Knowledge

Probabilistic risk assessment

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For example, without specifying an uncertainty level, the Japanese regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety Commission issued restrictive safety goal in terms of qualitative health objectives in 2003, such that individual fatality risks should not exceed 10/year. Then it was translated in a safety goal
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The spectrum of risks across classes of events are also of concern, and are usually controlled in licensing processes – it would be of concern if rare but high consequence events were found to dominate the overall risk, particularly as these risk assessments are very sensitive to assumptions (how
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The second point is a possible lack of design in order to prevent and mitigate the catastrophic events, which has the lowest probability of the event and biggest magnitude of the impact, and the lowest degree of uncertainty about their magnitude. A
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What and how severe are the potential detriments, or the adverse consequences that the technological entity (or the ecological system in the case of a PERA) may be eventually subjected to as a result of the occurrence of the
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while CCF deals with methods for evaluating the effect of inter-system and intra-system dependencies which tend to cause simultaneous failures and thus significant increase in overall risk.
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What can go wrong with the studied technological entity or stressor, or what are the initiators or initiating events (undesirable starting events) that lead to adverse consequence(s)?
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One point of possible objection interests the uncertainties associated with a PSA. The PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) has often no associated uncertainty, though in
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Consequences are expressed numerically (e.g., the number of people potentially hurt or killed) and their likelihoods of occurrence are expressed as
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Risk in a PRA is defined as a feasible detrimental outcome of an activity or action. In a PRA, risk is characterized by two quantities:
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In addition to the above methods, PRA studies require special but often very important analysis tools like
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How likely to occur are these undesirable consequences, or what are their probabilities or frequencies?
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PRA Software used by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and NASA
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Verdonck, F. A. M.; Jaworska, J.; Janssen, C. R.; Vanrolleghem, Peter A. (2002).
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Goussen, Benoit; Price, Oliver R.; Rendal, Cecilie; Ashauer, Roman (2016).
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Probabilistic Ecological Risk Assessment Framework for Chemical Substances
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associated with a complex engineered technological entity (such as an
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Probabilistic risk assessment usually answers three basic questions:
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the magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence(s), and
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the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence.
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Two common methods of answering this last question are
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analysis (CCF). HRA deals with methods for modeling
357: 435:A collection of links to free publications on PRA 176:Containment Failure Frequency (CFF): 1.2 × 10 /yr 467: 131: 410: 173:Core Damage Frequency (CDF): 1.6 × 10 /year, 227:of those events, e.g. a nuclear program or 287:Transportation safety in the United States 456: 386: 340: 411:Stamatelatos, Michael (April 5, 2000). 368: 14: 468: 49:) or the effects of stressors on the 369:Song, Jin Ho; Kim, Tae Woon (2014). 83:rare is a high consequence event?). 24: 375:Nuclear Engineering and Technology 25: 497: 399: 109:– for explanations of these, see 216:in relation to the fixed value. 144:shall be related to a secondary 27:Methodology for evaluating risks 300: 13: 1: 430:Industry PRA software (CAFTA) 293: 31:Probabilistic risk assessment 18:Probabilistic Risk Assessment 219:Such external events may be 132:PSA for nuclear power plants 7: 476:Risk analysis methodologies 257:Reference class forecasting 234: 152:shall be examined with the 10: 502: 160:for nuclear power plants: 440:PRA software RiskSpectrum 225:condition the probability 190:CDF: 2.4 × 10 /year, and 156:inside the set of data. 388:10.5516/NET.03.2013.079 146:measurement uncertainty 486:Management cybernetics 481:Probability assessment 277:Risk management tools 193:CFF: 5.5 × 10 /yr for 181:for reactors of type 164:for reactors of type 122:common-cause-failure 325:2016NatSR...636004G 247:Common mode failure 120:analysis (HRA) and 107:fault tree analysis 103:event tree analysis 47:nuclear power plant 425:on March 14, 2006. 313:Scientific Reports 229:economic sanctions 111:safety engineering 333:10.1038/srep36004 282:Threat assessment 118:human reliability 16:(Redirected from 493: 462: 460: 426: 424: 418:. Archived from 417: 393: 392: 390: 366: 355: 354: 344: 304: 206:factor of safety 21: 501: 500: 496: 495: 494: 492: 491: 490: 466: 465: 458:10.1.1.112.1047 422: 415: 402: 397: 396: 367: 358: 305: 301: 296: 291: 262:Risk assessment 237: 150:random variable 134: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 499: 489: 488: 483: 478: 464: 463: 442: 437: 432: 427: 408: 401: 400:External links 398: 395: 394: 381:(2): 207–216. 356: 298: 297: 295: 292: 290: 289: 284: 279: 274: 269: 264: 259: 254: 249: 244: 238: 236: 233: 221:natural hazard 202:cost-effective 197: 196: 195: 194: 191: 179: 178: 177: 174: 133: 130: 99: 98: 95: 91: 65: 64: 61: 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 498: 487: 484: 482: 479: 477: 474: 473: 471: 459: 454: 450: 449: 443: 441: 438: 436: 433: 431: 428: 421: 414: 409: 407: 404: 403: 389: 384: 380: 376: 372: 365: 363: 361: 352: 348: 343: 338: 334: 330: 326: 322: 318: 314: 310: 303: 299: 288: 285: 283: 280: 278: 275: 273: 270: 268: 265: 263: 260: 258: 255: 253: 250: 248: 245: 243: 240: 239: 232: 230: 226: 222: 217: 215: 211: 207: 203: 192: 189: 188: 186: 185: 180: 175: 172: 171: 169: 168: 163: 162: 161: 157: 155: 151: 147: 143: 139: 129: 127: 123: 119: 114: 112: 108: 104: 96: 92: 89: 88: 87: 84: 80: 78: 77:expected loss 74: 70: 69:probabilities 62: 59: 58: 57: 54: 52: 48: 44: 40: 36: 32: 19: 447: 420:the original 378: 374: 316: 312: 302: 272:Extreme risk 242:Benefit risk 218: 198: 182: 165: 158: 135: 115: 100: 85: 81: 66: 55: 34: 30: 29: 267:Risk matrix 126:human error 73:frequencies 51:environment 470:Categories 294:References 154:dispersion 94:initiator? 453:CiteSeerX 319:: 36004. 252:Cost risk 210:resilient 138:metrology 351:27782171 235:See also 43:airliner 342:5080554 321:Bibcode 204:of the 142:measure 455:  349:  339:  214:robust 187:, in: 170:, in: 423:(PDF) 416:(PDF) 184:BWR-5 167:BWR-4 45:or a 39:risks 347:PMID 212:and 140:any 105:and 383:doi 337:PMC 329:doi 71:or 35:PRA 472:: 379:46 377:. 373:. 359:^ 345:. 335:. 327:. 315:. 311:. 231:. 113:. 461:. 391:. 385:: 353:. 331:: 323:: 317:6 33:( 20:)

Index

Probabilistic Risk Assessment
risks
airliner
nuclear power plant
environment
probabilities
frequencies
expected loss
event tree analysis
fault tree analysis
safety engineering
human reliability
common-cause-failure
human error
metrology
measure
measurement uncertainty
random variable
dispersion
BWR-4
BWR-5
cost-effective
factor of safety
resilient
robust
natural hazard
condition the probability
economic sanctions
Benefit risk
Common mode failure

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