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Mary only obtained the ability to do something, not the knowledge of something new. Lewis put forth a similar argument, claiming that Mary gained an ability to "remember, imagine and recognize." In the response to
Jackson's knowledge argument, they both agree that Mary makes a genuine discovery when she sees red for the first time, but deny her discovery involves coming to know some facts of which she was not already cognizant before her release. Therefore, what she obtained is a discovery of new abilities rather than new facts; her discovery of what it is like to experience color consists merely in her gaining new ability of how to do certain things, but not gaining new factual knowledge. In light of such considerations, Churchland distinguishes between two senses of knowing, "knowing how" and "knowing that", where knowing how refers to abilities and knowing that refers to knowledge of facts. He aims to reinforce this line of objection by appealing to the different locations in which each type of knowledge is represented in the brain, arguing that there is a true, demonstratively physical distinction between them. By distinguishing that Mary does not learn new facts, simply abilities, it helps to negate the problem posed by the thought experiment to the physicalist standpoint.
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necessary, Conee cites the example of someone who is able to see colors when she is looking at them, but who lacks the capacity to imagine colors when she is not. He argues that while staring at something that looks red to her, she would have knowledge of what it is like to see red, even though she lacks the ability to imagine what it is like. In order to show precisely that imaginative abilities are not sufficient for knowing what it is like, Conee introduces the following example: Martha, "who is highly skilled at visualizing an intermediate shade that she has not experienced between pairs of shades that she has experienced...happens not to have any familiarity with the shade known as cherry red". Martha has been told that cherry red is exactly midway between burgundy red and fire red (she has experienced these two shades of red, but not cherry). With this, Martha has the ability to imagine cherry red if she so chooses, but as long as she does not exercise this ability, to imagine cherry red, she does not know what it is like to see cherry red.
579:, one of the most prominent contemporary dualists, considers Jackson's thought experiment to successfully show that materialism is false. Chalmers considers responses along the lines of the "ability hypothesis" objection (described above) to be the most promising objections, but unsuccessful: even if Mary does gain a new ability to imagine or recognize colors, she would also necessarily gain factual knowledge about the colors she now sees, such as the fact of how the experience of seeing red relates to the physical brain states underlying it. He also considers arguments that knowledge of what it is like to see red and of the underlying physical mechanisms are actually knowledge of the same fact, just under a different "mode of presentation", meaning Mary did not truly gain new factual knowledge. Chalmers rejects these, arguing that Mary still necessarily gains new factual knowledge about how the experience and the physical processes relate to one another, i.e. a fact about exactly what kind of experience is caused by those processes.
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knowledge can be reduced to factual knowledge or whether it requires direct experience. Another analysis, called the old fact/new guise analysis, denies that Mary learns something new at all. Instead, it suggests that Mary gains a new understanding of an old fact in a different way. This analysis depends on the idea that there are many ways to express the same fact. For example, the fact that Bruce Wayne is 6'2" tall can also be expressed as "Batman is 6'2" tall" or "Bruce Wayne mesure 1.8796 mètres" in French. Proponents of the old fact/new guise analysis argue that Mary gains a new understanding of an old fact through the acquisition of a phenomenal concept of red. They believe that Mary is now able to express an old fact about the sensation of red in a new way. However, whether this analysis is successful in responding to the knowledge argument depends on how phenomenal concepts are defined in a way that is compatible with physicalism.
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as well as putting their facts into practice. One can have all the knowledge-that (knowing all the safety rules related to driving) while having no knowledge-how (driving safely). Kind characterizes Mary's understanding of color sensation as what it's like knowledge, a sub-category of knowledge-that. She states that while Mary does learn something upon seeing the red tomato for the first time and gains knowledge-how; David Lewis claims Mary is now able to recognize, remember and imagine seeing the color red. Advocates of the ability analysis hold the belief that while Mary may have a surprised reaction to seeing red for the first time, she doesn't gain any new facts about the sensation of red.
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knowledge comes her way after confinement," enough that this view "deserves to be described as the received physicalist view of the
Knowledge Argument." Some philosophers have also objected to Jackson's first premise by arguing that Mary could not know all the physical facts about color vision prior to leaving the room. Owen Flanagan argues that Jackson's thought experiment "is easy to defeat". He grants that "Mary knows everything about color vision that can be expressed in the vocabularies of a complete physics, chemistry, and neuroscience," and then distinguishes between "metaphysical physicalism" and "linguistic physicalism":
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acquaintance of an experience," that is not reducible to factual knowledge nor to knowing-how. He argues that the knowledge Mary actually obtains post-release is acquaintance knowledge. Knowing an experience by acquaintance "requires the person to be familiar with the known entity in the most direct way that it is possible for a person to be aware of that thing". Since "experiencing a quality is the most direct way to apprehend a quality," Mary gains acquaintance with color qualia after release. Conee thus defends himself against the knowledge argument like this:
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experiment can be refined to account for this: rather than situating Mary in a black and white room, one might stipulate that she was unable to experience color from birth, but was given this ability via medical procedure later in life. Nida-RĂĽmelin recognizes that one might question whether this scenario would be possible given the science of color vision (although Graham and Horgan suggest it is), but argues it is not clear that this matters to the efficacy of the thought experiment, provided we can at least conceive of the scenario taking place.
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about color", that knowledge would necessarily include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the "qualia" of color. Moreover, that knowledge would include the ability to functionally differentiate between red and other colors. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that functional knowledge is identical to the experience, with no ineffable "qualia" left over. J. Christopher
Maloney argues similarly:
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A person may know facts about Sydney, Australia, but they won't actually be acquainted with it until they have been there in person. Gertler uses this disparity to oppose Conee's account: a dualist who posits the existence of qualia has a way of explaining it, with reference to qualia as different entities than physical objects; while Conee describes the disparity, Gertler argues that his physicalist account does nothing to explain it.
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539:, the view that the mind, or at least some aspects of the mind, are non-physical. Nida-Rümelin contends that, because mind–body dualism is relatively unpopular among contemporary philosophers, and there are also not many examples of dualist responses to the knowledge argument; nevertheless, she points out that there are some prominent examples of dualists responding to the Knowledge Argument worth noting.
57:—the view that the universe, including all that is mental, is entirely physical. Jackson says that the "irresistible conclusion" is that "there are more properties than physicalists talk about". Jackson would eventually call himself a physicalist and say, in 2023, "I no longer accept the argument" though he still feels that the argument should be "addressed really seriously if you are a physicalist".
392:...some facts about conscious experiences of various kinds cannot be learned through purely discursive means. This, however, does not yet license any further conclusions about the nature of the experiences that these discursively unlearnable facts are about. In particular, it does not entitle us to infer that these experiences are not physical events.
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Objections have also been raised that, even if Mary's environment were constructed as described in the thought experiment, she would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red. Daniel
Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything
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is false. Specifically, the knowledge argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical explanations of mental states. Mary may know everything about the science of color perception, but can she know what the experience of red is like if she has never seen red? Jackson
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However, Jackson opposes it by saying that
Churchland's formulation is not his intended argument. He especially objects to the first premise of Churchland's formulation: "The whole thrust of the knowledge argument is that Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about brain
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In Conee's account, one can come to know (be acquainted with) a phenomenal quality only by experiencing it, but not by knowing facts about it as Mary did. This is different from other physical objects of knowledge: one comes to know a city, for example, simply by knowing facts about it. For example:
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Flanagan argues that, while Mary has all the facts that are expressible in "explicitly physical language", she can only be said to have all the facts if one accepts linguistic physicalism. A metaphysical physicalist can simply deny linguistic physicalism and hold that Mary's learning what seeing red
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Kind offers a concrete and more realistic example: a driving test, where a person would have to complete a written test where their knowledge of road laws and facts will be tested, as well as an in-car exam, where they must display their ability to drive correctly while following the laws they know
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of vision and acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes or the sky and use terms like "red", "blue", and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces
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One might accept Conee's arguments that imaginative ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to see a color, but preserve a version of the ability hypothesis that employs an ability other than imagination. For example, Brie
Gertler discusses the option that what Mary
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The experiment describes Mary, a scientist who exists in a black-and-white world where she has extensive access to physical descriptions of color, but no actual perceptual experience of color. Mary has learned everything there is to learn about color, but she has never actually experienced it
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Several objections to the argument have been raised on the grounds that Mary does not gain new factual knowledge when she leaves the room, but rather a new ability. Nemirow claims that "knowing what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having the experience". He argues that
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Metaphysical physicalism simply asserts that what there is, and all there is, is physical stuff and its relations. Linguistic physicalism is the thesis that everything physical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the basic sciences…Linguistic physicalism is stronger than metaphysical
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He would know exactly what the microscopic structure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to predict that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when it gets into the human nose. The utmost that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would
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Jackson himself went on to reject epiphenomenalism and mind–body dualism altogether. He argues that, because when Mary first sees red, she says "Wow!", it must be Mary's qualia that causes her to say "Wow!". This contradicts epiphenomenalism because it involves a conscious state causing an overt
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In response, Levin argues that a novel color experience does in fact yield new factual knowledge, such as "information about the color's similarities and compatibilities with other colors, and its effect on other of our mental states." Tye counters that Mary could have (and would have, given the
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Surveying the literature on
Jackson's argument, Nida-RĂĽmelin identifies, however, that many simply doubt the claim that Mary would not gain new knowledge upon leaving the room, including physicalists who do not agree with Jackson's conclusions. Most cannot help but admit that "new information or
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If Mary learns something new upon seeing red, it shows that qualia (the subjective, qualitative properties of experiences, conceived as wholly independent of behavior and disposition) exist. Therefore, it must be conceded that qualia are real, since there is a difference between a person who has
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enables him to experience colors in his mind that he has never seen in the real world. He calls these "Martian colors." The fact that color cells (and corresponding colors) can activate in his brain helps us answer the philosophical question: we suggest that the same thing will happen to Mary."
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Earl Conee objects that having an ability to imagine seeing a color is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to see that color, meaning the ability hypothesis does not capture the nature of the new knowledge Mary acquires upon leaving the room. To show that ability is not
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questioned the premise that Mary, simply by being confined to a monochromatic environment, would not have any color experiences, since she may be able to see color when dreaming, after rubbing her eyes, or in afterimages from light perception. However, Graham and Horgan suggest that the thought
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The response to the knowledge argument depends on whether we can accurately capture the new type of knowledge Mary gains when she leaves the room. Those who propose the ability analysis and the acquaintance analysis both agree that Mary learns something new, but they differ on whether this new
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Ramachandran and
Hubbard's contribution is in terms of exploring "the neural basis of qualia" by "using pre-existing, stable differences in the conscious experiences of people who experience synaesthesia compared with those who do not" but, they note that "this still doesn't explain why these
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The acquaintance analysis argues that Mary is able to learn something new without obtaining accurate knowledge. Due to his dissatisfaction with the ability hypothesis, Earl Conee presents another variant. Conee's acquaintance hypothesis identifies a third category of knowledge, "knowledge by
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take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But he could not possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself.
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Nida-RĂĽmelin argues in response to such views that it is "hard to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be physical once we drop the assumption that physical properties and physical facts are just those properties and facts that can be expressed in physical terminology."
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is like, though it cannot be expressed in language, is nevertheless a fact about the physical world, since the physical is all that exists. Similarly to
Flanagan, Torin Alter contends that Jackson conflates physical facts with "discursively learnable" facts, without justification:
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It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and
Physicalism is
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stipulations of the thought experiment) learned all such facts prior to leaving the room, without needing to experience the color firsthand. For example, Mary could know the fact "red is more like orange than green" without ever experiencing the colors in question.
547:) provides the better explanation. In contrast to epiphenomenalism, Jackson says that the experience of red is entirely contained in the brain, and the experience immediately causes further changes in the brain (e.g. creating memories). This is more
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After release Mary gets acquainted with Q, but she does not acquire any new item of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted with Q (in particular she already knew under what conditions normal perceivers have experiences with the property
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room and subsequently 'cured' of the akinetopsia, they would not be surprised to discover any new facts about the world (they do, in fact, know that objects move). Instead, their surprise would come from their brain now allowing them to
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If, as the argument allows, Mary does understand all that there is to know regarding the physical nature of colour vision, she would be in a position to imagine what colour vision would be like. It would be like being in physical state
280:, that all behaviour is caused by physical forces of some kind. And the thought experiment seems to prove the existence of qualia, a non-physical part of the mind. Jackson argued that if both of these theses are true, then
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states and their properties because she does not know about certain qualia associated with them. What is complete, according to the argument, is her knowledge of matters physical." He suggests his preferred interpretation:
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capabilities of bats. Even with the entire physical database at one's fingertips, humans would not be able to fully perceive or understand a bat's sensory system, namely what it is like to "see" the world through sound.
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Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers.
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the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence "The sky is blue." What happens when Mary is released from her black-and-white room or is given a
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Tye also defends a version of the acquaintance hypothesis that he compares to Conee's, though he clarifies that acquaintance with a color should not be equated to applying a concept to one's color experience.
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and other states of chromatic vision...Give her a precise description in the notation of neurophysiology of a colour vision state, and she will very likely be able to imagine what such a state would be like.
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speech behavior. Since the Mary's room thought experiment seems to create this contradiction, there must be something wrong with it. Jackson now believes that the physicalist approach (from a perspective of
334:, they contend, then what she does gain may be accounted for within the physicalist framework. These are the two most notable objections to Jackson's thought experiment, and the claim it sets out to make.
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Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor. She specializes in the
205:...the Martian would be lacking completely in the sort of imagery and empathy which depends on familiarity (direct acquaintance) with the kinds of qualia to be imaged or empathized.
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subject. Much like the theoretical Mary, our colorblind synesthete volunteer cannot see certain hues, because of deficient color receptors. However, when he looks at numbers, his
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for herself. The central question of the thought experiment is whether Mary will gain new knowledge when she goes outside of the colorless world and experiences seeing in color.
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Objections have been raised that have required the argument to be refined. Doubters cite various holes in the thought experiment that have arisen through critical examination.
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Kind brings up three strategies that have been brought up in reaction to this argument: the ability analysis, the acquaintance analysis, and the old fact/new guise analysis.
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Despite a lack of dualist responses overall and Jackson's own change of view, there are more recent instances of prominent dualists defending the knowledge argument.
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Roughly thirty years later, Feigl expresses a similar notion. He concerns himself with a Martian, studying human behavior, but lacking human sentiments. Feigl says:
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for color, in which she reports seeing no difference between a red apple and an apple painted gray, but when asked to point to the red apple, she correctly does.
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555:. Jackson suggests that Mary is simply discovering a new way for her brain to represent qualities that exist in the world. In a similar argument, philosopher
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There is disagreement about how to summarize the premises and conclusion of Jackson's argument in this thought experiment. Paul Churchland did as follows:
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Nemirow and Lewis present the "ability hypothesis", and Conee argues for the "acquaintance hypothesis". Both approaches attempt to demonstrate that Mary
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Some have objected to Jackson's argument on the grounds that the scenario described in the thought experiment itself is not possible. For example,
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When Mary exits the Room and sees a ripe red tomato, she learns a new fact about the sensation of seeing red, namely its subjective character.
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Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other people (because she learns something about them on her release).
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Mary can know all about Q and she can know that a given experience has Q before release, although—before release—she is not acquainted with Q.
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188:, over a fifty-year span, presented insight to the subject. Broad makes the following remarks, describing a thought experiment where an
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While in the room, Mary has acquired all the physical facts there are about color sensations, including the sensation of seeing red.
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Pettit, Philip (2004). "Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument". In Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel (eds.).
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They explain further: "Which of these three possible outcomes will actually occur? We believe we've learned the answer from a
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1465:. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 370–497.
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Levin, Janet (1986-01-01). "Could Love Be like a Heatwave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience".
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is true—the view that mental states are caused by physical states, but have no causal effects on the physical world.
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Qualia are physical properties of experiences (and experiences are physical processes). Let Q be such a property.
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defends a complex, though similar, view, involving properties of experience she calls "phenomenal properties".
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Jackson says there are quite a few similar arguments that predate his formulation, even going back as far as
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gains is not an ability to imagine colors, but an ability to recognize colors by their phenomenal quality.
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Therefore, sensations and their properties are not the same (≠) as the brain states and their properties.
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There's Something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument
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There's Something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument
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Whether Mary learns something new upon experiencing color has two major implications: the existence of
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If there are non-physical facts about color sensations, then color sensations are non-physical events.
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takes a slightly different approach. He takes the perspective of humans attempting to understand the
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It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about sensations and their properties.
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Jackson argues further, saying that if Mary does learn something new upon experiencing color, then
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Therefore, there are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story.
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Feigl, H. (1958). "The Mental and the Physical". In H. Feigl; M. Scriven; G. Maxwell (eds.).
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argue that Mary might do one of three things upon seeing a red apple for the first time:
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The debate that emerged following its publication became the subject of an edited volume—
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She has the "Wow!" response from subjectively experiencing the color for the first time.
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Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people.
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Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their properties.
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contends that, yes, she has learned something new, via experience, and hence,
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Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment, by Eleanor Nelsen on Ted-Ed
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Colour vision: a study in cognitive science and the philosophy of perception
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Graham, George; Horgan, Terence (2000-05-01). "Mary Mary, Quite Contrary".
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The thought experiment was originally proposed by Frank Jackson as follows:
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monitor? Does she learn anything new or not? Jackson claims that she does.
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809:. Philosophical issues in science (1. publ ed.). London: Routledge.
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If color sensations are non-physical events, then physicalism is false.
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Dennett, Daniel (2006). "What RoboMary Knows". In Alter, Torin (ed.).
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Alter, Torin (1998). "A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument".
364:, but that is no bar to her knowing what it would be like to be in S
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Gertler, Brie (1999-03-01). "A Defense of the Knowledge Argument".
527:") but at least it narrows the scope of the problem" (p. 25).
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particular events are qualia laden and others are not (Chalmers' "
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Nida-RĂĽmelin, Martine (2007). "Grasping Phenomenal Properties".
1318:. Philosophy of mind series. New York: Oxford University Press.
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368:. For she, unlike us, can describe the nomic relations between S
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Therefore, there are non-physical facts about color sensations.
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1259:"Synaesthesia – A window into perception, thought and language"
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Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel, eds. (2004).
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Later on, Amy Kind proposes another summary for the argument:
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694:"Mind Chat S03E03 The Greatest Argument Against Materialism"
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and Edward Hubbard of the Center for Brain and Cognition at
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Ramachandran, V. S.; Edward M. Hubbard. (January 1, 2001).
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Maloney, J. Christopher (1985-03-01). "About being a bat".
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Ramachandran, V. S.; Edward M. Hubbard. (April 14, 2003).
46:" (1982) and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).
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Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)
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gains no new knowledge, but instead gains something else
64:(2004)—which includes replies from such philosophers as
2722:
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
1541:
1315:
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
151:
Therefore, color sensations are non-physical events.
276:
Jackson believed in the explanatory completeness of
337:
239:access to a particular quale and one who does not.
1154:Conee, Earl (1994-06-01). "Phenomenal knowledge".
1026:Philosophical Papers Volume I - Oxford Scholarship
1003:. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Basil Blackwell.
996:
464:
2856:
1505:Jackson, Frank (1986). "What Mary Didn't Know".
779:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
718:Frank Jackson Refutes His Own Knowledge Argument
230:and the knowledge argument against physicalism.
1431:. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press.
1683:
1463:Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem
770:
475:
1619:"The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism"
1428:Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
1341:Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
1338:
829:
684:
242:
53:The experiment is intended to argue against
1690:
1676:
1291:. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 105–142.
1056:
435:
2880:Thought experiments in philosophy of mind
2348:Electromagnetic theories of consciousness
1597:
1487:
1359:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0013
1348:
1234:"More Common Questions about Synesthesia"
559:likens the case of Mary to patients with
1311:
924:
801:
192:has unlimited mathematical competences:
1637:"Frank Jackson, Latter Day Physicalist"
1504:
1469:
1424:
1395:
1188:
1063:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
931:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
889:
877:
873:
789:
766:
764:
762:
760:
758:
535:Jackson's argument is meant to support
400:
2857:
2358:Higher-order theories of consciousness
1649:focused on "Mary's room" (Archived by
1286:
2373:Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis
1671:
1639:a 2011 interview of Frank Jackson by
1460:
1386:
1153:
1083:
1023:
995:Lycan, William G., ed. (1990-01-01).
994:
951:
749:
737:
551:with neuroscience's understanding of
408:
79:
2839:
755:
530:
491:Mary says she sees nothing but gray.
1624:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1609:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1312:Chalmers, David John (1996-01-01).
1126:
783:
777:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
265:
13:
2664:Subjective character of experience
2560:Neural correlates of consciousness
1561:(shared by publisher, archived by
1535:
1182:
1156:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1147:
1057:Churchland, Paul M. (1989-01-01).
892:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
661:Subjective character of experience
616:Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
14:
2891:
2694:Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation
2343:Damasio's theory of consciousness
1697:
1657:"Frank Jackson on What Mary Knew"
1616:
1591:
1130:Consciousness, color, and content
286:
157:Therefore, physicalism is false.
2838:
2829:
2828:
2756:Journal of Consciousness Studies
2644:Sociology of human consciousness
2480:Dual consciousness (split-brain)
2383:Orchestrated objective reduction
1600:"Qualia: The Knowledge Argument"
1584:Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
1402:. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
1389:The Mind and His Place in Nature
1263:Journal of Consciousness Studies
925:Flanagan, Owen J. (1992-01-01).
773:"Qualia: The Knowledge Argument"
383:physicalism and less plausible.
338:Design of the thought experiment
2762:Online Consciousness Conference
2749:How the Self Controls Its Brain
1332:
1305:
1280:
1250:
1225:
1120:
1077:
1050:
1017:
988:
945:
918:
883:
771:Nida-Ruemelin, Martine (2015).
465:The old fact/new guise analysis
221:
2408:Altered state of consciousness
866:
823:
795:
743:
731:
709:
678:
330:. If she in fact gains no new
42:in his article "Epiphenomenal
1:
2510:Hard problem of consciousness
2368:Integrated information theory
1379:
165:
2808:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
2795:The Science of Consciousness
2669:Subjectivity and objectivity
999:Mind and cognition: a reader
318:
211:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
62:There's Something About Mary
7:
2801:Understanding Consciousness
2728:Consciousness and Cognition
2716:A Universe of Consciousness
1127:Tye, Michael (2000-01-01).
1034:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
1028:. Oxford University Press.
1024:Lewis, David (1983-08-18).
641:Phenomenal concept strategy
586:
10:
2896:
2775:The Astonishing Hypothesis
2470:Disorders of consciousness
1646:The Philosophers' Magazine
1571:reviews of Ludlow (2004):
928:Consciousness reconsidered
497:She experiences a form of
476:The neural basis of qualia
269:
2824:
2707:
2555:Minimally conscious state
2465:Consciousness after death
2395:
2325:
2197:
2190:
2125:
2019:
1953:
1712:
1705:
1168:10.1080/00048409412345971
904:10.1080/00048408512341671
666:The Missing Shade of Blue
256:is false. Jackson states:
243:Refutation of physicalism
233:
2418:Artificial consciousness
1935:William Kingdon Clifford
1598:Nida-Ruemelin, Martine.
1546:. Cambridge: MIT Press.
1396:Dennett, Daniel (1991).
1391:. Routledge & Kegan.
721:, event occurs at 11:00
671:
656:Philosophy of perception
293:Explanatory completeness
29:Mary the super-scientist
2735:Consciousness Explained
2654:Stream of consciousness
2629:Secondary consciousness
2353:Global workspace theory
2338:Dynamic core hypothesis
2333:Attention schema theory
2307:Revisionary materialism
2222:Eliminative materialism
1745:Charles Augustus Strong
1476:Philosophical Quarterly
1470:Jackson, Frank (1982).
1399:Consciousness Explained
1203:10.1023/A:1004216101557
966:10.1023/a:1004290020847
844:10.1023/A:1018779425306
436:Acquaintance hypothesis
332:propositional knowledge
2789:The Emperor's New Mind
2595:Problem of other minds
2530:Introspection illusion
2363:Holonomic brain theory
1720:Alfred North Whitehead
1472:"Epiphenomenal Qualia"
631:Map–territory relation
394:
385:
375:
263:
207:
199:
104:
95:central nervous system
2590:Primary consciousness
2475:Divided consciousness
2378:Multiple drafts model
1880:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1507:Journal of Philosophy
1387:Broad, C. D. (1925).
1191:Philosophical Studies
1086:Philosophical Studies
954:Philosophical Studies
832:Philosophical Studies
646:Philosophical zombies
390:
380:
353:
258:
203:
194:
86:
2742:Cosmic Consciousness
2580:Philosophical zombie
2520:Higher consciousness
2413:Animal consciousness
2217:Double-aspect theory
1750:Christopher Peacocke
1343:. pp. 307–338.
876:, p. 398 &
692:(January 25, 2023),
600:Allegory of the cave
581:Martine Nida-RĂĽmelin
401:The three strategies
2870:Metaphysics of mind
2515:Heterophenomenology
2428:Attentional control
2077:Lawrence Weiskrantz
1905:Patricia Churchland
1740:Brian O'Shaughnessy
1725:Arthur Schopenhauer
1238:Scientific American
2815:Wider than the Sky
2782:The Conscious Mind
2585:Philosophy of mind
2565:Neurophenomenology
2540:Locked-in syndrome
2535:Knowledge argument
2199:Philosophy of mind
1820:George Henry Lewes
1790:Douglas Hofstadter
1098:10.1007/bf00354338
651:Philosophy of mind
409:Ability hypothesis
80:Thought experiment
36:thought experiment
21:knowledge argument
16:Thought experiment
2852:
2851:
2550:Mind–body problem
2500:Flash suppression
2460:Cartesian theater
2445:Binocular rivalry
2391:
2390:
2257:Mind–body dualism
2186:
2185:
2173:Victor J. Stenger
2148:Erwin Schrödinger
2102:Stanislas Dehaene
2082:Michael Gazzaniga
1966:Donald D. Hoffman
1850:John Polkinghorne
1830:Gottfried Leibniz
1580:Byrne, A., (2006)
1573:Alter, T., (2005)
1553:978-0-262-12272-6
1438:978-0-19-517165-5
1409:978-0-316-18065-8
1298:978-0-262-12272-6
816:978-0-415-11796-8
636:Mind–body dualism
621:Inverted spectrum
537:mind–body dualism
531:Dualist responses
481:V.S. Ramachandran
313:
312:
309:epiphenomenalism
2887:
2842:
2841:
2832:
2831:
2674:Unconscious mind
2302:Reflexive monism
2297:Property dualism
2272:New mysterianism
2232:Epiphenomenalism
2212:Computationalism
2207:Anomalous monism
2195:
2194:
2087:Michael Graziano
2057:Francisco Varela
1961:Carl Gustav Jung
1925:Thomas Metzinger
1895:Martin Heidegger
1875:Kenneth M. Sayre
1735:Bertrand Russell
1710:
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1692:
1685:
1678:
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1668:
1664:interview (2011)
1661:Philosophy Bites
1628:
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1604:Zalta, Edward N.
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2490:Explanatory gap
2440:Binding problem
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2168:Susan Blackmore
2121:
2112:Stuart Hameroff
2032:Antonio Damasio
2015:
2011:Wolfgang Köhler
1949:
1910:Paul Churchland
1815:George Berkeley
1785:Donald Davidson
1701:
1696:
1651:Wayback Machine
1594:
1578:. Monash Uni.;
1563:Wayback Machine
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1536:Further reading
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1489:10.2307/2960077
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2143:Eugene Wigner
2141:
2139:
2136:
2134:
2133:Annaka Harris
2131:
2130:
2128:
2124:
2118:
2115:
2113:
2110:
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2100:
2098:
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2093:
2090:
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2075:
2073:
2070:
2068:
2067:Giulio Tononi
2065:
2063:
2060:
2058:
2055:
2053:
2052:Francis Crick
2050:
2048:
2047:Christof Koch
2045:
2043:
2042:Bernard Baars
2040:
2038:
2035:
2033:
2030:
2028:
2025:
2024:
2022:
2018:
2012:
2009:
2007:
2006:William James
2004:
2002:
2001:Wilhelm Wundt
1999:
1997:
1996:Sigmund Freud
1994:
1992:
1989:
1987:
1984:
1982:
1981:Julian Jaynes
1979:
1977:
1974:
1972:
1969:
1967:
1964:
1962:
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1946:
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1940:William Lycan
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1860:Joseph Levine
1858:
1856:
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1848:
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1843:
1841:
1838:
1836:
1835:Immanuel Kant
1833:
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1828:
1826:
1823:
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1813:
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1808:
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1800:Frank Jackson
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1699:Consciousness
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1103:
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1043:9780199833382
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1000:
991:
983:
979:
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905:
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857:
853:
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841:
837:
833:
826:
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808:
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798:
792:, p. 130
791:
786:
778:
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752:, p. 431
751:
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637:
634:
632:
629:
627:
626:Leibniz's gap
624:
622:
619:
617:
614:
612:
609:
606:
603:
601:
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596:
595:
591:
590:
584:
582:
578:
573:
572:this motion.
571:
566:
562:
558:
557:Philip Pettit
554:
550:
546:
540:
538:
528:
526:
520:
517:
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406:
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393:
389:
384:
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345:
344:Evan Thompson
335:
333:
329:
324:
316:
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231:
229:
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216:
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206:
202:
198:
193:
191:
187:
183:
182:Herbert Feigl
179:
175:
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163:
156:
153:
150:
147:
144:
141:
138:
137:
136:
130:
127:
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123:
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115:
112:
109:
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103:
101:
96:
91:
85:
77:
75:
71:
67:
63:
58:
56:
51:
47:
45:
41:
40:Frank Jackson
37:
34:
33:philosophical
30:
26:
22:
2813:
2799:
2787:
2780:
2773:
2766:
2754:
2747:
2740:
2733:
2726:
2714:
2659:Subconscious
2619:
2605:Quantum mind
2534:
2097:Roger Sperry
2072:Karl Pribram
2020:Neuroscience
1930:Thomas Nagel
1805:Fred Dretske
1780:David Pearce
1755:Colin McGinn
1659:
1644:
1641:James Garvey
1622:
1607:
1583:
1575:
1559:Introduction
1543:
1510:
1506:
1479:
1475:
1462:
1450:. Retrieved
1427:
1398:
1388:
1340:
1334:
1314:
1307:
1288:
1282:
1271:. Retrieved
1266:
1262:
1252:
1241:. Retrieved
1237:
1227:
1194:
1190:
1184:
1159:
1155:
1149:
1129:
1122:
1089:
1085:
1079:
1059:
1052:
1025:
1019:
998:
990:
960:(1): 35–56.
957:
953:
947:
927:
920:
898:(1): 26–49.
895:
891:
885:
878:Dennett 2006
874:Dennett 1991
868:
838:(1): 59–87.
835:
831:
825:
806:
797:
790:Jackson 1982
785:
776:
745:
740:, p. 71
733:
723:, retrieved
717:
711:
701:, retrieved
697:
686:Goff, Philip
680:
592:
574:
569:
565:stroboscopic
553:color vision
541:
534:
525:hard problem
521:
506:
498:
479:
468:
459:
455:
439:
428:
424:
420:
416:
412:
404:
395:
391:
386:
381:
376:
354:
349:
341:
327:
325:
322:
314:
275:
259:
246:
237:
225:
222:Implications
215:echolocation
208:
204:
200:
195:
186:Thomas Nagel
176:
169:
160:
134:
119:
105:
87:
83:
61:
59:
52:
48:
38:proposed by
28:
24:
20:
18:
2292:Physicalism
2287:Parallelism
2282:Panpsychism
2252:Materialism
2227:Emergentism
2117:Wolf Singer
1986:Kurt Koffka
1915:Philip Goff
1890:Michael Tye
1885:Max Velmans
1865:Karl Popper
1855:John Searle
1840:John Eccles
1825:Georges Rey
1569:Open Access
1452:December 2,
561:akinetopsia
516:synesthesia
254:physicalism
249:physicalism
178:C. D. Broad
70:David Lewis
55:physicalism
25:Mary's Room
2859:Categories
2684:Upanishads
2485:Experience
2450:Blindsight
2277:Nondualism
2158:Max Planck
2138:David Bohm
1954:Psychology
1845:John Locke
1770:David Hume
1713:Philosophy
1380:References
1273:2011-05-02
1269:(12): 3–34
1243:2007-03-12
750:Feigl 1958
738:Broad 1925
725:2023-10-30
703:2023-10-20
605:Blindsight
549:consilient
512:synesthete
509:colorblind
500:blindsight
278:physiology
172:John Locke
166:Background
2699:Yogachara
2634:Sentience
2495:Free will
2435:Awareness
2423:Attention
2312:Solipsism
2027:Anil Seth
1900:Ned Block
1345:CiteSeerX
1219:169356196
1211:0031-8116
1176:0004-8402
1114:170227257
982:170569288
912:0004-8402
860:170191214
852:0031-8116
594:The Giver
319:Responses
190:archangel
2834:Category
2570:Ontology
2525:Illusion
2242:Idealism
2191:Theories
1447:63195957
1418:23648691
805:(1995).
587:See also
298: +
93:via the
2844:Commons
2621:Purusha
2610:Reentry
2403:Agnosia
2326:Science
1706:Figures
1606:(ed.).
1527:2026143
1498:2960077
1106:4319824
974:4320837
698:YouTube
290:
31:) is a
2875:Qualia
2768:Psyche
2615:Sakshi
2600:Qualia
2396:Topics
2262:Monism
2126:Others
1576:Psyche
1550:
1525:
1496:
1445:
1435:
1416:
1406:
1365:
1347:
1322:
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1104:
1067:
1040:
1007:
980:
972:
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910:
858:
850:
813:
301:qualia
261:false.
234:Qualia
228:qualia
184:, and
72:, and
44:Qualia
2865:Color
2708:Works
2455:Brain
1602:. In
1523:JSTOR
1494:JSTOR
1215:S2CID
1110:S2CID
1102:JSTOR
978:S2CID
970:JSTOR
856:S2CID
672:Notes
2649:Soul
2545:Mind
1643:for
1548:ISBN
1454:2009
1443:OCLC
1433:ISBN
1414:OCLC
1404:ISBN
1363:ISBN
1320:ISBN
1293:ISBN
1207:ISSN
1172:ISSN
1135:ISBN
1065:ISBN
1038:ISBN
1005:ISBN
933:ISBN
908:ISSN
872:See
848:ISSN
811:ISBN
485:UCSD
19:The
1565:),
1515:doi
1484:doi
1355:doi
1199:doi
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