1036:
market concentration and efficiency, such that firms display an increase in efficiency when their relevant market concentration decreases. The above positions of Bain (1956) as well as
Collins and Preston (1969) are not only supportive of collusion but also of the efficiency-profitability hypothesis: profits are higher for bigger firms within a greater concentrated market as this concentration signifies greater efficiency through mass production. In particular, economies of scale was the greatest kind of efficiency that large firms could achieve in influencing their costs, granting them greater market share. Notably however, Rosenbaum (1994) observed that most studies assumed the relationship between actual market share and observed profitability by following the implication that large firms hold greater market share due to their efficiency, demonstrating that the relationship between these efficiency and market share is not clearly defined.
1953:. Originally, the Lorenz curve measured the inequality of income distributed with a population and ranked individuals from highest to lowest earnings. Therefore, in this context the Gini coefficient is located between the 45° line representing an equal distribution of income and the Lorenz curve representing the actual distribution of income within the population. In a market concentration context, the Lorenz curve can be plotted ranking firms' market shares from smallest to largest to simulate a concentration curve. The firms’ cumulative percentage shares would remain on the y axis and the cumulative percentage of sellers would remain on the x axis.
42:
676:
1073:
consensus. For example, a negative correlation was established by
Connelly and Hirschey (1984) who explained that the correlation evidenced a decreased expenditure on R&D by oligopolistic firms to benefit from greater monopolised profits. However, Blundell et al. observed a positive correlation by tallying the patents lodged by firms. This general observation was also shared by Aghion et al. in 2005.
1105:
1023:. Collins and Preston (1969) shared a similar view to Bain with focus on the reduced competitive impact of smaller firms upon larger firms. Demsetz held an alternative view where he found a positive relationship between the margins of specifically the largest firms within a concentrated industry and collusion as to pricing.
705:, it is calculated. It can be used to assess the market's strength over both the short and long haul. Generally speaking, a CR of less than 40% and a CR of more than 60% are regarded as modest and high levels of market concentration, respectively. This ratio measures the concentration of the largest firms in the form
1061:(1950) first recognised the relationship between market concentration and innovation in that a higher concentrated market would facilitate innovation. He reasoned that firms with the greatest market share have the greatest opportunity to benefit from their innovations, particularly through investment into
1083:
Research presented by Aghion et al. (2005) suggested an inverted U-shape model that represents the relationship between market concentration and innovation. Delbono and
Lambertini modelled empirical evidence onto a graph and found that the pattern demonstrated by the data supported the existence of a
1026:
Although theoretical models predict a strong correlation between market concentration and collusion, there is little empirical evidence linking market concentration to the level of collusion in an industry. In the scenario of a merger, some studies have also shown that the asymmetric market structure
1100:
is due to the necessity of maintaining market competition in order to avoid the formation of monopolies. These laws typically require firms to report their market share and limit the degree of market concentration that is allowed. In some cases, antitrust laws may require the breakup of firms or the
1072:
In practice, there are complications in observing the direct correlation between market concentration and its effect on. In collecting empirical evidence, issues have also arisen as to how innovation, a firm's control and gaps between R&D and firm size are measured. There has also been a lack of
1948:
The Gini coefficient measures the difference between firms' sizes without including the number of firms operating in a market. This is known as a relative concentration measure and differs from absolute concentration measures (like the
Rosenbluth index) which includes the number of firms and firms'
1851:
The
Rosenbluth index assigns more weight to smaller competitors when there are more firms present in the marketplace, and is sensitive to the amount of competitors in the market, even if there is a small amount of large firms dominating. Its coefficients and ranking are similar to results produced
1775:
except that greater weight is assigned to the share of the largest firm. When compared to the HHI index, it does present some advantages, such as giving more weight to the quantity of small firms, however the arbitrary choice to only include the absolute value of one firm has led to criticism over
2014:
For a given set of nodes, each with degree k, the power-law exponent (α) serves as a pivotal metric for analyzing concentration within a network. This exponent characterizes the distribution of out-degrees among nodes, offering insights into the concentration of certain attributes or interactions
1035:
As an economic tool market concentration is useful because it reflects the degree of competition in the market. Understanding the market concentration is important for firms when deciding their marketing strategy. As well, empirical evidence shows that there exists an inverse relationship between
1585:
firms. Although it doesn't capture the peripheral firms like the HHI formula, it works to capture the "core" of the market, and measure the degree of inequality between the size variable accounted for by various sib-samples of firms. This index does assume pre-calculation on the users' behalf to
506:
A simple measure of market concentration is to calculate 1/N where N is the number of firms in the market. A result of 1 would indicate a pure monopoly, and will decrease with the number of active firms in the market, and nonincreasing in the degree of symmetry between them. This measure of
1049:
A high level of market concentration can lead to a decrease in competition and increased market power for the dominant firms. This might lead to greater costs, less quality, fewer options, and less innovation. Thus, consumers and society may be negatively impacted by large levels of market
1218:
is a constant or a parameter (to be estimated empirically) and N is the number of firms. Davies (1979) suggests that a concentration index should in general depend on both N and the inequality of firms' shares. Davis (1980) indicates, there are many suitable candidates to be used for
650:
If market shares are expressed as decimals, an HHI of 0 represents a perfectly competitive industry while an HHI index of 1 represents a monopolised industry. Regardless whether the decimal or percentage HHI is used, a higher HHI indicates higher concentration within a market.
1108:. A high degree of market concentration is typically undesirable since it might result in less competition and more power for the leading enterprises on the market. Antitrust laws and other economic regulations safeguard market competition and the avoidance of monopolies.
1478:
1080:”. Petit and Teece (2021) argued that technological opportunities, a variable which Schumpeter and Arrow did not include during their time, would be included in this definition as it enables new entrants to make a “breakthrough” into the industry.
956:
in 2001, was approved in the United States, however the condition's that
European Commission enforced for the approval were too impactful for General Electric, and was abandoned. This is an example on how different regulatory bodies view
1997:
would the sum of weighted market share located in the area above the concentration curve. The Gini coefficient is 0 when the concentration curve aligns with the 45° line representing a single firm's market share, meaning the market is a
974:
between firms which, resulting in higher pricing. In contrast, market concentration occurs as a result of the efficiency obtained in the course of being a large firm, which is more profitable in comparison to smaller firms and their
945:
companies, respectively) attempted 2014 merger was blocked by the US DOJ, after fears that the merger would increase costs for oil companies in 23 separate product markets, and therefore would stiffen innovation in the oil
1019:. Bain's (1956) original concern with market concentration was based on an intuitive relationship between high concentration and collusion which led to Bain's finding that firms in concentrated markets should be earning
1069:(1962) that a greater market concentration will decrease incentive to innovate because a firm within a monopoly or monopolistic market would have already reached profit levels that greatly exceed costs.
1944:
1721:
930:
threatened to file an antitrust lawsuit, citing that the HHI of the national television industry would increase by 639 points to a HHI of 2454, and feared this merger would lead to increased prices for
901:
determined that any merger that increases the HHI by more than 200 proposes a legitimate concern to antitrust laws and consumer welfare . Therefore, when considering potential mergers, especially in
905:
applications, antitrust agencies will consider the whether the increase in efficiency is worth the potential decrease in consumer welfare, through increased costs or reduction in quantity produced.
553:
market shares. A higher HHI indicates a higher level of market concentration. A market concentration level of less than 1000 is typically seen as low, whilst one of more than 1500 is regarded as
319:. Market concentration is the portion of a given market's market share that is held by a small number of businesses. To ascertain whether an industry is competitive or not, it is employed in
792:
1838:
1312:
1773:
616:
1995:
876:. The first major example of the Sherman Act being imposed on a company to prevent potential consumer abuse through excessive market concentration was in the 1911 court case of
1298:
Terrence Kavyu
Muthoka defines distribution just as functionals in the Swartz space which is the space of functions with compact support and with all derivatives existing. The
1169:
499:
and firms, through defining the product and geographical parameters, various metrics can be employed to determine the market concentration. This can be quantified using the
1290:
2683:
500:
104:
1614:
1563:
1244:
1196:
645:
1533:
1583:
1507:
1216:
1116:
Although not as common as the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index or Concentration Ratio metrics, various alternative measures of market concentration can also be used.
2488:
J. Gregory Sidak, Evaluating Market Power Using
Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 387, 387-388 (2007).
507:
concentration ignores the dispersion among the firms' shares. This measure is practically useful only if a sample of firms' market shares is believed to be
894:
Modern regulatory bodies state that an increase in market concentration can inhibit innovation, and have detrimental effects on overall consumer welfare.
527:
487:
Although fewer competitors doesn't always indicate high market concentration, it can be a strong indicator of the market structure and power allocation.
480:
and current advertising levels. There are also firm specific factors affecting market concentration, including: research and development levels, and the
923:
3259:
2353:
872:. Since the passing of the act, these metrics have also been used to evaluate potential mergers' effect on overall market competition and overall
2659:
2386:
878:
4143:
327:
is likely to exist. In most cases, high market concentration produces undesirable consequences such as reduced competition and higher prices.
2030:
Conversely, as α decreases below 0, the concentration among a select few firms diminishes further, suggesting a diversified market landscape.
549:(HHI) (the most commonly used market concentration) is added portion of market attentiveness. It is derived by adding the squares of all the
342:, employment numbers, active users or other relevant indicators. In theory and in practice, market concentration is closely associated with
2973:
434:
The 2020 Australian
Telecommunications firms market share: an example of a highly concentrated market with an estimated HHI of 3034.
282:
1076:
Schumpeter also failed to distinguish between the different technologies that contribute to innovation and did not properly define “
4204:
1862:
1626:
1027:
produced by a merger will negatively affect collusion despite the increased concentration of the market that occurs post-merger.
4189:
647:
is the market share of firm i, conventionally expressed as a percentage, and N is the number of firms in the relevant market.
323:
and economic regulation. When market concentration is high, it indicates that a few firms dominate the market and oligopoly or
17:
2634:
3277:
1015:
927:
898:
655:
3460:
3395:
3200:"Possibilities of Application of the Index Concentration of Linda in Small Economy: Example of Serbian Food Industries"
942:
1473:{\displaystyle L={\frac {1}{N(N-1)}}\sum _{i=1}^{N-1}Q_{i}\left\left\vert {\frac {CR_{i}}{CR_{n}-CR_{i}}}\right\vert }
4245:
3382:
388:
Market concentration is related to industrial concentration, which concerns the distribution of production within an
251:
710:
3387:
2885:
1786:
2255:
1299:
365:
and existing competition. Market concentration ratios also allows users to more accurately determine the type of
2216:"Responding to Rivals and Complements: How Market Concentration Shapes Generational Product Innovation Strategy"
1732:
562:
4209:
546:
89:
4255:
3729:
3116:"Original Article Innovating Big Tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition"
886:
was monopolising the petroleum industry, the court-ordered remedy was the breakup into 34 smaller companies.
861:
275:
194:
4153:
3824:
2060:
664:
3691:
2025:
As α approaches 0, the distribution flattens, indicating a more equitable distribution of contract awards.
1104:
Market concentration reveals a market's degree of concentration. It is employed to ascertain the level of
3648:
3633:
1956:
3889:
3613:
2118:
868:
agencies regularly use market concentration as an important metric to evaluate potential violations of
411:
An alternative economic interpretation is that market concentration is a criterion that can be used to
123:
58:
1246:, however, the measure he advocates "is a simple transformation of the coefficient of variation (c):
4250:
3754:
1125:
4224:
3433:
2085:
1249:
1062:
1020:
659:
519:
374:
351:
324:
268:
3373:
4199:
4063:
3469:
3158:
2400:
2020:
When α>0, a skewed distribution emerges where a small percentage of firms dominate the market.
477:
393:
3159:"Innovation and product market concentration: Schumpeter, arrow, and the inverted U-shape curve"
2119:"What is Market Concentration? Definition of Market Concentration, Market Concentration Meaning"
4194:
3992:
3618:
3538:
3453:
2287:
995:) that predict that an increase in market concentration will result in higher prices and lower
913:
902:
523:
304:
168:
2166:
1198:
is an accepted measure of inequality (in practice the coefficient of variation is suggested),
4184:
4093:
4083:
3789:
3583:
3299:
3253:
2380:
2347:
2095:
2045:
1097:
256:
27:
Function of number of companies & their respective shares of total production in a market
3278:"Concentration Measures as an element in testing the structure-conduct-performance paradigm"
1589:
1538:
970:
can be divided into two arguments: greater market concentration increases the likelihood of
919:
Modern examples of market concentration being utilised to protect consumer welfare include:
4078:
3884:
3721:
3711:
3543:
3488:
3322:"Analyzing concentration in the Greek public procurement market: a network theory approach"
2090:
2070:
1222:
1174:
1077:
623:
531:
464:
There are various factors that affect the concentration of specific markets which include;
389:
211:
206:
3623:
3037:
2660:"Why the Time Warner-Comcast merger isn't going to happen—at least the way it looks today"
8:
4163:
4073:
4068:
4058:
4048:
3972:
3869:
3671:
3553:
3548:
3115:
2569:
2464:
2424:
2040:
2007:
1512:
1009:
976:
909:
694:
370:
4012:
3944:
3603:
3066:"The Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Market Concentration in Horizontal Mergers"
2190:
419:' shares of the total production (alternatively, total capacity or total reserves) in a
4179:
4043:
3954:
3859:
3799:
3518:
3483:
3377:
3093:
3085:
3019:
2955:
2947:
2908:
2866:
2858:
2819:
2765:
2757:
2616:
2527:
2335:
2142:
1568:
1492:
1201:
967:
550:
469:
420:
343:
334:
measures the concentration of the top firms in the market, this can be through various
316:
230:
152:
3244:
3227:
2316:"Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936-1940"
4053:
3919:
3879:
3446:
3401:
3391:
3341:
3097:
2959:
2943:
2870:
2769:
2620:
2608:
2531:
2519:
2263:
2215:
1058:
996:
465:
362:
216:
201:
84:
72:
2783:
Schmalensee, Richard (1987). "Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance".
554:
4138:
4123:
4088:
4007:
4002:
3987:
3939:
3904:
3854:
3749:
3638:
3628:
3608:
3578:
3558:
3498:
3333:
3239:
3178:
3170:
3137:
3127:
3077:
3011:
2939:
2900:
2850:
2811:
2749:
2600:
2511:
2327:
2235:
2227:
2055:
2050:
1616:
However, there is little empirical evidence of regulatory usage of the Linda Index.
949:
873:
669:
668:
is entitled "Market Definition, Measurement and Concentration" and states that the
535:
366:
354:
and other regulatory issues. Market concentration is important in determining firm
225:
179:
175:
77:
4148:
4103:
4098:
4027:
3997:
3874:
3839:
3834:
3829:
3809:
3794:
3784:
3593:
3533:
3523:
3503:
2368:
1093:
869:
496:
347:
320:
184:
163:
109:
33:
3563:
2545:
4219:
4022:
4017:
3929:
3899:
3814:
3769:
3696:
3681:
3656:
3598:
3528:
3508:
3434:
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines
3337:
2588:
2075:
401:
315:
of the total production (alternatively, total capacity or total reserves) in a
132:
114:
3081:
2604:
2515:
683:
4239:
4214:
4108:
3982:
3977:
3967:
3914:
3894:
3864:
3849:
3779:
3764:
3759:
3706:
3666:
3661:
3588:
3568:
3513:
3405:
3345:
3321:
2612:
2523:
2267:
1295:
The "number of effective competitors" is the inverse of the Herfindahl index.
1066:
864:, in response to growing monopolies and anti-competitive firms in the 1880s,
481:
473:
335:
221:
189:
2499:
4128:
4118:
3962:
3934:
3909:
3774:
3701:
3676:
3573:
2231:
2065:
1950:
938:
883:
698:
697:(CR) is a measure of how concentrated a market is. By dividing the overall
355:
312:
235:
148:
99:
3438:
3174:
3132:
4158:
4133:
3844:
3739:
3686:
3493:
3364:
Curry, B. and K. D. George (1983). "Industrial concentration: A survey"
3199:
2974:"Highly concentrated markets are bad for consumers and bad for investors"
988:
934:
916:, which post merger HHI is under 2000 (except in special circumstances).
405:
397:
158:
3183:
3089:
3065:
2951:
2927:
2761:
2737:
1101:
establishment of “firewalls” that prevent the potential abuse of power.
3819:
3804:
3734:
3023:
2999:
2912:
2823:
2799:
2753:
2709:
2339:
2315:
800:
Relationship between Market Structure and Market Concentration Metrics
3142:
2862:
2838:
2240:
3924:
3744:
2003:
1000:
992:
971:
953:
865:
675:
382:
296:
137:
67:
41:
3015:
2904:
2815:
2331:
416:
308:
2854:
2080:
378:
361:
Market concentration is affected through various forces, including
63:
2425:"Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - United States Department of Justice"
1845:
702:
515:
511:, rather than determined by the firms' inherent characteristics.
412:
672:
is the measure of concentration that these Guidelines will use.
530:) can be used as a market concentration criterion. Examples are
1780:(d) The Rosenbluth (1961) index (also Hall and Tideman, 1967):
1004:
508:
143:
3198:
Bukvić, Rajko; Pavlović, Radica; Gajić, Аlеksаndаr M. (2014).
2589:"Market Concentration, Economic Welfare, and Antitrust Policy"
2500:"Market Concentration, Economic Welfare, and Antitrust Policy"
2113:
2111:
2684:"Halliburton and Baker Hughes Abandon Anticompetitive Merger"
2214:
Turner, Scott F.; Mitchell, Will; Bettis, Richard A. (2010).
339:
331:
1729:
is the share of the largest firm. The index is similar to
2928:"Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence"
2710:"U.S./EU: Analysis -- What Killed The GE-Honeywell Merger?"
2108:
1939:{\displaystyle G=1-\sum _{i=1}^{N}S_{i}{\frac {(2i-1)}{N}}}
1716:{\displaystyle CCI=s_{1}+\sum _{i=2}^{N}s_{i}^{2}(2-s_{i})}
2256:"What We Can Learn from Merger Deals That Never Happened"
426:
3300:"Measurement of Specialization # The Choice of Indices"
2839:"Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy"
1949:
distribution sizes. It is used in conjunction with the
924:
2014 Attempted purchase of Time Warner Cable by Comcast
1620:(c) Comprehensive concentration index (Horwath 1970):
2893:
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics
2886:"The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered"
1959:
1865:
1789:
1735:
1629:
1592:
1571:
1541:
1515:
1495:
1315:
1252:
1225:
1204:
1177:
1128:
713:
626:
565:
3271:
3269:
2213:
1489:
is the ratio between the average share of the first
1065:. This can be contrasted with the position taken by
3197:
2451:
Markets for Managers: A Managerial Economics Primer
1084:U-shaped relationship between these two variables.
1007:(i.e. explicit collusion) is absent. Examples are
396:, market concentration may be used as a measure of
2738:"Efficiency v. Collusion: Evidence Cast in Cement"
2366:
1989:
1938:
1852:through the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
1832:
1767:
1715:
1608:
1577:
1557:
1527:
1501:
1472:
1284:
1238:
1210:
1190:
1163:
966:The relationship between market concentration and
786:
639:
610:
3266:
3225:
3156:
3059:
3057:
2546:"Standard Oil | History, Monopoly, & Breakup"
2369:"Market Concentration: The Effects of Technology"
4237:
2731:
2729:
2639:Official Journal C 031, 05/02/2004, p. 0005-0018
3307:Research Centre International Economics, Vienna
2926:Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo (2008).
2587:Brock, James W.; Obst, Norman P. (2007-10-03).
2498:Brock, James W.; Obst, Norman P. (2009-03-01).
1565:is the concentration coefficient for the first
1092:The existence of economic regulations like the
879:Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
701:by the sum of the market shares of the largest
3361:Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press.
3228:"Additive measurement of Market Concentration"
3054:
2925:
2797:
1016:Bertrand oligopoly for differentiated products
787:{\displaystyle CR_{n}=C_{1}+C_{2}+.....+C_{n}}
3454:
3226:Romualdas, Stasys, Ginevičius, Čirba (2009).
3109:
3107:
2726:
2006:exponent (α) of the fitting curve on the out-
1833:{\displaystyle R={\frac {1}{2\sum is_{i}-1}}}
1509:firms and the average share of the remaining
541:
514:Any criterion that can be used to compare or
276:
3326:Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
3258:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
3232:Journal of Business Economics and Management
2798:Collins, Norman R.; Preston, Lee E. (1969).
2352:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
404:in the industry, for example in the work of
400:, theorized to be positively related to the
3468:
3371:
3320:Pliatsidis, Andreas Christos (2024-02-12).
2800:"Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure"
2782:
2385:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (
684:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMJCLwBJYnQ
3461:
3447:
3423:Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press.
3319:
3275:
3157:Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca (2022).
3113:
3104:
3063:
2593:Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
2504:Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
1768:{\displaystyle 2{\text{H}}-\sum s_{i}^{3}}
611:{\displaystyle H=\sum _{i=1}^{N}s_{i}^{2}}
283:
269:
3243:
3182:
3141:
3131:
2735:
2586:
2497:
2239:
991:models of market interaction (e.g. among
244:Enforcement authorities and organizations
3114:Petit, Nicolas; Teece, David J. (2021).
2883:
2657:
2453:. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. p. 69.
1302:or the Dirac function is a good example.
674:
346:, and therefore is important to various
3150:
2836:
2574:The United States Department of Justice
961:
14:
4238:
4190:English historical school of economics
4144:Structure–conduct–performance paradigm
3414:The Theory of Industrial Organization.
3004:The Review of Economics and Statistics
2997:
2804:The Review of Economics and Statistics
1111:
688:
427:Factors affecting market concentration
3442:
3297:
3221:
3219:
2707:
2448:
941:(at the time the 2nd and 3rd largest
796:where N is usually between 3 and 5.
3416:Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
2367:Janashvili '02, David (2002-04-26).
2313:
2309:
2307:
1045:Implications of market concentration
822:6000 - 10 000 (Depending on Region)
2785:Handbook of Industrial Organization
1990:{\displaystyle {\frac {(2i-1)}{N}}}
1039:
899:United States Department of Justice
855:
850:
350:agencies when considering proposed
24:
3216:
2658:Fernholz, Tim (13 February 2014).
2320:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
2010:of the network (Pliatsidis, 2024)
1088:Regulation of market concentration
833:2000 - 6000 (Depending on Region)
358:in setting prices and quantities.
40:
25:
4267:
3427:
3383:Concise Encyclopedia of Economics
3285:Economic Research Southern Africa
3245:10.3846/1611-1699.2009.10.191-198
3070:Review of Industrial Organization
3000:"Market Power and/or Efficiency?"
2742:Review of Industrial Organization
2304:
252:International Competition Network
3388:Library of Economics and Liberty
3372:Shughart II, William F. (2008).
2944:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02126.x
2635:"EUR-Lex - 52004XC0205(02) - EN"
1856:(e) The Gini coefficient (1912)
1586:determine the relevant value of
1119:(a) The U Index (Davies, 1980):
3313:
3291:
3191:
3120:Industrial and Corporate Change
3030:
2991:
2966:
2919:
2877:
2830:
2791:
2776:
2714:Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
2701:
2676:
2651:
2627:
2580:
2562:
2538:
2491:
2482:
2457:
2442:
2417:
2393:
889:
844:0 - 2000 (Depending on Region)
495:After determining the relevant
4210:Historical school of economics
3386:(2nd ed.). Indianapolis:
2787:. (Working Paper No. 1874-87).
2360:
2280:
2248:
2207:
2183:
2159:
2135:
1978:
1963:
1927:
1912:
1710:
1691:
1343:
1331:
1164:{\displaystyle U=I^{*a}N^{-1}}
860:Since the introduction of the
547:The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
257:List of competition regulators
13:
1:
3309:. (FIW Working Paper No. 62).
3064:Sonenshine, Ralph M. (2010).
2101:
1285:{\displaystyle I^{*}=1+c^{2}}
1053:
1030:
862:Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
392:, as opposed to a market. In
4154:Theory of two-level planning
3649:New institutional economists
3359:Barriers to New Competition.
2843:Journal of Law and Economics
2736:Rosenbaum, David I. (1994).
2708:Baker, Mark (9 April 2008).
2570:"HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX"
2465:"Herfindahl-Hirschman Index"
2061:Horizontal Merger Guidelines
1776:its accuracy and usefulness.
1096:and antitrust laws like the
982:
952:'s attempted acquisition of
665:Horizontal Merger Guidelines
7:
3634:Edward Lawrence Wheelwright
3287:. (Working Papers No. 345).
3276:du Pisanie, Johann (2013).
2034:
1306:(b) The Linda index (1976)
912:is unlikely to contest any
468:(high start-up costs, high
369:they are observing, from a
10:
4272:
4129:Penalty of taking the lead
3374:"Industrial Concentration"
3338:10.1007/s40812-023-00291-z
2884:Salinger, Michael (1990).
2449:Evans, Anthony J. (2014).
926:, was abandoned after the
679:Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
542:Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
490:
476:), industry size and age,
124:Anti-competitive practices
90:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
59:History of competition law
4172:
4036:
3953:
3720:
3647:
3476:
3082:10.1007/s11151-010-9262-8
2605:10.1007/s10842-007-0026-6
2516:10.1007/s10842-007-0026-6
1021:supra-competitive profits
415:various distributions of
330:The market concentration
4246:Concentration indicators
4225:Post-Keynesian economics
4205:French historical school
3477:Institutional economists
3421:Concentration and price.
2998:Martin, Stephen (1988).
2837:Demsetz, Harold (1973).
2429:US Department of Justice
2086:Probability distribution
1300:Media:Dirac_Distribution
882:where after determining
660:Federal Trade Commission
520:probability distribution
325:monopolistic competition
4200:Evolutionary psychology
4064:Conspicuous consumption
3470:Institutional economics
3204:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
2550:Encyclopædia Britannica
2260:Harvard Business Review
478:product differentiation
394:industrial organization
4195:Evolutionary economics
4037:Key concepts and ideas
3993:Donald Angus MacKenzie
3619:George W. Stocking Sr.
3539:John Kenneth Galbraith
3366:Jour. of Indust. Econ.
3298:Palan, Nicole (2010).
3163:Oxford Economic Papers
2232:10.1287/orsc.1090.0486
1991:
1940:
1898:
1834:
1769:
1717:
1675:
1610:
1609:{\displaystyle CR_{i}}
1579:
1559:
1558:{\displaystyle CR_{i}}
1529:
1503:
1474:
1375:
1286:
1240:
1212:
1192:
1165:
1106:industrial competition
914:horizontal integration
903:horizontal integration
788:
680:
641:
612:
592:
524:frequency distribution
344:market competitiveness
169:Occupational licensing
45:
18:Industry concentration
4185:Development economics
4094:Hiding hand principle
4084:Effective competition
3955:Economic sociologists
3722:Behavioral economists
3584:Wesley Clair Mitchell
3419:Weiss, L. W. (1989).
2314:Bain, Joe, S (1951).
2096:Relative market share
2046:Dominance (economics)
1992:
1941:
1878:
1844:indicates the firm's
1835:
1770:
1718:
1655:
1611:
1580:
1560:
1530:
1504:
1475:
1349:
1287:
1241:
1239:{\displaystyle I^{*}}
1213:
1193:
1191:{\displaystyle I^{*}}
1166:
789:
678:
656:Department of Justice
642:
640:{\displaystyle s_{i}}
613:
572:
311:and their respective
44:
4256:Monopoly (economics)
4114:Market concentration
4079:Countervailing power
3885:Sendhil Mullainathan
3712:Oliver E. Williamson
3544:Walton Hale Hamilton
3489:Clarence Edwin Ayres
2932:The Economic Journal
2401:"Market participant"
2220:Organization Science
2091:Stochastic dominance
2071:Inequality of wealth
1957:
1863:
1787:
1733:
1627:
1590:
1569:
1539:
1513:
1493:
1313:
1250:
1223:
1202:
1175:
1126:
1078:creative destruction
962:Motivation for firms
711:
624:
563:
532:stochastic dominance
518:distributions (e.g.
452: Vodafone (27%)
301:market concentration
212:Occupational closure
207:Dividing territories
195:Essential facilities
95:Market concentration
4164:Veblenian dichotomy
4074:Conventional wisdom
4069:Conspicuous leisure
4059:Bounded rationality
4049:Administered prices
3870:Brigitte C. Madrian
3672:Steven N. S. Cheung
3554:Albert O. Hirschman
3549:Orris C. Herfindahl
3412:Tirole, J. (1988).
3175:10.1093/oep/gpaa044
3133:10.1093/icc/dtab049
2041:Concentration ratio
2008:degree distribution
2002:(f) Utilizing the
1764:
1690:
1528:{\displaystyle N-i}
1112:Alternative metrics
910:European Commission
801:
695:concentration ratio
689:Concentration ratio
607:
551:market participants
440: Telstra (37%)
371:perfect competitive
4180:Cultural economics
4044:Accelerator effect
3860:George Loewenstein
3800:Catherine C. Eckel
3519:John Maurice Clark
3484:Werner Abelshauser
3378:David R. Henderson
2754:10.1007/BF01029512
2342:– via JSTOR.
2288:"Market structure"
2123:The Economic Times
2015:within the system.
1987:
1936:
1830:
1765:
1750:
1713:
1676:
1606:
1575:
1555:
1525:
1499:
1470:
1282:
1236:
1208:
1188:
1161:
977:lack of efficiency
799:
784:
681:
637:
608:
593:
470:economies of scale
385:market structure.
231:Regulatory capture
46:
4233:
4232:
4054:Barriers to entry
3920:Robert J. Shiller
3880:Matteo Motterlini
3624:Lars Pålsson Syll
3357:Bain, J. (1956).
2167:"Competition law"
1985:
1934:
1828:
1742:
1578:{\displaystyle i}
1502:{\displaystyle i}
1464:
1406:
1347:
1211:{\displaystyle a}
1010:Cournot oligopoly
943:oilfield services
848:
847:
654:Section 1 of the
528:size distribution
466:barriers to entry
446: Optus (30%)
363:barriers to entry
307:of the number of
293:
292:
222:Misuse of patents
217:Predatory pricing
202:Exclusive dealing
85:Barriers to entry
73:Coercive monopoly
16:(Redirected from
4263:
4251:Market structure
4139:Shortage economy
4124:Market structure
4089:Herfindahl index
4013:Laurent Thévenot
4008:Richard Swedberg
4003:Lynette Spillman
3988:Mark Granovetter
3973:James S. Coleman
3945:Georg Weizsäcker
3940:Robert W. Vishny
3905:Klaus M. Schmidt
3855:Jeffrey R. Kling
3750:Douglas Bernheim
3639:Erich Zimmermann
3629:Thorstein Veblen
3609:Herbert A. Simon
3604:François Simiand
3579:Jesse W. Markham
3559:Geoffrey Hodgson
3499:Shimshon Bichler
3463:
3456:
3449:
3440:
3439:
3409:
3350:
3349:
3317:
3311:
3310:
3304:
3295:
3289:
3288:
3282:
3273:
3264:
3263:
3257:
3249:
3247:
3223:
3214:
3213:
3211:
3210:
3195:
3189:
3188:
3186:
3154:
3148:
3147:
3145:
3135:
3111:
3102:
3101:
3061:
3052:
3051:
3050:
3049:
3034:
3028:
3027:
2995:
2989:
2988:
2986:
2985:
2970:
2964:
2963:
2938:(527): 387–400.
2923:
2917:
2916:
2890:
2881:
2875:
2874:
2834:
2828:
2827:
2795:
2789:
2788:
2780:
2774:
2773:
2733:
2724:
2723:
2721:
2720:
2705:
2699:
2698:
2696:
2695:
2680:
2674:
2673:
2671:
2670:
2655:
2649:
2648:
2646:
2645:
2631:
2625:
2624:
2584:
2578:
2577:
2566:
2560:
2559:
2557:
2556:
2542:
2536:
2535:
2495:
2489:
2486:
2480:
2479:
2477:
2476:
2461:
2455:
2454:
2446:
2440:
2439:
2437:
2436:
2421:
2415:
2414:
2413:
2412:
2397:
2391:
2390:
2384:
2376:
2364:
2358:
2357:
2351:
2343:
2311:
2302:
2301:
2300:
2299:
2284:
2278:
2277:
2275:
2274:
2252:
2246:
2245:
2243:
2211:
2205:
2204:
2203:
2202:
2187:
2181:
2180:
2179:
2178:
2163:
2157:
2156:
2155:
2154:
2139:
2133:
2132:
2130:
2129:
2115:
2056:Herfindahl index
2051:Gini coefficient
1996:
1994:
1993:
1988:
1986:
1981:
1961:
1945:
1943:
1942:
1937:
1935:
1930:
1910:
1908:
1907:
1897:
1892:
1839:
1837:
1836:
1831:
1829:
1827:
1820:
1819:
1797:
1774:
1772:
1771:
1766:
1763:
1758:
1743:
1740:
1722:
1720:
1719:
1714:
1709:
1708:
1689:
1684:
1674:
1669:
1651:
1650:
1615:
1613:
1612:
1607:
1605:
1604:
1584:
1582:
1581:
1576:
1564:
1562:
1561:
1556:
1554:
1553:
1534:
1532:
1531:
1526:
1508:
1506:
1505:
1500:
1479:
1477:
1476:
1471:
1469:
1465:
1463:
1462:
1461:
1446:
1445:
1432:
1431:
1430:
1417:
1411:
1407:
1402:
1391:
1385:
1384:
1374:
1363:
1348:
1346:
1323:
1291:
1289:
1288:
1283:
1281:
1280:
1262:
1261:
1245:
1243:
1242:
1237:
1235:
1234:
1217:
1215:
1214:
1209:
1197:
1195:
1194:
1189:
1187:
1186:
1170:
1168:
1167:
1162:
1160:
1159:
1147:
1146:
1040:Industry effects
1003:in the sense of
997:consumer welfare
950:General Electric
874:consumer welfare
870:competition laws
856:Historical usage
851:Regulatory usage
802:
798:
793:
791:
790:
785:
783:
782:
752:
751:
739:
738:
726:
725:
670:Herfindahl index
646:
644:
643:
638:
636:
635:
617:
615:
614:
609:
606:
601:
591:
586:
536:Gini coefficient
458: Other (6%)
457:
451:
445:
439:
367:market structure
285:
278:
271:
176:Product bundling
78:Natural monopoly
30:
29:
21:
4271:
4270:
4266:
4265:
4264:
4262:
4261:
4260:
4236:
4235:
4234:
4229:
4168:
4149:Technostructure
4104:Instrumentalism
4099:Hirschman cycle
4032:
4028:Viviana Zelizer
3998:Joel M. Podolny
3949:
3875:Gary McClelland
3840:Daniel Kahneman
3835:David Ryan Just
3830:Charles A. Holt
3810:Urs Fischbacher
3795:Stephen Duneier
3785:Werner De Bondt
3716:
3643:
3594:Jonathan Nitzan
3534:Robert H. Frank
3524:John R. Commons
3504:Robert A. Brady
3472:
3467:
3430:
3398:
3354:
3353:
3318:
3314:
3302:
3296:
3292:
3280:
3274:
3267:
3251:
3250:
3224:
3217:
3208:
3206:
3196:
3192:
3155:
3151:
3112:
3105:
3062:
3055:
3047:
3045:
3036:
3035:
3031:
3016:10.2307/1928318
2996:
2992:
2983:
2981:
2972:
2971:
2967:
2924:
2920:
2905:10.2307/2534784
2888:
2882:
2878:
2835:
2831:
2816:10.2307/1926562
2796:
2792:
2781:
2777:
2734:
2727:
2718:
2716:
2706:
2702:
2693:
2691:
2688:www.justice.gov
2682:
2681:
2677:
2668:
2666:
2656:
2652:
2643:
2641:
2633:
2632:
2628:
2585:
2581:
2576:. 25 June 2015.
2568:
2567:
2563:
2554:
2552:
2544:
2543:
2539:
2496:
2492:
2487:
2483:
2474:
2472:
2469:www.justice.gov
2463:
2462:
2458:
2447:
2443:
2434:
2432:
2423:
2422:
2418:
2410:
2408:
2399:
2398:
2394:
2378:
2377:
2373:Honors Projects
2365:
2361:
2345:
2344:
2332:10.2307/1882217
2312:
2305:
2297:
2295:
2286:
2285:
2281:
2272:
2270:
2254:
2253:
2249:
2212:
2208:
2200:
2198:
2189:
2188:
2184:
2176:
2174:
2165:
2164:
2160:
2152:
2150:
2141:
2140:
2136:
2127:
2125:
2117:
2116:
2109:
2104:
2037:
1962:
1960:
1958:
1955:
1954:
1911:
1909:
1903:
1899:
1893:
1882:
1864:
1861:
1860:
1815:
1811:
1801:
1796:
1788:
1785:
1784:
1759:
1754:
1739:
1734:
1731:
1730:
1728:
1704:
1700:
1685:
1680:
1670:
1659:
1646:
1642:
1628:
1625:
1624:
1600:
1596:
1591:
1588:
1587:
1570:
1567:
1566:
1549:
1545:
1540:
1537:
1536:
1514:
1511:
1510:
1494:
1491:
1490:
1487:
1457:
1453:
1441:
1437:
1433:
1426:
1422:
1418:
1416:
1412:
1392:
1390:
1386:
1380:
1376:
1364:
1353:
1327:
1322:
1314:
1311:
1310:
1276:
1272:
1257:
1253:
1251:
1248:
1247:
1230:
1226:
1224:
1221:
1220:
1203:
1200:
1199:
1182:
1178:
1176:
1173:
1172:
1152:
1148:
1139:
1135:
1127:
1124:
1123:
1114:
1094:Competition Act
1056:
1050:concentration.
1042:
1033:
985:
964:
892:
858:
853:
805:Type of Market
778:
774:
747:
743:
734:
730:
721:
717:
712:
709:
708:
691:
631:
627:
625:
622:
621:
602:
597:
587:
576:
564:
561:
560:
544:
493:
462:
461:
460:
459:
455:
453:
449:
447:
443:
441:
437:
429:
289:
185:Refusal to deal
164:Tacit collusion
110:Relevant market
34:Competition law
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
4269:
4259:
4258:
4253:
4248:
4231:
4230:
4228:
4227:
4222:
4220:Microeconomics
4217:
4212:
4207:
4202:
4197:
4192:
4187:
4182:
4176:
4174:
4173:Related fields
4170:
4169:
4167:
4166:
4161:
4156:
4151:
4146:
4141:
4136:
4131:
4126:
4121:
4116:
4111:
4109:Kuznets cycles
4106:
4101:
4096:
4091:
4086:
4081:
4076:
4071:
4066:
4061:
4056:
4051:
4046:
4040:
4038:
4034:
4033:
4031:
4030:
4025:
4023:Harrison White
4020:
4018:Carlo Trigilia
4015:
4010:
4005:
4000:
3995:
3990:
3985:
3980:
3975:
3970:
3965:
3959:
3957:
3951:
3950:
3948:
3947:
3942:
3937:
3932:
3930:Richard Thaler
3927:
3922:
3917:
3912:
3907:
3902:
3900:Howard Rachlin
3897:
3892:
3890:Michael Norton
3887:
3882:
3877:
3872:
3867:
3862:
3857:
3852:
3847:
3842:
3837:
3832:
3827:
3822:
3817:
3815:Herbert Gintis
3812:
3807:
3802:
3797:
3792:
3787:
3782:
3777:
3772:
3770:David Cesarini
3767:
3762:
3757:
3752:
3747:
3742:
3737:
3732:
3730:George Ainslie
3726:
3724:
3718:
3717:
3715:
3714:
3709:
3704:
3699:
3697:Douglass North
3694:
3689:
3684:
3682:Harold Demsetz
3679:
3674:
3669:
3664:
3662:Armen Alchian
3659:
3657:Daron Acemoglu
3653:
3651:
3645:
3644:
3642:
3641:
3636:
3631:
3626:
3621:
3616:
3614:Frank Stilwell
3611:
3606:
3601:
3599:Warren Samuels
3596:
3591:
3586:
3581:
3576:
3571:
3566:
3561:
3556:
3551:
3546:
3541:
3536:
3531:
3529:Richard T. Ely
3526:
3521:
3516:
3511:
3509:Daniel Bromley
3506:
3501:
3496:
3491:
3486:
3480:
3478:
3474:
3473:
3466:
3465:
3458:
3451:
3443:
3437:
3436:
3429:
3428:External links
3426:
3425:
3424:
3417:
3410:
3397:978-0865976658
3396:
3369:
3362:
3352:
3351:
3332:(2): 431–480.
3312:
3290:
3265:
3238:(3): 191–198.
3215:
3190:
3169:(1): 297–311.
3149:
3103:
3076:(2): 119–140.
3053:
3029:
3010:(2): 331–335.
2990:
2965:
2918:
2876:
2855:10.1086/466752
2829:
2810:(3): 271–286.
2790:
2775:
2748:(4): 379–392.
2725:
2700:
2675:
2650:
2626:
2579:
2561:
2537:
2490:
2481:
2456:
2441:
2431:. 25 June 2015
2416:
2392:
2359:
2326:(3): 293–324.
2303:
2279:
2262:. 2016-06-21.
2247:
2206:
2182:
2158:
2134:
2106:
2105:
2103:
2100:
2099:
2098:
2093:
2088:
2083:
2078:
2076:Market failure
2073:
2068:
2063:
2058:
2053:
2048:
2043:
2036:
2033:
2032:
2031:
2027:
2026:
2022:
2021:
2017:
2016:
2000:
1999:
1984:
1980:
1977:
1974:
1971:
1968:
1965:
1946:
1933:
1929:
1926:
1923:
1920:
1917:
1914:
1906:
1902:
1896:
1891:
1888:
1885:
1881:
1877:
1874:
1871:
1868:
1854:
1853:
1849:
1826:
1823:
1818:
1814:
1810:
1807:
1804:
1800:
1795:
1792:
1778:
1777:
1762:
1757:
1753:
1749:
1746:
1738:
1726:
1723:
1712:
1707:
1703:
1699:
1696:
1693:
1688:
1683:
1679:
1673:
1668:
1665:
1662:
1658:
1654:
1649:
1645:
1641:
1638:
1635:
1632:
1618:
1617:
1603:
1599:
1595:
1574:
1552:
1548:
1544:
1524:
1521:
1518:
1498:
1485:
1480:
1468:
1460:
1456:
1452:
1449:
1444:
1440:
1436:
1429:
1425:
1421:
1415:
1410:
1405:
1401:
1398:
1395:
1389:
1383:
1379:
1373:
1370:
1367:
1362:
1359:
1356:
1352:
1345:
1342:
1339:
1336:
1333:
1330:
1326:
1321:
1318:
1304:
1303:
1296:
1293:
1279:
1275:
1271:
1268:
1265:
1260:
1256:
1233:
1229:
1207:
1185:
1181:
1158:
1155:
1151:
1145:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1131:
1113:
1110:
1055:
1052:
1041:
1038:
1032:
1029:
989:game theoretic
984:
981:
963:
960:
959:
958:
947:
932:
891:
888:
857:
854:
852:
849:
846:
845:
842:
839:
835:
834:
831:
828:
824:
823:
820:
817:
813:
812:
809:
806:
781:
777:
773:
770:
767:
764:
761:
758:
755:
750:
746:
742:
737:
733:
729:
724:
720:
716:
690:
687:
634:
630:
605:
600:
596:
590:
585:
582:
579:
575:
571:
568:
543:
540:
492:
489:
484:requirements.
454:
448:
442:
436:
432:
431:
430:
428:
425:
402:rate of profit
291:
290:
288:
287:
280:
273:
265:
262:
261:
260:
259:
254:
246:
245:
241:
240:
239:
238:
233:
228:
219:
214:
209:
204:
199:
198:
197:
192:
182:
173:
172:
171:
166:
161:
156:
146:
135:
133:Monopolization
127:
126:
120:
119:
118:
117:
115:Merger control
112:
107:
102:
97:
92:
87:
82:
81:
80:
75:
61:
53:
52:
51:Basic concepts
48:
47:
37:
36:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4268:
4257:
4254:
4252:
4249:
4247:
4244:
4243:
4241:
4226:
4223:
4221:
4218:
4216:
4215:Legal realism
4213:
4211:
4208:
4206:
4203:
4201:
4198:
4196:
4193:
4191:
4188:
4186:
4183:
4181:
4178:
4177:
4175:
4171:
4165:
4162:
4160:
4157:
4155:
4152:
4150:
4147:
4145:
4142:
4140:
4137:
4135:
4132:
4130:
4127:
4125:
4122:
4120:
4117:
4115:
4112:
4110:
4107:
4105:
4102:
4100:
4097:
4095:
4092:
4090:
4087:
4085:
4082:
4080:
4077:
4075:
4072:
4070:
4067:
4065:
4062:
4060:
4057:
4055:
4052:
4050:
4047:
4045:
4042:
4041:
4039:
4035:
4029:
4026:
4024:
4021:
4019:
4016:
4014:
4011:
4009:
4006:
4004:
4001:
3999:
3996:
3994:
3991:
3989:
3986:
3984:
3983:Paula England
3981:
3979:
3978:Paul DiMaggio
3976:
3974:
3971:
3969:
3968:Fred L. Block
3966:
3964:
3961:
3960:
3958:
3956:
3952:
3946:
3943:
3941:
3938:
3936:
3933:
3931:
3928:
3926:
3923:
3921:
3918:
3916:
3915:Hersh Shefrin
3913:
3911:
3908:
3906:
3903:
3901:
3898:
3896:
3895:Matthew Rabin
3893:
3891:
3888:
3886:
3883:
3881:
3878:
3876:
3873:
3871:
3868:
3866:
3865:Graham Loomes
3863:
3861:
3858:
3856:
3853:
3851:
3850:George Katona
3848:
3846:
3843:
3841:
3838:
3836:
3833:
3831:
3828:
3826:
3825:David Halpern
3823:
3821:
3818:
3816:
3813:
3811:
3808:
3806:
3803:
3801:
3798:
3796:
3793:
3791:
3788:
3786:
3783:
3781:
3780:Rachel Croson
3778:
3776:
3773:
3771:
3768:
3766:
3765:Colin Camerer
3763:
3761:
3760:Sarah Brosnan
3758:
3756:
3755:Samuel Bowles
3753:
3751:
3748:
3746:
3743:
3741:
3738:
3736:
3733:
3731:
3728:
3727:
3725:
3723:
3719:
3713:
3710:
3708:
3707:Elinor Ostrom
3705:
3703:
3700:
3698:
3695:
3693:
3692:Claude Ménard
3690:
3688:
3685:
3683:
3680:
3678:
3675:
3673:
3670:
3668:
3667:Masahiko Aoki
3665:
3663:
3660:
3658:
3655:
3654:
3652:
3650:
3646:
3640:
3637:
3635:
3632:
3630:
3627:
3625:
3622:
3620:
3617:
3615:
3612:
3610:
3607:
3605:
3602:
3600:
3597:
3595:
3592:
3590:
3589:Gunnar Myrdal
3587:
3585:
3582:
3580:
3577:
3575:
3572:
3570:
3569:Simon Kuznets
3567:
3565:
3562:
3560:
3557:
3555:
3552:
3550:
3547:
3545:
3542:
3540:
3537:
3535:
3532:
3530:
3527:
3525:
3522:
3520:
3517:
3515:
3514:Ha-Joon Chang
3512:
3510:
3507:
3505:
3502:
3500:
3497:
3495:
3492:
3490:
3487:
3485:
3482:
3481:
3479:
3475:
3471:
3464:
3459:
3457:
3452:
3450:
3445:
3444:
3441:
3435:
3432:
3431:
3422:
3418:
3415:
3411:
3407:
3403:
3399:
3393:
3389:
3385:
3384:
3379:
3375:
3370:
3368:31(3): 203–55
3367:
3363:
3360:
3356:
3355:
3347:
3343:
3339:
3335:
3331:
3327:
3323:
3316:
3308:
3301:
3294:
3286:
3279:
3272:
3270:
3261:
3255:
3246:
3241:
3237:
3233:
3229:
3222:
3220:
3205:
3201:
3194:
3185:
3180:
3176:
3172:
3168:
3164:
3160:
3153:
3144:
3139:
3134:
3129:
3126:(1168–1198).
3125:
3121:
3117:
3110:
3108:
3099:
3095:
3091:
3087:
3083:
3079:
3075:
3071:
3067:
3060:
3058:
3043:
3039:
3038:"Competition"
3033:
3025:
3021:
3017:
3013:
3009:
3005:
3001:
2994:
2980:. 21 May 2019
2979:
2975:
2969:
2961:
2957:
2953:
2949:
2945:
2941:
2937:
2933:
2929:
2922:
2914:
2910:
2906:
2902:
2898:
2894:
2887:
2880:
2872:
2868:
2864:
2860:
2856:
2852:
2848:
2844:
2840:
2833:
2825:
2821:
2817:
2813:
2809:
2805:
2801:
2794:
2786:
2779:
2771:
2767:
2763:
2759:
2755:
2751:
2747:
2743:
2739:
2732:
2730:
2715:
2711:
2704:
2689:
2685:
2679:
2665:
2661:
2654:
2640:
2636:
2630:
2622:
2618:
2614:
2610:
2606:
2602:
2598:
2594:
2590:
2583:
2575:
2571:
2565:
2551:
2547:
2541:
2533:
2529:
2525:
2521:
2517:
2513:
2509:
2505:
2501:
2494:
2485:
2470:
2466:
2460:
2452:
2445:
2430:
2426:
2420:
2406:
2402:
2396:
2388:
2382:
2374:
2370:
2363:
2355:
2349:
2341:
2337:
2333:
2329:
2325:
2321:
2317:
2310:
2308:
2293:
2289:
2283:
2269:
2265:
2261:
2257:
2251:
2242:
2237:
2233:
2229:
2225:
2221:
2217:
2210:
2196:
2192:
2186:
2172:
2168:
2162:
2148:
2144:
2138:
2124:
2120:
2114:
2112:
2107:
2097:
2094:
2092:
2089:
2087:
2084:
2082:
2079:
2077:
2074:
2072:
2069:
2067:
2064:
2062:
2059:
2057:
2054:
2052:
2049:
2047:
2044:
2042:
2039:
2038:
2029:
2028:
2024:
2023:
2019:
2018:
2013:
2012:
2011:
2009:
2005:
1982:
1975:
1972:
1969:
1966:
1952:
1947:
1931:
1924:
1921:
1918:
1915:
1904:
1900:
1894:
1889:
1886:
1883:
1879:
1875:
1872:
1869:
1866:
1859:
1858:
1857:
1850:
1847:
1846:rank position
1843:
1840:where symbol
1824:
1821:
1816:
1812:
1808:
1805:
1802:
1798:
1793:
1790:
1783:
1782:
1781:
1760:
1755:
1751:
1747:
1744:
1736:
1724:
1705:
1701:
1697:
1694:
1686:
1681:
1677:
1671:
1666:
1663:
1660:
1656:
1652:
1647:
1643:
1639:
1636:
1633:
1630:
1623:
1622:
1621:
1601:
1597:
1593:
1572:
1550:
1546:
1542:
1522:
1519:
1516:
1496:
1488:
1481:
1466:
1458:
1454:
1450:
1447:
1442:
1438:
1434:
1427:
1423:
1419:
1413:
1408:
1403:
1399:
1396:
1393:
1387:
1381:
1377:
1371:
1368:
1365:
1360:
1357:
1354:
1350:
1340:
1337:
1334:
1328:
1324:
1319:
1316:
1309:
1308:
1307:
1301:
1297:
1294:
1277:
1273:
1269:
1266:
1263:
1258:
1254:
1231:
1227:
1205:
1183:
1179:
1156:
1153:
1149:
1143:
1140:
1136:
1132:
1129:
1122:
1121:
1120:
1117:
1109:
1107:
1102:
1099:
1095:
1090:
1089:
1085:
1081:
1079:
1074:
1070:
1068:
1064:
1060:
1051:
1047:
1046:
1037:
1028:
1024:
1022:
1018:
1017:
1012:
1011:
1006:
1005:cartelization
1002:
998:
994:
990:
980:
978:
973:
969:
968:profitability
955:
951:
948:
944:
940:
936:
933:
929:
925:
922:
921:
920:
917:
915:
911:
906:
904:
900:
895:
887:
885:
881:
880:
875:
871:
867:
863:
843:
840:
837:
836:
832:
829:
826:
825:
821:
818:
815:
814:
810:
807:
804:
803:
797:
794:
779:
775:
771:
768:
765:
762:
759:
756:
753:
748:
744:
740:
735:
731:
727:
722:
718:
714:
706:
704:
700:
696:
686:
685:
677:
673:
671:
667:
666:
661:
657:
652:
648:
632:
628:
618:
603:
598:
594:
588:
583:
580:
577:
573:
569:
566:
558:
556:
552:
548:
539:
537:
533:
529:
525:
521:
517:
512:
510:
504:
502:
498:
488:
485:
483:
482:human capital
479:
475:
474:brand loyalty
471:
467:
435:
424:
422:
418:
414:
409:
407:
403:
399:
395:
391:
386:
384:
383:oligopolistic
380:
376:
372:
368:
364:
359:
357:
353:
349:
345:
341:
337:
333:
328:
326:
322:
321:antitrust law
318:
314:
310:
306:
302:
298:
286:
281:
279:
274:
272:
267:
266:
264:
263:
258:
255:
253:
250:
249:
248:
247:
243:
242:
237:
234:
232:
229:
227:
223:
220:
218:
215:
213:
210:
208:
205:
203:
200:
196:
193:
191:
190:Group boycott
188:
187:
186:
183:
181:
177:
174:
170:
167:
165:
162:
160:
157:
154:
150:
147:
145:
142:Formation of
141:
140:
139:
136:
134:
131:
130:
129:
128:
125:
122:
121:
116:
113:
111:
108:
106:
103:
101:
98:
96:
93:
91:
88:
86:
83:
79:
76:
74:
71:
70:
69:
65:
62:
60:
57:
56:
55:
54:
50:
49:
43:
39:
38:
35:
32:
31:
19:
4159:Veblen goods
4119:Market power
4113:
3963:Jens Beckert
3935:Amos Tversky
3910:Eldar Shafir
3775:Kay-Yut Chen
3702:Mancur Olson
3677:Ronald Coase
3574:Hunter Lewis
3564:János Kornai
3420:
3413:
3381:
3365:
3358:
3329:
3325:
3315:
3306:
3293:
3284:
3254:cite journal
3235:
3231:
3207:. Retrieved
3203:
3193:
3184:11585/831079
3166:
3162:
3152:
3123:
3119:
3073:
3069:
3046:, retrieved
3044:, 2023-03-15
3041:
3032:
3007:
3003:
2993:
2982:. Retrieved
2977:
2968:
2935:
2931:
2921:
2896:
2892:
2879:
2846:
2842:
2832:
2807:
2803:
2793:
2784:
2778:
2745:
2741:
2717:. Retrieved
2713:
2703:
2692:. Retrieved
2690:. 2017-03-15
2687:
2678:
2667:. Retrieved
2663:
2653:
2642:. Retrieved
2638:
2629:
2599:(1): 65–75.
2596:
2592:
2582:
2573:
2564:
2553:. Retrieved
2549:
2540:
2510:(1): 65–75.
2507:
2503:
2493:
2484:
2473:. Retrieved
2471:. 2015-06-25
2468:
2459:
2450:
2444:
2433:. Retrieved
2428:
2419:
2409:, retrieved
2407:, 2021-03-29
2404:
2395:
2381:cite journal
2372:
2362:
2348:cite journal
2323:
2319:
2296:, retrieved
2294:, 2023-04-23
2291:
2282:
2271:. Retrieved
2259:
2250:
2223:
2219:
2209:
2199:, retrieved
2197:, 2023-04-24
2194:
2185:
2175:, retrieved
2173:, 2023-04-12
2170:
2161:
2151:, retrieved
2149:, 2023-01-23
2146:
2137:
2126:. Retrieved
2122:
2066:Lorenz curve
2001:
1951:Lorenz curve
1855:
1841:
1779:
1619:
1483:
1305:
1118:
1115:
1103:
1091:
1087:
1086:
1082:
1075:
1071:
1057:
1048:
1044:
1043:
1034:
1025:
1014:
1008:
993:oligopolists
986:
965:
939:Baker Hughes
918:
908:Whereas the
907:
896:
893:
890:Modern usage
884:Standard Oil
877:
859:
838:Competitive
795:
707:
699:market share
692:
682:
663:
653:
649:
619:
559:
545:
513:
505:
494:
486:
463:
433:
410:
387:
375:monopolistic
360:
356:market power
329:
300:
294:
236:Rent-seeking
149:Price fixing
100:Market power
94:
4134:Satisficing
3845:Ariel Kalil
3740:Nava Ashraf
3687:Avner Greif
3494:Joe S. Bain
2899:: 287–335.
2191:"Oligopoly"
1098:Sherman Act
935:Halliburton
703:enterprises
406:Joe S. Bain
398:competition
159:Bid rigging
4240:Categories
3820:Uri Gneezy
3805:Armin Falk
3790:Paul Dolan
3735:Dan Ariely
3209:2021-04-27
3143:1814/74432
3048:2023-04-24
2984:2021-04-28
2849:(1): 1–9.
2719:2021-04-24
2694:2021-04-24
2669:2021-04-24
2644:2021-04-24
2555:2021-04-24
2475:2021-04-24
2435:2022-11-09
2411:2023-04-24
2298:2023-04-24
2273:2021-04-24
2241:10161/4440
2226:(4): 856.
2201:2023-04-24
2177:2023-04-24
2153:2023-04-24
2143:"Industry"
2128:2021-04-24
2102:References
1535:firms and
1059:Schumpeter
1054:Innovation
1031:Efficiency
999:even when
987:There are
931:consumers.
827:Oligopoly
811:HHI Range
501:SSNIP test
413:rank order
226:copyrights
105:SSNIP test
3925:Uwe Sunde
3745:Ofer Azar
3406:237794267
3346:1972-4977
3098:155085616
3042:Knowledge
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