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to endow the central bank with such an authority. The author describes how in the initial passage of the act in 1913, Congress demonstrated its steadfast commitment to the "real bills" doctrine in two interrelated ways: 1) by limiting what assets the Fed could purchase, discount, and use as collateral for advances, and 2) by ensuring that any newly created government-sponsored credit enterprises were kept separate from the
Federal Reserve System. During the Great Depression, however, Congress passed legislation that blurred the line between monetary and credit policy, slowly chipping away at the real bills doctrine as it sought to combat the crisis. It was in this context that Congress added Section 13(3) to the Federal Reserve Act. In tracing this history, the author concludes that the original framers of Section 13(3) meant to sanction direct Federal Reserve lending to the real economy, rather than simply to a weakened financial sector, in emergency circumstances. This Depression-era history provides insights into the evolving role of the Federal Reserve as an emergency provider of liquidity.
387:
consistent with full employment and then let the money stock adjust to money demand to achieve that desired target rate. In effect, this means that the Fed would relinquish control over the money stock, letting it expand as required in a vain effort to eliminate discrepancies between the market rate and the predetermined target rate. This low target interest rate proposal has much in common with the long-discredited real bills doctrine, according to which the money supply should expand passively to accommodate the legitimate needs of trade.
105:
63:
22:
214:, the doctrine assures that the volume of money created will be just enough to allow purchasers to buy the finished goods off the market as final product without affecting prices. From their sales receipts, businessmen then pay off their real bills bank loans. Banks retire the returned money from circulation until the next batch of goods need financing.
302:, "This so-called commercial loan theory or real bills doctrine was a basic principle underlying the money functions of the new system. The essential fallacy in the doctrine was that note issue would also vary with the price level as well as the real volume of trade. Thus its operation would be inherently inflationary or deflationary."
453:
intermediation. The quantity-theory prescription, in contrast, is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate 'money' from credit. Although our models are consistent with quantity-theory predictions about money supply and price-level behavior under these two policy prescriptions, the models imply that the
414:
particularly of the stock-market variety. Few bankers wished to expose themselves to such withering interrogation. To avoid such questioning, bankers refrained from applying for
Federal Reserve emergency liquidity aid even though they needed it. This was especially so in the panicky situation of the October
386:
With recession lingering and interest rates remaining high, one hears increasingly that the Fed should abandon its money growth targets and move to a policy of lowering interest rates to full employment levels. All would be well, we are told, if only the Fed would set a fixed low interest rate target
535:
At the height of the financial crisis of 2007–09, the
Federal Reserve conducted emergency lending under authority granted to it in the third paragraph of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. This article explores the political and legislative origins of the section, focusing on why Congress chose
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representing claims to real goods in the process of production, the loans will be just sufficient to finance the production of goods. The doctrine seeks to have real output determine its own means of purchase without affecting prices. Under the real bills doctrine, there is only one policy role for
263:
in 1929 launched his Direct
Pressure initiative. It required all member banks seeking Federal Reserve discount window assistance to affirm that they had never made speculative loans, especially of the stock-market variety. No self-respecting banker seeking to borrow emergency reserves from the Fed
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when bank depositors were seeking to cash in their checking deposits and take the cash from the banks. Instead of borrowing the reserves needed to meet the cash drain from the Fed and exposing themselves to "Direct
Pressure" questioning, those banks failed in huge numbers. Humphrey and Timberlake
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assert that a real bills doctrine is essentially a "metastable mechanism", since it is "beyond" stable. They contend that the doctrine itself "does not imply either a stable or an unstable system", but that "it depends completely on the institutional environment in which the doctrine appears".
475:
The founders of the
Federal Reserve desired to end financial panics. In order to achieve this end, they created a decentralized collection of reserve depositories – the Federal Reserve banks. They also wanted to remove control of the financial system from Wall Street. At the time, policymakers
413:
contraction of the money stock which precipitated the Great
Depression. The "Direct Pressure" letter required any commercial bank seeking to avail itself of Fed lender-of-last-resort assistance to show, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it had never even thought of making "speculative" loans,
354:
between "productive activity" and "speculative activity", Humphrey and
Timberlake argue, the Doctrine wrongfully impugned speculation as the source of asset price bubbles and financial panic. Such flawed premises made the Fed unduly reluctant to make full use of the United States' ample gold
285:
Here was the doctrine's third flaw. It calls for pro-cyclical contractions and expansions of the money stock when correct stabilization policy calls for counter-cyclical ones. The doctrine fell into disuse in the late 1930s, but its legacy still influences banking policy from time to time.
452:
in 1982. They contended that "Two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models" and that "the real-bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such
259:. Adhering to the doctrine's second flaw, namely that speculative activity/paper can be sharply distinguished from purely productive activity/paper (as if production motivated by uncertain expected future profits does not involve a speculative element), long-time Fed Board member
248:(1760–1815) was an early critic of the real bills doctrine. He noted one of the doctrine's three main flaws, namely that by linking money not to real output as the original intention was, but to the price times quantity—or nominal dollar value—of real output, it set up a positive
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was willing to undergo such interrogation, especially given that a "hard-boiled" Federal
Reserve was unlikely to grant such aid. Instead, the banks chose to fail (and the Federal Reserve let them), which they did in large numbers, almost 9000 of them. These failures led to the
476:
understood financial panics as resulting from speculative excess, especially on Wall Street. These "real bills" views of financial panic originated in the 19th century
American experience. They influenced monetary policy significantly until the post-World War II period.
700:
Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One-hundredth Congress, First
399:(1866–1953), long-term member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors as the person most responsible. Under the influence of the RBD, Miller launched his "Direct Pressure" initiative in late 1929. That initiative, a letter sent out to all member banks of the
489:, wrote in 1927 that "The 'real bills doctrine' has its origin in banking developments of the 17th and 18th centuries. It received its first authoritative exposition in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, was then repudiated by
237:, by using land as a measure of, and collateral for, real activity. Smith then substituted short-term self-liquidating commercial paper for Law's production proxy, land, and so the real bills doctrine was born.
505:
in the currency-banking debate of the mid–19th century. Even now, echoes of the real bills doctrine reverberate in modern monetary theory." Green's description of the real bills doctrine was later repeated in
252:
running from price to money to price. When the monetary authority holds the market (loan) rate of interest, below the profit rate on capital, this feedback loop can generate continuing inflation.
229:(1705) originated the basic idea of the real bills doctrine, the concept of an "output-governed currency secured to real property and responding to the needs of trade". Law sought to limit
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548:, and their state is maintained through distributed consensus, the concept of the real bills doctrine may have no obvious impact on their use. There have reportedly been
366:
was an American statistician and economist who was instrumental in bringing about the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. Riefler served as an assistant to the chairman of the
514:-backed search engine for academic publications begun in 2015. Green wrote the article entry about the "Real Bills Doctrine in Classical Economics" published in
191:: lending commercial banks the necessary reserves against real customer bills, which the banks offer as collateral. The term "real bills doctrine" was coined by
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cause, of the Great Depression. However, Warburton did not single out Adolph Miller as Direct Pressure's principal formulator, as Humphrey and Timberlake have.
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and was the only economist Timberlake and Humphrey could find who, other than themselves, identified the Direct Pressure initiative as a major cause, if not
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255:
Doctrinal historians have noted the real bills doctrine's place as one factor contributing to the instability of the U.S. money supply precipitating the
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has observed that Sargent and Wallace's version of the real bills doctrine is not the same as the one prevailing in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
278:. The result was a decade-long fall of real output and prices, which by the needs-of-trade logic of the real bills doctrine justified shrinkage of the
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from 1948 to 1959. His Riefler-Burgess framework was in opposition to the real bills doctrine's use as a guiding philosophy of
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In 2018, Parintha Sastry's article "The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act" was published in the
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says that as long as bankers lend to businessmen only against the security (collateral) of short-term 30-, 60-, or 90-day
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165:
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49:
750:
Laidler, David (1 February 1984). "Misconceptions about the Real-Bills Doctrine: A Comment on Sargent and Wallace".
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who wrote in the 1940s, 1950s, and early-1960s at a time when most other economists were Keynesians, worked for the
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Mints, Lloyd (February 1923). "Open Market Borrowing to Finance the Production of Goods Sold for Future Delivery".
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531:. In this article Sastry discussed the role of the real bills doctrine in the financial crisis of 2007–2009:
449:
395:, discussed the real bills doctrine (RBD) and the chief personnel involved in its failure. They identified
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Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
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and led to the Great Depression. Skeptics of this hypothesis that cite other monetary crises – like the
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Australian Professor Emeritus Roy Green, a Special Advisor and Chair for UTS Innovation Council at the
1166:"Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg seeks to reassure wary lawmakers about Libra, elections in rare D.C. trip"
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In 1988, economist James Parthemos, a former senior vice president and director of research at the
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403:, led to the wave of bank failures. Nine-thousand banks failed, and their failure resulted in the
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in the famous bullionist controversy, and was finally rehabilitated as the 'law of reflux' by
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held that opinion but did not discuss its full implications in their book published in 1963,
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published "The Real-Bills Doctrine Versus The Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration" for the
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are granted to businessmen in the form either of new bank notes or of additions to their
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contraction of the money stock, which, according to Friedman and Schwartz, caused the
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Legislating Instability: Adam Smith, Free Banking, and the Financial Crisis of 1772
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systems do not require a central authority such as the Federal Reserve Bank or the
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Gold, the Real Bills Doctrine, and the Fed: Sources of Monetary Disorder 1922–1938
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199:. The doctrine was previously known as "the commercial loan theory of banking".
125:
841:
Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History
623:(1945 ed.). Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. p. vi.
565:
541:
458:
338:" – the unprecedented collapse of the U.S. money supply, which began after the
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Selgin, G. A. (1989). "The Analytical Framework of the Real-Bills Doctrine".
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Money and Trade Considered: With a Proposal for Supplying a Nation with Money
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How 18th Century Ideas of Money Supply Can Help Identify Problems with Libra
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Money and Trade Considered With a Proposal for Supplying a Nation with Money
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An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain
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939:"The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration"
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1091:"The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act"
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A History of Banking Theory in Great Britain and the United States
1116:"China Is Said to be Cracking Down on a Cryptocurrency Loophole"
350:– to their true source: the real bills doctrine. By drawing a
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391:
Thomas Humphrey and Richard Timberlake in their 2019 book,
334:. Today the gold standard remains a popular scapegoat for "
480:
865:
Glasner, David; Cooley, Thomas F.; Murphy, Larry (1997).
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and the real-bills prescription is." Monetary historian
289:
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Eatwell, John; Milgate, Murray; Newman, Peter (1992).
210:, which deposits constitute the main component of the
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Sargent, Thomas J.; Wallace, Neil (1 December 1982).
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894:""The Treasury-Fed Accord." Federal Reserve History"
827:. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
901:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
864:
802:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
825:A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960
76:Needs to reflect best academic historical opinion.
986:"The Real Bills Views of the Founders of the Fed"
1188:
1065:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance
868:Business Cycles and Depressions: An Encyclopedia
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892:Hetzel, Robert; Leach, Ralph F. (Winter 2001).
244:, anti-slavery activist, and monetary theorist
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217:The doctrine has roots in some statements of
823:Friedman, Milton; Schwartz, Anna J. (1963).
795:"Historical Origins of the Cost-Push Theory"
891:
672:(2nd ed.). Edinburgh: Andrew Anderson.
72:needs attention from an expert in Economics
50:Learn how and when to remove these messages
837:
556:(formerly known as Libra), a commissioned
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128:. Please do not remove this message until
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166:Learn how and when to remove this message
148:Learn how and when to remove this message
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704:. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1988.
124:Relevant discussion may be found on the
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481:Real bills doctrine in the 21st century
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312:A Monetary History of the United States
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984:Hetzel, Robert (Second Quarter 2014).
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683:Thornton, Henry; Hayek, F. A. (1939).
82:may be able to help recruit an expert.
1202:Great Depression in the United States
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425:, an early-pre-Friedman-and-Schwartz
240:The British banker, parliamentarian,
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290:Commercial bank clearinghouse system
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918:. Social Science Research Network.
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560:which was proposed by the American
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992:. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
368:Federal Reserve Board of Governors
14:
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31:This article has multiple issues.
1164:Romm, Tony (19 September 2019).
1095:Federal Reserve Bank of New York
469:Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
382:In 1982, Thomas Humphrey wrote,
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838:Timberlake, Richard H. (1993).
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487:University of Technology Sydney
471:economist Robert Hetzel wrote:
39:or discuss these issues on the
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634:Goodspeed, Tyler Beck (2016).
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943:Journal of Political Economy
914:Humphrey, Thomas M. (1982).
752:Journal of Political Economy
640:. Harvard University Press.
586:Journal of Political Economy
450:Journal of Political Economy
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1212:History of economic thought
197:A History of Banking Theory
130:conditions to do so are met
74:. The specific problem is:
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871:. Taylor & Francis.
619:Mints, Lloyd W. (1945).
525:New York Federal Reserve
916:The Real Bills Doctrine
512:artificial intelligence
359:Financial panic of 1929
340:1929 stock market crash
298:, wrote for the bank's
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529:Economic Policy Review
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401:Federal Reserve system
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687:. New York: Rinehart.
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344:German hyperinflation
336:the Great Contraction
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793:Humphrey, Thomas M.
457:prescription is not
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372:U.S. monetary policy
1089:Sastry, Parinitha.
364:Winfield W. Riefler
330:did not create the
225:(1671–1729) in his
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117:of this article is
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668:Law, John (1720).
348:Mississippi Bubble
324:Richard Timberlake
300:Economic Quarterly
231:monetary expansion
195:in his 1945 book,
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440:Economists
280:money stock
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193:Lloyd Mints
1191:Categories
592:: 128–38.
571:References
558:blockchain
546:World Bank
427:monetarist
416:1929 crash
355:reserves.
219:Adam Smith
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115:neutrality
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