market liquidity 305:brokerage houses 293:liquidity crisis 289:Frederic Mishkin 169:market liquidity 125:, persistent US 112:Great Depression 52:October 19, 1987 38: 31: 27: 6196: 6195: 6189: 6188: 6187: 6185: 6184: 6183: 6124: 6123: 6122: 6110: 6098: 6090: 6088: 6083: 6076: 6069: 6062: 6055: 6047: 6040: 6033: 6026: 6018: 6011: 6004: 5996: 5987: 5980: 5973: 5966: 5958: 5950: 5942: 5934: 5927: 5919: 5911: 5904: 5897: 5890: 5883: 5875: 5868: 5860: 5853: 5846: 5839: 5832: 5824: 5816: 5809: 5802: 5795: 5788: 5786:Information Age 5780: 5771: 5764: 5757: 5750: 5743: 5736: 5729: 5722: 5715: 5708: 5701: 5694: 5687: 5680: 5673: 5666: 5659: 5652: 5645: 5638: 5636:Great Recession 5630: 5622: 5615: 5608: 5600: 5593: 5586: 5579: 5572: 5565: 5557: 5549: 5541: 5534: 5527: 5520: 5513: 5506: 5498: 5491: 5484: 5476: 5469: 5461: 5454: 5447: 5440: 5433: 5425: 5417: 5410: 5403: 5395: 5387: 5380: 5373: 5366: 5358: 5350: 5343: 5339: 5330: 5322: 5317:1979 oil crisis 5315: 5308: 5300: 5292: 5285: 5278: 5273:1973 oil crisis 5271: 5263: 5256: 5254:Great Inflation 5248: 5241: 5234: 5227: 5219: 5212: 5205: 5197: 5189: 5181: 5174: 5172:Interwar period 5166: 5159: 5152: 5144: 5137: 5130: 5123: 5115: 5108: 5101: 5093: 5085: 5077: 5070: 5063: 5056: 5049: 5041: 5033: 5026: 5019: 5012: 5003: 4996: 4988: 4977: 4970: 4963: 4956: 4948: 4941: 4934: 4927: 4920: 4912: 4905: 4897: 4890: 4883: 4875: 4867: 4859: 4851: 4841: 4833: 4825: 4817: 4810: 4802: 4794: 4780: 4773: 4766: 4759: 4750: 4743: 4736: 4729: 4722: 4715: 4708: 4699: 4692: 4685: 4678: 4673:Currency crisis 4671: 4664: 4657: 4650: 4643: 4635: 4630: 4582: 4580: 4571: 4568: 4563: 4557: 4527: 4499: 4457: 4437:Greenspan, Alan 4426: 4424: 4330: 4311: 4309:Further reading 4306: 4292: 4235:Physics Reports 4147: 4055: 4010:10.2307/3594994 3971: 3924: 3922: 3903: 3892: 3865: 3843: 3841: 3817: 3798: 3740:10.2307/2331324 3635: 3633: 3629: 3618: 3515:Kohn, Donald L. 3482: 3450: 3431: 3400: 3398: 3394: 3371: 3336: 3334: 3264: 3262: 3254: 3167: 3116: 3110: 3041: 3006: 2999: 2997: 2897: 2877: 2863: 2786: 2706: 2701: 2693: 2689: 2681: 2677: 2669:, p. 562; 2665: 2661: 2653: 2649: 2637: 2633: 2627:Cunningham 1994 2625: 2621: 2615:Cunningham 1994 2613: 2609: 2597: 2593: 2585: 2581: 2575:Cunningham 1994 2573: 2569: 2561: 2557: 2549: 2545: 2537: 2533: 2525: 2521: 2513: 2506: 2498: 2494: 2486: 2482: 2478:, pp. 6–7. 2474: 2470: 2462: 2458: 2450: 2446: 2438: 2434: 2426: 2422: 2414: 2410: 2402: 2398: 2386: 2382: 2374: 2370: 2362: 2358: 2350: 2346: 2338: 2334: 2326: 2322: 2314: 2310: 2302: 2298: 2290: 2286: 2274: 2270: 2262: 2258: 2250: 2246: 2234: 2230: 2222:, p. 135; 2218: 2214: 2206: 2202: 2186: 2182: 2174: 2170: 2162: 2158: 2146: 2142: 2134: 2130: 2122: 2118: 2110: 2099: 2091: 2084: 2076: 2069: 2061: 2057: 2049: 2042: 2034: 2030: 2018: 2014: 2006:, p. 330; 2002: 1998: 1990: 1986: 1978: 1965: 1957: 1953: 1941: 1934: 1922: 1918: 1910: 1906: 1900:Gunningham 1990 1898: 1894: 1888:Gunningham 1990 1886: 1882: 1872:Gunningham 1990 1870: 1866: 1856:Gunningham 1990 1854: 1850: 1844:Gunningham 1990 1842: 1838: 1830: 1826: 1820:Gunningham 1990 1818: 1814: 1808:Gunningham 1990 1806: 1802: 1796:Gunningham 1990 1794: 1790: 1784:Gunningham 1990 1782: 1778: 1772:Gunningham 1990 1770: 1766: 1760:Gunningham 1990 1758: 1754: 1748:Gunningham 1990 1746: 1739: 1733:Gunningham 1990 1731: 1724: 1716: 1709: 1701: 1697: 1689: 1685: 1677: 1673: 1665: 1661: 1653: 1646: 1638: 1634: 1626: 1622: 1614: 1605: 1593: 1589: 1581: 1577: 1569:, p. 153; 1565: 1561: 1549: 1545: 1537: 1533: 1525: 1521: 1513: 1509: 1501:, p. 125; 1499:Toporowski 1993 1497: 1493: 1481: 1477: 1469: 1465: 1457: 1453: 1445: 1441: 1433: 1429: 1417: 1413: 1405: 1396: 1388: 1384: 1376: 1372: 1360: 1356: 1348: 1341: 1333: 1329: 1317: 1313: 1305: 1301: 1289: 1285: 1277: 1270: 1262: 1258: 1246: 1242: 1234: 1230: 1226:, pp. 8–9. 1222: 1218: 1214:, pp. 8–9. 1210:, p. 165; 1206: 1202: 1194: 1190: 1182: 1171: 1163: 1159: 1151: 1147: 1143:, pp. 3–4. 1139: 1132: 1124: 1120: 1108: 1104: 1088: 1084: 1076: 1069: 1061: 1057: 1049: 1045: 1037: 1033: 1025: 1021: 1013: 1006: 998: 991: 983: 974: 970:, p. 1009. 962: 958: 954: 949: 948: 934: 930: 924:Discount window 922: 918: 909: 905: 900: 877:(Black Tuesday) 861: 826: 796: 784:market analysis 748: 727:program trading 719:index arbitrage 712:price discovery 692: 687: 685:Market meltdown 633: 621: 560: 554: 526: 520: 468: 462: 426: 409: 348:Federal Reserve 340: 315:as a whole. As 286: 241: 194:Federal Reserve 186: 181: 157:monetary policy 131:budget deficits 102:(also known as 44: 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 6194: 6193: 6182: 6181: 6176: 6171: 6166: 6161: 6156: 6151: 6146: 6141: 6139:1987 disasters 6136: 6121: 6120: 6108: 6085: 6084: 6082: 6081: 6074: 6067: 6060: 6052: 6049: 6048: 6046: 6045: 6038: 6031: 6024: 6022:(2022–present) 6016: 6009: 6002: 6000:(2020–present) 5994: 5993: 5992: 5985: 5978: 5964: 5962:(2019–present) 5956: 5954:(2019–present) 5948: 5946:(2018–present) 5940: 5932: 5925: 5917: 5909: 5902: 5895: 5888: 5881: 5873: 5866: 5864:(2013–present) 5858: 5851: 5844: 5837: 5830: 5828:(2011–present) 5822: 5820:(2010–present) 5814: 5807: 5800: 5792: 5790: 5789:(2009–present) 5782: 5781: 5779: 5778: 5777: 5776: 5769: 5762: 5755: 5748: 5741: 5734: 5727: 5720: 5713: 5706: 5699: 5692: 5685: 5678: 5671: 5664: 5657: 5654:September 2008 5642: 5640: 5632: 5631: 5629: 5628: 5626:(2007–present) 5620: 5613: 5606: 5598: 5591: 5584: 5577: 5570: 5563: 5555: 5547: 5539: 5532: 5525: 5518: 5511: 5504: 5496: 5489: 5482: 5474: 5467: 5459: 5452: 5445: 5438: 5431: 5423: 5415: 5408: 5401: 5393: 5385: 5378: 5371: 5364: 5356: 5347: 5345: 5332: 5331: 5329: 5328: 5320: 5313: 5306: 5298: 5290: 5283: 5276: 5269: 5260: 5258: 5250: 5249: 5247: 5246: 5239: 5231: 5229: 5221: 5220: 5218: 5217: 5210: 5203: 5195: 5187: 5178: 5176: 5168: 5167: 5165: 5164: 5157: 5150: 5142: 5135: 5128: 5121: 5113: 5106: 5099: 5091: 5083: 5075: 5068: 5061: 5053: 5051: 5043: 5042: 5040: 5039: 5031: 5024: 5017: 5010: 5009: 5008: 5001: 4985: 4983: 4979: 4978: 4976: 4975: 4968: 4961: 4954: 4946: 4939: 4932: 4925: 4918: 4916:(c. 1780–1795) 4910: 4903: 4895: 4887: 4885: 4877: 4876: 4874: 4873: 4865: 4857: 4849: 4839: 4837:(c. 1600–1760) 4831: 4823: 4814: 4812: 4804: 4803: 4801: 4800: 4791: 4789: 4782: 4781: 4779: 4778: 4771: 4764: 4757: 4756: 4755: 4748: 4741: 4734: 4720: 4717:Hyperinflation 4713: 4706: 4705: 4704: 4690: 4683: 4676: 4669: 4662: 4655: 4648: 4640: 4637: 4636: 4629: 4628: 4621: 4614: 4606: 4600: 4599: 4594: 4589: 4567: 4566:External links 4564: 4562: 4561: 4556:978-0743204125 4555: 4531: 4526:978-0525484042 4525: 4503: 4498:978-0738202754 4497: 4476: 4461: 4456:978-0143114161 4455: 4433: 4410: 4372: 4349: 4334: 4329:978-0857191151 4328: 4312: 4310: 4307: 4305: 4304: 4290: 4277: 4227: 4206: 4201:10.1086/654091 4179: 4156: 4138: 4117: 4080: 4059: 4053: 4038: 3993: 3975: 3970:978-0415476249 3969: 3956: 3931: 3896: 3890: 3877: 3863: 3850: 3827: 3821: 3816:978-0137530137 3815: 3802: 3796: 3783: 3760: 3734:(3): 353–364. 3723: 3705:(3): 303–334. 3694: 3667: 3642: 3622: 3616: 3599: 3560: 3529: 3511: 3475: 3465:(1): 133–140. 3454: 3449:978-0881327113 3448: 3435: 3429: 3407: 3364: 3354:(3): 281–297. 3343: 3315: 3305:(4): 313–336. 3294: 3271: 3245: 3216: 3192: 3171: 3165: 3146: 3125: 3103: 3093:(2): 151–155. 3080: 3045: 3039: 3026: 3009: 2976: 2966:(4): 337–348. 2953: 2932: 2909: 2896:978-0203962589 2895: 2882: 2868: 2854: 2836:(4): 827–848. 2825: 2820:10.1086/654089 2798: 2784: 2771: 2762: 2744:(1): 133–151. 2731: 2707: 2705: 2702: 2700: 2699: 2697:, p. 335. 2687: 2675: 2659: 2647: 2631: 2619: 2607: 2601:, p. 30; 2591: 2579: 2567: 2565:, p. 287. 2563:Bernstein 1996 2555: 2543: 2531: 2519: 2504: 2492: 2480: 2468: 2464:MacKenzie 2004 2456: 2444: 2432: 2420: 2408: 2396: 2390:, p. 80; 2380: 2368: 2366:, p. 933. 2356: 2344: 2332: 2330:, p. 832. 2320: 2308: 2296: 2294:, p. 851. 2284: 2268: 2256: 2254:, p. 235. 2252:Funabashi 1989 2244: 2228: 2212: 2200: 2190:, p. 51; 2180: 2168: 2166:, p. 134. 2156: 2154:, p. 343. 2150:, p. 65; 2140: 2138:, p. 338. 2128: 2126:, p. 337. 2116: 2097: 2082: 2067: 2065:, p. 837. 2055: 2053:, p. 317. 2040: 2028: 2022:, p. 14; 2012: 1996: 1984: 1963: 1951: 1945:, p. 35; 1932: 1930:, p. 337. 1926:, p. 36; 1916: 1914:, p. 329. 1904: 1892: 1880: 1864: 1848: 1836: 1834:, p. 141. 1824: 1812: 1800: 1788: 1776: 1764: 1752: 1737: 1722: 1707: 1695: 1683: 1671: 1659: 1644: 1642:, p. 284. 1632: 1620: 1603: 1601:, p. 149. 1597:, p. 14; 1587: 1585:, p. 149. 1575: 1573:, p. 149. 1559: 1557:, p. 153. 1543: 1531: 1519: 1517:, p. 128. 1507: 1505:, p. 134. 1491: 1475: 1463: 1451: 1449:, p. 915. 1447:Greenspan 1987 1439: 1437:, p. 148. 1427: 1411: 1409:, p. 151. 1394: 1382: 1380:, p. 127. 1370: 1354: 1352:, p. 153. 1339: 1327: 1311: 1299: 1283: 1268: 1256: 1254:, p. 146. 1240: 1228: 1216: 1200: 1188: 1169: 1157: 1145: 1130: 1118: 1102: 1100:, p. 354. 1096:, p. 41; 1082: 1067: 1055: 1043: 1031: 1029:, p. 330. 1019: 1004: 989: 972: 955: 953: 950: 947: 946: 944:in April 1991. 928: 916: 902: 901: 899: 896: 895: 894: 888: 883: 878: 872: 867: 860: 857: 825: 822: 795: 792: 747: 744: 723:sell at market 691: 688: 686: 683: 632: 629: 620: 617: 604:balance sheets 576:financial risk 570:and a wave of 556:Main article: 553: 550: 538:credit control 522:Main article: 519: 516: 472:Ulrike Schaede 464:Main article: 461: 458: 433:FTSE 100 Index 425: 424:United Kingdom 422: 408: 405: 367:Alan Greenspan 339: 336: 332:counterparties 285: 282: 240: 237: 185: 182: 180: 177: 135:interest rates 95: 94: 93: 92: 82: 79: 76: 73: 68: 64: 63: 58: 54: 53: 50: 46: 45: 39: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6192: 6191: 6180: 6177: 6175: 6172: 6170: 6167: 6165: 6162: 6160: 6157: 6155: 6152: 6150: 6147: 6145: 6142: 6140: 6137: 6135: 6132: 6131: 6129: 6119: 6114: 6109: 6107: 6102: 6097: 6096: 6093: 6079: 6075: 6072: 6068: 6065: 6061: 6058: 6054: 6053: 6050: 6043: 6039: 6036: 6032: 6029: 6025: 6021: 6017: 6014: 6010: 6007: 6003: 5999: 5995: 5990: 5986: 5983: 5979: 5976: 5972: 5971: 5969: 5965: 5961: 5957: 5953: 5949: 5945: 5941: 5937: 5933: 5930: 5926: 5922: 5918: 5914: 5910: 5907: 5903: 5900: 5896: 5893: 5889: 5886: 5882: 5878: 5874: 5871: 5867: 5863: 5859: 5856: 5852: 5849: 5845: 5842: 5838: 5835: 5831: 5827: 5823: 5819: 5815: 5812: 5808: 5805: 5801: 5798: 5794: 5793: 5791: 5787: 5783: 5774: 5770: 5767: 5763: 5760: 5756: 5753: 5749: 5746: 5742: 5739: 5735: 5732: 5728: 5725: 5721: 5718: 5714: 5711: 5707: 5704: 5700: 5697: 5693: 5690: 5686: 5683: 5679: 5676: 5675:December 2008 5672: 5669: 5668:November 2008 5665: 5662: 5658: 5655: 5651: 5650: 5648: 5644: 5643: 5641: 5637: 5633: 5625: 5621: 5618: 5614: 5611: 5607: 5603: 5599: 5596: 5592: 5589: 5585: 5582: 5578: 5575: 5571: 5568: 5564: 5560: 5556: 5552: 5548: 5544: 5540: 5537: 5533: 5530: 5526: 5523: 5519: 5516: 5512: 5509: 5505: 5501: 5497: 5494: 5490: 5487: 5483: 5479: 5475: 5472: 5468: 5464: 5460: 5457: 5453: 5450: 5446: 5443: 5439: 5436: 5432: 5428: 5424: 5420: 5416: 5413: 5409: 5406: 5402: 5398: 5394: 5390: 5386: 5383: 5379: 5376: 5372: 5369: 5365: 5361: 5357: 5353: 5349: 5348: 5346: 5342: 5337: 5333: 5325: 5321: 5318: 5314: 5311: 5307: 5303: 5299: 5295: 5291: 5288: 5284: 5281: 5277: 5274: 5270: 5266: 5262: 5261: 5259: 5255: 5251: 5244: 5240: 5237: 5233: 5232: 5230: 5226: 5222: 5215: 5214:Panic of 1930 5211: 5208: 5204: 5200: 5196: 5192: 5188: 5184: 5180: 5179: 5177: 5173: 5169: 5162: 5158: 5155: 5151: 5147: 5143: 5140: 5139:Panic of 1907 5136: 5133: 5132:Panic of 1901 5129: 5126: 5125:Panic of 1896 5122: 5118: 5114: 5111: 5107: 5104: 5103:Panic of 1893 5100: 5096: 5092: 5088: 5087:Baring crisis 5084: 5080: 5079:Arendal crash 5076: 5073: 5072:Panic of 1884 5069: 5066: 5062: 5059: 5058:Panic of 1873 5055: 5054: 5052: 5048: 5044: 5036: 5032: 5029: 5028:Panic of 1866 5025: 5022: 5021:Panic of 1857 5018: 5015: 5014:Panic of 1847 5011: 5006: 5002: 4999: 4995: 4994: 4991: 4987: 4986: 4984: 4980: 4973: 4972:Panic of 1837 4969: 4966: 4965:Panic of 1825 4962: 4959: 4958:Panic of 1819 4955: 4951: 4947: 4944: 4940: 4937: 4933: 4930: 4929:Panic of 1792 4926: 4923: 4919: 4915: 4911: 4908: 4904: 4900: 4896: 4893: 4889: 4888: 4886: 4882: 4878: 4870: 4866: 4862: 4858: 4854: 4850: 4846: 4845: 4840: 4836: 4832: 4828: 4824: 4820: 4816: 4815: 4813: 4809: 4805: 4797: 4793: 4792: 4790: 4788: 4783: 4776: 4772: 4769: 4768:Social crisis 4765: 4762: 4761:Minsky moment 4758: 4753: 4749: 4746: 4742: 4739: 4735: 4732: 4728: 4727: 4725: 4721: 4718: 4714: 4711: 4707: 4702: 4698: 4697: 4695: 4691: 4688: 4687:Energy crisis 4684: 4681: 4677: 4674: 4670: 4667: 4663: 4660: 4659:Credit crunch 4656: 4653: 4649: 4646: 4642: 4641: 4638: 4634: 4627: 4622: 4620: 4615: 4613: 4608: 4607: 4604: 4598: 4595: 4593: 4590: 4578: 4574: 4570: 4569: 4558: 4552: 4548: 4543: 4542: 4536: 4535:Woodward, Bob 4532: 4528: 4522: 4518: 4514: 4513: 4508: 4507:Sobel, Robert 4504: 4500: 4494: 4490: 4486: 4485:Cambridge, MA 4482: 4477: 4473: 4472: 4467: 4462: 4458: 4452: 4448: 4447:Penguin Books 4444: 4443: 4438: 4434: 4422: 4418: 4417: 4411: 4409: 4405: 4401: 4397: 4392: 4388: 4387: 4382: 4378: 4373: 4369: 4365: 4361: 4360: 4355: 4350: 4346: 4345: 4340: 4335: 4331: 4325: 4321: 4320: 4314: 4313: 4301: 4297: 4293: 4287: 4283: 4278: 4274: 4270: 4266: 4262: 4258: 4254: 4249: 4244: 4240: 4236: 4232: 4228: 4224: 4220: 4216: 4212: 4207: 4202: 4197: 4193: 4189: 4185: 4180: 4176: 4172: 4168: 4167: 4162: 4157: 4153: 4146: 4145: 4139: 4135: 4131: 4127: 4123: 4118: 4114: 4110: 4106: 4102: 4098: 4094: 4090: 4086: 4081: 4077: 4073: 4069: 4065: 4060: 4056: 4050: 4046: 4045: 4039: 4035: 4031: 4027: 4023: 4019: 4015: 4011: 4007: 4003: 3999: 3994: 3990: 3986: 3982: 3981: 3976: 3972: 3966: 3962: 3957: 3953: 3949: 3945: 3941: 3937: 3932: 3921: 3917: 3913: 3909: 3902: 3897: 3893: 3887: 3883: 3878: 3874: 3870: 3866: 3860: 3856: 3851: 3839: 3835: 3834: 3828: 3822: 3818: 3812: 3808: 3803: 3799: 3793: 3789: 3784: 3780: 3776: 3773:: 1993–2043. 3772: 3768: 3767: 3761: 3757: 3753: 3749: 3745: 3741: 3737: 3733: 3729: 3724: 3720: 3716: 3712: 3708: 3704: 3700: 3695: 3691: 3687: 3683: 3679: 3678: 3673: 3668: 3664: 3660: 3656: 3655: 3649: 3643: 3628: 3623: 3619: 3613: 3609: 3605: 3600: 3596: 3592: 3588: 3584: 3580: 3576: 3573:(44): 80–89. 3572: 3568: 3567: 3561: 3557: 3553: 3549: 3545: 3541: 3537: 3536: 3530: 3526: 3522: 3521: 3516: 3512: 3508: 3504: 3500: 3496: 3492: 3488: 3481: 3476: 3472: 3468: 3464: 3460: 3455: 3451: 3445: 3441: 3436: 3432: 3430:0-13-046592-5 3426: 3422: 3421:Prentice Hall 3418: 3417: 3412: 3411:Hull, John C. 3408: 3393: 3389: 3385: 3381: 3377: 3370: 3365: 3361: 3357: 3353: 3349: 3344: 3333: 3329: 3325: 3321: 3316: 3312: 3308: 3304: 3300: 3295: 3291: 3287: 3283: 3279: 3278: 3272: 3260: 3253: 3252: 3246: 3242: 3238: 3234: 3230: 3226: 3222: 3217: 3213: 3209: 3205: 3204: 3198: 3193: 3189: 3185: 3181: 3177: 3172: 3168: 3166:0-86473-308-9 3162: 3158: 3154: 3153: 3147: 3143: 3139: 3135: 3131: 3126: 3123: 3122:public domain 3109: 3104: 3100: 3096: 3092: 3088: 3087: 3081: 3077: 3073: 3068: 3063: 3059: 3055: 3051: 3046: 3042: 3040:0-88132-071-4 3036: 3032: 3027: 3023: 3019: 3015: 3010: 2996: 2992: 2988: 2987: 2982: 2977: 2973: 2969: 2965: 2961: 2960: 2954: 2950: 2946: 2942: 2938: 2933: 2929: 2925: 2921: 2920: 2915: 2910: 2906: 2902: 2898: 2892: 2888: 2883: 2876: 2875: 2869: 2862: 2861: 2855: 2851: 2847: 2843: 2839: 2835: 2831: 2826: 2821: 2816: 2812: 2808: 2804: 2799: 2795: 2791: 2787: 2785:9780471295631 2781: 2777: 2772: 2768: 2763: 2759: 2755: 2751: 2747: 2743: 2739: 2738: 2732: 2728: 2724: 2720: 2716: 2715: 2709: 2708: 2696: 2691: 2684: 2679: 2672: 2668: 2667:Reinalda 2009 2663: 2656: 2651: 2644: 2641:, p. 3; 2640: 2635: 2629:, p. 26. 2628: 2623: 2616: 2611: 2604: 2600: 2595: 2588: 2583: 2577:, p. 10. 2576: 2571: 2564: 2559: 2552: 2551:Gaffikin 2007 2547: 2540: 2535: 2529:, p. 23. 2528: 2523: 2517:, p. 26. 2516: 2511: 2509: 2501: 2496: 2489: 2484: 2477: 2472: 2466:, p. 10. 2465: 2460: 2453: 2448: 2441: 2436: 2429: 2424: 2417: 2412: 2405: 2400: 2393: 2389: 2384: 2377: 2372: 2365: 2360: 2354:, p. 56. 2353: 2348: 2341: 2336: 2329: 2324: 2317: 2312: 2305: 2300: 2293: 2288: 2281: 2277: 2272: 2265: 2260: 2253: 2248: 2241: 2238:, p. 19 2237: 2232: 2226:, p. 42. 2225: 2221: 2216: 2210:, p. 48. 2209: 2204: 2197: 2193: 2189: 2184: 2177: 2172: 2165: 2160: 2153: 2149: 2144: 2137: 2132: 2125: 2120: 2113: 2108: 2106: 2104: 2102: 2094: 2089: 2087: 2079: 2074: 2072: 2064: 2059: 2052: 2051:Headrick 1992 2047: 2045: 2037: 2032: 2026:, p. 36. 2025: 2021: 2016: 2010:, p. 36. 2009: 2005: 2000: 1994:, p. 14. 1993: 1988: 1982:, p. 36. 1981: 1976: 1974: 1972: 1970: 1968: 1961:, p. 35. 1960: 1955: 1949:, p. 14. 1948: 1944: 1939: 1937: 1929: 1925: 1920: 1913: 1908: 1902:, p. 19. 1901: 1896: 1890:, p. 39. 1889: 1884: 1877: 1873: 1868: 1861: 1858:, pp. 2 1857: 1852: 1846:, p. 15. 1845: 1840: 1833: 1832:Bernanke 1990 1828: 1821: 1816: 1809: 1804: 1797: 1792: 1785: 1780: 1774:, p. 44. 1773: 1768: 1761: 1756: 1749: 1744: 1742: 1734: 1729: 1727: 1720:, p. 45. 1719: 1714: 1712: 1704: 1699: 1692: 1687: 1680: 1675: 1668: 1663: 1656: 1655:Sornette 2003 1651: 1649: 1641: 1636: 1630:, p. 19. 1629: 1624: 1617: 1612: 1610: 1608: 1600: 1599:Bernanke 1990 1596: 1591: 1584: 1583:Bernanke 1990 1579: 1572: 1571:Bernanke 1990 1568: 1563: 1556: 1552: 1547: 1541:, p. 18. 1540: 1535: 1528: 1523: 1516: 1511: 1504: 1500: 1495: 1488: 1484: 1479: 1473:, p. 10. 1472: 1467: 1461:, p. 30. 1460: 1455: 1448: 1443: 1436: 1435:Bernanke 1990 1431: 1424: 1420: 1415: 1408: 1403: 1401: 1399: 1391: 1386: 1379: 1374: 1367: 1366:Bernanke 1990 1363: 1358: 1351: 1346: 1344: 1336: 1331: 1324: 1320: 1315: 1309:, p. 10. 1308: 1303: 1297:, p. 20. 1296: 1293:, p. 1; 1292: 1287: 1280: 1275: 1273: 1265: 1260: 1253: 1252:Bernanke 1990 1250:, p. 9; 1249: 1244: 1238:, p. 55. 1237: 1232: 1225: 1220: 1213: 1209: 1204: 1197: 1192: 1185: 1180: 1178: 1176: 1174: 1166: 1161: 1155:, p. 29. 1154: 1149: 1142: 1137: 1135: 1128:, p. 22. 1127: 1122: 1115: 1111: 1106: 1099: 1095: 1092:, p. 6; 1091: 1086: 1080:, p. 36. 1079: 1074: 1072: 1065:, p. 14. 1064: 1059: 1052: 1047: 1040: 1035: 1028: 1023: 1016: 1011: 1009: 1001: 996: 994: 987:, p. 42. 986: 981: 979: 977: 969: 965: 960: 956: 943: 939: 932: 925: 920: 913: 907: 903: 892: 889: 887: 884: 882: 879: 876: 873: 871: 868: 866: 863: 862: 856: 854: 850: 846: 841: 839: 838:Louvre Accord 834: 832: 821: 818: 814: 813:feedback loop 809: 806: 801: 794:Noise trading 791: 789: 785: 780: 776: 770: 768: 764: 760: 756: 752: 743: 741: 734: 730: 728: 724: 720: 715: 713: 708: 704: 701: 697: 682: 678: 675: 669: 667: 662: 659: 655: 654:Louvre Accord 650: 648: 642: 639: 631:Market forces 628: 626: 616: 613: 607: 605: 601: 597: 593: 589: 584: 581: 577: 573: 569: 564: 559: 549: 545: 543: 539: 534: 530: 525: 515: 513: 508: 504: 500: 496: 495:short-selling 492: 491:trading curbs 488: 487:David D. Hale 485: 480: 477: 473: 467: 457: 454: 450: 446: 438: 434: 430: 421: 419: 415: 407:International 404: 400: 395: 393: 389: 388:moral suasion 384: 381: 380:monetary base 376: 371: 368: 363: 361: 357: 353: 349: 345: 344:Michael Mussa 335: 333: 329: 325: 320: 318: 314: 310: 306: 302: 298: 294: 290: 281: 279: 275: 270: 269:trading halts 265: 261: 256: 254: 250: 249:market makers 246: 236: 233: 228: 225: 221: 220:trade deficit 217: 213: 208: 206: 202: 195: 190: 179:United States 176: 174: 170: 166: 162: 161:central banks 158: 153: 151: 150:index futures 147: 144: 140: 139:Louvre Accord 136: 133:, and rising 132: 128: 124: 120: 115: 113: 109: 105: 104:Black Tuesday 101: 90: 89:trading curbs 86: 83: 80: 77: 74: 71: 70: 69: 65: 62: 59: 55: 51: 47: 42: 37: 32: 26: 22: 5661:October 2008 5543:Samba effect 5404: 5399:(1987–2000s) 5294:Steel crisis 5117:Black Monday 5095:Encilhamento 5035:Black Friday 4842: 4798:(235–284 CE) 4666:Credit cycle 4581:. Retrieved 4576: 4540: 4517:E. P. Dutton 4511: 4480: 4469: 4441: 4425:. Retrieved 4415: 4384: 4357: 4342: 4318: 4281: 4238: 4234: 4217:(2): 19–33. 4214: 4210: 4191: 4187: 4164: 4143: 4125: 4121: 4091:(2): 39–57. 4088: 4084: 4070:(5): 19–35. 4067: 4063: 4043: 4004:(1): 29–61. 4001: 3997: 3984: 3979: 3960: 3946:(6): 46–61. 3943: 3939: 3923:. Retrieved 3911: 3907: 3881: 3854: 3842:. Retrieved 3832: 3806: 3787: 3770: 3764: 3731: 3727: 3702: 3698: 3681: 3675: 3652: 3634:. Retrieved 3607: 3570: 3564: 3539: 3533: 3519: 3490: 3486: 3462: 3458: 3439: 3415: 3399:. Retrieved 3392:the original 3382:(4): 26–41. 3379: 3375: 3351: 3347: 3335:. Retrieved 3323: 3302: 3298: 3281: 3275: 3263:. Retrieved 3250: 3224: 3220: 3201: 3179: 3151: 3133: 3129: 3090: 3084: 3057: 3053: 3030: 3013: 2998:. Retrieved 2984: 2963: 2957: 2940: 2936: 2917: 2886: 2873: 2859: 2833: 2829: 2810: 2806: 2775: 2741: 2735: 2718: 2712: 2690: 2678: 2662: 2655:Shieber 2020 2650: 2634: 2622: 2610: 2594: 2587:Carlson 2007 2582: 2570: 2558: 2553:, p. 7. 2546: 2534: 2527:Shiller 1987 2522: 2495: 2483: 2471: 2459: 2454:, p. 6. 2447: 2435: 2430:, p. v. 2423: 2411: 2399: 2383: 2371: 2359: 2347: 2342:, p. 5. 2340:Carlson 2007 2335: 2323: 2311: 2299: 2287: 2271: 2264:Forsyth 2017 2259: 2247: 2239: 2236:Meltzer 1989 2231: 2224:Schaede 1991 2220:Kandiah 1999 2215: 2203: 2183: 2171: 2164:Kandiah 1999 2159: 2143: 2131: 2119: 2093:Shiller 1988 2058: 2031: 2015: 1999: 1987: 1954: 1919: 1907: 1895: 1883: 1875: 1867: 1859: 1851: 1839: 1827: 1815: 1803: 1791: 1786:, p. 8. 1779: 1767: 1755: 1750:, p. 3. 1735:, p. 2. 1718:Schaede 1991 1698: 1691:Schaede 1991 1686: 1679:Roberts 2008 1674: 1662: 1657:, p. 4. 1635: 1623: 1595:Carlson 2007 1590: 1578: 1562: 1551:Carlson 2007 1546: 1539:Carlson 2007 1534: 1527:Carlson 2007 1522: 1510: 1494: 1483:Mishkin 1988 1478: 1471:Carlson 2007 1466: 1459:Mishkin 1988 1454: 1442: 1430: 1419:Carlson 2007 1414: 1390:Mishkin 1988 1385: 1373: 1357: 1335:Carlson 2007 1330: 1323:Carlson 2007 1314: 1307:Glauber 1988 1302: 1295:Carlson 2007 1286: 1264:Mishkin 1988 1259: 1248:Carlson 2007 1243: 1231: 1224:Carlson 2007 1219: 1212:Carlson 2007 1203: 1198:, p. 1. 1191: 1186:, p. 8. 1184:Carlson 2007 1165:Carlson 2007 1160: 1148: 1121: 1113: 1105: 1090:Carlson 2007 1085: 1058: 1046: 1034: 1022: 985:Schaede 1991 959: 931: 919: 912:risk premium 906: 842: 835: 827: 810: 797: 788:Richard Roll 775:Hayne Leland 771: 766: 749: 739: 736: 732: 716: 709: 705: 693: 680: 673: 671: 666:currency war 651: 643: 634: 622: 608: 592:deleveraging 585: 565: 561: 546: 542:moral hazard 535: 531: 527: 481: 469: 442: 410: 402: 397: 392:Ben Bernanke 385: 372: 364: 341: 324:margin calls 321: 313:real economy 287: 257: 242: 229: 209: 198: 165:West Germany 154: 116: 103: 100:Black Monday 99: 98: 29:Black Monday 25: 21:Black Monday 5938:(2017–2018) 5923:(2016–2022) 5879:(2014–2022) 5639:(2007–2009) 5604:(2003–2008) 5553:(2000–2004) 5502:(1994–1996) 5480:(1992–1994) 5465:(1991–2000) 5429:(1990–1992) 5421:(1990–1992) 5391:(1986–1995) 5354:(1982–1994) 5344:(1982–2007) 5326:(1980–1982) 5304:(1975–1982) 5296:(1973–1982) 5267:(1973–1980) 5257:(1973–1982) 5228:(1945–1973) 5193:(1921–1923) 5185:(1917–1924) 5175:(1918–1939) 5097:(1890–1893) 5050:(1870–1914) 4992:(1845–1856) 4952:(1815–1816) 4901:(1769–1784) 4884:(1760–1840) 4847:(1621–1623) 4829:(1544–1551) 4811:(1000–1760) 4710:Flash crash 4680:Debt crisis 4241:(1): 1–98. 4194:: 287–297. 3914:(2): 5–21. 3493:(1): 5–33. 3227:(1): 1–48. 3060:(1): 1–17. 2813:: 269–275. 2440:Leland 1988 2416:Leland 1992 2392:Leland 1992 2388:Leland 1988 2364:Harris 1988 1567:Garcia 1989 1555:Garcia 1989 1423:Garcia 1989 1407:Garcia 1989 1350:Garcia 1989 1039:Hinden 1989 1000:Group of 33 968:Seyhun 1990 696:derivatives 677:confidence. 661:James Baker 580:speculation 552:New Zealand 503:mutual fund 243:Before the 232:mutual fund 201:bull market 6174:Black days 6128:Categories 4731:Accounting 4291:1852788976 4175:1058545022 4166:TechCrunch 3864:0226240932 3797:1556231385 3284:: 927–42. 2949:1286478945 2603:Black 1988 2539:Black 1988 2196:Cohen 2007 2148:Cohen 2007 2004:Grant 1997 1928:Grant 1997 1912:Grant 1997 1515:Mussa 1994 1378:Mussa 1994 1027:Grant 1997 964:Bates 1991 952:References 600:collateral 476:Nikkei 225 184:Background 123:correction 119:overvalued 5989:Recession 4982:1840–1870 4583:April 16, 4439:(2008) . 4427:April 21, 4408:163149563 4400:317650570 4368:781541372 4113:154808689 4034:154940716 4026:781598756 3952:1932-8117 3925:April 21, 3920:0112-871X 3844:April 21, 3825:(Report). 3779:0016-8092 3719:143644137 3690:0010-8847 3663:781541372 3636:April 21, 3595:156790783 3507:154421440 3388:0112-871X 3337:April 22, 3332:0190-8286 3290:0010-8847 3265:April 21, 3241:154680095 3188:0014-9209 3142:647060020 3113:(Report). 3099:847300958 2995:1077-8039 2928:818988457 2905:779908166 2695:Hull 2003 2488:Roll 1988 2208:Rees 2007 2024:Hunt 2009 2008:Hunt 2009 1980:Hunt 2009 1959:Hunt 2009 1943:Hunt 2009 1924:Hunt 2009 1703:Hale 1988 1628:Roll 1988 1616:Roll 1988 1503:Metz 1992 1362:Kohn 2006 1126:Roll 1988 1015:Lobb 2007 898:Footnotes 824:Aftermath 596:fire sale 518:Hong Kong 484:economist 276:and NYSE 239:The Crash 6118:Business 4645:Bank run 4537:(2000). 4509:(1988). 4404:50016270 4300:27895569 4273:12847333 4105:41166649 3873:28506978 3756:56354928 3587:41166528 3413:(2003). 3401:April 4, 3136:: 4–11. 3076:54659656 2986:Barron's 2972:42629270 2794:34411005 2758:10499111 2683:Ito 2016 2671:Ito 2016 859:See also 800:volatile 418:Malaysia 301:solvency 278:SuperDot 91:in 1988. 6092:Portals 4745:Funding 4738:Capital 4383:(ed.). 4253:Bibcode 4154:. 2446. 4018:3594994 3991:. 1988. 3748:2331324 3556:2328969 3212:1645522 3022:1645522 2850:2328612 2704:Sources 1876:note 46 849:options 755:hedging 435:of the 295:in the 274:Fedwire 264:options 146:hedging 67:Outcome 6169:Monday 5915:(2016) 5561:(2001) 5545:(1999) 5362:(1982) 5201:(1927) 5148:(1910) 5119:(1894) 5089:(1890) 5081:(1886) 5037:(1869) 4871:(1720) 4863:(1720) 4855:(1637) 4752:Market 4553: 4523: 4495: 4453: 4398: 4366: 4326: 4298: 4288: 4271: 4173: 4111: 4103: 4051: 4032: 4024: 4016: 3967: 3950: 3918: 3888: 3871: 3861: 3813: 3794: 3777: 3754: 3746: 3717: 3688: 3661: 3614: 3593: 3585: 3554: 3505: 3446: 3427: 3386: 3330: 3288: 3239: 3210: 3186: 3163: 3140: 3097: 3074: 3037: 3020: 3000:May 7, 2993: 2970: 2947: 2926: 2903: 2893: 2848: 2792: 2782: 2756: 2240:note 3 1860:note 3 1114:note 5 740:broken 619:Causes 588:trough 203:, the 6106:1980s 4379:. 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