28:
269:
336:
On 27 May Egypt canceled a planned attack on Israel at the last minute, and on May 30, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day, at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and armored units in Jordan. Any military analyst should have recognized that the arrival of
419:
to ask for reassurance. Ben-Gurion, however, accused him of putting the country in mortal jeopardy by mobilizing the reserves and openly preparing for war against a coalition of Arab states, saying that at the very least, Rabin should have obtained the support of a foreign power as he himself had
488:
On the evening of May 28, Eshkol gave a radio address to the nation. During the preparation of the speech several versions were drafted after Eshkol had proofread it. When he reached the paragraph in which a correction was made, and the words "withdrawing forces" were changed to "moving forces,"
287:, Nasser verified that the report was false, but still told his people that Israel troops were placed on Syria's border. Subsequently, he took three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: On 14 May he deployed his troops in Sinai near the border with Israel, on 19 May expelled the
852:
During the night of 26/27 May...the Soviet ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Cairo roused the two heads of government from their beds with urgent messages...urged Israel to settle the conflict by non military means...advised Nasser that the
Israelis had alleged that Egypt was about to attack Israel,
496:
newspaper wrote in its editorial that "Mr. Eshkol is not built to be the prime minister and the security minister in the current situation". Eshkol spoke in the
Knesset and tried to calm the public that "it is reasonable to expect that the states that support in the principle of the freedom of
946:
any military analyst should have recognized that the arrival of large numbers of Arab troops and Iraqi planes in Jordan would inevitably make Israel anxious swiftly to act against Jordan before these new forces were fully deployed. Therefore, Jordan should have realized that it was absolutely
497:
sailing, will do and will coordinate an efficient action in order to ensure that the straits and the bay will be open to the passage of the ships of all the nations without discrimination". But the internal pressure continued. On June 1, Eshkol handed over the security portfolio to
615:
Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the
Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22
306:. However, when Nasser declared that his forces were withdrawing from Yemen and making their way to Sinai, Israel drafted every fit man, which led to an economic paralyzation. No emergency was felt on the Jordanian border. Tourists kept crossing the
652:
Yet in taking this step, Nasser and other
Egyptian leaders understood that it would be considered a casus belli by Israel. ... Indeed, a number of senior Egyptian officials rightly concluded at the time that closing the strait to Israel made war
374:
said that "the existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is an opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948." The Iraqi Prime
Minister predicted that "there will be practically no Jewish survivors".
382:, then Syria's Defense Minister declared: "Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The
1079:
337:
large numbers of Arab troops and Iraqi planes in Jordan would inevitably make Israel anxious to swiftly act against Jordan before these new forces were fully deployed. Israel continued to prepare for war.
489:
Eshkol began to hesitate, not understanding that a correction was made. The entire country heard him stammer in front of the live microphone. This address became known as the "stammer address".
302:
When the UN forces evacuated its troops, Israel military commentators and political officials still believed that Egypt would not open a front against Israel, due to its involvement in the
27:
344:
has argued that this period was also crucial to Israel's nuclear policy, and that the anxiety led Israel to advance towards "operational readiness" of its nuclear option.
160:
155:
361:
Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we are ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation.
424:
11 years earlier. Rabin was shaken by the meeting and took to his bed for 36 hours, in what became known as the 'nicotine poisoning' incident. Rabin turned to
165:
598:
532:
On June 2, Eshkol convened the security cabinet along with the IDF's
General Staff at the Tel Aviv headquarters. Opposition to an attack came from Mapai's
122:
63:
1050:
386:, with its finger on the trigger, is united... I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."
409:
299:
by Israel. 90% of
Israeli oil passed through the Straits of Tiran. Oil tankers that were due to pass through the straits were delayed.
283:
received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. According to
Israeli historian
947:
essential to avoid giving Israel any excuse to launch an offensive against it before those troops had reached their battle stations
725:
556:
said "IDF forces are more prepared than they ever were" to "totally destroy the
Egyptian forces". Eshkol remained unconvinced.
995:
939:
903:
815:
709:
679:
56:
359:
At the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the
Straits of Tiran closure implications: "
288:
876:
845:
645:
608:
436:
428:
and asked him to replace him as Chief of Staff. Weizman refused, saying that it would be a severe blow to the IDF.
49:
268:
447:
1002:
On 26 May he declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel
117:
514:
22:
559:
On June 4, a cabinet session now led by Dayan, decided to embark on a war. On June 5, at 7:45 AM, the
150:
141:
461:
1058:
1023:
807:
637:
399:
929:
893:
866:
985:
835:
699:
669:
303:
1128:
1103:
774:
1167:
446:
announced that it would intervene on Israel's behalf only if the USSR joined the fighting.
181:
8:
405:
tried to calm the situation by assuring the Arab states that Israel was not seeking war.
480:
party initially opposed the widening of its government, it eventually changed its mind.
800:
630:
537:
280:
127:
732:
453:
asked Israel not to start a military operation, promising to provide Israel with oil.
991:
935:
899:
872:
841:
811:
705:
675:
641:
604:
545:
450:
367:
132:
831:
549:
518:
465:
457:
443:
416:
354:
The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.
311:
292:
960:
868:
When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics
307:
253:
229:
201:
110:
506:
469:
421:
379:
476:, where Begin asked Ben-Gurion to join Eshkol's government. Although Eshkol's
291:
stationed in the Sinai Peninsula border with Israel, and on 23 May closed the
1161:
541:
412:
330:
553:
425:
284:
540:, who said "I am ready to fight but not to commit suicide." Major-General
295:
to Israeli bound shipping, although he knew that it would be considered a
560:
533:
510:
498:
402:
383:
341:
296:
257:
73:
249:
35:
473:
439:
432:
319:
208:
802:
Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
529:
and Jerusalem, people began digging trenches and filling sandbags.
526:
853:
perhaps even dawn the next morning...urged Egypt not to go to war
493:
395:
32:
326:
241:
41:
697:
667:
502:
477:
315:
273:
245:
686:
90% of Israeli oil was imported through the Straits of Tiran
371:
333:
warned both Israel and Egypt not to take military action.
552:
wondered why Israel was waiting, while Major-General
830:
775:"The Six Day War — May 1967, one moment before"
698:
Avi Shlaim; William Roger Louis (13 February 2012).
668:
Avi Shlaim; William Roger Louis (13 February 2012).
871:. University of BenjaminMiller Press. p. 145.
858:
701:
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences
671:
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences
600:
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences
521:established in Israel, and in this time was called
435:went to the United States and met three times with
799:
661:
629:
726:"Daily brief to the U.S president on 27 May 1967"
691:
1159:
464:calling for an emergency government. Old rivals
983:
927:
885:
864:
797:
627:
921:
621:
977:
891:
824:
632:A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
590:
57:
483:
1133:Middle East Review of International Affairs
934:. Cambridge University Press. p. 150.
791:
674:. Cambridge University Press. p. 224.
603:. Cambridge University Press. p. 106.
347:
244:, May 15 – June 5, 1967, between the
1048:
1042:
990:. Cambridge University Press. p. 95.
895:Superpower Intervention in the Middle East
768:
766:
764:
762:
760:
758:
756:
704:. Cambridge University Press. p. 27.
240:) was a 3-week interval in the history of
64:
50:
513:joined the government and were appointed
1097:
1095:
772:
748:"diverted as was a sister ship yesterday
267:
26:
753:
1160:
1120:
1072:
596:
1101:
1092:
958:
952:
636:. Indiana University Press. pp.
45:
456:Calls were growing in Jerusalem for
806:. Oxford University Press. p.
279:On 13 May 1967, Egyptian president
272:Israeli armored unit stands in the
233:
13:
1126:
1049:Rabinovich, Abraham (1997-06-13).
628:Mark A. Tessler (1 January 1994).
389:
14:
1179:
1153:
892:Peter Mangold (14 October 2013).
310:, although there were reports of
1129:"Israel's Decision to Go to War"
984:Samir A. Mutawi (18 July 2002).
928:Samir A. Mutawi (18 July 2002).
1080:"In days of threat and waiting"
1033:
1016:
1007:
912:
840:. Brill Archive. pp. 48–.
544:tried to convince them that an
415:met with former prime minister
325:Nasser's move was supported by
71:
961:"Going for the nuclear option"
773:Druckman, Yaron (2007-04-06).
718:
581:
572:
448:President of the United States
1:
731:. 27 May 1967. Archived from
566:
898:. Routledge. pp. 135–.
837:The Making of Resolution 242
352:On 26 May Nasser declared, "
7:
1102:Sofer, Ronny (2007-04-06).
959:Cohen, Avner (2007-05-22).
515:ministers without portfolio
10:
1184:
1013:Shlaim; Louis (2012) p. 63
263:
23:Origins of the Six-Day War
20:
16:Lead up to the Six-Day War
550:Major-General Matti Peled
484:National unity government
81:
1028:, Jewish Virtual Library
865:Benjamin Miller (2002).
798:Michael B. Oren (2002).
462:National Religious Party
348:Views of Arab leadership
256:and the outbreak of the
1104:"Eshkol's steel nerves"
1051:"The War Nobody Wanted"
1039:Bard 2002, p. 196.
918:Churchill pgs 52 and 77
987:Jordan in the 1967 War
931:Jordan in the 1967 War
548:attack was necessary.
410:chief of general staff
400:Israeli Prime Minister
276:
174:Mediterranean Campaign
39:
38:before the Six-Day War
523:Memshelet Likud Leumi
304:North Yemen Civil War
271:
30:
832:Sydney Dawson Bailey
597:Shlaim, Avi (2012).
394:Speaking before the
31:Digging trenches on
587:Morris, 2001, p.305
517:. It was the first
314:forces moving from
834:(1 January 1985).
538:Haim-Moshe Shapira
437:Secretary of State
281:Gamal Abdel Nasser
277:
142:Jordanian Campaign
40:
997:978-0-521-52858-0
941:978-0-521-52858-0
905:978-1-135-04683-5
817:978-0-19-515174-9
711:978-1-107-00236-4
681:978-1-107-00236-4
578:Mutawi 2002 p. 93
546:Israeli Air Force
451:Lyndon B. Johnson
368:Abdul Rahman Arif
221:
220:
216:
215:
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1148:
1147:
1145:
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1115:
1114:
1099:
1090:
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1086:
1076:
1070:
1069:
1067:
1066:
1057:. Archived from
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1040:
1037:
1031:
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1020:
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1005:
1004:
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975:
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695:
689:
688:
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659:
658:
635:
625:
619:
618:
594:
588:
585:
579:
576:
525:. Meanwhile, in
519:unity government
505:representatives
466:David Ben-Gurion
458:unity government
420:done during the
417:David Ben-Gurion
340:Israeli scholar
312:Jordanian Legion
293:Straits of Tiran
248:crossing of the
238:Tkufat HaHamtana
235:
161:Augusta-Victoria
84:
83:
76:
66:
59:
52:
43:
42:
1183:
1182:
1178:
1177:
1176:
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1158:
1157:
1156:
1151:
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1125:
1121:
1112:
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1093:
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1078:
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1064:
1062:
1047:
1043:
1038:
1034:
1022:
1021:
1017:
1012:
1008:
998:
982:
978:
969:
967:
957:
953:
942:
926:
922:
917:
913:
906:
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886:
879:
863:
859:
848:
829:
825:
818:
796:
792:
783:
781:
771:
754:
741:
739:
738:on 17 June 2014
735:
728:
724:
723:
719:
712:
696:
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662:
648:
626:
622:
611:
595:
591:
586:
582:
577:
573:
569:
486:
392:
390:Political moves
350:
308:Mandelbaum Gate
289:UN peacekeepers
266:
254:Sinai Peninsula
222:
217:
194:Syrian Campaign
151:Ammunition Hill
77:
72:
70:
25:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1181:
1171:
1170:
1155:
1154:External links
1152:
1150:
1149:
1119:
1091:
1071:
1055:Jerusalem Post
1041:
1032:
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536:and the NRP's
507:Menachem Begin
485:
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470:Menachem Begin
422:Sinai Campaign
391:
388:
380:Hafez al-Assad
349:
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226:waiting period
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95:Waiting period
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21:Main article:
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1127:Gluska, Ami.
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1061:on 2012-01-12
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878:0-472-08872-6
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847:90-247-3073-2
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647:0-253-20873-4
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610:9781107002364
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427:
423:
418:
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413:Yitzhak Rabin
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397:
387:
385:
381:
378:In May 1967,
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331:United States
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75:
67:
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53:
48:
47:
44:
37:
34:
29:
24:
19:
1141:. Retrieved
1136:
1132:
1122:
1111:. Retrieved
1107:
1083:. Retrieved
1074:
1063:. Retrieved
1059:the original
1054:
1044:
1035:
1024:
1018:
1009:
1001:
986:
979:
968:. Retrieved
964:
954:
945:
930:
923:
914:
894:
887:
867:
860:
851:
836:
826:
801:
793:
782:. Retrieved
778:
747:
740:. Retrieved
733:the original
720:
700:
693:
685:
670:
663:
654:
651:
631:
623:
614:
599:
592:
583:
574:
558:
554:Ariel Sharon
531:
522:
491:
487:
455:
430:
426:Ezer Weizman
407:
393:
377:
365:
360:
358:
353:
351:
339:
335:
329:, while the
324:
318:towards the
301:
285:Benny Morris
278:
237:
234:תקופת ההמתנה
225:
223:
202:
183:
111:
94:
18:
1168:Six-Day War
1139:(June 2007)
561:war erupted
534:Zalman Aran
511:Yosef Sapir
499:Moshe Dayan
492:On May 29,
460:, with the
442:. However,
431:Meanwhile,
408:On May 23,
403:Levi Eshkol
384:Syrian Army
342:Avner Cohen
297:casus belli
258:Six-Day War
74:Six-Day War
1143:2008-05-23
1113:2008-05-23
1085:2008-05-23
1065:2008-05-23
970:2008-05-23
784:2008-05-23
655:inevitable
567:References
444:Washington
366:President
250:Suez Canal
118:Abu-Ageila
36:Gan Shmuel
542:Motti Hod
474:Sde Boker
440:Dean Rusk
433:Abba Eban
320:West Bank
252:into the
209:Tel Faher
166:Bethlehem
133:massacres
1162:Category
1108:Ynetnews
779:Ynetnews
527:Tel Aviv
246:Egyptian
186:incident
156:Old City
128:El Arish
123:Um Katef
965:Haaretz
494:Haaretz
472:met in
396:Knesset
264:History
184:Liberty
33:kibbutz
1025:67 War
994:
938:
902:
875:
844:
814:
742:26 May
708:
678:
644:
607:
327:Moscow
242:Israel
230:Hebrew
87:Israel
736:(PDF)
729:(PDF)
503:Gahal
478:Mapai
316:Amman
274:Negev
203:Focus
112:Focus
992:ISBN
936:ISBN
900:ISBN
873:ISBN
842:ISBN
812:ISBN
744:2014
706:ISBN
676:ISBN
642:ISBN
616:May.
605:ISBN
509:and
468:and
372:Iraq
224:The
182:USS
808:120
638:392
370:of
1164::
1137:11
1135:.
1131:.
1106:.
1094:^
1053:.
1000:.
963:.
944:.
850:.
810:.
777:.
755:^
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684:.
650:.
640:.
613:.
563:.
501:.
398:,
363:"
356:"
322:.
260:.
232::
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1116:.
1088:.
1068:.
1030:.
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908:.
881:.
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787:.
714:.
236:,
228:(
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