568:
capacity to enter it in the near future. Of particular importance here are paragraphs 16 and 17 of the commission's
Guidance...16. Competition is a dynamic process and an assessment of the competitive constraints on an undertaking cannot be based solely on the existing market situation. The potential impact of expansion by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors, including the threat of such expansion or entry, is also relevant. An undertaking can be deterred from increasing prices if expansion or entry is likely, timely and sufficient. For the commission to consider expansion or entry likely it must be sufficiently profitable for the competitor or entrant, taking into account factors such as the barriers to expansion or entry, the likely reactions of the allegedly dominant undertaking and other competitors, and the risks and costs of failure.
1279:, which is a legal entity acting in the course of business, is probably able to exercise substantial market power. Furthermore, in paragraph 11, this is developed on, arguing if an undertaking can increase their products above the competitive price level, and does not face economic restraints, it is therefore dominant. For example, in basic terms, if two businesses are selling competing products, and one can increase their selling price, and not suffer an economic consequence such as a boycott of their products or a shift of their customers to a cheaper product, they are dominant.
482:(The âbananasâ case) where the court of justice said, 'the dominant position thus referred to by Article relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumersâ The commission's Guidance suggests that market shares is only a âuseful first indicationâ in the process of assessing market power.
45:
430:
existing supplies from, and the position of, actual competitors, meaning those who are competing with the undertaking in question. This involves looking at the day-to-day downwards pressure that retains low product prices and competitiveness within the market, which market shares are only useful as a first indication of; this needs to be followed by the consideration of other factors such as market conditions and dynamics.
2207:
competitive constraints - Abuse of procedures relating to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products and of marketing authorisation procedures for medicinal products - Misleading representations - Deregistration of marketing authorisations - Obstacles to the marketing of generic medicinal products and to parallel imports - Fines. Case T-321/05.
333:, relative to competitive offerings, whereby a dominant firm can behave independent of their competitors or consumers, and without concern for resource allocation. Dominant positioning is both a legal concept and an economic concept and the distinction between the two is important when determining whether a firm's market position is dominant.
1310:
interchangeability and demand substitutability, meaning whether one product can be a substitute for another, and whether an undertaking's market power puts them above price competition. The second stage of the test requires the commission to look at various factors to see if an undertaking enjoys a dominant position on that relevant market.
443:. This is the percentage of the total market served by a firm or brand. A declining scale of market shares is common in most industries: that is, if the industry leader has say 50% share, the next largest might have 25% share, the next 12% share, the next 6% share, and all remaining firms combined might have 7% share.
518:
period of time can be a preliminary indication of dominance. The
International Competition Network stress that determining whether substantial market power is apparent should not be based on market shares alone, but instead an analysis of all factors affecting the competitive conditions in the market, should be used.
582:. In this case, the Court of Justice confirmed the commission's decision, that Microsoft were dominant and had abused their dominant position regarding their refusal to supply the interoperability information for operating PC Windows with other systems. Microsoft was forced to license out its interoperability data.
600:. It is a measure of the size of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can range from 0 to 10,000, moving from a very large amount of very small firms to a single
1243:
always has to be accountable to customers that give it its high market share and are not hesitant to switch product preference to the next firm. Such customers will need to have sufficient bargaining strength which will normally come from its size or its commercial significance in the industry sector.
2206:
Judgment of the
General Court (Sixth Chamber, extended composition) of 1 July 2010. AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission. Competition - Abuse of dominant position - Market in anti-ulcer medicines - Decision finding an infringement of Article 82 EC - Market definition - Significant
540:
that where there is market share of at least 50%, without exceptional circumstances, there will be a presumption of dominance that shifts the burden of proof on to the undertaking. The
European Commission has affirmed this threshold in cases since AKZO. For example, in paragraph 100 of the Commission
1246:
The final point that must be considered is the bargaining strength of the undertaking's customers, also known as the countervailing buyer power. This refers to the competitive constraints that customers may exert where they are a large size, or commercially significant, for a dominant firm. However,
1242:
Countervailing Buyer Power is something else that should be considered when calculating market dominance. In market where the buyers have more power than suppliers in determining prices or changes in the market a firm of high market share may not exercise its powers against competitors easily as it
557:
A dominant position can generally be said to exist once a market share to the order of 40% to 45% is reached. Although this share does not in itself automatically give control of the market, if there are large gaps between the position of the firm concerned and those of its closest competitors and
517:
According to the
European Commission, market shares provide a useful first indication of the structure of any market and of the relative importance of the various undertakings active on it. In paragraph 15 of the Guidance on A102, the European Commission state that a high market share over a long
429:
Identifying a dominant position involves the use of several factors. The
European Commission's Guidance on A102 states that a dominant position is derived from a combination of factors, which taken separately are not determinative. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the constraints imposed by
1274:
The
European Commission equates dominance with the economic concept of substantial market power, which indicates that dominance can be exerted and abused, in its Guidance on A102 Enforcement Priorities. In paragraph 10 of the Guidance, it is stated that where there is no competitive pressure, an
494:. Monopolistic power is derived from market share, and thus intertwined with dominance. Whilst a theoretical monopoly will have a single firm supplying the industry, market dominance can describe a situation where multiple firms operate in the market, however a single firm has majority control.
2085:
Judgment of the Court of First
Instance (Second Chamber) of 1 April 1993. - BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Abuse of a dominant position - Exclusive purchase contract - Loyalty payments - Effect on trade between Member States -
1297:
The identification of the relevant and geographic market must first be established before being able to calculate shares or an undertakingâs dominance within that market. Dominance as an economic concept is determined within EU competition law through a 2-stage process, which first requires the
379:
Many dominant firms are the first "important" competitor in their industry. These firms can achieve short- or long-term advantages over their competitors when they are the first offering in a new industry. First-movers can set a benchmark for competitors and consumers regarding expectations of
1292:
THE DOMINANT POSITION REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE (102) RELATES TO A POSITION OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH ENJOYED BY AN UNDERTAKING WHICH ENABLES IT TO PREVENT EFFECTIVE COMPETITION BEING MAINTAINED ON THE RELEVANT MARKET BY GIVING IT THE POWER TO BEHAVE TO AN APPRECIABLE EXTENT INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS
567:
Another way of calculating market dominance, by looking at competition as market shares, are even less useful when assessing the competitive pressure that is exerted on an undertaking â i.e. the competition that would come from other firms that are not yet operating on the market but have the
420:
As firms expand, production becomes more efficient and costs lower. It has been shown in empirically several times that there is a clear link between profitability and market share, and thus market dominance. The explicit relationship between economies of scale and market shares has also been
1309:
The identification of the relevant and geographic market is assessed through the hypothetical monopolist test, which questions would a party's customer, switch to an alternative supplier located elsewhere, in response to a small relative price increase. Therefore, it is a question of
552:
implies that a significant disparity between the largest and the second-largest firm shares can indicate that the largest firm has a dominant position in the market. Specifically, under a section entitled "Scrutiny of mergers for compatibility with
Article 86 EEC," the Report states:
438:
There is often a geographic element to the competitive landscape. In defining market dominance, one must see to what extent a product, brand, or firm controls a product category in a given geographic area. There are several ways of measuring market dominance. The most direct is
2119:
Judgment of the Court of First
Instance (Fifth Chamber, extended composition) of 30 January 2007. France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Communities. Competition - Abuse of a dominant position - Market for services in high-speed Internet access - Predatory pricing. Case
545:, the Commission state that ââŠvery large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant positionâŠâ, citing the Court of Justice judgement in AZKO, paragraph 60, ââŠthis was so in the case of a 50% market share.â.
1322:, dealing specifically with why firms choose to maximize their profits. As research links market share to return on investment, it is expected that firms will choose to follow strategies which lead to increasing market share and a more dominant position in the market.
2148:
Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. (1990). "Implications of U.S. Experience with Horizontal Mergers and Takeovers for Canadian Competition Policy". in Mathewson, G. Franklin et al. (eds.). The Law and Economics of Competition Policy. Vancouver, B.C.: The Fraser Institute.
1250:
Previous findings of dominance can not be used to calculate dominance as agreed in the Coca-Cola v Commission case where it was Court held that the Commission must take a fresh approach to the market conditions each time it adopts a decision in relation to Art 102.
1282:
The Guidance is not law, it is instead a set of rules the courts are to follow. However, the same definition can be found elsewhere, in Chapter 3 of the Unilateral Conduct Workbook. The Guidance is also supported by paragraph 65 of the commission's judgement in
1233:
380:
product and service offering, technology, convenience, quality, or price. These firms are representative of their industry and their brand can become synonymous with the product category itself, such as the company
839:
571:
The Guidance also states that the constraints imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual competitors, or entry by potential competitors, is a required factor of consideration. For example,
737:
475:, which consists of the combined market share of the four largest firms, as a percentage, in the total industry. The higher the concentration ratio, the greater the market power of the leading firms.
1106:
1051:
449:
is not a perfect proxy of market dominance. Although there are no hard and fast rules governing the relationship between market share and market dominance, the following are general criteria:
558:
also other factors likely to place it at an advantage as regards competition, a dominant position may well exist. (European Commission's Tenth Report on Competition, page 103, paragraph 150.)
1367:
459:
A market share of less than 35%, held by one brand, product or service, is not an indicator of strength or dominance and will not raise anti-competitive concerns by government regulators.
2108:
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 3 July 1991. AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities. Article 86 - Eliminatory practices of a dominant undertaking. Case C-62/86.
1830:
Communication from the Commission â Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings
1264:
990:
946:
2195:
Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978. United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. Chiquita Bananas. Case 27/76.
1131:
968:
924:
889:
640:
107:
1140:
471:
of an industry is used as an indicator of the relative size of leading firms in relation to the industry as a whole. One commonly used concentration ratio is the
396:
have are apparent, and in conjunction with empirical evidence, research has attempted to explain whether more dominant firms or less dominant firms innovate more.
2218:
Judgment of the Court of 21 February 1973. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities. Case 6-72.
1318:
Why firms want a greater market share is a logical concept with both empirical and theoretical foundations. One of the main driving principles is a firm's
1306:, in which the Commission stated that it must be assessed whether an undertaking is able to act independently of its competitors, customers and consumers.
2074:
88/501/EEC: Commission Decision of 26 July 1988 relating to a proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.043 - Tetra Pak I (BTG licence)
1247:
the commission will not come to a final decision without examining all of the factors which may be relevant to constrain the behavior of the undertaking.
536:, the Court of Justice said that large market shares are âevidence of the existence of a dominant positionâ which led to the Court of Justice decision in
2139:
Brown, Donald M., and Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Testing the Structure- Competition Relationship on Cross-Sectional Firm Data, EAG 88-6, May 11, 1988.
456:
A market share of over 35% but less than 60%, held by one brand, product or service, is an indicator of market strength but not necessarily dominance.
392:
It is recognised that firms who place greater importance on product innovation often have an advantage over firms who do not. The significant links to
1450:
1267:(Formerly Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), that deals specifically with the abuse of dominance in the market regarding
1259:
There are different perspectives of what indicates dominance and how to go about establishing dominance. One of these being the perspective of the
505:
hold the position that a firm with significant market power (relating to dominant firms, all the way up to firms in a complete monopoly) must not "
2097:
Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1979. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities. Dominant position. Case 85/76.
2038:
502:
1841:
384:. First-mover advantage is a limited source of market dominance if a firm becomes complacent or fails to keep up innovation by competitors.
748:
501:
in most countries applies to both monopolistic firms, as well as firms who hold dominant market positions. In Australia, for example, the
453:
A company, brand, product, or service that has a combined market share exceeding 60% most probably has market power and market dominance.
1793:
1872:
1809:
1887:
1426:
648:
285:
2130:
Kwoka, J. E. "Large firm dominance and price-cost margins in manufacturing industries." Southern Econ J (1977) vol. 44, pp. 183â9.
467:, each with 50% share; or there could be three firms in the industry each with 33% share; or 100 firms each with 1% share. The
1897:
1409:
1377:
1056:
995:
576:
in the form of patent protection, is a potential legal barrier to entering the market for new businesses, as was shown in
478:
Legally, the determination is often more complex. A case that can be used to define market dominance under EU Law is the
408:
can contribute to gains in market dominance for firms who choose to capitalise on its worth, whether through charging a
2154:
2033:
1930:
642:) is defined as the sum of the squared differences between each firm's share and the next largest share in a market:
254:
1660:
521:
100% market shares are very rare but can arise in niche areas, a close example of this being 91.8% market share in
1268:
597:
591:
92:
2230:
2293:
278:
197:
1829:
2181:
578:
463:
Market shares within an industry might not exhibit a declining scale. There could be only two firms in a
2217:
2205:
2194:
2118:
2107:
2096:
2084:
2073:
126:
61:
20:
2061:
Recommended Practices: Dominance/Substantial Market Power Analysis Pursuant To Unilateral Conduct Laws
2298:
1627:
337:
2170:. 10th Annual ICN Conference The Hague, Netherlands: The Unilateral Conduct Working Group. May 2011.
1980:"Defining Market Dominance: A Study of Antitrust Decisions on Business Acquisitions in New Zealand"
271:
1508:
973:
929:
1848:
1114:
951:
907:
844:
507:
do anything that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
491:
306:
623:
171:
2255:
1475:
1228:{\displaystyle {\text{AI}}={\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{n}\left(s_{i}-{\frac {1}{n}}\right)^{2}}{n}}.}
1346:
573:
352:
259:
1737:
1451:"Market Dominance: How Firms Gain, Hold, or Lose It and the Impact on Economic Performance"
214:
209:
97:
8:
1369:
Market Dominance: How Firms Gain, Hold, Or Lose it and the Impact on Economic Performance
1260:
468:
326:
27:
900:
As part of its merger review process, Mexican Competition Commission uses GarcĂa Alba's
2175:
2015:
2007:
1693:
1608:
1569:
367:
322:
233:
155:
1427:"What does dominant market position mean? Is it acceptable? | Department of Economics"
2263:
2150:
2019:
1999:
1936:
1926:
1893:
1866:
1762:
1697:
1685:
1635:
1561:
1542:"First-Mover Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions"
1516:
1483:
1373:
219:
204:
87:
75:
1954:
1991:
1918:
1805:
1774:
1675:
1600:
1553:
604:
producer. Decreases in the HerfindahlâHirschman index generally indicate a loss of
228:
182:
178:
80:
1913:"United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Yearbook 1976".
1341:
302:
187:
166:
112:
36:
1661:"Problemas multiplicativos tipo transformaciĂłn lineal: tareas de compra y venta"
926:), described as the HerfindahlâHirschman index of a HerfindahlâHirschman index (
348:
Firms can achieve dominance in their industry through multiple means, such as;
135:
117:
1995:
2287:
2267:
2003:
1940:
1794:"Interfirm differences in scale economies and the evolution of market shares"
1689:
1639:
1565:
1520:
1487:
1331:
1319:
605:
409:
224:
192:
1712:
1604:
1336:
446:
440:
405:
361:
314:
238:
151:
102:
1810:
10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199910)20:10<935::AID-SMJ56>3.0.CO;2-G
1922:
393:
330:
161:
2254:
Buzzell, Robert D.; Gale, Bradley T.; Sultan, Ralph G. M. (1975-01-01).
2011:
1979:
1915:
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Yearbook
1474:
Buzzell, Robert D.; Gale, Bradley T.; Sultan, Ralph G. M. (1975-01-01).
1680:
1612:
1588:
1573:
498:
608:
and an increase in competition, whereas increases imply the opposite.
1778:
1541:
834:{\displaystyle s_{1}\geq ...\geq s_{i}\geq s_{i+1}\geq ...\geq s_{n}}
404:
Referring to the value that branding adds over a generic equivalent,
140:
70:
44:
1557:
1540:
Kerin, Roger A.; Varadarajan, P. Rajan; Peterson, Robert A. (1992).
1134:
601:
381:
66:
1265:
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
1276:
464:
1955:"What Is a Monopoly? Types, Regulations, and Impact on Markets"
732:{\displaystyle {\text{D}}=\sum _{i=1}^{n-1}(s_{i}-s_{i+1})^{2}}
490:
Market dominance is closely related to the economic concept of
146:
2168:
Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 3: Assessment of Dominance
1713:"Brand Equity: How to Encourage Customers to Trust Your Brand"
318:
310:
1298:
identification of the relevant market as was established in
16:
Measure of the strength of a brand, product, service or firm
1738:"Economies of Scale: What Are They and How Are They Used?"
525:, and the 96% market share in plasterboard held by BPB in
305:
by a firm. A dominant firm possesses the power to affect
1978:
STRONG, NATHAN; BOLLARD, ALAN; PICKFORD, MICHAEL (2000).
1293:
COMPETITORS , CUSTOMERS AND ULTIMATELY OF ITS CONSUMERS."
1539:
1302:. This was affirmed in paragraph 30 of the judgement of
970:
is the sum of squared firm contributions to the market
1507:
Suarez, Fernando F.; Lanzolla, Gianvito (2005-04-01).
1101:{\displaystyle h_{i}={\frac {s_{i}^{2}}{\text{HHI}}}.}
1977:
1763:"The Relation Between Market Share and Profitability"
1143:
1117:
1059:
998:
976:
954:
932:
910:
895:
847:
751:
651:
626:
2086:
Attributability of the infringement. - Case T-65/89.
1046:{\displaystyle {\text{ID}}=\sum _{i=1}^{n}h_{i}^{2}}
1586:
1313:
1227:
1125:
1100:
1045:
984:
962:
940:
918:
883:
833:
731:
634:
485:
2253:
1658:
1473:
2285:
2039:Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
503:Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
1506:
343:
2229:Mauborgne, W. Chan Kim | Renée (2016-03-29).
1587:Lieberman, Marvin; Montgomery, David (1988).
585:
424:
279:
1628:"Strategies for High Market-Share Companies"
1625:
541:Judgment in the Court of First Instance in
1760:
1626:Bloom, Paul; Kotler, Philip (1975-11-01).
611:
286:
272:
2228:
1679:
1509:"The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage"
1365:
374:
313:. A firms' dominance is a measure of the
247:Enforcement authorities and organizations
1395:The Economics of Industrial Organisation
1392:
562:
2231:"Three Steps Towards Market Domination"
2063:. ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group.
1791:
1659:Oviedo de Valeria, Jenny (1994-08-02).
1397:. NJ: Englewood Cliffs. pp. 273=0.
497:As economic competition is encouraged,
2286:
1871:: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (
2256:"Market Shareâa Key to Profitability"
1889:Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy
1885:
1825:
1823:
1821:
1819:
1710:
1476:"Market Shareâa Key to Profitability"
1407:
415:
340:, however dominance itself is legal.
1761:Wernerfelt, Birger (February 1986).
1408:Doyle, Chris (20â22 November 2002).
1254:
13:
1816:
896:Other measures of market dominance
527:BPB Industries Plc v Commission OJ
43:
14:
2310:
1984:Review of Industrial Organization
1792:Makadok, Richard (October 1999).
1711:Joshi, Sagar (3 September 2021).
1410:"Market Definition and Dominance"
1237:
255:International Competition Network
1886:Utton, Michael A. (2005-01-01).
336:Abuse of market dominance is an
2247:
2222:
2211:
2199:
2188:
2160:
2142:
2133:
2124:
2112:
2101:
2090:
2078:
2067:
2053:
2026:
1971:
1947:
1906:
1879:
1834:
1785:
1754:
1730:
1704:
1652:
1619:
1314:Market Dominance Attractiveness
1263:regarding their application of
486:Market dominance and monopolies
433:
399:
1580:
1533:
1500:
1467:
1443:
1419:
1401:
1386:
1372:. Greenwood Publishing Group.
1359:
720:
687:
260:List of competition regulators
1:
1366:Rosenbaum, David Ira (1998).
1352:
534:Hoffman-La Roche v Commission
473:four-firm concentration ratio
387:
1798:Strategic Management Journal
1767:Journal of Business Strategy
1593:Strategic Management Journal
1300:Continental Can v Commission
985:{\displaystyle {\text{HHI}}}
941:{\displaystyle {\text{HHI}}}
412:or other business strategy.
7:
1892:. Edward Elgar Publishing.
1325:
1304:AstraZeneca AB v Commission
1126:{\displaystyle {\text{AI}}}
963:{\displaystyle {\text{ID}}}
919:{\displaystyle {\text{ID}}}
884:{\displaystyle i=1,...,n-1}
550:Tenth Report on Competition
543:France Telecom v Commission
344:Sources of market dominance
10:
2315:
1781:– via Research Gate.
1393:Shepherd, William (1990).
1285:United Brands v Commission
635:{\displaystyle {\text{D}}}
598:HerfindahlâHirschman index
592:HerfindahlâHirschman index
589:
586:HerfindahlâHirschman index
513:Relevance of market shares
480:United Brands v Commission
425:Measuring market dominance
127:Anti-competitive practices
93:HerfindahlâHirschman index
62:History of competition law
25:
18:
523:Tetra Pak 1 (BTG Licence)
338:anti-competitive practice
2180:: CS1 maint: location (
2034:"Misuse of market power"
1589:"First-Mover Advantages"
2260:Harvard Business Review
1996:10.1023/A:1007850614256
1632:Harvard Business Review
1513:Harvard Business Review
1480:Harvard Business Review
612:Kwoka's dominance index
1605:10.1002/smj.4250090706
1229:
1175:
1127:
1102:
1047:
1027:
986:
964:
942:
920:
885:
835:
733:
686:
636:
548:European Commission's
375:First-mover advantages
172:Occupational licensing
48:
1347:First-mover advantage
1230:
1155:
1128:
1103:
1048:
1007:
987:
965:
943:
921:
886:
836:
734:
660:
637:
574:Intellectual Property
563:Impact on competitors
353:First-mover advantage
309:and influence market
47:
26:For game theory, see
2294:Monopoly (economics)
1923:10.18356/60cfa22d-en
1668:EducaciĂłn matemĂĄtica
1546:Journal of Marketing
1431:www.econ.iastate.edu
1141:
1135:statistical variance
1133:) is defined as the
1115:
1057:
996:
974:
952:
930:
908:
845:
749:
649:
624:
301:is the control of a
215:Occupational closure
210:Dividing territories
198:Essential facilities
98:Market concentration
19:For other uses, see
1261:European Commission
1089:
1042:
469:concentration ratio
28:Strategic dominance
1812:– via Wiley.
1681:10.24844/em0602.06
1225:
1137:of market shares:
1123:
1098:
1075:
1043:
1028:
982:
960:
938:
916:
881:
831:
729:
632:
596:There is also the
465:duopolistic market
416:Economies of Scale
368:Economies of scale
234:Regulatory capture
49:
1899:978-1-84376-748-0
1379:978-0-275-95604-2
1220:
1203:
1147:
1121:
1093:
1092:
1002:
980:
958:
936:
914:
655:
630:
538:AKZO v Commission
296:
295:
225:Misuse of patents
220:Predatory pricing
205:Exclusive dealing
88:Barriers to entry
76:Coercive monopoly
2306:
2299:Business indices
2278:
2277:
2275:
2274:
2251:
2245:
2244:
2242:
2241:
2235:INSEAD Knowledge
2226:
2220:
2215:
2209:
2203:
2197:
2192:
2186:
2185:
2179:
2171:
2164:
2158:
2146:
2140:
2137:
2131:
2128:
2122:
2116:
2110:
2105:
2099:
2094:
2088:
2082:
2076:
2071:
2065:
2064:
2057:
2051:
2050:
2048:
2047:
2030:
2024:
2023:
1975:
1969:
1968:
1966:
1965:
1951:
1945:
1944:
1910:
1904:
1903:
1883:
1877:
1876:
1870:
1862:
1860:
1859:
1853:
1847:. Archived from
1846:
1838:
1832:
1827:
1814:
1813:
1789:
1783:
1782:
1779:10.1108/eb039133
1758:
1752:
1751:
1749:
1748:
1734:
1728:
1727:
1725:
1723:
1708:
1702:
1701:
1683:
1665:
1656:
1650:
1649:
1647:
1646:
1623:
1617:
1616:
1599:. Wiley: 41â58.
1584:
1578:
1577:
1537:
1531:
1530:
1528:
1527:
1504:
1498:
1497:
1495:
1494:
1471:
1465:
1464:
1462:
1461:
1447:
1441:
1440:
1438:
1437:
1423:
1417:
1416:
1414:
1405:
1399:
1398:
1390:
1384:
1383:
1363:
1255:Legal definition
1234:
1232:
1231:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1215:
1214:
1209:
1205:
1204:
1196:
1191:
1190:
1174:
1169:
1153:
1148:
1145:
1132:
1130:
1129:
1124:
1122:
1119:
1107:
1105:
1104:
1099:
1094:
1090:
1088:
1083:
1074:
1069:
1068:
1052:
1050:
1049:
1044:
1041:
1036:
1026:
1021:
1003:
1000:
991:
989:
988:
983:
981:
978:
969:
967:
966:
961:
959:
956:
947:
945:
944:
939:
937:
934:
925:
923:
922:
917:
915:
912:
890:
888:
887:
882:
840:
838:
837:
832:
830:
829:
805:
804:
786:
785:
761:
760:
738:
736:
735:
730:
728:
727:
718:
717:
699:
698:
685:
674:
656:
653:
641:
639:
638:
633:
631:
628:
299:Market dominance
288:
281:
274:
179:Product bundling
81:Natural monopoly
33:
32:
2314:
2313:
2309:
2308:
2307:
2305:
2304:
2303:
2284:
2283:
2282:
2281:
2272:
2270:
2252:
2248:
2239:
2237:
2227:
2223:
2216:
2212:
2204:
2200:
2193:
2189:
2173:
2172:
2166:
2165:
2161:
2147:
2143:
2138:
2134:
2129:
2125:
2117:
2113:
2106:
2102:
2095:
2091:
2083:
2079:
2072:
2068:
2059:
2058:
2054:
2045:
2043:
2032:
2031:
2027:
1976:
1972:
1963:
1961:
1953:
1952:
1948:
1933:
1912:
1911:
1907:
1900:
1884:
1880:
1864:
1863:
1857:
1855:
1851:
1844:
1842:"Archived copy"
1840:
1839:
1835:
1828:
1817:
1804:(10): 935â952.
1790:
1786:
1759:
1755:
1746:
1744:
1736:
1735:
1731:
1721:
1719:
1709:
1705:
1663:
1657:
1653:
1644:
1642:
1624:
1620:
1585:
1581:
1558:10.2307/1251985
1538:
1534:
1525:
1523:
1505:
1501:
1492:
1490:
1472:
1468:
1459:
1457:
1449:
1448:
1444:
1435:
1433:
1425:
1424:
1420:
1412:
1406:
1402:
1391:
1387:
1380:
1364:
1360:
1355:
1342:Competition law
1328:
1316:
1269:competition law
1257:
1240:
1210:
1195:
1186:
1182:
1181:
1177:
1176:
1170:
1159:
1154:
1152:
1144:
1142:
1139:
1138:
1118:
1116:
1113:
1112:
1109:Asymmetry Index
1084:
1079:
1073:
1064:
1060:
1058:
1055:
1054:
1037:
1032:
1022:
1011:
999:
997:
994:
993:
977:
975:
972:
971:
955:
953:
950:
949:
933:
931:
928:
927:
911:
909:
906:
905:
902:dominance index
898:
846:
843:
842:
825:
821:
794:
790:
781:
777:
756:
752:
750:
747:
746:
723:
719:
707:
703:
694:
690:
675:
664:
652:
650:
647:
646:
627:
625:
622:
621:
618:dominance index
614:
594:
588:
565:
488:
436:
427:
418:
402:
390:
377:
346:
303:economic market
292:
188:Refusal to deal
167:Tacit collusion
113:Relevant market
37:Competition law
31:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
2312:
2302:
2301:
2296:
2280:
2279:
2246:
2221:
2210:
2198:
2187:
2159:
2141:
2132:
2123:
2111:
2100:
2089:
2077:
2066:
2052:
2025:
1990:(2): 209â227.
1970:
1946:
1931:
1917:. 1976-05-06.
1905:
1898:
1878:
1833:
1815:
1784:
1753:
1729:
1703:
1651:
1618:
1579:
1532:
1499:
1466:
1442:
1418:
1400:
1385:
1378:
1357:
1356:
1354:
1351:
1350:
1349:
1344:
1339:
1334:
1327:
1324:
1315:
1312:
1256:
1253:
1239:
1238:Customer power
1236:
1224:
1219:
1213:
1208:
1202:
1199:
1194:
1189:
1185:
1180:
1173:
1168:
1165:
1162:
1158:
1151:
1097:
1087:
1082:
1078:
1072:
1067:
1063:
1040:
1035:
1031:
1025:
1020:
1017:
1014:
1010:
1006:
897:
894:
893:
892:
880:
877:
874:
871:
868:
865:
862:
859:
856:
853:
850:
828:
824:
820:
817:
814:
811:
808:
803:
800:
797:
793:
789:
784:
780:
776:
773:
770:
767:
764:
759:
755:
740:
739:
726:
722:
716:
713:
710:
706:
702:
697:
693:
689:
684:
681:
678:
673:
670:
667:
663:
659:
613:
610:
590:Main article:
587:
584:
579:Microsoft Corp
564:
561:
560:
559:
487:
484:
461:
460:
457:
454:
435:
432:
426:
423:
417:
414:
401:
398:
389:
386:
376:
373:
372:
371:
365:
359:
356:
345:
342:
294:
293:
291:
290:
283:
276:
268:
265:
264:
263:
262:
257:
249:
248:
244:
243:
242:
241:
236:
231:
222:
217:
212:
207:
202:
201:
200:
195:
185:
176:
175:
174:
169:
164:
159:
149:
138:
136:Monopolization
130:
129:
123:
122:
121:
120:
118:Merger control
115:
110:
105:
100:
95:
90:
85:
84:
83:
78:
64:
56:
55:
54:Basic concepts
51:
50:
40:
39:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2311:
2300:
2297:
2295:
2292:
2291:
2289:
2269:
2265:
2261:
2257:
2250:
2236:
2232:
2225:
2219:
2214:
2208:
2202:
2196:
2191:
2183:
2177:
2169:
2163:
2156:
2155:0-88975-121-8
2152:
2145:
2136:
2127:
2121:
2115:
2109:
2104:
2098:
2093:
2087:
2081:
2075:
2070:
2062:
2056:
2041:
2040:
2035:
2029:
2021:
2017:
2013:
2009:
2005:
2001:
1997:
1993:
1989:
1985:
1981:
1974:
1960:
1956:
1950:
1942:
1938:
1934:
1932:9789210450928
1928:
1924:
1920:
1916:
1909:
1901:
1895:
1891:
1890:
1882:
1874:
1868:
1854:on 2012-04-10
1850:
1843:
1837:
1831:
1826:
1824:
1822:
1820:
1811:
1807:
1803:
1799:
1795:
1788:
1780:
1776:
1772:
1768:
1764:
1757:
1743:
1739:
1733:
1718:
1714:
1707:
1699:
1695:
1691:
1687:
1682:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1662:
1655:
1641:
1637:
1633:
1629:
1622:
1614:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1598:
1594:
1590:
1583:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1563:
1559:
1555:
1551:
1547:
1543:
1536:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1503:
1489:
1485:
1481:
1477:
1470:
1456:
1452:
1446:
1432:
1428:
1422:
1411:
1404:
1396:
1389:
1381:
1375:
1371:
1370:
1362:
1358:
1348:
1345:
1343:
1340:
1338:
1335:
1333:
1332:Early adopter
1330:
1329:
1323:
1321:
1320:profit motive
1311:
1307:
1305:
1301:
1295:
1294:
1288:
1286:
1280:
1278:
1272:
1270:
1266:
1262:
1252:
1248:
1244:
1235:
1222:
1217:
1211:
1206:
1200:
1197:
1192:
1187:
1183:
1178:
1171:
1166:
1163:
1160:
1156:
1149:
1136:
1110:
1095:
1085:
1080:
1076:
1070:
1065:
1061:
1038:
1033:
1029:
1023:
1018:
1015:
1012:
1008:
1004:
948:). Formally,
903:
878:
875:
872:
869:
866:
863:
860:
857:
854:
851:
848:
826:
822:
818:
815:
812:
809:
806:
801:
798:
795:
791:
787:
782:
778:
774:
771:
768:
765:
762:
757:
753:
745:
744:
743:
724:
714:
711:
708:
704:
700:
695:
691:
682:
679:
676:
671:
668:
665:
661:
657:
645:
644:
643:
619:
609:
607:
606:pricing power
603:
599:
593:
583:
581:
580:
575:
569:
556:
555:
554:
551:
546:
544:
539:
535:
530:
528:
524:
519:
515:
514:
510:
508:
504:
500:
495:
493:
483:
481:
476:
474:
470:
466:
458:
455:
452:
451:
450:
448:
444:
442:
431:
422:
413:
411:
410:price premium
407:
397:
395:
385:
383:
369:
366:
363:
360:
357:
354:
351:
350:
349:
341:
339:
334:
332:
328:
324:
320:
316:
312:
308:
304:
300:
289:
284:
282:
277:
275:
270:
269:
267:
266:
261:
258:
256:
253:
252:
251:
250:
246:
245:
240:
237:
235:
232:
230:
226:
223:
221:
218:
216:
213:
211:
208:
206:
203:
199:
196:
194:
193:Group boycott
191:
190:
189:
186:
184:
180:
177:
173:
170:
168:
165:
163:
160:
157:
153:
150:
148:
145:Formation of
144:
143:
142:
139:
137:
134:
133:
132:
131:
128:
125:
124:
119:
116:
114:
111:
109:
106:
104:
101:
99:
96:
94:
91:
89:
86:
82:
79:
77:
74:
73:
72:
68:
65:
63:
60:
59:
58:
57:
53:
52:
46:
42:
41:
38:
35:
34:
29:
22:
2271:. Retrieved
2259:
2249:
2238:. Retrieved
2234:
2224:
2213:
2201:
2190:
2167:
2162:
2144:
2135:
2126:
2114:
2103:
2092:
2080:
2069:
2060:
2055:
2044:. Retrieved
2042:. 2023-03-26
2037:
2028:
1987:
1983:
1973:
1962:. Retrieved
1959:Investopedia
1958:
1949:
1914:
1908:
1888:
1881:
1856:. Retrieved
1849:the original
1836:
1801:
1797:
1787:
1773:(4): 67â74.
1770:
1766:
1756:
1745:. Retrieved
1742:Investopedia
1741:
1732:
1720:. Retrieved
1716:
1706:
1674:(2): 73â86.
1671:
1667:
1654:
1643:. Retrieved
1631:
1621:
1596:
1592:
1582:
1549:
1545:
1535:
1524:. Retrieved
1512:
1502:
1491:. Retrieved
1479:
1469:
1458:. Retrieved
1454:
1445:
1434:. Retrieved
1430:
1421:
1403:
1394:
1388:
1368:
1361:
1337:Market power
1317:
1308:
1303:
1299:
1296:
1291:
1289:
1284:
1281:
1273:
1258:
1249:
1245:
1241:
1108:
901:
899:
741:
617:
615:
602:monopolistic
595:
577:
570:
566:
549:
547:
542:
537:
533:
531:
526:
522:
520:
516:
512:
511:
506:
496:
489:
479:
477:
472:
462:
447:Market share
445:
441:market share
437:
434:Market share
428:
419:
406:Brand Equity
403:
400:Brand Equity
391:
378:
362:Brand equity
347:
335:
298:
297:
239:Rent-seeking
152:Price fixing
103:Market power
1277:undertaking
492:competition
394:Game theory
358:Innovation,
307:competition
162:Bid rigging
2288:Categories
2273:2023-04-24
2240:2023-04-24
2046:2023-04-24
1964:2023-04-24
1858:2013-02-04
1747:2023-04-23
1645:2023-04-22
1526:2022-05-02
1493:2022-05-02
1460:2022-05-02
1436:2022-05-02
1353:References
499:regulation
421:explored.
388:Innovation
229:copyrights
108:SSNIP test
2268:0017-8012
2176:cite book
2120:T-340/03.
2020:152600540
2004:0889-938X
1941:2412-1169
1698:256222263
1690:2448-8089
1640:0017-8012
1566:0022-2429
1552:(4): 33.
1521:0017-8012
1488:0017-8012
1193:−
1157:∑
1009:∑
876:−
819:≥
807:≥
788:≥
775:≥
763:≥
701:−
680:−
662:∑
141:Collusion
71:oligopoly
21:Dominance
2012:41798951
1867:cite web
1722:24 April
1326:See also
841:for all
616:Kwoka's
382:Band-Aid
67:Monopoly
1613:2486211
1574:1251985
327:service
323:product
147:cartels
2266:
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2018:
2010:
2002:
1939:
1929:
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1696:
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1611:
1572:
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1519:
1486:
1455:eh.net
1376:
1053:where
742:where
2016:S2CID
2008:JSTOR
1852:(PDF)
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1694:S2CID
1664:(PDF)
1609:JSTOR
1570:JSTOR
1413:(PDF)
364:, and
329:, or
319:brand
317:of a
315:power
311:price
183:tying
156:cases
2264:ISSN
2182:link
2151:ISBN
2000:ISSN
1937:ISSN
1927:ISBN
1894:ISBN
1873:link
1724:2023
1686:ISSN
1636:ISSN
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1517:ISSN
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1374:ISBN
331:firm
227:and
181:and
69:and
1992:doi
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