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connection. As with the connection between diagonals and angle blocks, it was critical that there be no space between the I-beams and the lugs on top of the angle block because these lugs transferred axial forces to the next member. Space between the member and lug would reduce the effectiveness of this transfer and introduce shear stress to the lug. The problems with camber led to members of the chords being shortened and the lugs being shaved down, actions which introduced space between the lugs and the chord members. Construction workers used metal shims to fill the space between the lug and the chord members until a tight fit was achieved. Friction alone, rather than an active connection such as a yoke or bolt, kept the shims in place. For some years prior to the disaster, locomotive engineers reported hearing "snapping sounds" as their trains crossed the
Ashtabula Bridge. This indicates that some shims had come loose and fallen off, reintroducing space between the chord members and angle block vertical lugs. This allowed members of the chord to thrust suddenly against the lugs, inducing even more metal fatigue. There is also an indication in the construction record that several chord members were misaligned. Even if their bearings had been flat, they would not have met the lugs completely. This, too, would have created uneven loading and worsened metal fatigue.
872:(stretches them). If the diagonals are already closely fitted to the angle blocks, prestressing compresses the diagonals. This allows them to carry more load. The Ashtabula Bridge diagonals, however, were only loosely fitted to the angle blocks. Prestressing brought the diagonals into a relatively close fit with the angle blocks, but did not put the diagonals in compression. The problem was worsened because shims were used to fill the space between the diagonal bearings and the angle blocks. The history of the bridge indicates that some of these shims had come loose over time and fallen away. The loss of shims induced uneven loading, as the more tightly connected diagonals absorbed load before the loose ones did. Åkesson points out that the shims themselves may even have created unequal pressure points between I-beams and the lugs, subjecting the lugs to bending forces as well as shear forces. With the diagonals not carrying the load they were intended to carry, extra stress was placed on the chords. Unequal loading of the angle blocks worsened the metal fatigue.
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other panel, the five beams making up each chord did not have a continuous interconnection between them, and the none of the parallel I-beams making up the diagonals were continuously interconnected. Åkesson points out that construction errors probably made the diagonals even less effective as thin members were placed where thicker ones should have gone and vice versa. The braces and counter-braces in a Howe truss must be the same size for the truss system to be robust and redundant. Making a brace stronger relative to a counter-brace, for example, actually reduces robustness and redundancy by changing the relative distribution of forces on the diagonals. These errors appreciably lessened the bridge's ability to withstand extra loading. Stone's strengthening of the bridge after the camber repairs also harmed the bridge's capabilities. By adding two I-beams to the end braces, Stone actually reduced the maximum stress the braces in the end panels could bear.
740:. Senator A.M. Burns chaired the committee. The joint committee hired three civil engineers (Benjamin F. Bowen, John Graham, and Thomas H. Johnson) to examine the wreckage and report to the committee regarding the bridge's design and performance. The committee also received written reports from civil engineers Albert S. Howland and W.S. Williams, and took personal testimony from civil engineer M.J. Becker and from railroad officials and employees Amasa Stone, Charles Collins, Albert Congdon, A.L. Rogers, and Gustavus Folsom (engineer of the "Columbia"). Technical advice was provided by civil engineers D.W. Caldwell and J.E. Wright. The coroner's jury granted the joint committee full access to all of its testimony and reports as well. In appendices to its report, the joint committee printed in full the coroner's jury testimony of civil engineers A. Gottlieb, John D. Crehore, and Joseph Tomlinson.
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iron rod 2 inches (51 mm) thick. The top of the rod passed through the space between the members of the chord at the top of the bridge and then through a gib-plate. A nut and washer screwed onto the upper end of the rod, creating tension as well as securing the gib-plate in place. Those angle blocks at the top of the bridge had vertical, squarish lugs. Those members of the chord which ended atop an angle block had their bearings placed against the lug. These lugs served to transmit stress from the chord to the angle block and thence to the diagonals. These upper angle blocks also had lugs facing inward, to which were attached (by means MacDonald did not describe) the lateral braces. The interior side of each upper angle block also had a recess to accept a lug and a tap bolt. The tap bolt was used to connect the lug on the end of the sway rod to the angle block.
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ground north of the bridge. The lower chord (at the top of the bridge) and what remained of the deck held for a moment, then fell directly down to land atop the locomotive, express cars, and baggage cars. Momentum pulled the rest of the train into the space where the bridge used to be. The first passenger coach landed upright in mid-stream atop the wreckage of the bridge and the second express car. The second passenger car twisted in the air as it fell, landing on its side atop the bridge and first baggage car. The smoking car, having broken free of the passenger coach ahead of it, moved more freely. It struck the forward part of the second passenger coach, crushing it, before being propelled into the first passenger coach. (It is widely believed most people in the first passenger coach died when the smoking car fell on them.)
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significantly weakened the ability of the lugs to transmit stress from the chord to the braces and counter-braces. According to his report, "The cast iron angle block at top of second set of braces had the south lug broken off close to the face, and the line of fracture disclosed an air hole extending over one half the entire section. ... failure first began in the south truss, at the second panel point from the west abutment." The second full angle block "was so far impaired by an air hole as to be reduced in strength fully one half. ... At no other point were these lugs subjected to so great strain, except at the end casting and here they were heavily reinforced." This "defective detail" caused the collapse of the bridge.
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accident nor those traveling on railroad-issued passes. Brakeman A.H. Stone believed the number of passengers was closer to 200, a number also used by historian
Darrell E. Hamilton. A wide range of numbers is offered by other sources: 131, 147 (128 passengers and 19 crew), 156, 159, 160, 197 (the railroad's official count), "nearly 200", 130 to 300, "nearly 300" (the conductor's estimate) and "over 300". The day and express coaches sat 70 people each and were full, and the sleepers held 30 passengers each. The smoking car was "not well filled". Passengers on the train believed there were many more than 131, as they had difficulty finding seats and sleeping berths. The number of crew, 19, is more firmly established.
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second panel from the end. This worsened the bridge's dead load problem. Collins, Congdon, Rogers, and Stone all later testified that the I-beams making up the diagonals were now turned 90 degrees, so that the flanges were horizontal. Congdon says that he realized the I-beams would carry more live load if they were rotated. Collins, Rogers, and Stone believed workers had installed the beams incorrectly (on their sides). To make the change, Stone had workers cut away portions of each diagonal I-beam's web at the bearing, enabling the web to fit over the lugs. This weakened the new diagonals. There is also some evidence that the angle blocks were damaged while the braces and counter-braces were rotated.
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that some survivors were still trapped in the wreck. Railroad employees also told Knapp that his firefighters should get the wounded out and clear a pathway up the side of the ravine. At least one member of the town begged Knapp to put water on the flames, but he refused. Instead, the townspeople secured buckets and (with the help of some members of the fire brigade) tried to put out the blaze. The
Protection Fire Company's hand-pumped engine and the Neptune Hose Company's steam-pumper (both horse-drawn) were hauled more than a mile through town to the bridge, but arrived too late to stop the spread of the fire.
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feet, hoes, rakes, and shovels to dig through the ash, ice, mud, and snow to find any personal items they could. These items—which included partially burned train tickets, diaries, photographs, watches, jewelry, unique or rare items of clothing, or keepsakes—were kept by the railroad. When a corpse could not be identified, grieving families sometimes were able to use these "relics" to confirm that a loved one had been aboard the train. Even so, identifying objects or papers often were separated from remains, and misidentification of remains was common.
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336:(its ability to carry trains). He also concluded that the beams and posts Stone intended to use were undersized. Tomlinson proposed riveting plates to the I-beams to strengthen them, but Stone angrily refused. Stone demanded that Tomlinson make the changes he required. Tomlinson refused, and was fired from the design effort. Stone then ordered the CP&A's chief engineer, Charles Collins, to make the desired changes to the bridge design. Collins refused, and was fired from the design effort. Stone then made the changes to the design.
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Buffalo" then nose-dived into the rear of the "Palatine", partially crushing it and killing several people. It continued through the "Palatine" into the rear of the "Yokohama", pushing the parlor car onto its side. The "Buffalo" smashed forward along the length of the parlor car, likely killing everyone inside. The rear of the "Buffalo" lay atop the "Palatine", high in the air. An eyewitness said no one in the "City of
Buffalo" survived the crash. The final sleeper, the "Osceo", landed on the east bank of the river, mostly upright.
583:-fed heating stoves and oil lamps overturned. An early report said fire broke out in the "Osceo" and in at least three other places, and within a minute the entire wreck was ablaze. Historian Darrell E. Hamilton says the fire broke out at either end, and moved toward the middle. According to rear brakeman A.H. Stone, those still left alive in the wreckage were dead within 20 minutes. By the time rescuers reached the bridge, many wounded passengers had already made their way to the shore and the fire was burning fiercely.
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347:. Stone's other major change involved the end panels. In the traditional Howe truss bridge, the end panel on each side of each end of the bridge has three vertical posts and three diagonal braces. Only five Howe truss bridges ever built by 1863 had just one vertical post and two diagonal braces in the end panels. These were known as "Single Howe" bridges. Amasa Stone used the "Single Howe" design for the end panels at Ashtabula. Thus, the bridge's entire structure relied on just 12 beams and posts (three at each end).
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other changes as well, but it is uncertain what these included. Gasparini and Fields suggest he had the lugs atop the angle block planed down as well. When the falsework began to be removed, the dead load caused the bridge to bend about 2.5 inches (64 mm) below horizontal. The bridge was jacked up and the falsework put back in place. Stone then ordered the chord members to be returned to their original lengths, restoring
Tomlinson's intended camber. Rather than ordering new I-beams, Rogers used
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38:
560:
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angle blocks and the flanges on the I-beams of the chords were cut away in part, reducing their strength and effectiveness. The construction of the yokes used to bind the braces and counter-braces was poor, and shims were used to compensate for chord members which were too short. The modifications made to the bridge before its completion used thick members where thin ones were required, and thin ones where thick ones should have been used.
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391:
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Cast iron is prone to fracture and fatigue cracks, and
Gasparini and Fields suggest that a significant fatigue crack, originating at the void in the lug, existed at the time of the disaster, created by repeated unequal stress over the previous 11 years. The low temperatures on the night of the accident increased the brittleness of the cast iron. An existing fracture worsened in the cold and likely caused the lug's failure.
652:
309:
371:(127.0 by 9.5 mm). Where a member of the chord ended at an angle block, a 3-by-1-inch (76 by 25 mm) lug was forged at the base of the bar. This lug fit into a slot in the angle block. The angle blocks which made up the chord at the bottom of the bridge also had lugs facing inward, to which were attached (by means MacDonald did not describe) the lateral braces.
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Ashtabula House hotel. As these places filled, residents opened their homes to the survivors. Ambulatory injured were the last to be hauled up from the valley. By midnight, all the survivors had reached safety. The 10 doctors in the village attended to the wounded. About 1 AM, a special train arrived from
Cleveland carrying railroad officials and five more surgeons.
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reacts in compression, counteracting the tension. Amasa Stone inverted this design so that only the upper chord (now at the bottom of the bridge) provided tension. Where diagonal braces did not receive the extra compression from a live load, inverted Howe truss bridges had a tendency to buckle where the vertical posts were attached to the deck with
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difficult to estimate and in part because many remains were partial (a hand, a leg, a torso). Most (although not all) remains recovered from the wreck were burned beyond recognition and could not be identified from clothing or personal items. An unknown number of the dead were essentially cremated in the blaze. Among the dead was hymn writer
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Whether braces or counter-braces had moved or even fallen out of position was a point of dispute. Albert
Howland, civil engineer hired by the joint legislative committee, said some braces had moved between 0.5 to 1.5 inches (13 to 38 mm) out of place. John D. Crehore, another civil engineer also
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Low temperatures the night of the disaster also worsened the metal fatigue in the already damaged lug. The role that low temperatures played in creating and worsening metal fatigue was also poorly understood in the 19th century. The temperature at the time of the accident was 16 °F (−9 °C).
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The construction of the upper chord of the bridge was also poor. This chord consisted of five I-beams running in parallel. Having all five members end at panel joints actually weakened a bridge, so Howe trusses were built so that three ended at one panel connection and the other two at the next panel
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MacDonald believed the bridge collapsed due to a flaw in the southernmost lug at the top of the first full angle block from the west end. He noted that the lugs atop the angle blocks on the bridge had, for some reason, been shaved down to 1.6875 inches (42.86 mm) from 2 inches (51 mm). This
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The bridge's design was flawed. Nothing in the design prevented the lateral buckling of the braces or the upper chord. Only a part of the upper chord was designed to transmit load to the angle blocks, and the lugs on the angle blocks were poorly designed (so that strain could not be fully transmitted
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Edward W. Richards on
December 31. The jury took testimony from 20 railroad officials and employees (including both locomotive engineers and the rear brakeman), nine members of the Ashtabula fire department, 10 residents of Ashtabula, six passengers, and eight civil engineers and bridge builders. The
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who even when sober was slow to make decisions and easily confused. The Lake Erie Hose
Company's hand- and steam-pumped horse-drawn fire engines arrived first, but Knapp never gave any orders to fight the flames. He told a bystander that there was no use in fighting the fire, even though it was plain
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Momentum also carried the parlor car "Yokohama" and the three sleeper cars into the chasm. All of them landed about 80 feet (24 m) south of the bridge. The "Yokohama" landed upright in mid-stream, and the sleeper "Palatine" landed mostly right-side up beside it to the north. The sleeper "City of
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of the bridge came into play, the camber would drop to between 3.5 to 4 inches (89 to 102 mm). Tomlinson was alarmed when Stone demanded that the bridge be constructed completely of iron, rather than a combination of wood and iron. An all-iron bridge would have a much greater dead load, reducing
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train, the Pacific Express, passed over the bridge as it failed. All but the lead locomotive plunged into the river. The train's oil lanterns and coal-fired heating stoves set the wooden cars alight. Firefighters declined to extinguish the flames, leaving individuals to try to pull survivors from the
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Some eyewitnesses alleged that Bliss survived the wreck but ran into the flames to try to save others and perished. A number of sources from the 19th century claimed Bliss tried to rush back into the flames to save his wife and children. (His children were not traveling with him.) Historians believe
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The CP&A changed its name to the Lake Shore Railway on June 17, 1868, and merged with the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad on April 6, 1869, to form the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway (LS&MS). This was followed on August 1, 1869, by the merger of the Buffalo and Erie
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Days after testifying before the state legislature committee, LS&MS chief engineer Charles Collins was found dead in his bedroom of a gunshot wound to the head. Having tendered his resignation to the railroad's board of directors the previous Monday and been refused, Collins was believed to have
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LS&MS president Amasa Stone categorically denied that there were any design or construction flaws. He initially blamed the bridge's collapse on the deraillment of one of the two locomotives pulling the train, or by a loose rail which caused the train's deraillment. The railroad also hypothesized
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The defects in design and construction could have been identified by careful inspection at any time, but the railroad's inspectors did not identify these problems. Many braces and counter-braces had fallen out of position before the bridge collapsed, something inspectors either did not notice or the
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The fire was worsened by the failure of those on the scene to attempt to douse the flames. The Lake Erie Hose Company's hand pump and steam pump, first on the scene, could have saved lives. The Neptune Hose Company's steam pump and the Protection Fire Company's hand pump were hauled more than 1 mile
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The bridge was poorly constructed. Each member of the bridge acted independently instead of being positively connected to its neighbors. Some of the vertical posts, braces, and cross-braces were put in the wrong places. To accommodate design changes during the bridge's strengthening, the lugs on the
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The bridge was poorly designed. An all-iron Howe truss was unsuitable for such a long bridge. Some of the members of the chords and braces were not designed to be of sufficient strength, and were poorly placed. The lateral cross-bracing was so underdesigned as to be of little value. The angle blocks
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Concerned friends and family members sent letters and telegrams in the hundreds to railroad and civic authorities, seeking knowledge of their loved ones. These contained descriptions of the alleged passenger, as well as any identifying personal effects. Some of these letters were fraudulent, sent by
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The injured and dying were either carried up the steep steps or hauled up the incline on sleds or sleighs pulled up by rope. There was no hospital in Ashtabula. The injured were first taken to the railroad engine house, to the filthy and run-down Eagle Hotel adjacent to the station, or to the nearby
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The "Columbia" and the 11 cars behind it acted like a linked chain load. The bridge's collapse was therefore not sudden, but rather somewhat slow and piecemeal. The "Columbia" struck the abutment, the engine supported by the stonework while the tender hung downward toward the river valley. The first
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The joint committee's report placed the proximate cause of the bridge's failure on buckling at the joint between the second and third panel from the west end of the bridge. However, the committee was unable to determine whether it was a chord member or brace which failed. Albert Howland, one of the
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The exact number of passengers cannot be known. Conductor Barnard Henn estimated from the tickets he collected that the train carried 127 to 131 adults, with an unknown number of children. However, he admitted his tickets would not show the total number of passengers on the train at the time of the
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Modern analyzes of the bridge collapse conclude that the railway had inadequately inspected and maintained the bridge. Åkesson, however, says that better inspection of the bridge may not have prevented a collapse. An inverted Howe truss puts the superstructure below the track, where it is difficult
879:
Gasparini and Fields conclude that the bridge might have survived the loss of the lug had the chords and diagonals been made stronger through active continuous connection. Active continuous connection was not used on the bridge: The members of the chords were connected to angle blocks at only every
871:
Poor construction of the bridge's diagonals worsened the stresses placed on the lugs on the angle blocks. Howe trusses rely on prestressing of braces and counter-braces to improve the way the bridge carries load. Tightening the nuts on the vertical posts (prestressing) puts the verticals in tension
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There were significant errors in construction. The members making up the braces were not connected to act in unison, greatly reducing the bridge's ability to carry a live load. In the lower chord, lateral braces were placed only at every other panel connection, extended across two panels (not one),
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As the "Socrates" neared the western abutment, engineer Daniel McGuire heard a crack and felt his locomotive drop slowly downward. Realizing the bridge was collapsing beneath him, he opened the throttle to maximum. The "Socrates" lurched ahead, just as the weight of the 11 cars began to pull on the
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The Ashtabula River bridge was erected in 1865 using Stone's design and plans and partly under his supervision. Tomlinson was the bridge's original construction supervisor, but Stone said he fired him for "inefficiency" at some point during the bridge's construction. Tomlinson was replaced by A. L.
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Nash gives the composition of the train as four baggage cars, two coaches, three sleeping cars, a parlor car, and a smoking car. Orth says the train consisted of two baggage cars, two coaches, two express cars, three sleeping cars, a dining car, and a smoking car, while Bellamy says there were two
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Gasparini and Fields noted that Rogers had prestressed the bridge very tightly before the falsework was moved. Rogers admitted that this buckled a few diagonals even before the falsework was removed. Although Rogers then loosened the vertical posts to eliminate visible buckling, the diagonals were
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The alarm bell from the Lake Street Fire House which was used to call for help on the night of December 29 has also been preserved. It passed into private hands, but was donated to the city of Ashtabula in 1975. It is now on display in front of the city's Main Avenue fire station, accompanied by a
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The crash was heard at the railroad's W. 32nd Street Station (just 100 yards (91 m) to the west of the bridge) and in the town, and the alarm was raised. Rescuers first on the scene included railroad employees, those waiting on the platform at the station, and residents of Ashtabula who lived
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The second express car and the two baggage cars landed largely upright, slightly south of the bridge. The second baggage car was slightly askew, its nose resting against the western abutment and its rear pointing southeast. Most of the bridge's upper chord (the bottom of the bridge) crashed to the
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bridge without incident, heading east. The bridge over the Ashtabula River was about 1,000 feet (300 m) east of the Ashtabula station, and the locomotives shut off their steam (cutting off power to the drive) about 66 to 99 feet (20 to 30 m) east of the bridge to allow the train to glide
420:
To correct this problem, Stone added more iron I-beams to the diagonals to strengthen them. The placement, size, and number of beams added is not clear, but Stone likely added two I-beams to the brace in the end panel, two I-beams to the brace in the first panel from the end, and one I-beam to the
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Stone made additional changes to the design. In a Howe truss bridge, the vertical posts connect the upper and lower chords (main parallels) in the truss. The deck on which the train travels usually hangs from these posts; the greater the live load, the greater the tension on the posts. The bracing
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of the bridge collapse: (1) the failure of an angle block lug on the west end of the bridge due to fatigue (caused by bending and shear stress), (2) thrust stress from improperly fitting chords and diagonals, and (3) low temperatures, which caused the cast iron angle blocks to become brittle. The
627:
Identification of the dead took a week or more. There were full or partial remains of about 36 bodies in the railroad freight house, with concerned families encouraged to come by and try to identify corpses. For several days after the wreck, townspeople and railroad employees used their hands and
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were hauling two baggage cars, two day-passenger coaches, two express coaches, a drawing room car (the "Yokohama"), three sleeper cars (the "Palatine", which originated in New York City and was bound for Chicago; the "City of Buffalo", which originated in Boston and was bound for Chicago; and the
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The bridge was prestressed again. In every other panel connection, the diagonal braces were fitted to the angle blocks using shims rather than by tightening the vertical posts and putting the diagonals under compression. This meant that the shims carried the weight of a live load, rather than the
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to support construction of a bridge with a 5-to-7-inch (130 to 180 mm) camber. Stone, now himself supervising Rogers' work, ordered the camber reduced to 3.5 inches (89 mm). With the members of the upper chord now too long, Rogers had the bearings shaved down. It is clear Rogers ordered
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Civil engineer Charles MacDonald, who inspected the bridge's original plans in 1877, described and made drawings of part of the angle blocks. He noted that the vertical posts were made of iron pipe 3 inches (76 mm) in diameter with a wall 0.5 inches (13 mm) thick. Inside the pipe ran an
327:, a well-known bridge builder and designer, was hired to flesh out Stone's design and create the fabrication drawings for all the bridge components. Tomlinson designed the bridge's lower chord to have a camber of 6 inches (150 mm). When the falsework supporting the bridge was removed and the
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Initially, the mass grave of unidentified remains in Chestnut Grove Cemetery was unmarked. Local citizens began an effort to erect a monument on the site in 1892, and the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster Monument was dedicated on May 30, 1895, before a crowd of 5,000 people. The names of 25 individuals
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MacDonald described (but did not publish a drawing of) the angle blocks at the bottom of the bridge. The bottom of the rod in the vertical posts screwed into these angle blocks. The members of the chord at the bottom of the bridge were flat bars, not I-beams, each bar measuring 5 by 0.375 inches
1313:
Because Amasa Stone used an inverted Howe truss, the upper chord was at the bottom of the bridge. This article uses the term "upper chord" to refer to the chord at the bottom of the bridge. Sources often use the term "upper chord" to refer to the chord at the top of the bridge, but this article
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The angle blocks were made of cast iron, which Åkesson says was appropriate, for the angle blocks were in compression. The vertical lugs atop the angle blocks in the upper chord of the bridge received shear stress, but this should have been minimal as shear stress was only induced by one of the
614:
The number of people killed in the Ashtabula bridge disaster will never be known. The number could be as low as 87 or as high as 200, although the official count is 92 dead. Another 64 people were injured. The number of deaths is inexact, in part because the number of passengers on the train is
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The coroner's report found that the bridge, located about 1,000 feet (300 m) from the railway station, had been improperly designed by the railroad company president, poorly constructed, and inadequately inspected. As a result of the accident, a hospital was built in the town and a federal
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Brockman says that the design changes were made with the assistance of A. L. Rogers, a carpenter with no bridge design or construction experience. Civil engineer Björn Åkesson points out that, since all-iron Howe trusses were so rare at the time, the use of a carpenter should not be considered
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hung in the air, but the forward movement of the "Socrates" pulled the tender forward and it regained the rails and solid ground. McGuire brought the "Socrates" to a halt about 100 yards (91 m) down the track, and began repeatedly sounding his whistle and ringing the train bell in alarm.
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MacDonald visited the scene of the disaster a few days after the bridge's collapse and made extensive drawings and notes. He made a copy of the bridge's building plan (then in the possession of John Newell, the railroad's general manager), and read through the bills of sale to determine what
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Thieves moved among the dead and wounded, stealing money and valuables. A large crowd of the curious gathered at the wreck site the next morning, and some in the crowd looted the train until Ashtabula's mayor, H. P. Hepburn, stationed a guard at the site. Some of the money and valuables were
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Amasa Stone was held personally responsible for the bridge's poor design, and the railroad company for the lax inspection of the bridge and the failure to use self-extinguishing heating apparatus. G.W. Knapp was held personally responsible for failing to fight the fire in a timely fashion.
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A burial service for the unidentified dead was held at Ashtabula's Chestnut Grove Cemetery on January 19, 1877. A mile-long procession conveyed the dead to the cemetery. The railroad purchased a burial plot in which 18 coffins, containing the remains of an estimated 22 people, were placed.
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The legislative joint committee drafted a bill that would have created Ohio's first bridge design code, required professional oversight of bridge construction, and mandated expert, frequent, regular inspections by civil engineers. The Ohio state legislature declined to act on the bill.
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The critical issue, Åkesson says, is that the broken lug on the southern angle block atop the joint between the second and third panel had a void. The void itself weakened the integrity of the block. Voids also encourage the formation of large grains and can accumulate impurities like
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Gasparini and Fields note that the alterations to the diagonal lugs and I-beams probably did lessen the strength of each diagonal. However, since Stone added more I-beams, the overall strength of the bridge was improved and the changes did not contribute to the bridge's
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In retrospect, Gasparini and Fields say, the point where the lug transitioned to the main body of the angle block was extremely problematic. The solidification rates of the molten iron were so different, this was a likely site for the formation of cracks or voids.
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express car fell into the ravine, crashing nose-first into the ground at the base of the abutment. The "Columbia" slipped backward off the abutment, landing upside-down and backward atop the first express car. It then fell onto its side, its trucks pointing north.
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The Lake Shore & Southern Michigan Railway was formed on April 6, 1869. Many sources say that the LS&MS built the bridge over the Ashtabula River, but these sources appear to be using a form of literary shorthand—using the company's better-known later
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and were not connected to one another where they crossed. The sway braces were too small to prevent sway, and placed only at every other panel as well. Neither the braces nor counter-braces were attached to the angle blocks, and their ends were not square.
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MacDonald and Gasparini and Fields noted that the diagonal I-beams were designed to connect to both the upper and lower angle blocks with the flanges of the I-beam in a vertical position. The web of the I-beam fit into a horizontal slot between two lugs.
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baggage cars, two "passenger cars", two express cars, three sleeping cars, and a smoking car. The Ohio legislature's official report on the accident said there was one baggage car, four coaches, two express cars, three sleeping cars, and one smoking car.
4221:
Report of the Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster Under Joint Resolution of the General Assembly. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, for the Adjourned Session of the Sixty-Second General Assembly. Volume
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wreck. Many who survived the crash burned to death in the wreckage. The accident killed approximately 92 of the 160 people aboard. It was the worst rail accident in the U.S. in the 19th century and the worst rail accident in U.S. history until the
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Sources vary widely on how far behind schedule the train was: About one hour, one hour and 8 minutes, two hours, two and a half hours, and four hours. The LS&MS railroad timetable, however, shows that the train was due to depart Erie at 3:45
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Railroad bridge inspectors did not perform their jobs adequately. Inspectors should have noted the severe deficiencies in the bridge's design and construction, and did not. They also should have observed problems with members becoming loose over
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in attempting to protect the railroad while also carrying out his public duties. His authority was deeply undermined by this, and his orders were disregarded, not implemented immediately, or questioned by townspeople, police, and railroad
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civil engineers employed by the joint committee, argued that the lower chord (top of the bridge) at the joint between the second and third panels gave way. The three continuous I-beam members, he concluded buckled outward at this point.
856:, caused the lug to fail. Metal fatigue was an issue in cast and wrought iron which only a few metallurgists and engineers were aware of in the 19th century. The failure of this lug on this angle block caused the entire bridge to fail.
503:
The No. 5 was due to arrive in Cleveland at 7:05 PM, but at about 7:30 PM it was just reaching Ashtabula—an hour and 53 minutes behind schedule. About half an hour earlier, the No. 8 passenger train of the LS&MS passed over the
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to see and inspect, and the angle blocks were hidden by the surrounding I-beams. Better inspection may have corrected some construction errors and identified falling shims, but might not have improved the bridge's survivability.
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began hitting northern Ohio, northwest Pennsylvania, and western New York two days earlier. More than 20 inches (510 mm) of snow had already fallen, and winds 24 to 54 miles per hour (39 to 87 km/h) were creating heavy
576:
near the bridge. The only access to the valley floor was a set of steep, narrow steps, covered in snow. Most people slid down the steep incline rather than take the steps, and several people brought axes to help free survivors.
487:"Osceo", a sleeper for passengers going to St. Louis), and a smoking car with about 150 to 200 passengers and 19 crew aboard. Two additional locomotives were needed to push the train away from the station due to the heavy snow.
432:
Upon completion, the bridge was tested by having three locomotives run over the bridge at speed. A second test had the three engines stand still on the bridge. Deflection was minimal and the bridge rebounded satisfactorily.
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were made by the mill. The mill also provided raw iron to the CP&A, which then made the cast and wrought iron elements according to the fabrication plans. Shop master mechanic Albert Congdon oversaw this latter work.
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Two official autopsies, both conducted in 1878, concluded that Collins had been murdered. For unknown reasons, law enforcement officials did not release these reports at the time. The reports were rediscovered in 2001.
748:
to the braces and counter-braces). The bridge was apparently designed for a non-moving live load, and little evidence existed to show it was designed to accommodate jarring, oscillation, vibration, or the force of wind.
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Three coffins with three corpses remained at the freight house in the hope that they could still be identified. When these remains went unclaimed, they were buried about a week later in the same plot at Chestnut Grove.
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Concern that the city lacked medical care for the victims of the bridge disaster, citizens of Ashtabula began raising money to build a hospital in their town. An emergency care clinic opened in 1882, followed by
594:
The darkness and blinding snow made it difficult for surviving passengers to orient themselves and get out of the wreck. A number of passengers drowned in the river, while others escaped the blaze only to die of
1370:Åkesson concludes that buckling during the removal of the falsework indicates an improper fit between the diagonals and the angle blocks, and to a lack of control over how much prestressing was actually induced.
731:
adopted a joint resolution appointing a committee to investigate the causes of the Ashtabula River bridge collapse, and to make recommendations to the legislature. The committee consisted of five members of the
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materials had actually been delivered. About a month later, he re-examined the wreckage of the bridge (by this time, it had been removed to the LS&MS shops in the Collingwood neighborhood of Cleveland).
4328:
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs of the State of Ohio, With Tabulations and Deductions From Reports of the Railroad Corporations of the State, for the Year Ending June 30, 1868
316:
Amasa Stone's bridge was, by his own admission, experimental. He had constructed only one all-iron Howe truss bridge before, a 5-foot (1.5 m) high, 30-foot (9.1 m) long railroad bridge over the
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crossed the bridge, it was doing 10 to 15 miles per hour (16 to 24 km/h) (according to the locomotive engineers). Visibility was practically nonexistent, at most one or two car lengths.
810:
Although the LS&MS refused to accept responsibility for the disaster, it paid out more than $ 500,000 ($ 14,300,000 in 2023 dollars) to victims and their families to quiet legal claims.
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for anyone else who turned over stolen items. Money and valuables worth about $ 1,500 ($ 42,919 in 2023 dollars) were collected, but most of the stolen money and goods were never recovered.
417:
When the falsework was removed a second time, the bridge buckled where the vertical posts connected to the deck. Several diagonals also buckled. Once more, the falsework went back in place.
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A one-paragraph technical note, clarifying the weight of locomotives running over the bridge from its erection to its completion, was added by James Sedgley, the railroad's master mechanic.
659:
At dawn on December 30, Ashtabula resident Fred W. Blakeslee took photos of the wrecked bridge and train. These provide the most extensive documentation of the wreck known as of 2003.
284:
bridge, a commonly used type of railroad bridge, and personally designed the new bridge. The longest span was 154 feet (47 m) long and 76 feet (23 m) above the river below.
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The chords, braces, and counter-braces were all made of I-beams. The vertical posts were made of rod. Each I-beam was 6 inches (150 mm) thick and 8 inches (200 mm) wide.
250:
378:
It is also known that, at the ends of the bridge, only half of each angle block received load because Stone used only a single diagonal in the end panel. This put enormous
1137:
Brockman says that turning the beams so the flanges were horizontal actually weakened the ability of the braces to reinforce the bridge, indicating Congdon was incorrect.
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on the railroad tracks 6 feet (1.8 m) deep in places. The snow was so heavy that, shortly after leaving Buffalo, a second engine was added to help pull the train.
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The volunteer Lake Erie Hose Company was a city-sponsored fire-fighting unit located on Lake Avenue and Depot Street (now W. 32nd Street), adjacent to the train depot.
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One design for a half-angle block. The attached chord puts immense downward (shear) stress on one side of the block only, for which the block is not designed.
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The coroner's jury held that the failure of the south half-angle block at the joint between the first and second panels was where the bridge collapse began.
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More people survived from the first passenger coach than any other car, because it landed upright and because it was not hit by any other part of the train.
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The river valley varied in depth from 70 to 135 feet (21 to 41 m), which may account for the discrepancy in sources regarding how far the train fell.
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A third investigation was conducted independently by civil engineer Charles MacDonald, who likely was commissioned to study the bridge's collapse by the
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The legislative joint committee issued its report on January 30, 1877. The committee blamed the collapse of the Ashtabula River bridge on three factors:
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surprising. Amasa Stone, however, said in 1877 that Rogers only had supervision of construction. Rogers himself denied designing any of the bridge.
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A gib-plate is a "plate or strap which holds in place the piece to which it is fastened and yet leaves it free to move in a prescribed direction."
1271:
Both were all-volunteer fire fighting units sponsored by the city. Protection Fire was located on Main Avenue, and Neptune Hose on Center Street.
949:
Letters from concerned friends and families seeking whether loved ones had survived are archived at the Jennie Munger Gregory Memorial Museum at
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Improper inspection by railroad officials. He noted, however, that the LS&MS was not alone in infrequent inspection by largely untrained men.
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Neither the joint committee, nor the coroner's jury, nor any of the engineers employed by them identified the flaw in the angle block casting.
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When construction began, Tomlinson observed that the I-beams intended for use as diagonals were smaller than the fabrication plans called for.
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632:
people seeking gold watches, jewelry, or other items as "loot". Fraudulent letters tended to be spotted fairly easily, and were not answered.
4474:
4514:
4428:
Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, for the Adjourned Session of the Sixty-Second General Assembly. Volume LXXIII
4396:
Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, for the Adjourned Session of the Sixty-Second General Assembly. Volume LXXIII
1333:
hired by the joint committee, concluded that no braces had moved out of position since the bridge had last been painted two years earlier.
4685:
1058:
The patented Howe truss bridge design used wooden beams for the diagonal and horizontal members, and iron posts for the vertical members.
363:
Gasparini and Fields claim that the exact design of the angle blocks and the ends (the "bearings") of the diagonals are lost to history.
359:
The chord, diagonals, angle blocks, and vertical posts of the Ashtabula Bridge, as drawn from original plans by Charles MacDonald in 1877
1049:"Camber is an upward curvature given to a beam or girder, or some line in it, in order to ensure its horizontality when fully loaded."
517:"Columbia" behind it. The connection between the two locomotives snapped, enabling the "Socrates" to make it off the bridge. The rear
1022:
It is unclear if Stone or Tomlinson set the bridge's height-to-span ratio or the number of panels, or designed its connection points.
978:
269:
was president of the CP&A. His construction firm had built the CP&A main line from 1850 to 1852, and Stone had purchased the
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Railroad into the LS&MS, which placed the line from Chicago to Buffalo under the control of a single company for the first time.
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229:
136:
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The railroad's policy was to let a train burn. The policy was not made with the possibility that passengers could still be aboard.
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1155:
The weight of the engines was estimated at 40 short tons (36 t) each in 1887, but at 30 short tons (27 t) each in 1993.
538:
Postcard photo of the wreck. The view is toward the west abutment; the locomotive "Columbia" can be seen in the wreckage at left.
3959:
Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships: The Rhetoric of Nineteenth Century Steamboat and Railroad Accident Investigation Reports, 1833–1879
4835:
988:
4496:, from the Ashtabula Historical Railroad Foundation. Web site includes pictures of the bridge before and after the collapse.
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discovered following investigations by local police, and a few arrests made. Hepburn later issued a proclamation promising
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An inadequate knowledge of the strength of iron. The whole industry suffered from a lack of this knowledge, he wrote.
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known to have died in the fire but whose remains could not be found are listed on a plaque on the memorial's base.
930:, cast iron was banned by civil engineers for use in load-carrying structures soon after the accident. About 1886,
827:
425:
braces themselves. It is also possible that the shims created uneven contact, causing angle blocks to undergo both
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had too few and poorly designed lugs, which did not keep the braces and counter-braces from slipping out of place.
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4823:
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3328:
920:
4003:
Disasters, Accidents, and Crises in American History: A Reference Guide to the Nation's Most Catastrophic Events
4811:
4673:
4623:
4563:
4346:
Seventh Annual Report of the Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs of Ohio for the Year Ending June 30, 1873
1389:
The five members were held together at each panel connection by two bolts running through the web of the beams.
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4847:
4805:
4751:
4697:
4062:
Ohio: A Four-Volume Reference Library on the History of a Great State. Volume 3: Historical Gazetteer of Ohio
733:
702:
The railroad failed to use self-extinguishing heating stoves, as required by state law passed on May 4, 1869.
686:
The coroner's jury blamed the collapse of the Ashtabula River bridge and the deaths by fire on five factors:
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3340:
344:
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4709:
4679:
4150:
Hamilton, Barbara J. (2003). "Who's Who?: Identifying Victims of the Disaster". In Corts, Thomas E. (ed.).
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848:, both of which also increase the brittleness of iron. The void also worsened stress on the block through
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931:
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Gasparini, Dario A.; Fields, Melissa (May 1993). "Collapse of Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876".
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234:
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4438:
Travelers' Official Guide of the Railway and Steam Navigation Lines in the United States and Canada
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274:
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4703:
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was adopted by the railroad, replacing the wood and coal stoves in passenger cars. As part of the
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The response by the Ashtabula Fire Brigade was minimal. G.W. Knapp, the city's fire chief, was an
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The amount of camber created a problem during construction. At Congdon's suggestion, Rogers built
4551:
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2401:
2399:
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1740:
935:
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4309:
Darkest Hours: A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters From Ancient Times to the Present
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288:
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4599:
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Bliss and Tragedy: The Ashtabula Railway-Bridge Accident of 1876 and the Loss of P. P. Bliss
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4171:
Bliss and Tragedy: The Ashtabula Railway-Bridge Accident of 1876 and the Loss of P.P. Bliss
4152:
Bliss and Tragedy: The Ashtabula Railway-Bridge Accident of 1876 and the Loss of P.P. Bliss
4043:
Bliss and Tragedy: The Ashtabula Railway-Bridge Accident of 1876 and the Loss of P.P. Bliss
3897:
Cleveland's Greatest Disasters! 16 Tragic True Tales of Death and Destruction: An Anthology
1281:
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The committee found no defects in materials, and rejected the idea that application of the
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committed suicide out of grief and feeling partially responsible for the tragic accident.
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failure of the angle block caused the upper chord to buckle, and the bridge to collapse.
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likely very close to their buckling load—even though no live load was yet on the bridge.
938:, a federal system was set up in 1887 to formally investigate fatal railroad accidents.
291:(then known as Stone, Chisholm & Jones Company), an iron and steel company based in
4268:
4169:
Hamilton, Darrell E. (2003). "Almost the Perfect Disaster". In Corts, Thomas E. (ed.).
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3978:
853:
475:
44:
4041:
Corts, Thomas E. (2003). "The Loss of Bliss in Ashtabula". In Corts, Thomas E. (ed.).
1146:
Brockman says that workers incorrectly installed the I-beam braces during repair work.
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1937:
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Several other changes were also made in the wake of the accident. Because of its low
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462:, at 2 PM on December 29, 1876, 1 hour and 8 minutes behind schedule. A powerful
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which is screwed into a threaded (or "tapped") hole rather attached using a nut.
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that all these stories are false: Bliss never made it out of the wreck alive.
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inverts the terminology used by sources where needed for consistency's sake.
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37:
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478:, at 5:01 PM, an hour and 16 minutes behind schedule. Its two locomotives,
379:
5012:
Accidents and incidents involving Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway
4069:
635:
Wreck investigators were still turning up remains as late as mid-January.
563:
1878 drawing based on a January 1877 photograph of the ruins of the bridge
969:
Collins was buried in an elaborate mausoleum at Chestnut Grove Cemetery.
737:
559:
266:
237:. However, it remains the Third-Deadliest rail accident in U.S. history.
4440:. Philadelphia: National General Ticket Agents' Association. June 1870.
2966:"Statement and Verdict of the Coroner's Jury on the Ashtabula Disaster"
1174:
This was the third major blizzard to hit the area in less than a month.
714:
587:
281:
4640:
4460:
4436:"Travelers' Official Railway Guide for the United States and Canada".
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may have hit the bridge, causing it to come loose from the abutments.
454:
Train No. 5 of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway, known as
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341:
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Joki, Virginia Carville (February 1954). "The Ashtabula Disaster".
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Frozen ground had caused a lengthy delay before burial could occur.
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390:
19:"Ashtabula Bridge" redirects here. For the present-day bridge, see
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Corts, Thomas E. (2003). "Appendices". In Corts, Thomas E. (ed.).
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and shear stress. Nevertheless, the bridge did not sag this time.
295:, Ohio, which was managed by his older brother, Andros Stone. The
4218:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster (1877).
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Stone also decided to award the contract for the ironwork to the
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system set up to formally investigate fatal railroad accidents.
4378:
Train Wrecks: A Pictorial History of Accidents on the Main Line
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4371:. Chicago: J.S. Goodman – Louis Lloyd & Co.
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852:. Gasparini and Fields conclude that this void, combined with
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4330:. Columbus, Ohio: Columbus Printing Company, State Printers.
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Trains and Technology. Volume 4: Bridges and Tunnels, Signals
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3347:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
3311:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
3299:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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2255:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
2243:
Joint Committee Concerning the Ashtabula Bridge Disaster 1877
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Hepburn was an employee of the railroad, and had a serious
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Great Train Disasters: The World's Worst Railway Accidents
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MacDonald blamed three factors for the bridge's failure:
655:
Charles Collins, the railroad's chief engineer of bridges
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by the second locomotive caused the bridge to collapse.
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706:(1.6 km) through snowdrifts, but arrived too late.
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Ohio Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs (1874).
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Ohio Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs (1868).
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It may have actually hit the abutment on the way down.
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coroner's jury submitted its report on March 8, 1877.
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The wooden cars burst into flame when their coal- and
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to close the space between the bearings and the lugs.
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Howland had also testified before the coroner's jury.
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Sway rods only connected to every other angle block.
715:
Conclusions by the state legislative joint committee
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truss bridge in 1842. Stone resolved to construct a
4349:. Columbus, Ohio: Nevins and Myers, State Printers.
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2167:Ohio Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs 1868
1413:Ohio Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs 1874
662:Three investigations were made into the disaster.
4425:Stone, Amasa (1877). "Testimony of Amasa Stone".
4393:Rogers, A.L. (1877). "Testimony of A.L. Rogers".
4255:. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.
910:Ohio historical marker near the site of the wreck
867:Poor construction caused overwhelming thrust load
257:), decided to replace the wooden bridge over the
4978:
4461:Engineering Tragedy:The Ashtabula Train Disaster
4100:Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities
2199:
4937:FIU Sweetwater UniversityCity pedestrian bridge
4287:
4097:
3649:
3625:
3601:
3562:
3541:
3514:
3394:
3358:
3286:
2178:
2096:
2017:
1990:
1858:
1753:
1720:
1696:
1577:
892:
884:Low temperature exacerbated the flaw in the lug
491:Initial collapse and survival of the "Socrates"
228:, in the United States on December 29, 1876. A
4812:Hyatt Regency walkway in Kansas City, Missouri
4290:The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway
4168:
4149:
3921:. Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press.
3839:
3779:
3738:
3228:
3216:
3204:
3189:
3174:
3162:
3147:
3123:
3106:
3056:
3044:
3025:
2922:
2867:
2843:
2775:
2739:
2560:
2548:
2505:
2417:
2358:
2304:
2225:
797:
382:on the bridgeward side of these angle blocks.
5002:Bridge disasters caused by construction error
4515:
1739:. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. p.
1040:This bridge was Ohio's first all-iron bridge.
350:
251:Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad
4997:Bridge disasters caused by engineering error
4431:. Springfield, Ohio: Elifritz & Winters.
4399:. Springfield, Ohio: Elifritz & Winters.
4225:. Springfield, Ohio: Elifritz & Winters.
2960:
2958:
2956:
2954:
2952:
2950:
2948:
2946:
2523:Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen's Magazine
2450:
2448:
2446:
1936:. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill. p. 404.
1525:Society for Industrial Archeology Newsletter
4410:. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.
4229:
4080:Misfortune on Cleveland's Millionaires' Row
3961:. Amityville, N.Y.: Baywood Publishing Co.
3711:
3246:
2444:
2442:
2440:
2438:
2436:
2434:
2432:
2430:
2428:
2426:
2269:
2267:
2265:
2263:
2119:
2117:
1031:The bridge was 19.5 feet (5.9 m) wide.
956:
814:Modern engineering analysis of the disaster
436:
4680:Rail bridge near Huntington, West Virginia
4522:
4508:
768:Conclusions of the MacDonald investigation
253:(CP&A; one of the predecessors of the
36:
5027:Wrought iron bridges in the United States
4248:
4234:. Avonmouth, Bristol, UK: Parragon Plus.
3956:
3914:
3574:
3418:
3406:
3382:
3370:
2943:
2751:
2048:
2029:
1963:
1917:
1902:
1870:
1790:
1765:
1623:
1598:
1515:
1492:"Springfield Bridge for Western Railroad"
1448:
1429:
979:List of structural failures and collapses
678:of six men from the town was convened by
154:Bridge collapse due to Structural failure
5017:Transportation in Ashtabula County, Ohio
4895:I-40 bridge near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma
4674:Rail bridge in Atlantic City, New Jersey
4203:. Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia Publishing.
4187:
4126:
3998:
3942:. Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia Publishing.
3935:
3876:
3673:
2645:
2628:
2577:
2469:
2423:
2260:
2114:
1929:
1889:. New York: The Century Co. p. 423.
1485:
1483:
1481:
1460:
905:
718:
650:
566:
558:
533:
494:
440:
389:
354:
307:
255:Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway
230:Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway
137:Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway
5007:Railway accidents and incidents in Ohio
4866:Lowe's Motor Speedway pedestrian bridge
4668:Rail bridge near Eden Station, Colorado
4618:Rail bridge near Chester, Massachusetts
4288:McLellan, David; Warrick, Bill (1989).
4196:
4173:. Birmingham, Ala.: Sherman Oak Books.
4154:. Birmingham, Ala.: Sherman Oak Books.
4083:. Charleston, S.C.: The History Press.
4045:. Birmingham, Ala.: Sherman Oak Books.
4026:. Birmingham, Ala.: Sherman Oak Books.
3893:
3855:
3750:
3723:
3699:
3661:
3637:
3613:
3589:
3529:
3499:
3487:
3460:
3448:
3267:
2937:
2703:
2616:
2592:
2193:
2154:
2108:
2079:
2060:
1978:
1841:
1802:
1679:
1638:
1552:
723:Sketch of the Ashtabula Bridge wreckage
220:) was the failure of a bridge over the
4979:
4925:I-5 bridge in Mount Vernon, Washington
4716:Rail bridge near Meadow Acres, Wyoming
4612:Rail bridge in Orange County, Virginia
4570:Rail bridge near Meridian, Mississippi
4464:– 2022 documentary partly produced by
4392:
4357:A History of Cleveland, Ohio. Volume I
3751:Feather, Carl E. (December 25, 2011).
2406:Travelers' Official Railway Guide 1870
1829:
1736:The Mechanics of Building Construction
1489:
989:List of wind-related railway accidents
449:
4987:Bridge disasters in the United States
4746:Rail bridge in Woodbridge, New Jersey
4606:Rail bridge near Chatsworth, Illinois
4564:Rail bridge near St. Joseph, Missouri
4503:
4424:
4360:. Chicago: S.J. Clarke Publishing Co.
4292:. Polo, Ill.: Transportation Trails.
4112:10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1993)7:2(109)
4076:
3975:
3879:Ashcroft's Railway Directory for 1865
3433:
2333:
1882:
1817:
1732:
1708:
1478:
245:Design and construction of the bridge
16:1876 railroad bridge collapse in Ohio
4686:Saint Croix–Vanceboro Railway Bridge
4403:
4375:
4364:
4353:
4306:
4059:
3815:
3803:
3791:
3240:
3094:
3002:
2990:
2903:
2891:
2855:
2818:
2806:
2794:
2763:
2718:
2657:
2604:
2481:
2388:
2370:
2321:
1650:
1472:
197:List of rail accidents (before 1880)
4546:Rail bridge in Norwalk, Connecticut
4252:The Failure of the Ashtabula Bridge
1490:Griggs, Frank Jr. (November 2014).
818:Björn Åkesson, a civil engineer at
774:American Society of Civil Engineers
499:Illustration of the bridge collapse
13:
4135:. Brattleboro, Vt.: Greene Press.
834:
554:
312:Amasa Stone, the bridge's designer
14:
5038:
4782:Benjamin Harrison Memorial Bridge
4656:Rail bridge in Danville, Virginia
4576:Rail bridge near Angola, New York
4453:
3674:Dillaway, Warren (July 2, 2019).
1886:The Century Dictionary Supplement
820:Chalmers University of Technology
666:Conclusions by the coroner's jury
206:Ashtabula River railroad disaster
50:January 20, 1877. The locomotive
31:Ashtabula River railroad disaster
4639:
4064:. Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co.
3980:Ships and Men of the Great Lakes
3862:. London: Taylor & Francis.
3744:
3667:
3062:
1883:Smith, Benjamin E., ed. (1910).
1516:Gasparini, Dario (Winter 2003).
1383:
1373:
1364:
1354:
1345:
1336:
1326:
1317:
1307:
1298:
1288:
1274:
1265:
1256:
1247:
1238:
1229:
1220:
646:
623:Identifying and burying the dead
530:Collapse of the remaining bridge
4836:Lacey V. Murrow Memorial Bridge
4758:Rail bridge in Meldrim, Georgia
4630:Enfield–Suffield Covered Bridge
4487:The Ashtabula Railroad Disaster
4407:Cleveland: The Making of a City
4190:The Story of American Railroads
3849:
2511:
2364:
2215:. December 30, 1876. p. 1.
1923:
1876:
1726:
1210:
1200:
1187:
1177:
1168:
1158:
1149:
1140:
1131:
1121:
1112:
1099:
1090:
1080:
1070:
1061:
1052:
1043:
1034:
1025:
1016:
840:adjacent members of the chord.
445:The iron bridge before collapse
385:
4365:Peet, Stephen Denison (1877).
4230:Kitchenside, Geoffrey (1997).
3915:Bianculli, Anthony J. (2003).
3859:Understanding Bridge Collapses
3136:Corts, "Loss of Bliss..." 2003
2131:. January 27, 1877. p. 24
1933:Introduction to Machine Design
1509:
1006:
789:The failure of a mis-cast lug.
1:
4955:I-95 overpass in Philadelphia
4404:Rose, William Ganson (1990).
4192:. New York: Crown Publishers.
4188:Holbrook, Stewart H. (1947).
3999:Campbell, Ballard C. (2008).
3257:. January 2, 1877. p. 2.
3076:. March 12, 1914. p. 523
2972:. March 16, 1877. p. 117
2459:. January 2, 1877. p. 4.
994:
734:Ohio House of Representatives
4127:Griswold, Wesley S. (1969).
3900:. Cleveland: Gray & Co.
3894:Bellamy, John Stark (2009).
2525:. November 1904. p. 806
2281:. January 6, 1877. p. 7
893:The issue of poor inspection
261:just east of the village of
42:Wood engraving published in
7:
4913:Bartonsville Covered Bridge
4907:I-35W bridge in Minneapolis
4380:. New York: Bonanza Books.
4354:Orth, Samuel Peter (1910).
4249:MacDonald, Charles (1877).
4060:Fess, Simeon David (1937).
4007:. New York: Facts on File.
3957:Brockmann, R. John (2005).
3881:. New York: John Ashcroft.
3676:"ACMC celebrates 115 years"
3650:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3626:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3602:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3563:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3542:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3515:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3395:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3359:Gasparini & Fields 1993
3287:Gasparini & Fields 1993
2519:"Ninth Biennial Convention"
2179:McLellan & Warrick 1989
2097:Gasparini & Fields 1993
2018:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1991:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1859:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1754:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1721:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1697:Gasparini & Fields 1993
1578:Gasparini & Fields 1993
972:
850:stress concentration effect
798:Conclusions by the railroad
10:
5043:
4788:West Spokane Street Bridge
921:Ashtabula General Hospital
351:Design of the angle blocks
265:, with an iron structure.
249:In 1863, officials of the
18:
5022:Railway accidents in 1876
4970:
4881:
4648:
4637:
4538:
4475:List of saved and wounded
4307:Nash, Jay Robert (1976).
4197:Johnson, Eric A. (2006).
901:
736:and three members of the
509:into the station. As the
303:
273:rights to brother-in-law
235:Great Train Wreck of 1918
214:Ashtabula Bridge disaster
195:
187:
179:
171:
163:
158:
150:
142:
132:
95:
84:
64:
59:
35:
30:
4961:Francis Scott Key Bridge
4854:Newhall Pass interchange
4770:Newhall Pass interchange
4376:Reed, Robert C. (1968).
4311:. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
3984:. New York: Dodd, Mead.
3936:Borsvold, David (2003).
3828:Corts, "Appendices" 2003
3337:, pp. 227, 229–230.
3253:"The Ashtabula Horror".
2275:"The Ashtabula Disaster"
984:List of bridge disasters
957:Death of Charles Collins
951:Geneva-on-the-Lake, Ohio
756:railroad did not repair.
727:On January 1, 1877, the
437:Bridge collapse and fire
218:Ashtabula train disaster
4889:Queen Isabella Causeway
4860:Queen Isabella Causeway
4842:Claiborne Avenue Bridge
4752:CRRNJ Newark Bay Bridge
4492:August 6, 2015, at the
4446:2027/mdp.39015076287575
4261:2027/uc1.31210023545609
4077:Dutka, Alan F. (2015).
3887:2027/njp.32101066799063
3877:Ashcroft, John (1865).
3856:Åkesson, Björn (2008).
3070:"Death of H.P. Hepburn"
1930:Bhandari, V.B. (2001).
936:Interstate Commerce Act
826:, has identified three
70:; 147 years ago
4931:I-85 bridge in Atlanta
4848:Big Bayou Canot Bridge
4824:Schoharie Creek Bridge
4806:Sunshine Skyway Bridge
4740:Chesapeake City Bridge
4692:Division Street Bridge
4368:The Ashtabula Disaster
4200:Ashtabula Firefighting
3976:Boyer, Dwight (1977).
3753:"The Ashtabula Horror"
2211:"Horror Upon Horror".
2125:"The Ashtabula Bridge"
1518:"Historic Bridge News"
911:
724:
656:
572:
564:
539:
500:
446:
395:
360:
313:
289:Cleveland Rolling Mill
68:December 29, 1876
4919:Eggner's Ferry Bridge
4800:Bedell Covered Bridge
4734:Tacoma Narrows Bridge
4624:Madison Street Bridge
3757:Ashtabula Star Beacon
3680:Ashtabula Star Beacon
3074:The Iron Trade Review
2455:"The Railway Wreck".
1733:Adams, Henry (1912).
909:
729:Ohio General Assembly
722:
654:
571:Disaster site in 2015
570:
562:
537:
498:
444:
393:
358:
311:
21:Ashtabula lift bridge
4776:Sidney Lanier Bridge
4698:Summer Street Bridge
4533:in the United States
4480:May 7, 2021, at the
2970:The Railroad Gazette
2279:The Engineering News
1756:, pp. 111, 113.
1282:conflict of interest
1197:was the lead engine.
680:Justice of the Peace
4818:Mianus River Bridge
4710:Allen Street Bridge
4552:Clark Street Bridge
3840:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3830:, pp. 145–158.
3818:, pp. 160–161.
3794:, pp. 159–161.
3780:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3739:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3604:, pp. 121–122.
3349:, pp. 227–230.
3229:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3217:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3205:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3190:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3175:Hamilton, B.J. 2003
3163:Hamilton, B.J. 2003
3148:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3124:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3107:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3057:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3045:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
3026:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2923:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2868:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2844:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2776:Hamilton, B.J. 2003
2740:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2561:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2549:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2506:Hamilton, B.J. 2003
2418:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2359:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2305:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2226:Hamilton, D.E. 2003
2032:, pp. 209–210.
1993:, pp. 115–116.
1832:, pp. 121–133.
1768:, pp. 208–209.
1475:, pp. 738–739.
456:The Pacific Express
450:Blizzard conditions
319:Ohio and Erie Canal
146:Derailment and fire
117:41.8785°N 80.7894°W
113: /
4943:Fern Hollow Bridge
2063:, pp. 25, 26.
912:
725:
657:
573:
565:
540:
501:
476:Erie, Pennsylvania
447:
396:
361:
314:
183:92 (approximately)
4974:
4973:
4901:Four Bears Bridge
4794:Hood Canal Bridge
4704:Greenfield Bridge
4336:2027/uc1.b2896930
3842:, pp. 19–21.
3702:, pp. 29–30.
3616:, pp. 22–23.
3502:, pp. 28–29.
3373:, pp. 83–85.
3231:, pp. 10–11.
3207:, pp. 15–16.
3177:, pp. 38–39.
3138:, pp. 81–83.
3005:, pp. 49–50.
2809:, pp. 28–29.
2766:, pp. 27–28.
2754:, pp. 79–80.
2563:, pp. 3, 19.
2082:, pp. 27–28.
1981:, pp. 26–27.
1844:, pp. 21–23.
1415:, pp. 92–93.
923:on July 1, 1904.
460:Buffalo, New York
224:near the town of
208:(also called the
202:
201:
122:41.8785; -80.7894
54:is at upper right
5034:
4830:Miamitown Bridge
4722:Honeymoon Bridge
4643:
4594:Des Moines River
4588:Ashtabula Bridge
4558:Gasconade Bridge
4531:Bridge disasters
4524:
4517:
4510:
4501:
4500:
4449:
4432:
4421:
4400:
4389:
4372:
4361:
4350:
4339:
4322:
4303:
4284:
4278:
4274:
4272:
4264:
4245:
4226:
4214:
4193:
4184:
4165:
4146:
4134:
4123:
4094:
4073:
4056:
4037:
4018:
4006:
3995:
3983:
3972:
3953:
3932:
3911:
3890:
3873:
3843:
3837:
3831:
3825:
3819:
3813:
3807:
3801:
3795:
3789:
3783:
3777:
3768:
3767:
3765:
3763:
3748:
3742:
3736:
3727:
3721:
3715:
3712:Kitchenside 1997
3709:
3703:
3697:
3691:
3690:
3688:
3686:
3671:
3665:
3659:
3653:
3647:
3641:
3635:
3629:
3623:
3617:
3611:
3605:
3599:
3593:
3587:
3578:
3572:
3566:
3560:
3545:
3539:
3533:
3527:
3518:
3512:
3503:
3497:
3491:
3485:
3464:
3458:
3452:
3446:
3437:
3431:
3422:
3416:
3410:
3404:
3398:
3392:
3386:
3380:
3374:
3368:
3362:
3356:
3350:
3344:
3338:
3332:
3326:
3320:
3314:
3308:
3302:
3296:
3290:
3284:
3271:
3265:
3259:
3258:
3255:The Plain Dealer
3250:
3244:
3238:
3232:
3226:
3220:
3214:
3208:
3202:
3193:
3187:
3178:
3172:
3166:
3160:
3151:
3145:
3139:
3133:
3127:
3121:
3110:
3104:
3098:
3092:
3086:
3085:
3083:
3081:
3066:
3060:
3059:, pp. 9–10.
3054:
3048:
3042:
3029:
3023:
3006:
3000:
2994:
2988:
2982:
2981:
2979:
2977:
2962:
2941:
2935:
2926:
2920:
2907:
2901:
2895:
2889:
2883:
2877:
2871:
2870:, pp. 1, 2.
2865:
2859:
2853:
2847:
2841:
2822:
2816:
2810:
2804:
2798:
2792:
2779:
2773:
2767:
2761:
2755:
2749:
2743:
2737:
2722:
2716:
2707:
2701:
2690:
2684:
2673:
2667:
2661:
2655:
2649:
2643:
2632:
2626:
2620:
2614:
2608:
2602:
2596:
2590:
2581:
2575:
2564:
2558:
2552:
2546:
2535:
2534:
2532:
2530:
2515:
2509:
2503:
2497:
2491:
2485:
2479:
2473:
2467:
2461:
2460:
2457:The Plain Dealer
2452:
2421:
2415:
2409:
2408:, Timetable 178.
2403:
2392:
2386:
2377:
2376:
2368:
2362:
2356:
2337:
2331:
2325:
2319:
2308:
2302:
2291:
2290:
2288:
2286:
2271:
2258:
2252:
2246:
2240:
2229:
2223:
2217:
2216:
2213:The Plain Dealer
2208:
2197:
2191:
2182:
2176:
2170:
2164:
2158:
2152:
2141:
2140:
2138:
2136:
2129:Engineering News
2121:
2112:
2106:
2100:
2094:
2083:
2077:
2064:
2058:
2052:
2046:
2033:
2027:
2021:
2015:
1994:
1988:
1982:
1976:
1967:
1961:
1948:
1947:
1927:
1921:
1915:
1906:
1900:
1891:
1890:
1880:
1874:
1868:
1862:
1856:
1845:
1839:
1833:
1827:
1821:
1815:
1806:
1800:
1794:
1788:
1769:
1763:
1757:
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1744:
1730:
1724:
1718:
1712:
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1700:
1694:
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1642:
1636:
1627:
1621:
1602:
1596:
1581:
1575:
1556:
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1534:
1532:
1522:
1513:
1507:
1506:
1504:
1502:
1487:
1476:
1470:
1464:
1458:
1452:
1446:
1433:
1427:
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1410:
1390:
1387:
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1377:
1371:
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1185:
1181:
1175:
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1162:
1156:
1153:
1147:
1144:
1138:
1135:
1129:
1125:
1119:
1116:
1110:
1105:A tap bolt is a
1103:
1097:
1094:
1088:
1084:
1078:
1074:
1068:
1065:
1059:
1056:
1050:
1047:
1041:
1038:
1032:
1029:
1023:
1020:
1014:
1010:
828:proximate causes
674:in Ashtabula, a
597:smoke inhalation
325:Joseph Tomlinson
279:
210:Ashtabula horror
128:
127:
125:
124:
123:
118:
114:
111:
110:
109:
106:
78:
76:
71:
40:
28:
27:
5042:
5041:
5037:
5036:
5035:
5033:
5032:
5031:
4977:
4976:
4975:
4966:
4949:Carbella Bridge
4877:
4644:
4635:
4534:
4528:
4494:Wayback Machine
4482:Wayback Machine
4456:
4418:
4319:
4300:
4276:
4275:
4266:
4265:
4242:
4211:
4181:
4162:
4143:
4091:
4053:
4034:
4015:
3992:
3969:
3950:
3929:
3908:
3870:
3852:
3847:
3846:
3838:
3834:
3826:
3822:
3814:
3810:
3802:
3798:
3790:
3786:
3778:
3771:
3761:
3759:
3749:
3745:
3737:
3730:
3722:
3718:
3710:
3706:
3698:
3694:
3684:
3682:
3672:
3668:
3660:
3656:
3648:
3644:
3636:
3632:
3624:
3620:
3612:
3608:
3600:
3596:
3588:
3581:
3573:
3569:
3561:
3548:
3540:
3536:
3528:
3521:
3513:
3506:
3498:
3494:
3486:
3467:
3459:
3455:
3447:
3440:
3432:
3425:
3417:
3413:
3405:
3401:
3393:
3389:
3381:
3377:
3369:
3365:
3357:
3353:
3345:
3341:
3333:
3329:
3321:
3317:
3309:
3305:
3297:
3293:
3285:
3274:
3266:
3262:
3252:
3251:
3247:
3239:
3235:
3227:
3223:
3215:
3211:
3203:
3196:
3188:
3181:
3173:
3169:
3161:
3154:
3146:
3142:
3134:
3130:
3122:
3113:
3105:
3101:
3093:
3089:
3079:
3077:
3068:
3067:
3063:
3055:
3051:
3043:
3032:
3024:
3009:
3001:
2997:
2989:
2985:
2975:
2973:
2964:
2963:
2944:
2936:
2929:
2921:
2910:
2902:
2898:
2890:
2886:
2878:
2874:
2866:
2862:
2854:
2850:
2842:
2825:
2817:
2813:
2805:
2801:
2793:
2782:
2774:
2770:
2762:
2758:
2750:
2746:
2738:
2725:
2717:
2710:
2702:
2693:
2685:
2676:
2668:
2664:
2656:
2652:
2648:, p. 1876.
2644:
2635:
2627:
2623:
2615:
2611:
2603:
2599:
2591:
2584:
2576:
2567:
2559:
2555:
2547:
2538:
2528:
2526:
2517:
2516:
2512:
2504:
2500:
2492:
2488:
2480:
2476:
2468:
2464:
2454:
2453:
2424:
2420:, pp. 3–4.
2416:
2412:
2404:
2395:
2387:
2380:
2369:
2365:
2357:
2340:
2332:
2328:
2320:
2311:
2303:
2294:
2284:
2282:
2273:
2272:
2261:
2253:
2249:
2241:
2232:
2224:
2220:
2210:
2209:
2200:
2192:
2185:
2177:
2173:
2165:
2161:
2153:
2144:
2134:
2132:
2123:
2122:
2115:
2107:
2103:
2095:
2086:
2078:
2067:
2059:
2055:
2047:
2036:
2028:
2024:
2016:
1997:
1989:
1985:
1977:
1970:
1962:
1951:
1944:
1928:
1924:
1916:
1909:
1901:
1894:
1881:
1877:
1869:
1865:
1857:
1848:
1840:
1836:
1828:
1824:
1816:
1809:
1801:
1797:
1789:
1772:
1764:
1760:
1752:
1748:
1731:
1727:
1719:
1715:
1707:
1703:
1695:
1686:
1678:
1657:
1649:
1645:
1637:
1630:
1622:
1605:
1597:
1584:
1576:
1559:
1551:
1540:
1530:
1528:
1520:
1514:
1510:
1500:
1498:
1488:
1479:
1471:
1467:
1459:
1455:
1447:
1436:
1428:
1419:
1411:
1404:
1394:
1393:
1388:
1384:
1378:
1374:
1369:
1365:
1359:
1355:
1350:
1346:
1341:
1337:
1331:
1327:
1322:
1318:
1312:
1308:
1303:
1299:
1293:
1289:
1279:
1275:
1270:
1266:
1261:
1257:
1252:
1248:
1243:
1239:
1234:
1230:
1225:
1221:
1215:
1211:
1205:
1201:
1192:
1188:
1182:
1178:
1173:
1169:
1163:
1159:
1154:
1150:
1145:
1141:
1136:
1132:
1126:
1122:
1117:
1113:
1104:
1100:
1095:
1091:
1085:
1081:
1075:
1071:
1066:
1062:
1057:
1053:
1048:
1044:
1039:
1035:
1030:
1026:
1021:
1017:
1011:
1007:
997:
975:
959:
904:
895:
886:
869:
837:
835:The angle block
816:
800:
770:
717:
670:There being no
668:
649:
625:
557:
555:Fire and deaths
532:
511:Pacific Express
506:Ashtabula River
493:
474:The train left
452:
439:
388:
353:
321:in Cleveland.
306:
277:
263:Ashtabula, Ohio
259:Ashtabula River
247:
226:Ashtabula, Ohio
222:Ashtabula River
121:
119:
115:
112:
107:
104:
102:
100:
99:
89:Ashtabula, Ohio
79:
74:
72:
69:
55:
49:
45:Harper's Weekly
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
5040:
5030:
5029:
5024:
5019:
5014:
5009:
5004:
4999:
4994:
4989:
4972:
4971:
4968:
4967:
4965:
4964:
4958:
4952:
4946:
4940:
4934:
4928:
4922:
4916:
4910:
4904:
4898:
4892:
4885:
4883:
4879:
4878:
4876:
4875:
4869:
4863:
4857:
4851:
4845:
4839:
4833:
4827:
4821:
4815:
4809:
4803:
4797:
4791:
4785:
4779:
4773:
4767:
4761:
4755:
4749:
4743:
4737:
4731:
4725:
4719:
4713:
4707:
4701:
4695:
4689:
4683:
4677:
4671:
4665:
4659:
4652:
4650:
4646:
4645:
4638:
4636:
4634:
4633:
4627:
4621:
4615:
4609:
4603:
4597:
4591:
4585:
4579:
4573:
4567:
4561:
4555:
4549:
4542:
4540:
4536:
4535:
4527:
4526:
4519:
4512:
4504:
4498:
4497:
4484:
4472:
4455:
4454:External links
4452:
4451:
4450:
4433:
4422:
4416:
4401:
4390:
4373:
4362:
4351:
4340:
4323:
4317:
4304:
4298:
4285:
4246:
4240:
4227:
4215:
4209:
4194:
4185:
4179:
4166:
4160:
4147:
4141:
4124:
4106:(2): 109–125.
4095:
4089:
4074:
4057:
4051:
4038:
4032:
4019:
4013:
3996:
3990:
3973:
3967:
3954:
3948:
3933:
3927:
3912:
3906:
3891:
3874:
3868:
3851:
3848:
3845:
3844:
3832:
3820:
3808:
3806:, p. 162.
3796:
3784:
3769:
3743:
3728:
3716:
3704:
3692:
3666:
3654:
3652:, p. 124.
3642:
3630:
3628:, p. 121.
3618:
3606:
3594:
3579:
3575:MacDonald 1877
3567:
3565:, p. 122.
3546:
3544:, p. 123.
3534:
3519:
3517:, p. 109.
3504:
3492:
3465:
3453:
3438:
3423:
3419:MacDonald 1877
3411:
3407:MacDonald 1877
3399:
3397:, p. 120.
3387:
3383:MacDonald 1877
3375:
3371:MacDonald 1877
3363:
3361:, p. 118.
3351:
3339:
3327:
3325:, p. 251.
3315:
3313:, p. 230.
3303:
3301:, p. 226.
3291:
3289:, p. 119.
3272:
3260:
3245:
3233:
3221:
3209:
3194:
3179:
3167:
3152:
3140:
3128:
3111:
3099:
3087:
3061:
3049:
3030:
3007:
2995:
2983:
2942:
2927:
2908:
2896:
2884:
2882:, p. 278.
2872:
2860:
2848:
2823:
2811:
2799:
2780:
2768:
2756:
2752:MacDonald 1877
2744:
2723:
2708:
2691:
2689:, p. 277.
2674:
2672:, p. 252.
2662:
2650:
2633:
2621:
2609:
2607:, p. 151.
2597:
2582:
2565:
2553:
2536:
2510:
2498:
2496:, p. 237.
2486:
2484:, p. 485.
2474:
2472:, p. 283.
2462:
2422:
2410:
2393:
2378:
2375:. p. 108.
2363:
2338:
2326:
2309:
2292:
2259:
2257:, p. 263.
2247:
2245:, p. 228.
2230:
2218:
2198:
2183:
2171:
2169:, p. 149.
2159:
2142:
2113:
2101:
2099:, p. 117.
2084:
2065:
2053:
2049:Bianculli 2003
2034:
2030:Brockmann 2005
2022:
2020:, p. 116.
1995:
1983:
1968:
1964:MacDonald 1877
1949:
1942:
1922:
1918:MacDonald 1877
1907:
1903:MacDonald 1877
1892:
1875:
1871:MacDonald 1877
1863:
1861:, p. 113.
1846:
1834:
1822:
1807:
1795:
1793:, p. 209.
1791:Brockmann 2005
1770:
1766:Brockmann 2005
1758:
1746:
1725:
1723:, p. 110.
1713:
1701:
1699:, p. 115.
1684:
1655:
1653:, p. 322.
1643:
1628:
1626:, p. 210.
1624:Brockmann 2005
1603:
1601:, p. 208.
1599:Brockmann 2005
1582:
1580:, p. 111.
1557:
1538:
1508:
1477:
1465:
1453:
1449:Bianculli 2003
1434:
1432:, p. 207.
1430:Brockmann 2005
1417:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1398:
1392:
1391:
1382:
1372:
1363:
1353:
1344:
1335:
1325:
1316:
1306:
1297:
1287:
1273:
1264:
1255:
1246:
1237:
1228:
1219:
1209:
1199:
1186:
1176:
1167:
1157:
1148:
1139:
1130:
1120:
1111:
1098:
1089:
1079:
1069:
1060:
1051:
1042:
1033:
1024:
1015:
1004:
1003:
1002:
1001:
996:
993:
992:
991:
986:
981:
974:
971:
958:
955:
946:small plaque.
903:
900:
894:
891:
885:
882:
868:
865:
836:
833:
815:
812:
799:
796:
791:
790:
787:
784:
769:
766:
758:
757:
753:
749:
716:
713:
708:
707:
703:
700:
696:
692:
676:coroner's jury
667:
664:
648:
645:
624:
621:
556:
553:
531:
528:
492:
489:
451:
448:
438:
435:
387:
384:
352:
349:
305:
302:
246:
243:
200:
199:
193:
192:
189:
185:
184:
181:
177:
176:
173:
169:
168:
165:
161:
160:
156:
155:
152:
148:
147:
144:
140:
139:
134:
130:
129:
97:
93:
92:
86:
82:
81:
66:
62:
61:
57:
56:
41:
33:
32:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
5039:
5028:
5025:
5023:
5020:
5018:
5015:
5013:
5010:
5008:
5005:
5003:
5000:
4998:
4995:
4993:
4990:
4988:
4985:
4984:
4982:
4969:
4962:
4959:
4956:
4953:
4950:
4947:
4944:
4941:
4938:
4935:
4932:
4929:
4926:
4923:
4920:
4917:
4914:
4911:
4908:
4905:
4902:
4899:
4896:
4893:
4890:
4887:
4886:
4884:
4880:
4873:
4870:
4867:
4864:
4861:
4858:
4855:
4852:
4849:
4846:
4843:
4840:
4837:
4834:
4831:
4828:
4825:
4822:
4819:
4816:
4813:
4810:
4807:
4804:
4801:
4798:
4795:
4792:
4789:
4786:
4783:
4780:
4777:
4774:
4771:
4768:
4765:
4764:Silver Bridge
4762:
4759:
4756:
4753:
4750:
4747:
4744:
4741:
4738:
4735:
4732:
4729:
4728:Bridge AA-438
4726:
4723:
4720:
4717:
4714:
4711:
4708:
4705:
4702:
4699:
4696:
4693:
4690:
4687:
4684:
4681:
4678:
4675:
4672:
4669:
4666:
4663:
4662:Wabash Bridge
4660:
4657:
4654:
4653:
4651:
4647:
4642:
4631:
4628:
4625:
4622:
4619:
4616:
4613:
4610:
4607:
4604:
4601:
4600:Bussey Bridge
4598:
4595:
4592:
4589:
4586:
4583:
4580:
4577:
4574:
4571:
4568:
4565:
4562:
4559:
4556:
4553:
4550:
4547:
4544:
4543:
4541:
4537:
4532:
4525:
4520:
4518:
4513:
4511:
4506:
4505:
4502:
4495:
4491:
4488:
4485:
4483:
4479:
4476:
4473:
4471:
4467:
4463:
4462:
4458:
4457:
4447:
4443:
4439:
4434:
4430:
4429:
4423:
4419:
4417:9780873384285
4413:
4409:
4408:
4402:
4398:
4397:
4391:
4387:
4383:
4379:
4374:
4370:
4369:
4363:
4359:
4358:
4352:
4348:
4347:
4341:
4337:
4333:
4329:
4324:
4320:
4318:9780882291406
4314:
4310:
4305:
4301:
4299:9780933449091
4295:
4291:
4286:
4282:
4270:
4262:
4258:
4254:
4253:
4247:
4243:
4241:9780752526300
4237:
4233:
4228:
4224:
4223:
4216:
4212:
4210:9780738540474
4206:
4202:
4201:
4195:
4191:
4186:
4182:
4180:9781931985093
4176:
4172:
4167:
4163:
4161:9781931985093
4157:
4153:
4148:
4144:
4142:9780828900997
4138:
4133:
4132:
4125:
4121:
4117:
4113:
4109:
4105:
4101:
4096:
4092:
4090:9781467117982
4086:
4082:
4081:
4075:
4071:
4067:
4063:
4058:
4054:
4052:9781931985093
4048:
4044:
4039:
4035:
4033:9781931985093
4029:
4025:
4020:
4016:
4014:9780816066032
4010:
4005:
4004:
3997:
3993:
3991:9780396074465
3987:
3982:
3981:
3974:
3970:
3968:9780895032911
3964:
3960:
3955:
3951:
3949:9780738523118
3945:
3941:
3940:
3934:
3930:
3928:9780874138030
3924:
3920:
3919:
3913:
3909:
3907:9781598510584
3903:
3899:
3898:
3892:
3888:
3884:
3880:
3875:
3871:
3869:9780415436236
3865:
3861:
3860:
3854:
3853:
3841:
3836:
3829:
3824:
3817:
3812:
3805:
3800:
3793:
3788:
3782:, p. 22.
3781:
3776:
3774:
3758:
3754:
3747:
3741:, p. 21.
3740:
3735:
3733:
3726:, p. 52.
3725:
3720:
3714:, p. 63.
3713:
3708:
3701:
3696:
3681:
3677:
3670:
3664:, p. 40.
3663:
3658:
3651:
3646:
3640:, p. 30.
3639:
3634:
3627:
3622:
3615:
3610:
3603:
3598:
3592:, p. 25.
3591:
3586:
3584:
3577:, p. 79.
3576:
3571:
3564:
3559:
3557:
3555:
3553:
3551:
3543:
3538:
3532:, p. 26.
3531:
3526:
3524:
3516:
3511:
3509:
3501:
3496:
3490:, p. 27.
3489:
3484:
3482:
3480:
3478:
3476:
3474:
3472:
3470:
3463:, p. 48.
3462:
3457:
3451:, p. 49.
3450:
3445:
3443:
3436:, p. 52.
3435:
3430:
3428:
3421:, p. 82.
3420:
3415:
3409:, p. 81.
3408:
3403:
3396:
3391:
3385:, p. 80.
3384:
3379:
3372:
3367:
3360:
3355:
3348:
3343:
3336:
3331:
3324:
3319:
3312:
3307:
3300:
3295:
3288:
3283:
3281:
3279:
3277:
3270:, p. 28.
3269:
3264:
3256:
3249:
3243:, p. 79.
3242:
3237:
3230:
3225:
3219:, p. 17.
3218:
3213:
3206:
3201:
3199:
3192:, p. 16.
3191:
3186:
3184:
3176:
3171:
3165:, p. 27.
3164:
3159:
3157:
3150:, p. 13.
3149:
3144:
3137:
3132:
3126:, p. 18.
3125:
3120:
3118:
3116:
3109:, p. 10.
3108:
3103:
3097:, p. 64.
3096:
3091:
3075:
3071:
3065:
3058:
3053:
3046:
3041:
3039:
3037:
3035:
3028:, p. 12.
3027:
3022:
3020:
3018:
3016:
3014:
3012:
3004:
2999:
2993:, p. 52.
2992:
2987:
2971:
2967:
2961:
2959:
2957:
2955:
2953:
2951:
2949:
2947:
2939:
2934:
2932:
2924:
2919:
2917:
2915:
2913:
2906:, p. 47.
2905:
2900:
2894:, p. 45.
2893:
2888:
2881:
2876:
2869:
2864:
2858:, p. 42.
2857:
2852:
2845:
2840:
2838:
2836:
2834:
2832:
2830:
2828:
2821:, p. 29.
2820:
2815:
2808:
2803:
2797:, p. 28.
2796:
2791:
2789:
2787:
2785:
2778:, p. 41.
2777:
2772:
2765:
2760:
2753:
2748:
2741:
2736:
2734:
2732:
2730:
2728:
2721:, p. 27.
2720:
2715:
2713:
2706:, p. 18.
2705:
2700:
2698:
2696:
2688:
2683:
2681:
2679:
2671:
2666:
2660:, p. 29.
2659:
2654:
2647:
2646:Campbell 2008
2642:
2640:
2638:
2631:, p. 56.
2630:
2629:Borsvold 2003
2625:
2619:, p. 33.
2618:
2613:
2606:
2601:
2595:, p. 42.
2594:
2589:
2587:
2580:, p. 55.
2579:
2578:Griswold 1969
2574:
2572:
2570:
2562:
2557:
2551:, p. 19.
2550:
2545:
2543:
2541:
2524:
2520:
2514:
2508:, p. 25.
2507:
2502:
2495:
2490:
2483:
2478:
2471:
2470:Holbrook 1947
2466:
2458:
2451:
2449:
2447:
2445:
2443:
2441:
2439:
2437:
2435:
2433:
2431:
2429:
2427:
2419:
2414:
2407:
2402:
2400:
2398:
2391:, p. 30.
2390:
2385:
2383:
2374:
2367:
2360:
2355:
2353:
2351:
2349:
2347:
2345:
2343:
2336:, p. 43.
2335:
2330:
2324:, p. 22.
2323:
2318:
2316:
2314:
2306:
2301:
2299:
2297:
2280:
2276:
2270:
2268:
2266:
2264:
2256:
2251:
2244:
2239:
2237:
2235:
2227:
2222:
2214:
2207:
2205:
2203:
2196:, p. 17.
2195:
2190:
2188:
2180:
2175:
2168:
2163:
2157:, p. 41.
2156:
2151:
2149:
2147:
2130:
2126:
2120:
2118:
2111:, p. 21.
2110:
2105:
2098:
2093:
2091:
2089:
2081:
2076:
2074:
2072:
2070:
2062:
2057:
2051:, p. 87.
2050:
2045:
2043:
2041:
2039:
2031:
2026:
2019:
2014:
2012:
2010:
2008:
2006:
2004:
2002:
2000:
1992:
1987:
1980:
1975:
1973:
1966:, p. 78.
1965:
1960:
1958:
1956:
1954:
1945:
1943:9780070434493
1939:
1935:
1934:
1926:
1920:, p. 77.
1919:
1914:
1912:
1905:, p. 76.
1904:
1899:
1897:
1888:
1887:
1879:
1873:, p. 75.
1872:
1867:
1860:
1855:
1853:
1851:
1843:
1838:
1831:
1826:
1820:, p. 76.
1819:
1814:
1812:
1805:, p. 31.
1804:
1799:
1792:
1787:
1785:
1783:
1781:
1779:
1777:
1775:
1767:
1762:
1755:
1750:
1742:
1738:
1737:
1729:
1722:
1717:
1711:, p. 49.
1710:
1705:
1698:
1693:
1691:
1689:
1682:, p. 24.
1681:
1676:
1674:
1672:
1670:
1668:
1666:
1664:
1662:
1660:
1652:
1647:
1641:, p. 20.
1640:
1635:
1633:
1625:
1620:
1618:
1616:
1614:
1612:
1610:
1608:
1600:
1595:
1593:
1591:
1589:
1587:
1579:
1574:
1572:
1570:
1568:
1566:
1564:
1562:
1555:, p. 19.
1554:
1549:
1547:
1545:
1543:
1526:
1519:
1512:
1497:
1493:
1486:
1484:
1482:
1474:
1469:
1463:, p. 88.
1462:
1461:Ashcroft 1865
1457:
1451:, p. 86.
1450:
1445:
1443:
1441:
1439:
1431:
1426:
1424:
1422:
1414:
1409:
1407:
1402:
1396:
1395:
1386:
1376:
1367:
1357:
1348:
1339:
1329:
1320:
1310:
1301:
1291:
1283:
1277:
1268:
1259:
1250:
1241:
1232:
1223:
1213:
1203:
1196:
1190:
1180:
1171:
1161:
1152:
1143:
1134:
1124:
1115:
1108:
1102:
1093:
1083:
1073:
1064:
1055:
1046:
1037:
1028:
1019:
1009:
1005:
999:
998:
990:
987:
985:
982:
980:
977:
976:
970:
967:
963:
954:
952:
947:
943:
939:
937:
933:
929:
924:
922:
916:
908:
899:
890:
881:
877:
873:
864:
860:
857:
855:
854:metal fatigue
851:
847:
841:
832:
829:
825:
821:
811:
808:
806:
795:
788:
785:
782:
781:
780:
777:
775:
765:
763:
754:
750:
746:
745:
744:
741:
739:
735:
730:
721:
712:
704:
701:
697:
693:
689:
688:
687:
684:
681:
677:
673:
663:
660:
653:
647:Investigation
644:
640:
636:
633:
629:
620:
618:
612:
610:
604:
600:
598:
592:
589:
584:
582:
577:
569:
561:
552:
548:
544:
536:
527:
524:
520:
514:
512:
507:
497:
488:
485:
481:
477:
472:
470:
465:
461:
457:
443:
434:
430:
428:
422:
418:
415:
413:
408:
403:
400:
392:
383:
381:
376:
372:
368:
364:
357:
348:
346:
343:
337:
335:
332:the bridge's
330:
326:
322:
320:
310:
301:
298:
294:
290:
285:
283:
276:
272:
268:
264:
260:
256:
252:
242:
238:
236:
231:
227:
223:
219:
215:
211:
207:
198:
194:
190:
186:
182:
178:
174:
170:
166:
162:
157:
153:
149:
145:
143:Incident type
141:
138:
135:
131:
126:
98:
94:
90:
87:
83:
80:About 7:30 pm
67:
63:
58:
53:
47:
46:
39:
34:
29:
26:
22:
4992:1876 in Ohio
4882:21st century
4649:20th century
4587:
4582:Dixon Bridge
4539:19th century
4459:
4437:
4427:
4406:
4395:
4377:
4367:
4356:
4345:
4327:
4308:
4289:
4251:
4231:
4220:
4199:
4189:
4170:
4151:
4131:Train wreck!
4130:
4103:
4099:
4079:
4061:
4042:
4023:
4002:
3979:
3958:
3938:
3917:
3896:
3878:
3858:
3850:Bibliography
3835:
3823:
3811:
3799:
3787:
3762:February 24,
3760:. Retrieved
3756:
3746:
3724:Bellamy 2009
3719:
3707:
3700:Åkesson 2008
3695:
3685:February 24,
3683:. Retrieved
3679:
3669:
3662:Johnson 2006
3657:
3645:
3638:Åkesson 2008
3633:
3621:
3614:Åkesson 2008
3609:
3597:
3590:Åkesson 2008
3570:
3537:
3530:Åkesson 2008
3500:Åkesson 2008
3495:
3488:Åkesson 2008
3461:Bellamy 2009
3456:
3449:Bellamy 2009
3414:
3402:
3390:
3378:
3366:
3354:
3342:
3330:
3318:
3306:
3294:
3268:Åkesson 2008
3263:
3254:
3248:
3236:
3224:
3212:
3170:
3143:
3131:
3102:
3090:
3080:February 24,
3078:. Retrieved
3073:
3064:
3052:
3047:, p. 8.
2998:
2986:
2976:February 24,
2974:. Retrieved
2969:
2940:, p. 8.
2938:Johnson 2006
2925:, p. 7.
2899:
2887:
2875:
2863:
2851:
2846:, p. 6.
2814:
2802:
2771:
2759:
2747:
2742:, p. 4.
2704:Åkesson 2008
2665:
2653:
2624:
2617:Johnson 2006
2612:
2600:
2593:Bellamy 2009
2556:
2529:February 11,
2527:. Retrieved
2522:
2513:
2501:
2489:
2477:
2465:
2456:
2413:
2372:
2366:
2361:, p. 3.
2329:
2307:, p. 1.
2283:. Retrieved
2278:
2250:
2228:, p. 2.
2221:
2212:
2194:Åkesson 2008
2181:, p. 9.
2174:
2162:
2155:Bellamy 2009
2133:. Retrieved
2128:
2109:Åkesson 2008
2104:
2080:Åkesson 2008
2061:Åkesson 2008
2056:
2025:
1986:
1979:Åkesson 2008
1932:
1925:
1885:
1878:
1866:
1842:Åkesson 2008
1837:
1825:
1803:Åkesson 2008
1798:
1761:
1749:
1735:
1728:
1716:
1704:
1680:Åkesson 2008
1646:
1639:Åkesson 2008
1553:Åkesson 2008
1529:. Retrieved
1524:
1511:
1499:. Retrieved
1495:
1468:
1456:
1385:
1375:
1366:
1356:
1347:
1338:
1328:
1319:
1309:
1300:
1290:
1276:
1267:
1258:
1249:
1240:
1231:
1222:
1212:
1202:
1194:
1189:
1179:
1170:
1160:
1151:
1142:
1133:
1123:
1114:
1101:
1092:
1082:
1072:
1063:
1054:
1045:
1036:
1027:
1018:
1008:
968:
964:
960:
948:
944:
940:
925:
917:
913:
896:
887:
878:
874:
870:
861:
858:
842:
838:
817:
809:
801:
792:
778:
771:
759:
742:
726:
709:
685:
669:
661:
658:
641:
637:
634:
630:
626:
617:Philip Bliss
613:
605:
601:
593:
585:
578:
574:
549:
545:
541:
515:
510:
502:
483:
479:
473:
455:
453:
431:
423:
419:
416:
404:
401:
397:
386:Construction
380:shear stress
377:
373:
369:
365:
362:
345:angle blocks
338:
323:
315:
286:
275:William Howe
248:
239:
217:
213:
209:
205:
203:
51:
43:
25:
4872:Hoan Bridge
4277:|work=
2285:February 9,
1830:Rogers 1877
1531:January 19,
1501:January 24,
738:Ohio Senate
267:Amasa Stone
120: /
96:Coordinates
4981:Categories
4468:affiliate
3434:Dutka 2015
2334:Boyer 1977
1818:Stone 1877
1709:Dutka 2015
1285:officials.
995:References
932:steam heat
762:air brakes
469:snowdrifts
282:Howe truss
216:, and the
159:Statistics
108:80°47′22″W
105:41°52′43″N
75:1876-12-29
4279:ignored (
4269:cite book
4120:0887-3828
3939:Ashtabula
3816:Peet 1877
3804:Peet 1877
3792:Peet 1877
3241:Peet 1877
3095:Peet 1877
3003:Peet 1877
2991:Peet 1877
2904:Peet 1877
2892:Peet 1877
2856:Peet 1877
2819:Peet 1877
2807:Peet 1877
2795:Peet 1877
2764:Peet 1877
2719:Peet 1877
2658:Reed 1968
2605:Fess 1937
2482:Orth 1910
2389:Nash 1976
2322:Peet 1877
2135:March 15,
1651:Rose 1990
1496:Structure
1473:Orth 1910
1397:Citations
1380:collapse.
928:ductility
588:alcoholic
484:Columbia,
407:falsework
342:cast iron
334:live load
329:dead load
293:Cleveland
4490:Archived
4478:Archived
4386:49730574
1195:Socrates
973:See also
776:(ASCE).
581:kerosene
480:Socrates
464:blizzard
399:Rogers.
133:Operator
85:Location
52:Socrates
2373:Coronet
805:tornado
803:that a
672:coroner
609:amnesty
521:on his
458:, left
427:bending
297:I-beams
188:Injured
73: (
60:Details
4963:(2024)
4957:(2023)
4951:(2022)
4945:(2022)
4939:(2018)
4933:(2017)
4927:(2013)
4921:(2012)
4915:(2011)
4909:(2007)
4903:(2004)
4897:(2002)
4891:(2001)
4874:(2000)
4868:(2000)
4862:(1996)
4856:(1994)
4850:(1993)
4844:(1993)
4838:(1990)
4832:(1989)
4826:(1987)
4820:(1983)
4814:(1981)
4808:(1980)
4802:(1979)
4796:(1979)
4790:(1978)
4784:(1977)
4778:(1972)
4772:(1971)
4766:(1967)
4760:(1959)
4754:(1958)
4748:(1951)
4742:(1942)
4736:(1940)
4730:(1938)
4724:(1938)
4718:(1923)
4712:(1923)
4706:(1921)
4700:(1916)
4694:(1915)
4688:(1915)
4682:(1913)
4676:(1906)
4670:(1904)
4664:(1903)
4658:(1903)
4632:(1900)
4626:(1893)
4620:(1893)
4614:(1888)
4608:(1887)
4602:(1887)
4596:(1881)
4590:(1876)
4584:(1873)
4578:(1867)
4572:(1863)
4566:(1861)
4560:(1855)
4554:(1853)
4548:(1853)
4414:
4384:
4315:
4296:
4238:
4222:LXXIII
4207:
4177:
4158:
4139:
4118:
4087:
4070:418516
4068:
4049:
4030:
4011:
3988:
3965:
3946:
3925:
3904:
3866:
1940:
902:Legacy
824:Sweden
523:tender
519:trucks
304:Design
278:'s
271:patent
212:, the
180:Deaths
164:Trains
91:, U.S.
1521:(PDF)
1013:name.
1000:Notes
699:time.
412:shims
151:Cause
4470:WQLN
4412:ISBN
4382:OCLC
4313:ISBN
4294:ISBN
4281:help
4236:ISBN
4205:ISBN
4175:ISBN
4156:ISBN
4137:ISBN
4116:ISSN
4085:ISBN
4066:OCLC
4047:ISBN
4028:ISBN
4009:ISBN
3986:ISBN
3963:ISBN
3944:ISBN
3923:ISBN
3902:ISBN
3864:ISBN
3764:2020
3687:2020
3082:2020
2978:2020
2531:2020
2287:2020
2137:2020
1938:ISBN
1533:2016
1527:: 14
1503:2020
1193:The
1107:bolt
846:slag
482:and
204:The
172:Crew
65:Date
4466:PBS
4442:hdl
4332:hdl
4257:hdl
4108:doi
3883:hdl
1184:PM.
822:in
4983::
4273::
4271:}}
4267:{{
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