759:: "Strictly we should distinguish two sorts of anti-realism. According to the first sort, talk of unobservable entities is not to be understood literally at all. So when a scientist pus forward a theory about electrons, for example, we should not take him to be asserting the existence of entities called 'electrons'. Rather, his talk of electrons is metaphorical. This form of anti-realism was popular in the first half of the 20th century, but few people advocate it today. It was motivated largely by a doctrine in the philosophy of language, according to which it is not possible to make meaningful assertions about things that cannot in principle be observed, a doctrine that few contemporary philosophers accept. The second sort of anti-realism accepts that talk of unobservable entities should be taken at face value: if a theory says that electrons are negatively charged, it is true if electrons do exist and are negatively charged, but false otherwise. But we will never know which, says the anti-realist. So the correct attitude towards the claims that scientists make about unobservable reality is one of total agnosticism. They are either true or false, but we are incapable of finding out which. Most modern anti-realism is of this second sort".
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which constitute' that reality (p 7). Thus, physical theory cannot explain—in the stated sense—the laws established by experiment unless it depends on metaphysics and thus remains subject to the interminable disputes of metaphysicians. Worse still, the teachings of no metaphysical school are sufficiently detailed and precise to account for all of the elements of physical theory (p 18). Duhem instead assigns to physical theories a more modest but autonomous and readily attainable aim: 'A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, derived from a small number of principles, whose purpose is to represent a set of experimental laws as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible (Duhem 1914, p. 24)".
795:(1906), which may well be, to this day, the best overall book on the subject. Its main theses, although quite novel when first put forward, have in the meantime become commonplace, so I shall review them summarily without detailed argument, just to associate them with his name. But first I ought to say that neither in the first nor in the second (1914) edition of his book did Duhem take into account—or even so much as mention—the deep changes that were then taking place in physics. Still, the subsequent success and current entrenchment of Duhem's ideas are due above all to their remarkable agreement with—and the light they throw on—the practice of mathematical physics in the twentieth century. In the first part of
881:(§6.1.4), according to which the so-called particles cannot be assigned a definite trajectory in ordinary space. But quantum field theories go a long step further and—or so it would seem—conceive 'particles' as excitation modes of the field. This, I presume, motivated Howard Stein's saying that 'the quantum theory of fields is the contemporary locus of metaphysical research' (1970, p. 285). Finally, the very fact that physicists conspicuously and fruitfully resort to unperspicacious theories can teach us something about the aim and reach of science. Here is how physicists work, dirty-handed, in their everyday practice, a far cry from what is taught at the Sunday school of the 'scientific worldview' ".
979:, quote: "Instrumentalism can be formulated as the thesis that scientific theories—the theories of the so-called 'pure' sciences—are nothing but computational rules (or inference rules); of the same character, fundamentally, as the computation rules of the so-called 'applied' sciences. (One might even formulate it as the thesis that "pure" science is a misnomer, and that all science is 'applied'.) Now my reply to instrumentalism consists in showing that there are profound differences between "pure" theories and technological computation rules, and that instrumentalism can give a perfect description of these rules but is quite unable to account for the difference between them and the theories".
266:, how mind's own categorization of noumena renders space Euclidean, time constant, and objects' motions exhibiting the very determinism predicted by Newtonian physics. Kant apparently presumed that the human mind, rather than a phenomenon itself that had evolved, had been predetermined and set forth upon the formation of humankind. In any event, the mind also was the veil of appearance that scientific methods could never lift. And yet the mind could ponder itself and discover such truths, although not on a theoretical level, but only by means of ethics. Kant's metaphysics, then,
183:, argued that an object's putative primary qualities as recognized by scientists, such as shape, extension, and impenetrability, are inconceivable without the putative secondary qualities of color, hardness, warmth, and so on. He also posed the question how or why an object could be properly conceived to exist independently of any perception of it. Berkeley did not object to everyday talk about the reality of objects, but instead took issue with philosophers' talk, who spoke as if they knew something beyond sensory impressions that ordinary folk did not.
365:. So by translating theoretical terms into observational terms and then decoding the theory's mathematical/logical structure, one could check whether the statement indeed matched patterns of experience, and thereby verify the scientific theory false or true. Such verification would be possible, as never before in science, since translation of theoretical terms into observational terms would make the scientific theory purely empirical, none metaphysical. Yet the logical positivists ran into insuperable difficulties.
1969:
105:
197:, although Comtean positivism added other principles concerning the scope, method, and uses of science that Berkeley would have disavowed. Berkeley also noted the usefulness of a scientific theory having terms that merely serve to aid calculations without their having to refer to anything in particular, so long as they proved useful in practice. Berkeley thus predated the insight that
1957:
873:, including quote: "First, quantum field theories have been the working theories at the frontline of physics for over 30 years. Second, these theories appear to do away with the familiar conception of physical systems as aggregates of substantive individual particles. This conception was already undermined by
449:, wherein a scientific theory was held to be a logical structure whose terms all ultimately refer to some form of observation, while an objective process neutrally arbitrates theory choice, compelling scientists to decide which scientific theory was superior. Physicists knew better, but, busy developing the
223:
on par with Newton's theory of motion, Hume supposed that he had championed inductivism over scientific realism. Upon reading Hume's work, Immanuel Kant was "awakened from dogmatic slumber", and thus sought to neutralise any threat to science posed by Humean empiricism. Kant would develop the first
408:. By the 1950s, the verificationists had established philosophy of science as subdiscipline within academia's philosophy departments. By 1962, verificationists had asked and endeavored to answer seemingly all the great questions about scientific theory. Their discoveries showed that the idealized
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as the more fundamental, and no longer even hoped to discover what entities and processes might be truly fundamental to nature, perhaps not even the field. Kuhn had not claimed to have developed a novel thesis, but instead hoped to synthesize more usefully recent developments in the philosophy and
412:
was naively mistaken. By then the leader of the legendary venture, Hempel raised the white flag that signaled verificationism's demise. Suddenly striking
Western society, then, was Kuhn's landmark thesis, introduced by none other than Carnap, verificationism's greatest firebrand. Instrumentalism
308:
as to new basis of scientific theory, all scientific terms to refer to either actual or potential sensations, thus eliminating hypotheses while permitting such seemingly disparate scientific theories as physical and psychological to share terms and forms. Phenomenalism was insuperably difficult to
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that religious myth and philosophical speculation have hitherto been unable to supply. Their explanation makes no sense unless (i) there is, 'beneath the sense appearances revealed to us by our perceptions, a reality different from these appearances' and (ii) we know 'the nature of the elements
679:, Summer 2013 edn: "Traditionally, instrumentalists maintain that terms for unobservables, by themselves, have no meaning; construed literally, statements involving them are not even candidates for truth or falsity. The most influential advocates of instrumentalism were the
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a set of experimental laws, without pretending to explain these laws' (Duhem 1914, p. 3). Duhem resolutely sides with the latter. His rejection of the former rests on his understanding of 'explanation' ('explication' in French), which he expresses as follows: 'To explain,
695:
group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere. In order to rationalize the ubiquitous use of terms which might otherwise be taken to refer to unobservables in scientific discourse, they adopted a non-literal
384:, whereby scientific theory refers to objects observable in space and at least in principle already recognizable by physicists. Finding strict empiricism untenable, verificationism underwent "liberalization of empiricism".
957:
Torretti 1999 p. 98: "I shall dwell at some length on Kant's conception of the sources and scope of Newton's conceptual frame, for it was the first full-blown philosophy of physics and remains to this day the most
377:—the traditional view traced to Descartes as founder of modern Western philosophy—whereupon only nonfoundationalism was found tenable. Science, then, could not find a secure foundation of indubitable truth.
186:
For
Berkeley, a scientific theory does not state causes or explanations, but simply identifies perceived types of objects and traces their typical regularities. Berkeley thus anticipated the basis of what
457:, that their talk, largely metaphorical, perhaps even metaphysical, was unintelligible to the public, while the steep mathematics warded off philosophers of physics. By the 1980s, physicists regarded not
201:—who originated in the late 1920s, but who, by the 1950s, had softened into logical empiricists—would be compelled to accept: theoretical terms in science do not always translate into
47:
in a particular domain of nature by formulating laws, which state or summarize regularities, while theories themselves do not reveal supposedly hidden aspects of nature that somehow
388:
even suggested that empiricism's basis was pragmatic. Recognizing that verification—proving a theory false or true—was unattainable, they discarded that demand and focused on
270:, secured science from doubt—in that it was a case of "synthetic a priori" knowledge ("universal, necessary and informative")—and yet discarded hope of scientific realism.
361:. They believed that scientific terms lacked meanings unto themselves, but acquired meanings from the logical structure that was the entire theory that in turn matched
445:, which usually involved a belief that science was progressively unveiling a truer view, and building a better understanding, of nature. The professional approach was
43:
reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's unobservable objects, properties or processes. Scientific theory is merely a tool whereby humans predict
791:, Duhem was a practicing scientist who devoted an important part of his adult life to the history and philosophy of physics. ... His philosophy is contained in
350:. Believing a theory's posited unobservables to always correspond to observations, the verificationists viewed a scientific theory's theoretical terms, such as
219:, which had been the prevailing, or at least the professed view concerning the attainment of scientific knowledge. Regarding himself as having placed his own
502:, followed Popper's critique of instrumentalism and argued that a scientific theory stripped of its explanatory content would be of strictly limited utility.
894:
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which enfold it like veils, in order to see the reality face to face' (pp 3–4). Authors in the first group expect from physics the true vision of
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questions 'external' to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories are also meaningless (the choice of a framework is made solely on
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on which we can base scientific investigations of mind and brain, but that acting as if other beings have beliefs is a successful strategy.
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319:. Logical positivists aimed not to instruct or restrict scientists, but to enlighten and structure philosophical discourse to render
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implement, yet heavily influenced a new generation of philosophers of science, who emerged in the 1920s while terming themselves
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theory of motion, whereby any object instantly interacts with all other objects across the universe, motivated the founder of
1586:
396:—its probable truth—but, despite his great mathematical and logical skill, discovered equations never operable to yield over
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instead. Popper alleged that instrumentalism reduces basic science to what is merely applied science. The
British physicist
2005:
35:
are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting natural
1408:
1123:
1084:
Gouinlock, James, "What is the Legacy of
Instrumentalism? Rorty's Interpretation of Dewey." In Herman J. Saatkamp, ed.,
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focuses on belief in the domain of the observable, so for this reason it is described as a form of instrumentalism.
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799:, Duhem contrasts two opinions concerning the aim of physical theory. For some authors, it ought to furnish 'the
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And since science aims to reveal not private but public truths, verificationists switched from phenomenalism to
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that would verify philosophical statements as well as scientific theories, and align all human knowledge into a
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according to which these terms acquire meaning by being associated with terms for observables (for example, '
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559:, the position that practical consequences are an essential basis for determining meaning, truth or value.
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of a set of experimentally established laws', while for others it is 'an abstract system whose aim is to
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254:, which are humans' recognized experiences. And so mind itself contains the structure that determines
62:'s ambitions to uncover metaphysical truth about nature, instrumentalism is usually categorized as an
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712:'). Insuperable difficulties with this semantics led ultimately (in large measure) to the demise of
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300:, whereby all that exists is one's own mind. Mach's positivism also strongly asserted the ultimate
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1998:
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895:"Physicists debate whether the world is made of particles or fields—or something else entirely
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441:, there were roughly two prevailing views about the nature of science. The popular view was
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Since the mind has virtually no power to know anything beyond direct sensory experience,
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reasoned that the mind is the precondition of experience and so, as the bridge from the
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The fabric of reality : the science of parallel universes-- and its implications
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of a region of a field, or is something else altogether. Instrumentalism holds that
68:, although its mere lack of commitment to scientific theory's realism can be termed
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Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the
Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
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1105:(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Berkeley, pp. 98, 101–4.
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72:. Instrumentalism merely bypasses debate concerning whether, for example, a
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669:, §4 "Antirealism: Foils for scientific realism: §4.1: "Empiricism", in
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these laws. Instrumentalism is a perspective originally introduced by
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need only be useful to predict the phenomena, the observed outcomes.
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often does not even discern unobservable from observable entities.
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540:
296:) verged on idealism. It was alleged to even be a surreptitious
243:
2345:
1366:
1057:
Chakravartty, Anjan (August 13, 2017). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
969:
Conjectures and
Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
708:'), or with demonstrable laboratory procedures (a view called '
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via its focus on sensations rather than realism, and developed
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1983:
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is a discrete entity enjoying individual existence, or is an
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1245:
354:, as metaphorical or elliptical at observations, such as
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392:. Carnap sought simply to quantify a universal law's
988:
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Constructive empiricism as a form of instrumentalism
1088:. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995.
926:
861:
859:
857:
330:The verificationists expected a strict gap between
2923:
1071:– via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
854:
771:
769:
767:
753:Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction
728:: a number of logical empiricists also held the
91:There are multiple versions of instrumentalism.
1063:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
993:(First American ed.). New York, New York.
869:(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
779:(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
238:To save Newton's law of universal gravitation,
2510:Fourth Great Debate in international relations
39:. According to instrumentalists, a successful
2462:
1999:
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793:La théorie physique: son objet, sa structure
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1025:) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
847:(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006),
755:(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),
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1992:
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1021:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
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2413:Relationship between religion and science
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1750:Relationship between religion and science
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145:Learn how and when to remove this message
2734:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
1060:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
884:
832:
676:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
438:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
116:not related to the topic of the article
2924:
2089:Machian positivism (empirio-criticism)
720:. The contrast here is not merely in
635:Chakravartty, Anjan (April 27, 2011).
555:Instrumentalism is closely related to
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1987:
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562:
469:
273:
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16:Position in the philosophy of science
683:(or logical positivists), including
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535:, instrumentalism is the view that
208:The last great British empiricist,
13:
2366:Nomothetic–idiographic distinction
1047:, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
591:Instrumental and value rationality
420:
212:, posed a number of challenges to
14:
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2694:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
2678:Materialism and Empirio-criticism
2534:The Course in Positive Philosophy
1770:Sociology of scientific knowledge
1765:Sociology of scientific ignorance
1718:History and philosophy of science
1967:
1955:
740:grounds), thereby rejecting the
704:' might mean 'white streak in a
596:Instrumental and intrinsic value
453:, were so steeped in developing
313:while pursuing a program termed
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2686:History and Class Consciousness
1050:
1037:
982:
961:
951:
691:, famously associated with the
646:– via plato.stanford.edu.
302:unity of the empirical sciences
2550:Critical History of Philosophy
2013:
1159:Analytic–synthetic distinction
989:Deutsch, David, 1953- (1997).
942:
917:
908:
623:
496:, in his much later 1997 book
304:. Mach's positivism asserted
31:is a methodological view that
1:
2758:Knowledge and Human Interests
2094:Rankean historical positivism
224:stark philosophy of physics.
125:or discuss this issue on the
2876:
2542:A General View of Positivism
1043:van Fraassen, Bas C., 1980,
971:(London: Routledge, 2003 ),
246:, which are how the world's
7:
2742:Conjectures and Refutations
2574:The Logic of Modern Physics
2391:Deductive-nomological model
1492:Hypothetico-deductive model
1467:Deductive-nomological model
1452:Constructivist epistemology
584:
484:, rejected all variants of
10:
2978:
2702:The Poverty of Historicism
2598:The Universe in a Nutshell
2582:Language, Truth, and Logic
2566:The Analysis of Sensations
1095:
509:
473:
424:
277:
248:things exist in themselves
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2782:The Rhetoric of Economics
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2463:Positivist-related debate
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1946:
1778:
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1553:Semantic view of theories
1472:Epistemological anarchism
1424:
1409:dependent and independent
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1103:The Philosophy of Physics
867:The Philosophy of Physics
777:The Philosophy of Physics
527:In the philosophy of mind
338:, mirrored by a theory's
2718:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
2435:Structural functionalism
2361:Naturalism in literature
1295:Intertheoretic reduction
1284:Ignoramus et ignorabimus
1261:Functional contextualism
923:Torretti 1999 p. 101–02.
616:
480:One scientific realist,
400:degree of confirmation.
2937:Epistemology of science
2845:Willard Van Orman Quine
2558:Idealism and Positivism
2150:Critique of metaphysics
2084:Sociological positivism
1780:Philosophers of science
1558:Scientific essentialism
1507:Model-dependent realism
1442:Constructive empiricism
1335:Evidence-based practice
521:constructive empiricism
512:Constructive empiricism
406:paradox of confirmation
268:transcendental idealism
234:Transcendental idealism
228:Transcendental idealism
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2859:Concepts in contention
2500:
2490:
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2371:Objectivity in science
2269:Non-Euclidean geometry
2235:Methodological dualism
2196:
1863:Alfred North Whitehead
1853:Charles Sanders Peirce
879:Fermi–Dirac statistics
748:(as in Carnap 1950)".
659:Cite journal requires
606:Fact–value distinction
551:Relation to pragmatism
394:degree of confirmation
363:patterns of experience
2947:Metatheory of science
2766:The Poverty of Theory
2386:Philosophy of science
2275:Uncertainty principle
1962:Philosophy portal
1713:Hard and soft science
1708:Faith and rationality
1577:Scientific skepticism
1357:Scientific Revolution
1140:Philosophy of science
948:Torretti 1999 p. 103.
939:Torretti 1999 p. 102.
519:'s (1980) project of
499:The Fabric of Reality
431:From the 1930s until
321:scientific philosophy
114:may contain material
21:philosophy of science
2774:The Scientific Image
2445:Structuration theory
2408:Qualitative research
2309:Criticism of science
2304:Critical rationalism
2240:Problem of induction
1688:Criticism of science
1563:Scientific formalism
1447:Constructive realism
1352:Scientific pluralism
1325:Problem of induction
1086:Rorty and Pragmatism
1045:The Scientific Image
914:Torretti 1999 p. 75.
826:things-in-themselves
637:"Scientific Realism"
490:critical rationalism
466:history of science.
455:quantum field theory
410:scientific worldview
325:scientific worldview
288:'s early version of
191:in the 1830s called
123:improve this section
2750:One-Dimensional Man
2198:Geisteswissenschaft
2181:Confirmation holism
1755:Rhetoric of science
1693:Descriptive science
1437:Confirmation holism
1330:Scientific evidence
1290:Inductive reasoning
1219:Demarcation problem
1101:Torretti, Roberto,
899:Scientific American
797:La théorie physique
681:logical empiricists
611:Inductive reasoning
390:confirmation theory
311:logical positivists
221:theory of knowledge
203:observational terms
199:logical positivists
2825:Hans-Georg Gadamer
2626:Alexander Bogdanov
2502:Positivismusstreit
2297:Post-behavioralism
2261:history of science
2113:Principal concepts
2069:Logical positivism
1974:Science portal
1903:Carl Gustav Hempel
1858:Wilhelm Windelband
1745:Questionable cause
1568:Scientific realism
1389:Underdetermination
1224:Empirical evidence
1214:Creative synthesis
893:Meinard Kuhlmann,
865:Roberto Torretti,
809:logically classify
775:Roberto Torretti,
716:and the growth of
714:logical empiricism
631:Anjan Chakravartty
563:Notable proponents
533:philosophy of mind
476:Scientific realism
470:Scientific realism
447:logical empiricism
443:scientific realism
290:logical positivism
280:Logical empiricism
274:Logical empiricism
173:British empiricism
164:British empiricism
158:British empiricism
60:scientific realism
2919:
2918:
2906:
2905:
2902:
2901:
2800:Theodor W. Adorno
2616:Richard Avenarius
2492:Werturteilsstreit
2453:
2452:
2401:Sense-data theory
2099:Polish positivism
2074:Positivist school
1981:
1980:
1823:
1822:
1735:Normative science
1592:Uniformitarianism
1347:Scientific method
1241:Explanatory power
843:P Kyle Stanford,
543:are not actually
341:theoretical terms
294:empirio-criticism
155:
154:
147:
86:theoretical terms
41:scientific theory
2969:
2895:
2881:
2805:Gaston Bachelard
2726:Truth and Method
2710:World Hypotheses
2590:The Two Cultures
2505:
2495:
2485:
2470:
2469:
2459:
2458:
2201:
2155:Unity of science
2064:Legal positivism
2023:
2022:
2008:
2001:
1994:
1985:
1984:
1972:
1971:
1960:
1959:
1958:
1933:Bas van Fraassen
1888:Hans Reichenbach
1868:Bertrand Russell
1785:
1784:
1611:Philosophy of...
1394:Unity of science
1187:Commensurability
1133:
1126:
1119:
1110:
1109:
1089:
1082:
1073:
1072:
1070:
1068:
1054:
1048:
1041:
1035:
1034:
1020:
1012:
986:
980:
965:
959:
955:
949:
946:
940:
937:
924:
921:
915:
912:
906:
891:
882:
863:
852:
841:
830:
773:
762:
668:
662:
657:
655:
647:
645:
643:
627:
517:Bas van Fraassen
356:white streak in
347:observable terms
150:
143:
139:
136:
130:
107:
106:
99:
78:particle physics
76:spoken about in
2977:
2976:
2972:
2971:
2970:
2968:
2967:
2966:
2922:
2921:
2920:
2915:
2898:
2854:
2820:Paul Feyerabend
2815:Wilhelm Dilthey
2788:
2665:
2604:
2521:
2464:
2449:
2396:Ramsey sentence
2351:Instrumentalism
2280:
2258:
2256:paradigm shifts
2249:
2186:Critical theory
2164:
2160:Verificationism
2108:
2104:Russian Machism
2052:
2017:
2012:
1982:
1977:
1966:
1956:
1954:
1942:
1923:Paul Feyerabend
1883:Michael Polanyi
1819:
1805:Galileo Galilei
1774:
1760:Science studies
1676:
1606:
1597:Verificationism
1502:Instrumentalism
1487:Foundationalism
1462:Conventionalism
1420:
1256:Feminist method
1142:
1137:
1098:
1093:
1092:
1083:
1076:
1066:
1064:
1055:
1051:
1042:
1038:
1014:
1013:
1001:
987:
983:
967:Karl R Popper,
966:
962:
956:
952:
947:
943:
938:
927:
922:
918:
913:
909:
892:
885:
864:
855:
842:
833:
816:, is to divest
774:
765:
671:Edward N. Zalta
660:
658:
649:
648:
641:
639:
628:
624:
619:
587:
565:
553:
539:attitudes like
529:
514:
508:
478:
472:
429:
427:Historical turn
423:
421:Historical turn
375:foundationalism
316:verificationism
282:
276:
236:
230:
214:Francis Bacon's
181:George Berkeley
166:
160:
151:
140:
134:
131:
120:
108:
104:
97:
82:excitation mode
29:instrumentalism
17:
12:
11:
5:
2975:
2965:
2964:
2959:
2954:
2949:
2944:
2939:
2934:
2917:
2916:
2911:
2908:
2907:
2904:
2903:
2900:
2899:
2897:
2896:
2887:
2882:
2873:
2868:
2862:
2860:
2856:
2855:
2853:
2852:
2847:
2842:
2837:
2832:
2827:
2822:
2817:
2812:
2807:
2802:
2796:
2794:
2790:
2789:
2787:
2786:
2778:
2770:
2762:
2754:
2746:
2738:
2730:
2722:
2714:
2706:
2698:
2690:
2682:
2673:
2671:
2667:
2666:
2664:
2663:
2658:
2653:
2648:
2643:
2641:Émile Durkheim
2638:
2633:
2628:
2623:
2618:
2612:
2610:
2606:
2605:
2603:
2602:
2594:
2586:
2578:
2570:
2562:
2554:
2546:
2538:
2529:
2527:
2523:
2522:
2520:
2519:
2513:
2507:
2497:
2487:
2482:Methodenstreit
2476:
2474:
2466:
2465:
2455:
2454:
2451:
2450:
2448:
2447:
2442:
2437:
2432:
2431:
2430:
2423:Social science
2420:
2415:
2410:
2405:
2404:
2403:
2398:
2393:
2383:
2378:
2376:Operationalism
2373:
2368:
2363:
2358:
2353:
2348:
2343:
2342:
2341:
2336:
2331:
2326:
2321:
2311:
2306:
2301:
2300:
2299:
2288:
2286:
2285:Related topics
2282:
2281:
2279:
2278:
2272:
2265:
2263:
2251:
2250:
2248:
2247:
2242:
2237:
2232:
2227:
2222:
2217:
2212:
2207:
2202:
2193:
2191:Falsifiability
2188:
2183:
2178:
2176:Antipositivism
2172:
2170:
2166:
2165:
2163:
2162:
2157:
2152:
2147:
2142:
2137:
2132:
2127:
2122:
2116:
2114:
2110:
2109:
2107:
2106:
2101:
2096:
2091:
2086:
2081:
2079:Postpositivism
2076:
2071:
2066:
2060:
2058:
2054:
2053:
2051:
2050:
2045:
2040:
2035:
2029:
2027:
2019:
2018:
2011:
2010:
2003:
1996:
1988:
1979:
1978:
1976:
1964:
1952:
1947:
1944:
1943:
1941:
1940:
1935:
1930:
1925:
1920:
1915:
1910:
1908:W. V. O. Quine
1905:
1900:
1895:
1890:
1885:
1880:
1875:
1870:
1865:
1860:
1855:
1850:
1845:
1843:Rudolf Steiner
1840:
1835:
1833:Henri Poincaré
1830:
1824:
1821:
1820:
1818:
1817:
1812:
1807:
1802:
1797:
1791:
1789:
1782:
1776:
1775:
1773:
1772:
1767:
1762:
1757:
1752:
1747:
1742:
1737:
1732:
1731:
1730:
1720:
1715:
1710:
1705:
1703:Exact sciences
1700:
1695:
1690:
1684:
1682:
1681:Related topics
1678:
1677:
1675:
1674:
1673:
1672:
1667:
1662:
1657:
1652:
1647:
1640:Social science
1637:
1636:
1635:
1633:Space and time
1625:
1620:
1614:
1612:
1608:
1607:
1605:
1604:
1599:
1594:
1589:
1584:
1579:
1574:
1565:
1560:
1555:
1546:
1537:
1532:
1519:
1514:
1509:
1504:
1499:
1494:
1489:
1484:
1479:
1474:
1469:
1464:
1459:
1454:
1449:
1444:
1439:
1434:
1428:
1426:
1422:
1421:
1419:
1418:
1413:
1412:
1411:
1406:
1396:
1391:
1386:
1385:
1384:
1379:
1374:
1364:
1359:
1354:
1349:
1344:
1342:Scientific law
1339:
1338:
1337:
1327:
1322:
1317:
1312:
1307:
1302:
1297:
1292:
1287:
1280:
1279:
1278:
1273:
1263:
1258:
1253:
1251:Falsifiability
1248:
1243:
1238:
1237:
1236:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1211:
1210:
1209:
1199:
1194:
1189:
1184:
1183:
1182:
1180:Mill's Methods
1172:
1161:
1156:
1150:
1148:
1144:
1143:
1136:
1135:
1128:
1121:
1113:
1107:
1106:
1097:
1094:
1091:
1090:
1074:
1049:
1036:
999:
981:
960:
950:
941:
925:
916:
907:
883:
853:
831:
763:
761:
760:
751:Samir Okasha,
710:operationalism
661:|journal=
621:
620:
618:
615:
614:
613:
608:
603:
598:
593:
586:
583:
582:
581:
576:
564:
561:
552:
549:
528:
525:
510:Main article:
507:
504:
474:Main article:
471:
468:
451:Standard Model
425:Main article:
422:
419:
367:Moritz Schlick
278:Main article:
275:
272:
232:Main article:
229:
226:
162:Main article:
159:
156:
153:
152:
111:
109:
102:
96:
93:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2974:
2963:
2960:
2958:
2955:
2953:
2950:
2948:
2945:
2943:
2940:
2938:
2935:
2933:
2930:
2929:
2927:
2914:
2909:
2894:
2893:
2888:
2886:
2883:
2880:
2879:
2874:
2872:
2869:
2867:
2864:
2863:
2861:
2857:
2851:
2848:
2846:
2843:
2841:
2838:
2836:
2835:György Lukács
2833:
2831:
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2806:
2803:
2801:
2798:
2797:
2795:
2791:
2784:
2783:
2779:
2776:
2775:
2771:
2768:
2767:
2763:
2760:
2759:
2755:
2752:
2751:
2747:
2744:
2743:
2739:
2736:
2735:
2731:
2728:
2727:
2723:
2720:
2719:
2715:
2712:
2711:
2707:
2704:
2703:
2699:
2696:
2695:
2691:
2688:
2687:
2683:
2680:
2679:
2675:
2674:
2672:
2668:
2662:
2661:Vienna Circle
2659:
2657:
2656:Berlin Circle
2654:
2652:
2649:
2647:
2644:
2642:
2639:
2637:
2636:Eugen DĂĽhring
2634:
2632:
2631:Auguste Comte
2629:
2627:
2624:
2622:
2619:
2617:
2614:
2613:
2611:
2607:
2600:
2599:
2595:
2592:
2591:
2587:
2584:
2583:
2579:
2576:
2575:
2571:
2568:
2567:
2563:
2560:
2559:
2555:
2552:
2551:
2547:
2544:
2543:
2539:
2536:
2535:
2531:
2530:
2528:
2526:Contributions
2524:
2517:
2514:
2511:
2508:
2504:
2503:
2498:
2494:
2493:
2488:
2484:
2483:
2478:
2477:
2475:
2471:
2467:
2460:
2456:
2446:
2443:
2441:
2440:Structuralism
2438:
2436:
2433:
2429:
2426:
2425:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2416:
2414:
2411:
2409:
2406:
2402:
2399:
2397:
2394:
2392:
2389:
2388:
2387:
2384:
2382:
2381:Phenomenalism
2379:
2377:
2374:
2372:
2369:
2367:
2364:
2362:
2359:
2357:
2354:
2352:
2349:
2347:
2344:
2340:
2337:
2335:
2332:
2330:
2327:
2325:
2322:
2320:
2317:
2316:
2315:
2312:
2310:
2307:
2305:
2302:
2298:
2295:
2294:
2293:
2292:Behavioralism
2290:
2289:
2287:
2283:
2276:
2273:
2270:
2267:
2266:
2264:
2262:
2257:
2252:
2246:
2243:
2241:
2238:
2236:
2233:
2231:
2228:
2226:
2223:
2221:
2220:Human science
2218:
2216:
2213:
2211:
2208:
2206:
2203:
2200:
2199:
2194:
2192:
2189:
2187:
2184:
2182:
2179:
2177:
2174:
2173:
2171:
2167:
2161:
2158:
2156:
2153:
2151:
2148:
2146:
2145:Pseudoscience
2143:
2141:
2140:Justification
2138:
2136:
2133:
2131:
2128:
2126:
2123:
2121:
2118:
2117:
2115:
2111:
2105:
2102:
2100:
2097:
2095:
2092:
2090:
2087:
2085:
2082:
2080:
2077:
2075:
2072:
2070:
2067:
2065:
2062:
2061:
2059:
2055:
2049:
2046:
2044:
2041:
2039:
2036:
2034:
2031:
2030:
2028:
2024:
2020:
2016:
2009:
2004:
2002:
1997:
1995:
1990:
1989:
1986:
1975:
1970:
1965:
1963:
1953:
1951:
1948:
1945:
1939:
1936:
1934:
1931:
1929:
1926:
1924:
1921:
1919:
1916:
1914:
1911:
1909:
1906:
1904:
1901:
1899:
1896:
1894:
1893:Rudolf Carnap
1891:
1889:
1886:
1884:
1881:
1879:
1876:
1874:
1871:
1869:
1866:
1864:
1861:
1859:
1856:
1854:
1851:
1849:
1846:
1844:
1841:
1839:
1836:
1834:
1831:
1829:
1828:Auguste Comte
1826:
1825:
1816:
1813:
1811:
1808:
1806:
1803:
1801:
1800:Francis Bacon
1798:
1796:
1793:
1792:
1790:
1786:
1783:
1781:
1777:
1771:
1768:
1766:
1763:
1761:
1758:
1756:
1753:
1751:
1748:
1746:
1743:
1741:
1738:
1736:
1733:
1729:
1728:Pseudoscience
1726:
1725:
1724:
1721:
1719:
1716:
1714:
1711:
1709:
1706:
1704:
1701:
1699:
1696:
1694:
1691:
1689:
1686:
1685:
1683:
1679:
1671:
1668:
1666:
1663:
1661:
1658:
1656:
1653:
1651:
1648:
1646:
1643:
1642:
1641:
1638:
1634:
1631:
1630:
1629:
1626:
1624:
1621:
1619:
1616:
1615:
1613:
1609:
1603:
1600:
1598:
1595:
1593:
1590:
1588:
1587:Structuralism
1585:
1583:
1580:
1578:
1575:
1573:
1569:
1566:
1564:
1561:
1559:
1556:
1554:
1550:
1549:Received view
1547:
1545:
1541:
1538:
1536:
1533:
1531:
1527:
1523:
1520:
1518:
1515:
1513:
1510:
1508:
1505:
1503:
1500:
1498:
1495:
1493:
1490:
1488:
1485:
1483:
1480:
1478:
1475:
1473:
1470:
1468:
1465:
1463:
1460:
1458:
1457:Contextualism
1455:
1453:
1450:
1448:
1445:
1443:
1440:
1438:
1435:
1433:
1430:
1429:
1427:
1423:
1417:
1414:
1410:
1407:
1405:
1402:
1401:
1400:
1397:
1395:
1392:
1390:
1387:
1383:
1380:
1378:
1375:
1373:
1370:
1369:
1368:
1365:
1363:
1360:
1358:
1355:
1353:
1350:
1348:
1345:
1343:
1340:
1336:
1333:
1332:
1331:
1328:
1326:
1323:
1321:
1318:
1316:
1313:
1311:
1308:
1306:
1303:
1301:
1298:
1296:
1293:
1291:
1288:
1286:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1274:
1272:
1269:
1268:
1267:
1264:
1262:
1259:
1257:
1254:
1252:
1249:
1247:
1244:
1242:
1239:
1235:
1232:
1231:
1230:
1227:
1225:
1222:
1220:
1217:
1215:
1212:
1208:
1205:
1204:
1203:
1200:
1198:
1195:
1193:
1190:
1188:
1185:
1181:
1178:
1177:
1176:
1173:
1171:
1170:
1166:
1162:
1160:
1157:
1155:
1152:
1151:
1149:
1145:
1141:
1134:
1129:
1127:
1122:
1120:
1115:
1114:
1111:
1104:
1100:
1099:
1087:
1081:
1079:
1062:
1061:
1053:
1046:
1040:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1018:
1010:
1006:
1002:
1000:0-7139-9061-9
996:
992:
985:
978:
977:0-415-28594-1
974:
970:
964:
958:significant".
954:
945:
936:
934:
932:
930:
920:
911:
904:
900:
896:
890:
888:
880:
876:
875:Bose–Einstein
872:
868:
862:
860:
858:
850:
846:
840:
838:
836:
827:
823:
819:
815:
810:
806:
802:
798:
794:
790:
786:
782:
778:
772:
770:
768:
758:
754:
750:
749:
747:
744:dimension of
743:
739:
735:
731:
727:
723:
719:
715:
711:
707:
706:cloud chamber
703:
699:
694:
693:Vienna Circle
690:
686:
682:
678:
677:
672:
666:
653:
638:
632:
626:
622:
612:
609:
607:
604:
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2314:Epistemology
2245:Reflectivism
2205:Hermeneutics
2057:Declinations
2033:Antihumanism
2026:Perspectives
1938:Larry Laudan
1918:Imre Lakatos
1873:Otto Neurath
1848:Karl Pearson
1838:Pierre Duhem
1810:Isaac Newton
1740:Protoscience
1698:Epistemology
1572:Anti-realism
1570: /
1551: /
1542: /
1528: /
1526:Reductionism
1524: /
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1497:Inductionism
1477:Evolutionism
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2962:Rationalism
2871:Objectivity
2840:Karl Popper
2830:Thomas Kuhn
2810:Mario Bunge
2561:(1879–1884)
2496:(1909–1959)
2230:Metaphysics
2210:Historicism
2125:Demarcation
2120:Consilience
2043:Rationalism
1928:Ian Hacking
1913:Thomas Kuhn
1898:Karl Popper
1878:C. D. Broad
1795:Roger Bacon
1723:Non-science
1665:Linguistics
1645:Archaeology
1540:Rationalism
1530:Determinism
1517:Physicalism
1482:Fallibilism
1432:Coherentism
1362:Testability
1315:Observation
1310:Objectivity
1271:alternative
1202:Correlation
1192:Consilience
901:, 2013 Aug;
822:appearances
801:explanation
734:ontological
730:neo-Kantian
482:Karl Popper
433:Thomas Kuhn
402:Carl Hempel
382:physicalism
336:observation
217:inductivism
65:antirealism
2957:Pragmatism
2952:Positivism
2942:John Dewey
2932:Empiricism
2926:Categories
2651:Ernst Mach
2646:Ernst Laas
2621:A. J. Ayer
2609:Proponents
2428:Philosophy
2225:Humanities
2169:Antitheses
2038:Empiricism
2015:Positivism
1815:David Hume
1788:Precursors
1670:Psychology
1650:Economics‎
1544:Empiricism
1535:Pragmatism
1522:Positivism
1512:Naturalism
1382:scientific
1266:Hypothesis
1229:Experiment
1067:August 13,
871:pp. 396–97
781:pp. 242–43
732:view that
642:August 13,
573:pragmatist
571:(American
569:John Dewey
557:pragmatism
486:positivism
415:scientists
404:found the
286:Ernst Mach
210:David Hume
194:positivism
177:John Locke
70:nonrealism
58:Rejecting
2892:Verstehen
2878:Phronesis
2866:Knowledge
2850:Max Weber
2670:Criticism
2418:Sociology
2356:Modernism
2334:pluralism
2319:anarchism
2215:Historism
2135:Induction
2048:Scientism
1655:Geography
1623:Chemistry
1582:Scientism
1377:ladenness
1197:Construct
1175:Causality
1017:cite book
820:from the
814:explicare
805:summarize
738:pragmatic
722:semantics
698:semantics
459:particles
298:solipsism
264:substance
252:phenomena
250:, to the
127:talk page
55:in 1906.
37:phenomena
2913:Category
2329:nihilism
2324:idealism
2254:Related
2130:Evidence
1950:Category
1602:Vitalism
1425:Theories
1399:Variable
1320:Paradigm
1207:function
1165:A priori
1154:Analysis
1147:Concepts
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783:: "Like
702:electron
585:See also
545:concepts
435:'s 1962
352:electron
169:Newton's
135:May 2021
74:particle
2793:Critics
2518:(1990s)
2512:(1980s)
2506:(1960s)
2486:(1890s)
2339:realism
2271:(1830s)
2259:in the
1660:History
1628:Physics
1618:Biology
1416:more...
1404:control
1300:Inquiry
1096:Sources
818:reality
785:Whewell
746:realism
718:realism
541:beliefs
531:In the
344:versus
334:versus
244:noumena
95:History
49:explain
23:and in
2785:(1986)
2777:(1980)
2769:(1978)
2761:(1968)
2753:(1964)
2745:(1963)
2737:(1962)
2729:(1960)
2721:(1951)
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2697:(1934)
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2601:(2001)
2593:(1959)
2585:(1936)
2577:(1927)
2569:(1886)
2553:(1869)
2545:(1848)
2537:(1830)
2473:Method
2346:Holism
2277:(1927)
1372:choice
1367:Theory
1305:Nature
1234:design
1007:
997:
975:
849:p. 198
689:Hempel
685:Carnap
673:, ed,
463:fields
461:, but
332:theory
262:, and
2885:Truth
757:p. 62
617:Notes
373:over
256:space
33:ideas
1276:null
1246:Fact
1167:and
1069:2019
1031:link
1027:link
1023:link
1005:OCLC
995:ISBN
973:ISBN
905:(2).
877:and
807:and
789:Mach
787:and
724:and
687:and
665:help
644:2019
398:zero
260:time
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