916:. But some philosophers reject its importance by emphasizing that "preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves". However, such objections are often dismissed by pointing out that philosophy is at its core a reflective and critical enterprise, which is perhaps best exemplified by its preoccupation with its own methods. This is also backed up by the arguments to the effect that one's philosophical method has important implications for how one does philosophy and which philosophical claims one accepts or rejects. Since philosophy also studies the methodology of other disciplines, such as the methods of science, it has been argued that the study of its own methodology is an essential part of philosophy.
332:: the problem that the observational evidence is often insufficient to determine which theory is true. This would lead to the implausible conclusion that even for the empirical sciences, many of their claims would be meaningless. But on a deeper level, the basic claim underlying verificationism seems itself to be meaningless by its own standards: it is not clear what empirical observations could verify the claim that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. In this sense, verificationism would be contradictory by directly refuting itself. These and other problems have led some theorists, especially from the sciences, to adopt
250:'s first principles stating that "he can know that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly is true only if he first knows that God exists and is not a deceiver". Another example is the causal axiom of Spinoza's system that "the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves knowledge of its cause", which has been criticized in various ways. In this sense, philosophical systems built using the geometrical method are open to criticisms that reject their basic axioms. A different form of objection holds that the inference from the axioms to the theorems may be faulty, for example, because it does not follow a
528:'s approach to ordinary language philosophy. According to him, ordinary language already has encoded many important distinctions and is our point of departure in theorizing. But "ordinary language is not the last word: in principle, it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded". However, it also falls prey to another criticism: that it is often not clear how to distinguish ordinary from non-ordinary language. This makes it difficult in all but the paradigmatic cases to decide whether a philosophical claim is or is not supported by ordinary language.
690:: "To develop perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivable practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare". Various criticisms to the pragmatic method have been raised. For example, it is commonly rejected that the terms "true" and "useful" mean the same thing. A closely related problem is that believing in a certain theory may be useful to one person and useless to another, which would mean the same theory is both true and false.
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brings with it the need for further interpretation in order to get from the given answers to the intuitions responsible for these answers. Another problem concerns the question of how reliable the intuitions of ordinary people on the often very technical issues are. The core of this objection is that, for many topics, the opinions of ordinary people are not very reliable since they have little familiarity with the issues themselves and the underlying problems they may pose. For this reason, it has been argued that they cannot replace the
726:": it argues that these additional assumptions also have to be true because otherwise, the initial fact would not be the case. For example, it has been used to argue for the existence of an external world based on the premise that the experience of the temporal order of our mental states would not be possible otherwise. Another example argues in favor of a description of nature in terms of concepts such as motion, force, and causal interaction based on the claim that an objective account of nature would not be possible otherwise.
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claims if the doubt is applied in its most radical form. Another is that while absolute certainty may be desirable, it is by no means necessary for knowledge. In this sense, it excludes too much and seems to be unwarranted and arbitrary, since it is not clear why very certain theorems justified by strong arguments should be abandoned just because they are not absolutely certain. This can be seen in relation to the insights discovered by the empirical sciences, which have proven very useful even though they are not indubitable.
576:: they activate the intuitions concerning the specific situation, which may then be generalized to arrive at universal principles. In some cases, the imagined scenario is physically possible but it would not be feasible to make an actual experiment due to the costs, negative consequences, or technological limitations. But other thought experiments even work with scenarios that defy what is physically possible. It is controversial to what extent thought experiments merit to be characterized as
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deal with the conflicts between the two by adjusting both the intuitions and the principles to reconcile them until an equilibrium is reached. One problem with this narrow interpretation is that it depends very much on the intuitions one started with. This means that different philosophers may start with very different intuitions and may therefore be unable to find a shared equilibrium. For example, the narrow method of reflective equilibrium may lead some moral philosophers towards
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an external world is necessary for the experience of the temporal order of our mental states. But even if this point is granted, it does not guarantee that the assumption itself is true. So even if the belief in a given proposition is a psychological necessity for a certain experience, it does not automatically follow that this belief itself is true. Instead, it could be the case that humans are just wired in such a way that they have to believe in certain false assumptions.
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traditionally claimed that it could lead to absolute certainty and thereby help philosophy achieve the status of a rigorous science. But phenomenology has been heavily criticized because of this overly optimistic outlook concerning the certainty of its insights. A different objection to the method of phenomenological reduction holds that it involves an artificial stance that gives too much emphasis on the theoretical attitude at the expense of feeling and practical concerns.
993:, i.e. that the truth of their premises ensures the truth of their conclusion. In other cases, philosophers may commit themselves to working hypotheses or norms of investigation even though they lack sufficient evidence. Such assumptions can be quite fruitful in simplifying the possibilities the philosopher needs to consider and by guiding them to ask interesting questions. But the lack of evidence makes this type of enterprise vulnerable to criticism.
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evidence base. This base may be used to eliminate philosophical theories that stray too far away from it, that are abstruse from its perspective. This can happen because either the theory itself or consequences that can be drawn from it violate common sense. For common sense philosophers, it is not the task of philosophy to question common sense. Instead, they should analyze it to formulate theories in accordance with it.
624:. In this sense, it is the endpoint of the deliberative process on the issue in question. The philosophical method of reflective equilibrium aims at reaching this type of state by mentally going back and forth between all relevant beliefs and intuitions. In this process, the thinker may have to let go of some beliefs or deemphasize certain intuitions that do not fit into the overall picture in order to progress.
394:". The underlying argument is that the question "Is what is good what maximizes happiness?" is an open question, unlike the question "Is what is good what is good?", which is a closed question. One problem with this approach is that it results in a very strict conception of what constitutes a correct conceptual analysis, leading to the conclusion that many concepts, like "goodness", are simple or indefinable.
560:. Examples of such propositions include "torturing a sentient being for fun is wrong" or "it is irrational to believe both something and its opposite". But not all defenders of intuitionism restrict intuitions to self-evident propositions. Instead, often weaker non-inferential impressions are also included as intuitions, such as a mother's intuition that her child is innocent of a certain crime.
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question of the nature of philosophy has important implications for which methods of inquiry are appropriate to philosophizing. Seeing philosophy as an empirical science brings its methods much closer to the methods found in the natural sciences. Seeing it as the attempt to clarify concepts and increase understanding, on the other hand, usually leads to a methodology much more focused on
138:, in order to achieve a certain goal, when used under the right conditions. In the context of inquiry, a method is a way of conducting one's research and theorizing, like inductive or axiomatic methods in logic or experimental methods in the sciences. Philosophical methodology studies the methods of philosophy. It is not primarily concerned with whether a philosophical position, such as
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776:. This variation casts doubt on the reliability of the intuitions and thereby also on theories supported by them. As a positive program, it uses empirical data to support its own philosophical claims. It differs from other philosophical methods in that it usually studies the intuitions of ordinary people and uses them, and not the experts' intuitions, as philosophical evidence.
944:. One important difference is that philosophy does not use experimental data obtained through measuring equipment like telescopes or cloud chambers to justify its claims. For example, even philosophical naturalists emphasizing the close relation between philosophy and the sciences mostly practice a form of armchair theorizing instead of gathering empirical data.
182:. The normative aspect of philosophical methodology expresses the idea that there is a difference between good and bad philosophy. In this sense, philosophical methods either articulate the standards of evaluation themselves or the practices that ensure that these standards are met. Philosophical methods can be understood as tools that help the theorist do
479:. Another problem is that for many issues, there is no one universally accepted common-sense opinion. In such cases, common sense only amounts to the majority opinion, which should not be blindly accepted by researchers. This problem can be approached by articulating a weaker version of the common-sense method. One such version is defended by
246:. The theorems arrived at this way may be challenged in two ways. On the one hand, they may be derived from axioms that are not as self-evident as their defenders proclaim and thereby fail to inherit the status of absolute certainty. For example, many philosophers have rejected the claim of self-evidence concerning one of
927:, has had important implications both on how philosophers conducted their theorizing and what claims they set out to defend. In some cases, such discoveries led the involved philosophers to overly optimistic outlooks, seeing them as historic breakthroughs that would dissolve all previous disagreements in philosophy.
382:. According to this view, asking whether the decomposition fits the concept should result in a closed or pointless question. If it results in an open or intelligible question, then the analysis does not exactly correspond to what we have in mind when we use the term. This can be used, for example, to reject the
864:, every true proposition is true because another entity, its truthmaker, exists. This principle can be used as a methodology to critically evaluate philosophical theories. In particular, this concerns theories that accept certain truths but are unable to provide their truthmaker. Such theorists are derided as
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Transcendental arguments have faced various challenges. On the one hand, the claim that the belief in a certain assumption is necessary for the experience of a certain entity is often not obvious. So in the example above, critics can argue against the transcendental argument by denying the claim that
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Intuitions can be used in various ways as a philosophical method. On the one hand, philosophers may consult their intuitions in relation to very general principles, which may then be used to deduce further theorems. Another technique, which is often applied in ethics, consists in considering concrete
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based on his common-sense impression that time exists. He holds that his simple common-sense impression is much more certain than that McTaggart's arguments are sound, even though Moore was unable to pinpoint where McTaggart's arguments went wrong. According to his method, common sense constitutes an
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that seem very certain to us, even if we do not believe them based on explicit arguments. Common sense philosophers use these beliefs as their starting point of philosophizing. This often takes the form of criticism directed against theories whose premises or conclusions are very far removed from how
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an object of the kind under investigation. The features of this object are then varied in order to see whether the resulting object still belongs to the investigated kind. If the object can survive the change of a certain feature then this feature is inessential to this kind. Otherwise, it belongs to
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by providing a secure path to knowledge. In other cases, one method may be understood as a development or a specific application of another method. Some philosophers or philosophical movements give primacy to one specific method, while others use a variety of methods depending on the problem they are
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When understood in a more narrow sense, the method aims at finding an equilibrium between particular intuitions and general principles. On this view, the thinker starts with intuitions about particular cases and formulates general principles that roughly reflect these intuitions. The next step is to
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is a state in which a thinker has the impression that they have considered all the relevant evidence for and against a theory and have made up their mind on this issue. It is a state of coherent balance among one's beliefs. This does not imply that all the evidence has really been considered, but it
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or
Socratic debate is a form of cooperative philosophizing in which one philosopher usually first states a claim, which is then scrutinized by their interlocutor by asking them questions about various related claims, often with the implicit goal of putting the initial claim into doubt. It continues
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theory is true or false. This is also intended to clarify the underlying issues by spelling out what would follow from them. Another goal of this approach is to expose pseudo-problems, which involve a merely verbal disagreement without any genuine difference on the level of the consequences between
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consists in tackling philosophical questions based on how the related terms are used in ordinary language. In this sense, it is related to the method of common sense but focuses more on linguistic aspects. Some types of ordinary language philosophy only take a negative form in that they try to show
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sentences cannot be verified by empirical observations, they are deemed to be non-sensical by verificationists. Verificationism has been criticized on various grounds. On the one hand, it has proved very difficult to give a precise formulation that includes all scientific claims, including the ones
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is a methodological principle of theory selection favoring simple over complex theories. A closely related aspect of philosophical methodology concerns the question of which conventions one needs to adopt necessarily to succeed at theory making. But in a more narrow sense, only guidelines that help
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One reason for the methodological difference between philosophy and science is that philosophical claims are usually more speculative and cannot be verified or falsified by looking through a telescope. This problem is not solved by citing works published by other philosophers, since it only defers
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may be the reason why it intuitively seems to a person that a proposition is true without providing any epistemological support for this proposition. Another objection, often raised in the empirical and naturalist tradition, is that intuitions do not constitute a reliable source of knowledge since
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is that different philosophers often defend mutually incompatible claims, which poses the challenge of how to select between them. Another difference between scientific and philosophical methodology is that there is wide agreement among scientists concerning their methods, testing procedures, and
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One problem for both the positive and the negative approaches is that the data obtained from surveys do not constitute hard empirical evidence since they do not directly express the intuitions of the participants. The participants may react to subtle pragmatic cues in giving their answers, which
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One important argument against this method is that common sense has often been wrong in the past, as is exemplified by various scientific discoveries. This suggests that common sense is in such cases just an antiquated theory that is eventually eliminated by the progress of science. For example,
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consists in understanding sentences by analyzing their characteristic conditions of verification, i.e. by determining which empirical observations would prove them to be true. A central motivation behind this method has been to distinguish meaningful from meaningless sentences. This is sometimes
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The disagreements within philosophy do not only concern which first-order philosophical claims are true, they also concern the second-order issue of which philosophical methods to use. One way to evaluate philosophical methods is to assess how well they do at solving philosophical problems. The
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has suggested a modified version that aims to cover only the most paradigmatic cases while excluding problematic or controversial cases. While this approach has become more popular in recent years, it has also been criticized based on the argument that it tends to change the subject rather than
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foundation of our knowledge. The method for finding these foundations is doubt: only that which is indubitable can serve this role. While this approach has been influential, it has also received various criticisms. One problem is that it has proven very difficult to find such absolutely certain
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method assesses the truth or falsity of theories by looking at the consequences of accepting them. In this sense, "he test of truth is utility: it's true if it works". Pragmatists approach intractable philosophical disputes in a down-to-earth fashion by asking about the concrete consequences
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of what things are like can get in the way of studying how they appear to be and thereby mislead the researcher into thinking they know the answer instead of looking for themselves. The phenomenological method can also be seen as a reaction to methodological skepticism since its defenders
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is the most recent development of the methods discussed in this article: it began only in the early years of the 21st century. Experimental philosophers try to answer philosophical questions by gathering empirical data. It is an interdisciplinary approach that applies the methods of
368:. Usually, philosophers use their own intuitions to determine whether a concept is applicable to a specific situation to test their analyses. But other approaches have also been utilized by using not the intuitions of philosophers but of regular people, an approach often defended by
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we currently hold. One problem with these methods of theory selection is that it is usually not clear how the different virtues are to be weighted, often resulting in cases where they are unable to resolve disputes between competing theories that excel at different virtues.
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claiming to show otherwise. The method of experimental philosophy can be used both in a negative or a positive program. As a negative program, it aims to challenge traditional philosophical movements and positions. This can be done, for example, by showing how the
599:. Others compare it not to perception but to the cognitive ability to evaluate counterfactual conditionals, which may be understood as the capacity to answer what-if questions. But the reliability of intuitions has been contested by its opponents. For example,
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that ultimately depend for their justification or rejection on empirical observational evidence. In this sense, philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences in that they both give priority to the scientific method for investigating all areas of reality.
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of the expressed sentences. This significantly complicates ordinary language philosophy, since philosophers have to take the specific context of the expression into account, which may considerably alter its meaning. This criticism is partially mitigated by
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In the widest sense, any principle for choosing between competing theories may be considered as part of the methodology of philosophy. In this sense, the philosophical methodology is "the general study of criteria for theory selection". For example,
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trying to solve. It has been argued that many of the philosophical methods are also commonly used implicitly in more crude forms by regular people and are only given a more careful, critical, and systematic exposition in philosophical methodology.
302:. For example, when imagining a triangle, one can vary its features, like the length of its sides or its color. These features are inessential since the changed object is still a triangle, but it ceases to be a triangle if a fourth side is added.
978:, which is concerned with explaining concepts and showing their interrelations. Philosophical naturalists often reject this line of thought and hold that empirical evidence can confirm or disconfirm philosophical theories, at least indirectly.
872:, the view that nothing outside the present exists. Philosophical presentists usually accept the very common belief that dinosaurs existed but have trouble in providing a truthmaker for this belief since they deny existence to past entities.
155:
philosophers learn about facts studied by philosophy qualify as philosophical methods. This is the more common sense, which applies to most of the methods listed in this article. In this sense, philosophical methodology is closely related to
686:: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Another formulation is due to
269:- broadly speaking, the science of phenomenon, given that almost all phenomena are perceived. The phenomenological method aims to study the appearances themselves and the relations found between them. This is achieved through the so-called
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is always on its side. But such a shift in the burden of proof does not constitute a blind belief in common sense since it leaves open the possibility that, for various issues, there is decisive evidence against the common-sense opinion.
969:. In this sense, philosophical methodology is concerned with the questions of what constitutes philosophical evidence, how much support it offers, and how to acquire it. In contrast to the empirical sciences, it is often claimed that
41:. Methods of philosophy are procedures for conducting research, creating new theories, and selecting between competing theories. In addition to the description of methods, philosophical methodology also compares and evaluates them.
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attempts at finding a small set of fixed and unrevisable beliefs from which to build one's philosophical theory. One problem with this wide conception of the reflective equilibrium is that it seems trivial: it is a truism that the
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relations in society. This is usually accompanied by the assertion that these beliefs were accepted and became established, because of non-rational considerations, such as because they served the interests of a predominant class.
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Various methods for the selection between competing theories have been proposed. They often focus on the theoretical virtues of the involved theories. One such method is based on the idea that, everything else being equal, the
514:
One problem for ordinary language philosophy is that regular speakers may have many different reasons for using a certain expression. Sometimes they intend to express what they believe, but other times they may be motivated by
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expressed through the claim that " meaning of a statement is the method of its verification". Meaningful sentences, like the ones found in the natural sciences, have clear conditions of empirical verification. But since most
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thing to do is to consider all the evidence before making up one's mind and to strive towards building a coherent perspective. But as a method to guide philosophizing, this is usually too vague to provide specific guidance.
989:, is central for justifying basic principles and axioms. These principles can then be used as premises to support further conclusions. Some approaches to philosophical methodology emphasize that these arguments have to be
511:, are responsible for this false impression. Other types take more positive approaches by defending and justifying philosophical claims, for example, based on what sounds insightful or odd to the average English speaker.
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to topics studied by philosophy. This usually takes the form of surveys probing the intuitions of ordinary people and then drawing conclusions from the findings. For example, one such inquiry came to the conclusion that
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is not used in justifying philosophical theories, that philosophy is less about the empirical world and more about how we think about the empirical world. In this sense, philosophy is often identified with
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The choice of method can significantly impact how theories are constructed and the arguments used to support them. As a result, methodological disagreements can lead to philosophical disagreements.
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instead. It is a less radical approach that holds that serious theories or hypotheses should at least be falsifiable, i.e. there should be some empirical observations that could prove them wrong.
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One problem with intuitions in general and thought experiments in particular consists in assessing their epistemological status, i.e. whether, how much, and in which circumstances they provide
242:. Historically, it can be understood as a response to methodological skepticism: it consists in trying to find a foundation of certain knowledge and then expanding this foundation through
568:, in which certain situations are imagined with the goal of determining the possible consequences of the imagined scenario. These consequences are assessed using intuition and
548:: they consist in the impression of correctness one has when considering a certain claim. They are intellectual seemings that make it appear to the thinker that the considered
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how philosophical problems are not real problems at all. Instead, it is aimed to show that false assumptions, to which humans are susceptible due to the confusing structure of
879:" refers to a form of criticism that tries to expose commonly held beliefs by uncovering their historical origin and function. For example, it may be used to reject specific
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909:. Different conceptions of philosophy often associated it with different goals, leading to certain methods being more or less suited to reach the corresponding goal.
813:" and "t was their wonder, astonishment, that first led men to philosophize and still leads them". This position is also adopted in the more recent philosophy of
408:. Another problem with conceptual analysis is that it is often very difficult to find an analysis of a concept that really covers all its cases. For this reason,
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for whether the application of this concept is true. The resulting claim about the relation between the concept and its constituents is normally seen as knowable
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417:, which consists in redefining concepts in fruitful ways or developing new interesting concepts. This method has been applied, for example, to the concepts of
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identifies composition and division as ways of forming propositions while he sees invention and judgment as forms of reasoning from the known to the unknown.
788:. This objection does not reject that the method of experimental philosophy has value, it just rejects that this method belongs to philosophical methodology.
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A great variety of philosophical methods has been proposed. Some of these methods were developed as a reaction to other methods, for example, to counter
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poses equally serious problems to how we tend to think about how elementary particles behave. This puts into question that common sense is a reliable
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273:, also known as epoché or bracketing: the researcher suspends their judgments about the natural external world in order to focus exclusively on the
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Luft, Sebastian (2015). "Hermann Cohen: The
Transcendental Method and Philosophy as a Foundational Science (Grundlegungswissenschaft) of Culture".
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together with relevant definitions and tries to deduce a great variety of theorems from this basis, thereby mirroring the methods found in
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is tied to the impression that engaging in further inquiry is unlikely to make one change one's mind, i.e. that one has reached a stable
214:, also referred to as Cartesian doubt, uses systematic doubt as a method of philosophy. It is motivated by the search for an absolutely
544:, use intuitions to evaluate whether a philosophical claim is true or false. In this context, intuitions are seen as a non-inferential
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Dever, Josh (19 May 2016). "What is
Philosophical Methodology?". In Cappelen, Herman; Gendler, Tamar Szabó; Hawthorne, John (eds.).
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An important goal of philosophical methods is to assist philosophers in attaining knowledge. This is often understood in terms of
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intuitions found in trained philosophers. Some critics have even argued that experimental philosophy does not really form part of
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of how things appear to be, independent of whether these appearances are true or false. One idea behind this approach is that our
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483:, who allows that theories violating common sense may still be true. He contends that, in such cases, the theory in question is
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philosophy and arrive at knowledge. The normative question of philosophical methodology is quite controversial since different
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404:. This objection is based on the idea that all claims, including how concepts are to be decomposed, are ultimately based on
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are an important exception: they use methods found in social psychology and other empirical sciences to test their claims.
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a given concept into its fundamental constituents. It consists in considering a philosophically interesting concept, like
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821:, like analysis, synthesis, dialectics, demonstration, definition, and reduction to absurdity. The medieval philosopher
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Cicovacki, Predrag (29 January 2016). "17. "The
Socratic Pathos of Wonder": On Hartmann's Conception of Philosophy".
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2533:"Common Sense and Philosophical Methodology: Some Metaphilosophical Reflections on Analytic Philosophy and Deleuze"
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The term "philosophical methodology" refers either to the methods used to philosophize or to the branch of
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for or against the proposition. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the proposition in question is
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In several instances in the history of philosophy, the discovery of a new philosophical method, such as
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An important difference in philosophical methodology concerns the distinction between descriptive and
4551:. Contributions to Phenomenology. Vol. 108. Springer International Publishing. pp. 97–105.
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results. This is often linked to the fact that science has seen much more progress than philosophy.
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reasoning. In this sense, philosophical methodology is closely tied up with the question of how
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emphasize the role of wonder in the practice of philosophy. On this view, "philosophy begins in
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2261:"Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods"
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4355:"Foucault's 'philosophy of the event': Genealogical Method and the Deployment of the Abnormal"
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Paulo, Norbert (2020). "Moral
Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking".
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often have very different views on what constitutes good philosophy and how to achieve it.
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Sankey, Howard (24 August 2020). "Scientific
Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense".
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by giving a concrete historical reconstruction of how their development was contingent on
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Martin, Wayne M. (20 November 2007). "29. Descartes and the
Phenomenological Tradition".
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of these phenomena. This method usually starts out with an obvious fact, often about our
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or because it includes implicitly assumed premises that are not themselves self-evident.
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4545:"Husserl's Idea of Rigorous Science and its Relevance for the Human and Social Sciences"
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the question of how their insights are justified. An additional complication concerning
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in that it consists in epistemological methods that enable philosophers to arrive at
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resolve the original problem. In this sense, it is closely related to the method of
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since it is true only in virtue of the involved concepts and thereby constitutes an
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The methods of philosophy differ in various respects from the methods found in the
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philosophers use widely held beliefs as their starting point of inquiry, whereas
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proposed that the correctness of a conceptual analysis can be tested using the
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The geometrical method came to particular prominence through rationalists like
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is to be preferred. Another gives preference to the theory that provides the
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studying these methods. A method is a way of doing things, such as a set of
2057:"Logical Empiricism: 4.1 Empiricism, Verificationism, and Anti-metaphysics"
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used to defend certain claims vary a lot depending on factors such as
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In this wide sense, reflective equilibrium is connected to a form of
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Philosophical evidence, which may be obtained, for example, through
572:. For this reason, thought experiments are sometimes referred to as
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103:
method assesses theories by their practical consequences. The
3052:
Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts
912:
The interest in philosophical methodology has risen a lot in
884:
802:
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in the past, while normative questions ask what methods they
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3875:
3873:
3871:
3869:
3867:
3865:
3863:
1519:
1151:
1149:
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the average person thinks about the issue in question.
87:
extract philosophical insights from ordinary language.
44:
Philosophers have employed a great variety of methods.
3735:
3418:
3416:
3414:
3412:
3410:
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2944:
2942:
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1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
1260:
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755:may be sufficient for knowledge despite various
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3890:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
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2397:Myers, C. Mason (1971).
2055:Creath, Richard (2021).
1593:A Companion to Descartes
1119:Enzyklopädie Philosophie
931:Relation to other fields
870:philosophical presentism
819:ancient Greek philosophy
67:study the conditions of
4641:Brown, Jessica (2011).
4367:10.1057/9780230592322_5
3926:Oxford Handbooks Online
3808:Encyclopedia Britannica
3656:James, William (1920).
3455:Little, Daniel (1984).
3397:10.5840/monist201295218
3348:10.4324/9780429325328-3
2922:"Intuitionism (ethics)"
2783:10.5840/monist199881324
2765:Lemos, Noah M. (1998).
2537:The Philosophical Forum
2156:10.15173/jhap.v7i4.3535
2100:10.1023/A:1013370201189
1717:Hatfield, Gary (2018).
1456:10.1057/9781137344557_1
925:phenomenological method
914:contemporary philosophy
739:Experimental philosophy
734:Experimental philosophy
724:transcendental argument
587:in comparison to other
570:counterfactual thinking
446:, for example, rejects
398:Willard Van Orman Quine
258:Phenomenological method
115:use empirical methods.
4614:Leonard, Nick (2021).
4588:Green, Christopher R.
4353:Bowman, Brett (2007).
3747:Stern, Robert (2021).
3091:Brendel, Elke (2004).
2445:Hurka, Thomas (2021).
2082:Okasha, Samir (2001).
839:epistemic conservatism
703:
684:Charles Sanders Peirce
617:Reflective equilibrium
612:Reflective equilibrium
415:conceptual engineering
356:, and determining the
97:reflective equilibrium
39:study of these methods
4475:. Walter de Gruyter.
4158:Philosophy of Science
3579:"What is Pragmatism?"
3268:Philosophy of Science
3190:Philosophy of Science
3014:"Thought Experiments"
2558:10536/DRO/DU:30061043
2008:Wisdom, John (1938).
753:justified true belief
694:Transcendental method
330:philosophy of science
188:schools of philosophy
91:-based methods, like
4690:10.5840/eip201213117
4678:Essays in Philosophy
4234:Logos & Episteme
3718:The Space of Culture
2817:Parker-Ryan, Sally.
2505:Ichikawa, Jonathan.
1987:. Psychology Press.
1666:"Geometrical Method"
1664:Goldenbaum, Ursula.
1596:. pp. 496–512.
1442:Daly, Chris (2015).
866:ontological cheaters
862:truthmaker theorists
589:sources of knowledge
542:ethical intuitionism
465:theory of relativity
380:open question method
244:deductive inferences
176:actually use or used
140:metaphysical dualism
18:Philosophical method
4272:"Truthmaker Theory"
4171:10.1017/psa.2021.40
3551:McDermid, Douglas.
3309:Pust, Joel (2019).
3152:Thought Experiments
2951:Pust, Joel (2019).
2369:. Rebus Foundation.
1340:. Broadview Press.
987:thought experiments
976:conceptual analysis
877:genealogical method
653:and others towards
566:thought experiments
546:source of knowledge
477:source of knowledge
348:is to decompose or
346:conceptual analysis
340:Conceptual analysis
107:method studies the
93:thought experiments
77:Conceptual analysis
3991:www.britannica.com
3987:"Socrates - Plato"
3678:www.britannica.com
3379:Neta, Ram (2012).
3054:. Brill: 165–191.
3042:Goffi, Jean-Yves;
2987:plato.stanford.edu
2926:www.britannica.com
2848:www.britannica.com
2615:www.britannica.com
2590:www.britannica.com
2478:plato.stanford.edu
2326:10.1111/meta.12158
2226:www.britannica.com
1927:. Scarecrow Press.
1846:Noë, Alva (2007).
1242:www.britannica.com
971:empirical evidence
748:cognitive sciences
448:J. M. E. McTaggart
406:empirical evidence
326:underdetermination
265:is the science of
223:Geometrical method
4566:978-3-030-29357-4
4482:978-3-11-032020-6
4376:978-0-230-59232-2
4308:cite encyclopedia
4083:978-3-11-043437-8
3943:978-0-19-993531-4
3728:978-0-19-873884-8
3357:978-0-429-32532-8
3170:978-0-19-512913-7
3135:978-0-393-34878-1
2907:978-0-7456-2358-0
2664:978-3-11-066473-7
1938:Spear, Andrew D.
1892:MacAvoy, Leslie.
1703:978-0-521-83620-3
1573:978-0-19-966877-9
1533:978-0-521-19341-2
1501:978-0-19-184724-0
1465:978-1-137-34455-7
1347:978-1-55111-934-2
1305:978-90-04-42049-6
1223:978-0-19-966877-9
1208:. pp. 3–24.
1169:978-1-107-54736-0
1029:Historical method
1024:Scientific method
1011:Philosophy portal
991:deductively valid
883:or the status of
536:Methods based on
481:Roderick Chisholm
452:unreality of time
287:eidetic variation
252:rule of inference
16:(Redirected from
4748:
4704:
4703:
4701:
4669:
4663:
4662:
4638:
4632:
4631:
4629:
4627:
4611:
4605:
4604:
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4600:
4585:
4579:
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4534:
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4493:
4487:
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4466:
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4459:
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4390:
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4219:
4218:
4216:
4214:
4198:
4192:
4191:
4173:
4149:
4140:
4139:
4114:(6): 2761–2793.
4099:
4088:
4087:
4059:
4053:
4044:
4038:
4025:
4019:
4018:
4008:
4002:
4001:
3999:
3997:
3983:
3977:
3976:
3966:
3955:
3954:
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3917:
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3899:
3897:
3895:
3879:
3858:
3857:
3825:
3819:
3818:
3816:
3814:
3800:
3794:
3793:
3791:
3789:
3777:Bardon, Adrian.
3774:
3765:
3764:
3762:
3760:
3744:
3733:
3732:
3712:
3706:
3705:
3695:
3689:
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3647:
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3644:
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3520:
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3486:
3477:
3476:
3452:
3441:
3440:
3438:
3436:
3420:
3401:
3400:
3376:
3370:
3369:
3333:
3327:
3326:
3324:
3322:
3306:
3300:
3299:
3259:
3253:
3252:
3220:
3214:
3213:
3181:
3175:
3174:
3146:
3140:
3139:
3119:
3113:
3112:
3088:
3082:
3081:
3039:
3030:
3029:
3027:
3025:
3009:
2998:
2997:
2995:
2993:
2978:
2969:
2968:
2966:
2964:
2948:
2937:
2936:
2934:
2932:
2918:
2912:
2911:
2891:
2885:
2884:
2882:
2880:
2870:"Metaphilosophy"
2868:Joll, Nicholas.
2865:
2859:
2858:
2856:
2854:
2840:
2834:
2833:
2831:
2829:
2814:
2803:
2802:
2762:
2756:
2755:
2753:
2751:
2739:Legum, Richard.
2736:
2730:
2729:
2727:
2725:
2709:
2703:
2702:
2700:
2698:
2683:
2677:
2676:
2632:
2626:
2625:
2623:
2621:
2607:
2601:
2600:
2598:
2596:
2582:
2571:
2570:
2560:
2528:
2522:
2521:
2519:
2517:
2502:
2489:
2488:
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2484:
2469:
2463:
2462:
2460:
2458:
2442:
2436:
2435:
2425:
2419:
2418:
2394:
2388:
2387:
2377:
2371:
2370:
2360:
2354:
2353:
2320:(4/5): 555–563.
2305:
2299:
2298:
2280:
2256:
2237:
2236:
2234:
2232:
2218:
2212:
2211:
2192:. pp. 1–6.
2183:
2177:
2176:
2158:
2134:
2128:
2127:
2079:
2073:
2072:
2070:
2068:
2052:
2046:
2045:
2020:(188): 452–498.
2005:
1999:
1998:
1978:
1972:
1971:
1961:
1955:
1954:
1952:
1950:
1935:
1929:
1928:
1918:
1909:
1908:
1906:
1904:
1889:
1883:
1882:
1880:
1878:
1858:(1–2): 231–245.
1843:
1837:
1836:
1834:
1832:
1817:
1808:
1807:
1805:
1803:
1788:
1782:
1781:
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1755:
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1735:
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1708:
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1687:
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1678:
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1661:
1655:
1654:
1622:
1616:
1615:
1587:
1578:
1577:
1549:
1538:
1537:
1517:
1506:
1505:
1485:
1470:
1469:
1439:
1352:
1351:
1331:
1310:
1309:
1289:
1283:
1282:
1272:
1253:
1252:
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1234:
1228:
1227:
1199:
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1173:
1153:
1124:
1123:
1113:
1092:
1091:
1081:
1070:
1069:
1067:
1065:
1050:
1019:Scholarly method
1013:
1008:
1007:
1006:
942:natural sciences
854:synthetic claims
835:best explanation
815:Nicolai Hartmann
661:Pragmatic method
601:wishful thinking
521:truth conditions
509:natural language
489:suspect and the
334:falsificationism
65:Verificationists
61:phenomenological
21:
4756:
4755:
4751:
4750:
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4199:
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4150:
4143:
4100:
4091:
4084:
4060:
4056:
4045:
4041:
4035:Benjamin Jowett
4026:
4022:
4009:
4005:
3995:
3993:
3985:
3984:
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3967:
3958:
3948:
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3802:
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3654:
3650:
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3638:
3627:
3618:
3595:10.2307/2011902
3589:(16): 421–427.
3575:
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3480:
3453:
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3434:
3432:
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3307:
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3260:
3256:
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3089:
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3010:
3001:
2991:
2989:
2979:
2972:
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2240:
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2184:
2180:
2135:
2131:
2080:
2076:
2066:
2064:
2053:
2049:
2006:
2002:
1995:
1979:
1975:
1967:Husserl Lexikon
1962:
1958:
1948:
1946:
1936:
1932:
1919:
1912:
1902:
1900:
1890:
1886:
1876:
1874:
1844:
1840:
1830:
1828:
1818:
1811:
1801:
1799:
1793:"Phenomenology"
1789:
1785:
1775:
1773:
1762:
1758:
1750:
1742:
1738:
1728:
1726:
1715:
1711:
1704:
1688:
1684:
1674:
1672:
1662:
1658:
1623:
1619:
1612:
1588:
1581:
1574:
1550:
1541:
1534:
1518:
1509:
1502:
1491:1. Introduction
1486:
1473:
1466:
1440:
1355:
1348:
1332:
1313:
1306:
1290:
1286:
1273:
1256:
1246:
1244:
1238:"Occam's razor"
1236:
1235:
1231:
1224:
1200:
1177:
1170:
1154:
1127:
1114:
1095:
1082:
1073:
1063:
1061:
1060:. HarperCollins
1052:
1051:
1047:
1042:
1009:
1004:
1002:
999:
963:
938:
933:
921:Cartesian doubt
898:
798:Socratic method
794:
736:
696:
680:pragmatic maxim
663:
637:foundationalist
614:
574:intuition pumps
534:
500:
491:burden of proof
473:quantum physics
461:Albert Einstein
431:
342:
312:verificationism
308:
306:Verificationism
279:presuppositions
260:
225:
209:
196:
124:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
4754:
4744:
4743:
4741:Metaphilosophy
4738:
4724:
4723:
4712:
4711:External links
4709:
4706:
4705:
4684:(1): 297–310.
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4653:(4): 493–516.
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4508:(3): 447–463.
4488:
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4425:(2): 180–201.
4413:Prinz (2016).
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3391:(2): 329–351.
3371:
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3280:10.1086/605826
3274:(5): 712–723.
3254:
3235:(3): 333–366.
3215:
3202:10.1086/392753
3196:(4): 534–541.
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2777:(3): 473–487.
2757:
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2686:Horgan, John.
2678:
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2543:(3): 231–258.
2523:
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2409:(4): 295–308.
2403:Metaphilosophy
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2314:Metaphilosophy
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823:Thomas Aquinas
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651:utilitarianism
613:
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597:sensory organs
533:
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502:The method of
499:
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469:space and time
433:The method of
430:
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366:analytic truth
341:
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310:The method of
307:
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248:René Descartes
229:Baruch Spinoza
224:
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144:utilitarianism
128:metaphilosophy
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3103:(1): 89–108.
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3069:9789004201774
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1820:Cogan, John.
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1791:Smith, Joel.
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787:
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757:Gettier cases
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585:justification
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410:Rudolf Carnap
407:
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322:unobservables
318:
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296:
292:
288:
283:
280:
276:
272:
268:
264:
263:Phenomenology
255:
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217:
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204:
201:
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189:
185:
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177:
173:
168:
166:
162:
158:
153:
152:Occam’s Razor
147:
145:
141:
137:
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129:
119:
116:
114:
110:
106:
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90:
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4681:
4677:
4667:
4650:
4646:
4636:
4624:. Retrieved
4619:
4609:
4597:. Retrieved
4593:
4583:
4548:
4538:
4505:
4501:
4491:
4471:
4464:
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4422:
4418:
4399:. Routledge.
4395:
4358:
4335:
4328:
4298:
4291:
4279:. Retrieved
4275:
4237:
4233:
4223:
4211:. Retrieved
4206:
4203:"Naturalism"
4196:
4161:
4157:
4111:
4107:
4064:
4057:
4047:
4042:
4028:
4023:
4013:
4006:
3994:. Retrieved
3990:
3981:
3975:. Routledge.
3971:
3947:. Retrieved
3925:
3892:. Retrieved
3887:
3837:
3833:
3823:
3811:. Retrieved
3807:
3798:
3786:. Retrieved
3782:
3757:. Retrieved
3752:
3717:
3710:
3700:
3693:
3681:. Retrieved
3677:
3668:
3658:
3651:
3639:. Retrieved
3634:
3631:"Pragmatism"
3586:
3582:
3572:
3560:. Retrieved
3556:
3553:"Pragmatism"
3498:
3494:
3464:
3460:
3433:. Retrieved
3428:
3388:
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3338:
3331:
3319:. Retrieved
3314:
3304:
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3232:
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3189:
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3100:
3096:
3086:
3051:
3044:Roux, Sophie
3022:. Retrieved
3017:
2990:. Retrieved
2986:
2981:Joel, Pust.
2961:. Retrieved
2956:
2929:. Retrieved
2925:
2916:
2896:
2889:
2877:. Retrieved
2873:
2863:
2851:. Retrieved
2847:
2838:
2826:. Retrieved
2822:
2774:
2770:
2760:
2748:. Retrieved
2744:
2734:
2722:. Retrieved
2717:
2707:
2695:. Retrieved
2691:
2681:
2655:11343/251906
2637:
2630:
2618:. Retrieved
2614:
2605:
2593:. Retrieved
2589:
2540:
2536:
2526:
2514:. Retrieved
2510:
2481:. Retrieved
2477:
2467:
2455:. Retrieved
2450:
2440:
2434:. Routledge.
2430:
2423:
2406:
2402:
2392:
2382:
2375:
2365:
2358:
2317:
2313:
2303:
2268:
2264:
2229:. Retrieved
2225:
2216:
2188:
2181:
2146:
2142:
2132:
2091:
2087:
2077:
2065:. Retrieved
2060:
2050:
2017:
2013:
2003:
1983:
1976:
1966:
1959:
1947:. Retrieved
1943:
1933:
1923:
1901:. Retrieved
1897:
1887:
1875:. Retrieved
1855:
1851:
1841:
1829:. Retrieved
1825:
1800:. Retrieved
1796:
1786:
1776:20 September
1774:. Retrieved
1769:
1759:
1746:
1739:
1727:. Retrieved
1722:
1712:
1692:
1685:
1673:. Retrieved
1669:
1659:
1634:
1630:
1620:
1592:
1554:
1522:
1490:
1447:
1336:
1294:
1287:
1281:. Macmillan.
1277:
1245:. Retrieved
1241:
1232:
1204:
1158:
1118:
1086:
1062:. Retrieved
1057:
1048:
980:
964:
961:Epistemology
950:
939:
918:
911:
899:
881:moral claims
874:
865:
859:
848:
827:
795:
785:
778:
737:
728:
697:
677:
672:metaphysical
664:
647:
626:
621:
615:
582:
577:
562:
558:self-evident
557:
535:
526:J. L. Austin
513:
501:
484:
457:
435:common sense
432:
429:Common sense
396:
386:claim that "
374:
349:
344:The goal of
343:
317:metaphysical
309:
299:
284:
261:
233:self-evident
226:
210:
197:
183:
179:
175:
169:
157:epistemology
148:
125:
117:
81:Common-sense
54:self-evident
43:
35:philosophize
30:
29:
4213:22 February
4049:Metaphysics
4046:Aristotle,
4033:155 d (tr.
3813:23 February
3788:23 February
3759:23 February
3641:22 February
3562:22 February
3435:28 February
3321:28 February
2992:28 February
2963:28 February
2931:28 February
2879:28 February
2853:28 February
2828:28 February
2750:27 February
2724:27 February
2620:27 February
2595:27 February
2516:22 February
2483:27 February
2457:27 February
2067:27 February
1949:22 December
1831:27 February
1729:27 February
1675:17 February
1247:27 February
1064:20 February
712:mental life
629:coherentism
622:equilibrium
550:proposition
486:prima facie
444:G. E. Moore
384:utilitarian
376:G. E. Moore
298:the kind's
267:appearances
4730:Categories
4721:PhilPapers
4647:Dialectica
4299:Presentism
4030:Theaetetus
3385:The Monist
3097:Dialectica
3024:29 October
2771:The Monist
2088:Erkenntnis
1802:10 October
1298:. Boston.
1040:References
983:intuitions
786:philosophy
762:intuitions
744:psychology
716:experience
655:Kantianism
593:perception
517:politeness
275:experience
200:skepticism
180:should use
122:Definition
101:pragmatist
4575:213082313
4530:171569977
4522:2363-9962
4439:171199302
4318:ignored (
4254:244235536
4188:249572764
4180:0031-8248
4128:1573-0964
3854:0039-3681
3603:0160-9335
3535:214652789
3527:0020-174X
3366:214337226
3288:0031-8248
3249:143017404
3210:170519663
3078:260640180
2900:. Wiley.
2791:0026-9662
2673:229662541
2567:0031-806X
2350:148551744
2334:0026-1068
2287:1573-0964
2173:196700261
2165:2159-0303
2124:141073837
2108:0165-0106
2034:0026-4423
1651:0967-2559
1122:. Meiner.
1034:Dialectic
954:testimony
807:Aristotle
774:ethnicity
667:pragmatic
554:arguments
538:intuition
392:happiness
354:knowledge
295:imagining
172:normative
165:justified
161:knowledge
136:decisions
89:Intuition
69:empirical
4136:46923450
4108:Synthese
3296:43496954
3046:(2011).
2799:27903601
2342:26602327
2295:54631297
2265:Synthese
2116:20013095
1872:24597361
997:See also
967:evidence
746:and the
642:rational
388:goodness
362:a priori
291:essences
240:geometry
37:and the
4626:2 March
4599:2 March
4281:1 March
4027:Plato,
3996:1 March
3949:1 March
3894:1 March
3683:6 March
3611:2011902
3495:Inquiry
2697:6 March
2231:5 March
2042:2250385
1903:5 March
1877:5 March
936:Science
923:or the
903:apriori
843:beliefs
766:culture
540:, like
439:beliefs
350:analyze
328:in the
300:essence
216:certain
194:Methods
132:actions
73:meaning
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792:Others
782:expert
770:gender
700:German
631:about
471:, and
419:gender
320:about
236:axioms
59:. The
57:axioms
4571:S2CID
4526:S2CID
4435:S2CID
4250:S2CID
4184:S2CID
4132:S2CID
3607:JSTOR
3531:S2CID
3362:S2CID
3292:S2CID
3245:S2CID
3206:S2CID
3074:S2CID
2795:JSTOR
2669:S2CID
2346:S2CID
2338:JSTOR
2291:S2CID
2169:S2CID
2149:(4).
2120:S2CID
2112:JSTOR
2038:JSTOR
1868:S2CID
1751:(PDF)
889:power
885:truth
803:Plato
772:, or
4628:2022
4601:2022
4561:ISBN
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4477:ISBN
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4320:help
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4215:2022
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2994:2022
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2933:2022
2902:ISBN
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2855:2022
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2202:ISBN
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2069:2022
2030:ISSN
2014:Mind
1989:ISBN
1951:2020
1905:2022
1879:2022
1833:2022
1804:2021
1778:2021
1731:2022
1698:ISBN
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1647:ISSN
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1568:ISBN
1528:ISBN
1496:ISBN
1460:ISBN
1342:ISBN
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