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was improperly disclosed to any person" and that "in every case the information disclosed was treated by the recipient as confidential and ... no use of such information was made for the purpose of private gain". The exoneration of everybody involved - government,
308:
was to be set and how decisions in its changes were to be communicated. For example, part-time and non-executive directors of the Bank of
England were to be excluded from discussions of Bank Rate. Although few of the recommendations of the
192:
financiers, rather than at the
Government. This provoked consternation amongst many of the City's bankers, who believed that the Government was trying to avoid the inquiry's scrutiny, and some believed that Government sought to
39:. Rumours and allegations had circulated that some financiers had taken advantage of their advance knowledge of a planned Bank rate rise, and so the inquiry primarily sought to establish whether there had been a form of
110:, told him that the proposed rate rise was common knowledge in her office before the public announcement. In order to ensure that the matter was properly investigated, he reported the conversation to the
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were immediately implemented by government, the report's findings reinforced a discontent with the monetary system that had also been expressed throughout the proceedings of the Bank Rate
Tribunal.
217:
in the two days before the official rate rise announcement. The sales were interpreted as a sharp change in the strategies of those businesses only days before the public announcement.
224:
called "a revealing glimpse into a special, jealously guarded world" that involved euphemistic conversations on
Scottish grouse moors during shooting parties, cabled messages to
62:
was improperly disclosed to any person". The inquiry attracted some attention in the winter of 1957 as details of the interactions amongst financiers - and between bankers,
296:
in 1959. Although the extent of the report's impact is debated, it was a further focus of dissatisfaction with the monetary system as it was operating in the 1950s. The
270:
244:
Published on 21 January 1958, Lord
Justice Parker's report found that there was "no justification for allegations that information about the raising of the
58:
QC. It reported on 21 January 1958. It ultimately concluded that there was "no justification for allegations that information about the raising of the
181:
The inquiry heard evidence through the winter of 1957, and reported its findings on 21 January 1958. Much of the questioning was undertaken by the
47:
28:
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The inquiry ran concurrent to the ongoing
Committee on the Working of the Monetary System under the chairmanship of the esteemed
232:
was managed, and speculation that its senior directors holding simultaneous positions in private financial firms constituted a
182:
364:
228:, and the casual movement of millions of pounds of securities. There was interest as to how efficiently and responsibly the
265:
Although the inquiry exonerated all involved, the details of the interactions between private financial institutions, the
74:
in
February 1958, and the press reaction to the Report was "distinctly critical", with suggestions that the Report was a
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reported a conversation concerning a possible leak of the proposed rate rise; his cousin, who worked as a secretary in
253:, and the individual financiers - attracted critical press comment, and has since been interpreted as a possible
118:
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and within private financial companies - took advantage of advance warning of the rate rise to sell
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who also held positions in private financial companies. One of these two non-executive directors (
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188:. As a member of the Government, he directed the line of his questioning primarily at
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operated. The Report particularly attracted attention through a two-day debate in the
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ahead of the public announcement. The rumours gained credibility when the diplomat
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422:
John Fforde, "The Bank of
England and Public Policy, 1941-1958", Cambridge, 1992.
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officials, and government figures - became public, shining some light on how the
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had been increased in
September 1957, but rumours rapidly circulated around the
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269:, and the government created quite a public stir. The economist and journalist
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213:, and the British Match Company, which between them had sold £2.5 million of
173:. Macmillan agreed to have an independent inquiry under Lord Justice Parker.
149:. Pressure continued to mount on the Government, and there was uproar in the
128:
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them. Much of the questioning focused on two non-executive directors of the
46:
The
Tribunal took evidence in the winter of 1957, under the chairmanship of
194:
35:
had been improperly discussed ahead of its public announcement by the
225:
94:
that some financiers - who simultaneously held positions within the
417:
Till Time's Last Stand: A History of The Bank of England, 1694-2013
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Till Time's Last Stand: A History of The Bank of England, 1694-2013
352:
Till Time's Last Stand: A History of The Bank of England, 1694-2013
334:
Till Time's Last Stand: A History of The Bank of England, 1694-2013
24:
425:
Alistair Horne, "Macmillan: The Official Biography", Viking, 1989.
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Alistair Horne, "Macmillan: The Official Biography", Viking, 1989
206:
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The proceedings aroused a degree of public interest into what
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accused the Government of leaking the planned rate rise to
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as an outmoded and sluggishly amateurish operation, and
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made several recommendations regarding reform of the
31:
to inquire into the allegations that an increase in
430:
131:pushed hard for an independent inquiry, but the
365:"Sir Laurence Pumphrey: Ambassador to Pakistan"
285:for its perceived cosiness with high finance.
138:was adamant than an inquiry be led by his
29:Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921
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390:, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, pg. 432
354:, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, pg. 435
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16:1957 United Kingdom tribunal
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281:continued to criticise the
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186:Reginald Manningham-Buller
23:was a 1957 United Kingdom
211:Royal Exchange Assurance
56:Geoffrey de Paiva Veale
27:established under the
292:, which produced the
100:gilt-edged securities
283:Macmillan Government
234:conflict of interest
439:1957 in British law
205:) had interests in
164:The Daily Telegraph
48:Lord Justice Parker
306:Official Bank Rate
33:Official Bank Rate
21:Bank Rate Tribunal
271:Andrew Schonfield
126:Shadow Chancellor
104:Laurence Pumphrey
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415:David Kynaston,
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386:David Kynaston,
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350:David Kynaston,
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332:David Kynaston,
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311:Radcliffe Report
298:Radcliffe Report
294:Radcliffe Report
183:Attorney General
151:House of Commons
147:Viscount Kilmuir
136:Harold Macmillan
72:House of Commons
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230:Bank of England
203:Hugh Kindersley
199:Bank of England
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170:Financial Times
144:Lord Chancellor
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64:Bank of England
41:insider trading
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190:City of London
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159:Leslie Plummer
142:colleague the
133:prime minister
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52:Milner Holland
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54:CBE QC and
433:Categories
400:New Yorker
317:References
240:The report
115:Opposition
82:Background
444:Tribunals
261:Aftermath
255:whitewash
246:Bank Rate
226:Hong Kong
195:scapegoat
88:Bank Rate
76:whitewash
60:Bank Rate
167:and the
25:tribunal
140:Cabinet
50:, with
279:Labour
207:Lazard
155:Labour
112:Labour
215:gilts
153:when
124:The
86:The
19:The
157:MP
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341:^
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