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this sense, concepts' structure relies on their relationships to other concepts as mandated by a particular mental theory about the state of the world. How this is supposed to work is a little less clear than in the previous two theories, but is still a prominent and notable theory. This is supposed to explain some of the issues of ignorance and error that come up in prototype and classical theories as concepts that are structured around each other seem to account for errors such as whale as a fish (this misconception came from an incorrect theory about what a whale is like, combining with our theory of what a fish is). When we learn that a whale is not a fish, we are recognizing that whales don't in fact fit the theory we had about what makes something a fish. Theory-theory also postulates that people's theories about the world are what inform their conceptual knowledge of the world. Therefore, analysing people's theories can offer insights into their concepts. In this sense, "theory" means an individual's mental explanation rather than scientific fact. This theory criticizes classical and prototype theory as relying too much on similarities and using them as a sufficient constraint. It suggests that theories or mental understandings contribute more to what has membership to a group rather than weighted similarities, and a cohesive category is formed more by what makes sense to the perceiver. Weights assigned to features have shown to fluctuate and vary depending on context and experimental task demonstrated by
Tversky. For this reason, similarities between members may be collateral rather than causal.
742:. There are not necessarily any necessary conditions for membership; a dog can still be a dog with only three legs. This view is particularly supported by psychological experimental evidence for prototypicality effects. Participants willingly and consistently rate objects in categories like 'vegetable' or 'furniture' as more or less typical of that class. It seems that our categories are fuzzy psychologically, and so this structure has explanatory power. We can judge an item's membership of the referent class of a concept by comparing it to the typical member—the most central member of the concept. If it is similar enough in the relevant ways, it will be cognitively admitted as a member of the relevant class of entities. Rosch suggests that every category is represented by a central exemplar which embodies all or the maximum possible number of features of a given category. Lech, Gunturkun, and Suchan explain that categorization involves many areas of the brain. Some of these are: visual association areas, prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and temporal lobe.
562:, founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him, the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world, namely, the way that some object is presented. Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses) have an ontological status.
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519:'s term) of an independently existing world of ideas, in that it denies the existence of any such realm. It also contrasts with the empiricist view that concepts are abstract generalizations of individual experiences, because the contingent and bodily experience is preserved in a concept, and not abstracted away. While the perspective is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism, the notion of the transformation of embodied concepts through structural mapping makes a distinct contribution to the problem of concept formation.
263:, a concept is a mental representation, which the brain uses to denote a class of things in the world. This is to say that it is literally, a symbol or group of symbols together made from the physical material of the brain. Concepts are mental representations that allow us to draw appropriate inferences about the type of entities we encounter in our everyday lives. Concepts do not encompass all mental representations, but are merely a subset of them. The use of concepts is necessary to cognitive processes such as
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Instead, Hampton found that some items were barely considered category members and others that were barely non-members. For example, participants considered sinks as barely members of kitchen utensil category, while sponges were considered barely non-members, with much disagreement among participants of the study. If concepts and categories were very well defined, such cases should be rare. Since then, many researches have discovered borderline members that are not clearly in or out of a category of concept.
242:(colloquially understood as the stances or perspectives we take towards ideas, be it "believing", "doubting", "wondering", "accepting", etc.). And these propositional attitudes, in turn, are the building blocks of our understanding of thoughts that populate everyday life, as well as folk psychology. In this way, we have an analysis that ties our common everyday understanding of thoughts down to the scientific and philosophical understanding of concepts.
57:. As such, concepts are studied within such disciplines as linguistics, psychology, and philosophy, and these disciplines are interested in the logical and psychological structure of concepts, and how they are put together to form thoughts and sentences. The study of concepts has served as an important flagship of an emerging interdisciplinary approach, cognitive science.
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critical to the function of language, and Labov's experiment found that the function that an artifact contributed to what people categorized it as. For example, a container holding mashed potatoes versus tea swayed people toward classifying them as a bowl and a cup, respectively. This experiment also illuminated the optimal dimensions of what the prototype for "cup" is.
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Classical Theory because something is either a member of a category or is not. This type of problem is paralleled in other areas of linguistics such as phonology, with an illogical question such as "is /i/ or /o/ a better vowel?" The
Classical approach and Aristotelian categories may be a better descriptor in some cases.
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comparing these objects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, and the like; further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree.
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domains such as freedom, equality, science, happiness, etc., are also symbolized by concepts. A concept is merely a symbol, a representation of the abstraction. The word is not to be mistaken for the thing. For example, the word "moon" (a concept) is not the large, bright, shape-changing object up in the sky, but only
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was the starkest proponent of the realist thesis of universal concepts. By his view, concepts (and ideas in general) are innate ideas that were instantiations of a transcendental world of pure forms that lay behind the veil of the physical world. In this way, universals were explained as transcendent
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Concepts are classified into a hierarchy, higher levels of which are termed "superordinate" and lower levels termed "subordinate". Additionally, there is the "basic" or "middle" level at which people will most readily categorize a concept. For example, a basic-level concept would be "chair", with its
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Experiments and research showed that assumptions of well defined concepts and categories might not be correct. Researcher
Hampton asked participants to differentiate whether items were in different categories. Hampton did not conclude that items were either clear and absolute members or non-members.
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of concepts—what kind of things they are. The ontology of concepts determines the answer to other questions, such as how to integrate concepts into a wider theory of the mind, what functions are allowed or disallowed by a concept's ontology, etc. There are two main views of the ontology of concepts:
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Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous two theories and develops them further. This theory postulates that categorization by concepts is something like scientific theorizing. Concepts are not learned in isolation, but rather are learned as a part of our experiences with the world around us. In
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as if it had concrete or material existence, such as a person, a place, or a thing. It may represent a natural object that exists in the real world like a tree, an animal, a stone, etc. It may also name an artificial (man-made) object like a chair, computer, house, etc. Abstract ideas and knowledge
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from the day's hippocampal events and objects into cortical concepts is often considered to be the computation underlying (some stages of) sleep and dreaming. Many people (beginning with
Aristotle) report memories of dreams which appear to mix the day's events with analogous or related historical
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Prototypes also deal with the essence of things and to what extent they belong to a category. There have been a number of experiments dealing with questionnaires asking participants to rate something according to the extent to which it belongs to a category. This question is contradictory to the
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Given that most later theories of concepts were born out of the rejection of some or all of the classical theory, it seems appropriate to give an account of what might be wrong with this theory. In the 20th century, philosophers such as
Wittgenstein and Rosch argued against the classical theory.
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The classical theory persisted for so long unquestioned because it seemed intuitively correct and has great explanatory power. It can explain how concepts would be acquired, how we use them to categorize and how we use the structure of a concept to determine its referent class. In fact, for many
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in which quantities are on the verge of nascence or evanescence, that is, coming into or going out of existence. The abstract concepts are now considered to be totally autonomous, even though they originated from the process of abstracting or taking away qualities from perceptions until only the
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In order to make our mental images into concepts, one must thus be able to compare, reflect, and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly
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The
Prototype perspective is proposed as an alternative view to the Classical approach. While the Classical theory requires an all-or-nothing membership in a group, prototypes allow for more fuzzy boundaries and are characterized by attributes. Lakoff stresses that experience and cognition are
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The classical theory of concepts, also referred to as the empiricist theory of concepts, is the oldest theory about the structure of concepts (it can be traced back to
Aristotle), and was prominently held until the 1970s. The classical theory of concepts says that concepts have a definitional
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for membership in the class of things covered by a particular concept. A feature is considered necessary if every member of the denoted class has that feature. A feature is considered sufficient if something has all the parts required by the definition. For example, the classic example
503:, abstract concepts are transformations of concrete concepts derived from embodied experience. The mechanism of transformation is structural mapping, in which properties of two or more source domains are selectively mapped onto a blended space (Fauconnier & Turner, 1995; see
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structure. Adequate definitions of the kind required by this theory usually take the form of a list of features. These features must have two important qualities to provide a comprehensive definition. Features entailed by the definition of a concept must be both
640:. An entity is a bachelor (by this definition) if and only if it is both unmarried and a man. To check whether something is a member of the class, you compare its qualities to the features in the definition. Another key part of this theory is that it obeys the
783:(or "sensing concepts"), activation of a concept may be the main mechanism responsible for the creation of phenomenal experiences. Therefore, understanding how the brain processes concepts may be central to solving the mystery of how conscious experiences (or
431:. He held that the account of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result from abstraction "a posteriori concepts" (meaning concepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an
417:, not of a particular thing. According to Kant, there are twelve categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each category is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an
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objects. Needless to say, this form of realism was tied deeply with Plato's ontological projects. This remark on Plato is not of merely historical interest. For example, the view that numbers are
Platonic objects was revived by
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Rosch, E. (1977). Classification of real-world objects: Origins and representations in cognition. In P. Johnson-Laird, & P. Wason, Thinking: Readings in
Cognitive Science (pp. 212–223). Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Some concepts have fuzzy membership. There are items for which it is vague whether or not they fall into (or out of) a particular referent class. This is not possible in the classical theory as everything has equal and full
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It seems as though there can be cases where our ignorance or error about a class means that we either don't know the definition of a concept, or have incorrect notions about what a definition of a particular concept might
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Nikolić, D. (2009) Is synaesthesia actually ideaesthesia? An inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. Proceedings of the Third
International Congress on Synaesthesia, Science & Art, Granada, Spain, April 26–29,
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Prototype theory came out of problems with the classical view of conceptual structure. Prototype theory says that concepts specify properties that members of a class tend to possess, rather than must possess.
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concepts and memories, and suggest that they were being sorted or organized into more abstract concepts. ("Sort" is itself another word for concept, and "sorting" thus means to organize into concepts.)
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There is a lot of discussion on the most effective theory in concepts. Another theory is semantic pointers, which use perceptual and motor representations and these representations are like symbols.
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Fodor, J. A., Garrett, M. F., Walker, E. C., & Parkes, C. H. (1999). against definitions. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 491–513). Massachusetts: MIT press.
336:. However, it is necessary at least to begin by understanding that the concept "dog" is philosophically distinct from the things in the world grouped by this concept—or the reference class or
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Murphy, G., & Medin, D. (1999). the role of theories in conceptual coherence. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 425–459). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1999). what some concepts might not be. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, Concepts (pp. 225–261). Massachusetts: MIT press.
658:. Concept analysis is the act of trying to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the membership in the referent class of a concept. For example, Shoemaker's classic "
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A representation of the concept of a tree. The four upper images of trees can be roughly quantified into an overall generalization of the idea of a tree, pictured in the lower image.
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Carey, S. (1999). knowledge acquisition: enrichment or conceptual change? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 459–489). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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578:, concepts in calculus do not refer to perceptions. As long as the concepts are useful and mutually compatible, they are accepted on their own. For example, the concepts of the
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Wittgenstein, L. (1999). philosophical investigations: sections 65–78. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 171–175). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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GĂłmez Milán, E., Iborra, O., de CĂłrdoba, M.J., Juárez-Ramos V., RodrĂguez Artacho, M.A., Rubio, J.L. (2013) The Kiki-Bouba effect: A case of personification and ideaesthesia.
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where it was noted that a synesthetic experience requires first an activation of a concept of the inducer. Later research expanded these results into everyday perception.
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Rosch, E. (1999). Principles of Categorization. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 189–206). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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Hume, D. (1739). book one part one: of the understanding of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction etc. In D. Hume, a treatise of human nature. England.
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Rey, G. (1999). Concepts and Stereotypes. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 279–301). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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662:" explored whether the concept of the flow of time can include flows where no changes take place, though change is usually taken as a definition of time.
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concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions, like empirical concepts, they originate in the mind itself. He called these concepts
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are not considered to refer to spatial or temporal perceptions of the external world of experience. Neither are they related in any way to mysterious
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Quine, W. (1999). two dogmas of empiricism. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 153–171). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Putnam, H. (1999). is semantics possible? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 177–189). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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found typicality effects which cannot be explained by the classical theory of concepts, these sparked the prototype theory. See below.
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are a few of the key proponents and creators of this theory. Wittgenstein describes the relationship between members of a class as
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objects. In this view, concepts are abstract objects of a category out of a human's mind rather than some mental representations.
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228:, the structural position of concepts can be understood as follows: Concepts serve as the building blocks of what are called
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that celestial object. Concepts are created (named) to describe, explain and capture reality as it is known and understood.
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787:) emerge within a physical system e.g., the sourness of the sour taste of lemon. This question is also known as the
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467:, i.e., the going back over different mental images, how they can be comprehended in one consciousness; and finally
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Margolis, Eric; Laurence, Stephen (2007). "The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?".
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Fodor, Jerry; Lepore, Ernest (1996). "The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes".
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Murphy, G. (2004). Chapter 2. In G. Murphy, a big book of concepts (pp. 11 – 41). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Georgij Yu. Somov (2010). Concepts and Senses in Visual Art: Through the example of analysis of some works by
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Carey, S. (1991). Knowledge Acquisition: Enrichment or Conceptual Change? In S. Carey and R. Gelman (Eds.),
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It seems that there simply are no definitions—especially those based in sensory primitive concepts.
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by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other
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Murphy, Gregory L.; Medin, Douglas L. (1985). "The role of theories in conceptual coherence".
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Concepts may be exact or inexact. When the mind makes a generalization such as the concept of
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The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:
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A concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant investigated the way that empirical
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as a result of certain puzzles that he took to arise from the phenomenological accounts.
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Psychological experiments show no evidence for our using concepts as strict definitions.
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Eysenck. M. W., (2012) Fundamentals of Cognition (2nd) Psychology Taylor & Francis
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1312:. in Concepts: Core Readings: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. pp. 3–83.
511:. This theory contrasts with the rationalist view that concepts are perceptions (or
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340:. Concepts that can be equated to a single word are called "lexical concepts".
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In the simplest terms, a concept is a name or label that regards or treats an
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of the particular objects and events which they abstract, which are stored in
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The study of concepts and conceptual structure falls into the disciplines of
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or the segregation of everything else by which the mental images differ ...
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A central question in the study of concepts is the question of what they
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Blouw, Peter; Solodkin, Eugene; Thagard, Paul; Eliasmith, Chris (2016).
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concept can relate to individual phenomena, in a manner analogous to an
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Concept simultaneously translated in several languages and meanings
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superordinate, "furniture", and its subordinate, "easy chair".
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idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles,
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Concepts are studied as components of human cognition in the
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There is debate as to the relationship between concepts and
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views of the mind construe concepts as abstract objects.
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The semantic view of concepts suggests that concepts are
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Volume 22, number 2 (April–June 1998), pp. 133–187.
1471:
Mroczko-Wä…Sowicz, Aleksandra; Nikoliä‡, Danko (2014).
1021:"Cognitive Science | Brain and Cognitive Sciences"
1008:
The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition
671:
There are six primary arguments summarized as follows:
194:. Philosophers construe this question as one about the
1779:
The History of Calculus and its Conceptual Development
1621:"Homework Help and Textbook Solutions | bartleby"
1521:
Stevan Harnad (1995). Why and How We Are Not Zombies.
1274:
1840:, John Stuart Mill, University Press of the Pacific,
1175:
1173:
1171:
1169:
1167:
413:. But these pure categories are predicates of things
395:
maintained the view that human minds possess pure or
213:
202:
806:
The term "concept" is traced back to 1554–60 (Latin
427:
concept, Kant employed the technical concept of the
53:. Concepts play an important role in all aspects of
791:. Research on ideasthesia emerged from research on
245:
1464:
1164:
1070:. Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford University
1057:
1055:
1053:
1051:
1049:
1047:
1045:
1043:
1041:
3610:
2052:Conceptual Science and Mathematical Permutations
1118:
2063:v:Conceptualize: A Wikiversity Learning Project
1952:. Horizons in Neuroscience Research 4: 157–167.
1370:
1368:
310:
286:Concepts are thought to be stored in long term
2047:Concepts. A Critical Approach, by Andy Blunden
1870:, H. J. Paton, London: Allen & Unwin, 1936
1347:Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior
1038:
689:also holds as an argument against definitions.
2950:
2095:
958:Goguen, Joseph (2005). "What is a Concept?".
595:Notable theories on the structure of concepts
522:
87:rather than a mental object or a mental state
64:, three understandings of a concept prevail:
1365:
1233:
1231:
1229:
1227:
1225:
1223:
1221:
1160:Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
650:years it was one of the major activities in
77:peculiar to cognitive agents (mental states)
1948:Daltrozzo J, Vion-Dury J, Schön D. (2010).
1915:Hjørland, Birger (2009). "Concept theory".
1659:
1427:
1219:
1217:
1215:
1213:
1211:
1209:
1207:
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1203:
1201:
27:Mental representation or an abstract object
2957:
2943:
2819:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
2109:
2102:
2088:
1879:Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 1998.
1748:
1588:
1551:
1498:
1488:
1242:. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1132:
1914:
1379:. Academic Press Inc. pp. 159–166.
1308:Stephen Lawrence; Eric Margolis (1999).
1198:
94:
1759:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015578.003.0071
1344:
591:common, essential attributes remained.
565:
185:
14:
3611:
2964:
1410:
1237:
957:
666:Arguments against the classical theory
548:
405:, in the sense of the word that means
3558:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
2938:
2083:
1705:
1559:The Journal of Consciousness Studies.
1374:
1179:
435:concept is a general representation (
1114:
1112:
1110:
374:
2042:Blending and Conceptual Integration
2034:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2020:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2006:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1995:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
1983:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1899:Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis
1334:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1068:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
710:
685:'s argument against analyticity in
599:
488:
24:
3659:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
1643:
1100:""The logic of inexact concepts",
214:The psychological view of concepts
203:Concepts as mental representations
25:
3685:
2076:on ideasthesia (sensing concepts)
1972:
1957:
1853:, Arthur Schopenhauer, Volume I,
1107:
1062:Eric Margolis; Stephen Lawrence.
1901:"Concepts and Cognitive Science"
1536:Journal of Consciousness Studies
1523:Journal of Consciousness Studies
1143:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00663.x
753:
507:). A common class of blends are
409:, attribute, characteristic, or
246:The physicalist view of concepts
1875:Conceptual Integration Networks
1868:Kant's Metaphysic of Experience
1613:
1564:
1541:
1528:
1515:
1477:Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
1421:
1338:
1326:
1265:
1256:
226:representational theory of mind
2759:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
2029:"Classical Theory of Concepts"
1716:10.7551/mitpress/3169.001.0001
1310:Concepts and Cognitive Science
1149:
1091:
1082:
1013:
1000:
984:
951:
768:
13:
1:
3415:Hard problem of consciousness
2640:Principle of compositionality
1800:The Writings of William James
1359:10.1016/S0022-5371(79)90246-9
944:
789:hard problem of consciousness
574:, in the introduction to his
2789:Philosophical Investigations
1674:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00694-X
928:Process of concept formation
801:
311:Concepts as abstract objects
232:(colloquially understood as
224:Within the framework of the
7:
2630:Modality (natural language)
2015:"Theory–Theory of Concepts"
1804:University of Chicago Press
1377:A New Paradigm of Reference
1184:. Oxford University Press.
815:
779:According to the theory of
209:Direct and indirect realism
10:
3690:
2769:Language, Truth, and Logic
2509:Theological noncognitivism
2394:Contrast theory of meaning
2389:Causal theory of reference
2120:Index of language articles
1442:10.1037/0033-295x.92.3.289
812:– "something conceived").
772:
757:
714:
643:law of the excluded middle
603:
552:
526:
523:Realist universal concepts
492:
381:
314:
249:
217:
206:
29:
3578:
3545:
3372:
3242:
3137:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
3127:David Lewis (philosopher)
2972:
2909:
2854:Philosophy of information
2841:
2690:
2542:
2454:Mediated reference theory
2379:
2126:
2117:
1104:19 (3/4): 325–373 (1969).
630:is said to be defined by
384:A priori and a posteriori
2779:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1851:Parerga and Paralipomena
1706:Prinz, Jesse J. (2002).
1490:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00509
1411:TAYLOR, John R. (1989).
1240:The Big Book of Concepts
1238:Murphy, Gregory (2002).
687:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
32:Concept (disambiguation)
3629:Concepts in metaphysics
3265:Eliminative materialism
2580:Use–mention distinction
2424:Direct reference theory
1905:Concepts: Core Readings
1889:, Penguin Books, 1982,
1855:Oxford University Press
1751:The Language of Thought
1332:'Godel's Rationalism',
893:General Concept Lattice
883:Formal concept analysis
290:memory, in contrast to
239:propositional attitudes
156:artificial intelligence
62:contemporary philosophy
3654:Philosophy of language
3517:Propositional attitude
3512:Problem of other minds
3420:Hypostatic abstraction
2514:Theory of descriptions
2449:Linguistic determinism
2111:Philosophy of language
1887:The Portable Nietzsche
1825:, Dover Publications,
1182:The Origin of Concepts
898:Hypostatic abstraction
486:
450:concepts are created.
321:Abstract object theory
230:mental representations
113:instantiated (reified)
100:
69:mental representations
3588:Philosophers category
3492:Mental representation
3255:Biological naturalism
3142:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
3117:Frank Cameron Jackson
2625:Mental representation
2560:Linguistic relativity
2444:Inquisitive semantics
1375:Brown, Roger (1978).
1180:Carey, Susan (2009).
501:cognitive linguistics
452:
443:, I, 1., §1, Note 1)
317:Abstract and concrete
220:Mental representation
178:often just means any
109:higher-level thinking
98:
3270:Emergent materialism
2809:Naming and Necessity
2719:De Arte Combinatoria
2518:Definite description
2479:Semantic externalism
1911:pp. 3–81, 1999.
1753:. pp. 159–182.
1561:20(1–2): pp. 84–102.
1430:Psychological Review
938:Intuitive statistics
858:Conceptual framework
566:Concepts in calculus
186:Ontology of concepts
30:For other uses, see
3639:Main topic articles
3467:Language of thought
3217:Ludwig Wittgenstein
3047:Patricia Churchland
2859:Philosophical logic
2849:Analytic philosophy
2655:Sense and reference
2534:Verification theory
2489:Situation semantics
1945:182 (1/4), 475–506.
1783:Carl Benjamin Boyer
1708:Furnishing the Mind
923:Object (philosophy)
918:Notion (philosophy)
873:Conversation theory
853:Conceptual blending
740:family resemblances
660:Time Without Change
572:Carl Benjamin Boyer
555:Sense and reference
549:Sense and reference
505:conceptual blending
3295:Neurophenomenology
2966:Philosophy of mind
2709:Port-Royal Grammar
2605:Family resemblance
2524:Theory of language
2499:Supposition theory
1950:Music and Concepts
1881:Cognitive Science.
1787:Dover Publications
1590:10.1111/cogs.12265
968:10.1007/11524564_4
863:Conceptual history
843:Concept and object
833:Class (philosophy)
495:Embodied cognition
101:
3624:Cognitive science
3606:
3605:
3502:Mind–body problem
3400:Cognitive closure
3364:Substance dualism
2982:G. E. M. Anscombe
2932:
2931:
2434:Dynamic semantics
1937:Bruegel the Elder
1929:10.1002/asi.21082
1837:A System of Logic
1577:Cognitive Science
1386:978-0-12-497750-1
1319:978-0-262-13353-1
1249:978-0-262-13409-5
1191:978-0-19-536763-8
977:978-3-540-27783-5
357:cognitive science
234:ideas in the mind
124:cognitive science
16:(Redirected from
3681:
3354:Representational
3349:Property dualism
3342:Type physicalism
3307:New mysterianism
3275:Epiphenomenalism
3097:Martin Heidegger
2959:
2952:
2945:
2936:
2935:
2894:Formal semantics
2842:Related articles
2834:
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2814:
2804:
2794:
2784:
2774:
2764:
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2744:
2734:
2724:
2714:
2704:
2474:Relevance theory
2469:Phallogocentrism
2104:
2097:
2090:
2081:
2080:
2038:
2024:
2010:
1987:
1974:Zalta, Edward N.
1932:
1923:(8): 1519–1536.
1772:
1729:
1693:
1637:
1635:
1633:
1632:
1623:. Archived from
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1611:
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1592:
1583:(5): 1128–1162.
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1032:
1023:. Archived from
1017:
1011:
1004:
998:
988:
982:
981:
955:
868:Conceptual model
717:Prototype theory
711:Prototype theory
656:concept analysis
600:Classical theory
529:Platonic realism
489:Embodied content
484:
334:natural language
148:computer science
85:abstract objects
21:
3689:
3688:
3684:
3683:
3682:
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3679:
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3609:
3608:
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3602:
3574:
3541:
3487:Mental property
3380:Abstract object
3368:
3238:
3192:Wilfrid Sellars
3067:Donald Davidson
3052:Paul Churchland
3012:George Berkeley
2968:
2963:
2933:
2928:
2905:
2884:School of Names
2837:
2832:
2822:
2812:
2802:
2799:Of Grammatology
2792:
2782:
2772:
2762:
2752:
2742:
2732:
2722:
2712:
2702:
2686:
2538:
2484:Semantic holism
2464:Non-cognitivism
2404:Conventionalism
2375:
2122:
2113:
2108:
2059:Latest concepts
2057:Concept Mobiles
2027:
2013:
1999:
1960:
1955:
1769:
1726:
1646:
1644:Further reading
1641:
1640:
1630:
1628:
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1569:
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1542:
1538:2 (3): 200–219.
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1134:10.1.1.188.9995
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388:Category (Kant)
382:Main articles:
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292:episodic memory
273:decision making
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188:
126:disciplines of
111:. A concept is
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5:
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3644:Mental content
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3452:Intentionality
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3302:Neutral monism
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3285:Interactionism
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3107:Edmund Husserl
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3077:René Descartes
3074:
3072:Daniel Dennett
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3042:David Chalmers
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3027:Franz Brentano
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3007:Alexander Bain
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2997:Thomas Aquinas
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3458:
3457:Introspection
3455:
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3410:Consciousness
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3406:
3403:
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3340:
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3335:
3333:
3332:Phenomenology
3330:
3328:
3327:Phenomenalism
3325:
3323:
3320:
3318:
3317:Occasionalism
3315:
3313:
3310:
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3303:
3300:
3296:
3293:
3292:
3291:
3290:NaĂŻve realism
3288:
3286:
3283:
3281:
3280:Functionalism
3278:
3276:
3273:
3271:
3268:
3266:
3263:
3261:
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3253:
3251:
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3185:
3183:
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3178:
3177:Richard Rorty
3175:
3173:
3172:Hilary Putnam
3170:
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3147:Marvin Minsky
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3130:
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3122:Immanuel Kant
3120:
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3113:
3112:William James
3110:
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3100:
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2880:
2879:Scholasticism
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2494:Structuralism
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2420:
2419:Descriptivism
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2402:
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2399:Contrastivism
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2016:
2012:
2008:
2007:
2002:
1998:
1996:
1992:
1989:
1985:
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1930:
1926:
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1895:0-14-015062-5
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1863:0-19-824508-4
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1846:1-4102-0252-6
1843:
1839:
1838:
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1831:0-486-25650-2
1828:
1824:
1823:Immanuel Kant
1820:
1819:
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1812:0-226-39188-4
1809:
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1795:0-486-60509-4
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1627:on 2008-07-06
1626:
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1098:Joseph Goguen
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1085:
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1027:on 2021-06-18
1026:
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933:Schema (Kant)
931:
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909:
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901:
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889:
888:Fuzzy concept
886:
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878:Definitionism
876:
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869:
866:
864:
861:
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838:Conceptualism
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760:Theory-theory
754:Theory-theory
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606:Definitionism
592:
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577:
573:
570:According to
563:
561:
560:Gottlob Frege
556:
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520:
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513:recollections
510:
506:
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18:Conceptualize
3568: /
3564: /
3560: /
3477:Mental image
3472:Mental event
3435:Intelligence
3404:
3385:Chinese room
3231:
3182:Gilbert Ryle
3162:Derek Parfit
3152:Thomas Nagel
3082:Fred Dretske
3002:J. L. Austin
2974:Philosophers
2827:
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2807:
2797:
2787:
2777:
2767:
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2727:
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2707:
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2679:
2620:Metalanguage
2615:Logical form
2584:
2570:Truth-bearer
2529:Unilalianism
2439:Expressivism
2266:Wittgenstein
2211:von Humboldt
2128:Philosophers
2032:
2018:
2004:
1981:
1940:
1920:
1916:
1904:
1886:
1880:
1873:
1867:
1850:
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1629:. Retrieved
1625:the original
1615:
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1067:
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1015:
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1002:
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763:
748:
744:
739:
732:Brent Berlin
724:Wittgenstein
720:
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618:
612:
609:
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512:
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470:
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448:a posteriori
447:
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432:
424:a posteriori
422:
418:
414:
396:
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102:
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3619:Abstraction
3562:information
3553:Metaphysics
3527:Tabula rasa
3337:Physicalism
3322:Parallelism
3250:Behaviorism
3207:Michael Tye
3202:Alan Turing
3187:John Searle
3062:Dharmakirti
3037:Tyler Burge
3032:C. D. Broad
2864:Linguistics
2829:Limited Inc
2749:On Denoting
2575:Proposition
2226:de Saussure
2191:Ibn Khaldun
1525:1: 164–167.
1156:Jerry Fodor
908:Ideasthesia
848:Concept map
823:Abstraction
793:synesthesia
781:ideasthesia
775:Ideasthesia
769:Ideasthesia
693:membership.
471:abstraction
437:Vorstellung
364:abstraction
345:linguistics
304:abstraction
296:hippocampus
258:physicalist
252:Physicalism
144:mathematics
128:linguistics
3613:Categories
3598:Task Force
3566:perception
3440:Artificial
3390:Creativity
3312:Nondualism
3212:Vasubandhu
3132:John Locke
3102:David Hume
3057:Andy Clark
2924:Discussion
2919:Task Force
2869:Pragmatics
2660:Speech act
2590:Categories
2504:Symbiosism
2459:Nominalism
2371:Watzlawick
2251:Bloomfield
2171:Chrysippus
1978:"Concepts"
1968:PhilPapers
1631:2011-11-25
1074:6 November
1064:"Concepts"
1031:2019-07-08
945:References
730:, Mervis,
652:philosophy
620:sufficient
580:derivative
543:Kurt Gödel
465:reflection
459:comparison
415:in general
403:categories
369:represents
353:psychology
349:philosophy
315:See also:
300:patient HM
250:See also:
207:See also:
168:categories
140:formalized
136:philosophy
132:psychology
3664:Semantics
3462:Intuition
3395:Cognition
3359:Solipsism
3022:Ned Block
2992:Armstrong
2987:Aristotle
2901:Semiotics
2889:Semantics
2739:Alciphron
2675:Statement
2610:Intension
2550:Ambiguity
2429:Dramatism
2409:Cratylism
2161:Eubulides
2156:Aristotle
2136:Confucius
2001:"Concept"
1942:Semiotica
1909:MIT Press
1662:Cognition
1450:0033-295X
1129:CiteSeerX
809:conceptum
802:Etymology
632:unmarried
614:necessary
534:Platonist
509:metaphors
483:Logic, §6
407:predicate
338:extension
281:inference
152:databases
75:abilities
55:cognition
3649:Ontology
3634:Concepts
3583:Category
3430:Identity
3373:Concepts
3243:Theories
3227:Zhuangzi
3157:Alva Noë
2914:Category
2874:Rhetoric
2699:Cratylus
2670:Sentence
2645:Property
2565:Language
2543:Concepts
2381:Theories
2346:Strawson
2331:Davidson
2321:Hintikka
2316:Anscombe
2261:Vygotsky
2216:Mauthner
2186:Averroes
2176:Zhuangzi
2166:Diodorus
2146:Cratylus
1690:15356470
1607:16809232
1599:26235459
1509:25191239
1102:Synthese
816:See also
627:bachelor
584:integral
582:and the
481:—
419:a priori
398:a priori
378:concepts
376:A priori
327:abstract
288:cortical
277:learning
196:ontology
172:informal
47:thoughts
43:abstract
3674:Objects
3669:Thought
3593:Project
3546:Related
3405:Concept
3260:Dualism
3233:more...
3092:Goldman
2681:more...
2585:Concept
2326:Dummett
2301:Gadamer
2296:Chomsky
2281:Derrida
2271:Russell
2256:Bergson
2241:Tillich
2201:Leibniz
2141:Gorgias
2072:TED-Ed
1993:at the
1991:Concept
1976:(ed.).
1964:Concept
1682:8820389
1500:4137691
1483:: 509.
1458:4023146
679:entail.
411:quality
176:concept
160:classes
51:beliefs
39:concept
3537:Zombie
3522:Qualia
2833:(1988)
2823:(1982)
2813:(1980)
2803:(1967)
2793:(1953)
2783:(1951)
2773:(1936)
2763:(1921)
2753:(1905)
2743:(1732)
2733:(1668)
2723:(1666)
2713:(1660)
2703:(n.d.)
2665:Symbol
2366:Searle
2356:Putnam
2306:Kripke
2291:Austin
2276:Carnap
2221:Ricœur
2206:Herder
2196:Hobbes
2074:Lesson
1893:
1861:
1844:
1829:
1810:
1793:
1765:
1742:Press.
1722:
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1383:
1316:
1246:
1188:
1131:
994:
974:
913:Noesis
785:qualia
736:Posner
588:limits
429:schema
355:, and
302:. The
279:, and
269:memory
164:schema
134:, and
49:, and
41:is an
3445:Human
3167:Plato
3087:Fodor
2691:Works
2600:Class
2361:Lewis
2351:Quine
2336:Grice
2286:Whorf
2246:Sapir
2231:Frege
2181:Xunzi
2151:Plato
1903:. In
1818:Logic
1686:S2CID
1603:S2CID
1548:2009.
728:Rosch
701:Rosch
683:Quine
538:Plato
517:Plato
515:, in
441:Logic
256:In a
170:. In
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