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Expected utility hypothesis

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3431:, a person who only cares about expected values of a gamble would pay an arbitrarily large finite amount to take this gamble. However, this experiment demonstrated that there is no upper bound on the potential rewards from very low probability events. In the hypothetical setup, a person flips a coin repeatedly. The participant's prize is determined by the number of times the coin lands on heads consecutively. For every time the coin comes up heads (1/2 probability), the participant's prize is doubled. The game ends when the participant flips the coin and it comes out tails. A player who only cares about expected value of the payoff should be willing to pay any finite amount of money to play because this entry cost will always be less than the expected, infinite, value of the game. However, in reality, people do not do this. "Only a few of the participants were willing to pay a maximum of $ 25 to enter the game because many of them were risk averse and unwilling to bet on a very small possibility at a very high price. 428:, an American statistician, derived a framework for comprehending expected utility. At that point, it was considered the first and most thorough foundation to understanding the concept. Savage's framework involved proving that expected utility could be used to make an optimal choice among several acts through seven axioms. In his book, The Foundations of Statistics, Savage integrated a normative account of decision making under risk (when probabilities are known) and under uncertainty (when probabilities are not objectively known). Savage concluded that people have neutral attitudes towards uncertainty and that observation is enough to predict the probabilities of uncertain events. A crucial methodological aspect of Savage's framework is its focus on observable choices. Cognitive processes and other psychological aspects of decision making matter only to the extent that they have directly measurable implications on choice. 283:. For example, as someone gets wealthier, an extra dollar or an additional good is perceived as less valuable. In other words, desirability related with a financial gain depends not only on the gain itself but also on the wealth of the person. Bernoulli suggested that people maximize "moral expectation" rather than expected monetary value. Bernoulli made a clear distinction between expected value and expected utility. Instead of using the weighted outcomes, he used the weighted utility multiplied by probabilities. He proved that the utility function used in real life is finite, even when its expected value is infinite. 300:
we can anticipate what choices they are going to take. In this model, he defined numerical utilities for each option to exploit the richness of the space of prices. The outcome of each preference is exclusive of each other. For example, if you study, then you can not see your friends, however you will get a good grade in your course. In this scenario, we analyze personal preferences and beliefs and will be able to predict which option a person might choose (e.g. if someone prioritizes their social life over academic results, they will go out with their friends). Assuming that the decisions of a person are
3614:, subjects tend to value "p bets" (lotteries with a high chance of winning a low prize) lower than "$ bets" (lotteries with a small chance of winning a large prize). When subjects are asked which lotteries they prefer in direct comparison, however, they frequently prefer the "p bets" over "$ bets". Many studies have examined this "preference reversal", from both an experimental (e.g., Plott & Grether, 1979) and theoretical (e.g., Holt, 1986) standpoint, indicating that this behavior can be brought into accordance with neoclassical economic theory under specific assumptions. 432:
researchers to be "the most brilliant axiomatic theory of utility ever developed". Instead of assuming the probability of an event, Savage defines it in terms of preferences over acts. Savage used the states (something a person doesn't control) to calculate the probability of an event. On the other hand, he used utility and intrinsic preferences to predict the outcome of the event. Savage assumed that each act and state are sufficient to uniquely determine an outcome. However, this assumption breaks in cases where an individual does not have enough information about the event.
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linear combination of the utilities of the outcomes, with the weights being the respective probabilities. Utility functions are also normally continuous functions. Such utility functions are also referred to as von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions. This is a central theme of the expected utility hypothesis in which an individual chooses not the highest expected value, but rather the highest expected utility. The expected utility maximizing individual makes decisions rationally based on the axioms of the theory.
3035: 259:, which has broad application in economics in addition to expected utility theory. He used this concept to formalize the idea that the same amount of additional money was less useful to an already-wealthy person than it would be to a poor person. The theory can also more accurately describe more realistic scenarios (where expected values are finite) than expected value alone. He proposed that a nonlinear function of utility of an outcome should be used instead of the 3478:, expected utility theory is a simplification of reality. The mathematical correctness of expected utility theory and the salience of its primitive concepts do not guarantee that expected utility theory is a reliable guide to human behavior or optimal practice. The mathematical clarity of expected utility theory has helped scientists design experiments to test its adequacy, and to distinguish systematic departures from its predictions. This has led to the field of 5821: 5810: 2664: 3448:, other desirable ends can also be included in utility such as pleasure, knowledge, friendship, etc. Originally the total utility of the consumer was the sum of independent utilities of the goods. However, the expected value theory was dropped as it was considered too static and deterministic. The classical counter example to the expected value theory (where everyone makes the same "correct" choice) is the 3030:{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}\operatorname {E} &=\operatorname {E} -b\operatorname {E} \\&=\operatorname {E} -b\operatorname {E} -a(w-\operatorname {E} )}]\\&=\operatorname {E} -be^{-a\operatorname {E} }\operatorname {E} )}]\\&={\text{expected wealth}}-b\cdot e^{-a\cdot {\text{expected wealth}}}\cdot {\text{risk}}.\end{aligned}}} 3547:
contexts are significantly different. This is demonstrated in the contrast of individual preferences under the insurance and lottery context shows the degree of indeterminacy of the expected utility theory. Additionally, experiments have shown systematic violations and generalizations based on the results of Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern.
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statement will be different for each person depending on intrinsic factors such as financial necessity or judgment about the company. For that reason, no state can rule out the performance of an act. Only when the state and the act are evaluated simultaneously, it becomes possible to determine an outcome with certainty.
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Additionally, he believed that outcomes must have the same utility regardless of state. For that reason, it is essential to correctly identify which statement is considered an outcome. For example, if someone says "I got the job" this affirmation is not considered an outcome, since the utility of the
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According to the empirical results there has been almost no recognition in decision theory of the distinction between the problem of justifying its theoretical claims regarding the properties of rational belief and desire. One of the main reasons is because people's basic tastes and preferences for
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is directly related to the curvature of the utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, while risk seeking individuals have convex utility functions and risk averse individuals have concave utility functions. The degree of risk aversion can be measured by the curvature
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In other words, if an individual's behavior always satisfies the above axioms, then there is a utility function such that the individual will choose one gamble over another if and only if the expected utility of one exceeds that of the other. The expected utility of any gamble may be expressed as a
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are defined over a set of bets where each option has a different yield. Ramsey believed that we always choose decisions to receive the best expected outcome according to our personal preferences. This implies that if we are able to understand the priorities and personal preferences of an individual
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exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, and for this reason is often avoided, although it has the advantage of offering substantial mathematical tractability when asset returns are normally distributed. Note that, as per the affine transformation property alluded to above, the utility function
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The theory of subjective expected utility combines two concepts: first, a personal utility function, and second, a personal probability distribution (usually based on Bayesian probability theory). This theoretical model has been known for its clear and elegant structure and its considered by some
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are considered insufficient to predict preferences and the expected utility. Additionally, experiments have shown systematic violations and generalizations based on the results of Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern. This is because preferences and utility functions constructed under different
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A decision that maximizes expected utility also maximizes the probability of the decision's consequences being preferable to some uncertain threshold. In the absence of uncertainty about the threshold, expected utility maximization simplifies to maximizing the probability of achieving some fixed
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is higher for low-probability events than the difference between the payout level of a particular outcome and its expected value. Bernoulli further proposed that it was not the goal of the gambler to maximize his expected gain but to instead maximize the logarithm of his gain.
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where it was demonstrated that people do not revise their degrees on belief in line with experimented probabilities and also that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. On the other hand, in updating probability distributions using evidence, a standard method uses
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If all these axioms are satisfied, then the individual is said to be rational and the preferences can be represented by a utility function, i.e. one can assign numbers (utilities) to each outcome of the lottery such that choosing the best lottery according to the preference
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The expected utility hypothesis states an agent chooses between risky prospects by comparing expected utility values (i.e. the weighted sum of adding the respective utility values of payoffs multiplied by their probabilities). The summarised formula for expected utility is
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pertains to well-defined preferences as well. It assumes that two gambles mixed with an irrelevant third one will maintain the same order of preference as when the two are presented independently of the third one. The independence axiom is the most controversial axiom..
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Although the expected utility hypothesis is standard in economic modelling, it has been found to be violated in psychological experiments. For many years, psychologists and economic theorists have been developing new theories to explain these deficiencies. These include
496:*If and only if all the axioms are satisfied one can use the information to reduce the uncertainty about the events that are out of their control. Additionally the theorem ranks the outcome according to a utility function that reflects the personal preferences. 3411:
target. If the uncertainty is uniformly distributed, then expected utility maximization becomes expected value maximization. Intermediate cases lead to increasing risk aversion above some fixed threshold and increasing risk seeking below a fixed threshold.
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For general utility functions, however, expected utility analysis does not permit the expression of preferences to be separated into two parameters with one representing the expected value of the variable in question and the other representing its risk.
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approaches to probability treat it as a degree of belief and thus they do not draw a distinction between risk and a wider concept of uncertainty: they deny the existence of Knightian uncertainty. They would model uncertain probabilities with
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Other critics argue applying expected utility to economic and policy decisions, has engendered inappropriate valuations, particularly in scenarios in which monetary units are used to scale the utility of nonmonetary outcomes, such as deaths.
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Starting with studies such as Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971), it was discovered that subjects sometimes exhibit signs of preference reversals with regard to their certainty equivalents of different lotteries. Specifically, when eliciting
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In the early days of the calculus of probability, classic utilitarians believed that the option which has the greatest utility will produce more pleasure or happiness for the agent and therefore must be chosen. The main problem with the
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In empirical applications, a number of violations of expected utility theory have been shown to be systematic and these falsifications have deepened understanding of how people actually decide.
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and its expected value are always negative: what matters for preference ordering is which of two gambles gives the higher expected utility, not the numerical values of those expected utilities.
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in which case the right side of this equation has a finite number of terms; or there could be an infinite set of discrete values, in which case the right side has an infinite number of terms.
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is not an adequate measure of the risk aversion of a utility function. Instead, it needs to be normalized. This leads to the definition of the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion:
304:, according to this theorem, we should be able to know the beliefs and utilities from a person just by looking at the choices they make (which is wrong). Ramsey defines a proposition as " 3444:
is that there might not be a unique correct way to quantify utility or to identify the best trade-offs. For example, some of the trade-offs may be intangible or qualitative. Rather than
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was originally suggested by Bernoulli (see above). It has relative risk aversion constant and equal to one, and is still sometimes assumed in economic analyses. The utility function
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Subjects changed their beliefs faster by conditioning on evidence (Bayes's theorem) than by using informal reasoning, according to a classic study by the psychologist Ward Edwards:
255:(involving infinite expected values) in 1713, prompting two Swiss mathematicians to develop expected utility theory as a solution. Bernoulli's paper was the first formalization of 1392: 448:(Savage, 1954) A preference < satisfies P1–P7 if and only if there is a finitely additive probability measure P and a function u : C → R such that for every pair of acts 1960: 445: 2008: 1916: 1875: 2645: 2069: 1659: 2037: 1827: 1605: 982: 916: 890: 864: 656: 630: 1702: 1456: 2324: 1774: 1738: 1519: 3126:
allowing different people to disagree about the degree of risk associated with any given portfolio. Individuals sharing a given risk measure (based on given value of
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illustrates that decision making based on expected value of monetary payoffs lead to absurd conclusions. When a probability distribution function has an infinite
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There are three components in the psychology field that are seen as crucial to the development of a more accurate descriptive theory of decision under risks.
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Psychologists have discovered systematic violations of probability calculations and behavior by humans. This have been evidenced with examples such as the
308:" when two possible outcomes have an equal value. In other words, if the probability can be defined in terms of a preference, each proposition should have 3894: 3534:" because they can depend on the way the problem is presented, not on the actual costs, rewards, or probabilities involved. Particular theories include 2142: 3530:
theories to account for instances where people's choices deviate from those predicted by expected utility theory. These deviations are described as "
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Lindley DV (September 1973). "The foundations of statistics (second edition), by Leonard J. Savage. Pp xv, 310. £1·75. 1972 (Dover/Constable)".
2412: 3597:, i.e. where the uncertain probabilities are modelled as distributions whose parameters are themselves drawn from a higher-level distribution ( 3747: 518:
A consequence is the description of all that is relevant to the decision maker's utility (e.g. monetary rewards, psychological factors, etc)
4836:(1964). "Foresight: its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources (translation of the 1937 article in French". In Kyburg HE, Smokler HE (eds.). 4806:(September 1989). "Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science (translation of 1931 article)". 1522: 547: 536: 506:
The specification of every aspect of the decision problem at hand or "A description of the world leaving no relevant aspect undescribed."
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Owen J, Rabinovitch R (1983). "On the class of elliptical distributions and their applications to the theory of portfolio choice".
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may occur. Thus one must make assumptions about the probabilities, but then the expected values of various decisions can be very
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expresses the utility of each respective payoff. Graphically the curvature of the u function captures the agent's risk attitude.
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The class of constant relative risk aversion utility functions contains three categories. Bernoulli's utility function
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assumes that, as an individual decides according to the completeness axiom, the individual also decides consistently.
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to the assumptions. This is particularly a problem when the expectation is dominated by rare extreme events, as in a
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has suggested that humans change their beliefs faster when using Bayesian methods than when using informal judgment.
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which showed empirically, how preferences of individuals are inconsistent among the same choices, depending on the
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to uncertainty of probability of outcomes, either not depending on probabilities of outcomes and only requiring
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is cardinal, in that implied behavior would be altered by a non-linear monotonic transformation of utility, the
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introduced the Ramsey's Representation Theorem. This representation theorem for expected utility assumed that
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Chamberlain G (1983). "A characterization of the distributions that imply mean-variance utility functions".
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assumes that an individual has well defined preferences and can always decide between any two alternatives.
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Lichtenstein S, Slovic P (1971). "Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions".
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preferences. The expected utility hypothesis imposes limitations on the utility function and makes utility
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In practice there will be many situations where the probabilities are unknown, and one is operating under
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Phillips LD, Edwards W (October 2008). "Chapter 6: Conservatism in a simple probability inference task (
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is ordinal because any monotonic increasing transformation of expected utility gives the same behavior.
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Schoemaker PJ (1982). "The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations".
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decision maker: completeness; transitivity; independence of irrelevant alternatives; and continuity.
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Often people refer to "risk" in the sense of a potentially quantifiable entity. In the context of
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Daniel Bernoulli drew attention to psychological and behavioral components behind the individual's
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Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
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Grether DM, Plott CR (1979). "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon".
3500: 3482:, which has produced deviations from expected utility theory to account for the empirical facts. 2584: 2572: 305: 276: 5060:
Briggs RA (2019). "Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility". In Zalta EN (ed.).
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Schoemaker PJ (1980). "Experiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis.".
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amounts to choosing the lottery with the highest expected utility. This result is called the
425: 3407:) functions, where ARA(w) is constant. They are often used in economics for simplification. 2356: 6022: 5981: 5885: 5736: 5656: 5588: 5503: 5397: 5333: 5121: 3662: 3657: 3611: 3589: 3563: 2579:
is used as a risk measure for portfolio return; however, this is only valid if returns are
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Edwards W (1968). "Conservatism in Human Information Processing". In Kleinmuntz, B (ed.).
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Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing Reprinted in Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing
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Pfanzagl J, Baumann V, Huber H (1968). "Events, Utility and Subjective Probability".
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losses cannot be represented with utility as they change under different scenarios.
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Oberhelman DD (June 2001). Zalta EN (ed.). "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy".
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can take on any of a continuous range of values, the expected utility is given by
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Edwards W (1982). "Conservatism in Human Information Processing (excerpted)". In
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Bell DE (December 1988). "One-switch utility functions and a measure of risk".
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Pratt JW (January–April 1964). "Risk aversion in the small and in the large".
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Castagnoli and LiCalzi, 1996; Bordley and LiCalzi, 2000; Bordley and Kirkwood
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in which the individual is then indifferent between this mix and the lottery
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The von Neumann–Morgenstern formulation is important in the application of
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Arrow KJ (1963). "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care".
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is its probability. There could be either a finite set of possible values
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where the left side is the subjective valuation of the gamble as a whole,
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Borch K (January 1969). "A note on uncertainty and indifference curves".
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maximize utility, meaning the subjective desirability of their actions.
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The expected utility theory takes into account that individuals may be
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of utility functions having hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA).
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to economics because it was developed shortly after the Hicks–Allen "
4822:(1937). "La Prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives". 4732:
Experiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis
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Arrow KJ (1965). "The theory of risk aversion". In Saatio YJ (ed.).
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An act is a finite-valued function that maps states to consequences.
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in order to be indifferent between both options. Ramsey shows that
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Holt C (1986). "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom".
4586:"Rationality, the Bayesian standpoint, and the Monty-Hall problem" 4036:, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1–36, 2009-01-21, 3633:
Better understanding of the psychologically relevant outcome space
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Vind K (February 2000). "von Neumann Morgenstern preferences".
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Essays in Mathematical Economics In Honor of Oskar Morgenstern
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Savage LJ (March 1951). "The Theory of Statistical Decision".
58:, builds this postulate to model aggregate social behaviour. 5483: 5365: 5345: 4915:
Pfanzagl J (1967). "Subjective Probability Derived from the
4118:(Third ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3389:{\displaystyle {\mathit {RRA}}(w)=-{\frac {wu''(w)}{u'(w)}}} 3270:{\displaystyle {\mathit {ARA}}(w)=-{\frac {u''(w)}{u'(w)}},} 5936: 5640: 3771:
Conte, Anna; Hey, John D.; Moffatt, Peter G. (2011-05-01).
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Axiom (Independence of irrelevant alternatives): For every
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Aase KK (January 2001). "On the St. Petersburg Paradox".
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The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays
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A Science of Decision Making:The Legacy of Ward Edwards
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in economic theory. However, while in this context the
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The Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is:
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has relative risk aversion equal to 1. The functions
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gives exactly the same preferences orderings as does
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von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representation theorem
4417:"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" 3403:) functions, where RRA(w) is constant, and the CARA ( 3312: 3286: 3193: 3109: 3046: 2667: 2596: 2547: 2514: 2415: 2392: 2359: 2332: 2296: 2265: 2145: 2111: 2091: 2045: 2019: 1971: 1924: 1886: 1841: 1788: 1746: 1710: 1671: 1616: 1566: 1556:
Examples of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions
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revolution" of the 1930s, and it revived the idea of
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affects a person's utility takes on one of a set of
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A psychologically richer theory of the determinants
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Special classes of utility functions are the CRRA (
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Savage's subjective expected utility representation
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Ramsey-theoretic approach to subjective probability
5100:"The time resolution of the St Petersburg paradox" 4931: 4768: 4634: 4111: 3828:Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox 3388: 3292: 3269: 3164:and show diminishing marginal wealth utility. The 3118: 3095: 3029: 2639: 2556: 2529: 2497: 2398: 2375: 2345: 2318: 2278: 2248: 2124: 2097: 2063: 2031: 2002: 1954: 1910: 1869: 1821: 1768: 1732: 1696: 1653: 1599: 1513: 1488: 1450: 1406: 1386: 1354: 1334: 1304: 1284: 1264: 1244: 1224: 1204: 1184: 1164: 1144: 1111: 1073: 1053: 976: 950: 910: 884: 858: 832: 812: 774: 754: 734: 714: 694: 674: 650: 624: 598: 578: 439: 408: 215:(though still not comparable across individuals). 192: 165: 145: 118: 5031:Aase KK (2001). "On the St. Petersburg Paradox". 4508:Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases 4071:"Attitudes to Uncertainty in a Strategic Setting" 1252:, then there should be a possible combination of 6009: 4068: 4874:Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern 4514: 4414: 4190: 3956:Journal of the American Statistical Association 3770: 2080: 4961:The psychology of judgment and decision making 4842:. Vol. 7. New York: Wiley. pp. 1–68. 3895:"Ramsey and the Ethically Neutral Proposition" 2567:Measuring risk in the expected utility context 279:and proposed that the utility of wealth has a 5851: 5184: 4890: 4876:. New York University Press. pp. 65–70. 3949: 3947: 3471:of the choices, i.e. how they are presented. 3414: 3172:Since the risk attitudes are unchanged under 1126:assumes that when there are three lotteries ( 550:of the expected utility theory that define a 4671: 3748:"Expected Utility Theory | Encyclopedia.com" 3605:Preference reversals over uncertain outcomes 2650:for individual-specific positive parameters 499:The key ingredients in Savage's theory are: 4904:Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 4864: 4163: 3825: 3586:), or being less sensitive to assumptions. 1740:; thus it is irrelevant that the values of 1054:{\displaystyle tA+(1-t)C\succeq tB+(1-t)C,} 153:is the probability that outcome indexed by 5957:Heuristics in judgment and decision-making 5858: 5844: 5191: 5177: 5158: 5069:Hacking I (1980). "Strange Expectations". 4993: 4848: 4832: 4818: 4802: 4729: 4387: 4064: 4062: 4060: 3944: 243: 5141: 5115: 5020:Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach 4771:Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk 4656: 4611: 4601: 4086: 4069:Li Z, Loomes G, Pogrebna G (2017-05-01). 2485: 4914: 4583: 4523:. Oxford University Press. p. 536. 4032:"1. Foundations of probability theory", 3518: 409:{\displaystyle P(E)=(1-U(m))(U(b)-U(w))} 5068: 5062:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4938:. Princeton University Press. pp.  4493: 4487:Formal Representation of Human Judgment 4484: 4057: 3988: 3858: 924:Independence of irrelevant alternatives 662:This means that the individual prefers 537:Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem 531:Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem 119:{\displaystyle U(p)=\sum u(x_{k})p_{k}} 14: 6010: 5097: 5059: 4967: 4368: 4110:von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1953) . 3953: 3914: 3570:. Alternative decision techniques are 5839: 5172: 4955: 4789: 4766: 4544: 4542: 4281: 4252: 4128: 4114:Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 3773:"Mixture models of choice under risk" 2658:. Then expected utility is given by 2039:have relative risk aversion equal to 1918:have relative risk aversion equal to 512:A set of states identified by someone 207:Standard utility functions represent 5030: 4973:"Chapter VII: Truth and Probability" 4824:Annales de l'Institut Henri PoincarĂ© 4700: 4548: 4458:"Expected utility | decision theory" 4325: 4225: 3821: 3819: 3817: 5865: 5161:Experiments on Decisions under Risk 4900:"On Small Differences in Sensation" 4775:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4375:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3892: 3830:. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 1387:{\displaystyle A\succeq B\succeq C} 24: 5747:Microfoundations of macroeconomics 5198: 4759: 4723: 4637:Journal of Experimental Psychology 4539: 4517:Journal of Experimental Psychology 4381: 4319: 4275: 4246: 3880:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00320.x 3617: 3315: 3196: 3076: 3047: 2944: 2915: 2898: 2866: 2833: 2803: 2783: 2762: 2724: 2703: 2672: 2456: 2451: 2416: 2146: 1955:{\displaystyle 1-\alpha \in (0,1)} 542:The von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms 25: 6049: 4839:Studies in Subjective Probability 4551:Journal of Mathematical Economics 3861:"Ramsey's Representation Theorem" 3814: 2003:{\displaystyle u(w)=-w^{\alpha }} 5820: 5819: 5808: 3826:Allais M, Hagen O, eds. (1979). 3490:Conservatism in updating beliefs 3145: 2585:jointly elliptically distributed 1911:{\displaystyle \alpha \in (0,1)} 1870:{\displaystyle u(w)=w^{\alpha }} 794:Axiom (Transitivity): For every 566:Axiom (Completeness): For every 238: 34:is a foundational assumption in 4694: 4665: 4628: 4577: 4474: 4450: 4408: 4369:Martin, Robert (16 June 2008). 4362: 4310: 4219: 4184: 4157: 4122: 4103: 3708:Rank-dependent expected utility 3540:rank-dependent expected utility 3405:constant absolute risk aversion 3401:constant relative risk aversion 2640:{\displaystyle u(w)=w-be^{-aw}} 2064:{\displaystyle 1-\alpha >1.} 440:Savage's representation theorem 225:rank-dependent expected utility 5033:Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 4996:Journal of Economic Literature 4415:Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979). 4328:Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 4034:Interpretations of Probability 4025: 3982: 3968:10.1080/01621459.1951.10500768 3908: 3902:Australian National University 3886: 3852: 3764: 3740: 3380: 3374: 3361: 3355: 3332: 3326: 3258: 3252: 3239: 3233: 3213: 3207: 3090: 3085: 3067: 3053: 2964: 2959: 2956: 2950: 2935: 2921: 2910: 2904: 2878: 2872: 2853: 2848: 2845: 2839: 2824: 2815: 2809: 2789: 2774: 2768: 2749: 2730: 2715: 2709: 2693: 2690: 2684: 2678: 2606: 2600: 2524: 2518: 2482: 2476: 2470: 2464: 2437: 2434: 2428: 2422: 2313: 2300: 2237: 2224: 2202: 2189: 2167: 2164: 2158: 2152: 1981: 1975: 1949: 1937: 1905: 1893: 1851: 1845: 1816: 1810: 1798: 1792: 1626: 1620: 1594: 1588: 1576: 1570: 1483: 1471: 1442: 1430: 1106: 1094: 1042: 1030: 1012: 1000: 403: 400: 394: 385: 379: 373: 370: 367: 361: 349: 343: 337: 263:of an outcome, accounting for 103: 90: 78: 72: 13: 1: 4872:". In Andrew Schotter (ed.). 4868:(1976). "Some Reflections on 4563:10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00004-x 4510:. Cambridge University Press. 3792:10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.10.011 3734: 1654:{\displaystyle u(w)=-e^{-aw}} 1172:) and the individual prefers 446:Savage representation theorem 4371:"The St. Petersburg Paradox" 4178:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90129-1 3673:Generalized expected utility 3528:generalized expected utility 3434: 2539:probability density function 2081:Formula for expected utility 2032:{\displaystyle \alpha <0} 1822:{\displaystyle u(w)=\log(w)} 1600:{\displaystyle u(w)=\log(w)} 1061:must hold for every lottery 742:, or is indifferent between 281:diminishing marginal utility 7: 5881:Expected utility hypothesis 5692:Civil engineering economics 5677:Statistical decision theory 5317:Income elasticity of demand 3723:Subjective expected utility 3640: 32:expected utility hypothesis 10: 6054: 5997:Evidential decision theory 5327:Price elasticity of supply 5322:Price elasticity of demand 5312:Cross elasticity of demand 5045:10.1080/034612301750077356 4951:. Wiley. pp. 195–220. 4402:10.1108/rr.2001.15.6.9.311 4340:10.1080/034612301750077356 4166:Journal of Economic Theory 4131:Review of Economic Studies 3728:Two-moment decision models 3544:cumulative prospect theory 3415:The St. Petersburg paradox 3149: 977:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 911:{\displaystyle A\succeq C} 885:{\displaystyle B\succeq C} 859:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 651:{\displaystyle A\preceq B} 625:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 534: 229:cumulative prospect theory 200:is realized, and function 5932:Principle of indifference 5894: 5873: 5803: 5770: 5649: 5206: 5024:Stanford University Press 4740:10.1007/978-94-017-5040-0 4584:Baratgin J (2015-08-11). 4003:10.1017/s0025557200132589 3836:10.1007/978-94-015-7629-1 3169:of the utility function. 3040:Thus the risk measure is 1697:{\displaystyle K-e^{-aw}} 1550:expected utility function 1451:{\displaystyle pA+(1-p)C} 5383:Income–consumption curve 4792:American Economic Review 4704:American Economic Review 4675:American Economic Review 4603:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01168 4267:: CS1 maint: location ( 3991:The Mathematical Gazette 3915:Briggs RA (2014-08-08). 3568:long-tailed distribution 3463:in 1979 presented their 3180:, the second derivative 2319:{\displaystyle u(x_{i})} 1769:{\displaystyle -e^{-aw}} 1733:{\displaystyle -e^{-aw}} 1514:{\displaystyle \succeq } 1414:is equally preferred to 1316:Axiom (Continuity): Let 5992:Emotional choice theory 5717:Industrial organization 4590:Frontiers in Psychology 4462:Encyclopedia Britannica 4240:10.1287/mnsc.34.12.1416 4042:10.1515/9783110213195.1 3780:Journal of Econometrics 3501:conditional probability 277:decision-making process 244:Bernoulli's formulation 5987:Causal decision theory 5952:St. Petersburg paradox 5902:Decision-matrix method 5134:10.1098/rsta.2011.0065 4730:Schoemaker PJ (1980). 3932:Cite journal requires 3450:St. Petersburg Paradox 3421:St. Petersburg paradox 3390: 3294: 3271: 3174:affine transformations 3120: 3097: 3031: 2641: 2573:mean-variance analysis 2558: 2531: 2499: 2400: 2377: 2376:{\displaystyle x_{i},} 2347: 2326:is its valuation, and 2320: 2280: 2250: 2126: 2099: 2065: 2033: 2004: 1956: 1912: 1871: 1823: 1770: 1734: 1698: 1655: 1601: 1515: 1490: 1452: 1408: 1388: 1356: 1336: 1306: 1286: 1266: 1246: 1226: 1206: 1186: 1166: 1146: 1113: 1075: 1055: 978: 952: 912: 886: 860: 834: 814: 776: 756: 736: 716: 696: 676: 652: 626: 600: 580: 410: 253:St. Petersburg paradox 194: 167: 147: 120: 52:Rational choice theory 36:mathematical economics 6028:Motivational theories 5967:Bayesian epistemology 5687:Engineering economics 5282:Cost–benefit analysis 5071:Philosophy of Science 4949:Theory of Measurement 4854:Theory of Probability 3688:Lottery (probability) 3612:certainty equivalents 3556:Knightian uncertainty 3526:has produced several 3519:Irrational deviations 3442:expected value theory 3391: 3295: 3272: 3136:Entropic risk measure 3121: 3098: 3032: 2642: 2559: 2532: 2500: 2401: 2378: 2348: 2346:{\displaystyle p_{i}} 2321: 2290:th possible outcome, 2281: 2279:{\displaystyle x_{i}} 2251: 2127: 2125:{\displaystyle x_{i}} 2100: 2066: 2034: 2005: 1962:. And the functions 1957: 1913: 1872: 1824: 1771: 1735: 1699: 1656: 1602: 1560:The utility function 1516: 1491: 1489:{\displaystyle p\in } 1453: 1409: 1389: 1357: 1337: 1307: 1287: 1267: 1247: 1227: 1207: 1187: 1167: 1147: 1114: 1112:{\displaystyle t\in } 1076: 1056: 979: 953: 913: 887: 861: 835: 815: 777: 757: 737: 717: 697: 677: 653: 627: 601: 581: 426:Leonard Jimmie Savage 411: 195: 193:{\displaystyle x_{k}} 168: 148: 146:{\displaystyle p_{k}} 121: 46:. It postulates that 5982:Social choice theory 5886:Intertemporal choice 5504:Price discrimination 5398:Intertemporal choice 4075:The Economic Journal 3752:www.encyclopedia.com 3663:Behavioral economics 3658:Bayesian probability 3310: 3284: 3191: 3107: 3044: 2665: 2594: 2581:normally distributed 2545: 2530:{\displaystyle f(x)} 2512: 2413: 2390: 2357: 2330: 2294: 2263: 2143: 2109: 2089: 2043: 2017: 1969: 1922: 1884: 1839: 1786: 1744: 1708: 1669: 1614: 1564: 1505: 1462: 1418: 1398: 1366: 1346: 1320: 1296: 1276: 1256: 1236: 1216: 1196: 1176: 1156: 1130: 1085: 1065: 988: 962: 936: 896: 870: 844: 824: 798: 766: 746: 726: 706: 686: 666: 636: 610: 590: 570: 331: 177: 157: 130: 66: 27:Concept in economics 5917:Strategic dominance 5815:Business portal 5752:Operations research 5579:Substitution effect 5126:2011RSPTA.369.4913P 5110:(1956): 4913–4931. 3630:effect (psychology) 3595:hierarchical models 3507:. An experiment on 3446:monetary incentives 2460: 1335:{\displaystyle A,B} 1145:{\displaystyle A,B} 951:{\displaystyle A,B} 813:{\displaystyle A,B} 233:bounded rationality 54:, a cornerstone of 5962:Probability theory 5393:Indifference curve 5361:Goods and services 5302:Economies of scope 5297:Economies of scale 5098:Peters O (2011) . 4860:. New York: Wiley. 4228:Management Science 4193:Journal of Finance 4088:10.1111/ecoj.12486 3859:Bradley R (2004). 3718:Risk in psychology 3698:Priority heuristic 3678:Indifference price 3653:Ambiguity aversion 3524:Behavioral finance 3496:Monty Hall problem 3480:behavioral finance 3476:mathematical model 3386: 3290: 3267: 3119:{\displaystyle a,} 3116: 3093: 3027: 3025: 2637: 2557:{\displaystyle x.} 2554: 2527: 2495: 2443: 2396: 2373: 2343: 2316: 2276: 2246: 2122: 2095: 2061: 2029: 2000: 1952: 1908: 1867: 1819: 1766: 1730: 1694: 1651: 1597: 1511: 1486: 1448: 1404: 1384: 1362:be lotteries with 1352: 1332: 1302: 1282: 1262: 1242: 1222: 1202: 1182: 1162: 1142: 1109: 1071: 1051: 974: 948: 908: 882: 856: 830: 810: 772: 752: 732: 712: 692: 672: 648: 622: 596: 576: 406: 249:Nicolaus Bernoulli 190: 163: 143: 116: 6033:Optimal decisions 6005: 6004: 5833: 5832: 5795:Political economy 5594:Supply and demand 5474:Pareto efficiency 4883:978-0-8147-7771-8 4782:978-0-19-823303-9 4749:978-94-017-5042-4 4530:978-0-19-532298-9 4390:Reference Reviews 4051:978-3-11-021319-5 3845:978-90-481-8354-8 3576:scenario analysis 3425:Nicolas Bernoulli 3384: 3293:{\displaystyle w} 3262: 3018: 3008: 2980: 2399:{\displaystyle x} 2098:{\displaystyle x} 1407:{\displaystyle B} 1355:{\displaystyle C} 1305:{\displaystyle B} 1285:{\displaystyle C} 1265:{\displaystyle A} 1245:{\displaystyle C} 1225:{\displaystyle B} 1205:{\displaystyle B} 1185:{\displaystyle A} 1165:{\displaystyle C} 1074:{\displaystyle C} 984:, the preference 833:{\displaystyle C} 775:{\displaystyle B} 755:{\displaystyle A} 735:{\displaystyle A} 715:{\displaystyle B} 695:{\displaystyle B} 675:{\displaystyle A} 599:{\displaystyle B} 579:{\displaystyle A} 306:ethically neutral 166:{\displaystyle k} 16:(Redirected from 6045: 6038:Expected utility 5947:Ellsberg paradox 5912:Expected utility 5860: 5853: 5846: 5837: 5836: 5823: 5822: 5813: 5812: 5555:Returns to scale 5413:Market structure 5193: 5186: 5179: 5170: 5169: 5164: 5155: 5145: 5119: 5094: 5065: 5056: 5027: 5003: 4990: 4988: 4982:. Archived from 4977: 4964: 4952: 4943: 4937: 4911: 4887: 4861: 4856:. Translated by 4843: 4827: 4815: 4799: 4786: 4774: 4767:Anand P (1993). 4754: 4753: 4727: 4721: 4720: 4698: 4692: 4691: 4669: 4663: 4662: 4660: 4649:10.1037/h0031207 4632: 4626: 4625: 4615: 4605: 4581: 4575: 4574: 4546: 4537: 4534: 4511: 4490: 4478: 4472: 4471: 4469: 4468: 4454: 4448: 4447: 4421: 4412: 4406: 4405: 4385: 4379: 4378: 4366: 4360: 4359: 4323: 4317: 4314: 4308: 4307: 4290:(1/2): 122–136. 4279: 4273: 4272: 4266: 4258: 4250: 4244: 4243: 4223: 4217: 4216: 4188: 4182: 4181: 4161: 4155: 4154: 4126: 4120: 4119: 4117: 4107: 4101: 4100: 4090: 4081:(601): 809–826. 4066: 4055: 4054: 4029: 4023: 4022: 3997:(401): 220–221. 3986: 3980: 3979: 3951: 3942: 3941: 3935: 3930: 3928: 3920: 3912: 3906: 3905: 3899: 3890: 3884: 3883: 3865: 3856: 3850: 3849: 3823: 3812: 3811: 3777: 3768: 3762: 3761: 3759: 3758: 3744: 3693:Marginal utility 3628:decision framing 3554:. In economics, 3395: 3393: 3392: 3387: 3385: 3383: 3373: 3364: 3354: 3342: 3325: 3324: 3299: 3297: 3296: 3291: 3276: 3274: 3273: 3268: 3263: 3261: 3251: 3242: 3232: 3223: 3206: 3205: 3125: 3123: 3122: 3117: 3102: 3100: 3099: 3094: 3089: 3088: 3036: 3034: 3033: 3028: 3026: 3019: 3016: 3011: 3010: 3009: 3006: 2981: 2978: 2970: 2963: 2962: 2914: 2913: 2859: 2852: 2851: 2755: 2748: 2747: 2646: 2644: 2643: 2638: 2636: 2635: 2563: 2561: 2560: 2555: 2536: 2534: 2533: 2528: 2504: 2502: 2501: 2496: 2459: 2454: 2405: 2403: 2402: 2397: 2382: 2380: 2379: 2374: 2369: 2368: 2352: 2350: 2349: 2344: 2342: 2341: 2325: 2323: 2322: 2317: 2312: 2311: 2285: 2283: 2282: 2277: 2275: 2274: 2255: 2253: 2252: 2247: 2236: 2235: 2217: 2216: 2201: 2200: 2182: 2181: 2131: 2129: 2128: 2123: 2121: 2120: 2104: 2102: 2101: 2096: 2085:When the entity 2070: 2068: 2067: 2062: 2038: 2036: 2035: 2030: 2009: 2007: 2006: 2001: 1999: 1998: 1961: 1959: 1958: 1953: 1917: 1915: 1914: 1909: 1876: 1874: 1873: 1868: 1866: 1865: 1828: 1826: 1825: 1820: 1775: 1773: 1772: 1767: 1765: 1764: 1739: 1737: 1736: 1731: 1729: 1728: 1703: 1701: 1700: 1695: 1693: 1692: 1660: 1658: 1657: 1652: 1650: 1649: 1606: 1604: 1603: 1598: 1546:utility function 1542:cardinal utility 1520: 1518: 1517: 1512: 1495: 1493: 1492: 1487: 1457: 1455: 1454: 1449: 1413: 1411: 1410: 1405: 1393: 1391: 1390: 1385: 1361: 1359: 1358: 1353: 1341: 1339: 1338: 1333: 1311: 1309: 1308: 1303: 1291: 1289: 1288: 1283: 1271: 1269: 1268: 1263: 1251: 1249: 1248: 1243: 1231: 1229: 1228: 1223: 1211: 1209: 1208: 1203: 1191: 1189: 1188: 1183: 1171: 1169: 1168: 1163: 1151: 1149: 1148: 1143: 1118: 1116: 1115: 1110: 1080: 1078: 1077: 1072: 1060: 1058: 1057: 1052: 983: 981: 980: 975: 957: 955: 954: 949: 917: 915: 914: 909: 891: 889: 888: 883: 865: 863: 862: 857: 839: 837: 836: 831: 819: 817: 816: 811: 781: 779: 778: 773: 761: 759: 758: 753: 741: 739: 738: 733: 721: 719: 718: 713: 701: 699: 698: 693: 681: 679: 678: 673: 657: 655: 654: 649: 631: 629: 628: 623: 605: 603: 602: 597: 585: 583: 582: 577: 415: 413: 412: 407: 323: 321: 320: 317: 314: 257:marginal utility 199: 197: 196: 191: 189: 188: 172: 170: 169: 164: 152: 150: 149: 144: 142: 141: 125: 123: 122: 117: 115: 114: 102: 101: 21: 18:Expected utility 6053: 6052: 6048: 6047: 6046: 6044: 6043: 6042: 6018:Belief revision 6008: 6007: 6006: 6001: 5907:Decision matrix 5890: 5869: 5867:Decision theory 5864: 5834: 5829: 5807: 5799: 5766: 5645: 5287:Deadweight loss 5224:Consumer choice 5202: 5197: 5167: 4986: 4975: 4884: 4783: 4762: 4760:Further reading 4757: 4750: 4728: 4724: 4699: 4695: 4670: 4666: 4633: 4629: 4582: 4578: 4547: 4540: 4531: 4496:Daniel Kahneman 4481: 4479: 4475: 4466: 4464: 4456: 4455: 4451: 4436:10.2307/1914185 4419: 4413: 4409: 4386: 4382: 4367: 4363: 4324: 4320: 4315: 4311: 4296:10.2307/1913738 4280: 4276: 4260: 4259: 4251: 4247: 4234:(12): 1416–24. 4224: 4220: 4205:10.2307/2328079 4189: 4185: 4162: 4158: 4143:10.2307/2296336 4127: 4123: 4108: 4104: 4067: 4058: 4052: 4031: 4030: 4026: 3987: 3983: 3952: 3945: 3933: 3931: 3922: 3921: 3913: 3909: 3897: 3891: 3887: 3863: 3857: 3853: 3846: 3824: 3815: 3775: 3769: 3765: 3756: 3754: 3746: 3745: 3741: 3737: 3732: 3703:Prospect theory 3668:Decision theory 3643: 3620: 3618:Recommendations 3607: 3536:prospect theory 3521: 3509:belief revision 3492: 3465:prospect theory 3457:Daniel Kahneman 3437: 3417: 3366: 3365: 3347: 3343: 3341: 3314: 3313: 3311: 3308: 3307: 3285: 3282: 3281: 3244: 3243: 3225: 3224: 3222: 3195: 3194: 3192: 3189: 3188: 3154: 3148: 3108: 3105: 3104: 3060: 3056: 3045: 3042: 3041: 3024: 3023: 3015: 3007:expected wealth 3005: 2995: 2991: 2979:expected wealth 2977: 2968: 2967: 2928: 2924: 2891: 2887: 2857: 2856: 2796: 2792: 2753: 2752: 2737: 2733: 2696: 2668: 2666: 2663: 2662: 2625: 2621: 2595: 2592: 2591: 2569: 2546: 2543: 2542: 2513: 2510: 2509: 2455: 2447: 2414: 2411: 2410: 2391: 2388: 2387: 2364: 2360: 2358: 2355: 2354: 2337: 2333: 2331: 2328: 2327: 2307: 2303: 2295: 2292: 2291: 2270: 2266: 2264: 2261: 2260: 2231: 2227: 2212: 2208: 2196: 2192: 2177: 2173: 2144: 2141: 2140: 2134:discrete values 2116: 2112: 2110: 2107: 2106: 2090: 2087: 2086: 2083: 2044: 2041: 2040: 2018: 2015: 2014: 1994: 1990: 1970: 1967: 1966: 1923: 1920: 1919: 1885: 1882: 1881: 1861: 1857: 1840: 1837: 1836: 1787: 1784: 1783: 1754: 1750: 1745: 1742: 1741: 1718: 1714: 1709: 1706: 1705: 1682: 1678: 1670: 1667: 1666: 1639: 1635: 1615: 1612: 1611: 1565: 1562: 1561: 1558: 1506: 1503: 1502: 1463: 1460: 1459: 1419: 1416: 1415: 1399: 1396: 1395: 1367: 1364: 1363: 1347: 1344: 1343: 1321: 1318: 1317: 1297: 1294: 1293: 1277: 1274: 1273: 1257: 1254: 1253: 1237: 1234: 1233: 1217: 1214: 1213: 1197: 1194: 1193: 1177: 1174: 1173: 1157: 1154: 1153: 1131: 1128: 1127: 1086: 1083: 1082: 1066: 1063: 1062: 989: 986: 985: 963: 960: 959: 937: 934: 933: 897: 894: 893: 871: 868: 867: 845: 842: 841: 825: 822: 821: 799: 796: 795: 767: 764: 763: 747: 744: 743: 727: 724: 723: 707: 704: 703: 687: 684: 683: 667: 664: 663: 637: 634: 633: 611: 608: 607: 591: 588: 587: 571: 568: 567: 544: 539: 533: 442: 422: 332: 329: 328: 318: 315: 312: 311: 309: 289: 246: 241: 221:prospect theory 184: 180: 178: 175: 174: 158: 155: 154: 137: 133: 131: 128: 127: 110: 106: 97: 93: 67: 64: 63: 48:rational agents 40:decision making 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 6051: 6041: 6040: 6035: 6030: 6025: 6020: 6003: 6002: 6000: 5999: 5994: 5989: 5984: 5979: 5974: 5969: 5964: 5959: 5954: 5949: 5944: 5942:Allais paradox 5939: 5934: 5929: 5924: 5919: 5914: 5909: 5904: 5898: 5896: 5892: 5891: 5889: 5888: 5883: 5877: 5875: 5871: 5870: 5863: 5862: 5855: 5848: 5840: 5831: 5830: 5828: 5827: 5817: 5804: 5801: 5800: 5798: 5797: 5792: 5790:Macroeconomics 5787: 5786: 5785: 5774: 5772: 5768: 5767: 5765: 5764: 5759: 5754: 5749: 5744: 5739: 5734: 5729: 5724: 5719: 5714: 5709: 5704: 5699: 5694: 5689: 5684: 5679: 5674: 5669: 5664: 5659: 5653: 5651: 5647: 5646: 5644: 5643: 5638: 5637: 5636: 5631: 5621: 5616: 5615: 5614: 5605: 5591: 5586: 5581: 5576: 5567: 5562: 5557: 5552: 5547: 5542: 5537: 5532: 5527: 5526: 5525: 5520: 5511: 5506: 5501: 5496: 5491: 5489:Price controls 5481: 5476: 5471: 5470: 5469: 5464: 5459: 5454: 5453: 5452: 5447: 5437: 5432: 5431: 5430: 5425: 5410: 5408:Market failure 5405: 5400: 5395: 5390: 5385: 5380: 5375: 5374: 5373: 5368: 5358: 5353: 5348: 5343: 5342: 5341: 5331: 5330: 5329: 5324: 5319: 5314: 5304: 5299: 5294: 5289: 5284: 5279: 5278: 5277: 5272: 5267: 5262: 5261: 5260: 5250: 5245: 5235: 5226: 5221: 5216: 5210: 5208: 5204: 5203: 5200:Microeconomics 5196: 5195: 5188: 5181: 5173: 5166: 5165: 5156: 5095: 5083:10.1086/288956 5077:(4): 562–567. 5066: 5057: 5028: 5004: 4991: 4989:on 2006-10-14. 4965: 4953: 4944: 4924:Utility Theory 4912: 4888: 4882: 4862: 4845: 4844: 4829: 4828: 4816: 4800: 4787: 4781: 4763: 4761: 4758: 4756: 4755: 4748: 4722: 4711:(3): 508–515. 4693: 4682:(4): 623–638. 4664: 4627: 4576: 4557:(1): 109–122. 4538: 4536: 4535: 4529: 4512: 4491: 4473: 4449: 4430:(2): 263–292. 4407: 4380: 4361: 4318: 4309: 4274: 4245: 4218: 4199:(3): 745–752. 4183: 4172:(1): 185–201. 4156: 4121: 4102: 4056: 4050: 4024: 3981: 3962:(253): 55–67. 3943: 3934:|journal= 3907: 3885: 3874:(4): 483–498. 3851: 3844: 3813: 3763: 3738: 3736: 3733: 3731: 3730: 3725: 3720: 3715: 3710: 3705: 3700: 3695: 3690: 3685: 3680: 3675: 3670: 3665: 3660: 3655: 3650: 3648:Allais paradox 3644: 3642: 3639: 3638: 3637: 3634: 3631: 3619: 3616: 3606: 3603: 3584:minimax regret 3520: 3517: 3491: 3488: 3436: 3433: 3429:expected value 3416: 3413: 3397: 3396: 3382: 3379: 3376: 3372: 3369: 3363: 3360: 3357: 3353: 3350: 3346: 3340: 3337: 3334: 3331: 3328: 3323: 3320: 3317: 3289: 3278: 3277: 3266: 3260: 3257: 3254: 3250: 3247: 3241: 3238: 3235: 3231: 3228: 3221: 3218: 3215: 3212: 3209: 3204: 3201: 3198: 3150:Main article: 3147: 3144: 3115: 3112: 3092: 3087: 3084: 3081: 3078: 3075: 3072: 3069: 3066: 3063: 3059: 3055: 3052: 3049: 3038: 3037: 3022: 3014: 3004: 3001: 2998: 2994: 2990: 2987: 2984: 2976: 2973: 2971: 2969: 2966: 2961: 2958: 2955: 2952: 2949: 2946: 2943: 2940: 2937: 2934: 2931: 2927: 2923: 2920: 2917: 2912: 2909: 2906: 2903: 2900: 2897: 2894: 2890: 2886: 2883: 2880: 2877: 2874: 2871: 2868: 2865: 2862: 2860: 2858: 2855: 2850: 2847: 2844: 2841: 2838: 2835: 2832: 2829: 2826: 2823: 2820: 2817: 2814: 2811: 2808: 2805: 2802: 2799: 2795: 2791: 2788: 2785: 2782: 2779: 2776: 2773: 2770: 2767: 2764: 2761: 2758: 2756: 2754: 2751: 2746: 2743: 2740: 2736: 2732: 2729: 2726: 2723: 2720: 2717: 2714: 2711: 2708: 2705: 2702: 2699: 2697: 2695: 2692: 2689: 2686: 2683: 2680: 2677: 2674: 2671: 2670: 2648: 2647: 2634: 2631: 2628: 2624: 2620: 2617: 2614: 2611: 2608: 2605: 2602: 2599: 2568: 2565: 2553: 2550: 2526: 2523: 2520: 2517: 2506: 2505: 2494: 2491: 2488: 2484: 2481: 2478: 2475: 2472: 2469: 2466: 2463: 2458: 2453: 2450: 2446: 2442: 2439: 2436: 2433: 2430: 2427: 2424: 2421: 2418: 2395: 2372: 2367: 2363: 2340: 2336: 2315: 2310: 2306: 2302: 2299: 2273: 2269: 2257: 2256: 2245: 2242: 2239: 2234: 2230: 2226: 2223: 2220: 2215: 2211: 2207: 2204: 2199: 2195: 2191: 2188: 2185: 2180: 2176: 2172: 2169: 2166: 2163: 2160: 2157: 2154: 2151: 2148: 2119: 2115: 2094: 2082: 2079: 2075:the discussion 2060: 2057: 2054: 2051: 2048: 2028: 2025: 2022: 2011: 2010: 1997: 1993: 1989: 1986: 1983: 1980: 1977: 1974: 1951: 1948: 1945: 1942: 1939: 1936: 1933: 1930: 1927: 1907: 1904: 1901: 1898: 1895: 1892: 1889: 1878: 1877: 1864: 1860: 1856: 1853: 1850: 1847: 1844: 1830: 1829: 1818: 1815: 1812: 1809: 1806: 1803: 1800: 1797: 1794: 1791: 1763: 1760: 1757: 1753: 1749: 1727: 1724: 1721: 1717: 1713: 1691: 1688: 1685: 1681: 1677: 1674: 1662: 1661: 1648: 1645: 1642: 1638: 1634: 1631: 1628: 1625: 1622: 1619: 1596: 1593: 1590: 1587: 1584: 1581: 1578: 1575: 1572: 1569: 1557: 1554: 1510: 1498: 1497: 1485: 1482: 1479: 1476: 1473: 1470: 1467: 1447: 1444: 1441: 1438: 1435: 1432: 1429: 1426: 1423: 1403: 1383: 1380: 1377: 1374: 1371: 1351: 1331: 1328: 1325: 1301: 1281: 1261: 1241: 1221: 1201: 1181: 1161: 1141: 1138: 1135: 1121: 1120: 1108: 1105: 1102: 1099: 1096: 1093: 1090: 1070: 1050: 1047: 1044: 1041: 1038: 1035: 1032: 1029: 1026: 1023: 1020: 1017: 1014: 1011: 1008: 1005: 1002: 999: 996: 993: 973: 970: 967: 947: 944: 941: 920: 919: 907: 904: 901: 881: 878: 875: 855: 852: 849: 829: 809: 806: 803: 771: 751: 731: 711: 691: 671: 660: 659: 647: 644: 641: 621: 618: 615: 595: 575: 543: 540: 535:Main article: 532: 529: 528: 527: 519: 513: 507: 441: 438: 424:In the 1950s, 421: 418: 417: 416: 405: 402: 399: 396: 393: 390: 387: 384: 381: 378: 375: 372: 369: 366: 363: 360: 357: 354: 351: 348: 345: 342: 339: 336: 288: 285: 261:expected value 251:described the 245: 242: 240: 237: 187: 183: 162: 140: 136: 113: 109: 105: 100: 96: 92: 89: 86: 83: 80: 77: 74: 71: 56:microeconomics 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6050: 6039: 6036: 6034: 6031: 6029: 6026: 6024: 6021: 6019: 6016: 6015: 6013: 5998: 5995: 5993: 5990: 5988: 5985: 5983: 5980: 5978: 5975: 5973: 5972:Risk aversion 5970: 5968: 5965: 5963: 5960: 5958: 5955: 5953: 5950: 5948: 5945: 5943: 5940: 5938: 5935: 5933: 5930: 5928: 5925: 5923: 5920: 5918: 5915: 5913: 5910: 5908: 5905: 5903: 5900: 5899: 5897: 5893: 5887: 5884: 5882: 5879: 5878: 5876: 5872: 5868: 5861: 5856: 5854: 5849: 5847: 5842: 5841: 5838: 5826: 5818: 5816: 5811: 5806: 5805: 5802: 5796: 5793: 5791: 5788: 5784: 5781: 5780: 5779: 5776: 5775: 5773: 5769: 5763: 5760: 5758: 5755: 5753: 5750: 5748: 5745: 5743: 5740: 5738: 5735: 5733: 5730: 5728: 5725: 5723: 5722:Institutional 5720: 5718: 5715: 5713: 5710: 5708: 5705: 5703: 5700: 5698: 5695: 5693: 5690: 5688: 5685: 5683: 5680: 5678: 5675: 5673: 5670: 5668: 5667:Computational 5665: 5663: 5660: 5658: 5655: 5654: 5652: 5648: 5642: 5639: 5635: 5632: 5630: 5627: 5626: 5625: 5622: 5620: 5617: 5613: 5612:Law of supply 5609: 5606: 5604: 5603:Law of demand 5600: 5597: 5596: 5595: 5592: 5590: 5589:Social choice 5587: 5585: 5582: 5580: 5577: 5575: 5574:Excess supply 5571: 5568: 5566: 5563: 5561: 5560:Risk aversion 5558: 5556: 5553: 5551: 5548: 5546: 5543: 5541: 5538: 5536: 5533: 5531: 5528: 5524: 5521: 5519: 5515: 5512: 5510: 5507: 5505: 5502: 5500: 5497: 5495: 5494:Price ceiling 5492: 5490: 5487: 5486: 5485: 5482: 5480: 5477: 5475: 5472: 5468: 5465: 5463: 5460: 5458: 5455: 5451: 5450:Complementary 5448: 5446: 5443: 5442: 5441: 5438: 5436: 5433: 5429: 5426: 5424: 5421: 5420: 5419: 5416: 5415: 5414: 5411: 5409: 5406: 5404: 5401: 5399: 5396: 5394: 5391: 5389: 5386: 5384: 5381: 5379: 5376: 5372: 5369: 5367: 5364: 5363: 5362: 5359: 5357: 5354: 5352: 5349: 5347: 5344: 5340: 5337: 5336: 5335: 5332: 5328: 5325: 5323: 5320: 5318: 5315: 5313: 5310: 5309: 5308: 5305: 5303: 5300: 5298: 5295: 5293: 5290: 5288: 5285: 5283: 5280: 5276: 5273: 5271: 5268: 5266: 5263: 5259: 5256: 5255: 5254: 5251: 5249: 5246: 5244: 5241: 5240: 5239: 5236: 5234: 5233:non-convexity 5230: 5227: 5225: 5222: 5220: 5217: 5215: 5212: 5211: 5209: 5205: 5201: 5194: 5189: 5187: 5182: 5180: 5175: 5174: 5171: 5162: 5157: 5153: 5149: 5144: 5139: 5135: 5131: 5127: 5123: 5118: 5113: 5109: 5105: 5101: 5096: 5092: 5088: 5084: 5080: 5076: 5072: 5067: 5063: 5058: 5054: 5050: 5046: 5042: 5038: 5034: 5029: 5025: 5021: 5017: 5013: 5009: 5005: 5001: 4997: 4992: 4985: 4981: 4974: 4970: 4966: 4962: 4958: 4954: 4950: 4945: 4941: 4936: 4935: 4929: 4928:Martin Shubik 4925: 4922: 4918: 4913: 4909: 4905: 4901: 4897: 4893: 4889: 4885: 4879: 4875: 4871: 4867: 4866:Morgenstern O 4863: 4859: 4855: 4851: 4847: 4846: 4841: 4840: 4835: 4831: 4830: 4825: 4821: 4817: 4813: 4809: 4805: 4801: 4797: 4793: 4788: 4784: 4778: 4773: 4772: 4765: 4764: 4751: 4745: 4741: 4737: 4733: 4726: 4718: 4714: 4710: 4706: 4705: 4697: 4689: 4685: 4681: 4677: 4676: 4668: 4659: 4654: 4650: 4646: 4642: 4638: 4631: 4623: 4619: 4614: 4609: 4604: 4599: 4595: 4591: 4587: 4580: 4572: 4568: 4564: 4560: 4556: 4552: 4545: 4543: 4532: 4526: 4522: 4518: 4513: 4509: 4505: 4501: 4497: 4492: 4488: 4483: 4482: 4477: 4463: 4459: 4453: 4445: 4441: 4437: 4433: 4429: 4425: 4418: 4411: 4403: 4399: 4395: 4391: 4384: 4376: 4372: 4365: 4357: 4353: 4349: 4345: 4341: 4337: 4333: 4329: 4322: 4313: 4305: 4301: 4297: 4293: 4289: 4285: 4278: 4270: 4264: 4256: 4249: 4241: 4237: 4233: 4229: 4222: 4214: 4210: 4206: 4202: 4198: 4194: 4187: 4179: 4175: 4171: 4167: 4160: 4152: 4148: 4144: 4140: 4136: 4132: 4125: 4116: 4115: 4106: 4098: 4094: 4089: 4084: 4080: 4076: 4072: 4065: 4063: 4061: 4053: 4047: 4043: 4039: 4035: 4028: 4020: 4016: 4012: 4008: 4004: 4000: 3996: 3992: 3985: 3977: 3973: 3969: 3965: 3961: 3957: 3950: 3948: 3939: 3926: 3918: 3911: 3903: 3896: 3889: 3881: 3877: 3873: 3869: 3862: 3855: 3847: 3841: 3837: 3833: 3829: 3822: 3820: 3818: 3809: 3805: 3801: 3797: 3793: 3789: 3785: 3781: 3774: 3767: 3753: 3749: 3743: 3739: 3729: 3726: 3724: 3721: 3719: 3716: 3714: 3713:Risk aversion 3711: 3709: 3706: 3704: 3701: 3699: 3696: 3694: 3691: 3689: 3686: 3684: 3683:Loss function 3681: 3679: 3676: 3674: 3671: 3669: 3666: 3664: 3661: 3659: 3656: 3654: 3651: 3649: 3646: 3645: 3635: 3632: 3629: 3625: 3624: 3623: 3615: 3613: 3602: 3600: 3596: 3591: 3587: 3585: 3581: 3577: 3573: 3569: 3565: 3561: 3557: 3553: 3548: 3545: 3541: 3537: 3533: 3529: 3525: 3516: 3512: 3510: 3506: 3505:rule of Bayes 3503:, namely the 3502: 3497: 3487: 3483: 3481: 3477: 3472: 3470: 3466: 3462: 3458: 3453: 3451: 3447: 3443: 3432: 3430: 3426: 3423:presented by 3422: 3412: 3408: 3406: 3402: 3377: 3370: 3367: 3358: 3351: 3348: 3344: 3338: 3335: 3329: 3306: 3305: 3304: 3301: 3287: 3264: 3255: 3248: 3245: 3236: 3229: 3226: 3219: 3216: 3210: 3187: 3186: 3185: 3183: 3179: 3175: 3170: 3167: 3166:risk attitude 3163: 3159: 3153: 3152:Risk aversion 3146:Risk aversion 3143: 3139: 3137: 3133: 3129: 3113: 3110: 3082: 3079: 3073: 3070: 3064: 3061: 3057: 3050: 3020: 3012: 3002: 2999: 2996: 2992: 2988: 2985: 2982: 2974: 2972: 2953: 2947: 2941: 2938: 2932: 2929: 2925: 2918: 2907: 2901: 2895: 2892: 2888: 2884: 2881: 2875: 2869: 2863: 2861: 2842: 2836: 2830: 2827: 2821: 2818: 2812: 2806: 2800: 2797: 2793: 2786: 2780: 2777: 2771: 2765: 2759: 2757: 2744: 2741: 2738: 2734: 2727: 2721: 2718: 2712: 2706: 2700: 2698: 2687: 2681: 2675: 2661: 2660: 2659: 2657: 2653: 2632: 2629: 2626: 2622: 2618: 2615: 2612: 2609: 2603: 2597: 2590: 2589: 2588: 2586: 2583:or otherwise 2582: 2578: 2574: 2564: 2551: 2548: 2540: 2521: 2515: 2492: 2489: 2486: 2479: 2473: 2467: 2461: 2448: 2444: 2440: 2431: 2425: 2419: 2409: 2408: 2407: 2393: 2384: 2370: 2365: 2361: 2338: 2334: 2308: 2304: 2297: 2289: 2271: 2267: 2243: 2240: 2232: 2228: 2221: 2218: 2213: 2209: 2205: 2197: 2193: 2186: 2183: 2178: 2174: 2170: 2161: 2155: 2149: 2139: 2138: 2137: 2135: 2117: 2113: 2092: 2078: 2076: 2071: 2058: 2055: 2052: 2049: 2046: 2026: 2023: 2020: 1995: 1991: 1987: 1984: 1978: 1972: 1965: 1964: 1963: 1946: 1943: 1940: 1934: 1931: 1928: 1925: 1902: 1899: 1896: 1890: 1887: 1862: 1858: 1854: 1848: 1842: 1835: 1834: 1833: 1813: 1807: 1804: 1801: 1795: 1789: 1782: 1781: 1780: 1777: 1761: 1758: 1755: 1751: 1747: 1725: 1722: 1719: 1715: 1711: 1689: 1686: 1683: 1679: 1675: 1672: 1646: 1643: 1640: 1636: 1632: 1629: 1623: 1617: 1610: 1609: 1608: 1591: 1585: 1582: 1579: 1573: 1567: 1553: 1551: 1547: 1543: 1539: 1535: 1530: 1526: 1524: 1508: 1480: 1477: 1474: 1468: 1465: 1445: 1439: 1436: 1433: 1427: 1424: 1421: 1401: 1381: 1378: 1375: 1372: 1369: 1349: 1329: 1326: 1323: 1315: 1314: 1313: 1299: 1279: 1259: 1239: 1219: 1199: 1179: 1159: 1139: 1136: 1133: 1125: 1103: 1100: 1097: 1091: 1088: 1068: 1048: 1045: 1039: 1036: 1033: 1027: 1024: 1021: 1018: 1015: 1009: 1006: 1003: 997: 994: 991: 971: 968: 965: 945: 942: 939: 931: 930: 929: 926: 925: 905: 902: 899: 892:we must have 879: 876: 873: 853: 850: 847: 827: 807: 804: 801: 793: 792: 791: 789: 788: 783: 769: 749: 729: 709: 689: 669: 645: 642: 639: 619: 616: 613: 593: 573: 565: 564: 563: 561: 560: 555: 553: 549: 538: 525: 524: 520: 517: 516:Consequences: 514: 511: 508: 505: 502: 501: 500: 497: 495: 491: 487: 483: 479: 475: 471: 467: 463: 459: 455: 451: 447: 437: 433: 429: 427: 397: 391: 388: 382: 376: 364: 358: 355: 352: 346: 340: 334: 327: 326: 325: 307: 303: 298: 294: 284: 282: 278: 273: 270: 266: 265:risk aversion 262: 258: 254: 250: 239:Justification 236: 234: 230: 226: 222: 216: 214: 210: 205: 203: 185: 181: 160: 138: 134: 111: 107: 98: 94: 87: 84: 81: 75: 69: 59: 57: 53: 49: 45: 41: 37: 33: 19: 5880: 5757:Optimization 5742:Mathematical 5702:Experimental 5697:Evolutionary 5682:Econometrics 5628: 5540:Public goods 5514:Price system 5509:Price signal 5423:Monopolistic 5292:Distribution 5207:Major topics 5160: 5107: 5103: 5074: 5070: 5061: 5039:(1): 69–78. 5036: 5032: 5019: 4999: 4995: 4984:the original 4979: 4960: 4948: 4933: 4907: 4903: 4873: 4853: 4850:de Finetti B 4838: 4834:de Finetti B 4823: 4820:de Finetti B 4811: 4807: 4804:de Finetti B 4795: 4791: 4770: 4731: 4725: 4708: 4702: 4696: 4679: 4673: 4667: 4643:(1): 46–55. 4640: 4636: 4630: 4593: 4589: 4579: 4554: 4550: 4520: 4516: 4507: 4504:Amos Tversky 4486: 4476: 4465:. Retrieved 4461: 4452: 4427: 4424:Econometrica 4423: 4410: 4393: 4389: 4383: 4374: 4364: 4334:(1): 69–78. 4331: 4327: 4321: 4312: 4287: 4284:Econometrica 4283: 4277: 4254: 4248: 4231: 4227: 4221: 4196: 4192: 4186: 4169: 4165: 4159: 4134: 4130: 4124: 4113: 4105: 4078: 4074: 4033: 4027: 3994: 3990: 3984: 3959: 3955: 3925:cite journal 3910: 3901: 3888: 3871: 3867: 3854: 3827: 3786:(1): 79–88. 3783: 3779: 3766: 3755:. Retrieved 3751: 3742: 3621: 3608: 3588: 3549: 3522: 3513: 3493: 3484: 3473: 3461:Amos Tversky 3454: 3438: 3418: 3409: 3398: 3302: 3279: 3181: 3177: 3171: 3155: 3140: 3131: 3127: 3039: 2655: 2651: 2649: 2570: 2507: 2385: 2287: 2258: 2105:whose value 2084: 2072: 2012: 1879: 1831: 1778: 1663: 1559: 1549: 1545: 1531: 1527: 1499: 1123: 1122: 922: 921: 787:Transitivity 786: 784: 661: 559:Completeness 558: 556: 551: 545: 522: 521: 515: 509: 503: 498: 493: 489: 485: 481: 477: 473: 469: 465: 461: 457: 453: 449: 443: 434: 430: 423: 293:Frank Ramsey 290: 274: 269:risk premium 267:, where the 247: 217: 206: 201: 173:with payoff 60: 31: 29: 6023:Game theory 5977:Game theory 5707:Game theory 5672:Development 5619:Uncertainty 5499:Price floor 5479:Preferences 5418:Competition 5388:Information 5351:Externality 5334:Equilibrium 5275:Transaction 5253:Opportunity 5214:Aggregation 4921:von Neumann 4917:Morgenstern 4500:Paul Slovic 3893:Elliott E. 3599:hyperpriors 3552:uncertainty 3300:is wealth. 3158:risk-averse 3134:. 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Index

Expected utility
mathematical economics
decision making
uncertainty
rational agents
Rational choice theory
microeconomics
ordinal
cardinal
prospect theory
rank-dependent expected utility
cumulative prospect theory
bounded rationality
Nicolaus Bernoulli
St. Petersburg paradox
marginal utility
expected value
risk aversion
risk premium
decision-making process
diminishing marginal utility
Frank Ramsey
preferences
rational
ethically neutral
Leonard Jimmie Savage
Savage representation theorem
Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem
four axioms
Completeness

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