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trials was that hardware advantages would drive engagement outcomes. Actual test results, however, proved otherwise. As in both historical combat experience and AIMVAL/ACEVAL, situational awareness proved to be "the single most important factor affecting engagement outcomes." For both sides, being
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by 1985, taking the lead in short-range missile technology and performance for the first time since the
Sidewinder entered service. This caused a number of countries to develop short-range missile programs to counter it, such as
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aware of and avoiding adversaries' weapons envelopes while trying to maneuver adversaries into their own weapons envelopes proved as important and dominant as it had been in ACEVAL.
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ACEVAL/AIMVAL resulted in development of AMRAAM, but did not recommend development of a high off-boresight short-range missile, opting instead for a
European-led effort to develop
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missiles. The conclusion was that a cheaper fighter such as an F-5 could engage the more expensive jets like F-14 or F-15 that carried big radar and
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ACEVAL looked at the effectiveness of the tactics utilized by high-performance U. S. aircraft against simpler, threat-type aircraft equipped with
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Additionally, part of the evaluation was to determine if the technology of the day had progressed to such a point that
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RED FLAG: HOW THE RISE OF “REALISTIC TRAINING” AFTER VIETNAM CHANGED THE AIR FORCE’S WAY OF WAR, 1975-1999
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program, which was under development at the time. Actual seeker hardware was utilized in AIMVAL.
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AIMVAL examined five missile concepts under consideration as replacements for the
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missile before it was shot down by the
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was no longer a factor in air-to-air combat. The natural expectation in the
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by BRIAN DANIEL LASLIE, PhD Dissertation, Kansas State
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