922:
57:
897:
909:
1134:
districts the entire district is represented by a single politician, even if a sizeable minority (or even a majority, in the case of plurality voting) of the electorate votes for candidates from other parties. This enables political parties to rig elections in their favor by drawing districts in such a way that more districts are won by their party than their proportion of the overall vote would dictate (in the
1006:, ratified in 1789, states: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States...Representatives...shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers." In other words, the Constitution specifies that each state will be apportioned a number of representatives in the
1034:), under the justification that they served as bulwarks against southern Democrats diluting the electoral power of African Americans by using strategically drawn at-large multi-member districts. For instance, Southern Democrats could create a single statewide multi-member district elected by plurality vote, all but guaranteeing the white majority would elect only Democrats.
1114:
A safe seat is one in which a plurality or majority of voters, depending on the electoral system, support a particular candidate or party so strongly that the candidate's election is practically guaranteed in advance of the vote. This means votes for other candidates effectively make no difference to
1051:
On the other hand, today most voters tend to vote for a candidate because they are endorsed by a particular political party or because they are in favor of who would become or remain the leader of the government, more than their feelings for or against the actual candidate standing. Sometimes voters
1047:
It has been argued by proponents of single-member constituencies that it encourages a stronger connection between the representative and constituents and increases accountability and is a check on incompetence and corruption. In countries that have multi-member constituencies, it is argued that the
1095:
Supporters view this effect as beneficial, claiming that two-party systems are more stable, and that the minority opposition does not have undue power to break a coalition. First-past-the-post minimizes the influence of third parties and thus arguably keeps out forms of opposition outside of the
1133:
Single-member districts enable gerrymandering, the practice of manipulating district boundaries to favor one political party. Whereas proportional multi-member districts ensure that political parties are represented roughly in proportion to the share of the vote they receive, in single-member
1119:, by both supporters of the dominant candidate (who can confidently abstain from voting because their preferred candidate's victory is nearly assured) as well as supporters of other candidates (who know their preferred candidate is essentially guaranteed to lose).
1096:
dominant rival party. Critics of two-party systems believe that two-party systems offer less choice to voters, create an exaggerated emphasis on issues that dominate more marginal seats, and does not completely remove the possibility of a balanced chamber (or
1025:
By 1842, single-member House districts had become the norm, with twenty-two states using single-member districts and only six using at-large multi-member districts. On 14 December 1967, single-member House districts were mandated by law pursuant to the
1420:
990:, members of the lower house of parliament are elected from single-member districts, while members of the upper house are elected from multi-member districts. In some other countries, such as
1150:
Contrary to conventional wisdom, a 2023 study found that single-member district systems do not have more geographically representative parliaments than systems with multi-member districts.
880:
564:
583:
1357:
1159:
1085:
950:
787:
1048:
constituency link is lost. For example, in Israel the whole country is a single constituency and representatives are selected by party-lists.
1302:
1195:
1378:
641:
1250:
673:
535:
530:
943:
636:
1135:
318:
1014:
those representatives should be apportioned. In the early years of the United States, a form of multi-member districts called
842:
93:
1056:
government in 1989 but, because of dissatisfaction with its leadership, the premier and leader of the governing party,
1027:
936:
1271:
1031:
1022:
multi-member districts (which had not yet been invented), plural districts were elected at-large in plurality votes.
837:
1052:
are in favor of a political party but do not like specific candidates. For example, voters in Canada re-elected the
1334:
1224:
1089:
827:
577:
548:
488:
559:
84:
622:
686:
1139:
264:
249:
234:
500:
423:
344:
1019:
1007:
865:
312:
294:
135:
1003:
756:
739:
706:
470:
458:
428:
229:
187:
120:
612:
605:
89:
1399:
666:
594:
446:
433:
416:
393:
371:
334:
324:
875:
1464:
1292:
1190:
792:
646:
329:
761:
821:
701:
631:
438:
729:
569:
453:
259:
238:
170:
148:
994:, members of parliament can be elected from either single-member or multi-member districts.
860:
847:
815:
79:
1100:), which can also give undue power to independents and lead to more, not less, stability.
8:
1383:
1081:
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253:
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921:
832:
802:
724:
661:
495:
222:
197:
180:
48:
1432:
1362:
1160:
Comparison of electoral systems § Compliance of selected single-winner methods
1069:
913:
870:
749:
463:
339:
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130:
125:
113:
74:
36:
1142:
won 45% of the popular vote but 64% of the seats, due in part to gerrymandering).
1084:
system is mathematically over-represented in the legislature. For example, in the
1115:
the result. This results in feelings of disenfranchisement, as well as increased
1097:
1015:
901:
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589:
554:
475:
386:
289:
212:
154:
32:
1128:
771:
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507:
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351:
202:
1436:
1272:"There's a simple way to end gerrymandering. Too bad Congress made it illegal"
1458:
1444:
1276:
780:
480:
268:
106:
69:
44:
20:
520:
284:
277:
207:
56:
398:
356:
299:
244:
1324:
1214:
1153:
896:
1116:
19:"Single-seat" redirects here. For a racing car with only one seat, see
1109:
1077:
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991:
983:
366:
361:
1329:
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1219:
617:
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403:
1068:
It has been argued that single-member districts tend to promote
908:
1379:"The several layers of Republican power-grabbing in Wisconsin"
1010:
proportional to its population. It does not, however, specify
987:
1076:, this principle has also been empirically supported by the
16:
Electoral district with one representative in a legislature
975:
represented by a single officeholder. It contrasts with a
1092:
won 51.2% of the popular vote but 56.7% of the seats.
1215:"The History of Single Member Districts for Congress"
1154:
Comparison of single-member district election methods
1086:
979:, which is represented by multiple officeholders.
1421:"Electoral Systems and Geographic Representation"
1456:
1400:"What Is Gerrymandering? And How Does it Work?"
1248:
997:
1418:
944:
1196:National Archives and Records Administration
1145:
1419:Carella, Leonardo; Eggers, Andrew (2023).
1358:"The Biggest Problem in American Politics"
1208:
1206:
951:
937:
1080:, which shows how the winning party in a
1063:
1269:
1293:"The Case for a Better Election System"
1203:
1018:were the norm. In contrast with modern
1457:
1136:2018 Wisconsin State Assembly election
1397:
1355:
1244:
1242:
1227:from the original on 19 December 2020
1072:(with some regional parties). Called
1425:British Journal of Political Science
1376:
1337:from the original on 16 October 2020
1305:from the original on 28 October 2020
1249:Editorial Board (10 November 2018).
1042:
1356:Salam, Reihan (11 September 2014).
1290:
13:
1291:Amy, Douglas J. (1 January 1997).
1270:Yglesias, Matthew (20 July 2015).
1239:
1028:Uniform Congressional District Act
55:
14:
1476:
1122:
1377:Bump, Philip (4 December 2018).
1212:
920:
907:
895:
843:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
489:Semi-proportional representation
121:First preference plurality (FPP)
1412:
1398:Wines, Michael (27 June 2019).
1251:"A Congress for Every American"
1391:
1370:
1349:
1317:
1284:
1263:
1183:
881:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
838:Moulin's impossibility theorem
803:Conflicting majorities paradox
1:
1176:
1103:
707:Frustrated majorities paradox
1191:"United States Constitution"
998:History in the United States
876:Condorcet dominance theorems
816:Social and collective choice
7:
1164:
982:In some countries, such as
542:By mechanism of combination
313:Proportional representation
10:
1481:
1157:
1126:
1107:
1037:
1004:United States Constitution
740:Multiple districts paradox
471:Fractional approval voting
459:Interactive representation
18:
1437:10.1017/S0007123423000121
1325:"Single Member Districts"
1146:Geographic representation
687:Paradoxes and pathologies
536:Mixed-member proportional
531:Mixed-member majoritarian
526:By results of combination
417:Approval-based committees
1008:House of Representatives
866:Condorcet's jury theorem
667:Double simultaneous vote
642:Rural–urban proportional
637:Dual-member proportional
599:
588:
555:Parallel (superposition)
447:Fractional social choice
434:Expanding approvals rule
263:
248:
233:
164:
153:
129:
793:Tyranny of the majority
570:Fusion (majority bonus)
387:Quota-remainder methods
1064:Fewer minority parties
965:single-member district
927:Mathematics portal
833:Majority impossibility
822:Impossibility theorems
618:Negative vote transfer
439:Method of equal shares
60:
1158:Further information:
977:multi-member district
730:Best-is-worst paradox
719:Pathological response
454:Direct representation
107:Single-winner methods
59:
914:Economics portal
861:Median voter theorem
80:Comparative politics
1384:The Washington Post
1138:, for example, the
1082:first-past-the-post
902:Politics portal
613:Vote linkage system
584:Seat linkage system
171:Ranked-choice (RCV)
1405:The New York Times
1256:The New York Times
1199:. 4 November 2015.
973:electoral district
798:Discursive dilemma
757:Lesser evil voting
632:Supermixed systems
335:Largest remainders
193:Round-robin voting
61:
1070:two-party systems
1060:, lost his seat.
1043:Constituency link
961:
960:
848:Gibbard's theorem
788:Dominance paradox
725:Perverse response
429:Phragmen's method
295:Majority judgment
223:Positional voting
181:Condorcet methods
49:electoral systems
1472:
1449:
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1416:
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1140:Republican Party
1117:nonparticipation
1090:Republican Party
1016:plural districts
953:
946:
939:
925:
924:
912:
911:
900:
899:
855:Positive results
750:Strategic voting
647:Majority jackpot
604:
593:
464:Liquid democracy
340:National remnant
330:Highest averages
267:
252:
237:
169:
160:Alternative vote
158:
142:Partisan primary
134:
75:Mechanism design
28:
27:
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1098:hung parliament
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1040:
1032:2 U.S. Code §2c
1000:
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828:Arrow's theorem
818:
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735:No-show paradox
716:
702:Cloning paradox
692:Spoiler effects
689:
679:
678:
653:
540:
523:
513:
512:
485:
476:Maximal lottery
443:
424:Thiele's method
413:
383:
315:
305:
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290:Approval voting
278:Cardinal voting
274:
219:
213:Maximal lottery
177:
109:
99:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1478:
1468:
1467:
1465:Constituencies
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1171:Duverger's law
1166:
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1144:
1129:Gerrymandering
1127:Main article:
1124:
1123:Gerrymandering
1121:
1108:Main article:
1105:
1102:
1074:Duverger's law
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772:Turkey-raising
769:
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743:
742:
732:
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712:Center squeeze
709:
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697:Spoiler effect
690:
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677:
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669:
656:By ballot type
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508:Limited voting
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382:
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377:Localized list
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149:Instant-runoff
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136:Jungle primary
123:
112:Single vote -
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871:May's theorem
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781:majority rule
779:Paradoxes of
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521:Mixed systems
517:
516:
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481:Random ballot
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325:Apportionment
323:
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298:
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288:
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283:
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261:
260:Antiplurality
258:
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214:
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188:Condorcet-IRV
186:
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78:
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70:Social choice
68:
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54:
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46:
45:Social choice
43:
42:
38:
34:
30:
29:
26:
22:
21:Single-seater
1428:
1424:
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1403:
1393:
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1372:
1361:
1351:
1339:. Retrieved
1328:
1319:
1307:. Retrieved
1296:
1286:
1275:
1265:
1254:
1229:. Retrieved
1218:
1213:Mast, Tony.
1194:
1185:
1149:
1132:
1113:
1094:
1067:
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1024:
1020:proportional
1011:
1001:
981:
969:constituency
968:
964:
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854:
853:
820:
778:
777:
762:Exaggeration
748:
747:
718:
717:
691:
655:
654:
623:Mixed ballot
578:Compensatory
576:
549:compensatory
546:
541:
525:
487:
486:
445:
444:
415:
414:
385:
384:
372:List-free PR
317:
285:Score voting
276:
275:
221:
220:
208:Ranked pairs
179:
178:
111:
25:
662:Single vote
565:Conditional
560:Coexistence
409:Quota Borda
399:Schulze STV
357:Closed list
300:STAR voting
245:Borda count
1341:24 January
1309:25 January
1231:24 January
1177:References
1104:Safe seats
767:Truncation
496:Cumulative
319:Party-list
94:By country
85:Comparison
1445:0007-1234
1431:: 40–68.
1110:Safe seat
1078:cube rule
1058:Don Getty
992:Singapore
984:Australia
674:Dual-vote
367:Panachage
362:Open list
352:List type
230:Plurality
126:Two-round
114:plurality
37:Economics
1459:Category
1335:Archived
1330:FairVote
1303:Archived
1298:FairVote
1225:Archived
1220:FairVote
1165:See also
394:Hare STV
33:Politics
31:A joint
1054:Alberta
1038:Aspects
404:CPO-STV
254:Baldwin
203:Schulze
198:Minimax
116:methods
1443:
1088:, the
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