365:
381:
harnesses. To leave the aircraft, a passenger would have had to either reach behind them and unscrew the locking carabiner (or assist another passenger with their carabiner), or use a cutting tool (provided by FlyNYON and attached to each harness) to sever the tether. A passing tugboat heard the mayday call from the pilot and tied up to the helicopter to keep it from sinking further. Rescue divers responded seven minutes after the first 911 call. The passengers were cut out of the wreck by emergency responders, some after having been dragged for 50 blocks south in the upside-down helicopter: a 3-knot (5.6 km/h; 3.5 mph) current pulled the helicopter from 86th to 34th during the rescue. The pilot was taken to the hospital for observation.
29:
240:
263:. Each passenger was also equipped with a supplemental harness system which allowed them to move within the cabin and sit in the door sill while airborne. The center passengers in the four-abreast rear bench seat were allowed to remove their primary restraints, leave their seat, and sit on the sills; they were prevented from falling out of the helicopter by the supplemental harnesses. The passengers on the outboard ends of the rear seat and front passenger seat were allowed to rotate outboard, but their primary restraints were not intended to be released. The supplemental harness was an off-the-shelf nylon
478:
skid's pressurized gas cylinder gauge indicated about 4,000 psi (28,000 kPa), implying the right side had failed to fully inflate. According to the NTSB report: "The trigger mechanism was smooth with no evidence of binding. Continuity of the float system control was established between the trigger, dual cable block, and the activation cable clevis connection. When the trigger was released, the dual cable block returned to its normal position (via spring within the junction box) but the upper and lower turnbuckles remained in their actuated positions."
431:
373:(240 m) agl. When he reached to engage the emergency fuel shutoff lever in preparation for a hard landing, he realized it had already been activated, and that part of a passenger's fall protection tether was underneath the fuel shutoff lever. When he disengaged the fuel shutoff lever, he was able to restart the engine, but at that point, the helicopter had already descended past 300 ft (91 m) agl and the engine "wasn't spooling up fast enough" to avoid a crash landing. He put the helicopter in a nose-up flare before it hit the water.
318:: 65NJ) at approximately 1900 EDT on March 11, 2018. The pilot had been flying passengers for FlyNYON on flights lasting 15 to 30 minutes since 11:00 that day, although he could not recall how many flights he had completed. When the van carrying the passengers arrived, the pilot checked each passenger's harness and put their life vests on. After seating the passengers in the helicopter, he locked their harness tethers to the helicopter and provided safety instructions, including where the cutting tool was on their harness and how to use it.
553:(FAA). ASR-18-02 recommends the prohibition of all open-door passenger flights that use additional passenger harness systems, unless the harness system is designed to allow passengers to "rapidly release the harness with minimal difficulty and without having to cut or forcefully remove the harness." The FAA released a statement on March 20 saying they intended to impose a ban on open-door passenger flights that use harnesses which could not be released quickly. Emergency Order of Prohibition 8900.456 (FAA-2018-0243; 83
390:
546:-130, issued on October 20, 2010, the design of the emergency fuel shutoff lever in the Eurocopter AS350 cockpit "allows for easy access to and inadvertent movement of (the lever), which could cause a serious or catastrophic accident if the movement occurs at a critical point during flight or on the ground." Airbus (then Eurocopter) had previously reviewed the design of the fuel cutoff lever prior to the safety recommendation and developed a new design, but the FAA did not require a retrofit of the new design.
251:, that had not been involved in any prior accidents. The tour company had had two other crashes in the preceding 11 years. The helicopter flew with open doors, and passengers were required to wear both the helicopter's primary restraints (seatbelts) along with a supplemental harness (provided by NYONair), designed to keep them inside the helicopter; the supplemental harnesses underwent scrutiny as a potential cause of fatality due to the difficulty of releasing the harness.
414:
supplemental harnesses used in most flights were yellow nylon harnesses designed as fall protection for construction workers, and the pilots stated they preferred a more expensive blue harness which was more adjustable, had been certified by the FAA for helicopter operations (under technical standard order C167), and had more attachment points, some of which were more accessible to passengers. Patrick Day, CEO of FlyNYON, stated to the
361:(NTSB), that a low rotor rpm alarm began to sound and warning lights came on, indicating low engine and fuel pressure. At that point, he believed the engine had failed and considered landing at Central Park, but thought there were too many people present to attempt a landing, and directed the helicopter towards the East River instead, starting the turn at 19:06:30. The pilot radioed a mayday call to LaGuardia at 19:06:58.
457:
passengers, and could be difficult to release in an emergency. Despite these warnings, Day insisted that the harnesses were safe and rebuffed the pilots' concerns. The pilots expressed that their recommendations were not only ignored but were met with threats of firing, which violates fundamental aviation safety principles and training that emphasize the importance of addressing and reporting safety concerns.
377:
sink, rolling past a 45° list. Subsequent review of a video showing the descent (recorded by a witness using a cellphone) led aviation experts to believe the passengers would have survived had the helicopter not turned over and sunk. The aircraft sank 11 seconds after touching down on the water, at approximately 19:07:26, when the onboard video camera's lens became submerged.
560:) was issued by the FAA on March 23, effective for one year, prohibiting "doors-off" flights with supplemental passenger restraint systems unless those systems have FAA approval through Form 337. 8900.456 was superseded by 8900.457 in April 2018; 8900.457 in turn was superseded by 8900.506, which renewed the ban on doors-off flights for another year starting in April 2019.
495:#ShoeSelfie, where the photographer's shoes could be seen in an aerial photograph. Day is the son of the director of operations for Liberty Helicopters. Patrick Day Sr. simultaneously held the director of operations position for FlyNYON, and Patrick Jr. was listed as the VP of charter and aircraft management for Liberty.
563:
The NTSB adopted
Aircraft Accident Report (AAR) 19-04 on December 10, 2019. AAR 19-04 concluded the pilot had successfully ditched the helicopter into the water in a survivable manner using an autorotative descent; however, the supplemental restraints provided by NYONair prevented the passengers
345:
Onboard video reviewed after the crash showed the front passenger turned in his seat so he was facing outboard with his legs outside the helicopter. While taking several photographs between 19:00 and 19:05, he leaned backward and his supplemental harness tether hung down loosely near the helicopter's
469:
Although the Airbus AS350 B2 helicopter is not certified for ditching in water, it can be equipped with an emergency flotation system; in this case, the helicopter was equipped with a system manufactured by Dart
Aerospace, type certificate SR00470LA. To prevent inadvertent activation, a shear pin is
460:
Despite the crash and the warnings from pilots about the safety risks, FlyNYON, under CEO Patrick Day, continued to operate "doors-off" flights with the same harness systems. This decision was controversial and heavily criticized, especially given that the improper use of these harnesses was a major
498:
A safety video was shown to the passengers, which included a segment on how to release the supplemental harness in case of an emergency. The video demonstrated one passenger helping another passenger to disengage the locking carabiner and also stated that a cutting tool was secured to a chest strap
490:
flights for professional and corporate photographers. FlyNYON sold single-seat tickets for aerial photography flights, reducing the per-passenger cost to facilitate access to doors-off photography flights for tourists. FlyNYON marketed its services via social media by encouraging passengers to post
443:
branded
Dyneema. In February, a pilot for Liberty identified a different knife and tether that could be cut "very easily" as well as a supplier that had more than fifty of each in stock, but social media postings by FlyNYON passengers showed the older tethers and cutters were still in use up to the
376:
With the doors off, the cabin began to fill with water, first on the pilot's side (right side) of the cabin. The pilot stated he started to unlock the carabiner securing the front passenger's tether to the helicopter, but had gotten no more than two or three rotations before the helicopter began to
293:
rules. According to a 2014 study, the crash rate of Part 91 air tours is 3.5 per 100,000 hours flown, "similar to the reported crash rates in categories considered to be 'high hazard' commercial aviation" such as medevac and off-shore drilling transport. Liberty
Helicopters spent $ 120,000 lobbying
418:
that on
October 31, 2017, "inspectors observed the harness and tethering process and continued to permit their use on Liberty and FlyNYON operated flights without issue". A spokesman for the FAA stated that supplemental harnesses are not subject to inspection. FlyNYON staff were instructed to use
545:
The family of one victim sued FlyNYON and
Liberty Helicopters on March 14, alleging that it was impossible for passengers to free themselves from their harnesses during an emergency. The lawsuit was later amended to add Airbus as a defendant. According to NTSB safety recommendations A-10-129 and
535:
Provide adequate warnings to operators/pilots of aircraft that incorporate STC SR0047LA that (a) it is necessary to pull the float actuation handle to its full travel to ensure that both reservoir assemblies have been actuated, and (b) that if only a single reservoir assembly is actuated for any
456:
The CEO of FlyNYON, Patrick Day, not only dismissed the pilots' repeated warnings about the safety issues with the harnesses but also threatened them with termination for raising these concerns. Pilots warned that the harnesses used for "doors-off" flights were unsuitable, especially for smaller
477:
were not as inflated as the left-side floats. The float system must operate flawlessly according to specification and certification. The post-crash examination of N350LH showed the left skid emergency float's pressurized gas cylinder gauge indicated about 0 psi (0 kPa) while the right
380:
The pilot, who was not attached to the aircraft by a supplemental harness, unbuckled his manufacturer-provided primary restraint after the helicopter was submerged and escaped. All five passengers drowned after the helicopter rolled over into the water as they were trapped by their supplemental
372:
During the descent, the pilot attempted to restart the engine at least twice, and then he confirmed the fuel flow control lever was still positioned for normal operation. After he was sure the helicopter could reach the river, the pilot activated the skid-mounted floats at 19:07:02, 800 ft
341:
to request entry into its controlled airspace, the pilot started to climb to approximately 2,000 ft (610 m) agl. During the climb, he noticed the front passenger had removed his primary restraint, and reminded the passenger to keep the restraint fastened, as the passengers in the left
413:
article about the crash. Several internal documents showed that pilots for
Liberty and FlyNYON had requested better-fitting supplemental passenger harnesses as well as better tools that would make it easier for passengers to free themselves for up to two months preceding the fatal flight. The
499:
and could be used to cut the tether if necessary; the video showed the passenger cutting the tether with a single stroke. Pilots were concerned about the adequacy of the cutting tools, and in one test, took more than 30 seconds to cut through a tether with the tools available to passengers.
521:
The FAA should review the certification testing for STC SR00831LA to determine whether it meets the relevant provisions of 14 CFR 27 and ensure that the system is capable of providing sufficient inflation for safe evacuation in the event that one of the two reservoir assemblies fails to
517:
The FAA should perform new certification testing for STC SR0047LA to determine whether it meets the relevant provisions of 14 CFR 27 and ensure that the system is capable of providing sufficient inflation for safe evacuation in the event that one of the two reservoir assemblies fails to
564:
from exiting the helicopter after it turned over and sank, causing them to drown. In addition, the supplemental restraint was the immediate cause of the accident; one restraint caught on and caused an inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever, resulting in a loss of power.
438:
Passengers were provided with a hook-shaped seat belt cutter to sever the restraint tether in case of an emergency, but internal testing in
November 2017 demonstrated how difficult it was to use that tool on the restraint tethers used in flight, which were made using the
271:
to the back of each passenger's supplemental harness at the start and end of each flight. Each carabiner was at the end of a tether attached in the helicopter's cabin. The supplemental harnesses were provided by FlyNYON, the vendor which had sold the passenger tickets.
346:
floor-mounted controls. At 19:05:51, when he sat up again, video showed the tail of the tether became taut, then suddenly released; this was followed two seconds later by decreased engine noises. Radar showed the helicopter began to descend at 19:06:11.
408:
Almost immediately, passengers on previous flights pointed out the "complicated system of straps, carabiners and an emergency blade for cutting off in case of trouble" and inadequate training as probable causes for the passengers' deaths in a March 12
294:
the mayor's office and the
Economic Development Corporation in 2015, according to an article about the curtailment of tourist flights from the Downtown Manhattan Heliport in 2016. Liberty and FlyNYON stated the flights met exemption criteria under
694:
Inadvertent
Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching | Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight | Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH | New York, New York | March 11, 2018 | Accident Report NTSB/AAR-19/04
342:
front, left rear, and right rear seats were supposed to stay restrained while the inboard passengers in the center rear seats were allowed to unclip their primary restraints and sit on the floor with their feet on the skids.
231:, killing 5 people. Two passengers died at the scene, and three others were pronounced dead at the hospital. The pilot escaped the helicopter following the crash. The aircraft was operated by Liberty Helicopters for FlyNyon.
532:
Redesign and recertify STC SR0047LA to ensure that (a) both reservoirs activate in tandem, and (b) all flotation bags inflate symmetrically and with sufficient pressure to ensure buoyancy stability.
511:
The FAA should require Airbus Helicopters to mandate the installation of a collective guard on all AS350B2 helicopters to protect against the possibility of inadvertent fuel control activation.
1928:
1154:
461:
factor in the fatal crash. The FAA eventually stepped in, issuing restrictions on "doors-off" flights to ensure that passenger safety restraints could be quickly released in an emergency.
1517:
470:
designed to break under 12 pounds-force (53 N) of force; the activator is installed on the cyclic control lever. The flotation system was installed by EuroTec Canada in 2013.
1948:
536:
reason that the cross-feed hose will not prevent asymmetrical inflation of the floats that will result in inadequate stability to allow for the safe egress of the aircraft.
1933:
434:
Exemplar NYONair yellow nylon supplemental harness; cutting tool is secured in a pouch on a shoulder strap, and the restraint tether is attached to the dorsal d-ring.
514:
The FAA should issue an immediate Airworthiness Directive to Dart to address and correct the known design deficiencies in the STC 0045LA emergency flotation system.
1137:
Party Submission to the National Transportation Safety Board: Investigation of the Airbus Helicopters A350B2 Accident, East River, NY, March 11, 2018 | ERA18MA099
1943:
1510:
766:
609:
85:
1056:
1899:
1893:
1503:
1938:
1180:
1348:
1326:
1304:
1761:
1661:
838:
445:
296:
286:
277:
256:
1611:
1681:
1230:
1208:
440:
1371:"NTSB Calls for Halt to Doors-Off Helicopter Rides Using Supplemental Passenger Restraints Recommends Closing Regulatory Loophole"
368:
Diagram showing the positions of fuel flow control lever and emergency fuel shutoff lever on the console of a Eurocopter AS350 B2
254:
The helicopter was equipped with primary restraints for the pilot and each passenger provided by the manufacturer compliant with
1561:
1446:
1621:
864:
364:
1395:
393:
358:
904:
1711:
1426:
1031:
1651:
1466:
1089:
992:
1741:
1601:
1527:
267:
device which anchored each passenger to the helicopter; ground crew were responsible for attaching and detaching a
1701:
1821:
1751:
1721:
966:
581:
550:
312:
1591:
1349:"8900.506 - Emergency Order of Prohibition Pertaining to "Doors-Off" Flight Operations for Compensation or Hire"
1327:"8900.457 - Emergency Order of Prohibition Pertaining to "Doors-Off" Flight Operations for Compensation or Hire"
1305:"8900.456 - Emergency Order of Prohibition Pertaining to "Doors-Off" Flight Operations for Compensation or Hire"
1918:
1871:
1851:
1801:
1771:
1671:
1641:
1057:"Technical Standard Order TSO-C167: Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS), also known as Human Harnesses"
427:, which FlyNYON called "NYON blue safety tape", to prevent inadvertent release of harnesses and restraints.
1881:
1691:
1551:
1406:
693:
637:
248:
125:
1923:
1841:
1581:
1571:
486:
FlyNYON is a spinoff of NY On Air (NYONair), which was founded by Patrick Day, Jr. in 2012 to coordinate
1279:
937:
1490:
720:
474:
1115:"NTSB Board Meeting: To Determine the Probable Cause of Airbus AS350 helicopter crash East River, NYC"
357:
at low altitudes immediately prior to its crash. The pilot stated, in a post-crash interview with the
1280:"Emergency Order of Prohibition Pertaining to "Doors-Off" Flight Operations for Compensation or Hire"
448:
said: "The contraption that FlyNYON rigged up turned a perfectly good helicopter into a death trap."
239:
889:
1495:
1253:
1370:
1155:"'This should never happen again': Family of New York helicopter crash victim sues tour operator"
1861:
1731:
444:
fatal flight. When discussing the restraint system used on the accident flight, NTSB Chairman
1811:
1781:
1351:. United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. April 10, 2019
1329:. United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. April 10, 2018
1307:. United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. March 23, 2018
140:
1399:
1136:
1114:
349:
According to several witnesses, the helicopter suddenly descended near the northern end of
8:
1953:
1831:
638:
Urgent Safety Recommendation Report: Additional Harness Systems to Allow for Rapid Egress
315:
430:
814:
789:
721:"Deadly helicopter crash raises questions over safety and regulation for popular tours"
557:
502:
NYONair performed an independent investigation and made the following recommendations:
487:
326:
259:
819:
338:
322:
1791:
809:
801:
554:
350:
299:
330:
289:
220:
280:
1484:
389:
28:
1912:
1285:. United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration
1062:. Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation. June 9, 2004
790:"The U.S. Commercial Air Tour Industry: A Review of Aviation Safety Concerns"
268:
228:
100:
87:
78:
823:
805:
424:
354:
334:
321:
The pilot, following the passengers' requests for sights, flew toward the
549:
On March 19, NTSB issued Aviation Safety Recommendation ASR-18-02 to the
275:
The flight was being conducted by the operator Liberty Helicopters under
264:
1373:(Press release). National Transportation Safety Board. December 10, 2019
473:
Subsequent evaluation of the wreck showed the right-side floats for the
396:
investigators examine the recovered wreckage of N350LH on March 13, 2018
1467:"Months Before Deadly Crash, Helicopter Pilots Warned of Safety Issues"
1090:"Months Before Deadly Crash, Helicopter Pilots Warned of Safety Issues"
216:
74:
34:
967:"Reporter, tourist and firefighter among NYC helicopter crash victims"
353:
and then plummeted into the river. The helicopter was described to be
400:
The NTSB opened an investigation immediately following the incident.
224:
938:"Doors-Off Helicopter Flights Under Scrutiny After East River Crash"
1525:
1181:"Airbus warned of helicopter defects before fatal East River crash"
905:"Brother of helicopter crash victim says 'it's hard not to seethe'"
1464:
1087:
1447:"FAA targets FlyNYON, company behind craze for doors-off flights"
700:(Report). National Transportation Safety Board. December 10, 2019
610:"Scrutiny turns to harnesses used in deadly NYC helicopter crash"
492:
420:
993:"When a Device Meant for Helicopter Safety Becomes a Death Grip"
865:"Everything We Know About the New York Tourist Helicopter Crash"
1427:"FlyNYON knew of safety concerns before fatal doors-off flight"
1032:"FlyNYON knew of safety concerns before fatal doors-off flight"
423:
to modify the harnesses to fit smaller passengers, and applied
1407:"Inside the Safety Issues Surrounding the NY Helicopter Crash"
769:(Report). National Transportation Safety Board. March 26, 2018
643:(Report). National Transportation Safety Board. March 19, 2018
284:
rules as an air tour for aerial photography for FlyNYON under
1929:
Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in 2018
215:
On March 11, 2018, a sightseeing helicopter crashed into the
1400:
Airbus sightseeing helicopter crash, Accident No. ERA18MA099
325:
at an altitude ranging from 300–500 ft (91–152 m)
890:"East River helicopter crash leaves 5 dead, officials say"
718:
243:
N350LH, the helicopter involved, photographed in July 2014
839:"Deal Restricts Tourist Helicopter Flights Over New York"
1233:. National Transportation Safety Board. October 20, 2010
1211:. National Transportation Safety Board. October 20, 2010
1949:
Accidents and incidents involving the Eurocopter AS350
1465:
Vogel, Kenneth P.; McGeehan, Patrick (April 7, 2018).
1088:
Vogel, Kenneth P.; McGeehan, Patrick (April 7, 2018).
787:
1254:"FAA Moves to Restrict Doors-Off Helicopter Flights"
1134:
862:
761:
582:"3 crashes for helicopter company in 11 years: NTSB"
759:
757:
755:
753:
751:
749:
747:
745:
743:
741:
1152:
1934:Aviation accidents and incidents in New York City
935:
836:
311:The flight originated from Helo Kearny Heliport (
66:Crashed into river following loss of engine power
1910:
902:
738:
1277:
990:
719:Sanchez, Ray; Kaufman, Ellie (March 18, 2018).
1944:Accidents and incidents involving helicopters
1511:
1251:
1083:
1081:
1079:
1077:
960:
958:
931:
929:
927:
925:
1178:
451:
247:The aircraft involved in the incident was a
1562:Sapphire Aviation Bell UH-1H Iroquois crash
1404:
1203:
1201:
1025:
1023:
1021:
1019:
1017:
1015:
1013:
794:Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
688:
686:
684:
682:
680:
678:
632:
630:
628:
626:
1518:
1504:
1444:
1424:
1074:
1029:
955:
922:
676:
674:
672:
670:
668:
666:
664:
662:
660:
658:
27:
813:
712:
1198:
1010:
623:
441:ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene
429:
388:
363:
238:
1592:Mexican Air Force Sikorsky UH-60M crash
863:Bellamy III, Woodrow (March 13, 2018).
788:Ballard, Sarah-Blythe (February 2014).
655:
403:
1939:March 2018 events in the United States
1911:
1135:O'Brien, Jillian (September 9, 2019).
837:Chaban, Matt A.V. (January 31, 2016).
481:
1762:K2 Aviation de Havilland Beaver crash
1612:Russian Air Force Antonov An-26 crash
1499:
1153:Phillips, Kristine (March 14, 2018).
1652:Philippines Piper PA-23 Apache crash
1622:Iran Bombardier Challenger 604 crash
1396:National Transportation Safety Board
964:
936:Mueller, Benjamin (March 12, 2018).
767:Aviation Accident Preliminary Report
604:
602:
359:National Transportation Safety Board
303:(e)(4)(iii) for aerial photography.
1682:U.S. Air National Guard C-130 crash
903:Hutchinson, Bill (March 15, 2018).
22:2018 New York City helicopter crash
13:
1278:Duncan, John S. (March 23, 2018).
991:Wilson, Michael (March 12, 2018).
14:
1965:
1389:
599:
1602:Iran Aseman Airlines Flight 3704
1528:Aviation accidents and incidents
1252:Pope, Stephen (March 20, 2018).
1231:"Safety Recommendation A-10-130"
1209:"Safety Recommendation A-10-129"
384:
337:. After contacting the tower at
161:Helo Kearny Heliport, New Jersey
153:Helo Kearny Heliport, New Jersey
33:N350LH being recovered from the
1363:
1341:
1319:
1297:
1271:
1245:
1223:
1179:Annese, John (March 29, 2018).
1172:
1146:
1128:
1107:
1049:
984:
896:
882:
551:Federal Aviation Administration
1872:Gatwick Airport drone incident
1852:Fly Jamaica Airways Flight 256
1802:Yirol Let L-410 Turbolet crash
1742:Aeroméxico Connect Flight 2431
1712:UY Aviation King Air C90 crash
1672:Southwest Airlines Flight 1380
1662:Algerian Air Force Il-76 crash
1632:New York City helicopter crash
869:Rotor & Wing International
856:
830:
781:
574:
464:
1:
1702:Cubana de Aviación Flight 972
1642:US-Bangla Airlines Flight 211
1445:Head, Elan (March 18, 2018).
1405:Adams, Eric (April 8, 2018).
567:
329:(agl), then proceeded to the
1692:Sichuan Airlines Flight 8633
1552:Pegasus Airlines Flight 8622
1425:Head, Elan (April 7, 2018).
1030:Head, Elan (April 7, 2018).
540:
7:
1842:Sky Lease Cargo Flight 4854
1582:United Airlines Flight 1175
1572:Saratov Airlines Flight 703
306:
234:
10:
1970:
1822:Leicester helicopter crash
1752:Ju-Air Junkers Ju 52 crash
1722:Pretoria Convair 340 crash
475:emergency flotation system
1891:
1772:Horizon Air Q400 incident
1543:
452:CEO dismissal of concerns
249:Eurocopter AS350 Écureuil
205:
197:
189:
181:
173:
165:
157:
149:
139:
131:
126:Eurocopter AS350 Écureuil
121:
116:
70:
62:
47:
42:
26:
51:March 11, 2018
1882:Puebla helicopter crash
101:40.773611°N 73.939444°W
1862:Air Astana Flight 1388
1732:Air Vanuatu Flight 241
806:10.3357/asem.3814.2014
435:
397:
369:
244:
1919:2018 in New York City
1812:Air Niugini Flight 73
1782:XiamenAir Flight 8667
433:
392:
367:
242:
106:40.773611; -73.939444
404:Supplemental harness
1900:► 2019
1894:2017 ◄
1832:Lion Air Flight 610
1185:New York Daily News
1159:The Washington Post
482:FlyNYON and Liberty
135:Liberty Helicopters
97: /
23:
1924:2010s in Manhattan
1897:
1094:The New York Times
997:The New York Times
942:The New York Times
843:The New York Times
527:For Dart Aerospace
491:pictures with the
488:aerial photography
436:
398:
370:
327:above ground level
245:
122:Aircraft type
21:
1906:
1905:
339:LaGuardia Airport
323:Statue of Liberty
269:locking carabiner
213:
212:
37:on March 12, 2018
1961:
1898:
1792:UTair Flight 579
1538:
1537:
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1520:
1513:
1506:
1497:
1496:
1487:
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1437:
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1417:
1383:
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1378:
1367:
1361:
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1356:
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1339:
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1301:
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1227:
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1486:NTSB hearing
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335:Central Park
320:
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141:Registration
18:
1377:January 28,
704:January 28,
586:am New York
465:Skid floats
297:14 CFR
287:14 CFR
278:14 CFR
265:fall arrest
257:14 CFR
158:Destination
104: /
1954:East River
1913:Categories
1355:October 3,
1333:October 3,
568:References
217:East River
190:Fatalities
174:Passengers
92:73°56′22″W
89:40°46′25″N
75:East River
55:2018-03-11
35:East River
1476:April 19,
1456:April 19,
1436:April 19,
1416:April 11,
1142:(Report).
1120:April 30,
1099:April 11,
1066:April 11,
1041:April 11,
976:March 13,
947:March 29,
773:March 29,
730:March 30,
647:March 29,
615:March 13,
591:March 13,
541:Aftermath
522:activate.
518:activate.
225:Manhattan
206:Survivors
166:Occupants
1471:NY Times
1451:Vertical
1431:Vertical
1311:April 5,
1289:April 5,
1263:April 5,
1237:April 5,
1215:April 5,
1190:April 5,
1164:April 5,
1036:Vertical
1002:April 5,
914:April 5,
909:ABC News
874:April 5,
848:April 5,
824:24597160
421:zip ties
307:Accident
235:Aircraft
219:off the
198:Injuries
132:Operator
117:Aircraft
43:Accident
1532: (
1530:in 2018
1491:YouTube
815:4888595
506:For FAA
493:hashtag
63:Summary
53: (
1878:Dec 24
1868:Dec 19
1858:Nov 11
1828:Oct 29
1818:Oct 27
1808:Sep 28
1778:Aug 16
1768:Aug 10
1738:Jul 31
1728:Jul 28
1718:Jul 10
1708:Jun 28
1698:May 18
1688:May 14
1668:Apr 17
1658:Apr 11
1648:Mar 17
1638:Mar 12
1628:Mar 11
1618:Mar 11
1598:Feb 18
1588:Feb 16
1578:Feb 13
1568:Feb 11
1558:Jan 17
1548:Jan 13
1258:Flying
822:
812:
260:27.785
145:N350LH
1848:Nov 9
1838:Nov 7
1798:Sep 9
1788:Sep 1
1758:Aug 4
1748:Aug 4
1678:May 2
1608:Mar 6
1411:Wired
1283:(PDF)
1140:(PDF)
1060:(PDF)
698:(PDF)
641:(PDF)
558:12856
300:119.1
81:, US
1534:2018
1478:2018
1458:2018
1438:2018
1418:2018
1379:2020
1357:2019
1335:2019
1313:2018
1291:2018
1265:2018
1239:2018
1217:2018
1192:2018
1166:2018
1122:2020
1101:2018
1068:2018
1043:2018
1004:2018
978:2018
949:2018
916:2018
876:2018
850:2018
820:PMID
775:2018
732:2018
706:2020
649:2018
617:2018
593:2018
394:NTSB
333:and
182:Crew
71:Site
48:Date
1489:on
971:CNN
810:PMC
802:doi
725:CNN
316:LID
313:FAA
290:136
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