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conditions of their freedom simply on the basis that it is judged to be their fault for losing them. Further, it involves the state making highly moralistic and intrusive judgements about the choices that individuals make, and seems to lead to very counter-intuitive conclusions: those who voluntarily enter jobs with higher-than-average risks or who "choose" to live in geographical locations prone to natural disasters may make no claim on others if they suffer as a result of it.
43:' theory of distributive justice in which he observed that a person's skills and abilities led to differential distributive justice outcomes. Rawls argued that this is unfair because one's natural talents or circumstances are morally arbitrary as they have been determined by a "natural lottery" rather than one's own choices. This concern influenced later egalitarians' theories of justice, of which,
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guide our thinking about justice rather than as an immediate policy prescription. The idea has its origin in John Rawls' thought that distributive shares should not be influenced by arbitrary factors. Luck egalitarians disagree among themselves about the proper way to measure how well off people are (for instance, whether we should measure
47:'s theory of equality of resources is considered to be the first with clearly luck egalitarian features, although he rejected the label himself. Following Dworkin, Richard Arneson's equality of opportunity for welfare theory and Gerald Cohen's equal access to advantage theory were two of the most prominent early luck egalitarian theories.
31:. According to this view, justice demands that variations in how well-off people are should be wholly determined by the responsible choices people make and not by differences in their unchosen circumstances. Luck egalitarianism expresses that it is a bad thing for some people to be worse off than others through no fault of their own.
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Global luck egalitarianism is a view about distributive justice at the global level associated with cosmopolitan moral theory. It starts from the premise that it is a bad thing for some people to be worse off than others through no fault of their own and applies this intuition across borders. Global
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Luck egalitarianism is based on the idea that arbitrary factors (such as accidents or illness) should not influence equality, and therefore people should be compensated for undeserved misfortune that impacts their interests. Luck egalitarianism is intended as a fundamental normative idea that might
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XIV: "Covenants
Extorted by Feare are Valide") have regarded as presumptively binding. She also claims that luck egalitarianism expresses a demeaning pity towards the disadvantaged, basing their claims to compensation not on equality but inferiority, and excludes many individuals from the social
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criticizes luck egalitarianism on the basis that when something is chosen does not necessarily make it acceptable. An example of this would be a robber offering someone the choice "Your
81:; opponents, most of whom reject the above premise either in its entirety or with respect to inequalities in which one party's welfare is at least above some minimum level, include
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luck egalitarians characteristically believe that moral agents may have duties to mitigate the brute luck of distant others. Proponents of this school of thought are amongst others
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BEARS Symposium on
Anderson's critique of luck egalitarianism including a contribution from Richard Arneson and a reply by Anderson
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Kibe, Takashi (2011). "The relational approach to egalitarian justice: a critique of luck egalitarianism".
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Kristin Voigt, "The
Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?"
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China in Global
Governance of Intellectual Property: Implications for Global Distributive Justice
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or some other factor) and the related issue of how to assess the value of their resources.
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Christian
Schemmel, "On The Usefulness Of Luck Egalitarian Arguments For Global Justice",
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393:(Revised ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 63–64.
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Shlomi Segall, "In
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Anderson, Elizabeth S. (1999-01-01). "What Is the Point of
Equality?".
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Dworkin's Theory of Equality: Domestic and Global Perspectives
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Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare",
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Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice
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Alexander Kaufman, "Choice, Responsibility and Equality",
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Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?"
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G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice",
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152:Cheng, Wenting (2023).
370:Parfit, Derek (1984).
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29:political philosophers
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344:"Luck Egalitarianism"
342:Knight, Carl (2013).
113:Elizabeth S. Anderson
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389:Rawls, John (1999).
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391:A theory of justice
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351:Philosophy Compass
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503:(Palgrave, 2009).
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450:Susan L. Hurley,
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