976:
not participate in establishing a single political party and refused to endorse the
Burmese Way to Socialism. According to Taylor it has been debated if the party leaders thought the military would eventually give up its power to the civilian parties, like they had done following the elections in 1960. It has also been suggested that the AFPFL may have expected that the military would, in one way or another, share power with the party, whom it had cooperated with prior to the coup. With the rejection of the civilian parties to conform to the Burmese Way of Socialism, the Revolutionary Council began the building of a party consisting of the political elite, and on 4 July 1962 the
995:
Thwin argue that the inclusion of individuals, who were a part of the previous administration, is a trait that can be seen in the behaviour of
Burmese Kings prior to the colonial rule. The kings used ministers that have served under previous royal opponents. Aung Thwin and Aung Thwin thus suggest that this strategy of engaging people from the former administration in the new political organs is an indigenous historical feature in Myanmar. The opportunity to be a part of BSPP was especially popular among the people, who had been kept outside the power elite of the AFPFL-government.
181:
168:
155:
99:
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Socialism in detail before publishing the statement, and the issue which caused the most negotiations was the question of nationalisation. On 1 January 1963 the
Burmese oil industry was nationalised, but only when council member Aung Gyi, who had been pro private businesses, resigned on 8 February 1963 did a comprehensive nationalisation of both foreign and domestic trade as well as the manufacturing and banking sector begin. By March 1964 – two years after the coup – the main part of Myanmar's economy was nationalised.
195:
133:
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Union – as opposed to
English. Other initiatives were the promotion of Burmese literature and the changing of street names that referred to prominent British individuals into names of famous Burmese persons. Even Western funding programmes such as the Fulbright scholarship programmes were shut down to ensure that no channels of external influence remained. These policies continue to have implications in Burma today, where English is spoken to a very narrow degree in the general public.
112:
1126:
510:
1053:
this shift in focus away from the industrial sector had great repercussion for the
Burmese economy. By the mid 1980s the neglect of the industrial sector and policies of protecting the peasants from over-taxation and land-seizure meant that the state had limited ability to generate capital to maintain even the most basic services in society. Despite promising the opposite the government demonetised the
968:
and conditions of peasants were prioritised. Furthermore, it was believed that by focusing on the peasants in terms of a coherent social class rather than ethnicity the integration of society could be improved. The notion of ethnicity should be neutralised by developing new community affiliations based on a national cultural identity and a shared public history founded in a
Buddhist past.
1024:" For foreign actors like the United States the coup and the military's anti-communist agenda was considered timely and beneficial, since the military was considered to be able to curb communism and restore political order. Furthermore, no foreign powers opposed the coup since the Revolutionary Council reassured that Myanmar's foreign policy of neutrality in the Cold War would continue.
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number of agents, including field commanders, tank commanders, and administrative personnel, who were involved in the coup. In fact, Callahan argues that the coup illustrated that the military acted as a united, bureaucratised entity, and that it might be this unity that explains the durability of the authoritarian rule that followed.
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conceived as an alternative to the parties, which made up the previous governments and was categorised in terms of being either right or left oriented. By claiming to represent all the people the party also aimed at distinguishing itself from communism, which formed an opposition to the landlords and capitalists.
1089:. In this narrative the significance of the coup becomes the military's ability to retain power and suppress democratisation for 26 years. One scholar who to a large extent framed the significance of the coup within this narrative is Callahan, who investigates how the coup brought civilian rule in Burma to "
848:
In contrast
Callahan argues that neither the specific character of Ne Win nor the threat of disintegration were the decisive causes for the staging of the coup, since these factors were present throughout the 1950s, without them leading to an army intervention. Instead Callahan suggests that the coup
820:
The increased autonomy in peripheral areas was also seen as problematic in terms of external threats. The army believed that if the areas got too independent they would attract foreign powers – a risk that seemed great with the Cold War context of 1962. In 1962 it was clear that the United States had
761:
In contrast, historian Mary P. Callahan describes the coup as a highly coordinated military accomplishment that "deployed troops and tanks in an overt seizure of power." Whereas Taylor ascribes greater influence to Ne Win as an individual in staging the coup, Callahan mentions Ne Win as one amongst a
711:
in July 1962, troops were sent to restore order. They fired on protesters and destroyed the student union building. Shortly afterward, Ne Win addressed the nation in a five-minute radio speech which concluded with the statement: "If these disturbances were made to challenge us, I have to declare that
663:
Yet the general public continued to perceive the elected government as corrupt, inept at ruling the country, and unable to restore law and order in a
Burmese society characterised by ever-increasing crime rates. The military continued to be perceived as crucial to ensuring social stability, which was
1048:
The economic policies focused on realising the objective of creating a socialist economy, but initially the question of the nationalisation of the economy constituted a point of conflict within the
Revolutionary Council. On 24 April the council met for a two-day meeting to discuss the Burmese Way of
1019:
Due to the public trust in the military's capabilities as a keeper of law and order and with the historical precedence from the election in 1960, which suggested that the military would act professionally and hand back power to a civilian government when the time was right, the military coup was met
1015:
Multiple scholars, including Aung Thwin & Aung Thwin and Taylor, describe how the coup at first didn't affect the lives of the general population in
Myanmar. To the majority of the population who worked in agriculture the coup initially improved the living conditions due to the military regime's
975:
in its implementation, in the sense that the Revolutionary Council wanted to form a single, legal political party through which all participatory processes would take place. In a meeting on 17 May between the revolutionary council and the civilian party leaders, the leaders announced that they would
891:
The concentration of power in the hands of Ne Win continued on 5 March 1962 when he undertook all executive, legislate and judicial authority by virtue of being the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. As head of both the Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary Government Cabinet Taylor argues
883:
Immediately after the coup Ne Win and a number of senior military officers formed the Revolutionary Council, which consisted of sixteen senior military officers and Ne Win as the council's chairman. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Government Cabinet was established with eight senior military officers
863:
The consolidation of the military was a result of lengthy periods of wars, as well as intra-military struggles, which led to a purge of army commanders who had tense relationships with Ne Win. In this way Callahan argues that Ne Win seized power at a time where there were no genuine obstacles due to
816:
Furthermore, the military rule justified the abolition of the political system by saying that multi-party democracy served the wealthy in society in being open to politicians representing capitalists and landlords. This critique of the political system served both as a reason for conducting the coup
1040:
To re-establish what was considered the indigenous Burmese culture and to distinguish the country from its colonial past it became a political objective to move away from values and culture that was considered foreign and external. Concretely the government made Burmese the official language of the
998:
The objective of the BSPP was to be the main channel for participation and mobilisation of people to support the state. The political orientation of the BSPP was described as the middle way between social democracy and communism, and the party should represent all working people. Thus the party was
963:
majority. The socialism applied thus became a localised version, fitted to the Burmese identity. The priorities in the ideological framework were the establishing of a socialist economy and the interests of the peasants, who comprised the largest group in society, and potentially the biggest threat
887:
Revolutionary council replaced the AFPFL-government and the day after the establishing of the new governmental body, the council abolished fundamental state institutions established with the 1947 constitution. This included the two houses of the Hluttaw (the parliament), the central legislature and
840:
Additionally, personal rivalry in the government damaged the cohesion and the power of the already weak AFPFL. In turn, Ne Win and the army feared that a split in the party would induce further instability. This fear was enhanced when U Nu announced that he would not run for office in the following
812:
was inherently weak and encouraged local autonomy. The multiple voices represented in parliament were seen as evoking instability and enhancing ethnic differences that would bring down the Union. The army thus argued that there was a need for a strong central government to secure the integration of
757:
The descriptions of the coup vary in the scholarly literature, when it comes to how militarily coordinated the coup was. According to historian Robert H. Taylor, Ne Win assumed power in secrecy, without the knowledge of even the deputy commander of the armed forced, Brigadier General Aung Gyi. Just
1057:
in 1985 which damaged the public trust in the government. The combination of the demonetisation and the drop in the price of rice and timber severely harmed the population and the agrarian economy. People began taking money out of the banks as yet another demonetisation occurred, which resulted in
1044:
Burma also turned away from the outside world when it came to the economic policies. The Burmanization of the economy included the expulsion of many Chinese and Indians from the country. Ne Win's government prohibited foreigners from owning land and practicing certain professions. By the mid 1960s
1036:
of the economy, a declaration that all political opposition to the regime was illegal, elimination of institutions rivalling the state and direct government control over legal, cultural and educational institutions as well as all publishing in Myanmar. Furthermore, the military implemented secular
994:
Initially the BSPP was only made up by members of the Revolutionary Council but eventually it also attracted politicians, especially the left-oriented. Furthermore, Ne Win included civil servants and former politicians who were ready to conform to the military rule in the BSPP. Aung Thwin and Aung
967:
In this sense the objective was a national social revolution across classes. However, since the peasants made up the largest group in society and since this class was perceived as having been neglected under colonial rule as well as by the post-colonial governments, policies to improve the economy
1052:
Due to the Burmese Way to Socialism's focus on improving the lives of the peasants the government chose to prioritise agriculture over industry and manufacturing by initiating policies that directed investment and resources towards the agricultural sector. But during the 26 years of military rule
844:
Historians differ when it comes to the importance of Ne Win as an individual leader in explaining why the coup was established and successfully executed. Aung Thwin & Aung Thwin argue that Ne Win possessed political legitimacy founded in Burmese culture and history, which enabled him to seize
1113:
reject (perhaps forget) the humiliating colonial past." In the same way the policies which protected the peasants from over-taxation and land-seizure are suggested to be a response to the colonial rulers hard taxation of peasants. Within this narrative the significance of the coup is the genuine
1108:
Finally the military's decisions to implement policies that distanced Burma from the external world can be understood as period of genuine independence, where the significance of the coup is to be found in the emotional autonomy that came from being economic and cultural independent from British
1096:
Another narrative can be characterised as cosmopolitan and frames the significance of the coup in terms of the following isolation from the international society and disconnectedness due to the state's economic and cultural detachment from the outside. Elements of this narrative are evident in
824:
If the union dissolved and the Shan and Kayah States claimed autonomy it meant that the states could pursue independent foreign policy and engage in alliances with powerful states like the United States. Due to the international security status an alliance like this would create a significant
730:, who by that time had fallen out with Ne Win and been dismissed, had given the order to dynamite the building. Ne Win further stated that he himself, as a "revolutionary leader", had to take responsibility for the incident by giving the "sword with sword and spear with spear" speech.
964:
to the government. To distinguish the Burmese Way to Socialism from communism, Ne Win argued that the socialist system of Burma should benefit all people of society and that the business class was not seen as the enemy, as long as they supported the Revolutionary Council.
648:
crisis, the civilian government and Prime Minister U Nu asked the military and Ne Win to step in as a temporary caretaker government. Once the political order had been restored, the caretaker government was expected to execute general elections and restore civilian rule.
1061:
According to Taylor, the lack of economic and democratic development in Burma during the 26 years of military rule under Ne Win resulted in the uprising of 1988, where people in a nationwide demonstration opposed the military dominance in the name of democracy.
903:
The coup created a policy vacuum, where the Revolutionary Council and Ne Win could realise their ideas for society, but Ne Win needed a rationale for implementing his political agenda that would resonate with the population. This led to the formulation of the
680:, Chief Minister of Kachin State and close ally with Prime Minister U Nu, was designated as president for next 5 years by Union Parliament on 28 February 1962. However he did not take office because of the coup. Ne Win became head of state as Chairman of the
797:". The army and Ne Win saw it as their responsibility to protect the cohesion of the Union and in the official press release the coup was presented as a necessity due to the policies of the AFPFL-government. Especially problematic was U Nu's attempt to make
1070:
Different aspects of the coup can be highlighted as significant depending on how the historical events following the coup are being read and analysed. From the scholarly literature three different narratives of the period following the coup can be deduced:
899:
The Revolutionary Council's political dominance was further ensured by making all institutions that were not eliminated by law dependent on the council either through their personnel or through finances, which prevented them from organising any opposition.
1027:
Despite the limited immediate implication for society at large the military coup resulted in comprehensive societal changes in the subsequent years with the Revolutionary Council's implementation of their policies founded in the Burmese Way to Socialism.
738:
Due to the AFPFL-government's weak position in society, the coup was not unexpected, and Ne Win had been urged to seize power by members of the army. Several foreign governments considered the military takeover a logical, if not positive, development.
597:, which had been founded by the council in 1962. The elected government remained hybrid between civilian and military, until 18 September 1988, when the military again took over as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (then renamed the
1093:" when authoritarian regimes in neighbouring countries got replaced with more or less democratic political systems. Callahan describes the period that follows the coup as one characterised by significant military presence in society.
849:
was a result of inter-elite conflicts over the state structures, and who possessed the legitimate claim on the state. Long-term structural development led to shifting fortunes of the military and political elites, which created: "...
1031:
As stated above the coup resulted in the abolition of the 1947 constitution, which eliminated major state institutions and concentrated the power in the Revolutionary Council. From its powerful position the council began a vast
836:
underlined the need to retain central control with the frontier states. In this scenario of external threats and an internal threat of disintegration, the civilian government was perceived as inadequate to protect the country.
1109:
colonial rule. An example of this narrative is found in Aung Thwin & Aung Thwin's analysis, where it is said that the cultural policies of the Revolutionary council were formulated to restore the Burmese culture and "...
1002:
In the first decade following the formation of the BSPP the revolutionary council enjoyed the supremacy over the party. This was in accordance with the party's constitution, which stated that he Revolutionary Council was
845:
power in the 1962 coup. Ne Win's political credentials were based on his fighting for the country in the 1940s and the fact that he served as a trusted lieutenant to Aung San, who was considered to be a national hero.
1007:". This hierarchy should later be reversed so the BSPP would lead the Revolutionary Council, and in 1974 with the formation of a new constitution the party took the political leadership in the general elections.
773:
A reason, which is highlighted by multiple historians, is that the coup was a response to a growing fear within the army that the Union of Burma was drifting towards disintegration under the AFPFL-Government.
1016:
egalitarian politics which prioritised the peasant. One obvious change for people, though, was that the new power elite would consist of army generals and the channel to obtain status was a military career.
1058:
protests amongst the urban population. The economic downturn meant that the state could not pay its foreign loans, which led to the UN's categorisation of Burma as the Least Developed Country in 1987.
888:
the regional councils – the channel of communication from the ethnic states to Yangon. The bureaucratic power embedded in these institutions was transferred to the Revolutionary Council and Ne Win.
777:
This explanation resonates with the one given by the army in the official press release following the coup. By 1962 the integrity of the country was seen as threatened by the two minorities, the
676:
Less than two years after the caretaker government had handed power back to the AFPFL-government, on 2 March 1962, Ne Win again seized power in a military-staged coup d'état. Before the coup,
346:
770:
There have been various explanations to why the military, headed by Ne Win, staged the military coup less than two years after acknowledging the authority of the civilian government.
742:
The coup was executed with the arrest of Prime Minister U Nu, five other cabinet members, the Chief of Justice, and around thirty politicians and former leaders from the states of
1022:
There were no riots or demonstration against it; no country broke diplomatic relations or recalled their ambassadors to reprimand them and certainly no sanctions were imposed.
952:
In a security perspective the leftist state ideology furthermore minimised the risk of Chinese attacks, which in 1962 constituted the largest external threat to Myanmar.
1101:
the state in Burma appeared to much of the rest of the world as isolated and sui generis." Furthermore, Taylor describes how the state practised an economic as well as "
633:. The elected Prime Minister U Nu appointed Ne Win as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on 1 February 1949, and was given total control of the army, replacing General
821:
a great interest in Asian countries bordering communist powers, which meant that Burma was a possible subject of interest with the country's borders to China.
677:
240:
185:
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However, the degraded economy and social disorder placed emphasis on the military. In October 1958, when instability in society rose to a level approaching a
2026:
2196:
1475:
272:
1230:
Schock, Kurt (August 1999). "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma".
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from the Council. Ne Win also chaired this group. The aim of Revolution Council was to lead an anti-colonial revolution and reassert the state.
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security threat to the rest of the country, with an increased risk of a conflict between the United States and China on Burmese territory.
322:
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resorting to a leftist ideology was perceived as surprising by external agents. But according to Historian Maung A. Myoe the inclusion of
726:
In 1988, 26 years later, Ne Win denied any involvement in the dynamiting of the Student Union building, stating that his deputy Brigadier
896:
Ne Win in theory possessed all state power and thus achieved a position of formal dominance within the state unprecedented since 1885."
233:
1412:
s headline of 9 July 1962 read "General Ne Win States Give Us Time to Work: Obstructionists are Warned: Will Fight Sword with Sword".
1045:
Myanmar's foreign trade declined and the ratio of foreign trade to GDP declined from 40 per cent in 1960 to 26 per cent in 1970.
657:
548:
103:
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395:
2181:
1940:
226:
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we will fight sword with sword and spear with spear." On 13 July 1962, less than a week after the speech, Ne Win left for
334:
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449:
385:
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Furthermore, the regional context served as argument to prevent the union from dissolving. The instability of divided
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with little objection – neither from domestic nor international actors. According to Aung Thwin & Aung Thwin: "
786:
708:
688:, and several others, and declared a socialist state run by a "Revolutionary Council" of senior military officers.
586:
429:
2022:
989:
977:
789:, to withdraw from the Union. On top of this the Shan leaders were beginning to form an armed opposition against
692:'s son, Sao Mye Thaik, was shot dead in what was generally described as a "bloodless" coup by the world's media.
594:
856:
By the time of the coup in 1962 the state was structured in favour of the military, which had developed into a "
817:
but also as a justification of the state structures and policies that were implemented in the subsequent years.
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bureaucratized, and central institution, capable of eliminating such challenges to its claims over state power.
468:
417:
412:
1459:
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390:
267:
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A common understanding of the coup is the framing of the coup and the decades that followed as a period of
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strengthened and prolonged the political dominance of the army, since it enabled the neutralisation of the
473:
32:
878:
556:
77:
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the state religion, since it contributed to the Christian minorities' motivation to fight for autonomy.
2176:
1355:
626:
370:
1161:
923:
917:
905:
463:
380:
1932:
360:
1460:"Le coup d'État du 2 mars 1962 en Birmanie. Perceptions et réactions de la diplomatie française"
1105:" from the world, where the Revolutionary Council turned inward to build a new state structure.
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concepts to create ideological objectives that were compatible with the morals of the country's
2191:
606:
434:
287:
1363:
589:, the Revolutionary Council handed over the power to the elected government, consisting of a
490:
312:
300:
945:, while projecting the army as revolutionary institution that could ensure the population's
809:
630:
353:
295:
8:
1392:". Two different English translations of the speech can be read on the front page of the
1166:
116:
1247:
956:
758:
28 officers were involved in the operation, and only Ne Win knew the date of the coup.
444:
1421:
News items of Ne Win's trip to these countries for "medical check up" can be found in
2143:
2136:
2120:
2101:
2082:
1936:
1367:
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the supreme authority of the party during the transitional period of its construction
955:
To secure public support of the ideology the Marxist elements were supplemented with
645:
575:
478:
307:
1097:
Taylor's account, where the period from 1962 to 1988 is described as one where: "...
544:
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policies and broke the tradition of cooperation with the Buddha Sasana Council.
1130:
931:
927:
751:
689:
685:
532:
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339:
282:
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602:
439:
329:
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Public support for the army was strengthened after the army facilitated the
1423:
1054:
782:
723:
All universities were closed for more than two years until September 1964.
697:
638:
590:
137:
1873:
The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, section 2, p. 61
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717:
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582:
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2079:
A history of Myanmar since ancient times: Traditions and transformations
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also disappeared mysteriously after being stopped at a checkpoint near
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retained power for 23 years until 2011, when it was transferred to the
566:
In the first 12 years following the coup, the country was ruled under
1359:
1086:
946:
942:
634:
159:
2023:"UN DESA | DPAD | CDP | Least Developed Country Factsheet | Myanmar"
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in 1948, Burma became a democratic socialist country and joined the
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960:
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election, which in turn increased the incentive to stage the coup.
798:
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218:
124:
36:
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59:
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Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia
980:(BSPP) was presented. All remaining parties were banned by law.
570:, and saw a significant expansion in the military's role in the
790:
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and acknowledged the authority of the elected civil government
560:
199:
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the economy and limiting foreign influence on businesses. The
1929:
The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia
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winners and losers, rulers and ruled, citizens and enemies."
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a high priority among the Burmese people following years of
833:
552:
172:
754:, which is why the coup has been described as bloodless.
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Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948
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2009:
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1205:
908:, which was presented to the public on 7 May 1962.
720:, and the United Kingdom "for a medical check up".
605:and virtual breakdown of the socialist regime. The
2161:. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
2135:
983:
2077:Aung-Thwin, Michael; Aung-Thwin, Maitrii (2013).
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750:. Only one person was killed, the son of general
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2005:
2003:
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1339:Burma – Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity
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2098:Making enemies: War and State Building in Burma
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1176:[mjàɴmànàɪɴŋàɴsɪʔʔànàθéɪɴkʰàɴja̰tɕʰɪ́ɴ]
1114:independence and autonomy that it facilitated.
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1167:1962 Mranmanuingngam cacanasim: hkamra.hkrang:
785:, who were claiming their right, given by the
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971:The implementation of the new ideology was
684:and also Prime Minister. He arrested U Nu,
1434:
241:
227:
2100:. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
543:in Burmese politics. In the 2 March 1962
2119:. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
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2081:(2nd ed.). London: Reaktion Books.
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804:Furthermore, the army believed that the
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2142:(2nd ed.). Singapore: NUS Press.
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1156:၁၉၆၂ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံစစ်အာဏာသိမ်းခံရခြင်း
864:the strong character of the military.
765:
611:Union Solidarity and Development Party
2159:General Ne Win: A Political Biography
2029:from the original on 21 November 2015
1478:from the original on 13 February 2021
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551:-government headed by Prime Minister
547:, the military replaced the civilian
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2197:1960s coups d'état and coup attempts
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1917:
1802:
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658:Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
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33:internal conflict in Burma (Myanmar)
1926:
1341:. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
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599:State Peace and Development Council
13:
1389:dah go dah gyin, hlan go hlan gyin
1330:
76:Civilian government replaced by a
14:
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2187:History of Myanmar (1948–present)
2010:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1912:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1835:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1721:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1631:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1583:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1325:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1313:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
1206:Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin 2013
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273:China–Myanmar border (1960–1961)
203:(Chief of Staff of the Tatmadaw)
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1726:
1680:
1651:
1605:
1559:
1517:
1505:
1451:
1415:
1376:
990:Burma Socialist Programme Party
984:Burma Socialist Programme Party
978:Burma Socialist Programme Party
595:Burma Socialist Programme Party
539:and the political dominance of
2069:
1318:
1270:
1258:
1223:
1143:
671:
189:(President-designate of Burma)
1:
1185:
1066:Significance of the 1962 coup
616:
2182:Internal conflict in Myanmar
1466:(in French) (164): 111–136.
924:The Burmese Way to Socialism
912:The Burmese Way to Socialism
7:
1388:
1117:
879:Union Revolutionary Council
810:parliament-style government
733:
709:riots at Rangoon University
682:Union Revolutionary Council
601:) following the nationwide
557:Union Revolutionary Council
10:
2233:
2157:Taylor, Robert H. (2015).
2134:Taylor, Robert H. (2009).
2096:Callahan, Mary P. (2004).
1356:Cambridge University Press
987:
915:
876:
501:ethnic armed organisations
176:(Prime Minister of Burma)
2212:Military coups in Myanmar
2207:March 1962 events in Asia
1464:Relations Internationales
1458:Egreteau, Renaud (2015).
1351:Boudreau, Vincent (2004)
1154:
1081:An independence narrative
260:
212:
207:
145:
117:Union Party (Clean AFPFL)
89:
42:
30:
25:
2202:20th-century revolutions
1403:of 9 July 1962. Part of
1136:
1078:A cosmopolitan narrative
918:Burmese Way to Socialism
906:Burmese Way to Socialism
531:marked the beginning of
529:1962 Burmese coup d'état
26:1962 Burmese coup d'état
2115:Myoe, Maung A. (2009).
1933:Oxford University Press
16:Military coup by Ne Win
1337:Smith, Martin (1991).
1091:such a definitive end,
795:national determination
660:(AFPFL), led by U Nu.
146:Commanders and leaders
2217:Socialist revolutions
1103:general disengagement
1075:A democracy narrative
1011:Aftermath and effects
873:Revolutionary council
621:After the end of the
268:Communist (1948–1988)
208:Casualties and losses
2138:The State in Myanmar
678:Samaduwa Sinhwanaung
631:Non-Aligned Movement
627:Burma's independence
587:constitution of 1974
457:Anti-Muslim violence
354:Bombings and attacks
186:Samaduwa Sinhwanaung
163:(President of Burma)
1660:, pp. 198, 203
1472:10.3917/ri.164.0111
1327:, pp. 245, 247
922:The state ideology
766:Causes for the coup
559:Chaired by General
104:Government of Burma
2062:, pp. 301–302
2025:. United Nations.
1927:Han, Enze (2024).
1897:, pp. 295–296
1885:, pp. 316–317
1820:, pp. 261–262
1526:, pp. 255–256
1220:, pp. 255–256
1131:Myanmar portal
668:and World War II.
515:Myanmar portal
2177:Conflicts in 1962
1942:978-0-19-769659-0
787:1947 constitution
646:national security
555:, along with the
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1399:and the Rangoon
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623:Second World War
585:. Following the
572:national economy
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1431:of 14 July 1962
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1232:Social Problems
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1034:nationalisation
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986:
926:had the aim of
920:
914:
893:
881:
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793:to claim Shan "
768:
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537:Burma (Myanmar)
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347:Northeast India
263:Armed conflicts
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2149:978-0824833626
2148:
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2126:978-9812308481
2125:
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2088:978-1861899019
2087:
2073:
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2040:
2014:
1999:
1987:
1975:
1963:
1948:
1941:
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1650:
1635:
1616:
1614:, pp. 256
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1012:
1009:
985:
982:
932:anti-communist
913:
910:
874:
871:
869:
866:
806:federal system
767:
764:
752:Sao Shwe Thaik
735:
732:
690:Sao Shwe Thaik
686:Sao Shwe Thaik
673:
670:
654:1960 elections
618:
615:
607:military junta
533:one-party rule
520:
519:
504:
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498:
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485:Related topics
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2056:
2050:, p. 302
2049:
2044:
2028:
2024:
2018:
2012:, p. 255
2011:
2006:
2004:
1997:, p. 297
1996:
1991:
1985:, p. 273
1984:
1979:
1973:, p. 261
1972:
1967:
1961:, p. 301
1960:
1955:
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1914:, p. 250
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1793:, p. 209
1792:
1791:Callahan 2004
1787:
1785:
1778:, p. 264
1777:
1772:
1766:, p. 257
1765:
1760:
1754:, p. 295
1753:
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1723:, p. 249
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1704:, p. 296
1703:
1698:
1696:
1689:, p. 258
1688:
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1677:, p. 208
1676:
1675:Callahan 2004
1671:
1669:
1667:
1659:
1658:Callahan 2004
1654:
1648:, p. 204
1647:
1646:Callahan 2004
1642:
1640:
1633:, p. 248
1632:
1627:
1625:
1623:
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1608:
1602:, p. 294
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1585:, p. 246
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1556:, p. 203
1555:
1554:Callahan 2004
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1548:
1541:, p. 202
1540:
1539:Callahan 2004
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1533:
1525:
1520:
1514:, p. 256
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1508:
1502:, p. 293
1501:
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1372:0-521-83989-0
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1333:
1326:
1321:
1315:, p. 247
1314:
1309:
1307:
1305:
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1301:
1293:
1288:
1286:
1279:, p. 134
1278:
1277:Callahan 2004
1273:
1267:, p. 207
1266:
1265:Callahan 2004
1261:
1253:
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1233:
1226:
1219:
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1208:, p. 245
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38:
34:
29:
24:
19:
2158:
2137:
2116:
2097:
2078:
2055:
2043:
2031:. Retrieved
2017:
1990:
1978:
1966:
1928:
1890:
1878:
1869:
1842:
1805:, p. 59
1798:
1771:
1759:
1728:
1682:
1653:
1607:
1568:, p. 60
1561:
1519:
1507:
1480:. Retrieved
1463:
1453:
1428:
1424:The Guardian
1422:
1417:
1404:
1400:
1396:
1378:
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1021:
1018:
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997:
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970:
966:
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951:
928:centralising
921:
902:
898:
890:
886:
882:
862:
857:
855:
847:
843:
839:
827:
823:
819:
815:
813:the nation.
803:
794:
776:
772:
769:
760:
756:
741:
737:
725:
722:
706:
698:Sao Kya Seng
681:
675:
662:
651:
643:
637:, an ethnic
620:
591:single-party
565:
541:the military
528:
526:
506:
484:
483:
479:2016–present
455:
454:
450:2021–present
423:
422:
407:
402:Coup d'états
401:
400:
352:
351:
323:2016–present
262:
151:
123:
95:
90:Belligerents
71:
50:2 March 1962
31:Part of the
18:
2070:Works cited
2060:Taylor 2009
2048:Taylor 2009
2033:20 November
1995:Taylor 2009
1983:Taylor 2015
1971:Taylor 2015
1959:Taylor 2009
1895:Taylor 2009
1883:Taylor 2009
1862:Taylor 2009
1847:Taylor 2009
1818:Taylor 2015
1776:Taylor 2015
1764:Taylor 2015
1752:Taylor 2009
1733:Taylor 2015
1702:Taylor 2009
1687:Taylor 2015
1612:Taylor 2015
1600:Taylor 2009
1524:Taylor 2015
1512:Taylor 2009
1500:Taylor 2009
1446:Taylor 2015
1386:phrase is "
1294:, p. 1
1218:Taylor 2009
949:' demands.
718:Switzerland
672:Coup d'état
666:colonialism
583:bureaucracy
568:martial law
2171:Categories
2107:0801472679
1429:The Nation
1406:The Nation
1238:(3): 358.
1186:References
1172:pronounced
988:See also:
947:socialists
916:See also:
892:that: "...
877:See also:
707:Following
617:Background
496:combatants
491:ceasefires
213:1–2 killed
138:Burma Army
1803:Myoe 2009
1566:Myoe 2009
1360:Cambridge
1292:Myoe 2009
1087:autocracy
943:communism
635:Smith Dun
445:2007–2008
318:1991–1992
288:Karen–Mon
160:Win Maung
2027:Archived
1476:Archived
1401:Guardian
1118:See also
973:Leninist
961:Buddhist
957:Buddhist
935:military
799:Buddhism
734:Strategy
728:Aung Gyi
702:Taunggyi
576:politics
424:Protests
308:Rohingya
125:Tatmadaw
55:Location
37:Cold War
35:and the
1482:15 June
1394:Rangoon
1384:Burmese
1252:3097105
1150:Burmese
939:Marxism
830:Vietnam
714:Austria
696:Sawbwa
292:Kokang
62:, Burma
60:Rangoon
2146:
2123:
2104:
2085:
1939:
1397:Nation
1370:
1362:, UK,
1250:
1111:
1099:
894:
851:
791:Yangon
694:Thibaw
593:, the
578:, and
561:Ne Win
278:Kachin
200:Ne Win
68:Result
1410:'
1248:JSTOR
1162:MLCTS
1137:Notes
783:Kayah
748:Kayah
639:Karen
580:state
549:AFPFL
283:Karen
2144:ISBN
2121:ISBN
2102:ISBN
2083:ISBN
2035:2015
1937:ISBN
1484:2020
1427:and
1382:The
1368:ISBN
1055:kyat
834:Laos
832:and
808:and
781:and
779:Shan
746:and
744:Shan
625:and
553:U Nu
545:coup
527:The
474:2015
469:2013
464:2012
440:1988
435:1974
430:1962
418:2021
413:1988
408:1962
396:2018
391:2013
386:2010
381:2005
376:2003
371:1999
366:1983
361:1947
340:2023
330:Shan
313:1978
301:2015
296:2009
173:U Nu
47:Date
1468:doi
1240:doi
535:in
2173::
2002:^
1951:^
1935:.
1919:^
1902:^
1854:^
1825:^
1810:^
1783:^
1740:^
1709:^
1694:^
1665:^
1638:^
1619:^
1590:^
1573:^
1546:^
1531:^
1492:^
1474:.
1462:.
1436:^
1366:,
1358:,
1299:^
1284:^
1246:.
1236:46
1234:.
1194:^
1170:,
1164::
1160:;
1152::
860:"
716:,
704:.
641:.
613:.
574:,
563:.
2152:.
2129:.
2110:.
2091:.
2037:.
1945:.
1486:.
1470::
1254:.
1242::
1003:"
242:e
235:t
228:v
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