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constitutive of human life. They are widely regarded as formidable benefits in themselves, despite the fact that they are conditions of misery as well as of happiness, and that a sufficient quantity of more particular evils can perhaps outweigh them. That is what is meant, I think by the allegation that it is good simply to be alive, even if one is undergoing terrible experiences. The situation is roughly this: There are elements which, it added to one's experience, make life better; there are other elements which if added to one's experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its consequences." 'Death' (essay), Thomas Nagel, CUP, 1979
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impersonal whole. The structure of Nagel's later ethical view is that all reasons must be brought into relation to this objective view of oneself. Reasons and values that withstand detached critical scrutiny are objective, but more subjective reasons and values can nevertheless be objectively tolerated. However, the most striking part of the earlier argument and of
Sidgwick's view is preserved: agent-neutral reasons are literally reasons for anyone, so all objectifiable reasons become individually possessed no matter whose they are. Thinking reflectively about ethics from this standpoint, one must take every other agent's standpoint on value as seriously as one's own, since one's own perspective is just a subjective take on an inter-subjective whole; one's personal set of reasons is thus swamped by the objective reasons of all others.
1120:, Nagel believes that one must conceive of one's good as an impersonal good and one's reasons as objective reasons. That means, practically, that a timeless and intrinsic value generates reasons for anyone. A person who denies the truth of this claim is committed, as in the case of a similar mistake about prudence, to a false view of themself. In this case the false view is that one's reasons are irreducibly theirs, in a way that does not allow them to be reasons for anyone: Nagel argues this commits such a person to the view that they cannot make the same judgments about their own reasons third-personally that they can make first-personally. Nagel calls this "
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that does not sufficiently respect the needs of others. He recommends a gradual move to much more demanding conceptions of equality, motivated by the special nature of political responsibility. Normally, people draw a distinction between what people do and what people fail to bring about, but this thesis, true of individuals, does not apply to the state, which is a collective agent. A Rawlsian state permits intolerable inequalities and people need to develop a more ambitious view of equality to do justice to the demands of the objective recognition of the reasons of others. For Nagel, honoring the objective point of view demands nothing less.
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a person is motivated to moral action it is indeed true that such actions are motivated, like all intentional actions, by a belief and a desire. But it is important to get the justificatory relations right: when a person accepts a moral judgment they are necessarily motivated to act. But it is the reason that does the justificatory work of justifying both the action and the desire. Nagel contrasts this view with a rival view which believes that a moral agent can only accept that they have a reason to act if the desire to carry out the action has an independent justification. An account based on presupposing sympathy would be of this kind.
1103:
reason in the future to justify one's current action without reference to the strength of one's current desires. If a hurricane were to destroy someone's car next year, at that point they will want their insurance company to pay them to replace it: that future reason gives them a reason to take out insurance now. The strength of the reason ought not to be hostage to the strength of one's current desires. The denial of this view of prudence, Nagel argues, means that one does not really believe that one is one and the same person through time. One is dissolving oneself into distinct person-stages.
1153:"agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" reasons. In the case of agent-relative reasons (the successor to subjective reasons), specifying the content of the reason makes essential reference back to the agent for whom it is a reason. An example of this might be: "Anyone has a reason to honor his or her parents." By contrast, in the case of agent-neutral reasons (the successor to objective reasons) specifying the content of the reason does not make any essential reference back to the person for whom it is a reason. An example of this might be: "Anyone has a reason to promote the good of parenthood."
805:. Both ask people to take up an interpretative perspective to making sense of other speakers in the context of a shared, objective world. This, for Nagel, elevates contingent conditions of our makeup into criteria for what is real. The result "cuts the world down to size" and makes what there is dependent on what there can be interpreted to be. Nagel claims this is no better than more orthodox forms of idealism in which reality is claimed to be made up of mental items or constitutively dependent on a form supplied by the mind.
737:. Understanding this bleached-out view of the world draws on our capacities as purely rational thinkers and fails to account for the specific nature of our perceptual sensibility. Nagel repeatedly returns to the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities—that is, between primary qualities of objects like mass and shape, which are mathematically and structurally describable independent of our sensory apparatuses, and secondary qualities like taste and color, which depend on our sensory apparatuses.
733:, Nagel believes that the rise of modern science has permanently changed how people think of the world and our place in it. A modern scientific understanding is one way of thinking about the world and our place in it that is more objective than the commonsense view it replaces. It is more objective because it is less dependent on our peculiarities as the kinds of thinkers that people are. Our modern scientific understanding involves the mathematicized understanding of the world represented by modern
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975:, nor mental, but such that it necessitates all three of these ways in which the mind "appears" to us. The difference between the kind of explanation he rejects and the kind he accepts depends on his understanding of transparency: from his earliest work to his most recent Nagel has always insisted that a prior context is required to make identity statements plausible, intelligible and transparent.
1187:. The objective standpoint and its demands have to be balanced with the subjective personal point of view of each person and its demands. One can always be maximally objective, but one does not have to be. One can legitimately "cap" the demands placed on oneself by the objective reasons of others. In addition, in his later work, Nagel finds a rationale for so-called
1242:, he wrote, "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that."
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way that people will simply be able to see that it necessitates both of these aspects. Now, it seems to people that the mental and the physical are irreducibly distinct, but that is not a metaphysical insight, or an acknowledgment of an irreducible explanatory gap, but simply where people are at their present stage of understanding.
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objective. He argues that scientific understanding's attempt at an objective viewpoint—a "view from nowhere"—necessarily leaves out something essential when applied to the mind, which inherently has a subjective point of view. As such, objective science is fundamentally unable to help people fully understand themselves. In "
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who believes in the separateness of persons, so his task is to explain why this objective viewpoint does not swallow up the individual standpoint of each of us. He provides an extended rationale for the importance to people of their personal point of view. The result is a hybrid ethical theory of the
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to uncover the formal principles that underlie reason in practice and the related general beliefs about the self that are necessary for those principles to be truly applicable to us. Nagel defends motivated desire theory about the motivation of moral action. According to motivated desire theory, when
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in nature will involve a revolution in our understanding of both the physical and the mental, and that this is a reasonable prospect that people can anticipate in the near future. A plausible science of the mind will give an account of the stuff that underpins mental and physical properties in such a
726:
intellectual commitments, whether about the external world, knowledge, or what our practical and moral reasons ought to be, one errs. For contingent, limited and finite creatures, no such unified world view is possible, because ways of understanding are not always better when they are more objective.
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that standpoint. One learns and uses mental concepts by being directly acquainted with one's own mind, whereas any attempt to think more objectively about mentality would abstract away from this fact. It would, of its nature, leave out what it is to be a thinker, and that, Nagel believes, would be a
768:
that are falsely objectifying in precisely this kind of way. They are right to be impressed—modern science really is objective—but wrong to take modern science to be the only paradigm of objectivity. The kind of understanding that science represents does not apply to everything people would like to
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to detailed scrutiny. Once again, Nagel places such weight on the objective point of view and its requirements that he finds Rawls's view of liberal equality not demanding enough. Rawls's aim to redress, not remove, the inequalities that arise from class and talent seems to Nagel to lead to a view
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The most striking claim of the book is that there is a very close parallel between prudential reasoning in one's own interests and moral reasons to act to further the interests of another person. When one reasons prudentially, for example about the future reasons that one will have, one allows the
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Despite what may seem like skepticism about the objective claims of science, Nagel does not dispute that science describes the world that exists independently of us. His contention, rather, is that a given way of understanding a subject matter should not be regarded as better simply for being more
954:, one puts oneself in a conscious state resembling pain. These two ways of imagining the two terms of the identity statement are so different that there will always seem to be an explanatory gap, whether or not this is the case. (Some philosophers of mind have taken these arguments as helpful for
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The different classes of reasons and values (i.e., agent-relative and agent-neutral) emphasized in Nagel's later work are situated within a
Sidgwickian model in which one's moral commitments are thought of objectively, such that one's personal reasons and values are simply incomplete parts of an
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Nagel has said, "There are elements which, if added to one's experience, make life better; there are other elements which if added to one's experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. ... The additional positive
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about the physical and the mental. This is, however, a misunderstanding: Nagel's point is that there is a constraint on what it is to possess the concept of a mental state, namely, that one be directly acquainted with it. Concepts of mental states are only made available to a thinker who can be
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the organism." In the 50th-anniversary republication of his article in book form, Nagel writes that he "tried to show that the irreducible subjectivity of consciousness is an obstacle to many proposed solutions to the mind-body problem." His critics have objected to what they see as a misguided
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The full quotation is "... the natural view that death is an evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life contains. We need not give an account of these goods here, except to observe that some of them, like perception, desire, activity, and thought, are so general as to be
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Nagel began to publish philosophy at age 22; his career now spans over 60 years of publication. He thinks that each person, owing to their capacity to reason, instinctively seeks a unified world view, but if this aspiration leads one to believe that there is only one way to understand our
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Rhys
Southan explains such ordinary experiences as having value "... because of the almost unbelievable fact that there is a world at all, and that we're conscious beings who get to be in it, feelings its sensations, and interacting with it and other similarly improbable existers."
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subjective reason, one can only take them to be the guise of the reasons that there really are: the objective ones. In later discussions, Nagel treats his former view as an incomplete attempt to convey the fact that there are distinct classes of reasons and values, and speaks instead of
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is, strictly speaking, irrefutable. The therapeutic or deflationary philosopher, influenced by
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, reconciles people to the dependence of our worldview on our "form of life". Nagel accuses Wittgenstein and American philosopher of mind and language
840:, be satisfactorily explained with the concepts of physics. This position was primarily discussed by Nagel in one of his most famous articles: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974). The article's title question, though often attributed to Nagel, was originally asked by
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attempt to argue from a fact about how one represents the world (trivially, one can only do so from one's point of view) to a false claim about the world, that it somehow has first-personal perspectives built into it. On that understanding, Nagel is a conventional
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view flies in the face of common sense. He writes that mind is a basic aspect of nature, and that any philosophy of nature that cannot account for it is fundamentally misguided. He argues that the principles that account for the emergence of life may be
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on the grounds that it exposes a limitation that makes the existence of an explanatory gap seem compelling, while others have argued that this makes the case for physicalism even more impossible as it cannot be defended even in principle.)
946:.) This argument that there will always be an explanatory gap between an identification of a state in mental and physical terms is compounded, Nagel argues, by the fact that imagination operates in two distinct ways. When asked to imagine
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Note that the paragraph in the earlier 1970 version of the essay published in Nous; Death Author(s): Thomas Nagel Source: Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb ... static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1011404/27295252/.../Nagel_Death.pdf?token...
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action for another person's good that person's reasons quite literally become reasons for one if they are timeless and intrinsic reasons. Genuine reasons are reasons for anyone. Like the 19th-century moral philosopher
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physics: he envisages in his most recent work that people may be close to a scientific breakthrough in identifying an underlying essence that is neither physical (as people currently think of the physical), nor
1128:(the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist). Once again, a false view of what is involved in reasoning properly is refuted by showing that it leads to a false view of people's nature.
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The extent to which one can lead a good life as an individual while respecting the demands of others leads inevitably to political philosophy. In the Locke lectures published as the book
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falsely objectifying view. Being a thinker is to have a subjective perspective on the world; if one abstracts away from this perspective one leaves out what he sought to explain.
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that enables—indeed compels—so many people to see in the world the expression of divine purpose as naturally as they see in a smiling face the expression of human feeling." In
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refugees
Carolyn (Baer) and Walter Nagel. He arrived in the US in 1939, and was raised in and around New York. He had no religious upbringing, but regards himself as a
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that he disagrees with both ID defenders and their opponents, who argue that the only naturalistic alternative to ID is the current reductionist neo-Darwinian model.
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are stimulated but one is not in pain and so refute any such psychophysical identity from the armchair. (A parallel argument does not hold for genuine
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Nagel thinks that philosophers, over-impressed by the paradigm of the kind of objective understanding represented by modern science, tend to produce
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Nagel is not a physicalist because he does not believe that an internal understanding of mental concepts shows them to have the kind of hidden
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Nagel's rationalism and tendency to present human nature as composite, structured around our capacity to reason, explains why he thinks that
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are not best grasped from a more objective perspective. The standpoint of the thinker does not present itself to the thinker: they
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Nagel has argued that ID should not be rejected as non-scientific, for instance writing in 2008 that "ID is very different from
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as one of his "Best Books of the Year." Nagel does not accept Meyer's conclusions but endorsed Meyer's approach, and argued in
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views in which one takes up the standpoint of a collective subject whose reasons are those of everyone. But Nagel remains an
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1997, "Assisted
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acquainted with their own states; clearly, the possession and use of physical concepts has no corresponding constraint.
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1900:, vol. 45, no. 17 (7 September 2023), pp. 9–10. "I was one of Austin's last students..." (p. 10.) A quotation from
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399:; born July 4, 1937) is an American philosopher. He is the University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at
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aspect. He writes, "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to
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Philosophy, morality, and international affairs: essays edited for the
Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs
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Nagel's later work on ethics ceases to place as much weight on the distinction between a person's personal or "
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1976, "Moral Luck", Proceedings of the
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constraints in a way
Scheffler could not. Following Warren Quinn and Frances Kamm, Nagel grounds them on the
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Mind and Cosmos: why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false.
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Mind and Cosmos: Why the
Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False
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526:, whom Nagel later called "the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century."
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he took the stance that if one's reasons really are about intrinsic and timeless values then,
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1904:: "Is it not possible that the next century may see the birth... of a true and comprehensive
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2021, Thomas Nagel, "Types of Intuition: Thomas Nagel on human rights and moral knowledge",
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Part of the puzzlement here is because of the limitations of imagination: influenced by his
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This is the basis of his analogy between prudential actions and moral actions: in cases of
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In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Nagel argues that consciousness has essential to it a
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1918:... in the only way we ever can get rid of philosophy, by kicking it upstairs." (p. 10.)
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that underpins a scientific identity in, say, chemistry. But his skepticism is about
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weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its consequences."
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440:
433:(1970) and subsequent writings. He continued the critique of reductionism in
429:" (1974), and for his contributions to liberal moral and political theory in
3992:
3859:
2447:
Pyka, Marek (2005). "Thomas Nagel on Mind, Morality, and Political Theory".
2426:"Arguments: Thomas Nagel and Stephen C. Meyer's Signature in the Cell - TLS"
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view of the emergence of life and consciousness, writing that the standard
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2951:
2741:
2298:"Balzan Prize 2008 (1 Million Swiss Francs) Awarded for Moral Philosophy"
2182:"Jewniversity corner: What makes life worthwhile? - The Jewish Chronicle"
1901:
1259:
Nagel married Doris Blum in 1954, divorcing in 1973. In 1979, he married
1083:
994:
955:
923:
837:
773:
419:
345:
32:
2468:
745:" and elsewhere, he writes that science cannot describe what it is like
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1915:
1864:
1733:
1983, "The Objective Self", in Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker (eds.),
1208:
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1075:
538:
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327:
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63:
2987:
2483:
6309:
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4583:
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4377:
4186:
3295:
3166:
2700:
1125:
1070:
Nagel has been highly influential in the related fields of moral and
753:
2684:
1090:. His distinctive ideas were first presented in the short monograph
6180:
6135:
5852:
5207:
5172:
4806:
4791:
4715:
4710:
4675:
4665:
4578:
4513:
4487:
2588:
1910:
464:
59:
2411:
Nagel, Thomas. (2008). "Public education and intelligent design,"
1537:
Secular philosophy and the religious temperament: essays 2002–2008
1094:
published in 1970. That book seeks by reflection on the nature of
6231:
6013:
4831:
4720:
4685:
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1906:
1229:
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4615:
4492:
4102:
2535:
1772:, Novartis Symposium 213, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3–10.
1410:
What does it all mean?: a very short introduction to philosophy
1057:, "do not deserve the scorn with which they are commonly met."
468:
408:
259:
67:
950:, one imagines C-fibres being stimulated; if asked to imagine
644:
from the article and its talk page, especially if potentially
391:
6741:
6065:
4796:
4786:
1785:
1998, "Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem",
1726:
1981, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Ethics of Conflict",
776:, Nagel believes that a proper understanding of the place of
104:
94:
2199:
Nagel, Thomas (2009). "Analytic Philosophy and Human Life".
6259:
6155:
5058:
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
4836:
4752:
4598:
4593:
4553:
385:
5928:
Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)
4762:
4071:
1687:
1973, "Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination",
1273:
PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award for the Art of the Essay
472:
388:
114:
2541:
https://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/maydede/mind/Nagel_Death.pdf
2320:"Oxford University Gazette, 20 June 2008: Encaenia 2008"
1641:
1971, "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness",
836:
cannot, at least with the contemporary understanding of
1914:? Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part of
1884:
J.L. Austin: Philosopher and D-Day Intelligence Officer
1291:(2008) and the Distinguished Achievement Award of the
930:
statement that identifies a physical state type with a
884:
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
2555:
http://www.oxonianreview.org/wp/the-vise-side-of-life/
1819:
2003, "Rawls and Liberalism", in Samuel Freeman (ed.)
978:
6333:
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
2353:
Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), p. 436.
1863:, vol. 43, no. 11 (3 June 2021), pp. 3, 5–6, 8.
1333:
850:, and has been reprinted several times, including in
382:
6998:
Members of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts
813:
1131:
379:
1494:
1429:
1343:
844:. The article was originally published in 1974 in
1833:2008, "Public Education and Intelligent Design",
1740:1987, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy",
1539:. Oxford New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press.
425:accounts of the mind, particularly in his essay "
6938:American consciousness researchers and theorists
6904:
2565:
1728:Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College
6495:
1179:kind defended by Nagel's Princeton PhD student
792:accounts of philosophy are complacent and that
2344:. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter VI.
1768:1998, "Reductionism and Antireductionism", in
1497:The myth of ownership : taxes and justice
1245:
506:in philosophy in 1960; there, he studied with
6993:Members of the American Philosophical Society
6481:
5294:
4087:
3003:
2449:American Journal of Theology & Philosophy
2382:
2380:
2378:
2376:
2374:
2372:
2100:"Thomas Nagel - Overview | NYU School of Law"
1823:, Cambridge University Press, pp. 62–85.
1806:, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 432–471.
6963:Corresponding fellows of the British Academy
5034:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
1939:New York University Department of Philosophy
1737:, Oxford University Press, pp. 211–232.
1520:. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
1501:. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
1478:. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1078:, he has been a longstanding proponent of a
1065:
2069:
2067:
2065:
2063:
1841:Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
1826:2003, "John Rawls and Affirmative Action",
1630:, pp. 394–403 (a discussion review of
1492:
1314:. Princeton, N.J: Oxford University Press.
1124:" and considers it a practical analogue of
549:, the last of whom is now his colleague at
6488:
6474:
5301:
5287:
4094:
4080:
3010:
2996:
2369:
2220:John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice
1878:2023: "Leader of the Martians" (review of
1754:1995, "Personal Rights and Public Space",
1678:, pp. 220–34 (a discussion review of
1559:Oxford New York: Oxford University Press,
1518:Concealment and exposure: and other essays
637:about living persons that is unsourced or
564:, and in 2006 was elected a member of the
31:
7008:New York University School of Law faculty
5959:Electromagnetic theories of consciousness
1839:2009, "The I in Me", a review article of
1828:The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education
708:Learn how and when to remove this message
522:in 1963. At Harvard, Nagel studied under
7018:PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award winners
6943:American people of German-Jewish descent
2241:
2239:
2192:
2060:
1576:1959, "Hobbes's Concept of Obligation",
1298:
866:Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology
490:and was introduced to the philosophy of
454:
7058:Yugoslav emigrants to the United States
5066:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
3286:
3017:
2524:, Oxford University Press, 1997, P. 130
2008:
1992:Nagel, Thomas, 1979, "Panpsychism", in
1608:1969, "The Boundaries of Inner Space",
1475:Other minds: critical essays, 1969–1994
1198:
824:Nagel is probably most widely known in
439:(2012), in which he argues against the
209: 1979; died 2014)
6905:
5969:Higher-order theories of consciousness
2621:
2011:"The Evolution of Nagel's Panpsychism"
1789:, vol. 73, no. 285, pp. 337–352.
486:in 1958, where he was a member of the
6469:
5984:Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis
5282:
4075:
2991:
2667:
2386:
2236:
2218:Pogge, Thomas Winfried Menko (2007).
2217:
2198:
1993:
1770:The Limits of Reductionism in Biology
1534:
1515:
1471:
1457:. New York: Oxford University Press.
1450:
1436:. New York: Oxford University Press.
1427:
1406:
1392:. New York: Oxford University Press.
1385:
1364:
1350:. New York: Oxford University Press.
1309:
1279:(1995). He has also been awarded the
808:
595:
578:National Endowment for the Humanities
558:American Academy of Arts and Sciences
467:, Yugoslavia (now Serbia), to German
6450:
2446:
2151:
2149:
2122:
2120:
1667:, vol. 1, pp. 123–44 (repr. in
1493:Nagel, Thomas; Murphy, Liam (2002).
1165:
1156:
1106:
1049:that Meyer and other ID proponents,
1037:by the philosopher and ID proponent
599:
5082:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
2481:
2391:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1843:by Galen Strawson, Oxford, 448 pp,
1721:Washington University Law Quarterly
1413:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
979:Natural selection and consciousness
905:that organism—something it is like
568:. He has held fellowships from the
463:Nagel was born on July 4, 1937, in
418:Nagel is known for his critique of
13:
6928:21st-century American philosophers
6923:20th-century American philosophers
6275:Subjective character of experience
6171:Neural correlates of consciousness
2615:
1998:. London: Canto. pp. 181–195.
1775:1998, "Concealment and Exposure",
1758:, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 83–107.
560:and a corresponding fellow of the
531:University of California, Berkeley
450:
351:subjective character of experience
14:
7069:
6968:American critics of postmodernism
6305:Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation
5954:Damasio's theory of consciousness
5308:
2632:
2146:
2117:
1779:, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 3–30.
1719:1979, "The Meaning of Equality",
1289:Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
1185:The Rejection of Consequentialism
1170:This is similar to "world agent"
814:What is it like to be a something
356:what is it like to be a something
7053:Serbian people of German descent
6449:
6440:
6439:
6367:Journal of Consciousness Studies
6255:Sociology of human consciousness
6091:Dual consciousness (split-brain)
5994:Orchestrated objective reduction
5263:
5262:
4055:
4046:
4045:
2823:PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award
2543:ends at "perhaps outweigh them."
2366:Oxford University Press, p. vii.
1821:The Cambridge Companion to Rawls
1632:A Materialist Theory of the Mind
1283:in Moral Philosophy (2008), the
1254:
1132:Subjective and objective reasons
828:as an advocate of the idea that
604:
584:for his work in philosophy, the
375:
183:
16:American philosopher (born 1937)
6373:Online Consciousness Conference
6360:How the Self Controls Its Brain
2727:Tanner Lecturer on Human Values
2559:
2546:
2527:
2514:
2475:
2440:
2418:
2413:Philosophy & Public Affairs
2405:
2356:
2347:
2334:
2312:
2290:
2264:
2211:
1777:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1756:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1742:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1689:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1665:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1626:1970, "Armstrong on the Mind",
1287:in Logic and Philosophy of the
1010:(ID), his book was "praised by
868:(edited by Ned Block), Nagel's
592:from the University of Oxford.
206:
179:
6019:Altered state of consciousness
5050:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
4420:Value monism – Value pluralism
3258:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2759:Howison Lecturer in Philosophy
2669:"What is it like to be a bat?"
2274:. May 12, 2008. Archived from
2174:
2092:
2035:
2002:
1986:
1330:, Princeton University Press.)
566:American Philosophical Society
459:Nagel in 2008, teaching ethics
101:Corpus Christi College, Oxford
1:
7028:American philosophers of mind
6121:Hard problem of consciousness
5979:Integrated information theory
2272:"The Rolf Schock Prizes 2008"
1979:
1959:Hard problem of consciousness
1934:List of American philosophers
1835:Philosophy and Public Affairs
1645:, pp. 396–413 (repr. in
1228:, Nagel writes that he is an
1043:The Times Literary Supplement
729:Like the British philosopher
588:, and the honorary degree of
7033:Princeton University faculty
6419:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
6406:The Science of Consciousness
6280:Subjectivity and objectivity
5114:On the Genealogy of Morality
5074:Critique of Practical Reason
2705:The New York Review of Books
2679:(4): 435–450. October 1974.
2536:http://dbanach.com/death.htm
2500:10.1080/09552367.2012.692534
2364:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
1702:, pp. 435–50 (repr. in
1696:What Is it Like to Be a Bat?
1656:, pp. 716–27 (repr. in
1146:The Possibility of Altruism,
1092:The Possibility of Altruism,
820:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
743:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
615:biography of a living person
427:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
284:Other academic advisors
135:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
7:
7038:Rolf Schock Prize laureates
7003:New York University faculty
6412:Understanding Consciousness
6339:Consciousness and Cognition
6327:A Universe of Consciousness
2222:. Oxford University Press.
1922:
1619:, pp. 73–80 (repr. in
1597:1969, "Sexual Perversion",
1570:
1312:The possibility of altruism
1246:Experience itself as a good
720:
642:must be removed immediately
580:. In 2008 he was awarded a
574:National Science Foundation
533:(from 1963 to 1966) and at
431:The Possibility of Altruism
10:
7074:
6386:The Astonishing Hypothesis
6081:Disorders of consciousness
5042:A Treatise of Human Nature
4101:
3157:Causal theory of reference
2075:"Thomas Nagel – Biography"
1804:New Essays on the A Priori
1691:, vol. 2, pp. 348–62.
1674:1973, "Rawls on Justice",
1663:1972, "War and Massacre",
1601:, pp. 5–17 (repr. in
1219:
982:
926:, Nagel believes that any
817:
518:degree in philosophy from
482:degree in philosophy from
7048:21st-century Serbian Jews
6973:Harvard University alumni
6958:Cornell University alumni
6805:
6698:
6603:
6504:
6435:
6318:
6166:Minimally conscious state
6076:Consciousness after death
6006:
5936:
5808:
5801:
5736:
5630:
5564:
5323:
5316:
5258:
5165:
5010:
4776:
4501:
4430:
4292:
4167:
4109:
4041:
4016:
3978:
3952:
3926:
3898:
3842:
3814:
3751:
3730:
3669:
3627:
3604:
3581:
3483:
3427:
3389:
3333:
3240:
3144:
3094:
3068:
3032:
3025:
2976:
2971:for Logic and Philosophy
2966:
2958:
2948:
2938:
2930:
2920:
2910:
2902:
2892:
2884:
2874:
2849:
2841:
2831:
2820:
2812:
2807:
2797:
2788:
2775:
2765:
2756:
2748:
2738:
2724:
2719:
2714:
2569:(October 1998). "Review:
1266:
1066:Nagel's Rawlsian approach
1060:
993:, Nagel argues against a
556:Nagel is a fellow of the
443:view of the emergence of
364:
336:
293:
283:
271:
258:
246:
242:
219:
160:
124:
83:
75:
42:
30:
23:
6978:Jewish American atheists
6029:Artificial consciousness
5546:William Kingdon Clifford
4393:Universal prescriptivism
3217:Scientific structuralism
2825:for the Art of the Essay
2482:Liu, JeeLoo (May 2012).
1830:, no. 39, pp. 82–4.
1763:New York Review of Books
1303:
1271:Nagel received the 1996
934:type would be, if true,
847:The Philosophical Review
7013:Non-Darwinian evolution
6724:Herzog & de Meuron
6512:Willard Van Orman Quine
6346:Consciousness Explained
6265:Stream of consciousness
6240:Secondary consciousness
5964:Global workspace theory
5949:Dynamic core hypothesis
5944:Attention schema theory
5918:Revisionary materialism
5833:Eliminative materialism
5356:Charles Augustus Strong
4182:Artificial intelligence
1553:Nagel, Thomas (2012).
1432:Equality and partiality
1205:Equality and Partiality
1144:" reasons. Earlier, in
752:Nagel argues that some
494:. He then attended the
6400:The Emperor's New Mind
6206:Problem of other minds
6141:Introspection illusion
5974:Holonomic brain theory
5331:Alfred North Whitehead
3273:Reflective equilibrium
2387:Nagel, Thomas (2012).
2362:Nagel, Thomas (2024).
1994:Nagel, Thomas (1979).
1897:London Review of Books
1860:London Review of Books
1535:Nagel, Thomas (2010).
1516:Nagel, Thomas (2002).
1472:Nagel, Thomas (1999).
1451:Nagel, Thomas (1997).
1428:Nagel, Thomas (1991).
1407:Nagel, Thomas (1987).
1386:Nagel, Thomas (1986).
1365:Nagel, Thomas (1979).
1310:Nagel, Thomas (1970).
944:theoretical identities
803:philosophical idealism
629:Please help by adding
460:
6948:Analytic philosophers
6201:Primary consciousness
6086:Divided consciousness
5989:Multiple drafts model
5491:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
5106:The Methods of Ethics
4344:Divine command theory
4339:Ideal observer theory
3944:Nicholas Wolterstorff
3399:David Malet Armstrong
2622:Thomas, Alan (2015),
2342:The View from Nowhere
2340:Nagel, Thomas. 1986,
2278:on September 29, 2008
2128:"Nagel, Thomas 1937-"
2009:Coleman, Sam (2018).
1749:The Mind-Body Problem
1654:Journal of Philosophy
1610:Journal of Philosophy
1599:Journal of Philosophy
1590:1965, "Physicalism",
1389:The view from nowhere
1299:Selected publications
1140:" reasons and their "
1034:Signature in the Cell
983:Further information:
895:subjective character,
834:subjective experience
818:Further information:
570:Guggenheim Foundation
500:Fulbright Scholarship
458:
142:The View from Nowhere
7023:People from Belgrade
6988:Kantian philosophers
6953:Atheist philosophers
6843:Anne Sofie von Otter
6772:Jean-Philippe Vassal
6505:Logic and philosophy
6353:Cosmic Consciousness
6191:Philosophical zombie
6131:Higher consciousness
6024:Animal consciousness
5828:Double-aspect theory
5361:Christopher Peacocke
5223:Political philosophy
2673:Philosophical Review
2648:. Dpt of Philosophy.
2415:, 36(2), pp. 187–205
1886:, Oxford, May 2023,
1700:Philosophical Review
1676:Philosophical Review
1652:1971, "The Absurd",
1628:Philosophical Review
1592:Philosophical Review
1578:Philosophical Review
1340:Morgenbesser, Sidney
1263:, who died in 2014.
1199:Political philosophy
1072:political philosophy
1014:", according to the
766:theories of the mind
635:Contentious material
535:Princeton University
529:Nagel taught at the
516:Doctor of Philosophy
496:University of Oxford
405:political philosophy
182: 1958;
6983:Jewish philosophers
6126:Heterophenomenology
6039:Attentional control
5688:Lawrence Weiskrantz
5516:Patricia Churchland
5351:Brian O'Shaughnessy
5336:Arthur Schopenhauer
5193:Evolutionary ethics
5154:Reasons and Persons
5130:A Theory of Justice
4284:Uncertain sentience
3766:Patricia Churchland
3697:Christine Korsgaard
3583:Logical positivists
3475:Ludwig Wittgenstein
3252:paradox of analysis
3019:Analytic philosophy
2861:Wallace S. Broecker
2791:John Locke Lecturer
2732:Stanford University
2247:"Nagel's CV at NYU"
2134:. November 24, 2021
1929:American philosophy
1744:, pp. 215–240.
1681:A Theory of Justice
1096:practical reasoning
772:As a philosophical
551:New York University
492:Ludwig Wittgenstein
401:New York University
253:Analytic philosophy
6683:Nikolai G. Makarov
6659:Michael Aschbacher
6641:Richard P. Stanley
6426:Wider than the Sky
6393:The Conscious Mind
6196:Philosophy of mind
6176:Neurophenomenology
6151:Locked-in syndrome
6146:Knowledge argument
5810:Philosophy of mind
5431:George Henry Lewes
5401:Douglas Hofstadter
5188:Ethics in religion
5183:Descriptive ethics
5018:Nicomachean Ethics
3939:William Lane Craig
3657:Friedrich Waismann
3614:Carl Gustav Hempel
3573:Timothy Williamson
3533:Alasdair MacIntyre
3391:Australian realism
3371:Russ Shafer-Landau
3232:Analytical Thomism
3187:Logical positivism
2816:J. B. Jackson
2780:Title last held by
2573:by Thomas Nagel".
1964:Knowledge argument
1813:2006-09-01 at the
1796:2006-09-01 at the
1735:Knowledge and Mind
1594:, pp. 339–56.
1583:1959, "Dreaming",
1235:sensus divinitatis
1020:. Nagel writes in
1008:intelligent design
880:David M. Rosenthal
875:The Nature of Mind
862:Douglas Hofstadter
826:philosophy of mind
809:Philosophy of mind
794:radical skepticism
613:This section of a
596:Philosophical work
520:Harvard University
514:. He received his
484:Cornell University
461:
413:philosophy of mind
111:Harvard University
91:Cornell University
6933:American atheists
6900:
6899:
6891:Víkingur Ólafsson
6867:Herbert Blomstedt
6718:Torsten Andersson
6497:Rolf Schock Prize
6463:
6462:
6161:Mind–body problem
6111:Flash suppression
6071:Cartesian theater
6056:Binocular rivalry
6002:
6001:
5868:Mind–body dualism
5797:
5796:
5784:Victor J. Stenger
5759:Erwin Schrödinger
5713:Stanislas Dehaene
5693:Michael Gazzaniga
5577:Donald D. Hoffman
5461:John Polkinghorne
5441:Gottfried Leibniz
5276:
5275:
5243:Social philosophy
5228:Population ethics
5218:Philosophy of law
5198:History of ethics
4681:Political freedom
4358:Euthyphro dilemma
4149:Suffering-focused
4069:
4068:
4037:
4036:
3753:Pittsburgh School
3743:Peter van Inwagen
3677:Roderick Chisholm
3665:
3664:
3558:Richard Swinburne
3493:G. E. M. Anscombe
3329:
3328:
3227:Analytic theology
3202:Ordinary language
3140:
3139:
2986:
2985:
2977:Succeeded by
2969:Rolf Schock Prize
2942:Paolo Rossi Monti
2939:Succeeded by
2924:Jules A. Hoffmann
2911:Succeeded by
2893:Succeeded by
2875:Succeeded by
2832:Succeeded by
2798:Succeeded by
2766:Succeeded by
2739:Succeeded by
2715:Academic offices
2398:978-0-19-991975-8
2229:978-0-19-513636-4
2201:Economia Politica
2079:NYU School of Law
1892:978 0 19 870758 5
1765:, March 27, 1997.
1730:, pp. 327–8.
1723:, pp. 25–31.
1612:, pp. 452–8.
1587:, pp. 112–6.
1580:, pp. 68–83.
1371:. London: Canto.
1328:Reprinted in 1978
1293:Mellon Foundation
1285:Rolf Schock Prize
1213:theory of justice
1166:World agent views
1157:Objective reasons
1107:Altruistic action
989:In his 2012 book
888:David J. Chalmers
778:mental properties
718:
717:
710:
692:
618:needs additional
590:Doctor of Letters
582:Rolf Schock Prize
478:Nagel received a
368:
367:
313:Rebecca Goldstein
294:Doctoral students
288:J. L. Austin
233:Rolf Schock Prize
7065:
7043:Serbian atheists
6879:Barbara Hannigan
6736:Susan Rothenberg
6542:Solomon Feferman
6490:
6483:
6476:
6467:
6466:
6453:
6452:
6443:
6442:
6285:Unconscious mind
5913:Reflexive monism
5908:Property dualism
5883:New mysterianism
5843:Epiphenomenalism
5823:Computationalism
5818:Anomalous monism
5806:
5805:
5698:Michael Graziano
5668:Francisco Varela
5572:Carl Gustav Jung
5536:Thomas Metzinger
5506:Martin Heidegger
5486:Kenneth M. Sayre
5346:Bertrand Russell
5321:
5320:
5303:
5296:
5289:
5280:
5279:
5266:
5265:
5213:Moral psychology
5158:
5150:
5142:
5138:Practical Ethics
5134:
5126:
5122:Principia Ethica
5118:
5110:
5102:
5094:
5086:
5078:
5070:
5062:
5054:
5046:
5038:
5030:
5026:Ethics (Spinoza)
5022:
4661:Moral imperative
4119:Consequentialism
4096:
4089:
4082:
4073:
4072:
4059:
4058:
4049:
4048:
3988:Nancy Cartwright
3829:Nicholas Rescher
3806:Bas van Fraassen
3796:Nicholas Rescher
3619:Hans Reichenbach
3602:
3601:
3568:Bernard Williams
3465:Bertrand Russell
3387:
3386:
3321:Rigid designator
3284:
3283:
3030:
3029:
3026:Related articles
3012:
3005:
2998:
2989:
2988:
2959:Preceded by
2949:Preceded by
2931:Preceded by
2921:Preceded by
2906:The Lady Higgins
2903:Preceded by
2885:Preceded by
2866:Maurizio Calvesi
2842:Preceded by
2813:Preceded by
2769:Bernard Williams
2749:Preceded by
2712:
2711:
2708:
2696:
2664:
2658:
2649:
2627:
2609:
2608:
2567:Larmore, Charles
2563:
2557:
2550:
2544:
2531:
2525:
2518:
2512:
2511:
2488:Asian Philosophy
2479:
2473:
2472:
2444:
2438:
2437:
2435:
2433:
2422:
2416:
2409:
2403:
2402:
2384:
2367:
2360:
2354:
2351:
2345:
2338:
2332:
2331:
2329:
2327:
2316:
2310:
2309:
2307:
2305:
2294:
2288:
2287:
2285:
2283:
2268:
2262:
2261:
2259:
2257:
2251:
2243:
2234:
2233:
2215:
2209:
2208:
2196:
2190:
2189:
2188:on July 5, 2018.
2184:. Archived from
2178:
2172:
2171:
2169:
2167:
2153:
2144:
2143:
2141:
2139:
2132:Encyclopedia.com
2124:
2115:
2114:
2112:
2110:
2096:
2090:
2089:
2087:
2085:
2071:
2058:
2057:
2055:
2053:
2039:
2033:
2032:
2030:
2028:
2015:
2006:
2000:
1999:
1996:Mortal questions
1990:
1869:consequentialism
1714:Mortal Questions
1704:Mortal Questions
1669:Mortal Questions
1658:Mortal Questions
1647:Mortal Questions
1621:Mortal Questions
1603:Mortal Questions
1550:
1531:
1512:
1500:
1489:
1468:
1447:
1435:
1424:
1403:
1382:
1368:Mortal questions
1361:
1349:
1325:
1207:, Nagel exposes
1181:Samuel Scheffler
1172:consequentialist
1088:moral philosophy
1074:. Supervised by
1039:Stephen C. Meyer
1029:creation science
936:necessarily true
870:Mortal Questions
731:Bernard Williams
713:
706:
702:
699:
693:
691:
650:
631:reliable sources
608:
607:
600:
547:Samuel Scheffler
480:Bachelor of Arts
398:
397:
394:
393:
390:
387:
384:
381:
323:Samuel Scheffler
309:
273:Doctoral advisor
210:
208:
187:
185:
181:
127:
56:
52:
50:
35:
21:
20:
7073:
7072:
7068:
7067:
7066:
7064:
7063:
7062:
6903:
6902:
6901:
6896:
6801:
6730:Giuseppe Penone
6712:Claes Oldenburg
6694:
6653:Endre Szemerédi
6647:Luis Caffarelli
6635:Elliott H. Lieb
6599:
6548:Jaakko Hintikka
6518:Michael Dummett
6500:
6494:
6464:
6459:
6431:
6314:
6290:Unconsciousness
6101:Explanatory gap
6051:Binding problem
5998:
5932:
5793:
5779:Susan Blackmore
5732:
5723:Stuart Hameroff
5643:Antonio Damasio
5626:
5622:Wolfgang Köhler
5560:
5521:Paul Churchland
5426:George Berkeley
5396:Donald Davidson
5312:
5307:
5277:
5272:
5254:
5161:
5156:
5148:
5140:
5132:
5124:
5116:
5108:
5100:
5092:
5084:
5076:
5068:
5060:
5052:
5044:
5036:
5028:
5020:
5006:
4779:
4772:
4696:Self-discipline
4656:Moral hierarchy
4604:Problem of evil
4549:Double standard
4539:Culture of life
4497:
4426:
4373:Non-cognitivism
4288:
4163:
4105:
4100:
4070:
4065:
4056:
4033:
4024:Jan Łukasiewicz
4012:
3980:Stanford School
3974:
3960:Paul Feyerabend
3948:
3934:Alvin Plantinga
3922:
3908:James F. Conant
3894:
3838:
3810:
3801:Wilfrid Sellars
3791:Alexander Pruss
3771:Paul Churchland
3747:
3726:
3682:Donald Davidson
3661:
3623:
3600:
3577:
3503:Michael Dummett
3479:
3470:Frank P. Ramsey
3423:
3385:
3361:Jaakko Hintikka
3346:Keith Donnellan
3325:
3282:
3236:
3197:Neurophilosophy
3182:Logical atomism
3136:
3090:
3064:
3021:
3016:
2982:
2973:
2964:
2962:Jaakko Hintikka
2954:
2944:
2936:
2926:
2916:
2908:
2898:
2896:Michael Grätzel
2890:
2880:
2864:
2857:
2855:
2847:
2837:
2828:
2824:
2818:
2803:
2794:
2781:
2771:
2762:
2754:
2752:Michael Dummett
2744:
2735:
2729:
2699:
2685:10.2307/2183914
2656:
2652:
2638:
2635:
2618:
2616:Further reading
2613:
2612:
2564:
2560:
2551:
2547:
2532:
2528:
2520:Nagel, Thomas,
2519:
2515:
2480:
2476:
2445:
2441:
2431:
2429:
2428:. The-tls.co.uk
2424:
2423:
2419:
2410:
2406:
2399:
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2357:
2352:
2348:
2339:
2335:
2325:
2323:
2318:
2317:
2313:
2303:
2301:
2300:. Apaonline.org
2296:
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2155:
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2126:
2125:
2118:
2108:
2106:
2104:its.law.nyu.edu
2098:
2097:
2093:
2083:
2081:
2073:
2072:
2061:
2051:
2049:
2041:
2040:
2036:
2026:
2024:
2013:
2007:
2003:
1991:
1987:
1982:
1925:
1815:Wayback Machine
1798:Wayback Machine
1684:by John Rawls).
1636:D. M. Armstrong
1615:1970, "Death",
1573:
1547:
1528:
1509:
1486:
1465:
1444:
1421:
1400:
1379:
1358:
1334:Nagel, Thomas;
1322:
1306:
1301:
1269:
1257:
1248:
1226:Mind and Cosmos
1222:
1201:
1168:
1159:
1134:
1109:
1068:
1063:
1051:David Berlinski
1047:Mind and Cosmos
1022:Mind and Cosmos
991:Mind and Cosmos
987:
985:Mind and Cosmos
981:
952:sympathetically
899:what it is like
842:Timothy Sprigge
822:
816:
811:
799:Donald Davidson
723:
714:
703:
697:
694:
651:
649:
628:
609:
605:
598:
562:British Academy
502:and received a
488:Telluride House
453:
451:Life and career
436:Mind and Cosmos
378:
374:
360:
339:
332:
303:
238:
215:
212:
204:
200:
197:
189:
186: 1973)
177:
173:
170:
156:
150:Mind and Cosmos
125:
120:
71:
57:
54:
48:
46:
38:
26:
17:
12:
11:
5:
7071:
7061:
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7055:
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7015:
7010:
7005:
7000:
6995:
6990:
6985:
6980:
6975:
6970:
6965:
6960:
6955:
6950:
6945:
6940:
6935:
6930:
6925:
6920:
6915:
6898:
6897:
6895:
6894:
6888:
6882:
6876:
6870:
6864:
6858:
6852:
6849:Mauricio Kagel
6846:
6840:
6837:Kaija Saariaho
6834:
6831:Kronos Quartet
6828:
6822:
6816:
6813:Ingvar Lidholm
6809:
6807:
6803:
6802:
6800:
6799:
6793:
6787:
6781:
6775:
6765:
6759:
6753:
6750:Ryue Nishizawa
6739:
6733:
6727:
6721:
6715:
6709:
6702:
6700:
6696:
6695:
6693:
6692:
6686:
6680:
6677:Ronald Coifman
6674:
6671:Richard Schoen
6668:
6662:
6656:
6650:
6644:
6638:
6632:
6626:
6620:
6614:
6611:Elias M. Stein
6607:
6605:
6601:
6600:
6598:
6597:
6591:
6588:Per Martin-Löf
6581:
6578:Saharon Shelah
6575:
6569:
6563:
6557:
6551:
6545:
6539:
6533:
6527:
6521:
6515:
6508:
6506:
6502:
6501:
6493:
6492:
6485:
6478:
6470:
6461:
6460:
6458:
6457:
6447:
6436:
6433:
6432:
6430:
6429:
6422:
6415:
6408:
6403:
6396:
6389:
6382:
6375:
6370:
6363:
6356:
6349:
6342:
6335:
6330:
6322:
6320:
6316:
6315:
6313:
6312:
6307:
6302:
6300:Visual masking
6297:
6292:
6287:
6282:
6277:
6272:
6267:
6262:
6257:
6252:
6250:Sentiocentrism
6247:
6242:
6237:
6236:
6235:
6223:
6218:
6213:
6208:
6203:
6198:
6193:
6188:
6183:
6178:
6173:
6168:
6163:
6158:
6153:
6148:
6143:
6138:
6133:
6128:
6123:
6118:
6113:
6108:
6103:
6098:
6093:
6088:
6083:
6078:
6073:
6068:
6063:
6058:
6053:
6048:
6043:
6042:
6041:
6031:
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6021:
6016:
6010:
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6004:
6003:
6000:
5999:
5997:
5996:
5991:
5986:
5981:
5976:
5971:
5966:
5961:
5956:
5951:
5946:
5940:
5938:
5934:
5933:
5931:
5930:
5925:
5920:
5915:
5910:
5905:
5900:
5895:
5890:
5885:
5880:
5878:Neutral monism
5875:
5870:
5865:
5860:
5858:Interactionism
5855:
5850:
5845:
5840:
5835:
5830:
5825:
5820:
5814:
5812:
5803:
5799:
5798:
5795:
5794:
5792:
5791:
5789:Wolfgang Pauli
5786:
5781:
5776:
5771:
5766:
5761:
5756:
5751:
5746:
5740:
5738:
5734:
5733:
5731:
5730:
5725:
5720:
5718:Steven Laureys
5715:
5710:
5705:
5703:Patrick Wilken
5700:
5695:
5690:
5685:
5680:
5675:
5673:Gerald Edelman
5670:
5665:
5660:
5655:
5650:
5648:Benjamin Libet
5645:
5640:
5634:
5632:
5628:
5627:
5625:
5624:
5619:
5614:
5609:
5604:
5602:Max Wertheimer
5599:
5594:
5589:
5587:Gustav Fechner
5584:
5582:Franz Brentano
5579:
5574:
5568:
5566:
5562:
5561:
5559:
5558:
5556:William Seager
5553:
5548:
5543:
5538:
5533:
5531:René Descartes
5528:
5523:
5518:
5513:
5508:
5503:
5498:
5493:
5488:
5483:
5481:Keith Frankish
5478:
5473:
5468:
5463:
5458:
5453:
5448:
5443:
5438:
5433:
5428:
5423:
5421:Galen Strawson
5418:
5413:
5408:
5406:Edmund Husserl
5403:
5398:
5393:
5388:
5386:David Papineau
5383:
5378:
5376:David Chalmers
5373:
5371:Daniel Dennett
5368:
5363:
5358:
5353:
5348:
5343:
5341:Baruch Spinoza
5338:
5333:
5327:
5325:
5318:
5314:
5313:
5306:
5305:
5298:
5291:
5283:
5274:
5273:
5271:
5270:
5259:
5256:
5255:
5253:
5252:
5245:
5240:
5238:Secular ethics
5235:
5233:Rehabilitation
5230:
5225:
5220:
5215:
5210:
5205:
5200:
5195:
5190:
5185:
5180:
5175:
5169:
5167:
5163:
5162:
5160:
5159:
5151:
5143:
5135:
5127:
5119:
5111:
5103:
5098:Utilitarianism
5095:
5087:
5079:
5071:
5063:
5055:
5047:
5039:
5031:
5023:
5014:
5012:
5008:
5007:
5005:
5004:
4999:
4994:
4989:
4984:
4979:
4974:
4969:
4964:
4959:
4954:
4949:
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4909:
4904:
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4894:
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4884:
4879:
4874:
4869:
4864:
4859:
4854:
4849:
4844:
4839:
4834:
4829:
4824:
4819:
4814:
4809:
4804:
4799:
4794:
4789:
4783:
4781:
4774:
4773:
4771:
4770:
4765:
4760:
4755:
4750:
4749:
4748:
4743:
4738:
4728:
4723:
4718:
4713:
4708:
4703:
4698:
4693:
4688:
4683:
4678:
4673:
4668:
4663:
4658:
4653:
4648:
4643:
4638:
4633:
4628:
4623:
4618:
4613:
4608:
4607:
4606:
4601:
4596:
4586:
4581:
4576:
4571:
4566:
4561:
4556:
4551:
4546:
4541:
4536:
4531:
4526:
4521:
4516:
4511:
4505:
4503:
4499:
4498:
4496:
4495:
4490:
4485:
4480:
4475:
4470:
4465:
4460:
4458:Existentialist
4455:
4450:
4445:
4440:
4434:
4432:
4428:
4427:
4425:
4424:
4423:
4422:
4412:
4407:
4402:
4397:
4396:
4395:
4390:
4385:
4380:
4370:
4365:
4360:
4355:
4353:Constructivism
4350:
4349:
4348:
4347:
4346:
4341:
4331:
4330:
4329:
4327:Non-naturalism
4324:
4309:
4304:
4298:
4296:
4290:
4289:
4287:
4286:
4281:
4276:
4271:
4266:
4261:
4256:
4251:
4246:
4241:
4236:
4231:
4226:
4221:
4220:
4219:
4209:
4204:
4199:
4194:
4189:
4184:
4179:
4173:
4171:
4165:
4164:
4162:
4161:
4156:
4154:Utilitarianism
4151:
4146:
4141:
4136:
4131:
4126:
4121:
4115:
4113:
4107:
4106:
4099:
4098:
4091:
4084:
4076:
4067:
4066:
4064:
4063:
4053:
4042:
4039:
4038:
4035:
4034:
4032:
4031:
4026:
4020:
4018:
4014:
4013:
4011:
4010:
4008:Patrick Suppes
4005:
4000:
3995:
3990:
3984:
3982:
3976:
3975:
3973:
3972:
3967:
3962:
3956:
3954:
3950:
3949:
3947:
3946:
3941:
3936:
3930:
3928:
3924:
3923:
3921:
3920:
3915:
3910:
3904:
3902:
3896:
3895:
3893:
3892:
3890:Michael Walzer
3887:
3882:
3877:
3872:
3867:
3862:
3857:
3852:
3846:
3844:
3840:
3839:
3837:
3836:
3831:
3826:
3820:
3818:
3812:
3811:
3809:
3808:
3803:
3798:
3793:
3788:
3783:
3778:
3776:Adolf Grünbaum
3773:
3768:
3763:
3761:Robert Brandom
3757:
3755:
3749:
3748:
3746:
3745:
3740:
3734:
3732:
3728:
3727:
3725:
3724:
3719:
3717:W. V. O. Quine
3714:
3709:
3704:
3699:
3694:
3692:Nelson Goodman
3689:
3687:Daniel Dennett
3684:
3679:
3673:
3671:
3667:
3666:
3663:
3662:
3660:
3659:
3654:
3652:Moritz Schlick
3649:
3644:
3639:
3633:
3631:
3625:
3624:
3622:
3621:
3616:
3610:
3608:
3599:
3598:
3593:
3587:
3585:
3579:
3578:
3576:
3575:
3570:
3565:
3563:Charles Taylor
3560:
3555:
3553:P. F. Strawson
3550:
3545:
3540:
3535:
3530:
3525:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3505:
3500:
3495:
3489:
3487:
3481:
3480:
3478:
3477:
3472:
3467:
3462:
3457:
3452:
3450:Norman Malcolm
3447:
3442:
3437:
3431:
3429:
3425:
3424:
3422:
3421:
3419:J. J. C. Smart
3416:
3411:
3406:
3404:David Chalmers
3401:
3395:
3393:
3384:
3383:
3378:
3373:
3368:
3366:Giuseppe Peano
3363:
3358:
3356:Edmund Gettier
3353:
3348:
3343:
3337:
3335:
3331:
3330:
3327:
3326:
3324:
3323:
3318:
3313:
3311:Possible world
3308:
3303:
3298:
3292:
3290:
3281:
3280:
3275:
3270:
3265:
3263:Counterfactual
3260:
3255:
3244:
3242:
3238:
3237:
3235:
3234:
3229:
3224:
3219:
3214:
3209:
3204:
3199:
3194:
3189:
3184:
3179:
3174:
3169:
3164:
3159:
3154:
3148:
3146:
3142:
3141:
3138:
3137:
3135:
3134:
3129:
3124:
3122:Paraconsistent
3119:
3114:
3109:
3104:
3098:
3096:
3092:
3091:
3089:
3088:
3083:
3078:
3072:
3070:
3066:
3065:
3063:
3062:
3057:
3052:
3047:
3042:
3036:
3034:
3033:Areas of focus
3027:
3023:
3022:
3015:
3014:
3007:
3000:
2992:
2984:
2983:
2978:
2975:
2965:
2960:
2956:
2955:
2950:
2946:
2945:
2940:
2937:
2932:
2928:
2927:
2922:
2918:
2917:
2912:
2909:
2904:
2900:
2899:
2894:
2891:
2888:Karlheinz Böhm
2886:
2882:
2881:
2876:
2873:
2848:
2843:
2839:
2838:
2833:
2830:
2819:
2814:
2810:
2809:
2805:
2804:
2799:
2796:
2787:
2779:
2773:
2772:
2767:
2764:
2755:
2750:
2746:
2745:
2740:
2737:
2723:
2717:
2716:
2710:
2709:
2701:"Thomas Nagel"
2697:
2665:
2650:
2640:"Thomas Nagel"
2634:
2633:External links
2631:
2630:
2629:
2617:
2614:
2611:
2610:
2597:10.1086/233878
2589:10.1086/233878
2583:(1): 166–168.
2558:
2545:
2526:
2513:
2474:
2455:(1/2): 85–95.
2439:
2417:
2404:
2397:
2368:
2355:
2346:
2333:
2311:
2289:
2263:
2235:
2228:
2210:
2191:
2173:
2145:
2116:
2091:
2059:
2043:"Thomas Nagel"
2034:
2001:
1984:
1983:
1981:
1978:
1977:
1976:
1974:Neutral monism
1971:
1966:
1961:
1956:
1954:Galen Strawson
1951:
1946:
1944:David Chalmers
1941:
1936:
1931:
1924:
1921:
1920:
1919:
1876:
1873:utilitarianism
1855:
1837:
1831:
1824:
1817:
1800:
1783:
1773:
1766:
1759:
1752:
1745:
1738:
1731:
1724:
1717:
1710:
1692:
1685:
1672:
1661:
1650:
1639:
1624:
1613:
1606:
1595:
1588:
1581:
1572:
1569:
1568:
1567:
1551:
1545:
1532:
1526:
1513:
1507:
1490:
1484:
1469:
1463:
1448:
1442:
1425:
1419:
1404:
1398:
1383:
1377:
1362:
1356:
1336:Held, Virginia
1331:
1320:
1305:
1302:
1300:
1297:
1268:
1265:
1261:Anne Hollander
1256:
1253:
1247:
1244:
1232:: "I lack the
1221:
1218:
1200:
1197:
1167:
1164:
1158:
1155:
1133:
1130:
1118:Henry Sidgwick
1108:
1105:
1067:
1064:
1062:
1059:
1017:New York Times
980:
977:
858:Daniel Dennett
815:
812:
810:
807:
722:
719:
716:
715:
657:"Thomas Nagel"
639:poorly sourced
612:
610:
603:
597:
594:
452:
449:
366:
365:
362:
361:
359:
358:
353:
348:
342:
340:
337:
334:
333:
331:
330:
325:
320:
315:
310:
301:Marcelo Alegre
297:
295:
291:
290:
285:
281:
280:
275:
269:
268:
262:
256:
255:
250:
244:
243:
240:
239:
237:
236:
230:
223:
221:
217:
216:
214:
213:
202:
198:
195:Anne Hollander
193:
192:
190:
175:
171:
168:
167:
164:
162:
158:
157:
155:
154:
146:
138:
130:
128:
122:
121:
119:
118:
108:
98:
87:
85:
81:
80:
77:
73:
72:
58:
44:
40:
39:
36:
28:
27:
24:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
7070:
7059:
7056:
7054:
7051:
7049:
7046:
7044:
7041:
7039:
7036:
7034:
7031:
7029:
7026:
7024:
7021:
7019:
7016:
7014:
7011:
7009:
7006:
7004:
7001:
6999:
6996:
6994:
6991:
6989:
6986:
6984:
6981:
6979:
6976:
6974:
6971:
6969:
6966:
6964:
6961:
6959:
6956:
6954:
6951:
6949:
6946:
6944:
6941:
6939:
6936:
6934:
6931:
6929:
6926:
6924:
6921:
6919:
6918:Living people
6916:
6914:
6911:
6910:
6908:
6892:
6889:
6886:
6885:György Kurtág
6883:
6880:
6877:
6874:
6873:Wayne Shorter
6871:
6868:
6865:
6862:
6859:
6856:
6853:
6850:
6847:
6844:
6841:
6838:
6835:
6832:
6829:
6826:
6823:
6820:
6819:György Ligeti
6817:
6814:
6811:
6810:
6808:
6804:
6797:
6794:
6791:
6788:
6785:
6784:Andrea Branzi
6782:
6779:
6778:Doris Salcedo
6776:
6773:
6769:
6766:
6763:
6762:Marlene Dumas
6760:
6757:
6754:
6751:
6747:
6746:Kazuyo Sejima
6743:
6740:
6737:
6734:
6731:
6728:
6725:
6722:
6719:
6716:
6713:
6710:
6707:
6704:
6703:
6701:
6697:
6690:
6689:Jonathan Pila
6687:
6684:
6681:
6678:
6675:
6672:
6669:
6666:
6663:
6660:
6657:
6654:
6651:
6648:
6645:
6642:
6639:
6636:
6633:
6630:
6629:Yuri I. Manin
6627:
6624:
6621:
6618:
6615:
6612:
6609:
6608:
6606:
6602:
6595:
6592:
6589:
6585:
6582:
6579:
6576:
6573:
6572:Ruth Millikan
6570:
6567:
6564:
6561:
6560:Hilary Putnam
6558:
6555:
6552:
6549:
6546:
6543:
6540:
6537:
6534:
6531:
6528:
6525:
6522:
6519:
6516:
6513:
6510:
6509:
6507:
6503:
6498:
6491:
6486:
6484:
6479:
6477:
6472:
6471:
6468:
6456:
6448:
6446:
6438:
6437:
6434:
6428:
6427:
6423:
6420:
6416:
6414:
6413:
6409:
6407:
6404:
6402:
6401:
6397:
6395:
6394:
6390:
6388:
6387:
6383:
6381:
6380:
6376:
6374:
6371:
6369:
6368:
6364:
6362:
6361:
6357:
6355:
6354:
6350:
6348:
6347:
6343:
6341:
6340:
6336:
6334:
6331:
6329:
6328:
6324:
6323:
6321:
6317:
6311:
6308:
6306:
6303:
6301:
6298:
6296:
6293:
6291:
6288:
6286:
6283:
6281:
6278:
6276:
6273:
6271:
6268:
6266:
6263:
6261:
6258:
6256:
6253:
6251:
6248:
6246:
6243:
6241:
6238:
6234:
6233:
6229:
6228:
6227:
6224:
6222:
6219:
6217:
6214:
6212:
6209:
6207:
6204:
6202:
6199:
6197:
6194:
6192:
6189:
6187:
6186:Phenomenology
6184:
6182:
6179:
6177:
6174:
6172:
6169:
6167:
6164:
6162:
6159:
6157:
6154:
6152:
6149:
6147:
6144:
6142:
6139:
6137:
6134:
6132:
6129:
6127:
6124:
6122:
6119:
6117:
6116:Hallucination
6114:
6112:
6109:
6107:
6104:
6102:
6099:
6097:
6094:
6092:
6089:
6087:
6084:
6082:
6079:
6077:
6074:
6072:
6069:
6067:
6064:
6062:
6059:
6057:
6054:
6052:
6049:
6047:
6044:
6040:
6037:
6036:
6035:
6032:
6030:
6027:
6025:
6022:
6020:
6017:
6015:
6012:
6011:
6009:
6005:
5995:
5992:
5990:
5987:
5985:
5982:
5980:
5977:
5975:
5972:
5970:
5967:
5965:
5962:
5960:
5957:
5955:
5952:
5950:
5947:
5945:
5942:
5941:
5939:
5935:
5929:
5926:
5924:
5921:
5919:
5916:
5914:
5911:
5909:
5906:
5904:
5901:
5899:
5896:
5894:
5891:
5889:
5886:
5884:
5881:
5879:
5876:
5874:
5871:
5869:
5866:
5864:
5861:
5859:
5856:
5854:
5851:
5849:
5848:Functionalism
5846:
5844:
5841:
5839:
5836:
5834:
5831:
5829:
5826:
5824:
5821:
5819:
5816:
5815:
5813:
5811:
5807:
5804:
5800:
5790:
5787:
5785:
5782:
5780:
5777:
5775:
5774:Roger Penrose
5772:
5770:
5767:
5765:
5764:Marvin Minsky
5762:
5760:
5757:
5755:
5754:Eugene Wigner
5752:
5750:
5747:
5745:
5744:Annaka Harris
5742:
5741:
5739:
5735:
5729:
5726:
5724:
5721:
5719:
5716:
5714:
5711:
5709:
5706:
5704:
5701:
5699:
5696:
5694:
5691:
5689:
5686:
5684:
5681:
5679:
5678:Giulio Tononi
5676:
5674:
5671:
5669:
5666:
5664:
5663:Francis Crick
5661:
5659:
5658:Christof Koch
5656:
5654:
5653:Bernard Baars
5651:
5649:
5646:
5644:
5641:
5639:
5636:
5635:
5633:
5629:
5623:
5620:
5618:
5617:William James
5615:
5613:
5612:Wilhelm Wundt
5610:
5608:
5607:Sigmund Freud
5605:
5603:
5600:
5598:
5595:
5593:
5592:Julian Jaynes
5590:
5588:
5585:
5583:
5580:
5578:
5575:
5573:
5570:
5569:
5567:
5563:
5557:
5554:
5552:
5551:William Lycan
5549:
5547:
5544:
5542:
5539:
5537:
5534:
5532:
5529:
5527:
5524:
5522:
5519:
5517:
5514:
5512:
5509:
5507:
5504:
5502:
5499:
5497:
5494:
5492:
5489:
5487:
5484:
5482:
5479:
5477:
5474:
5472:
5471:Joseph Levine
5469:
5467:
5464:
5462:
5459:
5457:
5454:
5452:
5449:
5447:
5446:Immanuel Kant
5444:
5442:
5439:
5437:
5434:
5432:
5429:
5427:
5424:
5422:
5419:
5417:
5414:
5412:
5411:Frank Jackson
5409:
5407:
5404:
5402:
5399:
5397:
5394:
5392:
5389:
5387:
5384:
5382:
5379:
5377:
5374:
5372:
5369:
5367:
5364:
5362:
5359:
5357:
5354:
5352:
5349:
5347:
5344:
5342:
5339:
5337:
5334:
5332:
5329:
5328:
5326:
5322:
5319:
5315:
5311:
5310:Consciousness
5304:
5299:
5297:
5292:
5290:
5285:
5284:
5281:
5269:
5261:
5260:
5257:
5251:
5250:
5246:
5244:
5241:
5239:
5236:
5234:
5231:
5229:
5226:
5224:
5221:
5219:
5216:
5214:
5211:
5209:
5206:
5204:
5201:
5199:
5196:
5194:
5191:
5189:
5186:
5184:
5181:
5179:
5176:
5174:
5171:
5170:
5168:
5164:
5155:
5152:
5147:
5144:
5139:
5136:
5131:
5128:
5123:
5120:
5115:
5112:
5107:
5104:
5099:
5096:
5091:
5088:
5083:
5080:
5075:
5072:
5067:
5064:
5059:
5056:
5051:
5048:
5043:
5040:
5035:
5032:
5027:
5024:
5019:
5016:
5015:
5013:
5009:
5003:
5000:
4998:
4995:
4993:
4990:
4988:
4985:
4983:
4980:
4978:
4975:
4973:
4970:
4968:
4965:
4963:
4960:
4958:
4955:
4953:
4950:
4948:
4945:
4943:
4940:
4938:
4935:
4933:
4930:
4928:
4925:
4923:
4920:
4918:
4915:
4913:
4910:
4908:
4905:
4903:
4900:
4898:
4895:
4893:
4890:
4888:
4885:
4883:
4880:
4878:
4875:
4873:
4870:
4868:
4865:
4863:
4860:
4858:
4855:
4853:
4850:
4848:
4845:
4843:
4840:
4838:
4835:
4833:
4830:
4828:
4825:
4823:
4820:
4818:
4815:
4813:
4810:
4808:
4805:
4803:
4800:
4798:
4795:
4793:
4790:
4788:
4785:
4784:
4782:
4780:
4775:
4769:
4766:
4764:
4761:
4759:
4756:
4754:
4751:
4747:
4744:
4742:
4739:
4737:
4734:
4733:
4732:
4729:
4727:
4724:
4722:
4719:
4717:
4714:
4712:
4709:
4707:
4704:
4702:
4699:
4697:
4694:
4692:
4689:
4687:
4684:
4682:
4679:
4677:
4674:
4672:
4669:
4667:
4664:
4662:
4659:
4657:
4654:
4652:
4651:Moral courage
4649:
4647:
4644:
4642:
4639:
4637:
4634:
4632:
4629:
4627:
4624:
4622:
4619:
4617:
4614:
4612:
4609:
4605:
4602:
4600:
4597:
4595:
4592:
4591:
4590:
4589:Good and evil
4587:
4585:
4582:
4580:
4577:
4575:
4574:Family values
4572:
4570:
4567:
4565:
4562:
4560:
4557:
4555:
4552:
4550:
4547:
4545:
4542:
4540:
4537:
4535:
4532:
4530:
4527:
4525:
4522:
4520:
4517:
4515:
4512:
4510:
4507:
4506:
4504:
4500:
4494:
4491:
4489:
4486:
4484:
4481:
4479:
4476:
4474:
4471:
4469:
4466:
4464:
4461:
4459:
4456:
4454:
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4416:
4413:
4411:
4408:
4406:
4403:
4401:
4398:
4394:
4391:
4389:
4388:Quasi-realism
4386:
4384:
4381:
4379:
4376:
4375:
4374:
4371:
4369:
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4364:
4361:
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4237:
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4232:
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4227:
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4222:
4218:
4215:
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4212:Environmental
4210:
4208:
4205:
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4198:
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4183:
4180:
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4160:
4157:
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4147:
4145:
4142:
4140:
4137:
4135:
4134:Particularism
4132:
4130:
4127:
4125:
4122:
4120:
4117:
4116:
4114:
4112:
4108:
4104:
4097:
4092:
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4085:
4083:
4078:
4077:
4074:
4062:
4054:
4052:
4044:
4043:
4040:
4030:
4029:Alfred Tarski
4027:
4025:
4022:
4021:
4019:
4015:
4009:
4006:
4004:
4001:
3999:
3998:Peter Galison
3996:
3994:
3991:
3989:
3986:
3985:
3983:
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3977:
3971:
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3966:
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3909:
3906:
3905:
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3901:
3897:
3891:
3888:
3886:
3885:Nathan Salmon
3883:
3881:
3880:Richard Rorty
3878:
3876:
3873:
3871:
3868:
3866:
3863:
3861:
3858:
3856:
3853:
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3850:Alonzo Church
3848:
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3835:
3832:
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3807:
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3802:
3799:
3797:
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3787:
3786:Ruth Millikan
3784:
3782:
3781:John McDowell
3779:
3777:
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3769:
3767:
3764:
3762:
3759:
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3723:
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3712:Hilary Putnam
3710:
3708:
3707:Robert Nozick
3705:
3703:
3700:
3698:
3695:
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3683:
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3674:
3672:
3668:
3658:
3655:
3653:
3650:
3648:
3645:
3643:
3640:
3638:
3637:Rudolf Carnap
3635:
3634:
3632:
3630:
3629:Vienna Circle
3626:
3620:
3617:
3615:
3612:
3611:
3609:
3607:
3606:Berlin Circle
3603:
3597:
3594:
3592:
3589:
3588:
3586:
3584:
3580:
3574:
3571:
3569:
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3529:
3526:
3524:
3521:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3513:Philippa Foot
3511:
3509:
3506:
3504:
3501:
3499:
3496:
3494:
3491:
3490:
3488:
3486:
3482:
3476:
3473:
3471:
3468:
3466:
3463:
3461:
3460:Graham Priest
3458:
3456:
3453:
3451:
3448:
3446:
3443:
3441:
3440:Charlie Broad
3438:
3436:
3433:
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3426:
3420:
3417:
3415:
3412:
3410:
3407:
3405:
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3397:
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3394:
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3388:
3382:
3379:
3377:
3374:
3372:
3369:
3367:
3364:
3362:
3359:
3357:
3354:
3352:
3351:Gottlob Frege
3349:
3347:
3344:
3342:
3339:
3338:
3336:
3332:
3322:
3319:
3317:
3314:
3312:
3309:
3307:
3304:
3302:
3299:
3297:
3294:
3293:
3291:
3289:
3285:
3279:
3278:Supervenience
3276:
3274:
3271:
3269:
3266:
3264:
3261:
3259:
3256:
3253:
3249:
3246:
3245:
3243:
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3228:
3225:
3223:
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3215:
3213:
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3208:
3205:
3203:
3200:
3198:
3195:
3193:
3190:
3188:
3185:
3183:
3180:
3178:
3177:Functionalism
3175:
3173:
3170:
3168:
3165:
3163:
3162:Descriptivism
3160:
3158:
3155:
3153:
3150:
3149:
3147:
3143:
3133:
3130:
3128:
3127:Philosophical
3125:
3123:
3120:
3118:
3117:Non-classical
3115:
3113:
3110:
3108:
3105:
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3024:
3020:
3013:
3008:
3006:
3001:
2999:
2994:
2993:
2990:
2981:
2980:Hilary Putnam
2972:
2970:
2963:
2957:
2953:
2947:
2943:
2935:
2929:
2925:
2919:
2915:
2914:Brenda Milner
2907:
2901:
2897:
2889:
2883:
2879:
2872:
2871:
2867:
2862:
2854:
2853:
2846:
2845:Bruce Beutler
2840:
2836:
2835:Cynthia Ozick
2827:
2826:
2817:
2811:
2806:
2802:
2801:John McDowell
2793:
2792:
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2785:
2778:
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2761:
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2753:
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2647:
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2641:
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2625:
2620:
2619:
2606:
2602:
2598:
2594:
2590:
2586:
2582:
2578:
2577:
2572:
2571:The Last Word
2568:
2562:
2556:
2549:
2542:
2537:
2530:
2523:
2522:The Last Word
2517:
2509:
2505:
2501:
2497:
2494:(2): 93–119.
2493:
2489:
2485:
2478:
2470:
2466:
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2427:
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2321:
2315:
2304:September 30,
2299:
2293:
2282:September 20,
2277:
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2248:
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2240:
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2202:
2195:
2187:
2183:
2177:
2162:
2161:www.thejc.com
2158:
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2105:
2101:
2095:
2080:
2076:
2070:
2068:
2066:
2064:
2048:
2044:
2038:
2027:September 19,
2023:
2019:
2012:
2005:
1997:
1989:
1985:
1975:
1972:
1970:
1969:Phenomenology
1967:
1965:
1962:
1960:
1957:
1955:
1952:
1950:
1949:Frank Jackson
1947:
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1940:
1937:
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1849:0-19-825006-1
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1607:
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1600:
1596:
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1589:
1586:
1582:
1579:
1575:
1574:
1566:
1565:9780199919758
1562:
1558:
1557:
1552:
1548:
1546:9780195394115
1542:
1538:
1533:
1529:
1527:9780195152937
1523:
1519:
1514:
1510:
1508:9780195176568
1504:
1499:
1498:
1491:
1487:
1485:9780195132465
1481:
1477:
1476:
1470:
1466:
1464:9780195149838
1460:
1456:
1455:
1454:The last word
1449:
1445:
1443:9780195098396
1439:
1434:
1433:
1426:
1422:
1420:9780195174373
1416:
1412:
1411:
1405:
1401:
1399:9780195056440
1395:
1391:
1390:
1384:
1380:
1378:9780521406765
1374:
1370:
1369:
1363:
1359:
1357:9780195017595
1353:
1348:
1347:
1341:
1337:
1332:
1329:
1323:
1321:9780691020020
1317:
1313:
1308:
1307:
1296:
1294:
1290:
1286:
1282:
1278:
1274:
1264:
1262:
1255:Personal life
1252:
1243:
1241:
1240:The Last Word
1237:
1236:
1231:
1227:
1217:
1214:
1210:
1206:
1196:
1194:
1193:inviolability
1190:
1186:
1182:
1177:
1176:individualist
1173:
1163:
1154:
1151:
1147:
1143:
1139:
1129:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1114:
1104:
1100:
1097:
1093:
1089:
1085:
1081:
1077:
1073:
1058:
1056:
1052:
1048:
1044:
1040:
1036:
1035:
1030:
1025:
1023:
1019:
1018:
1013:
1009:
1005:
1000:
999:neo-Darwinian
996:
992:
986:
976:
974:
969:
965:
960:
957:
953:
949:
945:
941:
937:
933:
929:
928:type identity
925:
921:
916:
913:
908:
904:
900:
896:
891:
889:
885:
881:
877:
876:
871:
867:
863:
859:
855:
854:
849:
848:
843:
839:
835:
831:
830:consciousness
827:
821:
806:
804:
800:
795:
791:
787:
782:
779:
775:
770:
767:
762:
759:
755:
750:
748:
744:
738:
736:
732:
727:
712:
709:
701:
690:
687:
683:
680:
676:
673:
669:
666:
662:
659: –
658:
654:
653:Find sources:
647:
643:
640:
636:
632:
626:
625:
621:
616:
611:
602:
601:
593:
591:
587:
583:
579:
575:
571:
567:
563:
559:
554:
552:
548:
544:
540:
536:
532:
527:
525:
521:
517:
513:
509:
505:
501:
497:
493:
489:
485:
481:
476:
474:
470:
466:
457:
448:
446:
445:consciousness
442:
441:neo-Darwinian
438:
437:
432:
428:
424:
421:
416:
414:
410:
406:
402:
396:
372:
363:
357:
354:
352:
349:
347:
344:
343:
341:
338:Notable ideas
335:
329:
326:
324:
321:
319:
316:
314:
311:
307:
302:
299:
298:
296:
292:
289:
286:
282:
279:
276:
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270:
266:
263:
261:
257:
254:
251:
249:
245:
241:
234:
231:
228:
225:
224:
222:
218:
196:
191:
169:Doris G. Blum
166:
165:
163:
159:
152:
151:
147:
144:
143:
139:
136:
132:
131:
129:
123:
116:
112:
109:
106:
102:
99:
96:
92:
89:
88:
86:
82:
78:
74:
69:
65:
61:
55:(age 87)
45:
41:
37:Nagel in 1978
34:
29:
22:
19:
6861:Andrew Manze
6855:Gidon Kremer
6825:Jorma Panula
6806:Musical arts
6796:Rem Koolhaas
6790:Francis Alÿs
6768:Anne Lacaton
6706:Rafael Moneo
6665:Yitang Zhang
6617:Andrew Wiles
6594:David Kaplan
6566:Derek Parfit
6554:Thomas Nagel
6553:
6424:
6410:
6398:
6391:
6384:
6377:
6365:
6358:
6351:
6344:
6337:
6325:
6270:Subconscious
6230:
6216:Quantum mind
5708:Roger Sperry
5683:Karl Pribram
5631:Neuroscience
5541:Thomas Nagel
5540:
5416:Fred Dretske
5391:David Pearce
5366:Colin McGinn
5247:
5203:Human rights
5146:After Virtue
4976:
4872:Schopenhauer
4646:Moral agency
4519:Common sense
4415:Universalism
4383:Expressivism
4363:Intuitionism
4334:Subjectivism
4279:Terraforming
4254:Professional
3918:Cora Diamond
3834:Morton White
3702:Thomas Nagel
3701:
3647:Otto Neurath
3596:Ernest Nagel
3543:Gilbert Ryle
3538:Derek Parfit
3498:J. L. Austin
3445:Casimir Lewy
3414:Peter Singer
3409:J. L. Mackie
3381:Barry Stroud
3341:Noam Chomsky
3334:Philosophers
3268:Natural kind
3152:Anti-realism
3112:Mathematical
3086:Performative
3045:Epistemology
2967:
2934:Sumio Iijima
2878:Terence Cave
2859:
2856:2008
2852:Balzan Prize
2850:
2821:
2789:
2784:Barry Stroud
2782:
2776:
2757:
2725:
2720:
2704:
2676:
2672:
2660:
2654:"Nagel's CV"
2643:
2624:Thomas Nagel
2623:
2580:
2574:
2570:
2561:
2548:
2529:
2521:
2516:
2491:
2487:
2477:
2452:
2448:
2442:
2430:. Retrieved
2420:
2412:
2407:
2388:
2363:
2358:
2349:
2341:
2336:
2324:. Retrieved
2314:
2302:. Retrieved
2292:
2280:. Retrieved
2276:the original
2266:
2254:. Retrieved
2219:
2213:
2204:
2200:
2194:
2186:the original
2176:
2164:. Retrieved
2160:
2136:. Retrieved
2131:
2107:. Retrieved
2103:
2094:
2082:. Retrieved
2050:. Retrieved
2046:
2037:
2025:. Retrieved
2021:
2017:
2004:
1995:
1988:
1905:
1895:
1894:, 660 pp.),
1883:
1858:
1840:
1834:
1827:
1820:
1803:
1786:
1776:
1769:
1762:
1755:
1751:, Blackwell.
1748:
1741:
1734:
1727:
1720:
1713:
1703:
1699:
1688:
1679:
1675:
1668:
1664:
1657:
1653:
1646:
1642:
1631:
1627:
1620:
1616:
1609:
1602:
1598:
1591:
1584:
1577:
1554:
1536:
1517:
1496:
1474:
1453:
1431:
1409:
1388:
1367:
1345:
1311:
1281:Balzan Prize
1276:
1270:
1258:
1249:
1239:
1233:
1225:
1223:
1204:
1202:
1195:of persons.
1184:
1169:
1160:
1149:
1145:
1135:
1122:dissociation
1110:
1101:
1091:
1086:approach to
1069:
1055:Michael Behe
1046:
1042:
1032:
1026:
1021:
1015:
1012:creationists
1004:teleological
990:
988:
967:
961:
951:
947:
932:mental state
917:
906:
902:
898:
894:
892:
883:
873:
869:
865:
853:The Mind's I
851:
845:
823:
790:deflationary
783:
771:
769:understand.
763:
757:
751:
746:
739:
728:
724:
704:
695:
685:
678:
671:
664:
652:
641:
624:verification
617:
586:Balzan prize
555:
543:Shelly Kagan
528:
508:J. L. Austin
477:
462:
434:
430:
423:reductionist
417:
371:Thomas Nagel
370:
369:
318:Shelly Kagan
267: (1963)
264:
227:Balzan Prize
148:
140:
126:Notable work
53:July 4, 1937
25:Thomas Nagel
18:
6913:1937 births
6756:Mona Hatoum
6699:Visual arts
6604:Mathematics
6584:Dag Prawitz
6536:Saul Kripke
5903:Physicalism
5898:Parallelism
5893:Panpsychism
5863:Materialism
5838:Emergentism
5728:Wolf Singer
5597:Kurt Koffka
5526:Philip Goff
5501:Michael Tye
5496:Max Velmans
5476:Karl Popper
5466:John Searle
5451:John Eccles
5436:Georges Rey
5021:(c. 322 BC)
4887:Kierkegaard
4706:Stewardship
4483:Rousseauian
4400:Rationalism
4312:Cognitivism
4259:Programming
4234:Meat eating
4207:Engineering
4017:Lwow-Warsaw
4003:Ian Hacking
3970:Karl Popper
3965:Thomas Kuhn
3913:Alice Crary
3875:Saul Kripke
3870:Jaegwon Kim
3865:David Lewis
3855:Jerry Fodor
3824:Susan Haack
3738:Robert Audi
3548:John Searle
3518:Peter Geach
3508:Antony Flew
3455:G. E. Moore
3376:Ernest Sosa
3306:Possibility
3055:Mathematics
3040:Metaphysics
2952:Michel Zink
2742:Amartya Sen
2626:, Routledge
2432:October 31,
2326:October 31,
2256:October 31,
2138:December 6,
1902:J.L. Austin
1781:Online text
1708:Online text
1277:Other Minds
1084:rationalist
995:materialist
956:physicalism
924:Saul Kripke
886:(edited by
878:(edited by
856:(edited by
838:physicalism
786:therapeutic
774:rationalist
346:Panpsychism
304: [
76:Nationality
6907:Categories
6623:Mikio Sato
6530:John Rawls
6524:Dana Scott
6295:Upanishads
6096:Experience
6061:Blindsight
5888:Nondualism
5769:Max Planck
5749:David Bohm
5565:Psychology
5456:John Locke
5381:David Hume
5324:Philosophy
4917:Bonhoeffer
4626:Immorality
4569:Eudaimonia
4529:Conscience
4524:Compassion
4410:Skepticism
4405:Relativism
4322:Naturalism
4302:Absolutism
4274:Technology
4124:Deontology
3993:John Dupré
3860:Kurt Gödel
3816:Pragmatism
3731:Notre Dame
3722:John Rawls
3591:A. J. Ayer
3528:R. M. Hare
3523:Paul Grice
3435:Arif Ahmed
3222:Sense data
3207:Pragmatism
3081:Linguistic
2870:Ian Frazer
2795:1989–1990
2736:1977–1978
2721:New office
2322:. Ox.ac.uk
2109:August 19,
2052:August 19,
2047:as.nyu.edu
1980:References
1916:philosophy
1865:Deontology
1808:Online PDF
1791:Online PDF
1787:Philosophy
1209:John Rawls
1138:subjective
1113:altruistic
1076:John Rawls
973:functional
922:colleague
698:March 2020
668:newspapers
576:, and the
539:Susan Wolf
524:John Rawls
512:Paul Grice
328:Susan Wolf
278:John Rawls
64:Yugoslavia
49:1937-07-04
6499:laureates
6310:Yogachara
6245:Sentience
6106:Free will
6046:Awareness
6034:Attention
5923:Solipsism
5638:Anil Seth
5511:Ned Block
5178:Casuistry
5090:Either/Or
4997:Korsgaard
4992:Azurmendi
4957:MacIntyre
4897:Nietzsche
4827:Augustine
4822:Confucius
4802:Aristotle
4778:Ethicists
4736:Intrinsic
4701:Suffering
4611:Happiness
4584:Free will
4564:Etiquette
4509:Authority
4453:Epicurean
4448:Confucian
4443:Christian
4378:Emotivism
4202:Discourse
4139:Pragmatic
4111:Normative
3843:Princeton
3642:Hans Hahn
3428:Cambridge
3301:Necessity
3296:Actualism
3167:Emotivism
3132:Predicate
3102:Classical
2605:171277680
2461:0194-3448
2252:. Myu.edu
1880:M.W. Rowe
1853:lrb.co.uk
1142:objective
1126:solipsism
948:sensorily
920:Princeton
754:phenomena
620:citations
84:Education
6445:Category
6181:Ontology
6136:Illusion
5853:Idealism
5802:Theories
5268:Category
5208:Ideology
5173:Axiology
5002:Nussbaum
4952:Frankena
4947:Anscombe
4937:Williams
4892:Sidgwick
4812:Valluvar
4807:Diogenes
4792:Socrates
4716:Theodicy
4711:Sympathy
4676:Pacifism
4666:Morality
4579:Fidelity
4559:Equality
4514:Autonomy
4502:Concepts
4463:Feminist
4438:Buddhist
4368:Nihilism
4307:Axiology
4264:Research
4197:Computer
4192:Business
4051:Category
3927:Reformed
3900:Quietism
3288:Modality
3248:Analysis
3241:Concepts
3212:Quietism
3172:Feminism
3145:Theories
3050:Language
2508:11457496
2469:27944340
2084:March 7,
1923:See also
1911:language
1811:Archived
1794:Archived
1643:Synthese
1585:Analysis
1571:Articles
1342:(1974).
1295:(2006).
940:C-fibres
872:(1979),
721:Overview
646:libelous
465:Belgrade
420:material
265:Altruism
137:" (1974)
79:American
60:Belgrade
6455:Commons
6232:Purusha
6221:Reentry
6014:Agnosia
5937:Science
5317:Figures
5166:Related
4912:Tillich
4877:Bentham
4852:Spinoza
4847:Aquinas
4832:Mencius
4746:Western
4721:Torture
4686:Precept
4641:Loyalty
4636:Liberty
4631:Justice
4544:Dignity
4534:Consent
4478:Kantian
4468:Islamic
4431:Schools
4317:Realism
4249:Nursing
4244:Medical
4229:Machine
4169:Applied
3953:Science
3670:Harvard
3316:Realism
3192:Marxism
3107:Deviant
3076:Aretaic
3060:Science
2808:Awards
2693:2183914
2677:LXXXIII
2166:July 4,
1907:science
1694:1974, "
1230:atheist
1220:Atheism
1189:deontic
1080:Kantian
968:current
964:essence
912:dualist
882:), and
735:physics
682:scholar
211:
203:
199:
188:
176:
172:
161:Spouses
6893:(2022)
6887:(2020)
6881:(2018)
6875:(2017)
6869:(2014)
6863:(2011)
6857:(2008)
6851:(2005)
6845:(2003)
6839:(2001)
6833:(1999)
6827:(1997)
6821:(1995)
6815:(1993)
6798:(2022)
6792:(2020)
6786:(2018)
6780:(2017)
6774:(2014)
6764:(2011)
6758:(2008)
6752:(2005)
6738:(2003)
6732:(2001)
6726:(1999)
6720:(1997)
6714:(1995)
6708:(1993)
6691:(2022)
6685:(2020)
6679:(2018)
6673:(2017)
6667:(2014)
6661:(2011)
6655:(2008)
6649:(2005)
6643:(2003)
6637:(2001)
6631:(1999)
6625:(1997)
6619:(1995)
6613:(1993)
6596:(2022)
6590:(2020)
6580:(2018)
6574:(2017)
6568:(2014)
6562:(2011)
6556:(2008)
6550:(2005)
6544:(2003)
6538:(2001)
6532:(1999)
6526:(1997)
6520:(1995)
6514:(1993)
6379:Psyche
6226:Sakshi
6211:Qualia
6007:Topics
5873:Monism
5737:Others
5157:(1984)
5149:(1981)
5141:(1979)
5133:(1971)
5125:(1903)
5117:(1887)
5109:(1874)
5101:(1861)
5093:(1843)
5085:(1820)
5077:(1788)
5069:(1785)
5061:(1780)
5053:(1759)
5045:(1740)
5037:(1726)
5029:(1677)
4987:Taylor
4972:Parfit
4967:Singer
4942:Mackie
4817:Cicero
4758:Virtue
4691:Rights
4616:Honour
4473:Jewish
4269:Sexual
4177:Animal
4159:Virtue
4103:Ethics
3485:Oxford
2868:, and
2858:With:
2777:Vacant
2691:
2603:
2595:
2576:Ethics
2506:
2467:
2459:
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2018:Klesis
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1396:
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1267:Awards
1061:Ethics
684:
677:
670:
663:
655:
572:, the
545:, and
469:Jewish
409:ethics
260:Thesis
248:School
235:(2008)
229:(2008)
220:Awards
153:(2012)
145:(1986)
68:Serbia
6742:SANAA
6319:Works
6066:Brain
5249:Index
5011:Works
4982:Adams
4977:Nagel
4932:Dewey
4927:Rawls
4907:Barth
4902:Moore
4867:Hegel
4842:Xunzi
4797:Plato
4787:Laozi
4768:Wrong
4741:Japan
4731:Value
4726:Trust
4621:Ideal
4488:Stoic
4239:Media
4224:Legal
4061:Index
3095:Logic
3069:Turns
2974:2008
2829:1996
2763:1987
2689:JSTOR
2657:(PDF)
2601:S2CID
2593:JSTOR
2504:S2CID
2465:JSTOR
2250:(PDF)
2014:(PDF)
1304:Books
747:to be
689:JSTOR
675:books
504:BPhil
498:on a
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6260:Soul
6156:Mind
4962:Hare
4922:Foot
4882:Mill
4862:Kant
4857:Hume
4837:Mozi
4753:Vice
4671:Norm
4599:Evil
4594:Good
4554:Duty
4294:Meta
4217:Land
4144:Role
4129:Care
2457:ISSN
2434:2014
2393:ISBN
2328:2014
2306:2008
2284:2008
2258:2014
2224:ISBN
2207:(1).
2168:2018
2140:2021
2111:2019
2086:2017
2054:2019
2029:2019
1888:ISBN
1845:ISBN
1617:Nous
1561:ISBN
1541:ISBN
1522:ISBN
1503:ISBN
1480:ISBN
1459:ISBN
1438:ISBN
1415:ISBN
1394:ISBN
1373:ISBN
1352:ISBN
1316:ISBN
1275:for
1082:and
1053:and
860:and
832:and
661:news
622:for
510:and
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