731:
concepts. I did not, therefore, mean to say that acts, which are more strictly singular than anything, could constitute the purport, or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. I compared action to the finale of the symphony of thought, belief being a demicadence. Nobody conceives that the few bars at the end of a musical movement are the purpose of the movement. They may be called its upshot. But the figure obviously would not bear detailed application. I only mention it to show that the suspicion I myself expressed after a too hasty rereading of the forgotten magazine paper, that it expressed a stoic, that is, a nominalistic, materialistic, and utterly philistine state of thought, was quite mistaken.
37:
730:
must then have had a purpose. In point of fact it had two. One was to show that I was speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of intellectual purport. The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but
713:
The seventh excerpt is a late reflection on the reception of pragmatism. With a sense of exasperation that is almost palpable, Peirce tries to justify the maxim of pragmatism and to correct its misreadings by pinpointing a number of false impressions that the intervening years have piled on it, and
596:
maxim, much less one that concerns itself with a routine matter of logical procedure, forms a sufficient basis for a whole philosophy. He suggests they might feel he makes pragmatism "a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle of speculative philosophy." For better philosophical standing,
527:
I will restate this in other words, since ofttimes one can thus eliminate some unsuspected source of perplexity to the reader. This time it shall be in the indicative mood, as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which,
718:
analysis, he presents a veritable autopsy of the ways that the main idea of pragmatism, for all its practicality, can be murdered by a host of misdissecting disciplinarians, by what are ostensibly its most devoted followers. He proceeds here (1906) to retract a philosophical confession—in the fifth
652:
axiom which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that we must
461:
Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
413:
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of
640:
The fifth excerpt is useful by way of additional clarification, and is aimed to correct a variety of historical misunderstandings that arose with regard to the intended meaning of the pragmatic maxim. For a source of such misunderstanding, Peirce points to his younger self (but will retract the
562:
and provides an alternative statement of the maxim. Such reasoning, and all reasonings turn upon the idea that one who exerts certain kinds of volition will undergo, in return, certain compulsory perceptions. Now this sort of consideration—that certain lines of conduct entail certain kinds of
714:
he attempts once more to prescribe against the deleterious effects of these mistakes. Recalling the very conception and birth of pragmatism, he reviews its initial promise and its intended lot in the light of its subsequent vicissitudes and its apparent fate. Adopting the style of a
492:
The second excerpt presents the pragmatic maxim (with added emphases on forms of the word "conceive") as a recommendation to you, the addressee, on how you can clarify your conception, then restates it in the indicative, in a way that emphasizes the generalism of
591:
The fourth excerpt illustrates one of Peirce's many attempts to get the sense of the pragmatic philosophy across by rephrasing the pragmatic maxim. Introducing this version, he addresses prospective critics who do not believe a simple
574:
To ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might result from the truth of that conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning of the
686:
is that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought. It will be seen that
793:
as "Considérer quels sont les effets pratiques que nous pensons pouvoir être produits par l'objet de notre conception. La conception de tous ces effets est la conception complète de l'objet.". Curiously, the
653:
look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought.
675:
A sixth excerpt is useful in stating the bearing of the pragmatic maxim on the topic of reflection, namely, that it makes all of pragmatism boil down to nothing more or less than a method of reflection.
658:
467:
444:
Peirce stated the pragmatic maxim in many different ways over the years, each of which adds its own bit of clarity or correction to their collective corpus.
405:
of logic, its function is to guide the conduct of thought toward the achievement of its purpose, advising on an optimal way of "attaining clearness of
315:
608:
is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a
350:
172:
249:
754:
343:
46:
528:
conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
770:(ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP x.y for volume x, paragraph y.
823:
290:
20:
477:
423:
336:
259:
454:
as an opinion favoring application of the pragmatic maxim as a recommendation about how to clarify meaning.
406:
500:
Pragmaticism was originally enounced in the form of a maxim, as follows: Consider what effects that might
419:
544:
85:
736:
581:
763:
323:
627:
Pragmatism as a
Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard 'Lectures on Pragmatism',
300:
128:
702:
390:
275:
163:
28:
537:
790:
782:
604:
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the
310:
663:
609:
472:
398:
305:
138:
108:
92:
719:
excerpt (above)—which he wrote in 1902 about his 1878 original presentation of pragmatism.
8:
818:
448:
The first excerpt appears in the form of a dictionary entry, intended as a definition of
227:
65:
759:
382:
201:
153:
402:
394:
123:
789:, which published it in its Volume VII in January 1879. There the maxim appeared on
295:
118:
767:
613:
605:
285:
113:
813:
693:
280:
254:
807:
597:
he endeavors to put pragmatism into the same form of a philosophical theorem:
409:". Here is its original 1878 statement in English when it was not yet named:
222:
196:
143:
697:
but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear.
377:
186:
181:
75:
148:
70:
36:
450:
370:
133:
55:
593:
239:
233:
191:
158:
622:
648:
The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action - a
244:
217:
682:
The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and
649:
439:
781:
The article containing it was originally written in French as
386:
462:
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
798:
version omits the article's last one and a half paragraphs.
567:. This justifies the maxim as a practical belief, that:
641:
confession as itself mistaken—see the seventh excerpt).
621:(Peirce, 1903, from the lectures on Pragmatism, CP
558:The third excerpt puts a gloss on the meaning of a
430:, v. 12, pp. 286–302. Reprinted widely, including
805:
726:This employment five times over of derivates of
532:(Peirce, 1905, from "Issues of Pragmaticism" in
344:
440:Seven ways of looking at the pragmatic maxim
755:Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
432:Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
351:
337:
484:v. 12, pp. 286-302. Reprinted in CP 5.2).
476:, including quote of himself from 1878, "
664:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
473:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
806:
516:of those effects is the whole of your
536:v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481-499, see p. 481
119:Entitative graph in Qualitative logic
563:inevitable experiences—is called a
13:
783:"Comment rendre nos idées claires"
14:
835:
35:
434:(CP) v. 5, paragraphs 388–410.)
291:Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce
775:
1:
746:
504:have practical bearings you
7:
612:having its apodosis in the
478:How to Make Our Ideas Clear
424:How to Make Our Ideas Clear
210:Miscellaneous contributions
10:
840:
667:. Reprinted CP 5.3, 1902).
550:. Reprinted in CP 5.438.).
250:Classification of sciences
766:(eds.), Vols. 7–8,
659:Pragmatic and Pragmatism
468:Pragmatic and Pragmatism
395:normative recommendation
324:Peirce Geodetic Monument
565:practical consideration
482:Popular Science Monthly
428:Popular Science Monthly
301:Christine Ladd-Franklin
129:Functional completeness
824:Charles Sanders Peirce
742:
708:
670:
618:
577:
553:
522:
487:
437:
391:Charles Sanders Peirce
276:Joseph Morton Ransdell
260:Quincuncial projection
164:Type-token distinction
29:Charles Sanders Peirce
758:, Volumes 1–6,
724:
680:
657:(Peirce, 1902, from "
646:
602:
572:
525:
498:
459:
411:
311:The Metaphysical Club
610:conditional sentence
512:to have. Then, your
508:the objects of your
399:regulative principle
367:, also known as the
306:Victoria, Lady Welby
139:Logic of information
109:Continuous predicate
93:Community of inquiry
796:Revue Philosophique
787:Revue Philosophique
66:Abductive reasoning
760:Charles Hartshorne
701:(Peirce, 1902, CP
580:(Peirce, 1905, CP
202:Universal rhetoric
154:Second-order logic
86:as theory of truth
633:v. 2, pp. 134-5.)
560:practical bearing
403:normative science
361:
360:
124:Existential graph
831:
799:
779:
631:Essential Peirce
547:Internet Archive
466:(Peirce, 1902, "
353:
346:
339:
296:Roberta Kevelson
39:
16:
15:
839:
838:
834:
833:
832:
830:
829:
828:
804:
803:
802:
780:
776:
768:Arthur W. Burks
749:
737:CP 5.402 note 3
735:(Peirce, 1906,
629:p. 110, and in
614:imperative mood
606:indicative mood
442:
393:. Serving as a
365:pragmatic maxim
357:
286:Juliette Peirce
173:Semiotic theory
58:in epistemology
12:
11:
5:
837:
827:
826:
821:
816:
801:
800:
773:
772:
771:
752:Peirce, C.S.,
748:
745:
744:
743:
741:
740:
721:
720:
710:
709:
707:
706:
694:Weltanschauung
677:
676:
672:
671:
669:
668:
643:
642:
637:
636:
635:
634:
599:
598:
588:
587:
586:
585:
569:
568:
555:
554:
552:
551:
523:
520:of the object.
495:
494:
489:
488:
486:
485:
456:
455:
441:
438:
436:
435:
389:formulated by
359:
358:
356:
355:
348:
341:
333:
330:
329:
328:
327:
320:
319:
318:
308:
303:
298:
293:
288:
283:
281:Allan Marquand
278:
270:
269:
265:
264:
263:
262:
257:
255:Listing number
252:
247:
242:
237:
230:
225:
220:
212:
211:
207:
206:
205:
204:
199:
194:
189:
184:
176:
175:
169:
168:
167:
166:
161:
156:
151:
146:
141:
136:
131:
126:
121:
116:
111:
103:
102:
98:
97:
96:
95:
90:
89:
88:
83:
73:
68:
60:
59:
52:
51:
50:
49:
41:
40:
32:
31:
25:
24:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
836:
825:
822:
820:
817:
815:
812:
811:
809:
797:
792:
788:
784:
778:
774:
769:
765:
761:
757:
756:
751:
750:
738:
734:
733:
732:
729:
723:
722:
717:
712:
711:
704:
700:
699:
698:
696:
695:
690:
685:
679:
678:
674:
673:
666:
665:
660:
656:
655:
654:
651:
645:
644:
639:
638:
632:
628:
624:
620:
619:
617:
615:
611:
607:
601:
600:
595:
590:
589:
583:
579:
578:
576:
571:
570:
566:
561:
557:
556:
549:
548:
542:
541:
535:
531:
530:
529:
524:
521:
519:
515:
511:
507:
503:
497:
496:
491:
490:
483:
479:
475:
474:
469:
465:
464:
463:
458:
457:
453:
452:
447:
446:
445:
433:
429:
425:
421:
417:
416:
415:
410:
408:
404:
400:
396:
392:
388:
384:
380:
379:
373:
372:
366:
354:
349:
347:
342:
340:
335:
334:
332:
331:
326:
325:
321:
317:
314:
313:
312:
309:
307:
304:
302:
299:
297:
294:
292:
289:
287:
284:
282:
279:
277:
274:
273:
272:
271:
267:
266:
261:
258:
256:
253:
251:
248:
246:
243:
241:
238:
236:
235:
231:
229:
226:
224:
223:Bell triangle
221:
219:
216:
215:
214:
213:
209:
208:
203:
200:
198:
197:Sign relation
195:
193:
190:
188:
185:
183:
180:
179:
178:
177:
174:
171:
170:
165:
162:
160:
157:
155:
152:
150:
147:
145:
144:Logical graph
142:
140:
137:
135:
132:
130:
127:
125:
122:
120:
117:
115:
112:
110:
107:
106:
105:
104:
100:
99:
94:
91:
87:
84:
82:
79:
78:
77:
74:
72:
69:
67:
64:
63:
62:
61:
57:
54:
53:
48:
45:
44:
43:
42:
38:
34:
33:
30:
27:
26:
22:
18:
17:
795:
786:
785:in 1877 for
777:
753:
727:
725:
715:
692:
688:
683:
681:
662:
647:
630:
626:
603:
573:
564:
559:
546:
540:Google Books
539:
533:
526:
517:
513:
509:
505:
501:
499:
481:
471:
460:
449:
443:
431:
427:
414:the object.
412:
407:apprehension
378:pragmaticism
375:
368:
364:
362:
322:
268:Biographical
232:
187:Interpretant
182:Indexicality
114:Peirce's law
80:
76:Pragmaticism
47:Bibliography
716:post mortem
703:5.13 note 1
575:conception.
502:conceivably
493:pragmatism:
418:(Peirce on
149:Logical NOR
71:Fallibilism
819:Pragmatism
808:Categories
764:Paul Weiss
747:References
689:pragmatism
684:pragmatism
625:, also in
534:The Monist
518:conception
514:conception
510:conception
451:pragmatism
371:pragmatism
228:Categories
134:Logic gate
56:Pragmatism
728:concipere
691:is not a
661:" in the
594:heuristic
470:" in the
376:maxim of
369:maxim of
240:Synechism
506:conceive
234:Phaneron
192:Semiosis
159:Trikonic
81:as maxim
21:a series
19:Part of
650:stoical
401:in the
381:, is a
374:or the
245:Tychism
218:Agapism
420:p. 293
814:Logic
791:p. 48
480:" in
397:or a
387:logic
383:maxim
101:Logic
762:and
623:5.18
545:via
543:and
538:via
422:of "
363:The
316:book
582:5.9
426:",
385:of
810::
739:).
705:).
584:.)
23:on
616:.
352:e
345:t
338:v
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
