835:"We assume that people understand the actions of others by viewing those actions as purposive, as goal directed. People use their knowledge of human intentionality, of the types of goals people have and of the types of plans they devise in service of those goals, to understand action sequences that are described in narratives or observed directly. Many recent approaches to comprehension emphasize the role of goal planning knowledge when understanding narratives and conversations, and when remembering observed sequences and goal directed actions. According to these approaches, understanding involves inferring the intentions (i.e. the plans and goals) of the characters, speakers, or actors. Such inferences are ubiquitous because narratives frequently provide only sketchy descriptions of the character's actions and goals; speakers rarely state their intentions directly; and observers rarely see all the events preceding or following the action to be explained. Therefore, people are forced to use their general knowledge of human intentionality to fill in the missing information; they do this by generating expectations and drawing inferences in order to come up with a plan that explains an actor's behavior. Although the importance of this type of knowledge for understanding natural discourse and action sequences has been recognized, only recently have cognitive scientists begun examining the psychological processes involved in drawing inferences about human intentionality..."
849:
we were rational agents, and this myth – for surely we are not all that rational – works very well because we are pretty rational" (p. 50). Siegert (2001, p. 183), agrees: "Evolutionary psychology argues that the ability to form a representation of what another human is thinking is an ability that has been acquired and developed through natural selection. The ability to interpret other people's facial expressions, their body language, and their tone of voice, has obvious advantages for survival. In earlier environments, our ancestors had to be able determine who was a friend and who was an enemy, who was a potential mate and who was not. The ability to distinguish between facial expressions associated with suspicion and curiosity, fear and anger, or disgust and sadness, may have been the difference between life and death. In modern society we also rely on this ability for surviving socially, if not literally. Our ability to accurately express our emotions, to know how and when to express them, to know when to conceal our emotions, and to be able read and interpret the emotions of other people are skills that impact hugely on our ability to form lasting relationships, breed and raise healthy children, and gain high status in our careers" (p. 183).
252:"). At this level, we are concerned with such things as purpose, function and design. When we predict that a bird will fly when it flaps its wings on the basis that wings are made for flying, we are taking the design stance. Likewise, we can understand the bimetallic strip as a particular type of thermometer, not concerning ourselves with the details of how this type of thermometer happens to work. We can also recognize the purpose that this thermometer serves inside a thermostat and even generalize to other kinds of thermostats that might use a different sort of thermometer. We can even explain the thermostat in terms of what it's good for, saying that it keeps track of the temperature and turns on the heater whenever it gets below a minimum, turning it off once it reaches a maximum.
759:
altogether. Instead of the term 'intentional' the
Scholastics very frequently used the expression 'objective'. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression 'intentional' because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as 'objectively existing', for modern day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to 'mere subjective appearances'."
1270:"The semantic content of knowledge and goals is assumed to be encoded by symbolic expressions" (Pylyshyn, 1989, p. 57). "We need the symbol level to explain such things as why some tasks take longer or result in more errors than other tasks" (p. 60). "Information processing psychology is full of examples of discovering that the form of the representation makes a difference to their behavior in experiments. For example, in problem-solving experiments it makes a difference whether subjects encode the fact that all the objects in a box are red or the equivalent fact that none of the objects is blue" (p. 61).
1317:: "Although the cognitive science community tends to use the term knowledge quite freely in discussing semantic level principles, it is sometimes worth distinguishing those semantic entities that are knowledge from those that are goals, percepts, plans, and so on. The more general term semantic level is used in contexts where such distinctions are important. Philosophers even talk about the 'intentional' level or 'intentional' objects, but because the use of that terminology tends to raise a large, ancient, and not entirely relevant set of issues, we shun that term here" (Pylyshyn, 1989, p. 86).
1024:, who, when asked why opium made people go to sleep, spoke of it having a "dormitive virtue" (a sleep-inducing factor): "If you know something about the design of an artifact, you can predict its behavior without worrying yourself about the underlying physics of its parts. Even small children can readily learn to manipulate such complicated objects as VCRs without having a clue how they work; they know just what will happen when they press a sequence of buttons, because they know what is designed to happen. They are operating from what I call the design stance" (Dennett, 1995, p. 229).
604:
to confirm that commonsense psychology does draw a distinction between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states—and this distinction seems to be dependent on the structural properties of an entity in a way that ascriptions of non-phenomenal states are not." However, this conclusion is only tentative in view of the high variance among participants. Experiment 2 showed analogous results: Both beliefs and happiness were ascribed most strongly to biological humans, and ascriptions of happiness to robots or cyborgs were less common than ascriptions of beliefs.
954:
which you cannot change at will at an instant. I believe that today is
Tuesday, that I am now in Oxford, that Aquinas died in AD 1274, and so on and so on. I cannot suddenly decide to believe that today is Monday, that I am now in Italy, or that Aquinas lived in the eighteenth century. That belief is involuntary was a claim of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. "Belief consists", wrote Hume, "merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters."
118:"The primary evolutionary role of the mind is to relate us in certain ways to the environment, and especially to other people. My subjective states relate me to the rest of the world, and the general name of that relationship is "intentionality." These subjective states include beliefs and desires, intentions and perceptions, as well as loves and hates, fears and hopes. "Intentionality," to repeat, is the general term for all the various forms by which the mind can be directed at, or be about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world." (p.85)
873:. The observer is not trying to objectively determine the agent's actual state of mind. His only need is to be able to represent the agent's behaviour to himself in such a way that he can respond to the agent's behaviour. Consequently, these attributions rarely describe any actual belief or desire an agent might maintain at any time; and the objective truth of the observer's subjective assumptions about the agent's "inner life" is entirely irrelevant – always provided, of course, that his response to the agent's behaviour has been appropriate.
2056:
567:
associated with identifying faces and biological objects (posterior temporal cortex), as well as emotion processing (right amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Meanwhile, the mechanical interactions activated regions related to identifying objects like tools that can be manipulated (posterior temporal lobe). The authors suggest "that these findings reveal putative 'core systems' for social and mechanical understanding that are divisible into constituent parts or elements with distinct processing and storage capabilities."
241:"). At this level, we are concerned with such things as mass, energy, velocity, and chemical composition. When we predict where a ball is going to land based on its current trajectory, we are taking the physical stance. Another example of this stance comes when we look at a strip made up of two types of metal bonded together and predict how it will bend as the temperature changes, based on the physical properties of the two metals.
942:"That subjective randomness results from people's failure to make sense of their observations is not a new idea. Piaget and Inhelder attribute the origin of the idea of chance in children to their realizing the impossibility of predicting oncoming events or finding causal explanations. The experience of randomness is thus construed as an admission of failure of our intellectual operations" (Falk and Konold, 1988, p. 658).
296:
as soon as the thermometer is used outside the circumstances for which it was designed. The actions of a mercury thermometer heated to 500 °C can no longer be predicted on the basis of treating it as a thermometer; we have to sink down to the physical stance to understand it as a melted and boiled piece of junk. For that matter, the "actions" of a dead bird are not predictable in terms of beliefs or desires.
537:
is looked into, it may be possible to formulate a predictive strategy specific to that person. Indeed this is what we often do when someone is behaving unpredictably — we look for the reasons why. In other words, we can only deal with irrationality by contrasting it against the background assumption of rationality. This development significantly undermines the claims of the intentional stance argument.
276:"). At this level, we are concerned with such things as belief, thinking and intent. When we predict that the bird will fly away because it knows the cat is coming and is afraid of getting eaten, we are taking the intentional stance. Another example would be when we predict that Mary will leave the theater and drive to the restaurant because she sees that the movie is over and is hungry.
517:
but no one's home". According to the intentional systems theory (IST), Jones and the robot have precisely the same beliefs and desires, but this is claimed to be false. The IST expert assigns the same mental states to
Blockhead as he does to Jones, "whereas in fact has not a thought in his head." Dennett has argued against this by denying the premise, on the basis that the robot is a
616:
630:
1154:. We could represent it in Morse code by a series of dots and dashes, or in Braille by a certain tactile pattern. Across all these examples the information being represented stays the same. This common information is called the content of the representation. Each different way the information can be expressed is called a representational code. So the words
300:
the problem as compared to staying at the design stance, but we would generate theoretical commitments that expose us to absurdities, such as the possibility of the thermostat not being in the mood to work today because the weather is so nice. Whether to take a particular stance, then, is determined by how successful that stance is when applied.
237:, the domain of physics and chemistry, which makes predictions from knowledge of the physical constitution of the system and the physical laws that govern its operation; and thus, given a particular set of physical laws and initial conditions, and a particular configuration, a specific future state is predicted (this could also be called the "
248:, the domain of biology and engineering, which requires no knowledge of the physical constitution or the physical laws that govern a system's operation. Based on an implicit assumption that there is no malfunction in the system, predictions are made from knowledge of the purpose of the system's design (this could also be called the "
90:. When clarifying the distinction between mental phenomena (viz., mental activity) and physical phenomena, Brentano (p. 97) argued that, in contrast with physical phenomena, the "distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena" was "the reference to something as an object" – a characteristic he called "
259:, the domain of software and minds, which requires no knowledge of either structure or design, and " the logic of mentalistic explanations of behaviour, their predictive power, and their relation to other forms of explanation" (Bolton & Hill, 1996, p. 24). Predictions are made on the basis of
1326:
Pylyshyn (1989): " why people, or appropriately programmed computers, do certain things by saying what they know and what their goals are and by showing that these are connected in certain meaningful or even rational ways." (p. 57) "We need the knowledge level to explain why certain goals and beliefs
516:
proposes that someone, Jones, has a twin who is in fact not a person but a very sophisticated robot which looks and acts like Jones in every way, but who (it is claimed) somehow does not have any thoughts or feelings at all, just a chip which controls his behaviour; in other words, "the lights are on
299:
Even when there is no immediate error, a higher-level stance can simply fail to be useful. If we were to try to understand the thermostat at the level of the intentional stance, ascribing to it beliefs about how hot it is and a desire to keep the temperature just right, we would gain no traction over
295:
A key point is that switching to a higher level of abstraction has its risks as well as its benefits. For example, when we view both a bimetallic strip and a tube of mercury as thermometers, we can lose track of the fact that they differ in accuracy and temperature range, leading to false predictions
62:
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and
868:
Note that it is irrelevant whether the agent actually holds these particular beliefs or not; the critical feature is that the observer ascribes them to the agent. The intentional stance involves an observer amassing a constellation of subjective, observer-centred assumptions, unique to that specific
511:
The most obvious objection to
Dennett is the intuition that it "matters" to us whether an object has an inner life or not. The claim is that we don't just imagine the intentional states of other people in order to predict their behaviour; the fact that they have thoughts and feelings just like we do
963:
In addressing cases where an agent's beliefs are not "both true and relevant to life", Dennett (1987, p. 49) notes that "when false beliefs are attributed, special stories must be told to explain how the error resulted from the presence of features in the environment that are deceptive relative to
848:
actions, and because this way of thinking about things seems to be so very effective – Fodor (1987, p. 3) speaks of its "extraordinary predictive power" – Dennett is certain that the practice of treating others as rational agents must have evolved and developed over time: "we treat each other as if
603:
studies to test students' ascriptions of various mental states to humans compared with cyborgs and robots. Experiment 1 showed that while students attributed both beliefs and pains most strongly to humans, they were more willing to attribute beliefs than pains to robots and cyborgs. "hese data seem
587:
illustrates this tendency of people to see phenomenal experience as different from physical processes. The authors suggest that psychopathy may represent a deficit in the phenomenal but not intentional stance, while people with autism appear to have intact moral sensibilities, just not mind-reading
562:
of intentional and physical stances in the brain. However, most studies have found no evidence of impairment in autistic individuals' ability to understand other people's basic intentions or goals; instead, data suggests that impairments are found in understanding more complex social emotions or in
536:
argues that people often have beliefs or desires which are irrational or bizarre, and IST doesn't allow us to say anything about these. If the person's "environmental niche" is examined closely enough, and the possibility of malfunction in their brain (which might affect their reasoning capacities)
1195:
as follows: "Listen to someone singing. Then listen to a recording of the same person singing the same song. The two sounds would probably be virtually identical. Yet the sound would be produced in very different ways – in one case by human vocal cords, in the other by electronic components. These
814:
is an unfortunate word, and like a lot of unfortunate words in philosophy, we owe it to the German-speaking philosophers. The word suggests that intentionality, in the sense of directedness, must always have some connection with 'intending' in the sense in which, for example, I intend to go to the
173:
Further, Dennett (1987, p. 52) argues that, based on our fixed personal views of what all humans ought to believe, desire and do, we predict (or explain) the beliefs, desires and actions of others "by calculating in a normative system"; and, driven by the reasonable assumption that all humans
566:
Robbins and Jack point to a 2003 study in which participants viewed animated geometric shapes in different "vignettes," some of which could be interpreted as constituting social interaction, while others suggested mechanical behavior. Viewing social interactions elicited activity in brain regions
953:
Swinburne (2001, pp. 39–40) argues that one of the most important features of beliefs is that they are involuntary: "Belief is a passive state; believing is a state in which you are, it is not a matter of you doing something. And it is an involuntary state, a state in which you find yourself and
591:
In a follow-up paper, Robbins and Jack describe four experiments about how the intentional and phenomenal stances relate to feelings of moral concern. The first two experiments showed that talking about lobsters as strongly emotional led to a much greater sentiment that lobsters deserved welfare
540:
The rationale behind the intentional stance is based on evolutionary theory, particularly the notion that the ability to make quick predictions of a system's behaviour based on what we think it might be thinking was an evolutionary adaptive advantage. The fact that our predictive powers are not
1093:
Papineau (1995) defines instrumentalism as: "The doctrine that scientific theories are not true descriptions of an unobservable reality, but merely useful instruments which enable us to order and anticipate the observable world": a parallel to
Perkins' "pragmatist's system" (Perkins, 1983, p.
758:
In his second edition (1973/1924, pp. 180–81), Brentano added this explanation of "intentional" to his 1911 edition: "This expression had been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it
63:
finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do.
549:
Philip
Robbins and Anthony I. Jack suggest that "Dennett's philosophical distinction between the physical and intentional stances has a lot going for it" from the perspective of psychology and neuroscience. They review studies on abilities to adopt an intentional stance (variously called
931:). This deep desire to eschew disorder and make things systematic has a parallel in the way that humans assess the concept of "randomness". In many circumstances, according to Falk and Konold (1997; 1998), an individual's concept of what is "random" is, in fact, far from it – and this "
858:
Dennett stresses how research into artificial intelligence has shown just how rational humans actually are: "Even the most sophisticated AI programs stumble blindly into misinterpretations and misunderstandings that even small children reliably evade without a second thought" (1987, p.
1230:"The structure and the principles by which the physical object functions correspond to the physical or the biological level" (Pylyshyn, 1989, p. 57). "We obviously need the biological level to explain such things as the effects of drugs or jet lag or brain damage on behavior" (p.6 1).
592:
protections than did talking about lobsters as highly intelligent. The third and fourth studies found that perceiving an agent as vulnerable led to greater attributions of phenomenal experience. Also, people who scored higher on the empathetic-concern subscale of the
768:
In addition to cogitations (such as judgement, recollection and inference) and emotions (such as joy and sorrow and fear), Brentano (op.cit. p. 79) includes things such as "hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warm or cold" in his category of physical
263:
expressed in terms of meaningful mental states; and, given the task of predicting or explaining the behaviour of a specific agent (a person, animal, corporation, artifact, nation, etc.), it is implicitly assumed that the agent will always act on the basis of its
1147:
or idea, namely the concept of a furry house-hold pet that purrs. Note that this same concept can be represented in many different ways. We could use a picture of a cat to represent the concept. We could translate cat into
Spanish and represent it by
1292:
Specifies how the device does what it does (Marr, 1982, p. 23): "How can this computational theory be implemented? In particular, what is the representation for the input and output, and what is the algorithm for the transformation?" (p.
357:: It is a "mechanism" that produces results regardless of the material used to perform the procedure ("the power of the procedure is due to its logical structure, not the causal powers of the materials used in the instantiation").
341:(b) the real world is structured and systematic, rather than being arbitrary or unpredictable. Thus, if a particular way of categorizing information does, indeed, "provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort",
935:" is, often, far more disordered than a truly random sequence. Lisanby and Lockhead (1991), also differentiate between subjective randomness and genuine randomness (upon which they bestow the tautologous title of "
1381:"To treat a system at the knowledge level is to treat it as having some knowledge and some goals, and believing it will do whatever is within its power to attain its goals, in so far as its knowledge indicates."
220:
The core idea is that, when understanding, explaining, and/or predicting the behavior of an object, we can choose to view it at varying levels of abstraction. The more concrete the level, the more accurate
228:
Dennett defines three levels of abstraction, attained by adopting one of three entirely different "stances", or intellectual strategies: the physical stance; the design stance; and the intentional stance:
200:
are those a rational individual ought to have (i.e., given their "biological needs", and "the most practicable means of satisfying them") in order to further their "survival" and "procreation" needs; and
126:
provides a systematic, "reason-giving explanation" for a particular action, and an account of the historical origins of that action, based on deeply embedded assumptions about the agent; namely that:
799:, it very clearly always carries the "inherence" meaning (i.e., the fact or condition of existing in something), rather than the "non-existence" meaning (i.e., the fact or condition of not existing).
1208:." Glass et al. also make the point that "cognitive psychology primarily explores representational codes" (p. 24) and "cognitive psychologists study representational codes rather than media" (p. 7).
521:
and therefore metaphysically impossible. In other words, if something acts in all ways conscious, it necessarily is, as consciousness is defined in terms of behavioral capacity, not ineffable
1217:
In the case of both
Dennett and Pylyshyn's terminology the designation "physical" means "relating to physics" (as in "physical laws"), with the strong implication that we are speaking of "
1804:, 1981, edited by A.F. Heath, Oxford: Oxford University Press; originally presented as a Herbert Spencer lecture at Oxford in November 1979; also published as chapter 2 in Dennett's book
1396:
the device does and why" (Marr, 1982, p. 22): "What is the goal of the computation, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out?" (p. 25)
334:'s (1978, p. 28) criterion of the "maximum information with the least cognitive effort". Rosch argues that, implicit within any system of categorization, are the assumptions that:
303:
Dennett argues that it is best to understand human behavior at the level of the intentional stance, without making any specific commitments to any deeper reality of the artifacts of
827:, the word for intention in the ordinary sense of intending to go to the movies.) So we have to keep in mind that in English intending is just one form of intentionality among many.
1340:. It was instantly clear to me that the knowledge level and the intentional stance are fundamentally the same, and I indicated as much in the talk." (Newell, 1988, p. 521)
973:
Dennett also addresses the cases in which the desires are "abnormal" and remarks that " 'abnormal' desires are attributable if special stories can be told" (1987, p. 49).
170:, whose joint study revealed that, when subjects were presented with an animated display of 2-dimensional shapes, they were inclined to ascribe intentions to the shapes.
1336:
Newell was aware of
Dennett's views prior to Newell's (1980) address that was, later, published in full 1982: "Before I finished preparing that address I found and read
338:(a) the major purpose of any system of categorization is to reduce the randomness of the universe by providing "maximum information with the least cognitive effort", and
104:; for example: "the aboutness of the pencil marks composing a shopping list is derived from the intentions of the person whose list it is" (Dennett, 1995, p. 240).
380:
The general notion of a three level system was widespread in the late 1970s/early 1980s; for example, when discussing the mental representation of information from a
319:, it has been taken as being more like Realism. His own words hint at something in the middle, as he suggests that the self is as real as a center of gravity, "an
869:
observer, that are expressed in the form of a set of supposed beliefs and desires which are attributed to (and projected upon) the object of that observation
778:
By contrast, Brentano (p. 80) includes things such as "a color... a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense" in his category of mental phenomena.
2127:
550:"mindreading", "mentalizing", or "theory of mind") as distinct from adopting a physical stance ("folk physics", "intuitive physics", or "theory of body").
1876:
Lisanby, S.H. & Lockhead, G., "Subjective
Randomness, Aesthetics, and Structure", pp. 97–114 in Lockhead, G.R. & Pomerantz, J.R. (eds.),
1779:
330:
As a way of thinking about things, Dennett's intentional stance is entirely consistent with everyday commonsense understanding; and, thus, it meets
1818:
1327:
tend to lead to certain behaviors, and why the behaviors can be changed in rational ways when new beliefs are added by telling things." (p. 60)
1252:
Specifies the algorithm's physical substrates (Marr, 1982, p. 24): "How can the representation and algorithm be realized physically?" (p. 25).
225:
our predictions are; the more abstract, the greater the computational power we gain by zooming out and skipping over the irrelevant details.
343:
it can only do so because the structure of that particular system of categories corresponds with the perceived structure of the real world
182:
on the basis of those beliefs and desires in order to get what they want – these predictions/explanations are based on four simple rules:
2211:
110:(1999, pp. 85) stresses that "competence" in predicting/explaining human behaviour involves being able to both recognize others as "
1592:
364:: Each constituent step, and each transition between each step, is so utterly simple, that they can be performed by a "dutiful idiot".
1373:(as might be suspected). Thus, the agent processes its knowledge to determine the actions to take. Finally, the behavior law is the
371:: "Whatever it is that an algorithm does, it always does it, if it is executed without misstep. An algorithm is a foolproof recipe."
1992:
1921:
Perkins, David N., "Why the Human Perceiver is a Bad Machine", pp. 341–364 in Beck, J. Hope, B. & Rosenfeld, A. (eds.),
307:. In addition to the controversy inherent in this, there is also some dispute about the extent to which Dennett is committing to
1261:
In "Brain Writing and Mind Reading" (1975), Dennett very clearly states that he is agnostic about what he terms "Brain Writing".
1020:, the theme of the "design" category is that things are simply just that way: a parallel to the doctoral candidate in Molière's
1932:
1762:
190:
are those a rational individual ought to have (i.e., given their "perceptual capacities", "epistemic needs" and "biography");
1054:
Observing that the term "belief" has a very wide range of meanings – and remarking that "we seldom talk about what people
1867:
704:
1166:
represent the same content, but in different codes (i.e., written English vs. written Spanish). In contrast the words
1797:
558:
can involve deficits in the physical stance with preservation of the intentional stance. This tentatively suggests a
1955:
Siegert, R.J., "Culture, Cognition, and Schizophrenia", pp. 171–189 in Schumaker, J.F. & Ward, T. (eds.),
1072:
are information-bearing states of people that arise from perceptions and that, together with appropriately related
709:
1848:
Foss, C.L. & Bow, G.H., "Understanding Actions in Relation to Goals", pp. 94–124 in Sharkey, N.E. (ed.),
1367:. Thus, an agent is composed of a set of actions, a set of goals and a body. The medium at the knowledge level is
384:
perspective, Glass and his colleagues (1979, p. 24) distinguished three important aspects of representation:
1898:
1827:
Falk, R. & Konold, C., "Subjective Randomness", pp. 653–659, in Kotz, S., Read, C.B. & Banks, D.L.,
1349:
Newell (1982), p. 98: "The system at the knowledge level is the agent. The components at the knowledge level are
787:
Note that, whilst the term "inexistence" appears haphazardly right throughout the text of Bretano's work as both
739:
283:
neither lower stance", there may well be a fourth, higher level: a "truly moral stance toward the system" – the "
2055:
2135:
593:
2191:
1707:, Routledge & Kegan Paul, (London) 1973 (The German version of the Second Edition was published in 1924).
882:
See Heider & Simmel (1944); the animation used in the experiment is at "youtube.com/watch?v=n9TWwG4SFWQ".
584:
1985:
1720:
Dennett, D.C., (1971/1978) "Mechanism and Responsibility", reprinted in pp. 233–255 in Dennett, D.C.,
2119:
575:
Robbins and Jack argue for an additional stance beyond the three that Dennett outlined. They call it the
419:
349:
Also, the intentional stance meets the criteria Dennett specified (1995, pp. 50–51) for algorithms:
588:
abilities. These examples suggest a double dissociation between the intentional and phenomenal stances.
2216:
2196:
2103:
2154:
2087:
1819:
Falk, R. & Konold, C., "Making Sense of Randomness: Implicit Encoding as a Basis for Judgement",
1711:
1469:
541:
perfect is a further result of the advantages sometimes accrued by acting contrary to expectations.
422:. The parallels between the four representations (each of which implicitly assumed that computers
114:" beings, and interpret others' minds as having "intentional states" (e.g., beliefs and desires):
2095:
1978:
1698:
Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry
830:
600:
1941:
Rosch, E., "Principles of Categorization", pp. 27–48 in Rosch, E. & Lloyd, B.B. (eds),
554:
seems to be a deficit in the intentional stance with preservation of the physical stance, while
2201:
1464:
1455:
Hamilton AF (2009). "Goals, intentions and mental states: challenges for theories of autism".
426:
human minds displayed each of the three distinct levels) are detailed in the following table:
311:
about mental properties. Initially, Dennett's interpretation was seen as leaning more towards
2045:
1218:
982:
Dennett, D. C., (1987) "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology", pp. 43–68 in Dennett, D. C.,
719:
308:
2186:
729:
518:
381:
8:
2165:
2025:
2020:
1892:
Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation of Visual Information
669:
659:
559:
529:
203:
The agent's behaviour will be composed of those acts a rational individual holding those
2206:
1668:
1615:
1573:
1529:
1504:
1437:
724:
513:
315:, but over the years, as this idea has been used to support more extensive theories of
1728:
1066:" – Dennett (1987, p. 46) produces a precise definition: "folk psychology has it that
2015:
1793:
1758:
1747:
1619:
1577:
1534:
1482:
1478:
1441:
694:
679:
635:
621:
555:
35:
410:
Other significant cognitive scientists who also advocated a three level system were
287:" – which not only "presupposes the intentional stance" (viz., treats the system as
1672:
1660:
1607:
1565:
1524:
1516:
1474:
1429:
1405:
1108:
2111:
2079:
1787:
674:
664:
580:
320:
312:
304:
167:
133:(b) the agent's action was entirely reasonable (in the prevailing circumstances);
123:
51:
2035:
2001:
1783:
1641:
1104:
734:
714:
689:
415:
324:
87:
83:
39:
27:
1664:
1611:
1569:
1520:
1433:
2180:
1856:
891:
In other words, humans have a propensity to systematically think as follows:
533:
331:
316:
47:
42:
proposed by Dennett, which provides the underpinnings of his later works on
1538:
1486:
579:: Attributing consciousness, emotions, and inner experience to a mind. The
411:
163:
2160:
2071:
699:
644:
150:(e) the agent's future action could be systematically predicted from the
107:
31:
24:
272:
in order to get precisely what it wants (this could also be called the "
1811:
Dennett, D. "Three kinds of intentional psychology" (IP) in Heil, J. -
1780:"Chapter 3. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works"
1178:
represent different contents, but in the same code (written English)."
279:
In 1971, Dennett also postulated that, whilst "the intentional stance
1914:
Papineau, D., "Instrumentalism", p. 410 in Honderich, T. (ed.),
1907:
Newell, A. (1988), "The intentional stance and the knowledge level",
1754:
1505:"Neural Foundations For Understanding Social And Mechanical Concepts"
1420:
Philip Robbins; Anthony I. Jack (Jan 2006). "The phenomenal stance".
684:
654:
96:
55:
43:
1834:
Fano, Vincenzo. "Holism and the naturalization of consciousness" in
1724:, Bradford Books, (Montgomery), 1978 (originally published in 1971).
2040:
1553:
1970:
1933:"Computing in Cognitive Science", pp.51-91 in Posner, M.I.(ed.),
596:
had generally higher absolute attributions of mental experience.
1789:
Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence
1642:"Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone
551:
522:
193:
In general, these beliefs "are both true and relevant to life;
82:
Dennett (1971, p. 87) states that he took the concept of "
528:
Another objection attacks the premise that treating people as
512:
is central to notions such as trust, friendship and love. The
1945:, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, (Hillsdale), 1978.
1590:
1551:
1419:
649:
844:
Because we use folk psychology effortlessly all the time to
1773:
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life
291:) but also "views it as a person" (1971/1978, p. 240).
1406:
Daniel Dennett, The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies
1302:
Dennett stressed "that the intentional stance presupposes
162:
This approach is also consistent with the earlier work of
1880:, American Psychological Association, (Washington), 1991.
815:
movies tonight. (German has no problem with this because
1950:
Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World
1792:. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1722:
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology
1705:
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Second Edition)
1502:
927:(which, as they understand things, will produce outcome
1033:
Perkins (1983, p. 360), refers to the results of this "
995:
Perkins (1983, p. 360), refers to the results of this "
34:
in which we view the behavior of an entity in terms of
375:
1863:, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, (Reading), 1979.
1829:
Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences: Update Volume 2
1498:
1496:
1737:
Dennett, D., (1987) "True Believers" in Dennett, D.
611:
1911:, Vol.11, No.3, (September 1988), pp. 520–522.
1379:: Actions are selected to attain the agent's goals.
1746:
1493:
1415:
1413:
1744:
2178:
1894:, W.H. Freeman & Company, (New York), 1982.
1716:, Vol.68, No. 4, (25 February 1971), pp.87-106.
1584:
1410:
808:Searle (1999, pp. 85–86) clarifies his usage: "
1868:"An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior",
1731:Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science
1635:
1633:
1631:
1629:
1187:Glass et al. (1979, p. 3) distinguish between
1127:Glass et al. (1979, p. 3) distinguish between
829:Foss and Bow (1986, p. 94) present a far more
1986:
1639:
1141:is a representation. It represents a certain
871:in order to explain something to the observer
130:(a) the agent's action was entirely rational;
122:According to Dennett (1987, pp. 48–49),
77:
1591:Anthony I. Jack; Philip Robbins (Sep 2012).
1552:Anthony I. Jack; Philip Robbins (Sep 2006).
1626:
1109:"The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity"
532:creatures will yield the best predictions.
1993:
1979:
1966:, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2001.
1918:, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1995.
1903:, Vol.18, No.1, (January 1982), pp.87-127.
1831:, John Wiley & Sons, (New York), 1988.
1823:, Vol.104, No.2, (April 1997), pp.301-318.
1700:, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1996.
1103:
86:" from the work of the German philosopher
1813:Philosophy of Mind: A guide and anthology
1775:, Simon & Schuster, (New York), 1995.
1528:
1468:
1308:lower stance" (Dennett 1971/1978, p. 240)
964:the perceptual capacities of the system."
506:
406:("the physical realization of the code").
399:("the format of the representation"); and
215:
1689:Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F.
1653:Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
1454:
1135:as follows: "A simple English word like
915:is how things obtain in the real world)
907:, and (on the basis of their desire for
1741:, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987
923:, with the intention of achieving goal
2179:
1957:Cultural Cognition and Psychopathology
1974:
1838:, Massimo Dell'Utri. Quodlibet. 2002.
1749:The Intentional Stance (6th printing)
94:". Dennett constantly speaks of the "
1852:, Ellis Horwood, (Chichester), 1986.
1845:, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987.
570:
483:Representation and Algorithm Level.
460:Physical Level, or Biological Level.
178:specific beliefs and desires and do
1937:, The MIT Press, (Cambridge), 1989.
1925:, Academic Press, (New York), 1983.
1600:Review of Philosophy and Psychology
1503:Alex Martin; Jill Weisberg (2003).
1279:Essentially the same as Pylyshyn's
1239:Essentially the same as Pylyshyn's
986:, The MIT Press, (Cambridge), 1987.
599:Bryce Huebner (2010) performed two
376:Variants of Dennett's three stances
13:
2212:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
2000:
1916:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
1729:"Brain Writing and Mind Reading",
1241:Physical Level or Biological Level
544:
14:
2228:
1593:"The Phenomenal Stance Revisited"
2054:
1935:Foundations of Cognitive Science
1753:, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
1691:Philosophy of Mind and Cognition
1479:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2009.02098.x
1202:for producing the same auditory
710:Naturalization of intentionality
628:
614:
563:considering others' viewpoints.
463:Physical Level, or Device Level.
1928:Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. .
1887:, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990
1850:Advances in Cognitive Science 1
1815:, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004
1693:, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1996
1545:
1448:
1399:
1384:
1343:
1330:
1320:
1311:
1296:
1286:
1273:
1264:
1255:
1246:
1233:
1224:
1211:
1181:
1121:
1097:
1087:
1048:
1027:
1010:
989:
976:
967:
957:
947:
885:
670:High- and low-level description
480:Program Level, or Symbol Level.
466:Hardware Implementation Level.
2136:From Bacteria to Bach and Back
1870:American Journal of Psychology
876:
862:
852:
838:
802:
781:
772:
762:
752:
594:Interpersonal Reactivity Index
392:("what is being represented");
244:Somewhat more abstract is the
1:
1909:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
1872:, Vol.57, (1944), pp.243-259.
1866:Heider, F. & Simmel, M.,
1682:
585:hard problem of consciousness
494:Semantic, or Knowledge Level.
323:, a theorist's fiction", but
174:are rational beings – who do
1959:, Praeger, (Westport), 2001.
1943:Cognition and Categorization
746:
500:Computational Theory Level.
38:. It is part of a theory of
7:
1878:The Perception of Structure
1696:Bolton, D. & Hill, J.,
1058:, we talk about what they
607:
136:(c) the agent held certain
10:
2233:
1952:, Phoenix, (London), 1999.
1778:Daniel C. Dennett (1997),
1745:Daniel C. Dennett (1996),
1703:Brentano, F., (1973/1924)
1646:about functional zombies?"
1640:Bryce Huebner (Mar 2010).
1457:J Child Psychol Psychiatry
78:Dennett and intentionality
2155:The Philosophical Lexicon
2146:
2063:
2052:
2008:
1714:The Journal of Philosophy
1665:10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6
1612:10.1007/s13164-012-0104-5
1570:10.1007/s11098-005-1730-x
1521:10.1080/02643290342000005
1434:10.1007/s11098-005-1730-x
740:The Philosophy of 'As if'
705:Marr's levels of analysis
233:The most concrete is the
1923:Human and Machine Vision
1376:principle of rationality
911:, and their belief that
439:"Levels of Organization"
2104:Darwin's Dangerous Idea
2096:Consciousness Explained
1964:Epistemic Justification
1901:Artificial Intelligence
1899:"The Knowledge Level",
1768:(First published 1987).
1712:"Intentional Systems",
1554:"The Phenomenal Stance"
1016:Like Rudyard Kipling's
601:experimental philosophy
444:"Levels of Description"
362:Underlying Mindlessness
92:intentional inexistence
1806:The Intentional Stance
1802:Scientific Explanation
1771:Dennett, D.C., (1995)
1739:The Intentional Stance
1727:Dennett, D.C., (1975)
1710:Dennett, D.C., (1971)
1390:This level specifies "
1078:, lead to intelligent
1039:" of perception as a "
1001:" of perception as a "
984:The Intentional Stance
846:systematically predict
507:Objections and replies
274:folk psychology stance
216:Dennett's three levels
75:
70:The Intentional Stance
2046:Multiple drafts model
1558:Philosophical Studies
1422:Philosophical Studies
937:stochastic randomness
933:subjective randomness
899:because they believe
895:has performed action
720:Philosophical realism
449:"Levels of Analysis"
255:Most abstract is the
60:
16:Philosophical concept
2192:Cognitive psychology
1885:Mind & Cognition
1821:Psychological Review
1800:(first published in
1022:Le Malade imaginaire
821:does not sound like
730:Stance (linguistics)
519:philosophical zombie
382:cognitive psychology
355:Substrate Neutrality
23:is a term coined by
2166:Universal Darwinism
2026:Heterophenomenology
2021:Greedy reductionism
1897:Newell, A., (1982)
1859:& Santa, J.L.,
1042:pragmatist's system
660:Conceptual blending
560:double dissociation
489:Intentional Stance.
250:teleological stance
211:) ought to perform.
147:certain things; and
2128:Breaking the Spell
2031:Intentional stance
1196:are two different
1004:physicist's system
725:Philosophy of mind
514:Blockhead argument
369:Guaranteed Results
257:intentional stance
207:(and having those
21:intentional stance
2217:Psycholinguistics
2197:Cognitive science
2174:
2173:
2016:Cartesian theater
1764:978-0-262-54053-7
1509:Cogn Neuropsychol
695:Level of analysis
680:Integrative level
636:Psychology portal
622:Philosophy portal
577:phenomenal stance
571:Phenomenal stance
556:Williams syndrome
504:
503:
36:mental properties
30:for the level of
2224:
2058:
1995:
1988:
1981:
1972:
1971:
1931:Pylyshyn, Z.W.,
1767:
1752:
1677:
1676:
1650:
1637:
1624:
1623:
1597:
1588:
1582:
1581:
1549:
1543:
1542:
1532:
1500:
1491:
1490:
1472:
1452:
1446:
1445:
1417:
1408:
1403:
1397:
1388:
1382:
1347:
1341:
1334:
1328:
1324:
1318:
1315:
1309:
1300:
1294:
1290:
1284:
1277:
1271:
1268:
1262:
1259:
1253:
1250:
1244:
1237:
1231:
1228:
1222:
1215:
1209:
1185:
1179:
1125:
1119:
1118:
1116:
1115:
1101:
1095:
1091:
1085:
1052:
1046:
1031:
1025:
1014:
1008:
993:
987:
980:
974:
971:
965:
961:
955:
951:
945:
889:
883:
880:
874:
866:
860:
856:
850:
842:
836:
818:Intentionalität'
806:
800:
785:
779:
776:
770:
766:
760:
756:
638:
633:
632:
631:
624:
619:
618:
617:
530:ideally rational
497:Knowledge Level.
455:Physical Stance.
429:
428:
239:structure stance
73:
68:Daniel Dennett,
2232:
2231:
2227:
2226:
2225:
2223:
2222:
2221:
2177:
2176:
2175:
2170:
2142:
2112:Freedom Evolves
2059:
2050:
2004:
1999:
1969:
1962:Swinburne, R.,
1843:Psychosemantics
1765:
1685:
1680:
1648:
1638:
1627:
1595:
1589:
1585:
1550:
1546:
1515:(3–6): 575–87.
1501:
1494:
1470:10.1.1.621.6275
1453:
1449:
1418:
1411:
1404:
1400:
1389:
1385:
1380:
1348:
1344:
1335:
1331:
1325:
1321:
1316:
1312:
1301:
1297:
1291:
1287:
1278:
1274:
1269:
1265:
1260:
1256:
1251:
1247:
1238:
1234:
1229:
1225:
1216:
1212:
1186:
1182:
1126:
1122:
1113:
1111:
1102:
1098:
1092:
1088:
1053:
1049:
1032:
1028:
1018:Just So Stories
1015:
1011:
994:
990:
981:
977:
972:
968:
962:
958:
952:
948:
890:
886:
881:
877:
867:
863:
857:
853:
843:
839:
834:
828:
807:
803:
786:
782:
777:
773:
767:
763:
757:
753:
749:
744:
675:Instrumentalism
665:Folk psychology
634:
629:
627:
620:
615:
613:
610:
581:explanatory gap
573:
547:
545:Neural evidence
509:
491:
490:
488:
474:
473:
471:
457:
456:
454:
448:
443:
438:
437:Zenon Pylyshyn
433:
432:Daniel Dennett
378:
321:abstract object
313:instrumentalism
305:folk psychology
285:personal stance
235:physical stance
218:
168:Marianne Simmel
124:folk psychology
80:
74:
67:
52:folk psychology
17:
12:
11:
5:
2230:
2220:
2219:
2214:
2209:
2204:
2199:
2194:
2189:
2172:
2171:
2169:
2168:
2163:
2158:
2150:
2148:
2144:
2143:
2141:
2140:
2132:
2124:
2116:
2108:
2100:
2092:
2084:
2076:
2067:
2065:
2064:Selected works
2061:
2060:
2053:
2051:
2049:
2048:
2043:
2038:
2036:Intuition pump
2033:
2028:
2023:
2018:
2012:
2010:
2006:
2005:
2002:Daniel Dennett
1998:
1997:
1990:
1983:
1975:
1968:
1967:
1960:
1953:
1946:
1939:
1929:
1926:
1919:
1912:
1905:
1895:
1888:
1881:
1874:
1864:
1853:
1846:
1839:
1832:
1825:
1816:
1809:
1784:John Haugeland
1776:
1769:
1763:
1742:
1735:
1725:
1718:
1708:
1701:
1694:
1686:
1684:
1681:
1679:
1678:
1625:
1606:(3): 383–403.
1583:
1564:(127): 59–85.
1544:
1492:
1447:
1409:
1398:
1383:
1342:
1329:
1319:
1310:
1295:
1285:
1272:
1263:
1254:
1245:
1232:
1223:
1210:
1180:
1120:
1105:Daniel Dennett
1096:
1086:
1062:and what they
1047:
1026:
1009:
988:
975:
966:
956:
946:
944:
943:
919:has chosen to
903:, and desires
884:
875:
861:
851:
837:
811:Intentionality
801:
780:
771:
761:
750:
748:
745:
743:
742:
737:
735:Theory of mind
732:
727:
722:
717:
715:Operationalism
712:
707:
702:
697:
692:
690:Intentionality
687:
682:
677:
672:
667:
662:
657:
652:
647:
641:
640:
639:
625:
609:
606:
572:
569:
546:
543:
508:
505:
502:
501:
498:
495:
492:
485:
484:
481:
478:
475:
472:Design Stance.
468:
467:
464:
461:
458:
451:
450:
445:
440:
435:
416:Zenon Pylyshyn
408:
407:
400:
393:
377:
374:
373:
372:
365:
358:
347:
346:
339:
293:
292:
277:
253:
242:
217:
214:
213:
212:
201:
194:
191:
160:
159:
148:
143:(d) the agent
141:
134:
131:
120:
119:
102:intentionality
88:Franz Brentano
84:intentionality
79:
76:
65:
40:mental content
28:Daniel Dennett
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2229:
2218:
2215:
2213:
2210:
2208:
2205:
2203:
2202:Consciousness
2200:
2198:
2195:
2193:
2190:
2188:
2185:
2184:
2182:
2167:
2164:
2162:
2159:
2157:
2156:
2152:
2151:
2149:
2145:
2138:
2137:
2133:
2130:
2129:
2125:
2122:
2121:
2117:
2114:
2113:
2109:
2106:
2105:
2101:
2098:
2097:
2093:
2090:
2089:
2085:
2082:
2081:
2077:
2074:
2073:
2069:
2068:
2066:
2062:
2057:
2047:
2044:
2042:
2039:
2037:
2034:
2032:
2029:
2027:
2024:
2022:
2019:
2017:
2014:
2013:
2011:
2007:
2003:
1996:
1991:
1989:
1984:
1982:
1977:
1976:
1973:
1965:
1961:
1958:
1954:
1951:
1947:
1944:
1940:
1938:
1936:
1930:
1927:
1924:
1920:
1917:
1913:
1910:
1906:
1904:
1902:
1896:
1893:
1889:
1886:
1882:
1879:
1875:
1873:
1871:
1865:
1862:
1858:
1857:Holyoak, K.J.
1855:Glass, A.L.,
1854:
1851:
1847:
1844:
1840:
1837:
1833:
1830:
1826:
1824:
1822:
1817:
1814:
1810:
1807:
1803:
1799:
1798:0-262-08259-4
1795:
1791:
1790:
1785:
1781:
1777:
1774:
1770:
1766:
1760:
1756:
1751:
1750:
1743:
1740:
1736:
1734:
1733:, 7: 403-415.
1732:
1726:
1723:
1719:
1717:
1715:
1709:
1706:
1702:
1699:
1695:
1692:
1688:
1687:
1674:
1670:
1666:
1662:
1659:(1): 133–55.
1658:
1654:
1647:
1645:
1636:
1634:
1632:
1630:
1621:
1617:
1613:
1609:
1605:
1601:
1594:
1587:
1579:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1563:
1559:
1555:
1548:
1540:
1536:
1531:
1526:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1506:
1499:
1497:
1488:
1484:
1480:
1476:
1471:
1466:
1463:(8): 881–92.
1462:
1458:
1451:
1443:
1439:
1435:
1431:
1427:
1423:
1416:
1414:
1407:
1402:
1395:
1394:
1387:
1378:
1377:
1372:
1371:
1366:
1365:
1360:
1359:
1354:
1353:
1346:
1339:
1333:
1323:
1314:
1307:
1306:
1299:
1289:
1282:
1276:
1267:
1258:
1249:
1242:
1236:
1227:
1220:
1214:
1207:
1206:
1201:
1200:
1194:
1190:
1184:
1177:
1176:
1171:
1170:
1165:
1164:
1159:
1158:
1153:
1152:
1146:
1145:
1140:
1139:
1134:
1130:
1124:
1110:
1106:
1100:
1090:
1083:
1082:
1077:
1076:
1071:
1070:
1065:
1061:
1057:
1051:
1044:
1043:
1038:
1037:
1030:
1023:
1019:
1013:
1006:
1005:
1000:
999:
998:machine style
992:
985:
979:
970:
960:
950:
941:
940:
938:
934:
930:
926:
922:
918:
914:
910:
906:
902:
898:
894:
888:
879:
872:
865:
855:
847:
841:
832:
831:A.I.-oriented
826:
825:
820:
819:
813:
812:
805:
798:
797:
792:
791:
784:
775:
765:
755:
751:
741:
738:
736:
733:
731:
728:
726:
723:
721:
718:
716:
713:
711:
708:
706:
703:
701:
698:
696:
693:
691:
688:
686:
683:
681:
678:
676:
673:
671:
668:
666:
663:
661:
658:
656:
653:
651:
648:
646:
643:
642:
637:
626:
623:
612:
605:
602:
597:
595:
589:
586:
582:
578:
568:
564:
561:
557:
553:
542:
538:
535:
534:Stephen Stich
531:
526:
524:
520:
515:
499:
496:
493:
487:
486:
482:
479:
477:Symbol Level.
476:
470:
469:
465:
462:
459:
453:
452:
446:
442:Allen Newell
441:
436:
431:
430:
427:
425:
421:
417:
413:
405:
401:
398:
394:
391:
387:
386:
385:
383:
370:
366:
363:
359:
356:
352:
351:
350:
344:
340:
337:
336:
335:
333:
332:Eleanor Rosch
328:
326:
325:operationally
322:
318:
317:consciousness
314:
310:
306:
301:
297:
290:
286:
282:
278:
275:
271:
267:
262:
258:
254:
251:
247:
246:design stance
243:
240:
236:
232:
231:
230:
226:
224:
210:
206:
202:
199:
195:
192:
189:
185:
184:
183:
181:
177:
171:
169:
165:
157:
153:
149:
146:
142:
139:
135:
132:
129:
128:
127:
125:
117:
116:
115:
113:
109:
105:
103:
99:
98:
93:
89:
85:
71:
64:
59:
57:
53:
49:
48:consciousness
45:
41:
37:
33:
29:
26:
22:
2153:
2134:
2126:
2120:Sweet Dreams
2118:
2110:
2102:
2094:
2086:
2080:The Mind's I
2078:
2070:
2030:
1963:
1956:
1949:
1948:Searle, J.,
1942:
1934:
1922:
1915:
1908:
1900:
1891:
1884:
1877:
1869:
1860:
1849:
1842:
1835:
1828:
1820:
1812:
1805:
1801:
1788:
1772:
1748:
1738:
1730:
1721:
1713:
1704:
1697:
1690:
1656:
1652:
1643:
1603:
1599:
1586:
1561:
1557:
1547:
1512:
1508:
1460:
1456:
1450:
1428:(1): 59–85.
1425:
1421:
1401:
1392:
1391:
1386:
1375:
1374:
1369:
1368:
1363:
1362:
1357:
1356:
1351:
1350:
1345:
1337:
1332:
1322:
1313:
1304:
1303:
1298:
1288:
1281:Symbol Level
1280:
1275:
1266:
1257:
1248:
1240:
1235:
1226:
1219:hard science
1213:
1204:
1203:
1198:
1197:
1192:
1188:
1183:
1174:
1173:
1168:
1167:
1162:
1161:
1156:
1155:
1150:
1149:
1143:
1142:
1137:
1136:
1132:
1128:
1123:
1112:. Retrieved
1099:
1089:
1080:
1079:
1074:
1073:
1068:
1067:
1063:
1059:
1055:
1050:
1041:
1040:
1035:
1034:
1029:
1021:
1017:
1012:
1003:
1002:
997:
996:
991:
983:
978:
969:
959:
949:
936:
932:
928:
924:
920:
916:
912:
908:
904:
900:
896:
892:
887:
878:
870:
864:
854:
845:
840:
823:
822:
817:
816:
810:
809:
804:
795:
794:
790:in-existence
789:
788:
783:
774:
764:
754:
598:
590:
576:
574:
565:
548:
539:
527:
510:
423:
412:Allen Newell
409:
403:
396:
389:
379:
368:
361:
354:
348:
342:
329:
302:
298:
294:
288:
284:
280:
273:
269:
265:
261:explanations
260:
256:
249:
245:
238:
234:
227:
223:in principle
222:
219:
208:
204:
197:
196:The agent's
187:
186:The agent's
179:
175:
172:
164:Fritz Heider
161:
158:so ascribed.
155:
151:
144:
137:
121:
111:
106:
101:
95:
91:
81:
69:
61:
20:
18:
2187:Abstraction
2161:New Atheism
2072:Brainstorms
1338:Brainstorms
1036:human style
796:inexistence
700:Life stance
645:Four causes
447:David Marr
281:presupposes
112:intentional
108:John Searle
32:abstraction
25:philosopher
2181:Categories
2088:Elbow Room
1890:Marr, D.,
1883:Lycan, W.
1841:Fodor, J.
1683:References
1114:2008-07-03
769:phenomena.
420:David Marr
2207:Intention
1861:Cognition
1755:MIT Press
1620:256060353
1578:170721672
1465:CiteSeerX
1442:170721672
1370:knowledge
747:Footnotes
685:Intention
655:Teleology
434:"Stances"
97:aboutness
56:evolution
44:free will
2041:Memetics
2009:Concepts
1539:16648880
1487:19508497
824:Absicht'
608:See also
402:(c) the
395:(b) the
388:(a) the
289:rational
66:—
1673:1363867
1530:1450338
1358:actions
1305:neither
1144:concept
1129:content
1075:desires
1069:beliefs
1056:believe
583:of the
390:content
327:valid.
309:realism
270:desires
266:beliefs
209:desires
205:beliefs
198:desires
188:beliefs
156:desires
152:beliefs
145:desired
138:beliefs
72:, p. 17
2139:(2017)
2131:(2006)
2123:(2005)
2115:(2003)
2107:(1995)
2099:(1991)
2091:(1984)
2083:(1981)
2075:(1981)
1836:Holism
1796:
1761:
1671:
1618:
1576:
1537:
1527:
1485:
1467:
1440:
1364:bodies
1361:, and
1175:lawyer
1081:action
552:Autism
523:qualia
418:, and
404:medium
54:, and
2147:Other
1782:, in
1669:S2CID
1649:(PDF)
1616:S2CID
1596:(PDF)
1574:S2CID
1438:S2CID
1352:goals
1199:media
1193:media
1094:360).
1060:think
833:view:
793:and '
650:Telos
100:" of
1794:ISBN
1759:ISBN
1644:care
1535:PMID
1483:PMID
1393:what
1293:25).
1205:code
1191:and
1189:code
1172:and
1163:gato
1160:and
1151:gato
1133:code
1131:and
1064:know
939:").
859:52).
397:code
367:(3)
360:(2)
353:(1)
268:and
176:have
166:and
154:and
19:The
1661:doi
1608:doi
1566:doi
1562:127
1525:PMC
1517:doi
1475:doi
1430:doi
1426:127
1169:cat
1157:cat
1138:cat
424:and
180:act
2183::
1808:).
1786:,
1757:,
1667:.
1655:.
1651:.
1628:^
1614:.
1602:.
1598:.
1572:.
1560:.
1556:.
1533:.
1523:.
1513:20
1511:.
1507:.
1495:^
1481:.
1473:.
1461:50
1459:.
1436:.
1424:.
1412:^
1355:,
1221:".
1107:.
1084:".
1045:".
1007:".
525:.
414:,
58:.
50:,
46:,
1994:e
1987:t
1980:v
1675:.
1663::
1657:9
1622:.
1610::
1604:3
1580:.
1568::
1541:.
1519::
1489:.
1477::
1444:.
1432::
1283:.
1243:.
1117:.
929:D
925:G
921:A
917:X
913:B
909:D
905:D
901:B
897:A
893:X
345:.
140:;
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.