536:
offensive conduct". But this outrage must be expressed in an ordered fashion, for
America is a society of laws. Retribution is consistent with human dignity, because society believes that "certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death". And although it is difficult to determine statistically how much crime the death penalty actually deters, the Court found that in 1976 there was "no convincing empirical evidence" supporting either the view that the death penalty is an effective deterrent to crime or the opposite view. Still, the Court could not completely discount the possibility that for certain "carefully contemplated murderers", "the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act".
974:
punishment should remain in use. He also felt that the Court should defer to a state legislature's response to the problem of juror response to the prospect of capital punishment, rather than dictate that the Eighth
Amendment requires a particular response. White also disagreed that the Constitution required a separate penalty hearing before imposing the death penalty. "Even if the character of the accused must be considered under the Eighth Amendment, surely a State is not constitutionally forbidden to provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes that the criminal's character is such that he deserves death." He also saw no difference between Louisiana's definition of first-degree murder and Texas's definition of capital murder.
136:
2748:
855:(the state's highest criminal court, to which all death sentences in Texas are automatically and directly appealed) indicated that the "continuing threat to society" special issue would allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the jury. The Court concluded that this special issue would allow for the same extensive consideration of mitigating evidence as the Georgia and Florida schemes. Thus, Texas's death penalty scheme, though considerably different from Florida's and Georgia's, also complied with the
2724:
2784:
560:, including murder, was death. This rule traveled with the colonists to America, and was the law in all states at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791. By then, however, a problem with the common-law mandatory death penalty had crept into the legal system. If the jury has only two options—convicting a defendant of murder, where the penalty is death, or acquitting the defendant outright—it has no vehicle to express the sentiment that the defendant should be punished
2736:
651:
aggravating factors or other special-verdict questions would assist it in deciding on a sentence. The drafters of the Model Penal Code "concluded that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete case." For the Court, these factors adequately guarded against the risk of arbitrary imposition of the death sentence.
2796:
2760:
1645:
22:
2772:
667:
decisional law that the court takes seriously its responsibility to ensure that the sentence imposed was not arbitrary. Currently, those states which still maintain a death penalty option have a mandatory appeal of the sentence (defendants sentenced to death cannot waive this appeal, but can waive appeals beyond this stage subject to a competency hearing).
576:
convicted first-degree murderers. This development spread, and by 1900, 23 states and the federal government had discretionary sentencing in capital cases. Fourteen more states followed in the first two decades of the 20th century, and by 1963, all death-penalty jurisdictions employed discretionary sentencing.
941:
Although
Louisiana had created a class of death-eligible crimes somewhat narrower than North Carolina had, it still had a mandatory death penalty for a significant range of crimes, which were aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping and treason; the lack of discretion in sentencing caused the Louisiana
769:
Second, the jury's role was only advisory; the judge could disregard the jury's sentencing recommendation, but had to explain the reasoning if they did. Under
Florida law, if the jury recommended life but the judge imposed a death sentence, "the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear
744:
The Court found that, because of the jury's finding at least one aggravating factor was a prerequisite for imposing the death penalty, Georgia's scheme adequately narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Although there was admittedly some discretion as to the mitigation phase,
571:
in 1794. First-degree murder, a capital crime, was limited to all "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" murders. All other murder was second-degree murder, and not a capital crime. This development eased the tension created by the common-law mandatory death penalty, but some juries still refused to
549:
and unusual, it must still be carried out in a manner consistent with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. In the Court's view, the country's history with capital punishment suggests that those evolving standards of decency could not tolerate a return to the
548:
The Court was determined to simultaneously save capital punishment in the United States and impose some reasoned basis for carrying it out. That reasoning flows from the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. Although capital punishment, per se, was not found by the Court to be cruel
480:
guidelines. Subsequently, the five named defendants were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in their respective states. The respective state supreme courts upheld the death sentence. The defendants then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review their death sentence, asking the Court to go beyond
650:
The drawback of having juries rather than judges fix the penalty in capital cases is the risk that they will have no frame of reference for imposing the death penalty in a rational manner. Although this problem may not be totally correctible, the Court trusted that the guidance given the jury by the
631:
Although in most criminal cases the judge decides and imposes the sentence, "jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in order to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect
832:
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society (under Texas law, "society" was defined as both inside and outside of the prison system; thus, a defendant who would pose a threat to persons inside prison –
986:
about the arbitrariness of the death penalty any more than North
Carolina's ignored them. He also disputed whether the appellate review of death sentences inherent in the systems the Court had approved could truly ensure that each death sentence satisfied those concerns. He finally took issue with
862:
The defendant in this case, Jerry Jurek (TDCJ #508), would ultimately see his sentence commuted to life in prison. Texas would later amend its three questions, keeping the "continuing threat to society" question, adding a second question specifically dealing with mitigating evidence, and adding a
799:
did not adopt the "aggravating factors" approach outlined by the Model Penal Code. Instead, it chose to modify and severely narrow the legal definition of "capital murder", thus requiring certain objective elements to be present before one could be charged with capital murder and thus eligible for
539:
Finally, the Court considered whether the death penalty is "disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed". Although death is severe and irrevocable, the Court could not say that death was always disproportionate to the crime of deliberately taking human life. "It is an extreme
496:
only one basic idea could command a majority vote of the
Justices: capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was cruel and unusual punishment because there were no rational standards that determined when it was imposed and when it was not. The question the Court resolved in these
688:
Under the
Georgia scheme (which generally followed the Model Penal Code), after the defendant was convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a capital crime (under the first part of the bifurcated trial proceeding), the second part of the bifurcated trial involved an additional hearing at which the jury
674:
and the companion cases, the Court approved three different schemes that had sufficiently narrow eligibility criteria and at the same time sufficiently broad discretion in selection. By contrast, the two schemes the Court disapproved had overly broad eligibility criteria and then no discretion in
636:
concluded that the now-familiar bifurcated procedure, in which the jury first considers the question of guilt without regard to punishment, and then determines whether the punishment should be death or life imprisonment, is the preferable model. This was the model that the Court approved in these
535:
The Court also found that the death penalty "comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the
Amendment". The death penalty serves two principal social purposes—retribution and deterrence. "In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly
777:
The Court concluded that, as the sentencer's discretion was limited in an objective fashion and directed in a reviewable manner, Florida's scheme also adequately narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. The Court noted that
Florida's scheme came closest to the Model Penal
662:
of an eligible defendant for the death penalty. A defendant is eligible for the death penalty once the jury has concluded that he is a member of that narrow class of criminal defendants who have committed the most morally outrageous of crimes. An eligible defendant is then selected for the death
627:
had held that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." The question the
981:
would have upheld North Carolina's and Louisiana's mandatory death penalties. He disputed the historical evidence adduced in support of the claim that American juries dislike mandatory death penalties. He also felt that the Court's decisions had an analytical flaw. The Court had struck down the
973:
countered that capital punishment cannot be unconstitutional because the Constitution expressly mentions it and because two centuries of Court decisions assumed that it was constitutional. Furthermore, for White the judgment of the legislatures of 35 states was paramount, and suggested that the
1116:
remarked that there was not one case on which he would vote differently today, "with one exception... the Texas death-penalty case ." He went on to say that "we made a mistake in that case...I think upon reflection, we should have held the Texas statute... unconstitutional." Two years earlier,
962:, that the death penalty does not deter crime and that American society has evolved to the point that it is no longer an appropriate vehicle for expressing retribution. In every subsequent capital case that would come before the Court during their tenures, they would refer to their opinions in
575:
Recognizing that juries in capital cases found discretion in sentencing desirable, Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana afforded their juries this discretion in the 1840s. Finally, the jury could respond to mitigating factors about the crime or the criminal and withhold the death penalty even for
847:
The Court concluded that Texas's narrow legal definition of capital murder served the same purpose as the aggravating factors in the Georgia and Florida schemes, that being to adequately narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. The Court even observed that "the principal
666:
In addition to jury sentencing through the guidance of aggravating factors, a constitutional capital sentencing scheme must provide for appellate review of the death sentence, typically by the state's supreme court. This review must not be a rubber stamp; there must be evidence in the state's
884:
murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other
757:
Florida's scheme differed from Georgia's in two respects. First, at the sentencing hearing of a capital felon, the jury determined whether one or more aggravating factors exist, drawing on a list very similar to Georgia's. Then the jury was specifically asked to weigh the
509:
by holding once and for all that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment. However the Court responded that "The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to
824:
If the defendant was convicted of capital murder, and if the prosecution sought the death penalty (which it has never been required to do in Texas), the second part of the bifurcated trial required the jury to consider two (or sometimes three) "special issues":
732:
Once the jury found that one or more of the aggravating factors existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant would be eligible for the death penalty. The jury may, but was not required to, then evaluate all the evidence it had heard, including
982:
mandatory death penalty because it took away discretion from the jury. Yet, Rehnquist pointed out, a jury in Georgia could reject the death penalty for no reason at all. Thus, Georgia's scheme did not alleviate the concerns articulated in
999:
was executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. Following his conviction and death sentence, Gilmore insisted he wanted to be executed, and for this reason some consider the national moratorium to have only ended in 1979 with
628:
Court confronted in these five cases was whether the procedures crafted by Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana adequately minimized that risk. In all five cases, the Court's primary focus was on the jury.
778:
Code's recommendation of an ideal sentencing scheme, as it used a weighing scheme whereas Georgia's scheme did not, thus allowing for individual sentencing. Thus, Florida's death penalty scheme also complied with the
229:. If the jury is furnished with standards to direct and limit the sentencing discretion, and the jury's decision is subjected to meaningful appellate review, the death sentence may be constitutional. If, however, the
790:
Texas's scheme differed considerably from that suggested by the Model Penal Code and followed in large part by Georgia and Florida. In order to narrow the class of death penalty-eligible defendants as required by
497:
cases was not whether the death sentence imposed on each of the individual defendants was cruel, but rather whether the process by which those sentences were imposed was rational and objectively reviewable.
588:
First, the scheme must provide objective criteria to direct and limit the death sentencing discretion. The objectiveness of these criteria must in turn be ensured by appellate review of all death sentences.
532:. The fact that juries remained willing to impose the death penalty also contributed to the Court's conclusion that American society did not believe in 1976 that the death penalty was unconstitutional.
895:
that rape is not a capital crime, at least where the victim is not killed; the statutes mandating death penalty for first-degree arson and first-degree burglary were abrogated by the General Assembly.
840:
If all applicable special issues were answered in the affirmative, then the result would be an automatic death sentence; if any special issue was not answered in the affirmative, the sentence would be
518:
by either specifying factors to be weighed and procedures to be followed when imposing a death sentence, or dictating that the death penalty would be mandatory for specific crimes. Furthermore, a
938:
Also, unlike North Carolina, Louisiana law required the jury in all first-degree murder cases to be instructed on second-degree murder and manslaughter, crimes ineligible for the death penalty.
2826:
829:
whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
663:
penalty after the sentencer takes into account mitigating evidence about the character and record of the defendant in order to decide whether that individual is worthy of a death sentence.
162:
v. State of Georgia; Charles William Proffitt v. State of Florida; Jerry Lane Jurek v. State of Texas; James Tyrone Woodson, et al. v. State of North Carolina; Roberts, et al. v. Louisiana
1011:
The July 2 Cases mark the beginning of the United States' modern legal conversation about the death penalty. Major subsequent developments include forbidding the death penalty for rape (
906:
analysis if the legislature removed the discretionary sentencing provision. However, it was the lack of discretion in sentencing that the Court used to rule the scheme unconstitutional.
880:(similar to the approach taken by the Texas Legislature) chose to adopt a narrow definition of "first-degree murder" which would be eligible for the death penalty, which was defined as:
2659:
851:
However, the special issues feature and its automatic death sentence imposition (if all were answered in the affirmative) was the key issue in the Court's analysis. In its review, the
564:, but not executed. Faced with this dilemma, some juries would acquit the defendant in order to spare his life. Of course, this meant that an obviously guilty person would go free.
2821:
848:
difference between Texas and the other two States is that the death penalty is an available sentencing option – even potentially – for a smaller class of murders in Texas".
737:
and other aggravating evidence not supporting one of the ten factors beyond a reasonable doubt—and decide whether the defendant should live or die. This scheme is called a
689:
received additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation. In order for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, the jury needed to find the existence of
2202:
1024:
485:
and declare once and for all the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus in violation of the Constitution; the Court agreed to hear the cases.
836:
if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
745:
that discretion is channeled in an objective way, and therefore provided for individualized sentencing. Thus, Georgia's death penalty scheme complied with the
371:
223:
455:'s dissent famously argued that "The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity
1866:
1815:
1764:
1713:
1662:
1445:
1318:
1301:
1284:
1245:
1219:
1193:
1135:
1130:
180:
1186:, there were six capital crimes in Georgia: murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking. The Supreme Court's later decision in
719:
The crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."
2831:
1960:
1240:
741:
scheme, because the sentencer is not required to weigh the statutory aggravating factors against mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence.
431:
367:
219:
1923:
770:
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." The trial judge must independently reweigh the aggravating factors against the
2836:
922:
when the offender has a specific intent to kill and is engaged in the perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, or armed robbery;
918:
adopted the approach taken by North Carolina, by redefining first-degree murder as the killing of a human being in one of five circumstances:
1501:
591:
Second, the scheme must allow the sentencer (whether judge or jury) to take into account the character and record of an individual defendant.
226:
1089:
decision, 35 states reenacted death penalty statutes. There was a significant shift in the attitudes towards capital punishment between
2816:
928:
when the offender has a specific intent to kill and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence;
1951:
607:, the Court found that the capital sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, respectively, met these criteria; whereas in
584:
The Court set out two broad guidelines that legislatures must follow in order to craft a constitutional capital sentencing scheme:
2841:
1203: (1978), invalidated Georgia's death penalty for rape (and probably also for robbery, at least where death does not result).
934:
when the offender has a specific intent to kill and has been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder
476:
decision, the states of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana amended their death penalty statutes to meet the
208:
Certiorari to the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
86:
2106:
623:
The proposition that the death penalty was not always cruel and unusual punishment was just the beginning of the discussion.
58:
1485:
995:
Utah was the first state to resume executions after capital punishment was reinstated in the United States in 1976, when
1597:
572:
convict defendants who were clearly guilty of first-degree murder because that crime carried a mandatory death penalty.
65:
430:. The court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the
413:
140:
233:, such that there is no provision for mercy based on the characteristics of the offender, then it is unconstitutional.
1273:
The Court has subsequently considered at great length the extent to which the Texas special issues allow the jury to
1121:
cases had been made out of respect for precedent within the court that held capital punishment to be constitutional.
925:
when the offender has a specific intent to kill a fireman or police officer engaged in the performance of his duties;
105:
39:
1169:
At the time Texas had (and still has) separate courts with final power of review over civil and criminal cases; the
72:
1571:
1170:
877:
852:
2586:
568:
519:
43:
889:
North Carolina had also enacted a mandatory death penalty for first-degree rape, but the Court later ruled in
54:
1073:), and requiring the jury to decide whether aggravating factors have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt (
1944:
1895:
1844:
1793:
1742:
1691:
1264:
The crimes punished by death in Florida are first-degree murder and sexual battery of a child under eleven.
899:
435:
1465:
1349:
Liebman, James S. (2006). "Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006".
987:
the idea that the fact that "death is different" requires any extra safeguards in the sentencing process.
2752:
2675:
2554:
931:
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one person; and
800:
the death penalty. The 1976 law defined capital murder in Texas as involving one of the five situations:
2714:
697:
The defendant has previously been convicted of a capital felony or has a history of committing serious
2538:
2210:
632:
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The drafters of the
2691:
2638:
1105:
was decided, a mere four years later in 1976, 66 percent of the public favored capital punishment.
1057:
762:
presented against the statutory aggravating factors that have been proved. This scheme is called a
230:
1649:
1509:
2667:
2063:
1937:
550:
529:
32:
2650:
2514:
2114:
1999:
1991:
1109:
710:
The defendant committed the crime for the purpose of receiving money or anything else of value.
524:
452:
256:
833:
such as other inmates or correctional officers – would be eligible for the death penalty); and
79:
2788:
2621:
2418:
2362:
2242:
1870:
1819:
1768:
1717:
1666:
1449:
1322:
1305:
1288:
1249:
1223:
1197:
915:
172:
1877:
1826:
1775:
1724:
1673:
1379:
2728:
2378:
2274:
2266:
2250:
2234:
2079:
2023:
1019:
807:
murder committed in the course of committing kidnapping, burglary, robbery, rape, or arson;
704:
The capital felony was committed while the defendant was committing another capital felony.
1929:
1912:
1410:
8:
2479:
2434:
2170:
2071:
2031:
1351:
288:
187:
2546:
2471:
2426:
2298:
2290:
2218:
2194:
2162:
2130:
2039:
1886:
1835:
1784:
1733:
1682:
1552:
1452:
1360:
1325:
1308:
1291:
1252:
1226:
1214:
1200:
1085:
has been described as a "judicial surrender to political pressure". In the wake of the
1063:
1035:
951:
615:, the Court found that the sentencing schemes of North Carolina and Louisiana did not.
488:
In the July 2 Cases, the Court's goal was to provide guidance to states in the wake of
409:
1615:
1117:
Stevens had come out in opposition to the death penalty, writing that his vote in the
505:
The defendants in each of the five cases urged the Court to go further than it had in
2562:
2530:
2455:
2346:
2314:
2282:
2178:
2122:
2098:
2055:
2047:
2007:
1544:
1422:
1391:
1313:
1113:
1101:
was decided, public support for the death penalty was around 50 percent. By the time
1069:
1046:
1029:
978:
955:
841:
817:
murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and
796:
771:
759:
734:
638:
447:
300:
292:
276:
1045:) from the death penalty, removing virtually all limitations on the presentation of
722:
The defendant killed a police officer, prison guard, or fireman in the line of duty.
2800:
2683:
2578:
2463:
2402:
2394:
2322:
2258:
2226:
2186:
2146:
1296:
1279:
1188:
1041:
1013:
891:
811:
633:
442:
248:
175:
2522:
2386:
2354:
2338:
2330:
2306:
2154:
1489:
1482:
1154:
1075:
1051:
1005:
643:
417:
159:
2764:
2630:
2570:
2506:
2487:
2410:
1440:
1001:
863:
third question applicable only if the defendant was convicted as an accessory.
280:
264:
522:
in California had overturned the California Supreme Court's earlier decision (
2810:
2015:
1548:
1426:
1395:
942:
scheme to suffer the same unconstitutional infirmities as North Carolina's.
2776:
2370:
996:
1904:
1853:
1802:
1751:
1700:
713:
The defendant killed a judge or prosecutor exercising his official duties.
970:
820:
murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee.
557:
514:." Both Congress and 35 states had complied with the Court's dictates in
268:
218:
The imposition of the death penalty does not, automatically, violate the
1556:
1532:
1364:
1173:
was (and remains) the court with final review power over criminal cases.
2740:
567:
To mitigate the harshness of the common-law rule, Pennsylvania divided
191:
543:
2735:
459:... An executed person has indeed 'lost the right to have rights.'"
21:
2660:
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
866:
678:
641:
in the sentencing process, an approval that persisted until 2002's
1644:
472:
All five cases share the same basic procedural history. After the
445:
on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in
1411:""Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty"
1212:
The vagueness of this language was at issue in the later case of
1061:), requiring precision in the definition of aggravating factors (
725:
The offense was committed by someone who had escaped from prison.
1918:
698:
135:
2827:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and death penalty case law
500:
420:. The set of cases is referred to by a leading scholar as the
728:
The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest.
1616:"Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)"
1959:
1182:
After Georgia revised its death penalty law in response to
902:
had ruled that its capital sentencing scheme could survive
416:, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on
412:. It reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the use of the
118:
1976 U.S. Supreme Court case upholding the death penalty
945:
618:
1380:"Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty"
958:
expressed their views, which they also articulated in
859:
requirements and was thus also approved by the Court.
782:
requirements and was thus also approved by the Court.
707:
The defendant created a grave risk of death to others.
2822:
United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court
2712:
1136:
List of landmark court decisions in the United States
1131:
List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 428
408:, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is a landmark decision of the
1598:"In Reversal, Stevens Says He Opposes Death Penalty"
966:
in support of their vote against the death penalty.
553:for murder that had prevailed in medieval England.
544:
Historical disapproval of mandatory death sentences
540:sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes."
46:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1572:"Sandra Day O'Connor Interviews John Paul Stevens"
749:requirements and was thus approved by the Court.
2808:
1973:
1924:Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Court Decisions
867:Capital punishment schemes rejected by the Court
679:Capital punishment schemes approved by the Court
325:White (in judgment), joined by Burger, Rehnquist
1569:
528:) holding that the death penalty violated the
1945:
424:, and elsewhere referred to by the lead case
2610:
637:cases—although it tacitly approved a model
556:In 18th century Britain, the penalty for a
501:Capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment
2832:Capital punishment in Georgia (U.S. state)
1952:
1938:
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
1502:"Nation: At Issue: Crime and Punishment"
579:
1408:
1377:
1348:
1033:), exempting the mentally handicapped (
654:Every death sentence involves first an
2809:
1595:
804:murder of a police officer or fireman;
438:". The decision essentially ended the
2837:Legal history of Georgia (U.S. state)
2609:
2107:Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber
1972:
1933:
1378:Scafidi, Nicholas (January 1, 1973).
1157:provides information on the crime in
123:1976 United States Supreme Court case
1570:Newsweek Staff (December 17, 2010).
1530:
1409:Pokorak, Jeffrey (January 1, 1991).
946:Other views expressed in these cases
619:Constitutional sentencing procedures
44:adding citations to reliable sources
15:
810:murder committed for remuneration (
13:
414:death penalty in the United States
141:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
2853:
2817:United States Supreme Court cases
1873:325 (1976) is available from:
1822:280 (1976) is available from:
1771:262 (1976) is available from:
1720:242 (1976) is available from:
1669:153 (1976) is available from:
1637:
1596:Barnes, Robert (April 17, 2008).
1108:In a 2010 interview with Justice
1023:), restricting the death penalty
871:
2794:
2782:
2770:
2758:
2746:
2734:
2722:
1643:
1483:Death Penalty Information Center
134:
20:
1608:
1589:
1563:
1524:
1494:
1476:
1458:
1433:
1267:
1171:Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
878:North Carolina General Assembly
853:Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
333:Burger, Rehnquist (in judgment)
31:needs additional citations for
2842:1976 in United States case law
2587:City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
1961:United States Eighth Amendment
1531:Lain, Corinna Barrett (2007).
1508:. June 4, 1979. Archived from
1402:
1371:
1342:
1258:
1232:
1206:
1176:
1163:
1148:
1008:, who resisted his execution.
1:
1415:California Western Law Review
1335:
716:The defendant hired a killer.
558:vast number of serious crimes
462:
436:cruel and unusual punishments
1974:Cruel and unusual punishment
990:
909:
900:North Carolina Supreme Court
693:of ten aggravating factors:
639:without any jury involvement
7:
2676:United States v. Bajakajian
1124:
10:
2858:
1905:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1854:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1803:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1752:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1701:Oyez (oral argument audio)
1039:) and juvenile murderers (
752:
683:
231:death penalty is mandatory
2649:
2620:
2616:
2605:
2539:South Carolina v. Gathers
2498:
2445:
2211:Skipper v. South Carolina
2090:
1983:
1979:
1968:
1812:Woodson v. North Carolina
1025:in cases of felony murder
658:determination and then a
399:Woodson v. North Carolina
366:
361:
353:
345:
337:
329:
321:
313:
308:
242:
237:
217:
212:
204:
199:
167:
154:
147:
133:
128:
2692:Tyler v. Hennepin County
2639:United States v. Salerno
2611:Excessive bail and fines
1141:
1058:Holmes v. South Carolina
785:
467:
368:U.S. Const. amends. VIII
317:Stewart, Powell, Stevens
148:Argued March 30–31, 1976
2668:Austin v. United States
2203:Caldwell v. Mississippi
2064:Montgomery v. Louisiana
1466:"Death Row Information"
551:mandatory death penalty
530:California constitution
2651:Excessive Fines Clause
2515:Robinson v. California
2131:California v. Anderson
2115:McGautha v. California
2000:Robinson v. California
1992:Weems v. United States
525:California v. Anderson
341:Blackmun (in judgment)
257:William J. Brennan Jr.
2622:Excessive Bail Clause
2363:Panetti v. Quarterman
2243:Maynard v. Cartwright
916:Louisiana Legislature
580:Decision of the Court
569:murder into "degrees"
2753:Georgia (U.S. state)
2379:Kennedy v. Louisiana
2275:Whitmore v. Arkansas
2267:Stanford v. Kentucky
2251:Thompson v. Oklahoma
2235:Lowenfield v. Phelps
2080:Jones v. Mississippi
2024:Harmelin v. Michigan
1863:Roberts v. Louisiana
1384:Villanova Law Review
1020:Kennedy v. Louisiana
405:Roberts v. Louisiana
150:Decided July 2, 1976
40:improve this article
2555:Helling v. McKinney
2480:Hudson v. McMillian
2446:Corporal punishment
2435:Bucklew v. Precythe
2171:Spaziano v. Florida
2072:Virginia v. LeBlanc
2032:Ewing v. California
1896:Library of Congress
1845:Library of Congress
1794:Library of Congress
1743:Library of Congress
1710:Proffitt v. Florida
1692:Library of Congress
1602:The Washington Post
1512:on January 19, 2008
1352:Columbia Law Review
1277:that evidence. See
1110:Sandra Day O'Connor
1047:mitigating evidence
760:mitigating evidence
735:mitigating evidence
387:Proffitt v. Florida
289:Lewis F. Powell Jr.
186:96 S. Ct. 2909; 49
2547:Payne v. Tennessee
2472:Ingraham v. Wright
2427:Madison v. Alabama
2299:Atkins v. Virginia
2291:Herrera v. Collins
2219:Ford v. Wainwright
2195:Glass v. Louisiana
2163:Godfrey v. Georgia
2040:Lockyer v. Andrade
1488:2008-04-21 at the
1215:Godfrey v. Georgia
1064:Godfrey v. Georgia
1036:Atkins v. Virginia
952:William J. Brennan
772:mitigating factors
410:U.S. Supreme Court
253:Associate Justices
55:"Gregg v. Georgia"
2710:
2709:
2706:
2705:
2702:
2701:
2601:
2600:
2597:
2596:
2563:Farmer v. Brennan
2531:Estelle v. Gamble
2456:Jackson v. Bishop
2347:Hill v. McDonough
2315:Tennard v. Dretke
2283:Walton v. Arizona
2179:Enmund v. Florida
2123:Furman v. Georgia
2099:Wilkerson v. Utah
2056:Miller v. Alabama
2048:Graham v. Florida
2008:Rummel v. Estelle
1648:Works related to
1314:Tennard v. Dretke
1114:John Paul Stevens
1070:Walton v. Arizona
1030:Enmund v. Florida
979:William Rehnquist
956:Thurgood Marshall
842:life imprisonment
797:Texas Legislature
448:Furman v. Georgia
377:
376:
293:William Rehnquist
277:Thurgood Marshall
116:
115:
108:
90:
2849:
2799:
2798:
2797:
2787:
2786:
2785:
2775:
2774:
2773:
2763:
2762:
2761:
2751:
2750:
2749:
2739:
2738:
2727:
2726:
2725:
2718:
2684:Timbs v. Indiana
2618:
2617:
2607:
2606:
2579:Kahler v. Kansas
2464:Gates v. Collier
2403:Hurst v. Florida
2395:Glossip v. Gross
2323:Roper v. Simmons
2259:Penry v. Lynaugh
2227:Tison v. Arizona
2187:Pulley v. Harris
2147:Coker v. Georgia
2139:Gregg v. Georgia
1981:
1980:
1970:
1969:
1954:
1947:
1940:
1931:
1930:
1914:Gregg v. Georgia
1909:
1903:
1900:
1894:
1891:
1885:
1882:
1876:
1858:
1852:
1849:
1843:
1840:
1834:
1831:
1825:
1807:
1801:
1798:
1792:
1789:
1783:
1780:
1774:
1756:
1750:
1747:
1741:
1738:
1732:
1729:
1723:
1705:
1699:
1696:
1690:
1687:
1681:
1678:
1672:
1659:Gregg v. Georgia
1651:Gregg v. Georgia
1647:
1631:
1630:
1628:
1626:
1612:
1606:
1605:
1593:
1587:
1586:
1584:
1582:
1567:
1561:
1560:
1537:Duke Law Journal
1533:"Deciding Death"
1528:
1522:
1521:
1519:
1517:
1498:
1492:
1480:
1474:
1473:
1462:
1456:
1437:
1431:
1430:
1406:
1400:
1399:
1375:
1369:
1368:
1346:
1329:
1297:Penry v. Johnson
1280:Penry v. Lynaugh
1271:
1265:
1262:
1256:
1241:Zant v. Stephens
1236:
1230:
1210:
1204:
1189:Coker v. Georgia
1180:
1174:
1167:
1161:
1152:
1097:; in 1972, when
1042:Roper v. Simmons
1014:Coker v. Georgia
892:Coker v. Georgia
812:contract killing
634:Model Penal Code
458:
432:Eighth Amendment
381:Gregg v. Georgia
249:Warren E. Burger
238:Court membership
138:
137:
129:Gregg v. Georgia
126:
125:
111:
104:
100:
97:
91:
89:
48:
24:
16:
2857:
2856:
2852:
2851:
2850:
2848:
2847:
2846:
2807:
2806:
2805:
2795:
2793:
2783:
2781:
2771:
2769:
2759:
2757:
2747:
2745:
2733:
2723:
2721:
2713:
2711:
2698:
2645:
2612:
2593:
2523:Powell v. Texas
2494:
2467:(5th Cir. 1974)
2459:(8th Cir. 1968)
2447:
2441:
2387:Hall v. Florida
2355:Kansas v. Marsh
2339:Oregon v. Guzek
2334:(5th Cir. 2005)
2331:Bigby v. Dretke
2307:Ring v. Arizona
2155:Lockett v. Ohio
2086:
1975:
1964:
1958:
1907:
1901:
1898:
1892:
1889:
1883:
1880:
1874:
1856:
1850:
1847:
1841:
1838:
1832:
1829:
1823:
1805:
1799:
1796:
1790:
1787:
1781:
1778:
1772:
1754:
1748:
1745:
1739:
1736:
1730:
1727:
1721:
1703:
1697:
1694:
1688:
1685:
1679:
1676:
1670:
1640:
1635:
1634:
1624:
1622:
1614:
1613:
1609:
1594:
1590:
1580:
1578:
1568:
1564:
1529:
1525:
1515:
1513:
1500:
1499:
1495:
1490:Wayback Machine
1481:
1477:
1464:
1463:
1459:
1438:
1434:
1407:
1403:
1376:
1372:
1347:
1343:
1338:
1333:
1332:
1272:
1268:
1263:
1259:
1237:
1233:
1211:
1207:
1181:
1177:
1168:
1164:
1153:
1149:
1144:
1127:
1076:Ring v. Arizona
1052:Lockett v. Ohio
1006:John Spenkelink
993:
948:
912:
874:
869:
788:
755:
686:
681:
644:Ring v. Arizona
621:
582:
546:
503:
470:
465:
456:
453:Justice Brennan
418:Troy Leon Gregg
301:John P. Stevens
291:
279:
267:
195:
160:Troy Leon Gregg
149:
143:
124:
119:
112:
101:
95:
92:
49:
47:
37:
25:
12:
11:
5:
2855:
2845:
2844:
2839:
2834:
2829:
2824:
2819:
2804:
2803:
2791:
2789:North Carolina
2779:
2767:
2755:
2743:
2731:
2708:
2707:
2704:
2703:
2700:
2699:
2697:
2696:
2688:
2680:
2672:
2664:
2655:
2653:
2647:
2646:
2644:
2643:
2635:
2631:Stack v. Boyle
2626:
2624:
2614:
2613:
2603:
2602:
2599:
2598:
2595:
2594:
2592:
2591:
2583:
2575:
2571:Brown v. Plata
2567:
2559:
2551:
2543:
2535:
2527:
2519:
2511:
2507:Trop v. Dulles
2502:
2500:
2496:
2495:
2493:
2492:
2488:Hope v. Pelzer
2484:
2476:
2468:
2460:
2451:
2449:
2443:
2442:
2440:
2439:
2431:
2423:
2419:Moore v. Texas
2415:
2411:Kansas v. Carr
2407:
2399:
2391:
2383:
2375:
2367:
2359:
2351:
2343:
2335:
2327:
2319:
2311:
2303:
2295:
2287:
2279:
2271:
2263:
2255:
2247:
2239:
2231:
2223:
2215:
2207:
2199:
2191:
2183:
2175:
2167:
2159:
2151:
2143:
2135:
2127:
2119:
2111:
2103:
2094:
2092:
2088:
2087:
2085:
2084:
2076:
2068:
2060:
2052:
2044:
2036:
2028:
2020:
2012:
2004:
1996:
1987:
1985:
1977:
1976:
1966:
1965:
1957:
1956:
1949:
1942:
1934:
1928:
1927:
1910:
1859:
1808:
1761:Jurek v. Texas
1757:
1706:
1655:
1639:
1638:External links
1636:
1633:
1632:
1607:
1588:
1562:
1523:
1493:
1475:
1457:
1441:Jurek v. Texas
1432:
1401:
1370:
1340:
1339:
1337:
1334:
1331:
1330:
1266:
1257:
1231:
1205:
1175:
1162:
1146:
1145:
1143:
1140:
1139:
1138:
1133:
1126:
1123:
992:
989:
947:
944:
936:
935:
932:
929:
926:
923:
911:
908:
887:
886:
873:
872:North Carolina
870:
868:
865:
838:
837:
834:
830:
822:
821:
818:
815:
808:
805:
787:
784:
754:
751:
730:
729:
726:
723:
720:
717:
714:
711:
708:
705:
702:
685:
682:
680:
677:
620:
617:
593:
592:
589:
581:
578:
545:
542:
502:
499:
469:
466:
464:
461:
393:Jurek v. Texas
375:
374:
364:
363:
359:
358:
355:
351:
350:
347:
343:
342:
339:
335:
334:
331:
327:
326:
323:
319:
318:
315:
311:
310:
306:
305:
304:
303:
281:Harry Blackmun
265:Potter Stewart
254:
251:
246:
240:
239:
235:
234:
215:
214:
210:
209:
206:
202:
201:
197:
196:
185:
169:
165:
164:
156:
155:Full case name
152:
151:
145:
144:
139:
131:
130:
122:
117:
114:
113:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2854:
2843:
2840:
2838:
2835:
2833:
2830:
2828:
2825:
2823:
2820:
2818:
2815:
2814:
2812:
2802:
2792:
2790:
2780:
2778:
2768:
2766:
2756:
2754:
2744:
2742:
2737:
2732:
2730:
2729:United States
2720:
2719:
2716:
2694:
2693:
2689:
2686:
2685:
2681:
2678:
2677:
2673:
2670:
2669:
2665:
2662:
2661:
2657:
2656:
2654:
2652:
2648:
2641:
2640:
2636:
2633:
2632:
2628:
2627:
2625:
2623:
2619:
2615:
2608:
2604:
2589:
2588:
2584:
2581:
2580:
2576:
2573:
2572:
2568:
2565:
2564:
2560:
2557:
2556:
2552:
2549:
2548:
2544:
2541:
2540:
2536:
2533:
2532:
2528:
2525:
2524:
2520:
2517:
2516:
2512:
2509:
2508:
2504:
2503:
2501:
2497:
2490:
2489:
2485:
2482:
2481:
2477:
2474:
2473:
2469:
2466:
2465:
2461:
2458:
2457:
2453:
2452:
2450:
2444:
2437:
2436:
2432:
2429:
2428:
2424:
2421:
2420:
2416:
2413:
2412:
2408:
2405:
2404:
2400:
2397:
2396:
2392:
2389:
2388:
2384:
2381:
2380:
2376:
2373:
2372:
2368:
2365:
2364:
2360:
2357:
2356:
2352:
2349:
2348:
2344:
2341:
2340:
2336:
2333:
2332:
2328:
2325:
2324:
2320:
2317:
2316:
2312:
2309:
2308:
2304:
2301:
2300:
2296:
2293:
2292:
2288:
2285:
2284:
2280:
2277:
2276:
2272:
2269:
2268:
2264:
2261:
2260:
2256:
2253:
2252:
2248:
2245:
2244:
2240:
2237:
2236:
2232:
2229:
2228:
2224:
2221:
2220:
2216:
2213:
2212:
2208:
2205:
2204:
2200:
2197:
2196:
2192:
2189:
2188:
2184:
2181:
2180:
2176:
2173:
2172:
2168:
2165:
2164:
2160:
2157:
2156:
2152:
2149:
2148:
2144:
2141:
2140:
2136:
2133:
2132:
2128:
2125:
2124:
2120:
2117:
2116:
2112:
2109:
2108:
2104:
2101:
2100:
2096:
2095:
2093:
2091:Death penalty
2089:
2082:
2081:
2077:
2074:
2073:
2069:
2066:
2065:
2061:
2058:
2057:
2053:
2050:
2049:
2045:
2042:
2041:
2037:
2034:
2033:
2029:
2026:
2025:
2021:
2018:
2017:
2016:Solem v. Helm
2013:
2010:
2009:
2005:
2002:
2001:
1997:
1994:
1993:
1989:
1988:
1986:
1984:Incarceration
1982:
1978:
1971:
1967:
1962:
1955:
1950:
1948:
1943:
1941:
1936:
1935:
1932:
1926:
1925:
1920:
1916:
1915:
1911:
1906:
1897:
1888:
1879:
1872:
1868:
1864:
1860:
1855:
1846:
1837:
1828:
1821:
1817:
1813:
1809:
1804:
1795:
1786:
1777:
1770:
1766:
1762:
1758:
1753:
1744:
1735:
1726:
1719:
1715:
1711:
1707:
1702:
1693:
1684:
1675:
1668:
1664:
1660:
1656:
1654:at Wikisource
1653:
1652:
1646:
1642:
1641:
1621:
1617:
1611:
1603:
1599:
1592:
1577:
1573:
1566:
1558:
1554:
1550:
1546:
1542:
1538:
1534:
1527:
1511:
1507:
1503:
1497:
1491:
1487:
1484:
1479:
1471:
1467:
1461:
1454:
1451:
1447:
1443:
1442:
1436:
1428:
1424:
1420:
1416:
1412:
1405:
1397:
1393:
1389:
1385:
1381:
1374:
1366:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1353:
1345:
1341:
1327:
1324:
1320:
1316:
1315:
1311: (2001);
1310:
1307:
1303:
1299:
1298:
1294: (1989);
1293:
1290:
1286:
1282:
1281:
1276:
1270:
1261:
1254:
1251:
1247:
1243:
1242:
1235:
1228:
1225:
1221:
1217:
1216:
1209:
1202:
1199:
1195:
1191:
1190:
1185:
1179:
1172:
1166:
1160:
1156:
1151:
1147:
1137:
1134:
1132:
1129:
1128:
1122:
1120:
1115:
1111:
1106:
1104:
1100:
1096:
1092:
1088:
1084:
1080:
1078:
1077:
1072:
1071:
1066:
1065:
1060:
1059:
1054:
1053:
1048:
1044:
1043:
1038:
1037:
1032:
1031:
1026:
1022:
1021:
1016:
1015:
1009:
1007:
1003:
1002:electrocution
998:
988:
985:
980:
975:
972:
967:
965:
961:
957:
953:
943:
939:
933:
930:
927:
924:
921:
920:
919:
917:
914:In 1973, the
907:
905:
901:
896:
894:
893:
883:
882:
881:
879:
876:In 1974, the
864:
860:
858:
854:
849:
845:
843:
835:
831:
828:
827:
826:
819:
816:
813:
809:
806:
803:
802:
801:
798:
794:
783:
781:
775:
773:
767:
765:
761:
750:
748:
742:
740:
736:
727:
724:
721:
718:
715:
712:
709:
706:
703:
700:
696:
695:
694:
692:
676:
673:
668:
664:
661:
657:
652:
648:
646:
645:
640:
635:
629:
626:
616:
614:
610:
606:
602:
598:
590:
587:
586:
585:
577:
573:
570:
565:
563:
559:
554:
552:
541:
537:
533:
531:
527:
526:
521:
517:
513:
508:
498:
495:
491:
486:
484:
479:
475:
460:
454:
450:
449:
444:
441:
437:
433:
429:
428:
423:
419:
415:
411:
407:
406:
401:
400:
395:
394:
389:
388:
383:
382:
373:
369:
365:
360:
356:
352:
348:
344:
340:
336:
332:
328:
324:
320:
316:
312:
309:Case opinions
307:
302:
298:
294:
290:
286:
282:
278:
274:
270:
266:
262:
258:
255:
252:
250:
247:
245:Chief Justice
244:
243:
241:
236:
232:
228:
225:
221:
216:
211:
207:
203:
198:
193:
189:
183:
182:
177:
174:
170:
166:
163:
161:
157:
153:
146:
142:
132:
127:
121:
110:
107:
99:
88:
85:
81:
78:
74:
71:
67:
64:
60:
57: –
56:
52:
51:Find sources:
45:
41:
35:
34:
29:This article
27:
23:
18:
17:
2690:
2682:
2674:
2666:
2658:
2637:
2629:
2585:
2577:
2569:
2561:
2553:
2545:
2537:
2529:
2521:
2513:
2505:
2486:
2478:
2470:
2462:
2454:
2433:
2425:
2417:
2409:
2401:
2393:
2385:
2377:
2371:Baze v. Rees
2369:
2361:
2353:
2345:
2337:
2329:
2321:
2313:
2305:
2297:
2289:
2281:
2273:
2265:
2257:
2249:
2241:
2233:
2225:
2217:
2209:
2201:
2193:
2185:
2177:
2174:(1981, 1984)
2169:
2161:
2153:
2145:
2138:
2137:
2129:
2121:
2113:
2105:
2097:
2078:
2070:
2062:
2054:
2046:
2038:
2030:
2022:
2014:
2006:
1998:
1990:
1922:
1913:
1862:
1811:
1760:
1709:
1658:
1650:
1625:November 17,
1623:. Retrieved
1619:
1610:
1601:
1591:
1581:November 17,
1579:. Retrieved
1575:
1565:
1540:
1536:
1526:
1514:. Retrieved
1510:the original
1505:
1496:
1478:
1469:
1460:
1455: (1976).
1439:
1435:
1418:
1414:
1404:
1387:
1383:
1373:
1359:(1): 1–130.
1356:
1350:
1344:
1328: (2004).
1312:
1295:
1278:
1274:
1269:
1260:
1255: (1983).
1239:
1234:
1229: (1980).
1213:
1208:
1187:
1183:
1178:
1165:
1158:
1155:This article
1150:
1118:
1107:
1102:
1098:
1094:
1090:
1086:
1082:
1081:
1074:
1068:
1062:
1056:
1050:
1040:
1034:
1028:
1018:
1012:
1010:
997:Gary Gilmore
994:
983:
976:
968:
963:
959:
949:
940:
937:
913:
903:
897:
890:
888:
875:
861:
856:
850:
846:
839:
823:
792:
789:
779:
776:
768:
763:
756:
746:
743:
739:non-weighing
738:
731:
690:
687:
675:sentencing.
671:
669:
665:
659:
655:
653:
649:
642:
630:
624:
622:
612:
608:
604:
600:
596:
594:
583:
574:
566:
561:
555:
547:
538:
534:
523:
515:
511:
506:
504:
493:
489:
487:
482:
477:
473:
471:
446:
439:
426:
425:
422:July 2 Cases
421:
404:
403:
398:
397:
392:
391:
386:
385:
380:
379:
378:
362:Laws applied
296:
284:
272:
260:
200:Case history
179:
158:
120:
102:
93:
83:
76:
69:
62:
50:
38:Please help
33:verification
30:
2448:or injuries
2134:(Cal. 1972)
1543:(1): 1–83.
1470:state.tx.us
971:Byron White
656:eligibility
338:Concurrence
330:Concurrence
322:Concurrence
269:Byron White
96:August 2024
2811:Categories
1620:Justia Law
1390:(4): 678.
1336:References
1112:, Justice
520:referendum
463:Background
443:moratorium
224:Fourteenth
192:U.S. LEXIS
190:859; 1976
66:newspapers
2801:Louisiana
1549:0012-7086
1516:April 28,
1427:0008-1639
1396:0042-6229
991:Aftermath
950:Justices
910:Louisiana
660:selection
314:Plurality
227:Amendment
188:L. Ed. 2d
168:Citations
1963:case law
1861:Text of
1810:Text of
1759:Text of
1708:Text of
1657:Text of
1576:Newsweek
1557:40040587
1486:Archived
1365:40041708
1275:consider
1125:See also
977:Justice
969:Justice
766:scheme.
764:weighing
699:felonies
601:Proffitt
451:(1972).
440:de facto
434:ban on "
357:Marshall
2765:Florida
2715:Portals
1878:Findlaw
1827:Findlaw
1776:Findlaw
1725:Findlaw
1674:Findlaw
885:felony.
753:Florida
684:Georgia
613:Roberts
609:Woodson
562:somehow
354:Dissent
349:Brennan
346:Dissent
213:Holding
80:scholar
2695:(2023)
2687:(2019)
2679:(1998)
2671:(1993)
2663:(1989)
2642:(1987)
2634:(1951)
2590:(2024)
2582:(2020)
2574:(2011)
2566:(1994)
2558:(1993)
2550:(1991)
2542:(1989)
2534:(1976)
2526:(1968)
2518:(1962)
2510:(1958)
2491:(2002)
2483:(1992)
2475:(1977)
2438:(2019)
2430:(2019)
2422:(2017)
2414:(2016)
2406:(2016)
2398:(2015)
2390:(2014)
2382:(2008)
2374:(2008)
2366:(2007)
2358:(2006)
2350:(2006)
2342:(2006)
2326:(2005)
2318:(2004)
2310:(2002)
2302:(2002)
2294:(1993)
2286:(1990)
2278:(1990)
2270:(1989)
2262:(1989)
2254:(1988)
2246:(1988)
2238:(1988)
2230:(1987)
2222:(1986)
2214:(1986)
2206:(1985)
2198:(1985)
2190:(1984)
2182:(1982)
2166:(1980)
2158:(1978)
2150:(1977)
2142:(1976)
2126:(1972)
2118:(1971)
2110:(1947)
2102:(1879)
2083:(2021)
2075:(2017)
2067:(2016)
2059:(2012)
2051:(2010)
2043:(2003)
2035:(2003)
2027:(1991)
2019:(1983)
2011:(1980)
2003:(1962)
1995:(1910)
1919:C-SPAN
1908:
1902:
1899:
1893:
1890:
1887:Justia
1884:
1881:
1875:
1857:
1851:
1848:
1842:
1839:
1836:Justia
1833:
1830:
1824:
1806:
1800:
1797:
1791:
1788:
1785:Justia
1782:
1779:
1773:
1755:
1749:
1746:
1740:
1737:
1734:Justia
1731:
1728:
1722:
1704:
1698:
1695:
1689:
1686:
1683:Justia
1680:
1677:
1671:
1555:
1547:
1444:,
1425:
1394:
1363:
1184:Furman
1159:Gregg.
1099:Furman
1091:Furman
1087:Furman
984:Furman
960:Furman
904:Furman
857:Furman
795:, the
793:Furman
780:Furman
747:Furman
625:Furman
603:, and
516:Furman
512:Furman
507:Furman
494:Furman
490:Furman
483:Furman
478:Furman
474:Furman
457:
402:, and
299:
297:·
295:
287:
285:·
283:
275:
273:·
271:
263:
261:·
259:
220:Eighth
82:
75:
68:
61:
53:
2777:Texas
2499:Other
1917:from
1869:
1818:
1767:
1716:
1665:
1553:JSTOR
1448:
1421:(2).
1361:JSTOR
1321:
1304:
1287:
1248:
1222:
1196:
1142:Notes
1119:Gregg
1103:Gregg
1095:Gregg
1083:Gregg
964:Gregg
786:Texas
672:Gregg
670:With
605:Jurek
597:Gregg
492:. In
468:Cases
427:Gregg
205:Prior
87:JSTOR
73:books
1871:U.S.
1820:U.S.
1769:U.S.
1718:U.S.
1667:U.S.
1627:2023
1583:2023
1545:ISSN
1518:2010
1506:Time
1450:U.S.
1423:ISSN
1392:ISSN
1323:U.S.
1306:U.S.
1289:U.S.
1250:U.S.
1244:,
1238:See
1224:U.S.
1198:U.S.
1093:and
954:and
898:The
611:and
222:and
181:more
173:U.S.
171:428
59:news
2741:Law
1921:'s
1867:428
1816:428
1765:428
1714:428
1663:428
1453:262
1446:428
1357:107
1326:274
1319:542
1309:782
1302:532
1292:302
1285:492
1253:862
1246:462
1227:420
1220:446
1201:584
1194:433
1079:).
1004:of
691:one
595:In
372:XIV
176:153
42:by
2813::
1865:,
1814:,
1763:,
1712:,
1661:,
1618:.
1600:.
1574:.
1551:.
1541:57
1539:.
1535:.
1504:.
1468:.
1419:27
1417:.
1413:.
1388:18
1386:.
1382:.
1355:.
1317:,
1300:,
1283:,
1218:,
1192:,
1067:,
1055:,
1017:,
844:.
814:);
774:.
647:.
599:,
396:,
390:,
384:,
370:,
194:82
2717::
1953:e
1946:t
1939:v
1629:.
1604:.
1585:.
1559:.
1520:.
1472:.
1429:.
1398:.
1367:.
1049:(
1027:(
701:.
184:)
178:(
109:)
103:(
98:)
94:(
84:·
77:·
70:·
63:·
36:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
