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would pass the 28-volt signal of the low-voltage batteries to the MC-788, which would close its connections and allow the high-voltage batteries to pass their 2500-volt signal to the X-Unit. "When the bomb fell a distance to provide sufficient differential pressure to close the differential-pressure-switch contacts, the circuit was completed through the arming/safing switch to the energizing coils of the safing rotary switch . This latter switch then moved to the armed position, the ground was removed from the X-unit, and the circuit from the high-voltage thermal battery pack to the X-unit was completed." Another more general explanation of this system is in a later review of safety innovations at Sandia at this time: "Motor-driven safing switches incorporated into bombs, called 'ready-safe' switches, were operated by the pilot moving a control knob in the cockpit. Switches capable of holding off in excess of 2500 volts were required for those systems... which had incorporated high voltage, thermally activated batteries. Systems which used low voltage power sources and some type of voltage step-up technique could use low voltage switches for the safing switch. Both high and low voltage safing switches had motor-driven contacts that would close when a 28-volt signal was applied."
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wreckage, along the line of flight. As with weapon no. 1, its "safing pins" were pulled, allowing its arming rods to withdraw. As before, this initiated the MC-845 Bisch generator, which activated the low-voltage thermal batteries and started the MC-543 Timer. However, because the weapon had been released at such a low altitude, and its parachute had not opened, it collided with the ground at high speed. Its timer circuit had run only 12 to 15 seconds when it impacted, and consequently, the high-voltage thermal battery did not activate. For unknown reasons, its parachute did not deploy, despite the parachute deployment mechanism having been activated. As the impact of the weapon had resulted in a crater of significant size – five feet (1.5 m) deep and nine feet (2.7 m) in diameter – it was initially assumed that the high-explosives in the weapon's "primary" stage had detonated. However, it was later confirmed that there had not been any HE detonation of this or the other weapon, and there had been no contamination of the site with fissile material.
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receiving this current, the MC-788 would then connect the (not yet-charged) high-voltage thermal battery to the X-Unit, the electrical device that provides a high voltage signal to the detonators used in the "primary" stage of the weapon. After the timing circuit completed its countdown of 42 seconds, it would then deliver initiation power to the MC-641 High
Voltage Thermal Battery pack. This would begin to generate its full voltage of 2500 volts within one to two seconds, which would be applied directly to the trigger circuit and, through the MC-788 High Voltage Safing System, to the capacitor bank of the X-Unit. Once the bomb impacted the ground, a crush switch on the nose of the bomb (the MC-787 Trigger Circuit) would be closed and trigger the X-Unit to discharge its capacitors and initiate the high-explosive system in the "primary" stage of the weapon.
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the crew by means of a lanyard that was connected to them. Additionally, prior to dropping the bomb, the pilot would need to operate a switch inside the cockpit (the T-380 Readiness Switch) that would operate the MC-722 Arm/Safe Switch inside the Mark 39 bomb itself. The Arm/Safe Switch was a low-voltage, solenoid-operated electro-mechanical switch that was kept in the "Safe" position until a deliberate choice was made to cause a nuclear detonation, but could be switched from "Safe" to "Arm" by a 28-volt electrical signal. The Mark 39 Mod 2 could only be detonated as a "contact" burst (and not an airburst). The bomb bay had a solenoid-operated lock system which would deploy the parachute automatically upon release if operated, using an MC-834 Explosive
Actuator, as opposed to a free-fall release.
1069:, the weapons involved did have Alt 197 applied to them, but the low-voltage thermal batteries were nonetheless activated in one of the weapons despite the MC-1288 Arm/Safe switches being in the "Safe" position. According to the Defense Atomic Support Agency, "post-mortem analysis indicates a probable cause of the activation of the low voltage thermal batteries of the one weapon was a cable short which permitted the energy from the MC-845 Bisch Generator to bypass the MC-1288 Arm/Safe Switch. It is suspected that the MC-845 pulse resulted from the mechanical shock sustained upon impact and was passed to the MC-640 through one of the possible random short circuits."
453:, the national laboratory which had the primary responsibility of nuclear warhead safety engineering, subjected the recovered weapons to careful analysis to determine how close they were to a possible nuclear detonation. Various accounts of their conclusions have circulated over the years, with some emphasizing the closeness of the detonation, and some emphasizing the success of the various safety features of the nuclear warheads. To make sense of their analysis and the controversies, it is first necessary to understand what the normal firing sequence of a Mark 39 Mod 2 used in combat conditions would be.
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progress of the fusing/firing sequence," notes the status of the tritium reservoirs after the status of the Arm/Safe Switch, and before the status of the High
Voltage Thermal Battery (triggered by the timer). Neither of the weapons at Goldsboro had their tritium reservoir "squibs" actuated, despite Weapon No. 1's timer having run down and successfully triggered its High Voltage Thermal Battery. This occasioned no obvious comment in the post-mortem accounts, suggesting this was as expected, which would be the case if the tritium reservoirs were only dischargeable if the Arm/Safe switch was set to "arm".
517:(EOD) team on the scene to be in the "Safe" position, and did not pass its current on further. The MC-543 safe-separation timer ran its full length (42 seconds), and initiated the MC-641 High-Voltage Thermal Battery Pack. Upon impact with the ground, the crush-switch closed, which would under normal circumstances fire the weapon. But as the MC-722 Arm/Safe Switch had not activated the MC-788 High-Voltage Safing Switch, the X-Unit was not charged, and no detonation occurred. The "squibs" that would inject the boost gas into the weapon did not release and the tritium reservoir was found intact.
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the internal SAC documents refer to it) operation doubled the previous number of sorties, bringing it up to 12 per day, flying on a "ladder" route "resembling giant north-south loops stretching from the US north into the
Canadian Arctic," and began on 15 January 1961. Problems emerged in this arrangement, however, as simply adding more flights to the same route would make it crowded and "jeopardize flight safety," and if the of flights climbed to 1/16th of the total force it would constitute a "safety hazard." As a result, a new "bomber stream airborne alert concept known as '
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Arm/Safe switch, with the main change being that the latter would prevent the charging of the low-voltage thermal battery when the Arm/Safe switch was in the "Safe" position, and as such would make sure that no electrical current was available anywhere within the bomb to power additional switches or hardware, legitimately or not. After the accident, all other Mark 39 Mod 2 weapons without the modification were taken off of deployment status ("red-lined") until the modification could be applied to the remaining inventory of the weapons.
603:"electrically... neither in armed nor safe position." The switch and other components were shipped to Sandia for further "post-mortem" analysis, and it was determined that while the switch's indicator drum had rotated to the "Arm" position, it had disconnected from its contacts, and was never electrically "armed." They concluded that this was damage caused by the impact shock of the bomb hitting the ground, which also damaged the switch to such an extent that the circuit could not have closed even if it were in the "Arm" position.
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and without any sign of damage, despite not having been pulled from the crew compartment. Once it left its rack, the bomb dropped in such a way that its arming rods were pulled out in much the same manner as an intentional drop sequence would be. This caused its MC-845 Bisch generator to be actuated, initiating the MC-640 low-voltage thermal battery pack and the MC-543 timer. The explosive actuators triggered the deployment of the bomb's parachute as in normal functioning.
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1015:'", which used two routes (one circumnavigating Canada, the other on a route from the Atlantic and Mediterranean), was developed. While it was pending approval, three other airborne alert "indoctrination training" operations were implemented after "Cover All" ended on 31 March 1961: "Clear Road" (1 April–30 June), "Keen Axe" (1 July–30 September), and "Wire Brush" (1 October–5 November). "Chrome Dome" began on 6 November.
862:, citing the possibility of accidental nuclear war. According to declassified meeting notes, McNamara "went on to describe crashes of US aircraft, one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted. He concluded that despite our best efforts, the possibility of an accidental nuclear explosion still existed."
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at 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Five men landed safely after ejecting or bailing out through a hatch, one did not survive his parachute landing, and two died in the crash. The third pilot of the bomber, Lt. Adam
Mattocks, is the only person known to have successfully bailed out of the top hatch of a B-52 without an ejection seat. The crew's final view of the aircraft was in an intact state with its payload of two
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accident, an electrical short could cause the Arm/Safe Switch to switch into the "Arm" mode, which, had it happened during the
Goldsboro accident, could have resulted in a multi-megaton detonation. A Sandia study on the US nuclear weapons safety program by R.N. Brodie written in 1987 noted that the ready/safe switches of the sort used in this era of weapon design, which required only a 28-volt
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to recover its MC-772 Arm/Safe Switch. In 2013, Lt. Jack ReVelle, an EOD officer on the scene, recalled the moment: "Until my death I will never forget hearing my sergeant say, 'Lieutenant, we found the arm/safe switch.' And I said, 'Great.' He said, 'Not great. It's on arm.'" Another EOD officer recalled: "The arm safety switch was on, armed and functioning."
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Weapon No. 2, which underwent something other than normal release from the aircraft, evidenced by the fact that the parachute did not deploy, also had its arming rods extracted, and those components which were given the opportunity to act, did act in the manner expected. Full operation of this weapon
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As the aircraft descended through 10,000 feet (3,000 m) on its approach to the airfield, the pilots were no longer able to keep it in stable descent and lost control. An entire wing of the aircraft apparently was lost. The pilot in command ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft, which they did
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with integral fuel tanks considerably increased the fuel capacity of B-52G and H models, but were found to be experiencing 60% more stress during flight than did the wings of older models. Wings and other areas susceptible to fatigue were modified in 1964 under Boeing engineering change proposal ECP
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To summarize the Sandia post-mortem described in detail above, for Bomb No. 1, had the Arm-Safe Switch been set to "Arm," or malfunctioned in a way that enabled the firing circuit to act as if it was armed, the bomb would have detonated with a full nuclear yield upon the contact fuze closing when it
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Excavation of the second bomb was complicated by the freezing cold, a high water table, and the extreme muddiness. Pumps were used to remove water, and the sides of the crater were reinforced with plywood, but it was decided after digging down to 42 feet (13 m) to abandon the effort. The fusion
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The EOD team found that the bomb had apparently left the airplane still attached to its rack, and that its timer circuit could not start until it had left its rack. (The rack was found a mile east of the bomb itself.) The bomb had become deeply buried in mud, and it required three days of excavation
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to operate, had been observed many times to inadvertently be set to "arm" when a stray current was applied to the system. "Since any 28-volt DC source could cause the motor to run, how could one argue that in severe environments 28 volts DC would never be applied to that wire, which might be tens of
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which were given an opportunity to actuate by the pulling of the Bisch rods did behave in the manner expected. Full operation of this weapon was prevented by the MC-772 Arm/Safe Switch, the primary safing device." Other measures meant to provide additional safing, such as the "safing pins," failed.
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Weapon no. 1, identified as serial number 434909 (and kept in the aft bomb bay), was flung out of the aircraft at an altitude of around 9,000 feet (2,700 m) above the ground. It apparently twisted from its rack in a way that caused the "safing pins" on its arming rods to pull out longitudinally
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For a parachute delivery, the Mark 39 would need to be released between 3,500 feet (1,100 m) and 5,700 feet (1,700 m) above the target. For a free-fall delivery, it would need to be released at least 35,000 feet (11,000 m) above the target, or else it would hit the ground prior to the
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Once the bomb cleared the bomb bay and the arming rods were retracted, they would trigger the MC-845 Bisch generator they were connected to. This was a single-pulse generator that began the overall firing sequence. The Bisch generator would send an initiation signal to the MC-640 low-voltage thermal
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The Mark 39 bombs would be suspended in the two bomb bays of the B-52 plane carrying it, one in front of other. "Arming rods" were extended out of each weapon, and held in place with "safing pins." Prior to normal use, the "safing pins" would need to be pulled out of the bomb, which could be done by
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Diagram of the external features of a Mark 39 nuclear bomb, with the warhead compartment labeled as "A" and the parachute pack labeled as "B". The location of the access panel for the Arm/Safe Switch is indicated at the rear of the bomb, before the parachute pack. On the top of the parachute pack is
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at 9,000 ft (2,700 m). Five crewmen successfully ejected or bailed out of the aircraft and landed safely; another ejected, but did not survive the landing, and two died in the crash. Information declassified since 2013 has shown that one of the bombs was judged by nuclear weapons engineers
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An internal SAC history for 1961 noted that, "From a modest beginning in
September 1958, with one bomb wing launching a combat ready B-52 every six hours, SAC's airborne alert indoctrination program had increased to 11 wings launching a total of 12 sorties per day by late 1962." The "Cover All" (as
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disassembled and "safed" the weapon (by disconnecting the tritium reservoir from the primary), and returned it to
Seymour Johnson AFB. The weapon was described as having only sustained "negligible damage", with only a broken nose plate, and its nose buried about 18 inches (460 mm) in the dirt.
442:, meaning that it was fully-assembled at all times. The Mark 39 Mod 2 warhead was itself enclosed in a gravity bomb casing which had a compartment containing a drogue parachute that both allowed the aircraft dropping it to move to a safe distance, and allowed it to be detonated on the surface by a
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The MC-788 High
Voltage Safing System was a switch that "would prevent high voltage from reaching the X-unit so that if a fire or extreme heat ignited the high-voltage batteries, no harm would result." It was not, in other words, an independent Arm/Safe switch separate from the MC-772; the MC-722
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A safety modification to Mark 39 Mod 2 weapons known as Alt 197 had been approved in
January 1960, but not yet applied to all deployed weapons prior to the Goldsboro accident, and was not applied to the weapons involved in the accident. Alt 197 replaced the MC-722 Arm/Safe switch with the MC-1288
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There have been differing interpretations offered as to how close this particular weapon was to having a nuclear detonation. An initial report by Sandia in February 1961 concluded that weapon no. 1 "underwent a normal release sequence in which the parachute opened and the components of the weapon
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By the time of the Goldsboro accident, the MC-722 Arm/Safe switch had been replaced in some Mark 39 Mod 2 units with another switch, the MC-1288 Arm/Safe switch, which also restricted the charging of the low-voltage thermal battery if the switch was in the "Safe" position. This was done to ensure
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Weapon no. 2 (kept in the forward bomb bay) separated from the B-52 later than weapon no. 1, when it was between 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and 2,000 feet (610 m) above the ground. It was discovered about 500 yards (460 m) away from the crew compartment and wing sections of the aircraft
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Parker F. Jones, a supervisor at Sandia, concluded in a reassessment of the accident in 1969 that "one simple, dynamo-technology, low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe" He further suggested that it would be "credible" to imagine that in the process of such an
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off the coast until the majority of fuel was consumed. However, when it reached its assigned position, the pilot reported that the leak had worsened and that 37,000 pounds (17,000 kg) of fuel had been lost in three minutes. The aircraft was immediately directed to return and land at Seymour
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Bill Stevens, a nuclear weapon safety engineer at Sandia, gave the following assessment in an internal documentary film produced by Sandia in 2010: "Some people can say, 'hey, the bomb worked exactly like designed.' Others can say, 'all but one switch operated, and that one switch prevented the
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The pilotless aircraft broke up in the air shortly after the crew ejected. Witnesses reported seeing two flashes of red light, suggesting that fuel explosions contributed to the breakup of the plane. At 12:35 a.m. EST on January 24, the remaining pieces of the B-52 impacted with the ground. The
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After the weapon had fallen a required vertical distance, the differential pressure switch would close contacts which passed battery current through the MC-772 Arm/Safe Switch and from there to the MC-788 High Voltage Safing System, which is armed by continual current being applied to it. Upon
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The ordering of events in some of the documents seems to indicate that the triggering of the boost gas would have been done by a line which was enabled by the arming of the MC-722 Arm/Safe switch. For example, the table included in Speer's observer report, which is ordered to show "subsequent
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A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission noted that after the discovery of the Arm/Safe Switch in the "Armed" position, and the arming rods having been pulled out, he and his colleagues "wondered why bomb No. 2 had been a dud." An immediate analysis showed that the Arm/Safe Switch was
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The two Mark 39 Mod 2 nuclear bombs involved in the Goldsboro crash had distinctly different outcomes. Official reports identified them as weapon no. 1 (or bomb no. 1) and weapon no. 2 (or bomb no. 2), with the first's parachute having deployed and the second having crashed into the ground in
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Another analysis by Sandia engineers in 1961 concluded that while in both weapons the MC-772 Arm/Safe Switch operated "as it was designed to do," the lanyard-controlled safing-pins "cannot be relied upon to prevent initiation of the fuzing sequence" in this kind of accident, and recommended
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Weapon no. 2 had broken into pieces on its impact, and the EOD technicians spent several days attempting to recover its pieces from the deep mud. The "primary" of the weapon was recovered on January 30, six days after the accident, at a depth of some 20 feet (6.1 m) in the mud. Its
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Charlie Burks, another nuclear weapons systems engineer for Sandia, also added: "Unfortunately, there have been thirty-some incidents where the ready/safe switch was operated inadvertently. We're fortunate that the weapons involved at Goldsboro were not suffering from that same malady."
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Later, diggers found the ARM/SAFE switch. It was in the ARM position. Why that bomb didn't explode has been debated for years. Was the ARM/SAFE switch broken? Did the impact of the crash spread out the parts so far they couldn't affect each other? Was the bomb a dud? No one will ever
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At some point in the above sequence, not indicated in declassified documents (possibly because of its classified nature), "squibs" on the Los Alamos Laboratory 1A Valve Mechanism would fire and cause the gas from the boost reservoir to be injected into the "primary" of the bomb.
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thermonuclear weapon. Of note are the "primary" (labeled "A") and the "secondary" (labeled "B") subcomponents. The Mark 39 Mod 2 likely had a very similar basic arrangement, along with a firing set (X-Unit) for injecting gas into the core of the "primary" and detonating
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hit the ground. For Bomb No. 2, because its timer had not run out by the time it impacted the ground, it could not have detonated even if its Arm-Safe Switch had been set to "Arm", as its thermal batteries had not charged, and they would be needed to fire the weapon.
1033:. (Lapp's account also incorrectly states there was a single bomb involved in the accident.) The exact weapon models involved in the accident were classified for many years, as were most details of the accident, leading to many seemingly contradictory accounts.
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additional safety for the weapons, and would remove the need for safing pins in the pullout rods. This modification (designated as Alt 197) had been approved in January 1960, but had not been performed on either of the bombs involved in the Goldsboro accident.
295:. During the hook-up, the tanker crew advised the B-52 aircraft commander, Major Walter Scott Tulloch, that his B-52 had a fuel leak in the right wing. The refueling was aborted, and ground control was notified of the problem. The B-52 was directed to assume a
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in 1962, many sources over the years the claim that the bombs at Goldsboro had yields of 24 megatons. This is now known to not be true. Lapp or his source may have gotten the weapons involved in the accident confused with the 23–25 megaton
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858:, in a Top Secret January 1963 meeting with representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, as well as the White House, used the Goldsboro accident to argue against the delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to
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high-explosives had not detonated, and some had crumbled out of the warhead sphere. By February 16, the excavation had gotten down to 70 feet (21 m), and had not located the "secondary" component of the weapon.
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was injected into its core, which would generate fusion reactions at the moment of detonation, producing neutrons that would increase the efficiency of the "primary". The pit of the primary was entirely composed of
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battery pack, as well as the MC-543 Timer. The timer would begin to count down. The retraction of the arming rods would also close valves sealing a reference chamber in the MC-832 Differential Pressure Switch, a
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The weapon was found in an upright position, with its parachute hanging on adjacent trees, about one mile (1.6 km) behind where the main wreckage of the aircraft impacted. On January 24, the EOD team from
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feet long?" He concluded that "if in the Goldsboro accident had experienced inadvertent operation of its ready-safe switch prior to breakup of the aircraft, a nuclear detonation would have resulted."
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322:(EOD) teams from Seymour Johnson and other bases arrived on the scene quickly, disarming the one bomb that was easily accessible. Representatives from the Albuquerque Operations Office of the
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316:, about 12 miles (19 km) north of Goldsboro. The arrangement of the aircraft pieces suggested that several pieces of the B-52 were upside down when they struck the ground.
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As with weapon no. 1, the tritium reservoir in weapon no. 2 was recovered intact and without any loss of tritium. The MC-788 High Voltage Safety Switch was destroyed on impact.
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A 1969 analysis by Sandia supervisor Parker F. Jones concluded that the Goldsboro accident illustrated that "the Mk 39 Mod 2 bomb did not possess adequate safety for the
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The "normal trajectory sequence" for the use of a Mark 39 Mod 2 nuclear bomb, indicating the arming sequence under normal (non-accident) nuclear weapons use conditions.
1189:, p. 36-37. "Accident #3" on page 36 of the report is clearly (despite redactions) the Goldsboro accident, and associates it with a "Project Coverall operation."
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weapon which initiates the detonation) and the "secondary" (the portion of the weapon that, under the influence of the energy released by the "primary," undergoes a
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The two bombs involved in the Goldsboro accident were Mark 39 Mod 2 thermonuclear weapons with a maximum predicted yield of 3.8 megatons of TNT equivalent. Like all
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implementing a modification to the weapons "as rapidly as possible" that would prevent the fuze power supply from activating except when live release was intended.
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without risk of the weapon breaking on contact with the ground. The weight of the assembled bomb was between 9,000 and 10,000 pounds (4,100 and 4,500 kg).
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The MC-832 Differential Pressure Switch operated as normal, and passed the battery current to the MC-722 Arm/Safe switch. This switch was found by the initial
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1587:, p. 2: "If a short to an 'arm' line occurred in a mid-air breakup, a postulate that seems credible, the Mk 39 Mod 2 could have given a nuclear blast".
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at the time to have been only one safety switch away from detonation, and that it was "credible" to imagine conditions under which it could have detonated.
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still on board, each with yields of 3.8 megatons. Sometime between the crew ejecting and the aircraft crashing, the two bombs separated from the aircraft.
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free-fall without any decrease in its speed. Weapon no. 2 was kept in the forward bomb bay of the aircraft, while weapon no. 1 was in the aft bomb bay.
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1111:. The US Air Force has released no information about other "Broken Arrow" incidents with sealed-pit weapons taking place in Texas prior to 1963.
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The "Official Observer's Report" of the accident summarized the condition of the two weapons' firing systems with the following table:
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An image of the MC-772 Arm/Safe Switch of the same kind used in the Mk 39 Mod 2 nuclear bombs involved in the 1961 Goldsboro accident.
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broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process. The pilot in command, Walter Scott Tulloch, ordered the crew to
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288:), which involved a continuous flow of staggered, nuclear-armed bombers on a "ladder" route into the Canadian Arctic and back.
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1928:"Analysis of the Safety Aspects of the MK 39 MOD 2 Bombs Involved in B52G Crash Near Greensboro, North Carolina (SCDR 81-61)"
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subsequently determined the buried depth of the secondary component to be 180 ± 10 feet (55 ± 3 m).
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the compartment from which the arming rods would be withdrawn. On the nose would be written: "REJECT IF DENTED OR DEFORMED".
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with a Mark 39 Mod 1 (sealed pit) weapon on board crashed and exploded shortly after takeoff (for a training mission) from
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1. Impact occurred so soon after separation of the Bisch rods that the timers were not given an opportunity to run down.
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purchased a 400-foot (120 m) diameter circular easement over the buried second bomb. The site of the easement, at
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The Broken Arrow of Camelot: An Analysis of the 1961 B-52 Crash and Loss of the Nuclear Weapon in Faro, North Carolina
1967:
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personnel work to recover the buried Mk. 39 thermonuclear bomb that fell into a Faro, North Carolina, field in 1961.
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1338:, at 24:30: "And that one safety device was the pre-arming switch which was operated normally by a 28 volt signal."
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replacement (ECP 1185) in 1966, and the B-52 Stability Augmentation and Flight Control program (ECP 1195) in 1967.
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Another document lists the "Reservoir type" of the weapons involved in this accident as "2A-12" and "2A-22755".
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The Guardian Newspaper - Account of hydrogen bomb near-disaster over North Carolina – declassified document
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were alerted to the accident on the morning of January 24. A team of scientists and engineers from the AEC,
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1797:"Non-Time Critical Removal Actions Uranium and Lead Contaminated Soil Report, B-47 Crash Site, Abilene, TX"
954:, 3 miles (4.8 km) north of the crash site, commemorating the crash under the title "Nuclear Mishap".
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1147:"Goldsboro revisited: account of hydrogen bomb near-disaster over North Carolina – declassified document"
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McNamara's reference to a Texas "Broken Arrow" may refer to the November 4, 1958, an accident in which a
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thermonuclear weapons, its warhead consisted of two distinct parts ("stages"), the "primary" (a mostly-
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2014:"Lincoln resident helped disarm hydrogen bomb following B-52 crash in North Carolina 56 years ago"
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aircraft wreckage covered a two-square-mile (5.2 km) area of tobacco and cotton farmland at
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B-52 Stratofortress: The Complete History of the World's Longest Serving and Best Known Bomber
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1968:"Goldsboro Revisited: Or How I Learned to Mistrust the H-Bomb: Or To Set the Record Straight"
1088:
1012:
641:
343:
285:
281:
142:
131:
582:
Air Force personnel working in an underground pit to recover parts of the MK-39 nuclear bomb
3147:
2505:
1907:"Accident Report on B-52G Near Seymour Johnson Air Force Base North Carolina (SCDR 106-61)"
1092:
852:
590:
The battered MC-722 Arm/Safe Switch from Weapon No. 2 in the Goldsboro B-52 accident, 1961.
493:
385:
313:
305:
211:
67:
34:
950:
In July 2012, the State of North Carolina erected a historical road marker in the town of
8:
3230:
2737:
2324:
1930:. Sandia Corporation (via the National Security Archive at George Washington University).
1915:
1909:. Sandia Corporation (via the National Security Archive at George Washington University).
1200:"History of Strategic Air Command July–December 1961 (Historical Study no. 88, Volume I)"
2319:
376:
3360:
2805:
Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States and U.S. territories in the 1960s
2485:
1781:
1361:
855:
402:
368:
2314:
567:
3307:
3289:
3094:
3012:
2465:
2320:
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) show from 2014-07-27 describing the incident
2283:
2262:
2237:
2071:
2018:
291:
Around midnight on 23–24 January 1961, the bomber had a rendezvous with a tanker for
16:
Crash of a United States Air Force bomber carrying nuclear warheads in North Carolina
2525:
2330:
Simulation illustrating the fallout and blast radius had the bomb actually exploded
1100:
1030:
632:
2. The Arm/Safe Switch was in the "Safe" condition as the weapon left the aircraft.
431:
292:
28:
1916:"A Review of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety Program – 1945 to 1986 (SAND86-2955)"
1214:"History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command 1961 (SAC Historical Study no. 89)"
350:
cargo plane, arriving at approximately 10:15 p.m. EST on the night of January 24.
3372:
2415:
2258:
2252:
2231:
2051:
2028:
1814:"Memorandum of Conversation: State-Defense Meeting of Group I, II, and IV Papers"
983:– involved another US military nuclear accident 8 days before the Goldsboro crash
462:
414:
406:
296:
2195:
1937:"Accidents and Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons (DASA Technical Letter 20-3)"
1614:
1602:
586:
3236:
3224:
3188:
2906:
2617:
2535:
2340:
1831:. Sandia National Laboratories (via the National Security Archive). p. 54.
1829:"The Origins and Evolution of SC at Sandia National Laboratories (SAND99-1308)"
1096:
539:
410:
37:
nuclear weapons at Goldsboro, largely intact, with its parachute still attached
1985:
1380:
3415:
1404:
938:, is clearly visible as a circle of trees in the middle of a plowed field on
925:
912:
578:
563:
The "probable trajectory sequence" of Weapon No. 2 in the Goldsboro Accident.
505:
The "probable trajectory sequence" of Weapon No. 1 in the Goldsboro Accident.
215:
96:
83:
2303:
2586:
2001:"Official Observer's Report, Air Force Accident, Goldsboro, North Carolina"
1448:
939:
443:
346:
Nuclear Safety Research Directorate. They flew to Seymour Johnson AFB on a
2347:. National Security Archive, The George Washington University. 9 June 2014
1955:"Narrative Summary of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1996"
1952:
1731:
1641:
1460:
1341:
1986:"Always/Never: The Quest for Safety, Control, and Survivability – Part 2"
393:
3404:
An asterisk (*) denotes an incident that took place in a U.S. territory.
1868:
1794:
1689:
363:
2102:"US nearly detonated atomic bomb over North Carolina – secret document"
1025:
992:
United States military nuclear incident terminology § Broken Arrow
339:
1438:
1436:
1319:
1317:
1315:
1313:
497:
Weapon No. 1 as it was discovered by the EOD team after the accident.
481:
timer circuit completing its countdown and the X-Unit being charged.
435:
422:
417:
reactions). In the case of the Mark 39 Mod 2, the "primary" was also
1553:
1551:
1423:
1421:
1419:
1368:
1285:
1283:
1099:. The high-explosives in the weapon's primary detonated, dispersing
2389:
2196:"A Close Call – Hero of 'The Goldsboro Broken Arrow' speaks at ECU"
2171:"Shaffer: In Eureka, They've Found a Way to Mark 'Nuclear Mishap.'"
1749:
1521:
1504:"The Man Who Disabled Two Hydrogen Bombs Dropped in North Carolina"
884:
879:
1701:
1484:
1433:
1310:
1990:
1713:
1548:
1472:
1416:
1362:"Expedited Procedures in Designing and Producing a Major MOD Kit"
1280:
1276:
AF Form 14 Report of Aircraft Accident (Report). 24 January 1961.
426:
284:'s airborne alert mission known as "Cover All" (a predecessor to
3432:
Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress
2214:
Yancy, N. (26 January 1961). "Life-Death Story of Flight Told".
859:
1269:
1174:"New Declassifications on Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security"
554:
488:
3442:
Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in 1961
1934:
1454:
1186:
899:
Road marker in Eureka, NC, commemorating the 1961 B-52 crash.
2315:
BBC News Article – US plane in 1961 'nuclear bomb near-miss'
1983:
1974:
1620:
1608:
1466:
1410:
1386:
1347:
1335:
421:, meaning that at the moment of detonation a gaseous mix of
1653:
1108:
527:
449:
Immediately after the Goldsboro accident, technicians from
347:
3447:
Aviation accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons
1795:
Sullivan – Arrowhead Federal Services JV (December 2011).
1306:. Vol. V. Chukela Publications. pp. 14, 354–359.
1139:
966:(another B-52/Mk 39 Mod 2 accident, weeks after Goldsboro)
614:"secondary" of the second weapon was never recovered. The
1944:
1835:
1631:
1629:
1568:
1566:
1538:
1536:
1232:
1230:
1228:
1226:
972:(another B-52 nuclear crash, with a different bomb type)
2147:"When two nukes crashed, he got the call (Part 2 of 2)"
1976:
1926:
de Montmollin, J. M.; Hoagland, W. R. (February 1961).
1590:
656:
Table of Component Behavior, Fusing and Firing Systems
621:
An analysis by Sandia in February 1961 concluded that:
1977:"History of the MK 39 weapon (SC-M-67-671/RS 3434/20)"
1626:
1563:
1533:
1129:
1127:
865:
2006:. US Atomic Energy Commission (via Government Attic).
1925:
1755:
1707:
1647:
1527:
1490:
1442:
1374:
1323:
1223:
3457:
Nuclear accidents and incidents in the United States
2341:"New Details on the 1961 Goldsboro Nuclear Accident"
1677:
1392:
1960:. U.S. Department of Energy (via Government Attic).
1953:Department of Defense/Department of Energy (1996).
1883:
1124:
3437:Aviation accidents and incidents in North Carolina
1761:
1665:
2325:The Night Hydrogen Bombs Fell over North Carolina
3413:
1779:
1242:
2070:. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History.
1898:
1732:Department of Defense/Department of Energy 1996
1263:Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation
883:1050. This was followed by a fuselage skin and
342:. They were joined by representatives from the
1935:Defense Atomic Support Agency (1 March 1966).
1024:Following an early account of the accident by
874:
358:
2790:
2375:
1975:Sandia National Laboratories (January 1968).
1816:. National Security Archive. 26 January 1963.
1065:In another B-52 crash a few weeks later, in
1855:Deed Book 581, Wayne County (NC) Courthouse
987:Special Weapons Emergency Separation System
616:University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
555:Weapon No. 2: Serial No. 359943 (free-fall)
489:Weapon No. 1: Serial No. 434909 (parachute)
253:
2797:
2783:
2382:
2368:
2099:
1061:
1059:
27:
2335:Audio interview with response team leader
1904:
1659:
1635:
1572:
1542:
1359:
1236:
3452:January 1961 events in the United States
3260:Braniff International Airways Flight 352
3160:Braniff International Airways Flight 250
2426:RAF Lakenheath nuclear weapons accidents
2119:
2011:
1970:. Sandia Corporation (via the Guardian).
1683:
1133:
894:
585:
577:
566:
558:
500:
492:
392:
384:
375:
362:
3343:Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 933
2304:C-SPAN Video book Goldsboro Brokenarrow
2168:
2026:
1889:
1826:
1056:
203:, United States, on 24 January 1961. A
3414:
2250:
2233:US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History
2229:
2193:
2144:
2060:
1962:(report begins on page 359 of the PDF)
1913:
1841:
1827:Stevens, William L. (September 2001).
1671:
1596:
1398:
1301:
413:reaction and also produces additional
237:
2954:Canadian Pacific Air Lines Flight 301
2836:Chicago Helicopter Airways Flight 698
2778:
2363:
2275:
2213:
2049:
2008:(report begins on page 81 of the PDF)
1998:
1984:Sandia National Laboratories (2010).
1965:
1767:
1743:
1719:
1695:
1584:
1557:
1478:
1427:
1289:
1248:
981:RAF Lakenheath near nuclear disasters
905:United States Army Corps of Engineers
530:jet fuel was found in the bomb case.
3355:Hawthorne Nevada Airlines Flight 708
3296:Wien Consolidated Airlines Flight 55
3154:American Flyers Airline Flight 280/D
3001:Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 293
2989:Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 705
2913:Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 706
2830:Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 710
2658:Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 706
2126:This Month in North Carolina History
2100:Pilkington, Ed (20 September 2013).
2064:Post-World War II Bombers, 1945–1973
1966:Jones, Parker F. (22 October 1969).
1364:. Sandia National Lab (DOE OpenNet).
1360:Carpenter, C.L. (18 February 1960).
1260:
1171:
276:The aircraft, a B-52G, was based at
2151:Orange County Register (California)
2056:(Thesis). East Carolina University.
1999:Speer, Ross B. (28 February 1961).
1780:Mound Laboratory (1 January 1964).
866:Consequences to Mark 39 bomb design
465:for detecting the bomb's altitude.
199:was an accident that occurred near
13:
2223:
2145:Sharon, Keith (27 December 2012).
2120:Sedgwick, Jessica (January 2008).
1455:Defense Atomic Support Agency 1966
1187:Defense Atomic Support Agency 1966
1172:Burr, William (18 November 2022).
976:List of military nuclear accidents
14:
3478:
3320:North Central Airlines Flight 458
2297:
1905:Bickelman, H.D. (February 1961).
1756:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1708:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1648:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1621:Sandia National Laboratories 2010
1609:Sandia National Laboratories 2010
1528:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1491:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1467:Sandia National Laboratories 1968
1443:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1411:Sandia National Laboratories 1968
1387:Sandia National Laboratories 1968
1375:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
1348:Sandia National Laboratories 1968
1336:Sandia National Laboratories 2010
1324:de Montmollin & Hoagland 1961
626:was prevented by several things:
74:, 12 miles (19 km) north of
3183:Lake Central Airlines Flight 527
2718:Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 322
2566:Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 644
2392:Aviation accidents and incidents
1219:. 1962. pp. 60–61, 180–181.
647:
252:
236:
229:
2194:Tuttle, Steve (27 March 2013).
2012:Atchison, David (2 July 2017).
1921:. Sandia National Laboratories.
1871:. Ibiblio.org. 18 November 2000
1861:
1847:
1820:
1806:
1788:
1773:
1496:
1353:
1329:
1304:Swords of Armageddon, version 2
1295:
1254:
1081:
1072:
1046:
1036:
1018:
970:1964 Savage Mountain B-52 crash
523:Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
3272:Los Angeles Airways Flight 417
3266:Los Angeles Airways Flight 841
3195:West Coast Airlines Flight 720
3166:West Coast Airlines Flight 956
3101:Continental Airlines Flight 12
2948:Continental Airlines Flight 11
2919:Imperial Airlines Flight 201/8
2698:Imperial Airlines Flight 201/8
2608:Holtaheia Vickers Viking crash
2061:Knaack, Marcelle Size (1988).
2029:"The Pentagon's Broken Arrows"
1914:Brodie, R.N. (February 1987).
1206:
1192:
1180:
1165:
1004:
945:
332:Los Alamos National Laboratory
280:in Goldsboro, and part of the
278:Seymour Johnson Air Force Base
165:Seymour Johnson Air Force Base
156:Seymour Johnson Air Force Base
1:
3385:Allegheny Airlines Flight 853
3337:Allegheny Airlines Flight 737
3302:Allegheny Airlines Flight 736
3278:Northeast Airlines Flight 946
3107:Allegheny Airlines Flight 604
3042:Paradise Airlines Flight 901A
2883:American Airlines Flight 1502
2818:National Airlines Flight 2511
2628:President Airlines DC-6 crash
2446:American Airlines Flight 1502
2169:Shaffer, Josh (2 July 2012).
733:Differential Pressure Switch
324:U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
3467:Wayne County, North Carolina
3219:Lake Erie skydiving disaster
3119:American Airlines Flight 383
3089:Eastern Air Lines Flight 663
3066:Flying Tiger Line Flight 282
3060:Bonanza Air Lines Flight 114
3048:Pacific Air Lines Flight 773
3036:Eastern Air Lines Flight 304
2966:Eastern Air Lines Flight 512
2925:Cincinnati Zantop DC-4 crash
2848:Eastern Air Lines Flight 375
2708:Cincinnati Zantop DC-4 crash
2216:Greensboro News & Record
2027:Hanauer, Gary (April 1981).
1899:General and cited references
1176:. National Security Archive.
1118:
789:High Voltage Thermal Battery
451:Sandia National Laboratories
328:Sandia National Laboratories
7:
3349:United Air Lines Flight 266
3213:Piedmont Airlines Flight 22
3201:Delta Air Lines Flight 9877
3125:United Air Lines Flight 227
3113:United Air Lines Flight 389
3054:United Air Lines Flight 823
2960:United Air Lines Flight 297
2895:United Air Lines Flight 859
2748:Mineralnye Vody Il-18 crash
2678:Turkish Airlines Flight 835
2648:F-84 Thunderstreak incident
2546:United Air Lines Flight 859
2456:Garuda Indonesia Flight 542
1265:. Basic Books. p. 127.
957:
890:
875:Consequences to B-52 design
747:Low Voltage Thermal Battery
515:explosive ordnance disposal
359:Mark 39 Mod 2 nuclear bombs
320:Explosive ordnance disposal
306:Mark 39 thermonuclear bombs
222:
10:
3483:
3391:Mohawk Airlines Flight 411
3367:Delta Air Lines Flight 821
3314:Ozark Air Lines Flight 982
3254:Ozark Air Lines Flight 965
3030:Savage Mountain B-52 crash
3007:Mohawk Airlines Flight 112
2942:American Airlines Flight 1
2901:Alaska Airlines Flight 779
2860:New York mid-air collision
2824:Capital Airlines Flight 20
2668:Transair Sweden DC-6 crash
2576:Alaska Airlines Flight 779
2254:The Goldsboro Broken Arrow
1782:"Weapon Systems Accidents"
1698:, pp. 5–6 (PDF pp. 86–87).
526:Approximately one pint of
353:
205:Boeing B-52 Stratofortress
3400:
3329:
3246:
3207:Mohawk Airlines Flight 40
3175:
3140:
3075:
3022:
2975:
2934:
2869:
2810:
2757:
2407:
2236:. Aerofax, Incorporated.
964:1961 Yuba City B-52 crash
847:
434:("all-oralloy"), with no
201:Goldsboro, North Carolina
197:1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash
185:
177:
169:
161:
151:
141:
127:
117:
112:
97:35.4928417°N 77.8587194°W
76:Goldsboro, North Carolina
63:
55:
47:
42:
26:
22:1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash
3422:1961 in military history
3402:This list is incomplete.
3284:Japan Air Lines Flight 2
3131:Carmel mid-air collision
2842:World Airways Flight 830
2200:East Carolina University
997:
300:Johnson Air Force Base.
3379:Newton Cessna 172 crash
1869:"Davis Family Easement"
1857:. 1962. pp. 89–91.
1202:. 1962. pp. 79–82.
1105:highly enriched uranium
547:nuclear detonation.'"
336:Kirtland Air Force Base
136:United States Air Force
102:35.4928417; -77.8587194
3427:1961 in North Carolina
2983:Elephant Mountain B-52
2854:Cal Poly football team
2638:Air France Flight 2005
2230:Hansen, Chuck (1988).
2122:"Bombs Over Goldsboro"
1302:Hansen, Chuck (2007).
900:
634:
591:
583:
575:
564:
506:
498:
398:
390:
382:
373:
3462:Nuclear weapon safety
2728:Ansett-ANA Flight 325
2516:Air France Flight 406
2251:Dobson, Joel (2011).
2050:Hardy, Scott (2005).
2034:Mother Jones Magazine
1650:, pp. 11, 14–15.
926:35.49278°N 77.85861°W
898:
803:Rotary Safing Switch
623:
589:
581:
570:
562:
504:
496:
396:
388:
379:
367:A basic diagram of a
366:
344:Department of Defense
286:Operation Chrome Dome
282:Strategic Air Command
212:Mark 39 nuclear bombs
132:Strategic Air Command
2889:Yuba City B-52 crash
2877:Goldsboro B-52 crash
2688:Derby Aviation crash
2506:LAN-Chile Flight 621
2476:Yuba City B-52 crash
2436:Goldsboro B-52 crash
2276:Yenne, Bill (2012).
1261:Lapp, Ralph (1992).
1093:Dyess Air Force Base
853:Secretary of Defense
268:class=notpageimage|
70:, Nahunta Township,
3231:X-15 Flight 3-65-97
3083:USAF KC-135 Wichita
2915:(September 17 1961)
2766:► 1962
2760:1960 ◄
2738:Aeroflot Flight 245
2132:on 28 December 2011
2087:on 27 November 2011
1844:, pp. 276–277.
1722:, p. 4 (PDF p. 85).
1560:, p. 3 (PDF p. 84).
1481:, p. 1 (PDF p. 82).
1430:, p. i (PDF p. 81).
1292:, p. 2 (PDF p. 83).
1153:. 20 September 2013
931:35.49278; -77.85861
922: /
736:All contacts closed
657:
642:airborne alert role
260:Seymour Johnson AFB
93: /
23:
3361:Prinair Flight 277
3322:(December 27 1968)
3316:(December 27 1968)
3310:(December 26 1968)
3304:(December 24 1968)
3292:(November 24 1968)
3286:(November 22 1968)
3239:(November 20 1967)
3233:(November 15 1967)
3127:(November 11 1965)
2968:(November 30 1962)
2962:(November 23 1962)
2927:(November 14 1961)
2909:(September 1 1961)
2763:
2486:Aeroflot Flight 68
2345:nsarchive2.gwu.edu
2282:. Zenith Imprint.
1662:, pp. 1, 3–4.
901:
856:Robert S. McNamara
739:2 contacts closed
722:Run down (42 sec.)
705:Explosive Actuator
655:
592:
584:
576:
565:
507:
499:
403:Teller-Ulam design
399:
391:
383:
374:
369:Teller-Ulam design
118:Aircraft type
59:Structural failure
21:
3409:
3408:
3351:(January 18 1969)
3345:(January 13 1969)
3308:Pan Am Flight 799
3298:(December 2 1968)
3290:Pan Am Flight 281
3227:(November 6 1967)
3121:(November 8 1965)
3095:Pan Am Flight 843
3013:Pan Am Flight 214
2921:(November 8 1961)
2885:(January 28 1961)
2879:(January 24 1961)
2856:(October 29 1960)
2844:(September 1960)*
2826:(January 18 1960)
2772:
2771:
2466:Sabena Flight 548
2175:News and Observer
2019:The Anniston Star
1599:, pp. 15–16.
1413:, pp. 18–19.
1389:, p. 11, 18.
841:
840:
775:Tritium Reservoir
725:Run (12-15 sec.)
207:carrying two 3.8-
193:
192:
3474:
3387:(September 1969)
3339:(January 6 1969)
2850:(October 4 1960)
2820:(January 6 1960)
2799:
2792:
2785:
2776:
2775:
2764:
2598:Malév C-47 crash
2526:Viasa Flight 897
2402:
2401:
2399:
2384:
2377:
2370:
2361:
2360:
2356:
2354:
2352:
2293:
2272:
2247:
2219:
2210:
2208:
2206:
2190:
2188:
2186:
2177:. Archived from
2165:
2159:
2157:
2141:
2139:
2137:
2128:. Archived from
2116:
2114:
2112:
2096:
2094:
2092:
2086:
2080:. Archived from
2069:
2057:
2046:
2044:
2042:
2023:
2007:
2005:
1995:
1980:
1971:
1961:
1959:
1949:
1941:
1931:
1922:
1920:
1910:
1893:
1887:
1881:
1880:
1878:
1876:
1865:
1859:
1858:
1851:
1845:
1839:
1833:
1832:
1824:
1818:
1817:
1810:
1804:
1803:
1801:
1792:
1786:
1785:
1777:
1771:
1765:
1759:
1753:
1747:
1741:
1735:
1729:
1723:
1717:
1711:
1705:
1699:
1693:
1687:
1681:
1675:
1669:
1663:
1657:
1651:
1645:
1639:
1633:
1624:
1618:
1612:
1606:
1600:
1594:
1588:
1582:
1576:
1570:
1561:
1555:
1546:
1540:
1531:
1525:
1519:
1518:
1516:
1514:
1500:
1494:
1488:
1482:
1476:
1470:
1464:
1458:
1452:
1446:
1440:
1431:
1425:
1414:
1408:
1402:
1396:
1390:
1384:
1378:
1372:
1366:
1365:
1357:
1351:
1345:
1339:
1333:
1327:
1321:
1308:
1307:
1299:
1293:
1287:
1278:
1277:
1273:
1267:
1266:
1258:
1252:
1246:
1240:
1234:
1221:
1220:
1218:
1210:
1204:
1203:
1196:
1190:
1184:
1178:
1177:
1169:
1163:
1162:
1160:
1158:
1143:
1137:
1131:
1112:
1101:depleted uranium
1085:
1079:
1076:
1070:
1063:
1054:
1050:
1044:
1040:
1034:
1031:B41 nuclear bomb
1022:
1016:
1008:
937:
936:
934:
933:
932:
927:
923:
920:
919:
918:
915:
691:Pulse Generator
658:
654:
432:enriched uranium
293:aerial refueling
256:
255:
246:
240:
239:
233:
108:
107:
105:
104:
103:
98:
94:
91:
90:
89:
86:
31:
24:
20:
3482:
3481:
3477:
3476:
3475:
3473:
3472:
3471:
3412:
3411:
3410:
3405:
3403:
3396:
3393:(November 1969)
3373:TWA Flight 5787
3369:(March 25 1969)
3363:(March 5 1969)*
3357:(February 1969)
3325:
3242:
3203:(March 30 1967)
3197:(March 10 1967)
3171:
3150:(February 1966)
3148:NASA T-38 crash
3136:
3133:(December 1965)
3091:(February 1965)
3071:
3068:(December 1964)
3062:(November 1964)
3038:(February 1964)
3018:
3015:(December 1963)
2991:(February 1963)
2971:
2930:
2865:
2862:(December 1960)
2806:
2803:
2773:
2768:
2762:
2753:
2752:
2751:
2750:
2745:
2741:
2740:
2735:
2731:
2730:
2725:
2721:
2720:
2715:
2711:
2710:
2705:
2701:
2700:
2695:
2691:
2690:
2685:
2681:
2680:
2675:
2671:
2670:
2665:
2661:
2660:
2655:
2651:
2650:
2645:
2641:
2640:
2635:
2631:
2630:
2625:
2621:
2620:
2615:
2611:
2610:
2605:
2601:
2600:
2595:
2591:
2590:
2583:
2579:
2578:
2573:
2569:
2568:
2563:
2559:
2558:
2553:
2549:
2548:
2543:
2539:
2538:
2533:
2529:
2528:
2523:
2519:
2518:
2513:
2509:
2508:
2503:
2499:
2498:
2493:
2489:
2488:
2483:
2479:
2478:
2473:
2469:
2468:
2463:
2459:
2458:
2453:
2449:
2448:
2443:
2439:
2438:
2433:
2429:
2428:
2423:
2419:
2418:
2416:Aero Flight 311
2413:
2403:
2397:
2395:
2390:
2388:
2350:
2348:
2339:
2300:
2290:
2269:
2244:
2226:
2224:Further reading
2204:
2202:
2184:
2182:
2155:
2153:
2135:
2133:
2110:
2108:
2090:
2088:
2084:
2078:
2067:
2040:
2038:
2003:
1957:
1939:
1918:
1901:
1896:
1888:
1884:
1874:
1872:
1867:
1866:
1862:
1853:
1852:
1848:
1840:
1836:
1825:
1821:
1812:
1811:
1807:
1799:
1793:
1789:
1778:
1774:
1766:
1762:
1754:
1750:
1742:
1738:
1730:
1726:
1718:
1714:
1706:
1702:
1694:
1690:
1682:
1678:
1670:
1666:
1658:
1654:
1646:
1642:
1634:
1627:
1619:
1615:
1607:
1603:
1595:
1591:
1583:
1579:
1571:
1564:
1556:
1549:
1541:
1534:
1526:
1522:
1512:
1510:
1502:
1501:
1497:
1489:
1485:
1477:
1473:
1465:
1461:
1453:
1449:
1441:
1434:
1426:
1417:
1409:
1405:
1397:
1393:
1385:
1381:
1377:, pp. 8–9.
1373:
1369:
1358:
1354:
1346:
1342:
1334:
1330:
1322:
1311:
1300:
1296:
1288:
1281:
1275:
1274:
1270:
1259:
1255:
1247:
1243:
1235:
1224:
1216:
1212:
1211:
1207:
1198:
1197:
1193:
1185:
1181:
1170:
1166:
1156:
1154:
1145:
1144:
1140:
1132:
1125:
1121:
1116:
1115:
1086:
1082:
1077:
1073:
1064:
1057:
1051:
1047:
1041:
1037:
1023:
1019:
1009:
1005:
1000:
960:
948:
930:
928:
924:
921:
916:
913:
911:
909:
908:
893:
877:
868:
850:
761:Arm-Safe Switch
650:
557:
491:
463:barometric fuze
415:nuclear fission
361:
356:
297:holding pattern
274:
273:
272:
270:
264:
263:
262:
261:
257:
249:
248:
247:
244:
241:
225:
101:
99:
95:
92:
87:
84:
82:
80:
79:
78:
51:24 January 1961
38:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3480:
3470:
3469:
3464:
3459:
3454:
3449:
3444:
3439:
3434:
3429:
3424:
3407:
3406:
3401:
3398:
3397:
3395:
3394:
3388:
3382:
3376:
3370:
3364:
3358:
3352:
3346:
3340:
3333:
3331:
3327:
3326:
3324:
3323:
3317:
3311:
3305:
3299:
3293:
3287:
3281:
3280:(October 1968)
3275:
3269:
3263:
3257:
3250:
3248:
3244:
3243:
3241:
3240:
3237:TWA Flight 128
3234:
3228:
3225:TWA Flight 159
3222:
3216:
3210:
3204:
3198:
3192:
3191:(March 9 1967)
3189:TWA Flight 553
3186:
3185:(March 5 1967)
3179:
3177:
3173:
3172:
3170:
3169:
3168:(October 1966)
3163:
3157:
3151:
3144:
3142:
3138:
3137:
3135:
3134:
3128:
3122:
3116:
3110:
3109:(July 23 1965)
3104:
3098:
3092:
3086:
3085:(January 1965)
3079:
3077:
3073:
3072:
3070:
3069:
3063:
3057:
3051:
3045:
3039:
3033:
3032:(January 1964)
3026:
3024:
3020:
3019:
3017:
3016:
3010:
3004:
2998:
2992:
2986:
2985:(January 1963)
2979:
2977:
2973:
2972:
2970:
2969:
2963:
2957:
2951:
2945:
2938:
2936:
2932:
2931:
2929:
2928:
2922:
2916:
2910:
2907:TWA Flight 529
2904:
2903:(July 21 1961)
2898:
2897:(July 11 1961)
2892:
2886:
2880:
2873:
2871:
2867:
2866:
2864:
2863:
2857:
2851:
2845:
2839:
2833:
2827:
2821:
2814:
2812:
2808:
2807:
2802:
2801:
2794:
2787:
2779:
2770:
2769:
2758:
2755:
2754:
2746:
2743:
2742:
2736:
2733:
2732:
2726:
2723:
2722:
2716:
2713:
2712:
2706:
2703:
2702:
2696:
2693:
2692:
2686:
2683:
2682:
2676:
2673:
2672:
2666:
2663:
2662:
2656:
2653:
2652:
2646:
2643:
2642:
2636:
2633:
2632:
2626:
2623:
2622:
2618:TWA Flight 529
2616:
2613:
2612:
2606:
2603:
2602:
2596:
2593:
2592:
2584:
2581:
2580:
2574:
2571:
2570:
2564:
2561:
2560:
2556:ČSA Flight 511
2554:
2551:
2550:
2544:
2541:
2540:
2536:KLM Flight 823
2534:
2531:
2530:
2524:
2521:
2520:
2514:
2511:
2510:
2504:
2501:
2500:
2496:ČSA Flight 511
2494:
2491:
2490:
2484:
2481:
2480:
2474:
2471:
2470:
2464:
2461:
2460:
2454:
2451:
2450:
2444:
2441:
2440:
2434:
2431:
2430:
2424:
2421:
2420:
2414:
2411:
2410:
2409:
2408:
2405:
2404:
2387:
2386:
2379:
2372:
2364:
2358:
2357:
2337:
2332:
2327:
2322:
2317:
2312:
2306:
2299:
2298:External links
2296:
2295:
2294:
2289:978-1610586726
2288:
2273:
2268:978-1257869527
2267:
2259:self published
2257:. Lulu Press (
2248:
2242:
2225:
2222:
2221:
2220:
2211:
2191:
2181:on 4 July 2012
2166:
2142:
2117:
2097:
2077:978-0160022609
2076:
2058:
2047:
2024:
2009:
1996:
1981:
1972:
1963:
1950:
1932:
1923:
1911:
1900:
1897:
1895:
1894:
1882:
1860:
1846:
1834:
1819:
1805:
1787:
1784:. DOE OpenNet.
1772:
1760:
1748:
1736:
1734:, PDF p. 389).
1724:
1712:
1700:
1688:
1676:
1664:
1660:Bickelman 1961
1652:
1640:
1636:Bickelman 1961
1625:
1613:
1601:
1589:
1577:
1573:Bickelman 1961
1562:
1547:
1543:Bickelman 1961
1532:
1520:
1508:storycorps.org
1495:
1483:
1471:
1459:
1447:
1432:
1415:
1403:
1391:
1379:
1367:
1352:
1340:
1328:
1309:
1294:
1279:
1268:
1253:
1241:
1237:Bickelman 1961
1222:
1205:
1191:
1179:
1164:
1138:
1122:
1120:
1117:
1114:
1113:
1097:Abilene, Texas
1080:
1071:
1055:
1045:
1035:
1017:
1002:
1001:
999:
996:
995:
994:
989:
984:
978:
973:
967:
959:
956:
947:
944:
892:
889:
876:
873:
867:
864:
849:
846:
839:
838:
835:
832:
831:Nose crystals
829:
825:
824:
821:
818:
815:
811:
810:
807:
804:
801:
797:
796:
793:
790:
787:
783:
782:
779:
776:
773:
769:
768:
765:
762:
759:
755:
754:
751:
748:
745:
741:
740:
737:
734:
731:
727:
726:
723:
720:
717:
713:
712:
709:
706:
703:
699:
698:
695:
692:
689:
685:
684:
681:
678:
675:
672:
671:
670:Bomb #359943
668:
665:
662:
649:
646:
644:in the B-52."
556:
553:
540:direct current
490:
487:
411:nuclear fusion
360:
357:
355:
352:
271:North Carolina
266:
265:
259:
258:
251:
250:
245:Accident scene
243:
242:
235:
234:
228:
227:
226:
224:
221:
191:
190:
187:
183:
182:
179:
175:
174:
171:
167:
166:
163:
159:
158:
153:
149:
148:
145:
139:
138:
129:
125:
124:
119:
115:
114:
110:
109:
65:
61:
60:
57:
53:
52:
49:
45:
44:
40:
39:
32:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3479:
3468:
3465:
3463:
3460:
3458:
3455:
3453:
3450:
3448:
3445:
3443:
3440:
3438:
3435:
3433:
3430:
3428:
3425:
3423:
3420:
3419:
3417:
3399:
3392:
3389:
3386:
3383:
3381:(August 1969)
3380:
3377:
3374:
3371:
3368:
3365:
3362:
3359:
3356:
3353:
3350:
3347:
3344:
3341:
3338:
3335:
3334:
3332:
3328:
3321:
3318:
3315:
3312:
3309:
3306:
3303:
3300:
3297:
3294:
3291:
3288:
3285:
3282:
3279:
3276:
3274:(August 1968)
3273:
3270:
3268:(May 22 1968)
3267:
3264:
3261:
3258:
3255:
3252:
3251:
3249:
3245:
3238:
3235:
3232:
3229:
3226:
3223:
3221:(August 1967)
3220:
3217:
3214:
3211:
3208:
3205:
3202:
3199:
3196:
3193:
3190:
3187:
3184:
3181:
3180:
3178:
3174:
3167:
3164:
3162:(August 1966)
3161:
3158:
3155:
3152:
3149:
3146:
3145:
3143:
3139:
3132:
3129:
3126:
3123:
3120:
3117:
3115:(August 1965)
3114:
3111:
3108:
3105:
3103:(July 1 1965)
3102:
3099:
3096:
3093:
3090:
3087:
3084:
3081:
3080:
3078:
3074:
3067:
3064:
3061:
3058:
3055:
3052:
3049:
3046:
3043:
3040:
3037:
3034:
3031:
3028:
3027:
3025:
3021:
3014:
3011:
3008:
3005:
3002:
2999:
2996:
2993:
2990:
2987:
2984:
2981:
2980:
2978:
2974:
2967:
2964:
2961:
2958:
2955:
2952:
2949:
2946:
2943:
2940:
2939:
2937:
2933:
2926:
2923:
2920:
2917:
2914:
2911:
2908:
2905:
2902:
2899:
2896:
2893:
2890:
2887:
2884:
2881:
2878:
2875:
2874:
2872:
2868:
2861:
2858:
2855:
2852:
2849:
2846:
2843:
2840:
2837:
2834:
2831:
2828:
2825:
2822:
2819:
2816:
2815:
2813:
2809:
2800:
2795:
2793:
2788:
2786:
2781:
2780:
2777:
2767:
2761:
2756:
2749:
2739:
2729:
2719:
2709:
2699:
2689:
2679:
2669:
2659:
2649:
2639:
2629:
2619:
2609:
2599:
2589:
2588:
2577:
2567:
2557:
2547:
2537:
2527:
2517:
2507:
2497:
2487:
2477:
2467:
2457:
2447:
2437:
2427:
2417:
2406:
2393:
2385:
2380:
2378:
2373:
2371:
2366:
2365:
2362:
2346:
2342:
2338:
2336:
2333:
2331:
2328:
2326:
2323:
2321:
2318:
2316:
2313:
2310:
2307:
2305:
2302:
2301:
2291:
2285:
2281:
2280:
2274:
2270:
2264:
2260:
2256:
2255:
2249:
2245:
2239:
2235:
2234:
2228:
2227:
2217:
2212:
2201:
2197:
2192:
2180:
2176:
2172:
2167:
2164:
2152:
2148:
2143:
2131:
2127:
2123:
2118:
2107:
2103:
2098:
2083:
2079:
2073:
2066:
2065:
2059:
2055:
2054:
2048:
2036:
2035:
2030:
2025:
2021:
2020:
2015:
2010:
2002:
1997:
1993:
1992:
1987:
1982:
1978:
1973:
1969:
1964:
1956:
1951:
1947:
1946:
1938:
1933:
1929:
1924:
1917:
1912:
1908:
1903:
1902:
1891:
1886:
1870:
1864:
1856:
1850:
1843:
1838:
1830:
1823:
1815:
1809:
1798:
1791:
1783:
1776:
1769:
1764:
1758:, p. 19.
1757:
1752:
1745:
1740:
1733:
1728:
1721:
1716:
1709:
1704:
1697:
1692:
1685:
1684:Atchison 2017
1680:
1673:
1668:
1661:
1656:
1649:
1644:
1637:
1632:
1630:
1622:
1617:
1610:
1605:
1598:
1593:
1586:
1581:
1574:
1569:
1567:
1559:
1554:
1552:
1544:
1539:
1537:
1530:, p. 10.
1529:
1524:
1509:
1505:
1499:
1492:
1487:
1480:
1475:
1469:, p. 19.
1468:
1463:
1457:, p. 41.
1456:
1451:
1444:
1439:
1437:
1429:
1424:
1422:
1420:
1412:
1407:
1401:, p. 10.
1400:
1395:
1388:
1383:
1376:
1371:
1363:
1356:
1350:, p. 18.
1349:
1344:
1337:
1332:
1325:
1320:
1318:
1316:
1314:
1305:
1298:
1291:
1286:
1284:
1272:
1264:
1257:
1250:
1245:
1238:
1233:
1231:
1229:
1227:
1215:
1209:
1201:
1195:
1188:
1183:
1175:
1168:
1152:
1151:Guardian News
1148:
1142:
1135:
1134:Sedgwick 2008
1130:
1128:
1123:
1110:
1106:
1102:
1098:
1094:
1090:
1084:
1075:
1068:
1062:
1060:
1049:
1039:
1032:
1027:
1021:
1014:
1007:
1003:
993:
990:
988:
985:
982:
979:
977:
974:
971:
968:
965:
962:
961:
955:
953:
943:
941:
935:
906:
903:In 1962, The
897:
888:
886:
881:
872:
863:
861:
857:
854:
845:
836:
833:
830:
827:
826:
822:
819:
816:
813:
812:
808:
805:
802:
799:
798:
795:Not actuated
794:
791:
788:
785:
784:
780:
777:
774:
771:
770:
766:
763:
760:
757:
756:
752:
749:
746:
743:
742:
738:
735:
732:
729:
728:
724:
721:
718:
715:
714:
710:
707:
704:
701:
700:
696:
693:
690:
687:
686:
682:
679:
677:Arming Wires
676:
674:
673:
669:
667:Bomb #434909
666:
663:
660:
659:
653:
648:Summary table
645:
643:
638:
633:
630:
627:
622:
619:
617:
611:
607:
604:
600:
596:
588:
580:
573:
569:
561:
552:
548:
544:
541:
535:
531:
529:
524:
518:
516:
511:
503:
495:
486:
482:
478:
474:
470:
466:
464:
458:
454:
452:
447:
445:
441:
437:
433:
428:
424:
420:
416:
412:
408:
404:
395:
387:
378:
370:
365:
351:
349:
345:
341:
337:
334:assembled at
333:
329:
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321:
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210:
206:
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198:
188:
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180:
176:
172:
168:
164:
160:
157:
154:
152:Flight origin
150:
146:
144:
140:
137:
133:
130:
126:
123:
120:
116:
111:
106:
88:77°51′31.39″W
85:35°29′34.23″N
77:
73:
69:
66:
62:
58:
54:
50:
46:
41:
36:
30:
25:
19:
3262:(May 3 1968)
3256:(March 1968)
3156:(April 1966)
3044:(March 1964)
2997:(March 1963)
2995:Camden PA-24
2944:(March 1962)
2891:(March 1961)
2876:
2832:(March 1960)
2587:Avion Pirata
2585:
2435:
2349:. Retrieved
2344:
2278:
2253:
2232:
2215:
2203:. Retrieved
2199:
2183:. Retrieved
2179:the original
2174:
2161:
2156:21 September
2154:. Retrieved
2150:
2134:. Retrieved
2130:the original
2125:
2111:20 September
2109:. Retrieved
2106:The Guardian
2105:
2091:25 September
2089:. Retrieved
2082:the original
2063:
2052:
2039:. Retrieved
2032:
2017:
1989:
1943:
1890:Shaffer 2012
1885:
1875:12 September
1873:. Retrieved
1863:
1854:
1849:
1837:
1822:
1808:
1790:
1775:
1770:, p. 2.
1763:
1751:
1739:
1727:
1715:
1710:, p. 4.
1703:
1691:
1679:
1667:
1655:
1643:
1638:, p. 6.
1616:
1604:
1592:
1580:
1575:, p. 8.
1545:, p. 5.
1523:
1511:. Retrieved
1507:
1498:
1493:, p. 5.
1486:
1474:
1462:
1450:
1445:, p. 9.
1406:
1394:
1382:
1370:
1355:
1343:
1331:
1326:, p. 6.
1303:
1297:
1271:
1262:
1256:
1244:
1239:, p. 3.
1208:
1194:
1182:
1167:
1155:. Retrieved
1150:
1141:
1083:
1074:
1048:
1038:
1020:
1006:
949:
940:Google Earth
902:
878:
869:
851:
842:
823:Not charged
806:Not operated
651:
639:
635:
631:
628:
624:
620:
612:
608:
605:
601:
597:
593:
549:
545:
536:
532:
519:
512:
508:
483:
479:
475:
471:
467:
459:
455:
448:
444:contact fuze
438:, and was a
400:
318:
310:
302:
290:
275:
196:
194:
143:Registration
72:Wayne County
18:
3375:(July 1969)
3215:(July 1967)
3209:(June 1967)
3097:(June 1965)
3056:(July 1964)
3009:(July 1963)
3003:(June 1963)
2956:(July 1962)
2838:(July 1960)
1842:Knaack 1988
1746:, p. .
1672:Tuttle 2013
1623:, at 24:51.
1611:, at 24:38.
1597:Brodie 1987
1399:Brodie 1987
1013:Chrome Dome
946:Road marker
929: /
820:Not charged
162:Destination
100: /
33:One of the
3416:Categories
3050:(May 1964)
2950:(May 1962)
2351:11 January
2243:0517567407
2205:24 January
2136:24 January
1768:Jones 1969
1744:Hardy 2005
1720:Speer 1961
1696:Speer 1961
1585:Jones 1969
1558:Speer 1961
1513:8 November
1479:Speer 1961
1428:Speer 1961
1290:Speer 1961
1249:Yancy 1961
1026:Ralph Lapp
917:77°51′31″W
914:35°29′34″N
809:Destroyed
440:sealed-pit
340:New Mexico
178:Fatalities
1119:Citations
1067:Yuba City
880:Wet wings
753:Actuated
697:Actuated
664:Component
436:plutonium
423:deuterium
186:Survivors
958:See also
891:Easement
885:longeron
837:Crushed
792:Actuated
750:Actuated
694:Actuated
661:Part No.
223:Accident
128:Operator
113:Aircraft
43:Accident
2396: (
2394:in 1961
2041:13 July
1991:YouTube
1157:21 June
1095:, near
834:Crushed
817:X-Unit
683:Pulled
427:tritium
419:boosted
407:fission
354:Weapons
209:megaton
147:58-0187
56:Summary
2744:Dec 31
2734:Dec 17
2724:Nov 30
2714:Nov 23
2704:Nov 14
2674:Sep 23
2664:Sep 18
2654:Sep 17
2644:Sep 14
2634:Sep 12
2624:Sep 10
2582:Jul 30
2572:Jul 21
2562:Jul 19
2552:Jul 12
2542:Jul 11
2532:Jun 12
2522:May 30
2512:May 10
2492:Mar 28
2482:Mar 16
2472:Mar 14
2462:Feb 15
2442:Jan 28
2432:Jan 24
2422:Jan 16
2286:
2265:
2240:
2185:2 July
2074:
1107:, and
952:Eureka
860:SACEUR
848:Legacy
828:MC-616
814:MC-730
800:MC-788
786:MC-641
781:Full
767:Safe
758:MC-772
744:MC-640
730:MC-832
716:MC-543
711:Fired
702:MC-834
688:MC-845
680:Pulled
330:, and
2694:Nov 8
2684:Oct 7
2614:Sep 1
2604:Aug 9
2594:Aug 6
2502:Apr 3
2452:Feb 3
2412:Jan 3
2163:know.
2085:(PDF)
2068:(PDF)
2004:(PDF)
1958:(PDF)
1940:(PDF)
1919:(PDF)
1800:(PDF)
1217:(PDF)
998:Notes
778:Full
719:Timer
708:Fired
216:eject
122:B-52G
35:Mk 39
3330:1969
3247:1968
3176:1967
3141:1966
3076:1965
3023:1964
2976:1963
2935:1962
2870:1961
2811:1960
2398:1961
2353:2022
2284:ISBN
2263:ISBN
2238:ISBN
2207:2022
2187:2012
2158:2013
2138:2012
2113:2013
2093:2013
2072:ISBN
2043:2009
2037:: 28
1877:2014
1515:2020
1159:2020
1109:lead
1089:B-47
764:Safe
528:JP-4
425:and
348:C-47
314:Faro
195:The
170:Crew
68:Faro
64:Site
48:Date
2261:).
1945:PBS
772:1-A
572:EOD
372:it.
338:in
3418::
2343:.
2198:.
2173:.
2160:.
2149:.
2124:.
2104:.
2031:.
2016:.
1988:.
1942:.
1628:^
1565:^
1550:^
1535:^
1506:.
1435:^
1418:^
1312:^
1282:^
1225:^
1149:.
1126:^
1103:,
1058:^
942:.
134:,
2798:e
2791:t
2784:v
2400:)
2383:e
2376:t
2369:v
2355:.
2311:.
2292:.
2271:.
2246:.
2218:.
2209:.
2189:.
2140:.
2115:.
2095:.
2045:.
2022:.
1994:.
1979:.
1948:.
1892:.
1879:.
1802:.
1686:.
1674:.
1517:.
1251:.
1161:.
1136:.
189:5
181:3
173:8
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