Pragmatic theory of truth

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mean by ‘going round’ the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him… but on the contrary if you mean being first in front of him, then behind him, then on his left, then finally in front again, it is quite obvious that the man fails to go round him." In such arguments, where no practical consequences can be found after making a distinction, the argument should be dropped. If, however, the argument was to yield one result which clearly holds greater consequences, then that side should be agreed upon solely for its intrinsic value. Although James never actually clarifies what “practical consequences” are, he does mention how the best way to find division between possible consequences is by first practically defining what each side of the argument means. In terms of James’s example, he says: “You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb ‘to go round’ in one practical fashion or the other." Thus the pragmatic theory seeks to find truth through the division and practical consequences between contrasting sides to establish which side is correct.

600:"The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual experience. Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea of its 'works' (unless you are a clockmaker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with reality. Even though it should shrink to the mere word 'works', that word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of the clock, or of its spring's 'elasticity', it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy." 579:, with an added dimension. Truth is verifiable to the extent that thoughts and statements correspond with actual things, as well as "hangs together," or coheres, fits as pieces of a puzzle might fit together, and these are in turn verified by the observed results of the application of an idea to actual practice. James said that "all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere." He also extended his pragmatic theory well beyond the scope of scientific verifiability, and even into the realm of the mystical: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, then it is 'true.' " 631:"live option." F.C.S. Schiller, on the other hand, clearly asserted beliefs could pass into and out of truth on a situational basis. Schiller held that truth was relative to specific problems. If I want to know how to return home safely, the true answer will be whatever is useful to solving that problem. Later on, when faced with a different problem, what I came to believe with the earlier problem may now be false. As my problems change, and as the most useful way to solve a problem shifts, so does the property of truth. 605:

by the ideas of analogues, copies, or iconic images of the thing represented? The answer is that the iconic aspect of correspondence can be taken literally only in regard to sensory experiences of the more precisely eidetic sort. When it comes to the kind of correspondence that might be said to exist between a symbol, a word like "works", and its object, the springs and catches of the clock on the wall, then the pragmatist recognizes that a more than nominal account of the matter still has a lot more explaining to do.

553:

destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. (Peirce 1878, CP 5.407).

779: 583:"Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'. Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement', and what by the term 'reality', when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with." 588:

By using the term ‘cash-value,’ James refers to the practical consequences that come from discerning the truth behind arguments, through the pragmatic method, that should yield no desirable answer. In such cases, the pragmatic method must “try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences." William James uses an analogy of a squirrel on a tree to further explain the pragmatic method.

571:'s version of the pragmatic theory is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving." By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic"). James's pragmatic theory is a synthesis of 899:", in which inquirers or members of a community suspend or bracket prevailing beliefs and engage in rational discourse aimed at truth and governed by the force of the better argument, under conditions in which all participants in discourse have equal opportunities to engage in constative (assertions of fact), normative, and expressive speech acts, and in which discourse is not distorted by the 868:

of the predicate 'true'. There is a difference between the two and pragmatism confuses them. In this pragmatism is akin to Berkeley's view that to be is to be perceived, which similarly confuses an indication or proof of that something exists with the meaning of the word 'exists', or with what it is

604:

James exhibits a knack for popular expression that Peirce seldom sought, and here his analysis of correspondence by way of a simple thought experiment cuts right to the quick of the first major question to ask about it, namely: To what extent is the notion of correspondence involved in truth covered

473:

In preparing for this task, Peirce makes use of an allegorical story, omitted here, the moral of which is that there is no use seeking a conception of truth that we cannot conceive ourselves being able to capture in a humanly conceivable concept. So we might as well proceed on the assumption that we

669:

Truth is, to be sure, an absolute notion, in the following sense: "true for me but not for you" and "true in my culture but not in yours" are weird, pointless locutions. So is "true then, but not now." ... James would, indeed, have done better to say that phrases like "the good in the way of belief"

630:

and back? For James, beliefs are not true until they have been made true by verification. James believed propositions become true over the long term through proving their utility in a person's specific situation. The opposite of this process is not falsification, but rather the belief ceases to be a

383:

Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential

634:

C.S. Peirce considered the idea that beliefs are true at one time but false at another (or true for one person but false for another) to be one of the "seeds of death" by which James allowed his pragmatism to become "infected." For Peirce the pragmatic view implies theoretical claims should be tied

595:

William James (1907) begins his chapter on "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth" in much the same letter and spirit as the above selection from Peirce (1906), noting the nominal definition of truth as a plausible point of departure, but immediately observing that the pragmatist's quest for the meaning

587:

Pragmatism, James clarifies, is not a new philosophy. He states that it instead focuses on discerning truth between contrasting schools of thought. “To understand truth, he argues, we must consider the pragmatic ‘cash-value’ of having true beliefs and the practical difference of having true ideas."

546:

The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without

478:

Now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out — the right method of transforming signs — then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry

227:

Theories of truth may be described according to several dimensions of description that affect the character of the predicate "true". The truth predicates that are used in different theories may be classified by the number of things that have to be mentioned in order to assess the truth of a sign,

591:

James imagines a squirrel on a tree. If it clung to one side of the tree, and a person stood on the other, and as the person walked around the tree so too did the squirrel as to never be seen by the person, would the person rightly be walking around the squirrel? “’Depends on what you practically

426:

says, merely the nominal definition of it. Truth belongs exclusively to propositions. A proposition has a subject (or set of subjects) and a predicate. The subject is a sign; the predicate is a sign; and the proposition is a sign that the predicate is a sign of that of which the subject is a

660:

rational acceptability for one fundamental reason; truth is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost. The statement 'The earth is flat' was, very likely, rationally acceptable 3000 years ago; but it is not rationally acceptable today. Yet it

552:

Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of

541:

are coordinate concepts in pragmatic thinking, each being defined in relation to the other, and both together as they participate in the time evolution of inquiry. Inquiry is not a disembodied process, nor the occupation of a singular individual, but the common life of an unbounded community.

684:

Unless we decide upon how we are going to use concepts like 'object', 'existence' etc., the question 'how many objects exist' does not really make any sense. But once we decide the use of these concepts, the answer to the above-mentioned question within that use or 'version', to put in Nelson

305:-adic if certain details can be abstracted away and neglected in a particular context of discussion. That said, given the generic division of truth predicates according to their arity, further species can be differentiated within each genus according to a number of more refined features. 138:

Most inquiries into the character of truth begin with a notion of an informative, meaningful, or significant element, the truth of whose information, meaning, or significance may be put into question and needs to be evaluated. Depending on the context, this element might be called an

613:

Instead of truth being ready-made for us, James asserts we and reality jointly "make" truth. This idea has two senses: (1) truth is mutable, (often attributed to William James and F.C.S. Schiller); and (2) truth is relative to a conceptual scheme (more widely accepted in Pragmatism).

431:

Here Peirce makes a statement that is decisive for understanding the relationship between his pragmatic definition of truth and any theory of truth that leaves it solely and simply a matter of representations corresponding with their objects. Peirce, like Kant before him, recognizes

279:

truth predicate is one that applies to its main subject only in reference to a second and a third subject. For example, in a pragmatic theory of truth, one has to specify both the object of the sign, and either its interpreter or another sign called the

726:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (Dewey, p. 108).

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Several qualifications must be kept in mind with respect to any such radically simple scheme of classification, as real practice seldom presents any pure types, and there are settings in which it is useful to speak of a theory of truth that is "almost"

743:

from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that by Peirce: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real . (Dewey, 343

479:

us. In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign — something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself. (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).

679:

With James and Schiller we make things true by verifying them—a view rejected by most pragmatists. However, nearly all pragmatists do accept the idea there can be no truths without a conceptual scheme to express those truths. That is,

316:

an objective situation, more briefly, that a sign is true of an object. The nature of the correspondence may vary from theory to theory in this family. The correspondence can be fairly arbitrary or it can take on the character of an

349:

Very little in Peirce's thought can be understood in its proper light without understanding that he thinks all thoughts are signs, and thus, according to his theory of thought, no thought is understandable outside the context of a

501:, a process that transforms signs into signs while maintaining a specific relationship to an object, which object may be located outside the trajectory of signs or else be found at the end of it. Inquiry includes all forms of 515:, what Peirce here means by "the right method of transforming signs". A sign-to-sign transaction relating to an object is a transaction that involves three parties, or a relation that involves three roles. This is called a 524:

The statement above tells us one more thing: Peirce, having started out in accord with Kant, is here giving notice that he is parting ways with the Kantian idea that the ultimate object of a representation is an unknowable

639:

be the ultimate outcome (not any outcome in real time) of inquiry by a (usually scientific) community of investigators. William James, while agreeing with this definition, also characterized truthfulness as a species of

887:, which sets out the universal pragmatic conditions of ideal consensus and responds to many objections to earlier versions of a pragmatic, consensus theory of truth. Habermas distinguishes explicitly between 312:

tells of a relation between representations and objective states of affairs, and is therefore expressed, for the most part, by a dyadic predicate. In general terms, one says that a representation is

245:

truth predicate is one that applies to its main subject — typically a concrete representation or its abstract content — independently of reference to anything else. In this case one can say that a

714:, less broadly than William James but much more broadly than Charles Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time 849:, a sign, that evening is coming on. It would be an obvious mistake to say that the word "evening" just means "the time that the streetlights turn on". In the same way, while it might be an 474:

have a real hope of comprehending the answer, of being able to "handle the truth" when the time comes. Bearing that in mind, the problem of defining truth reduces to the following form:

1499:, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para. 135:

of it and the means to achieve it. In this view, truth cannot be discussed to much effect outside the context of inquiry, knowledge, and logic, all very broadly considered.

237:

of the predicate. The kinds of truth predicates may then be subdivided according to any number of more specific characters that various theorists recognize as important.

470:, namely, a purely nominal sense. To get beneath the superficiality of the nominal definition it is necessary to analyze the notion of correspondence in greater depth. 635:

to verification processes (i.e. they should be subject to test). They shouldn't be tied to our specific problems or life needs. Truth is defined, for Peirce, as what

644:: if something is true it is trustworthy and reliable and will remain so in every conceivable situation. Both Peirce and Dewey connect the definitions of truth and 256:

truth predicate is one that applies to its main subject only in reference to something else, a second subject. Most commonly, the auxiliary subject is either an

1722: 697:

it out of nothing, truth is a transformation of our experience—but this doesn't imply reality is something we're free to construct or imagine as we please.

101:. Pragmatic ideas about truth are often confused with the quite distinct notions of "logic and inquiry", "judging what is true", and "truth predicates". 888: 661:

would be wrong to say that 'the earth is flat' was true 3,000 years ago; for that would mean that the earth has changed its shape. (Putnam 1981, p. 55)

1365: 1342: 444: 427:

sign. If it be so, it is true. But what does this correspondence or reference of the sign, to its object, consist in? (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).

1463: 1252: 531:. Peirce would say that the object is knowable, in fact, it is known in the form of its representation, however imperfectly or partially. 1792: 1509:, Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1992. Cited as EP 1:page. 1313: 211:, and so on. Whatever the case, one has the task of judging whether the bearers of information, meaning, or significance are indeed 718:

openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths. In his

392:

This statement emphasizes Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he describes elsewhere as

1708: 1649: 876:"works", or that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led to much debate. 652:

around the idea a belief is true if it is ideally justified in epistemic terms. About James' and Schiller's view, Putnam says:

689:

F.C.S. Schiller used the analogy of a chair to make clear what he meant by the phrase that truth is made: just as a carpenter

364: 335:, whereby a representation is rendered true of its object by the existence of corresponding elements and a similar structure. 1681: 1274: 1228: 1195: 1162: 1516:, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998. Cited as EP 2:page. 1504: 1495: 967: 398:

and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper conception of truth. Although Peirce occasionally uses words like

1474: 670:

and "what it is better for us to believe" are interchangeable with "justified" rather than with "true." (Rorty 1998, p. 2)

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of truth, that a proposition is part of that perfect science at the ideal limit of inquiry, that just isn't what "true"

1018: 1006: 1932: 1785: 521:

in logic. Consequently, pragmatic theories of truth are largely expressed in terms of triadic truth predicates.

368:, his theory of sign relations, is key to understanding his entire philosophy of pragmatic thinking and thought. 790: 1861: 1546: 572: 466: 309: 1424:, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 410:, he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than 127: 1866: 1689: 1673: 1373: 1350: 1876: 1871: 1856: 1642: 908: 1922: 1886: 1778: 961:", beginning on p. 718, column 1, and ending on p. 720 with the initials "(C.S.P.)", see Google Books 1851: 1846: 1584: 1531: 576: 1478:, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianoplis, IN, 1981–. 1092: 1073: 1912: 1891: 1570: 962: 1524: 1459: 483:

Peirce's theory of truth depends on two other, intimately related subject matters, his theory of

1937: 1754: 1739: 1635: 1469: 931: 896: 821:(1907) in a discussion of James's theory, is that pragmatism mixes up the notion of truth with 344: 269: 36: 1560:", pp. 718–720 in "Truth and Falsity and Error", pp. 716–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), 1759: 1744: 547:

definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. (Peirce 1868, CP 5.311).

1562: 1323: 1398:(1976), "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", 1221:

Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking : popular lectures on philosophy

1188:

Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking : popular lectures on philosophy

1155:

Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking : popular lectures on philosophy

1055:

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.6, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", p427-428 (Macmillan, 1969)

879:

A viable, more sophisticated consensus theory of truth, a mixture of Peircean theory with

8: 1927: 1715: 1406:(ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, 1308:

Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry",

769: 1318: 1135: 950: 892: 438: 372: 94: 1395: 927: 884: 1830: 1815: 1617: 1270: 1234: 1224: 1201: 1191: 1168: 1158: 1139: 1127: 1014: 1002: 923: 904: 880: 814:

Several objections are commonly made to pragmatist account of truth, of either sort.

511: 506: 114: 1439:

Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy

1597: 1119: 818: 649: 641: 517: 460: 325: 414:

definitions, which he follows long tradition in relegating to a lower status than

1346: 527: 502: 359: 219:, whose positive application to a sign, or so on, asserts that the sign is true. 49: 24: 1917: 1403: 1379: 1123: 926:

have attempted to formulate Peirce's theory of truth in a way that improves on

900: 846: 1906: 1658: 1607: 1553:

12 (1878), 286–302. Reprinted (CP 5.388–410), (W 3:257–276)), (EP 1:124–141).

1451: 1434: 1238: 1205: 1172: 1131: 949:

Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 716–720 in

912: 568: 563: 485: 423: 407: 351: 40: 1538:

12 (1877), 1–15. Reprinted (CP 5.358–387), (W 3:242–257), (EP 1:109–123).

1523:

2 (1868), 140–157. Reprinted (CP 5.264–317), (W 2:211–242), (EP 1:28–55).

1360:, Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938. Reprinted, pp. 1–527 in 872:

Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a

845:. For example, when the streetlights turn on at the end of a day, that's an 422:

That truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object is, as

1825: 1539: 1514:

The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913)

1369: 919: 32: 1337:, Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY. Reprinted, pp. 1–254 in 685:

Goodman's phrase, is no more a matter of 'convention'. (Maitra 2003 p. 40)

622:"Truth" is not readily defined in Pragmatism. Can beliefs pass from being 1820: 1385: 1335:

The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action

394: 246: 212: 98: 778: 1330: 1289:

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Dewey, John" p383 (Macmillan, 1969)

711: 706: 449: 44: 28: 1110:

Capps, John (2019-06-18). "A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth".

891:, i.e. the beliefs that happen to hold in a particular community, and 464:

of its object. This tells us the sense in which Peirce entertained a

433: 371:

In his contribution to the article "Truth and Falsity and Error" for

132: 71: 65: 53:

as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts such as

731:

The index of the same book has exactly one entry under the heading

497: 331: 215:. This judgment is typically expressed in the form of a specific 1590:

Peirce, C.S. (1906), "Basis of Pragmaticism", first published in

491: 454: 354:. Sign relations taken collectively are the subject matter of a 319: 118: 82: 1627: 93:

Pragmatic theories of truth developed from the earlier ideas of

1519:

Peirce, C.S. (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities",

1078:

Lecture 6: Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking

873: 355: 59: 109:

In one classical formulation, truth is defined as the good of

47:. The common features of these theories are a reliance on the 1801: 1624:, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ. Cited as DOP. 1390:

Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology

1303:

William James on Habit, Will, Truth, and the Meaning of Life.

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as the end-in-view and conclusion of inquiry (Dewey, 14–15).

233: 110: 77: 1410:, Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1979. 833:

of truth. It really cannot be regarded as a theory of the

895:, i.e. consensus attained in conditions approximating an " 1067: 1065: 1063: 1061: 1770: 1580:

15, 161–181. Reprinted (CP 5.411–437), (EP 2:331–345).

1382:(1962), "Consensus Gentium", p. 64 in Runes (1962). 722:(1938), Dewey gave the following definition of inquiry: 1362:

John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12: 1938

1475:

Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition

1339:

John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4: 1929

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Rorty has also weighed in against James and Schiller:

1505:

The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings

1431:, Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1417:, Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA. 1046:, Ch.3: "The Thing and its Relations" (1912): 92-122. 883:

and social theory, is that presented and defended by

1097:

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking

999:

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking

990: 35:. Pragmatic theories of truth were first posited by 1099:. New York: Longman Green and Co. pp. 105–116. 860:Russell's objection is that pragmatism mixes up an 448:, one that states the function of the concept, the 379:(1901), Peirce defines truth in the following way: 1310:Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 1080:. New York: Longman Green and Co. pp. 76–91. 837:of the word "true". There's a difference between 1904: 1466:(intro.), Barnes and Noble, New York, NY, 2005. 1218: 1185: 1152: 1446:The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism' 930:and provides an epistemological conception of 693:a chair out of existing materials and doesn't 1786: 1643: 1448:, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY. 1441:, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY. 1376:Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986. 1353:Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984. 308:The truth predicate of interest in a typical 228:counting the sign itself as the first thing. 1614:, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1602:Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus 1422:Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 1576:Peirce, C.S. (1905), "What Pragmatism Is", 1253:A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God 735:, and it refers to the following footnote: 231:In formal logic, this number is called the 1793: 1779: 1650: 1636: 1496:Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce 1415:Communication and the Evolution of Society 1408:Communication and the Evolution of Society 1305:Frederic C. Beil, Publisher, Savannah, GA. 752:Dewey says more of what he understands by 284:before one can say that the sign is true 1709:The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life 1345:(ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), 596:of truth can only begin, not end there. 452:for conceiving it, and so indicates the 406:to describe one aspect of the pragmatic 384:ingredient of truth. (Peirce 1901, see 1563:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 1556:Peirce, C.S. (1901), section entitled " 1527:. NB. Misprints in CP and Eprint copy. 1324:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 955:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 937: 377:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 268:to which the representation bears some 1905: 1604:, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 1264: 979: 977: 957:, v. 2. Peirce's section is entitled " 1774: 1682:The Varieties of Religious Experience 1631: 1490:, 1986. Cited as W volume:page. 1109: 1090: 1071: 996: 756:in terms of his preferred concept of 1368:(ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), 1327:, 3 volumes in 4, New York, NY. 1093:"Lecture 8: Pragmatism and Religion" 773: 104: 1612:Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 1392:, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. 974: 648:. Hilary Putnam also developed his 442:, a definition in name only, and a 222: 57:; and an emphasis on the fact that 13: 1295: 1074:"Pragmatism's Conception of Truth" 14: 1949: 1657: 1521:Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16:Theory of truth within pragmatism 777: 495:. Inquiry is a special case of 1400:Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie 1283: 1258: 1245: 1212: 1179: 1146: 608: 292:its interpreting agent or sign. 1269:. Cambridge University Press. 1103: 1049: 1036: 1023: 943: 573:correspondence theory of truth 467:correspondence theory of truth 310:correspondence theory of truth 1: 1594:, CP 1.573–574 and 5.549–554. 809: 88: 1690:Essays in Radical Empiricism 1674:The Principles of Psychology 1374:Southern Illinois University 1358:Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 1351:Southern Illinois University 1044:Essays in Radical Empiricism 720:Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 7: 1573:. Reprinted (CP 5.565–573). 1547:How to Make Our Ideas Clear 518:ternary or triadic relation 27:within the philosophies of 10: 1954: 1124:10.1007/s11406-019-00099-z 1031:A World of Pure Experience 825:. Pragmatism describes an 767: 704: 561: 342: 301:-adic, or that "would be" 1839: 1808: 1800: 1750:Pragmatic theory of truth 1732: 1700: 1665: 1427:Habermas, Jürgen (2003), 1420:Habermas, Jürgen (1990), 1413:Habermas, Jürgen (1979), 1267:Reason, Truth and History 817:First, due originally to 675:(2) Conceptual relativity 577:coherence theory of truth 436:'s distinction between a 338: 249:is true in and of itself. 21:pragmatic theory of truth 1622:Dictionary of Philosophy 1301:Allen, James Sloan, ed. 1223:. Hardpress Publishing. 1219:James, William. (2012). 1190:. Hardpress Publishing. 1186:James, William. (2012). 1157:. Hardpress Publishing. 1153:James, William. (2012). 997:James, William (1981) . 911:of systematic blocks to 869:for something to exist. 700: 557: 1551:Popular Science Monthly 1536:Popular Science Monthly 1460:Thomas Kingsmill Abbott 1444:James, William (1909), 1429:Truth and Justification 1265:Putnam, Hilary (1981). 1091:James, William (1907). 1072:James, William (1907). 763: 758:warranted assertibility 739:The best definition of 646:warranted assertability 618:(1) Mutability of truth 1933:Charles Sanders Peirce 1755:William James Lectures 1545:Peirce, C.S. (1878), " 1532:The Fixation of Belief 1530:Peirce, C.S. (1877), " 1507:, Volume 1 (1867–1893) 1001:. Hackett Publishing. 932:deliberative democracy 897:ideal speech situation 750: 729: 687: 672: 663: 602: 585: 555: 549: 481: 429: 390: 345:Charles Sanders Peirce 37:Charles Sanders Peirce 1760:William James Society 1745:The Metaphysical Club 1456:Introduction to Logic 737: 724: 682: 667: 654: 598: 581: 550: 544: 476: 420: 381: 1488:Volume 3 (1872–1878) 1484:Volume 2 (1867–1871) 1480:Volume 1 (1857–1866) 1356:Dewey, John (1938), 985:The Meaning of Truth 938:Notes and references 839:stating an indicator 656:Truth cannot simply 81:is the result of an 1723:The Energies of Men 1716:The Will to Believe 1255:", final paragraph. 1251:See Peirce's 1908 " 770:George Herbert Mead 113:, where logic is a 1740:James–Lange theory 1618:Runes, Dagobert D. 971:v. 5, pp. 565–573. 951:James Mark Baldwin 918:Recent Peirceans, 893:rational consensus 864:of truth with the 843:giving the meaning 789:. You can help by 489:and his theory of 439:nominal definition 95:ancient philosophy 1923:Theories of truth 1900: 1899: 1768: 1767: 1598:Rescher, Nicholas 1276:978-0-521-29776-9 1230:978-1-290-34904-8 1197:978-1-290-34904-8 1164:978-1-290-34904-8 1029:James, William. 924:Robert B. Talisse 889:factual consensus 881:speech-act theory 807: 806: 512:scientific method 507:logical inference 458:, the underlying 115:normative science 105:Logic and inquiry 1945: 1795: 1788: 1781: 1772: 1771: 1652: 1645: 1638: 1629: 1628: 1592:Collected Papers 1582:Internet Archive 1396:Habermas, Jürgen 1290: 1287: 1281: 1280: 1262: 1256: 1249: 1243: 1242: 1216: 1210: 1209: 1183: 1177: 1176: 1150: 1144: 1143: 1107: 1101: 1100: 1088: 1082: 1081: 1069: 1056: 1053: 1047: 1042:James, William. 1040: 1034: 1027: 1021: 1012: 994: 988: 983:James, William. 981: 972: 968:Collected Papers 947: 819:Bertrand Russell 802: 799: 781: 774: 650:internal realism 386:Collected Papers 223:Truth predicates 1953: 1952: 1948: 1947: 1946: 1944: 1943: 1942: 1913:Belief revision 1903: 1902: 1901: 1896: 1835: 1804: 1799: 1769: 1764: 1728: 1696: 1661: 1656: 1380:Ferm, Vergilius 1366:Jo Ann Boydston 1347:Stephen Toulmin 1343:Jo Ann Boydston 1298: 1296:Further reading 1293: 1288: 1284: 1277: 1263: 1259: 1250: 1246: 1231: 1217: 1213: 1198: 1184: 1180: 1165: 1151: 1147: 1108: 1104: 1089: 1085: 1070: 1059: 1054: 1050: 1041: 1037: 1028: 1024: 1009: 995: 991: 982: 975: 948: 944: 940: 909:internalization 885:Jürgen Habermas 812: 803: 797: 794: 787:needs expansion 772: 766: 709: 703: 611: 566: 560: 528:thing-in-itself 503:belief revision 445:real definition 362:. So Peirce's 347: 341: 225: 217:truth predicate 107: 91: 50:pragmatic maxim 25:theory of truth 17: 12: 11: 5: 1951: 1941: 1940: 1935: 1930: 1925: 1920: 1915: 1898: 1897: 1895: 1894: 1889: 1884: 1879: 1874: 1869: 1864: 1862:Correspondence 1859: 1857:Constructivist 1854: 1849: 1843: 1841: 1837: 1836: 1834: 1833: 1828: 1823: 1818: 1812: 1810: 1806: 1805: 1798: 1797: 1790: 1783: 1775: 1766: 1765: 1763: 1762: 1757: 1752: 1747: 1742: 1736: 1734: 1730: 1729: 1727: 1726: 1719: 1712: 1704: 1702: 1698: 1697: 1695: 1694: 1686: 1678: 1669: 1667: 1663: 1662: 1655: 1654: 1647: 1640: 1632: 1626: 1625: 1615: 1605: 1595: 1588: 1574: 1554: 1543: 1528: 1517: 1512:Peirce, C.S., 1510: 1502:Peirce, C.S., 1500: 1493:Peirce, C.S., 1491: 1467: 1458:. Reprinted, 1452:Kant, Immanuel 1449: 1442: 1435:James, William 1432: 1425: 1418: 1411: 1404:Karl-Otto Apel 1393: 1383: 1377: 1354: 1328: 1316: 1306: 1297: 1294: 1292: 1291: 1282: 1275: 1257: 1244: 1229: 1211: 1196: 1178: 1163: 1145: 1118:(2): 463–481. 1102: 1083: 1057: 1048: 1035: 1022: 1007: 989: 973: 941: 939: 936: 811: 808: 805: 804: 784: 782: 768:Main article: 765: 762: 705:Main article: 702: 699: 610: 607: 562:Main article: 559: 556: 486:sign relations 404:correspondence 343:Main article: 340: 337: 294: 293: 273: 250: 224: 221: 117:, that is, an 106: 103: 90: 87: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1950: 1939: 1938:William James 1936: 1934: 1931: 1929: 1926: 1924: 1921: 1919: 1916: 1914: 1911: 1910: 1908: 1893: 1890: 1888: 1885: 1883: 1880: 1878: 1875: 1873: 1870: 1868: 1865: 1863: 1860: 1858: 1855: 1853: 1850: 1848: 1845: 1844: 1842: 1838: 1832: 1829: 1827: 1824: 1822: 1819: 1817: 1814: 1813: 1811: 1807: 1803: 1796: 1791: 1789: 1784: 1782: 1777: 1776: 1773: 1761: 1758: 1756: 1753: 1751: 1748: 1746: 1743: 1741: 1738: 1737: 1735: 1731: 1724: 1720: 1717: 1713: 1710: 1706: 1705: 1703: 1699: 1692: 1691: 1687: 1684: 1683: 1679: 1676: 1675: 1671: 1670: 1668: 1664: 1660: 1659:William James 1653: 1648: 1646: 1641: 1639: 1634: 1633: 1630: 1623: 1620:(ed., 1962), 1619: 1616: 1613: 1609: 1606: 1603: 1599: 1596: 1593: 1589: 1586: 1583: 1579: 1575: 1572: 1569: 1565: 1564: 1559: 1555: 1552: 1548: 1544: 1541: 1537: 1533: 1529: 1526: 1522: 1518: 1515: 1511: 1508: 1506: 1501: 1498: 1497: 1492: 1489: 1485: 1481: 1477: 1476: 1471: 1468: 1465: 1461: 1457: 1453: 1450: 1447: 1443: 1440: 1436: 1433: 1430: 1426: 1423: 1419: 1416: 1412: 1409: 1405: 1401: 1397: 1394: 1391: 1387: 1384: 1381: 1378: 1375: 1371: 1367: 1363: 1359: 1355: 1352: 1348: 1344: 1340: 1336: 1332: 1329: 1326: 1325: 1321:(1901–1905), 1320: 1319:Baldwin, J.M. 1317: 1315: 1311: 1307: 1304: 1300: 1299: 1286: 1278: 1272: 1268: 1261: 1254: 1248: 1240: 1236: 1232: 1226: 1222: 1215: 1207: 1203: 1199: 1193: 1189: 1182: 1174: 1170: 1166: 1160: 1156: 1149: 1141: 1137: 1133: 1129: 1125: 1121: 1117: 1113: 1106: 1098: 1094: 1087: 1079: 1075: 1068: 1066: 1064: 1062: 1052: 1045: 1039: 1032: 1026: 1020: 1019:0-486-28270-8 1016: 1010: 1008:0-915145-05-7 1004: 1000: 993: 986: 980: 978: 970: 969: 965:. Reprinted, 964: 960: 956: 952: 946: 942: 935: 933: 929: 925: 921: 916: 914: 913:communication 910: 906: 902: 898: 894: 890: 886: 882: 877: 875: 870: 867: 863: 858: 856: 852: 848: 844: 840: 836: 832: 828: 824: 820: 815: 801: 792: 788: 785:This section 783: 780: 776: 775: 771: 761: 759: 755: 749: 747: 742: 736: 734: 728: 723: 721: 717: 713: 708: 698: 696: 692: 686: 681: 677: 676: 671: 666: 662: 659: 653: 651: 647: 643: 638: 632: 629: 625: 620: 619: 615: 606: 601: 597: 593: 589: 584: 580: 578: 574: 570: 569:William James 565: 564:William James 554: 548: 543: 540: 536: 532: 530: 529: 522: 520: 519: 514: 513: 508: 504: 500: 499: 494: 493: 488: 487: 480: 475: 471: 469: 468: 463: 462: 457: 456: 451: 447: 446: 441: 440: 435: 428: 425: 419: 418:definitions. 417: 413: 409: 408:sign relation 405: 401: 397: 396: 389: 388:(CP) 5.565). 387: 380: 378: 374: 369: 367: 366: 361: 357: 353: 352:sign relation 346: 336: 334: 333: 328: 327: 322: 321: 315: 311: 306: 304: 300: 291: 287: 283: 278: 274: 271: 267: 263: 259: 255: 251: 248: 244: 240: 239: 238: 236: 235: 229: 220: 218: 214: 213:truth-bearers 210: 206: 202: 198: 194: 190: 186: 182: 178: 174: 170: 166: 162: 158: 154: 150: 146: 142: 136: 134: 130: 129: 124: 120: 116: 112: 102: 100: 96: 86: 84: 80: 79: 74: 73: 68: 67: 62: 61: 56: 52: 51: 46: 42: 41:William James 38: 34: 30: 26: 22: 1881: 1867:Deflationary 1826:Truth-bearer 1821:Propositions 1749: 1688: 1680: 1672: 1621: 1611: 1601: 1591: 1581: 1577: 1568:Google Books 1567: 1561: 1557: 1550: 1535: 1520: 1513: 1503: 1494: 1487: 1483: 1479: 1473: 1470:Peirce, C.S. 1464:Dennis Sweet 1455: 1445: 1438: 1428: 1421: 1414: 1407: 1399: 1389: 1386:Haack, Susan 1370:Ernest Nagel 1361: 1357: 1338: 1334: 1322: 1312:15, 40–52. 1309: 1302: 1285: 1266: 1260: 1247: 1220: 1214: 1187: 1181: 1154: 1148: 1115: 1111: 1105: 1096: 1086: 1077: 1051: 1043: 1038: 1030: 1025: 1013:Dover 1995: 998: 992: 984: 966: 958: 954: 945: 920:Cheryl Misak 917: 901:intervention 878: 871: 865: 861: 859: 854: 850: 842: 838: 834: 830: 826: 823:epistemology 822: 816: 813: 795: 791:adding to it 786: 757: 753: 751: 745: 740: 738: 732: 730: 725: 719: 715: 710: 694: 690: 688: 683: 678: 674: 673: 668: 664: 657: 655: 645: 636: 633: 627: 623: 621: 617: 616: 612: 609:Making truth 603: 599: 594: 590: 586: 582: 567: 551: 545: 538: 534: 533: 526: 523: 516: 510: 509:, including 496: 490: 484: 482: 477: 472: 465: 459: 453: 443: 437: 430: 421: 415: 411: 403: 399: 393: 391: 385: 382: 376: 370: 363: 348: 330: 324: 318: 313: 307: 302: 298: 295: 289: 285: 282:interpretant 281: 276: 265: 261: 257: 253: 242: 232: 230: 226: 216: 208: 204: 200: 196: 192: 188: 184: 180: 176: 172: 168: 164: 160: 156: 152: 148: 144: 140: 137: 126: 122: 108: 92: 76: 70: 64: 58: 54: 48: 33:pragmaticism 20: 18: 1831:Truth-maker 1331:Dewey, John 1112:Philosophia 400:concordance 395:fallibilism 288:its object 262:interpreter 247:truthbearer 165:performance 131:that seeks 99:Scholastics 1928:Pragmatism 1907:Categories 1887:Redundancy 1578:The Monist 1566:, vol. 2. 1462:(trans.), 1372:(intro.), 1349:(intro.), 810:Criticisms 712:John Dewey 707:John Dewey 153:impression 145:expression 89:Background 45:John Dewey 29:pragmatism 1882:Pragmatic 1877:Pluralist 1872:Epistemic 1852:Consensus 1847:Coherence 1816:Statement 1608:Rorty, R. 1486:, 1984. 1482:, 1981. 1239:940839361 1206:940839361 1173:940839361 1140:255166253 1132:0048-3893 862:indicator 851:indicator 847:indicator 827:indicator 626:to being 461:substance 434:Aristotle 201:utterance 133:knowledge 72:knowledge 66:certainty 1892:Semantic 1840:Theories 1725:" (1907) 1718:" (1896) 1711:" (1891) 1610:(1979), 1600:(1995), 1454:(1800), 1437:(1907), 1388:(1993), 1333:(1929), 928:Habermas 798:May 2008 642:the good 498:semiosis 365:semiotic 332:morphism 270:relation 266:language 173:sentence 141:artefact 1809:General 1733:Related 1558:Logical 1033:(1904). 987:(1909). 959:Logical 953:, ed., 907:or the 866:meaning 835:meaning 535:Reality 492:inquiry 455:essence 412:nominal 373:Baldwin 329:, or a 320:analogy 314:true of 277:triadic 264:, or a 243:monadic 193:thought 169:picture 121:into a 119:inquiry 83:inquiry 1701:Essays 1693:(1912) 1685:(1902) 1677:(1890) 1585:Eprint 1571:Eprint 1540:Eprint 1525:Eprint 1314:Eprint 1273: 1237: 1227: 1204: 1194: 1171: 1161: 1138: 1130: 1017: 1005: 963:Eprint 922:, and 874:belief 695:create 628:untrue 450:reason 356:theory 339:Peirce 258:object 254:dyadic 185:symbol 181:string 97:, the 60:belief 43:, and 1918:Logic 1802:Truth 1666:Books 1136:S2CID 905:power 855:means 829:or a 754:truth 741:truth 733:truth 701:Dewey 691:makes 637:would 558:James 539:truth 360:signs 323:, an 260:, an 234:arity 197:token 157:lyric 149:image 128:value 125:or a 111:logic 78:truth 75:, or 55:truth 23:is a 1271:ISBN 1235:OCLC 1225:ISBN 1202:OCLC 1192:ISBN 1169:OCLC 1159:ISBN 1128:ISSN 1015:ISBN 1003:ISBN 841:and 831:sign 764:Mead 624:true 575:and 537:and 505:and 424:Kant 416:real 402:and 326:icon 209:work 205:word 189:text 177:sign 161:mark 123:good 31:and 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Index