159:, and Levenotoglu and Tarar have argued that secret operations, threats, and agreements can reduce inadvertent escalation to war by insulating leaders from the domestic backlash that would have occurred if the diplomacy had been conducted in public. Austin Carson argues that covert operations allow states to pursue their foreign policy interests without risking escalation to war. By keeping the operation covert, states avoid pressure by domestic audiences to escalate the operation beyond their original intent and communicate to their adversary their intent to keep the operation limited. Keren Yarhi-Milo argues that secret agreements between adversaries can lead to lasting peace if their initiator faces domestic opposition to the terms of the agreement. The ability of the other state to publicly disclose the terms means that it is a form of costly signaling of intentions by the initiator.
86:) makes them hard to detect empirically. Kenneth Schultz has also remarked on the methodological difficulties in empirically assessing audience costs. A major problem in assessing audience costs is the fact that leaders typically make threats that are ambiguous in terms of time, place, specific action that trigger the threat, and nature of response. A smoking gun case for audience costs would be a case of the public opposing military action but subsequently punishing a leader for not going through with a threat to engage in military action.
103:
found no relationship between regime type and effective threats. A 2017 study that recoded flaws in the MID dataset ultimately concluded " that there are no regime-based differences in dispute reciprocation, and prior findings may be based largely on poorly coded data." Other scholars have disputed the democratic credibility argument and questioned its causal logic and empirical validity.
78:
the partisan divide had punished Trump, Obama, and "The
President" for backing down after issuing threats, but it also found that presidents could reduce the audience costs by justifying the backing down as being in the national interest of the United States. Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu argue that the nature of audience costs (they are a
108:
explicit threat). They add that in cases of audience costs being observed, it is frequently when the public is hawkish and pushes leaders to adopt hardline stances and actions. It is unclear whether the domestic costs in those cases is because leaders fear getting caught bluffing, or they just do not want to defy a hawkish public.
77:
and ICB datasets, provided empirical support for the notion that democracies were more likely to issue effective threats. Survey experiment data substantiate that specified threats induce audience costs, but other data have mixed findings and nuanced findings. A 2019 study found that audiences across
142:
argued that the
Chinese regime fomented or clamped down on nationalist (or anti-foreign) protests in China to signal resolve. Fomenting or permitting nationalist protests entail audience costs, as they make it harder for the Chinese regime to back down in a foreign policy crisis out of fear of the
102:
However, a 2012 study by
Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser found that existing datasets were not suitable to draw any conclusions as to whether democratic states issued more effective threats. They constructed their own dataset specifically for interstate military threats and outcomes, which
89:
Branislav
Slantchev, Matthew Baum and Philip Potter have argued that the presence of the free media is a key component of audience costs. According to Matthew S. Levendusky, and Michael C. Horowitz, leaders can provide justifications to their audiences for why they backed down from a threat, thus
107:
and Erica
Borghard argue that there is no evidence of audience costs in any post-1945 crises, leaders rarely make unambiguous threats, publics care about policy substance (not leader consistency in rhetoric and action), and publics care about the country's honor (not whether the leader issued an
111:
A 2021 study found that
Americans perceived democracies to be more likely to back down in crises, which contradicts the expectations of the audience costs literature. A 2011 study argued that domestic audiences in democratic states were less capable of punishing leaders for backing down because
251:
I'm drawing here on arguments about what the IR literature usually calls 'audience costs', which are domestic political costs a leader may pay for escalating an international dispute, or for making implicit or explicit threats, and then backing down or not following
127:, found that in situations of both sides issuing public threats, a "prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands."
130:
According to a 2021 study by Jayme R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy, leaders may be unaware of audience costs. To the extent that audience costs work, that may be a learned practice, rather than a consistent and timeless feature of international politics.
181:
A 2020 study by John Harden explored some links between narcissistic leaders and audience cost theory. Narcissistic leaders can, in some cases, exploit audience costs to force uncooperative branches of government into action by swinging public opinion.
177:
A 2006 study by Todd Allee and Paul Huth found that leaders try to avoid audience costs for voluntary-negotiated settlements by instead using rulings by an international court or arbitration body, which the leaders can blame for adverse outcomes.
93:
Roseanne McManus finds support for the existence of audience costs but argues that the credibility of a threat necessarily also relies on the threatener's military strength, hawkishness of domestic veto players, and leaders' security in office.
1812:
1765:
1421:
853:
720:
1597:
591:
65:
in which he argued that democracies carry greater audience costs than authoritarian states, which makes them better at signaling their intentions in interstate disputes. It is one of the mechanisms for
1277:
806:
73:
Fearon's argument regarding the credibility of democratic states in disputes has been subject to debate among international relations scholars. Two studies 2001, using the
1233:
Gibler, Douglas M.; Miller, Steven V.; Little, Erin K. (2016-12-01). "An
Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816β2001".
556:
235:
33:
1905:
1199:
199:
1657:
1580:
1545:
1217:
574:
219:
44:
174:
about leaders lead to audience costs, as women leaders are punished more severely for backing down after issuing threats.
1114:"Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Democratic Constraint"
104:
120:, which analyzed a dozen great power crises, found no evidence of the presence of audience costs in these crises.
409:
Fearon, James D. (September 1994). "Domestic
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute".
74:
21:
138:
argued that some authoritarian regime types have similar audience costs as in democratic states. Research by
39:
The implication of audience costs is that threats issued by leaders, who incur audience costs, against other
642:
1160:
499:
Tomz, Michael (2007). "Domestic
Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach".
28:
crisis and are then seen as backing down. It is considered to be one of the potential mechanisms for
513:
1113:
1910:
67:
56:
29:
1766:"Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining"
1325:"Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy"
508:
24:, is the domestic political cost that leaders incur from their constituency if they escalate a
767:
681:
1161:"When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs"
370:"Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863β4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis"
1813:"Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover"
282:
265:
8:
1840:
1793:
1705:
1625:
1551:
1516:
1508:
1459:
1399:
1352:
1305:
1258:
1141:
1094:
1086:
1039:
983:
975:
928:
881:
834:
748:
643:"The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party"
619:
561:. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
534:
481:
434:
426:
347:
339:
171:
139:
135:
113:
1881:
1844:
1832:
1797:
1785:
1746:
1709:
1697:
1653:
1629:
1617:
1576:
1541:
1520:
1500:
1451:
1403:
1391:
1356:
1344:
1309:
1297:
1262:
1250:
1213:
1180:
1133:
1078:
1074:
1043:
1031:
987:
967:
932:
920:
885:
873:
854:"Is There a Trump Effect? An Experiment on Political Polarization and Audience Costs"
838:
826:
787:
752:
740:
701:
662:
658:
623:
611:
570:
538:
526:
485:
473:
391:
351:
331:
287:
215:
211:
117:
1555:
1535:
1463:
1145:
1098:
438:
1871:
1824:
1777:
1741:
1736:
1724:
1689:
1609:
1490:
1441:
1433:
1383:
1336:
1289:
1242:
1205:
1172:
1125:
1070:
1023:
959:
912:
865:
818:
779:
732:
693:
654:
603:
562:
518:
465:
418:
381:
323:
277:
207:
167:
States may be more likely to honor alliance commitments because of audience costs.
156:
768:"Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory"
1693:
1647:
1570:
1387:
1340:
916:
469:
1860:"All The World's a Stage: US Presidential Narcissism and International Conflict"
963:
682:"Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory"
47:
and thus lead those states to meet the demands of the leader who makes threats.
1678:"Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance"
1677:
1371:
1324:
1201:
Statements of
Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
1011:
900:
680:
Levy, Jack S.; McKoy, Michael K.; Poast, Paul; Wallace, Geoffrey P. R. (2015).
453:
40:
25:
1828:
1781:
1613:
1495:
1478:
1437:
1293:
1176:
1129:
1027:
869:
822:
736:
721:"Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach"
607:
522:
327:
1899:
1885:
1836:
1789:
1750:
1701:
1621:
1504:
1455:
1395:
1348:
1301:
1254:
1184:
1137:
1082:
1035:
971:
924:
877:
830:
791:
744:
705:
666:
615:
566:
530:
477:
395:
335:
291:
152:
1422:"Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining"
638:
170:
According to a 2020 study by Joshua A. Schwartz and Christopher W. Blair,
124:
62:
1876:
1859:
1209:
1246:
1512:
343:
311:
1090:
1058:
979:
947:
783:
697:
430:
386:
369:
1598:"Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy"
1446:
422:
1572:
Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations
1276:
Kertzer, Joshua D.; Renshon, Jonathan; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2021).
592:"Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918β94"
1479:"Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve"
852:
Evers, Miles M.; Fisher, Aleksandr; Schaaf, Steven D. (2019).
236:"'Credibility' is not everything but it's not nothing either"
151:
Some scholars have grappled with the relationship between
1275:
61:
The term was popularized in a 1994 academic article by
1649:
Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics
1159:
Levendusky, Matthew S.; Horowitz, Michael C. (2012).
1059:"Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs"
679:
155:
and audience costs. Shuhei Kurizaki, Austin Carson,
1764:Schwartz, Joshua A.; Blair, Christopher W. (2020).
454:"Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now"
200:"Audience Costs and the Credibility of Commitments"
1232:
1158:
590:Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001).
1012:"The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound"
851:
1897:
1419:
1323:Brown, Jonathan N.; Marcum, Anthony S. (2011).
1112:Potter, Philip B. K.; Baum, Matthew A. (2014).
367:
310:Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012).
1009:
804:
765:
589:
1763:
636:
368:Schlesinger, Jayme R.; Levy, Jack S. (2021).
309:
1369:
807:"A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs"
233:
1322:
898:
1675:
1111:
805:Brutger, Ryan; Kertzer, Joshua D. (2018).
766:Kertzer, Joshua D.; Brutger, Ryan (2016).
374:European Journal of International Security
50:
36:scholarship in international relations.
1875:
1810:
1740:
1494:
1445:
1420:LevenotoΔlu, Bahar; Tarar, Ahmer (2005).
1056:
1010:Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011).
512:
385:
281:
1595:
1372:"Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis"
312:"The Illusion of Democratic Credibility"
1197:
945:
554:
492:
451:
402:
143:protestors turning against the regime.
1898:
1857:
1811:Allee, Todd L.; Huth, Paul K. (2006).
1722:
1645:
408:
263:
146:
1671:
1669:
1641:
1639:
1568:
1533:
1476:
1415:
1413:
1005:
1003:
1001:
999:
997:
899:Gartzke, Erik; Lupu, Yonatan (2012).
772:American Journal of Political Science
686:American Journal of Political Science
647:American Journal of Political Science
283:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051214-100534
1282:British Journal of Political Science
718:
498:
363:
361:
305:
303:
301:
162:
1226:
543:The seminal article is Fearon 1994.
13:
1729:Annual Review of Political Science
1666:
1636:
1410:
1278:"How Do Observers Assess Resolve?"
994:
952:The Journal of Conflict Resolution
901:"Still Looking for Audience Costs"
270:Annual Review of Political Science
14:
1922:
1817:American Political Science Review
1725:"Alliances: Why Write Them Down?"
1602:American Political Science Review
1426:American Political Science Review
1016:American Political Science Review
596:American Political Science Review
411:American Political Science Review
358:
298:
234:James Fearon (7 September 2013).
206:, Oxford University Press, 2021,
1075:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00409.x
1057:Slantchev, Branislav L. (2006).
659:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x
558:Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
266:"The Diplomacy of War and Peace"
112:democratic leaders have larger "
1864:International Studies Quarterly
1851:
1804:
1757:
1716:
1589:
1562:
1527:
1470:
1363:
1316:
1269:
1235:International Studies Quarterly
1191:
1152:
1105:
1063:International Studies Quarterly
1050:
939:
892:
845:
798:
759:
712:
673:
630:
583:
1906:International relations theory
1742:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63
1652:. Princeton University Press.
1204:. Cambridge University Press.
548:
445:
257:
227:
212:10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0305
192:
43:are more likely to be seen as
22:international relations theory
1:
1534:Weeks, Jessica L. P. (2014).
1198:McManus, Roseanne W. (2017).
185:
97:
90:reducing the audience costs.
1694:10.1080/09636412.2013.816126
1569:Weiss, Jessica Chen (2014).
1540:. Cornell University Press.
1388:10.1080/09636412.2012.650590
1341:10.1080/09636412.2011.572671
948:"Looking for Audience Costs"
946:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001).
917:10.1080/09636412.2012.706486
555:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001).
470:10.1080/09636412.2012.706475
452:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2012).
7:
1575:. Oxford University Press.
1370:Trachtenberg, Marc (2012).
964:10.1177/0022002701045001002
123:A 2005 study, which used a
10:
1927:
1770:International Organization
1676:Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2013).
1537:Dictators at War and Peace
1483:International Organization
1477:Weeks, Jessica L. (2008).
811:International Organization
725:International Organization
501:International Organization
316:International Organization
264:Trager, Robert F. (2016).
54:
1829:10.1017/S0003055406062125
1782:10.1017/S0020818320000223
1723:Morrow, James D. (2000).
1614:10.1017/S0003055407070396
1596:Kurizaki, Shuhei (2007).
1496:10.1017/S0020818308080028
1438:10.1017/S0003055405051750
1294:10.1017/S0007123418000595
1177:10.1017/S002238161100154X
1130:10.1017/S0022381613001230
1028:10.1017/s000305541100027x
870:10.1017/S1537592718003390
823:10.1017/S0020818318000188
737:10.1017/S0020818307070282
608:10.1017/S0003055401003148
523:10.1017/S0020818307070282
328:10.1017/S0020818312000161
1858:Harden, John P. (2021).
858:Perspectives on Politics
567:10.1017/cbo9780511491658
32:. It is associated with
1646:Carson, Austin (2018).
1165:The Journal of Politics
1118:The Journal of Politics
204:International Relations
125:formal bargaining model
68:democratic peace theory
57:Democratic peace theory
51:Democratic peace theory
30:democratic peace theory
719:Tomz, Michael (2007).
1210:10.1017/9781316756263
1556:10.7591/j.ctt1287f18
1877:10.1093/isq/sqab048
637:Trager, Robert F.;
153:secret negotiations
147:Secret negotiations
116:." A 2012 study by
1247:10.1093/isq/sqw045
784:10.1111/ajps.12201
698:10.1111/ajps.12197
387:10.1017/eis.2021.7
172:gender stereotypes
140:Jessica Chen Weiss
114:winning coalitions
1659:978-0-691-18176-9
1582:978-0-19-938757-1
1547:978-0-8014-5296-3
1219:978-1-107-17034-6
576:978-0-521-79227-1
221:978-0-19-974329-2
163:In other contexts
118:Marc Trachtenberg
1918:
1890:
1889:
1879:
1855:
1849:
1848:
1808:
1802:
1801:
1761:
1755:
1754:
1744:
1720:
1714:
1713:
1682:Security Studies
1673:
1664:
1663:
1643:
1634:
1633:
1593:
1587:
1586:
1566:
1560:
1559:
1531:
1525:
1524:
1498:
1474:
1468:
1467:
1449:
1417:
1408:
1407:
1376:Security Studies
1367:
1361:
1360:
1329:Security Studies
1320:
1314:
1313:
1273:
1267:
1266:
1230:
1224:
1223:
1195:
1189:
1188:
1156:
1150:
1149:
1109:
1103:
1102:
1054:
1048:
1047:
1007:
992:
991:
943:
937:
936:
905:Security Studies
896:
890:
889:
849:
843:
842:
802:
796:
795:
763:
757:
756:
716:
710:
709:
677:
671:
670:
634:
628:
627:
587:
581:
580:
552:
546:
545:
516:
496:
490:
489:
458:Security Studies
449:
443:
442:
406:
400:
399:
389:
365:
356:
355:
307:
296:
295:
285:
261:
255:
254:
248:
246:
231:
225:
224:
196:
157:Keren Yarhi-Milo
1926:
1925:
1921:
1920:
1919:
1917:
1916:
1915:
1896:
1895:
1894:
1893:
1856:
1852:
1809:
1805:
1762:
1758:
1721:
1717:
1674:
1667:
1660:
1644:
1637:
1594:
1590:
1583:
1567:
1563:
1548:
1532:
1528:
1475:
1471:
1418:
1411:
1368:
1364:
1321:
1317:
1274:
1270:
1231:
1227:
1220:
1196:
1192:
1157:
1153:
1110:
1106:
1055:
1051:
1008:
995:
944:
940:
897:
893:
850:
846:
803:
799:
764:
760:
717:
713:
692:(4): 988β1001.
678:
674:
635:
631:
588:
584:
577:
553:
549:
514:10.1.1.386.7495
497:
493:
450:
446:
423:10.2307/2944796
407:
403:
366:
359:
308:
299:
262:
258:
244:
242:
240:The Monkey Cage
232:
228:
222:
198:
197:
193:
188:
165:
149:
100:
59:
53:
34:rational choice
12:
11:
5:
1924:
1914:
1913:
1911:Foreign policy
1908:
1892:
1891:
1870:(3): 825β837.
1850:
1823:(2): 219β234.
1803:
1776:(4): 872β895.
1756:
1715:
1688:(3): 405β435.
1665:
1658:
1635:
1608:(3): 543β558.
1588:
1581:
1561:
1546:
1526:
1469:
1432:(3): 419β433.
1409:
1362:
1335:(2): 141β170.
1315:
1288:(1): 308β330.
1268:
1241:(4): 719β730.
1225:
1218:
1190:
1171:(2): 323β338.
1151:
1124:(1): 167β181.
1104:
1069:(2): 445β477.
1049:
1022:(3): 437β456.
993:
938:
911:(3): 391β397.
891:
864:(2): 433β452.
844:
817:(3): 693β724.
797:
778:(1): 234β249.
758:
731:(4): 821β840.
711:
672:
653:(3): 526β545.
629:
602:(3): 633β647.
582:
575:
547:
491:
464:(3): 369β375.
444:
417:(3): 577β592.
401:
380:(3): 338β357.
357:
322:(3): 457β489.
297:
276:(1): 205β228.
256:
226:
220:
190:
189:
187:
184:
164:
161:
148:
145:
99:
96:
55:Main article:
52:
49:
26:foreign policy
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1923:
1912:
1909:
1907:
1904:
1903:
1901:
1887:
1883:
1878:
1873:
1869:
1865:
1861:
1854:
1846:
1842:
1838:
1834:
1830:
1826:
1822:
1818:
1814:
1807:
1799:
1795:
1791:
1787:
1783:
1779:
1775:
1771:
1767:
1760:
1752:
1748:
1743:
1738:
1734:
1730:
1726:
1719:
1711:
1707:
1703:
1699:
1695:
1691:
1687:
1683:
1679:
1672:
1670:
1661:
1655:
1651:
1650:
1642:
1640:
1631:
1627:
1623:
1619:
1615:
1611:
1607:
1603:
1599:
1592:
1584:
1578:
1574:
1573:
1565:
1557:
1553:
1549:
1543:
1539:
1538:
1530:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1497:
1492:
1488:
1484:
1480:
1473:
1465:
1461:
1457:
1453:
1448:
1443:
1439:
1435:
1431:
1427:
1423:
1416:
1414:
1405:
1401:
1397:
1393:
1389:
1385:
1381:
1377:
1373:
1366:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
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