914:. This was due in large part to the demand for ammunition created by the First World War and also to the increasing cost of the ammunition that remained for sale. This lack of ammunition resupply would prove to be a pivotal issue in the Battle of Celaya. Allegedly, some of the ammunition that Villa had purchased before the battle from private vendors from the US was faulty and failed to perform under the conditions of the battle. Whether or not this was deceit on the part of the suppliers is difficult if not impossible to discern. Furthermore, Villa's forces were at a marked disadvantage regarding their artillery. Not only did Obregon's forces possess 15 more artillery pieces than Villa, their scarce European-sourced ammunition was vastly more lethal, reliable and had a further effective range. Before the battle began, Villa was well aware of his force's shortage of ammunition and communicated this in a message to
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ordered his men to place much more barbed wire along potential
Villista avenues of approach and cover the obstacles with additional machine-gun fire. Understanding the critical impact his reserve force had had earlier, Obregón ordered Gen. Cesareo Castro to lead a nearly 6,000-man cavalry force to conceal themselves in a nearby wooded area. The Villistas did not observe the force being positioned and were to be surprised by a reserve element. In addition to their military advantages, Obregón's men were emboldened by their resounding earlier defeat of the Villista forces. Villa himself was a victim of his earlier successes. He knew that his own prestige and the prestige of his army was at stake and they had to attack Obregón wherever they found him. Despite being low on ammunition, with morale dropping and at a tactical disadvantage, Villa's forces prepared to attack.
982:“I have the honor of telling you that the fighting has become desperate. We have no reserves of ammunition and we only have sufficient bullets to fight for a few hours more. We will undertake every effort to save the situation.” After receiving the message, Carranza immediately dispatched a train loaded with munitions to Obregón at Celaya. This resupply was critical to continue the fight against Villa's massive numbers of soldiers. As Villa's troops were exhausted after nearly 48 hours of combat, Obregón sprang his reserve cavalry force from the north and counterattacked as he had done in the previous battle. With a larger, more mobile reserve force, the attack was completely devastating to the Villistas and a full retreat ensued. Obregón sealed his victory at Celaya by ordering his forces to completely drive the Villistas from the field.
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movement of Villa's forces, Obregón ordered a 1,500-man element to occupy a hacienda called “El Guaje” near Celaya, to serve as a base to attack the railways that Villa relied upon for movement of his troops. This was a tactical miscalculation, as the majority of the
Villista forces were already nearby and immediately attacked the comparatively small Constitutionalist force. As soon as Obregón heard of the engagement, he quickly boarded a troop train to personally reinforce his men at the hacienda. A competent military mind, Obregón immediately realized that this initial tactical error could be the perfect ruse to lure the bulk of Villa's forces into his defensive positions. Obregon ordered his forces to retreat; the Villistas took the bait and pursued the Constitutionalists back towards their prepared positions at Celaya.
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839:. History would vindicate Angeles’ military expertise, as Villa's forces and tactics were no match for Obregón's use of modern weaponry and tactics. Reportedly, Villa's rationale for insisting on engaging Obregón's forces was that he did not want to appear weak or inhibit the fighting spirit of his men. However, his actual words to Gen. Angeles cannot be completely verified, as no actual record of their conversation exists. Obregón's men made excellent use of barbed wire and field-expedient obstacles to slow, disrupt and maneuver Villa's forces into the fields of fire prepared for them. As a fighting force, the cavalry and
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Obregón recalled that the
Villistas launched nearly 40 assaults with only a single penetration of his own lines. Even this minor success was thwarted by a quick-thinking Obregón. As the Villistas occupied the defensive positions they had captured, Obregón ordered his bugler to sound general retreat. The Villistas, believing the order to have come from their own bugler, were fooled into retreating and surrendered the only ground they had gained during the fighting. As Villa's men retreated, Obregón seized the opportunity and ordered a devastating counterattack.
22:
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to Obregón as “El
Perfumado” or “the one who wears perfume”, referring to Obregón's perceived more refined qualities. While Villa was often impulsive and inflammatory, he was sometimes shrewd and cunning. Obregón understood Villa's character and often tried to infuriate and provoke him. Immediately before the Battle of Celaya, Obregón boasted of his eventual defeat of Villa and even offered to dedicate his inevitable victory to his friends. As the war of words between the two commanders became more heated, Villa gave the following statement to the newspaper
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955:, Villa sent a letter to Obregón asking him to abandon Celaya in the hope that civilian casualties could be avoided. Obregón declined Villa's invitation, clearly understanding Villa's real intention to deceive him into abandoning his advantageous defense position. Villa's appeal proved popular with foreigners in Celaya, who feared the damage the Villista artillery would wreak on the city.
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both sides sought a decisive battle, the stage was set for a huge military engagement. Obregón lured Villa to the field of battle that Obregón had chosen in the Bajio. Villa's fighting style was traditional warfare relying on frontal attacks and cavalry charges. Obregón, however, would adopt advanced tactics in the forms of trenches and barbed wire being used in the world war.
883:'s followers might have cut Obregón's supply lines near Veracruz, but did not, "to Villa's disgust." Before the Battle of Celaya began, Obregón's forces occupied the field first, a strategic advantage. This was critical to the primarily defensive strategy of Obregón. In a broad stroke he planned to goad Villa into an all-out
1004:" in the sense that he was dealt a crippling military defeat. Irreparable damage was done to both his military power and his critical aura of invincibility. Further, a number of domestic and foreign observers of the revolution came to the conclusion that the Villistas were not capable of defeating the Constitutionalist army.
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The
Villistas continued this tactic for nearly two days as their cavalry and infantry conducted assault after assault on the trenches, each time meeting defeat. Even after the Villista artillery attempted to weaken the enemy's defenses with artillery barrages, the defenses continued to repulse every Villista attack.
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Militarily, the
Villistas were never again as strong as they were before taking the field at Celaya in April 1915. As a result of the disastrous battle, Villa himself was forced to go on the defensive in an attempt to reorganize his forces and procure war materiel lost at Celaya. His faithful adviser
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After the
Constitutionalists occupied the battlefield on April 4, 1915, their commanders knew that the Villistas were close. As Obregón's troops fortified their defensive positions and waited for the Villista main attack, Villa's forces began to move towards Celaya on April 5. In order to disrupt the
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Obregón's strategy was to draw Villa's army away from its lines of communication and supply and choose the place for a major encounter. Obregón's lines of communication and supply were much shorter than Villa's, but they were stretched nonetheless, as Obregón moved north, closer to Villa's territory.
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Villa was known to be a rash and sometimes overconfident commander who would not refuse a battle with Obregón's forces. This weakness would prove to be his undoing at Celaya. Also, Villa and Obregón intensely disliked each other, which led to a war of words before the battle. Publicly, Villa referred
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in March 1914, Angeles became one of Villa's most trusted military advisers. Unlike Villa, Angeles was more careful and calculating. Privately, he thought that Villa was often too rash in his decision-making. Angeles' initial absence due to an injury while riding his horse would prove critical at the
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While Villa and his senior staff had escaped, Obregón had won a nearly total victory for the
Constitutionalists. Many of the Villista junior officers were not as fortunate as their senior commanders and were captured or surrendered to Obregón's forces. Obregón ordered all of the 120 officers his men
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However, all was not well with Obregón's forces. After days of fighting and limited resupply, their ammunition supply was running dangerously low. So precarious was their logistical situation that Obregón wrote an urgent telegram to
President Carranza on the second day of fighting on April 14, 1915:
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In addition to his battle-weary forces, Obregón also called in his reserve, which pushed the
Villistas back to their own lines. In a stroke of good fortune for Obregón, the Villistas’ supply of ammunition for their small arms had run low after the day's fighting. In the middle of the retreat, one of
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The second battle of Celaya began on April 13, 1915, with a massive frontal assault by the Villista cavalry on the Constitutionalist defensive lines. As in the first battle, the Villista cavalry was repeatedly driven back again and again by the overwhelming machine-gun fire from Obregón's trenches.
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Both sides resupplied to their best ability for the ensuing battle they knew would come, as neither side was going to retreat. However, ammunition was running low on both sides of the battlefield. Obregón wisely calculated that Villa would not attempt to bypass his defenses. In preparation, Obregón
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and was an avid student of the latest military technological and tactical advancements. One of his most respected advisers was Col. Maximilian Kloss, a German immigrant turned army officer. Kloss’ military advice and remarkable insight into the nature of Villa's style of war would prove decisive at
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The results of the first battle were not catastrophic or conclusive for either side. Importantly, however, Villa was dealt his first major military setback as a commander. Despite that, morale among the Villistas was still high and they were prepared to re-engage the Constitutionalists. Villa was
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While Villa planned to use his artillery assets to weaken Obregón's defensive position, his overall plan was simply a full frontal assault by his cavalry and infantry at dawn on April 6, 1915. Prior to the battle, Villa had not personally surveyed the battlefield and was confident that his forces
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on the night before the battle began: “This time Obregón will not escape me. I know that he will attempt to withdraw as he always does, but I shall force him to fight in order to destroy the forces that constitute an obstacle to military operations without being of any great use to the enemy.” As
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Mexican Revolution and helped determine the military course of it. "The two battles of Celaya did not bring the warring to an end, but they foretold Villa's ultimate defeat." Villa lost as many as 50,000 men in these Bajío battles, and he ceased to be a force to contend with on a national scale.
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Obregón and Villa met twice more in the Bajío at León (also called the battle of Trinidad), in a protracted battle lasting 38 days, and at Aguascalientes in July, sealing the Constitutionalists' victory over Villa. Taken together these battles in the Bajío are considered a watershed event in the
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Following the battle at Celaya, Obregón sent a telegram to President Carranza saying, “Fortunately, Villa led the attack personally” explaining his victory against Villa. Estimates of casualties on both sides vary widely, as Villa attempted to soften the blow of his defeat after the battle. The
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His military service was quite distinguished and he initially left the army as a colonel. He deftly navigated the shifting political alliances that marked the early days of the Mexican Revolution. Eventually he was appointed to be the senior general in the Carranza administration. Obregón often
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As Villa's forces attacked the enemy defenses, their advance was halted by Obregon's machine guns and artillery. Instead of using his cavalry to outmaneuver the enemy defenses, Villa ordered his troops to launch wave after wave of frontal assaults against Obregón's positions. After the battle,
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quick to place the blame for the day's defeat on his lack of ammunition and resupply. This fact, combined with his failure to maintain a reserve force and his playing into the hands of Obregón by engaging on the battleground Obregon had chosen, is a more realistic appraisal of the defeat.
823:, who followed behind the main military force. These camp followers were often refugees, soldiers’ wives and family, and support personnel. This often slowed down Villa's military forces and he eventually banned them. Villa himself was an excellent horseman from his early days as a
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Obregón's advance forces arrived at Celaya in early March, nearly a month before the battle itself. By early April he had increased the size of his forces, with "6,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, 86 machine guns and 13 field pieces." It is unclear how many Villa commanded at Celaya.
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The battle of Celaya would prove to be Villa's last major contribution in the civil war as he was no longer a powerful leader. Thus, the United States began to shift their support to the victorious constitutionalists and forcing Villa to go on the run.
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had captured to be executed. In addition to capturing many of the Villistas’ experienced officers, the Constitutionalists also captured thousands of small arms and ammunition, hundreds of horses and dozens of almost irreplaceable artillery pieces.
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similar to what Obregón had done at Celaya. Obregón himself continued his to pursue his destruction of Villa in the ensuing battles of the revolution. At the battle of León, Obregón lost his right arm in the fighting and nearly died.
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over an open field. Villa's defeat was the result of his multiple tactical miscalculations and overconfidence in his much larger, undefeated army's ability to best Obregón's army under any circumstances. Villa's
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and tended to favor his cavalry and rely upon its speed to quickly maneuver around an enemy force. Before the Battle of Celaya, Villa's forces had never been defeated in a major battle against its opponents.
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Villa's commanders defected to the Constitutionalists and opened fire on Villa's troops. By a series of good tactical decisions and considerable luck, Obregón had won the first battle of Celaya.
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815:(1913–14) to oust Victoriano Huerta, was not an army in the modern, industrialized sense. In addition to their military component, Villa's army also included a large component of
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on his well-prepared defensive positions. As students of modern warfare, Obregón and his military advisers were acutely aware that machine guns, barbed wired and dug-in
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there is a monument to Obregón on the site where he was assassinated in 1928; until 1986, the monument contained Obregón's arm, which he lost at León, preserved in
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Villa consulted his staff, who understood that they would need to attempt to either outmaneuver Obregón or force him out of his defensive position. According to
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Ocho Mil Kilómetros en campaña: Relación de las acciones de armas efectuadas en más de veinte Estados de la República durante un período de cuatro años
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Ocho Mil Kilómetros en campaña: Relación de las acciones de armas efectuadas en más de veinte Estados de la República durant un período de cuatro años
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elements of the Villistas were highly mobile in early 20th-century terms. Villa used the rail system to maneuver his troops quickly, just as the
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Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2: Counter-revolution and Reconstruction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986, pp. 306; 309.
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Obregón chose the site of battle, arrived in advance to prepare it and kept to his defensive strategy, knowing Villa's propensity for blind
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and small irrigation canals that, when improved, would serve as trenches to provide excellent cover and concealment to Obregón's forces.
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Villa, by contrast, was nearly illiterate and had never served in a professional army. However, he complemented his staff with Gen.
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would punch through any defenses or his cavalry could outmaneuver them. The Constitutionalists had prepared cleared, overlapping
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gave a marked advantage to a defender. The terrain at Celaya was excellent for a defending force with modern armaments.
779:. His military career began when he belatedly joined pro-Madero forces in 1912 to put down the anti-Madero rebellion of
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Villa, displaying supreme confidence in his military judgement, decided to conduct a defensive battle at
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The commander of the Constitutionalist forces was Álvaro Obregón. He, like Villa, had no formal
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Critically, both Villa's División del Norte and Obregón's forces suffered chronic shortages of
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The location of the battle of Celaya is in the immediate vicinity of the present-day city of
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Obregón was a skilled military commander and understood that if Villa could be lured into a
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1281:, Mexico City: Librería de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret, 1917 is his memoir of his military years.
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outnumbered Obregón's Constitutionalists 2:1, but Obregón had lured Villa far from his
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Battle of Celaya is referred to by some historians of the period as Pancho Villa's "
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649:. The second battle of Celaya was fought April 15–16. These encounters between the
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Centaur of the North: Francisco Villa, the Mexican Revolution, and Northern Mexico
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The army of Pancho Villa, the División del Norte, which had fought alongside the
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propelled him to national prominence. He became president of Mexico in 1920.
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Celaya. Obregón himself was known to be an urbane, intellectual person.
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605:, 6–15 April 1915, was part of a series of military engagements in the
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Monument to Álvaro Obregón in the Parque de la Bombilla, Mexico City.
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617:(February 1913-July 1914) and then fought each other for control of
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700:. Obregón was able to utilize many tactical innovations from the
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1105:. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 2002.
1084:. Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1989.
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between the winners, who had allied against the regime of Gen.
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637:. The first battle of Celaya was fought April 6–7, 1915, near
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Alvaro Obregón: Power & Revolution in Mexico 1911-1920
1147:. Mexico City: Librería de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret, 1917
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for their machine guns. Additionally, there were many
1112:. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 1981.
661:'s best general, and the army under the command of
1140:. Mexico City: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, S.A., 1950.
1242:. Austin: University of Texas Press 1972, p. 202.
1091:. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1972.
720:and troop movement techniques such as the use of
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1240:Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years
1089:Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years
665:were crucial in determining the outcome of the
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1119:. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
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66:Learn how and when to remove this message
1362:Villa: Soldier of the Mexican Revolution
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29:This article includes a list of general
851:, were deployed before the Revolution.
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1133:. Austin, Texas: Eakin Press, 1988.
1077:. New York: John Day Company, 1970.
1012:argued that Villa should return to
808:beginning of the Battle of Celaya.
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1117:The Life and Times of Pancho Villa
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847:, the crack rural police force of
629:faced off against the Army of the
35:it lacks sufficient corresponding
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1420:Battles of the Mexican Revolution
1214:"Latin America's Wars Volume II".
1201:"Latin America's Wars Volume II".
1188:"Latin America's Wars Volume II".
1103:The Mexican Revolution: 1910-1940
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1349:The Mexican Revolution
1336:The Mexican Revolution
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1080:Clausewitz, Carl Von.
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733:
730:
655:Álvaro Obregón
596:
595:
593:
592:
587:
582:
577:
572:
567:
562:
557:
552:
547:
542:
537:
532:
527:
522:
517:
512:
507:
502:
497:
492:
487:
482:
477:
472:
467:
462:
457:
452:
447:
442:
437:
432:
427:
422:
417:
412:
407:
402:
397:
392:
387:
382:
377:
372:
367:
362:
357:
352:
347:
342:
337:
332:
327:
322:
317:
312:
307:
302:
297:
291:
288:
287:
276:
275:
268:
261:
253:
245:
244:
241:6,500 captured
237:
231:
230:
226:
225:
222:
216:
215:
211:
210:
198:
196:Álvaro Obregón
185:
184:
180:
179:
178:
177:
169:Conventionists
158:
157:
156:
136:
135:
131:
130:
127:
126:
123:
119:
118:
112:
110:
106:
105:
102:
94:
93:
83:
82:
74:
73:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1442:
1431:
1428:
1426:
1423:
1421:
1418:
1416:
1413:
1411:
1408:
1407:
1405:
1398:
1388:
1379:
1370:
1363:
1357:
1350:
1344:
1337:
1331:
1324:
1318:
1311:
1305:
1296:
1287:
1280:
1274:
1267:
1261:
1254:
1248:
1241:
1235:
1228:
1222:
1215:
1209:
1202:
1196:
1189:
1183:
1176:
1170:
1161:
1157:
1146:
1142:
1139:
1135:
1132:
1128:
1125:
1121:
1118:
1114:
1111:
1108:Hall, Linda.
1107:
1104:
1100:
1097:
1093:
1090:
1086:
1083:
1079:
1076:
1072:
1071:
1060:
1056:
1054:
1050:
1046:
1042:
1038:
1029:
1025:
1022:
1017:
1015:
1011:
1005:
1003:
992:
983:
979:
970:
959:Second battle
956:
954:
949:
940:
936:
932:
923:
921:
917:
913:
908:
906:
902:
896:
892:
890:
886:
882:
866:
863:
852:
850:
849:Porfirio Díaz
846:
842:
838:
834:
829:
826:
822:
818:
814:
809:
806:
802:
798:
793:
790:
784:
782:
778:
774:
766:
762:
758:
754:
747:
743:
738:
729:
725:
723:
719:
715:
711:
707:
703:
702:Western Front
699:
695:
691:
687:
686:communication
683:
678:
675:
670:
668:
664:
660:
656:
652:
648:
644:
640:
636:
632:
628:
624:
620:
616:
612:
608:
604:
591:
588:
586:
583:
581:
578:
576:
573:
571:
568:
566:
563:
561:
558:
556:
553:
551:
548:
546:
543:
541:
538:
536:
533:
531:
528:
526:
523:
521:
518:
516:
513:
511:
508:
506:
503:
501:
498:
496:
493:
491:
488:
486:
483:
481:
478:
476:
475:Gómez Palacio
473:
471:
468:
466:
463:
461:
458:
456:
453:
451:
448:
446:
445:Tierra Blanca
443:
441:
438:
436:
433:
431:
428:
426:
423:
421:
418:
416:
413:
411:
408:
406:
403:
401:
398:
396:
393:
391:
388:
386:
383:
381:
378:
376:
373:
371:
368:
366:
363:
361:
358:
356:
353:
351:
348:
346:
343:
341:
340:Casas Grandes
338:
336:
333:
331:
328:
326:
323:
321:
318:
316:
313:
311:
308:
306:
303:
301:
298:
296:
293:
292:
289:
284:
274:
269:
267:
262:
260:
255:
254:
251:
243:5,000 wounded
238:
233:
232:
227:
223:
218:
217:
212:
209:
199:
197:
187:
186:
181:
176:
173:
172:
171:
170:
159:
155:
152:
151:
150:
149:
138:
137:
132:
124:
121:
120:
115:
111:
108:
107:
103:
100:
99:
95:
89:
84:
79:
70:
67:
59:
49:
45:
39:
38:
32:
27:
18:
17:
1397:
1387:
1378:
1369:
1361:
1356:
1348:
1343:
1335:
1330:
1322:
1317:
1309:
1304:
1295:
1286:
1278:
1273:
1265:
1260:
1252:
1251:Cumberland,
1247:
1239:
1234:
1226:
1221:
1208:
1195:
1182:
1174:
1173:Cumberland,
1169:
1160:
1144:
1137:
1130:
1123:
1116:
1109:
1102:
1095:
1088:
1081:
1074:
1057:
1053:formaldehyde
1034:
1018:
1006:
998:
989:
980:
976:
967:
950:
946:
937:
933:
929:
909:
897:
893:
877:
869:First battle
861:
858:
830:
810:
794:
785:
770:
765:Pancho Villa
742:Pancho Villa
726:
714:machine guns
690:supply lines
671:
663:Pancho Villa
653:led by Gen.
635:Pancho Villa
602:
600:
524:
515:Norias Ranch
460:Chilpancingo
335:Smelter View
239:6,000 killed
208:Pancho Villa
160:
139:
134:Belligerents
62:
53:
34:
1049:Mexico City
964:Preparation
724:were seen.
710:barbed wire
625:under Gen.
609:during the
575:3rd Nogales
570:3rd Torreón
540:2nd Nogales
520:Ojo de Agua
485:2nd Torreón
430:1st Torreón
415:Jonacatepec
405:1st Nogales
395:2nd Rellano
390:1st Rellano
375:2nd Tijuana
360:1st Tijuana
305:Buena Noche
300:Costa Oeste
236:641 wounded
48:introducing
1425:Guanajuato
1404:Categories
1152:References
1041:Guanajuato
862:Vida Nueva
821:soldaderas
718:logistical
643:Guanajuato
560:Xochimilco
545:San Ysabel
510:Bandit War
425:San Andrés
385:Cuernavaca
345:2nd Bauche
330:1st Bauche
315:Rosamorada
234:695 killed
56:April 2014
31:references
1325:, p. 321.
1312:, p. 322.
1255:, p. 203.
1229:, p. 323.
1177:, p. 201.
986:Aftermath
943:Aftermath
912:munitions
889:artillery
555:Tlayacapa
500:Zacatecas
435:Chihuahua
325:2nd Tepic
320:1st Tepic
1391:Hall 125
1382:Katz 493
1351:, p. 321
1347:Knight,
1338:, p. 321
1334:Knight,
1321:Knight,
1308:Knight,
1225:Knight,
1002:Waterloo
920:Veracruz
841:infantry
698:trenches
565:Carrizal
550:Columbus
505:2nd Naco
495:Veracruz
450:Zaragoza
410:1st Naco
350:Mexicali
214:Strength
109:Location
905:ditches
855:Prelude
845:Rurales
704:in the
677:charges
674:cavalry
585:Durango
455:Ojinaga
365:Cuautla
310:Rosario
44:improve
1082:On War
1045:Mexico
1037:Celaya
973:Battle
926:Battle
825:bandit
722:trains
694:canals
647:Mexico
639:Celaya
621:. The
619:Mexico
525:Celaya
420:Aviles
380:Parque
224:22,000
219:15,000
122:Result
114:Celaya
33:, but
1216:2003.
1203:2003.
1190:2003.
1008:Gen.
759:Gen.
740:Gen.
607:Bajío
1021:León
712:and
696:and
688:and
601:The
590:Ruby
530:León
101:Date
819:or
803:'s
633:of
1406::
1055:.
1043:,
1039:,
922:.
669:.
657:,
645:,
1364:.
272:e
265:t
258:v
69:)
63:(
58:)
54:(
40:.
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