573:(increasing the incentives to shirk), and because intervention rights from the central characteristic of a firm tend to be accompanied by some form of income insurance to compensate for the lesser responsibility, thereby diluting incentives. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) explain the increased cost of management as due to the incentives of employees to provide false information beneficial to themselves, resulting in costs to managers of filtering information, and often the making of decisions without full information. This grows worse with firm size and more layers in the hierarchy. Empirical analyses of transaction costs have attempted to measure and operationalize transaction costs. Research that attempts to measure transaction costs is the most critical limit to efforts to potential falsification and validation of transaction cost economics.
852:
produce the good (non-integration) or should the buyer be the owner (integration)? After relationship-specific investments have been made, the seller and the buyer bargain. When they are symmetrically informed, they will always agree to collaborate. Yet, the division of the ex post surplus depends on the partiesâ disagreement payoffs (the payoffs they would get if no ex post agreement were reached), which in turn depend on the ownership structure. Thus, the ownership structure has an influence on the incentives to invest. A central insight of the theory is that the party with the more important investment decision should be the owner. Another prominent conclusion is that joint asset ownership is suboptimal if investments are in human capital.
859:. Chiu (1998) and DeMeza and Lockwood (1998) have extended the model by considering different bargaining games that the parties may play ex post (which can explain ownership by the less important investor). Oliver Williamson (2002) has criticized the GrossmanâHartâMoore model because it is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while it neglects ex post inefficiencies. Schmitz (2006) has studied a variant of the GrossmanâHartâMoore model in which a party may have or acquire private information about its disagreement payoff, which can explain ex post inefficiencies and ownership by the less important investor. Several variants of the GrossmanâHartâMoore model such as the one with private information can also explain joint ownership.
486:
firm, therefore, is an entity that brings together a team that is more productive working together than at arm's length through the market, because of informational problems associated with monitoring of effort. In effect, therefore, this is a "principal-agent" theory, since it is asymmetric information within the firm which
Alchian and Demsetz emphasise must be overcome. In Barzel (1982)âs theory of the firm, drawing on Jensen and Meckling (1976), the firm emerges as a means of centralising monitoring and thereby avoiding costly redundancy in that function (since in a firm the responsibility for monitoring can be centralised in a way that it cannot if production is organised as a group of workers each acting as a firm).
650:, the ownership structure (i.e., integration or non-integration) determines how the returns to non-contractible investments will be divided in future negotiations. Hence, whether or not outsourcing an activity to a different firm is optimal depends on the relative importance of the investments that the trading partners have to make. For instance, if only one party has to make an important non-contractible investment decision, then this party should be owner. However, the conclusions of the incomplete contracting theory crucially rely on the specification of the negotiations protocol and on whether or not there is asymmetric information.
668:
social structureâcomprising people, relationships, and interactionsâand the technical systemâencompassing tools, processes, and resources. This approach acknowledges that the effectiveness and functionality of a firm arise not solely from its technical prowess but also from the way its social system interacts and interfaces with the technical framework. The dynamic between these systems, as articulated by Trist, Bamforth, Emery, and Trist, illustrates the need for an integrated understanding of human behavior, organizational culture, and technological systems within the framework of a firm.
457:"âthat is, to attempt to attain realistic goals, rather than maximize a utility or profit function. Cyert and March argued that the firm cannot be regarded as a monolith, because different individuals and groups within it have their own aspirations and conflicting interests, and that firm behaviour is the weighted outcome of these conflicts. Organisational mechanisms (such as "satisficing" and sequential decision-taking) exist to maintain conflict at levels that are not unacceptably detrimental. Compared to ideal state of productive efficiency, there is organisational slack (Leibenstein's
712:
the structure of this network of interactions unravels. This makes disintegration a powerful constraint on the maximum size for a viable contour structure. The flow of resources and information also places the firm in a situation of constant threat since such structures rely on relationships with the environment to sustain their dynamics. This underscores the necessity for an adjustment field that compensates for environmental disturbancesâa crucial factor in preventing the system from reaching thermodynamic equilibrium, which ultimately signifies the demise of the structure.
786:, in which employers offer wages unrelated to variations in output and above the market level, and workers have developed a concern for each other's welfare, such that all put in effort above the minimum required, but the more able workers are not rewarded for their extra productivity; again, size here depends not on rationality or efficiency but on social factors. In sum, the limit to the firm's size is given where costs rise to the point where the market can undertake some transactions more efficiently than the firm.
407:â analysis (e.g., Spence and Zeckhauser and Ross (1973) on problems of contracting with asymmetric information) which models a widely applicable case where a principal (a shareholder or firm for example) cannot costlessly infer how an agent (a manager or supplier, say) is behaving. This may arise either because the agent has greater expertise or knowledge than the principal, or because the principal cannot directly observe the agent's actions; it is asymmetric information that leads to a problem of
268:. Another is in defining a firm in a manner which is both realistic and compatible with the idea of substitution at the margin, so instruments of conventional economic analysis apply. He notes that a firm's interactions with the market may not be under its control (for instance because of sales taxes), but its internal allocation of resources are: âWithin a firm, ⊠market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the
226:
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as markets, society, and the environment, occur at a pace that allows them to regenerate to maintain their identity and organization, or that enables the firm itself to adapt to the new realities imposed by qualitative leaps that may occur in the dynamics of supersystems. If this need is neglected, it can lead the environment to deteriorate at a rate greater than the compensatory fields of organizations can support, leading them to disintegrate.
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emerges, its development inherently involves a history of recurrent interactions within the environment that both emerges with it and contains it. Both the system's structure and the environment spontaneously change congruently and complementarily as the firm strives to maintain its organization and operational coherence. Its ultimate product refers not to its outputs per se but to its own organization and realization of identity and autonomy.
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where internalising an additional transaction equals the cost of making that transaction in the market. (At the lower limit, the firm's costs exceed the market's costs, and it does not come into existence.) In practice, diminishing returns to management contribute most to raising the costs of organising a large firm, particularly in large firms with many different plants and differing internal transactions (such as a
25:
330:) tend to increase the size of firms, since firms internally would not be subject to such transaction costs. Thus, Coase defines the firm as "the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on the entrepreneur." We can therefore think of a firm as getting larger or smaller based on whether the entrepreneur organises more or fewer transactions.
594:). Meaning, there are economies of scope where it is less expensive for firms to combine two or more product lines into one, than it is to produce each product separately. Scope economies, wherein resources are synergistically used, has been found to improve firm performance. However, coordination, adjustment and execution costs related to producing products synergistically are limiting factors.
311:
exchange for which the employee is paid. These kinds of contracts are drawn up in situations of uncertainty, in particular for relationships that last over long periods of time. Such a situation runs counter to neo-classical economic theory. The neo-classical market is instantaneous, forbidding the development of extended agent-principal (employee-manager) relationships, planning, and of
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broad, vertically deep, or both. Firms with horizontal breadth have numerous product lines or types, whereas firms with vertical depth are integrated into various stages of the value chain. Generally, a firm's capabilities are specific to a particular scope direction, for example, marketing skills lead to horizontal breadth, and production expertise lead to vertical depth.
522:. Moreover, there are likely to be situations where a purchaser may require a particular, firm-specific investment of a supplier which would be profitable for both; but after the investment has been made it becomes a sunk cost and the purchaser can attempt to re-negotiate the contract such that the supplier may make a loss on the investment (this is the
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attraction basins and are surrounded by their own social "satellites" in a structure analogous to a planetary system. Here, the star can be understood as the technical system, the planets as leaders, and other agents as satellites or free bodies not confined to a single social attraction basin but related to the technical system.
526:, which occurs when either party asymmetrically incurs substantial costs or benefits before being paid for or paying for them). In this kind of situation, the most efficient way to overcome the continual conflict of interest between the two agents (or coalitions of agents) may be the removal of one of them from the equation by
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process expertise, including technology selection, asset utilisation, and supply chain management. Vertical depth often improves a firm's governance of activities, and contributes to a beneficial exploitation of internal capabilities, but is limited by the costs of hierarchical management, such as monitoring and coordination.
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largest perhaps a symphony orchestra), since most outputs within a firm (such as manufacturing and secretarial work) are separable so that individual inputs can be rewarded on the basis of outputs. Hence team production cannot offer the explanation of why firms (in particular, large multi-plant and multi-product firms) exist.
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proposed by
Luhmann, imparting an autoreferential dynamic to this subsystem, while technical structures exhibit a goal-oriented dynamic. These two systems symbiotically form the firm's supersystem, also manifesting an autoreferential dynamic, where social systems act as the mind animating the organization's physical body.
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observations employing a systemic perspective, that firms could be comprehended as structured sociotechnical systems. These systems were recognized as being open to the environment, possessing the capacity for self-regulation to achieve their objectives, and adapting by creating alternative pathways when necessary.
86:. Firms are key drivers in economics, providing goods and services in return for monetary payments and rewards. Organisational structure, incentives, employee productivity, and information all influence the successful operation of a firm in the economy and within itself. As such major economic theories such as
502:, the existence of firms derives from âasset specificityâ in production, where assets are specific to each other such that their value is much less in a second-best use. This causes problems if the assets are owned by different firms (such as purchaser and supplier), because it will lead to protracted
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models like that of
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) suggest wage rents as an addition to monitoring, since this gives employees an incentive not to shirk, given a certain probability of detection and the consequence of being fired. Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975) suggest promotion incentives within
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The theory of
Symbiotic Dynamics is based on the intimate association between organizations and the systems that surround them, in such a way that the survival of these is correlated. Thus, it is important for the organization's survival that the deterioration and transformation of supersystems, such
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Regarding the essential conditions for a firm's emergence and sustenance, Terra and
Passador identified four crucial elements: (1) the ability to integrate external agents into its formal network of relations; (2) being pervaded by a resource flow sustaining its self-referential network; (3) offering
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The viability of the firm, as a self-referential entity enclosed within operational closure, is linked to the rate of regeneration of its sociotechnical systems and the flow of resources and information traversing it. If the rate of disintegration exceeds the pace at which the firm can repair itself,
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A firm is vertically deep if it possesses stronger capabilities than external producers, and thus can produce and distribute its goods or services more efficiently internally - either upstream or downstream on the manufacturing chain. Vertically deep firms leverage capabilities such as production and
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If a firm operated internally under the market system, many contracts would be required (for instance, even for procuring a pen or delivering a presentation). In contrast, a real firm has very few (though much more complex) contracts, such as defining a manager's power of direction over employees, in
689:
From this standpoint, firms represent a system traversed by a continuous flow of information and resources, enclosed within themselves, ensuring their unity. Therefore, they lack inputs or outputs in the same sense as in finalistic views of firms. Due to their structural determinism, once the system
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unified the creation and management of a firm into a single economic theory, emphasizing the dynamic nature of firms as evolving entities that learn and innovate within their fundamental routines. He also differentiated between firm development and growth, previously considered interlinked concepts.
489:
The weakness in
Alchian and Demsetz's argument, according to Williamson, is that their concept of team production has quite a narrow range of applications, as it assumes outputs cannot be related to individual inputs. In practice, this may have limited applicability (small work group activities, the
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Coase begins from the standpoint that markets could in theory carry out all production and that what needs to be explained is the existence of the firm, with its "distinguishing mark ⊠the supersession of the price mechanism." Coase identifies some reasons why firms might arise, and dismisses each
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Although the experiments highlighted technical systems as primary attractors, the authors' model also demonstrates a recursion in this system, where agents contribute to what attracts them in the technical system, just as the technical system shapes social structures by attracting agents. Hence, an
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The sociotechnical approach delineates firms not merely as economic entities but as systems that amalgamate social and technical facets. It delves into the interplay between the human and technological elements within organizations, emphasizing the interconnectedness and interdependence between the
585:
A firm is horizontally broad when it utilises excess indivisible resources to expand into various products, and obtain scope economies. Horizontally broad firms leverage capabilities such as marketing skills, product knowledge, customer service, and reputation for their expansions. Scope economies,
485:
by observing or specifying input behaviour. Such monitoring as is therefore necessary, however, can only be encouraged effectively if the monitor is the recipient of the activity's residual income (otherwise the monitor herself would have to be monitored, ad infinitum). For
Alchian and Demsetz, the
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The model also reveals that relocating or including an agent or subsystem in an organization can affect its dynamics by altering the attraction basins governing it. This may lead to undesired qualitative leaps or even rupture of the organization's self-referential network, potentially resulting in
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Under the perspective of the firm as a symbiotic entity, boundaries are defined through its operational closure. These boundaries encompass not only hierarchical relationships among agents but also various classes of relations linking social agents to a particular technical and social system. This
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As an organization is a self-referential entity, enclosed within operational closure, its function focuses on its own constitution. In this context, the exchanges it conducts with its supra-systems merely represent disturbances and residues allowing it to capture from the environment the necessary
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Klein (1983) asserts that âEconomists now recognise that such a sharp distinction does not exist and that it is useful to consider also transactions occurring within the firm as representing market (contractual) relationships.â The costs involved in such transactions that are within a firm or even
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Instead, for Coase the main reason to establish a firm is to avoid some of the transaction costs of using the price mechanism. These include discovering relevant prices (which can be reduced but not eliminated by purchasing this information through specialists), as well as the costs of negotiating
229:
The model shows institutions and market as a possible form of organization to coordinate economic transactions. When the external transaction costs are higher than the internal transaction costs, the company will grow. If the external transaction costs are lower than the internal transaction costs
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Evolutionary approaches to understanding firms arose as a parallel branch to classical theories, stemming from the pioneering work of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter diverged from the abstract concept of the firm, introducing the notion that each firm possesses a distinct structural identity. He
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The question then arises of what determines the size of the firm; why does the entrepreneur organise the transactions he does, why no more or less? Since the reason for the firm's being is to have lower costs than the market, the upper limit on the firm's size is set by costs rising to the point
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paradigm. They argue that if contracts cannot specify what is to be done given every possible contingency, then property rights (and hence firm boundaries) matter. Specifically, consider a seller of an intermediate good and a buyer. Should the seller own the physical assets that are necessary to
617:
A study of firms in France illustrated how distortions to the number of employees and size of a firm directly impacts levels of productivity, wage and welfare within the organisation. Firms with at least 50 workers are subject to a number of additional regulations, which leads some firms to stay
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Boundaries of the firm explores the restrictions on size and output variety of firms, and how and why these restrictions affect production and enterprise success. There are two boundaries, horizontal, and vertical. As part of their corporate strategy, firms must choose between being horizontally
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Experiments conducted by Terra and
Passador underscored the significant role of attraction basins governing firm dynamics. In this context, technical systems emerged as the central element of organizational dynamics, around which social attractors orbit. These social attractors create secondary
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extends and clarifies earlier work by Coase. Thus according to them the firm emerges because extra output is provided by team production, but the success of this depends on being able to manage the team so that metering problems (it is costly to measure the marginal outputs of the co-operating
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In this context, organizations need to be guided by a hybrid logic, blending proactivity and reactivity, where organizations recognize their impact on the environment as a whole and act in an organized manner to reduce their degeneration, while adapting to the demands that may arise from these
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While regeneration of the formal network of relations appeared possible without specialized structures, organizations lacking such systems tend to be structurally unstable. Establishing routines specialized in replacing and reconstituting the social network enhances stability and significantly
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This structural description paved the way for Terra and
Passador to propose a dynamic perspective on firms that goes beyond profit-centric views. The authors utilize sociotechnical concepts, describing firms where the social system meets the self-regulation and self-preservation requirements
658:
The concept of viewing firms as sociotechnical systems finds its roots in the studies conducted by researchers at The
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, particularly the seminal works of Trist and Bamforth and Emery and Trist. These pioneering scholars observed, through extensive field
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and writing enforceable contracts for each transaction (which can be large if there is uncertainty). Moreover, contracts in an uncertain world will necessarily be incomplete and have to be frequently re-negotiated. The costs of haggling about the division of surplus, particularly if there is
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does too), and the large firm's increasing inability to replicate the high-powered incentives of the residual income of an owner-entrepreneur. This is partly because it is in the nature of a large firm that its existence is more secure and less dependent on the actions of any one individual
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and consider the implications of this for firm behavior in contrast to the profit-maximising case. (Baumol suggested that managersâ interests are best served by maximising sales after achieving a minimum level of profit which satisfies shareholders.) More recently this has developed into
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intimate and symbiotic relationship exists between the social and technical systems, wherein the former shapes the latter. This grants leaders a crucial role in the growth and regeneration of structures since their control capacity directly impacts the organization's viable boundary.
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Trist, E. L.; Bamforth, K.W. (1951). "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-Getting: An Examination of the Psychological Situation and Defences of a Work Group in Relation to the Social Structure and Technological Content of the Work System".
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interactions. In the context at hand, organizations need to include in their decisions all the other systems with which they are coupled, making it possible to envision the construction of complex socio-economic systems where they integrate in a stable and sustainable manner.
642:(1979), who has emphasized the importance of different transaction costs within and between firms. The boundaries of the firm (i.e., the distinction between transactions taking place within a firm and transactions between different firms) have been formally studied by
341:
Coase concludes by saying that the size of the firm is dependent on the costs of using the price mechanism, and on the costs of organisation of other entrepreneurs. These two factors together determine how many products a firm produces and how much of each.
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the collapse of one of its subsystems. Simultaneously, such restructuring in relationships and social attraction basins can also promote innovation, akin to DNA mutations, creating new dynamics and altering the variety and redundancy within organizations.
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to shift companies every day looking for better alternatives. Similarly, it may be costly for companies to find new suppliers daily. Thus, firms engage in a long-term contract with their employees or a long-term contract with suppliers to minimize the
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one). Leibenstein (1966) sees a firm's norms or conventions, dependent on its history of management initiatives, labour relations and other factors, as determining the firm's "culture" of effort, thus affecting the firm's productivity and hence size.
609:, as it recognises that transaction costs are a significant factor in a firm's decision to outsource, or internally produce, but also considers other influences specific to firms, such as their relevant capabilities, and governance decisions.
411:. This means that to an extent managers can pursue their own interests. Traditional managerial models typically assume that managers, instead of maximising profit, maximise a simple objective utility function (this may include salary,
315:. Coase concludes that âa firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short-term contract would be unsatisfactoryâ, and that âit seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertaintyâ.
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order for its survival and sustenance of its identity. This contrasts with finalistic conceptions of firms, where the scope is to meet external demands. Under this perspective, the firm's purpose is to ensure its own existence.
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extends the organization's lifespan. This suggests that mechanisms specialized in reconstructing the organization's social network topology, even in simplified forms, are vital to ensure the longevity of such structures.
534:. Asset specificity can also apply to some extent to both physical and human capital so that the hold-up problem can also occur with labour (e.g. labour can threaten a strike, because of the lack of good alternative
170:
was no longer an adequate model of how firms behaved. Economic theory until then had focused on trying to understand markets alone and there had been little study on understanding why firms or organisations exist.
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Ultimately, whether the firm constitutes a domain of bureaucratic direction that is shielded from market forces or simply âa legal fictionâ, âa nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individualsâ (as
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with a (possibly large) number of agents in the entire market, and the incentives are no longer there to represent their positions honestly: large-numbers bargaining is transformed into small-number bargaining.
847:. The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is also known as the âGrossmanâHartâMoore theoryâ. In their seminal work, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) developed the
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the firm as an alternative to morale-damaging monitoring, where promotion is based on objectively measurable performance. (The difference between these two approaches may be that the former is applicable to a
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below the 50-worker threshold. The distortion acts like an additional tax on hiring workers, thereby preventing the reallocation from less productive to more productive firms, and reducing overall welfare.
113:
Boundaries. Why is the boundary between firms and the market located exactly there in relation to size and output variety? Which transactions are performed internally and which are negotiated on the market?
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It was only in the 1960s that the neo-classical theory of the firm was seriously challenged by alternatives such as managerial and behavioral theories. Managerial theories of the firm, as developed by
354:, most economists accept distinction between intra-firm and interfirm transaction but also that the two shade into each other; the extent of a firm is not simply defined by its capital stock.
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Special Issue of Journal of Retailing in Honor of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009 to Oliver E. Williamson, 86(3), pp. 209-290, article-preview
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are guided by prices and quality as illustrated by vegetable markets where a buyer is free to switch sellers in an exchange. The need for a revised theory of the firm was emphasized by
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If the transaction is a recurring or lengthy one, re-negotiation may be necessary as a continual power struggle takes place concerning the gains from trade, further increasing the
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advantages for agents to associate with it; and (4) the capability to regenerate its formal network of relations when an agent is lost, especially at the supervisory level.
116:
Organization. Why are firms structured in such a specific way, for example as to hierarchy or decentralization? What is the interplay of formal and informal relationships?
1190:
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Leiblein, Michael J.; Miller, Douglas J. (September 2003). "An empirical examination of transaction- and firm-level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm".
1702:
Oliar, Dotan; Sprigman, Christopher (2008). "There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy".
260:) attempts to define the firm theoretically in relation to the market. One aspect of its 'neoclassicism' lies in presenting an explanation of the firm consistent with
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occurs through the values and bonds of trust established by agents, ensuring the self-production of the organization's values and their relative stability over time.
449:'s work in the 1950s concerning behaviour in situations of uncertainty, which argued that âpeople possess limited cognitive ability and so can exercise only â
46:
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Feroz, Ehsan H.; Park, Kyungjoo; Pastena, Victor S. (1991). "The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases".
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for example, notes that a rigid distinction fails because of the existence of intermediate forms between firm and market such as inter-firm co-operation.
280:), could not either achieve all production, so that either firms use internal prices for all their production, or one big firm runs the entire economy.
126:
Firms exist as an alternative system to the market-price mechanism when it is more efficient to produce in a non-market environment. For example, in a
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de Meza, D.; Lockwood, B. (1 May 1998). "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm".
391:
445:
places emphasis on explaining how decisions are taken within the firm, and goes well beyond neoclassical economics. Much of this depended on
2508:
Gattai, Valeria; Natale, Piergiovanna (February 2017). "A new Cinderella story: Joint ventures and the property rights theory of the firm".
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The First World War period saw a change of emphasis in economic theory away from industry-level analysis which mainly included analyzing
33:
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Management Sciences, Models and Techniques: Proceedings of the 6th- International Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences
638:(1937) asked the famous question: Why is not all production carried on by one big firm? An informal answer has been provided by
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put it) is âa function of the completeness of markets and the ability of market forces to penetrate intra-firm relationshipsâ.
590:, describe the aspect of production wherein cost savings result from the scope of an enterprise, as opposed to its scale (see
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if some people prefer to direct others and are prepared to pay for this (but generally people are paid more to direct others);
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Terra, L. A. A.; Passador, J. L. (2019). "The nature of social organization of production: From firms to complex dynamics".
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Terra, L. A. A.; Passador, J. L. (2016). "Symbiotic Dynamic: The Strategic Problem from the Perspective of Complexity".
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of coordinating production through the market exchange, given imperfect information, is greater than within the firm.
138:
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2008:
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Schmitz, Patrick W (1 February 2006). "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach".
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if some people prefer to work under the direction and are prepared to pay for the privilege (but this is unlikely);
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when they have to hire and fire their workers depending on demand/supply conditions. It might also be costly for
951:
428:
95:
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1964:
Williamson, Oliver E. (October 1979). "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations".
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Ahmad, Imtiaz; Mahmood, Zafar (2 April 2020). "Firms' heterogeneity and margins of trade under uncertainty".
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557:). If a reputation for opportunism significantly damages an agent's dealings in the future, this alters the
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inputs for reward purposes) and attendant shirking (the moral hazard problem) can be overcome, by estimating
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2324:"Role and Responsibilities of Managerial Economists: Empowering Business through Methodology and Strategy"
1808:"Can Firms Be Both Broad and Deep? Exploring Interdependencies Between Horizontal and Vertical Firm Scope"
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835:, the âtheory of the firmâ is often identified with the âproperty rights approachâ that was developed by
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further questioned the rigid distinction between firms and markets based on the increasing salience of â
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646:(1995) and his coauthors. According to the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on
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Existence. Why do firms emerge? Why are not all transactions in the economy mediated over the market?
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Heterogeneity of firm actions/performances. What drives different actions and performances of firms?
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The GrossmanâHartâMoore model has been successfully applied in many contexts, e.g. with regard to
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Spence, Michael A.; Zeckhauser, Richard (1971). "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action".
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453:â when making decisions in complex, uncertain situationsâ. Thus individuals and groups tend to "
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2740:"Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?"
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Williamson, Oliver E (1 June 2010). "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression".
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510:, because both agents are likely to become locked into a position where they are no longer
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1055:"Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences"
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415:, security, power, prestige) subject to an arbitrarily given profit constraint (profit
272:⊠who directs production.â He asks why alternative methods of production (such as the
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2036:
2014:
2004:
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1347:
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1020:
919:
371:
304:
2773:
2494:
1325:
1271:
1245:
Williamson, Oliver E. (2009). "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression,"
1232:
930:
564:
Williamson sees the limit on the size of the firm as being given partly by costs of
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3338:
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2126:
2096:
2056:
2048:
2037:"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration"
1985:
1973:
1950:
1936:
1926:
1887:
1822:
1788:
1738:
1575:
Ross, Stephen A. (1973). "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem".
1532:
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1481:
1376:
1311:
1303:
1259:
1218:
1141:
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87:
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832:
627:
523:
477:
442:
351:
1899:
3401:
3141:
3100:
3019:
2811:
2681:"Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France"
2166:
2130:
1915:"Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France"
1638:
1509:"Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure"
1380:
1223:
1206:
1180:
790:
779:
473:
458:
438:
387:
327:
184:
2617:
Holmstrom, Bengt R.; Tirole, Jean (1989). "Chapter 2 the theory of the firm".
2399:"Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm"
3451:
3323:
3223:
3214:
3185:
3171:
3161:
3105:
2869:
2859:
2849:
1826:
1634:
1602:
856:
535:
469:
434:
204:
188:
2486:
2455:
2100:
2018:
816:
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
106:
In simplified terms, the theory of the firm aims to answer these questions:
3293:
3125:
3120:
2854:
2662:
2645:
1784:
1071:
635:
408:
269:
249:
235:
166:
to analysis at the level of the firm, as it became increasingly clear that
1367:
Hall, R.; Charles J. Hitch (1939). "Price Theory and Business Behaviour".
1263:
98:
will allow for an in-depth analysis on various firm and management types.
3318:
3230:
3110:
2962:
2876:
2756:
2739:
2697:
2680:
2606:
2414:
1931:
1914:
1606:
1339:
1207:"The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract"
1160:
820:
631:
569:
550:
416:
225:
208:
192:
180:
82:, including its existence, behaviour, structure, and relationship to the
79:
2765:
2595:
The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management
2061:
1715:
1316:
1146:
1129:
745:
3078:
2830:
2707:
2521:
1941:
1861:
1750:
1656:
1588:
1493:
1388:
985:
671:
565:
542:
503:
122:
Evidence. What tests are there for the respective theories of the firm?
2471:"The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons"
2308:
2245:
2082:
2080:
1428:
1200:
1198:
3389:
3156:
3073:
3068:
2881:
2679:
Garicano, Luis; Lelarge, Claire; Van Reenen, John (1 November 2016).
806:
558:
511:
454:
323:
319:
176:
142:
71:
2206:
The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital
1891:
1742:
1641:(1972). "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization".
1485:
977:
3181:
3176:
3051:
2077:
2052:
1977:
1307:
1195:
554:
527:
134:
3235:
3134:
3046:
2780:
1848:
Panzar, John C.; Willig, Robert D. (1981). "Economies of Scope".
1801:
1799:
1797:
1033:
Thomas N. Hubbard (2008). "firm boundaries (empirical studies),"
399:
75:
2354:
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets
1806:
Brahm, Francisco; Parmigiani, Anne; TarzijĂĄn, Jorge (May 2021).
24:
3421:
3210:
531:
398:(1966), suggest that managers would seek to maximise their own
242:", people begin to organise their production in firms when the
195:, leaving control in the hands of managers who own very little
2185:
Emery, F. E.; Trist, E. L. (1960). "Socio-technical systems".
1794:
732:
345:
3095:
2977:
2957:
1873:
1871:
1001:
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
802:
602:
1677:
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
3252:
2030:
2028:
1048:
1046:
147:
1913:
Garicano, Luis; Lelarge, Claire; Van Reenen, John (2016).
1868:
1415:
Coase, R. H. (1988). "The Nature of the Firm: Influence".
964:
Cohen, Lloyd R. (1979). "The Firm: A Revised Definition".
318:
He notes that government measures relating to the market (
230:
the company will be downsized by outsourcing, for example.
2678:
2469:
Hart, O.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. W. (1 November 1997).
1912:
1553:
1507:
Jensen, Michael C.; Meckling, William H. (October 1976).
546:
2025:
1285:
1283:
1281:
1101:
Coase, R. H. (November 1937). "The Nature of the Firm".
1043:
433:
The behavioural approach, as developed in particular by
256:
theory of the firm in 1937, making it one of the first (
1805:
1338:
819:, which was released in 2006 under a Creative Commons
381:
2730:
Kroszner, Randall S.; Putterman, Louis, eds. (2009).
2290:
2035:
Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (August 1986).
1547:
1278:
746:
Relationships with the environment and sustainability
2288:
2286:
2284:
2282:
2280:
2278:
2276:
2274:
2272:
2270:
2227:
2225:
2223:
2221:
2219:
2217:
2215:
1366:
1053:
Macher, Jeffrey T.; Richman, Barak D. (April 2008).
672:
Evolutionary and Complexity Theory-Based Approaches.
541:
Probably the best constraint on such opportunism is
1627:
1500:
1128:Holmström, Bengt; Roberts, John (1 November 1998).
2468:
2369:
1695:
1674:
653:
2367:
2267:
2212:
2180:
2178:
2176:
2145:
621:
74:that explain and predict the nature of the firm,
3449:
2738:Aghion, Philippe; Holden, Richard (1 May 2011).
2572:
1728:
1401:Archibald, G.C. (1987 ). "firm, theory of the,"
1127:
338:), or if the relevant prices change frequently.
187:, who made it clear that ownership of a typical
16:Theories relating to firms' roles in the economy
2616:
2597:. Taylor and Francis. v. IâIV. Chapter preview
2368:Bolton, Patrick; Dewatripont, Matthias (2005).
2086:
1595:
1332:
2197:
2173:
2112:
2110:
1877:
1633:
1506:
1360:
538:; but equally the firm can threaten to fire).
2796:
2294:
2231:
2151:
1701:
1417:Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
1052:
826:
568:(as a firm's size increases its hierarchical
294:if purchasers prefer goods produced by firms.
2737:
2619:Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 1
2507:
2034:
1847:
1292:"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm"
998:
191:corporation is spread over a wide number of
2252:
2107:
1403:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics
1344:The Modern Corporation and Private Property
1290:Hart, Oliver; Moore, John (December 1990).
1096:
1094:
1092:
1090:
733:Essential conditions for a firm's emergence
612:
601:The concept of boundaries can be linked to
346:Reconsiderations of transaction cost theory
133:, it might be very difficult or costly for
2803:
2789:
2203:
2184:
1963:
1669:
1663:
1601:
1468:
1462:
1249:
1204:
913:
662:
214:
2755:
2732:The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader
2706:
2696:
2661:
2438:Firms, contracts, and financial structure
2335:
2060:
2001:Firms, contracts, and financial structure
1940:
1930:
1448:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1441:
1435:
1395:
1315:
1289:
1222:
1145:
1070:
938: âą Spulber, Daniel F. (2009).
782:(1982) develops a gift exchange model of
576:
2573:Clarke, Roger; McGuinness, Tony (1987).
2208:. New Brunswick: Transaction Publichers.
1472:(1972). "The Organisation of Industry".
1186:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
1087:
1035:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
680:
224:
203:found that executives made decisions by
49:of all important aspects of the article.
2644:Robé, Jean-Philippe (31 January 2011).
2350:
2344:
2297:Systems Research and Behavioral Science
2258:
2234:Systems Research and Behavioral Science
2116:
422:
3450:
2734:(3rd ed.) Cambridge University Press.
2609:, "The Theory of the Firm," v. I, pp.
2263:. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1205:Williamson, Oliver E (1 August 2002).
1130:"The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited"
813:, etc. He put forth this argument in
45:Please consider expanding the lead to
2784:
1414:
1165:The Theory of Industrial Organization
1100:
963:
2643:
2553:
2435:
2396:
2321:
1998:
1574:
715:
493:
18:
2357:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2322:Hans, V. Basil (21 December 2016).
382:Managerial and behavioural theories
13:
3359:Microfoundations of macroeconomics
2810:
2724:
2558:. New York: Longman. p. 182.
2475:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
2089:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1906:
1115:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
880:Knowledge-based theory of the firm
553:, composition, and enforcement of
464:
14:
3484:
2646:"The Legal Structure of the Firm"
706:
3432:
3431:
3420:
2744:Journal of Economic Perspectives
2621:. Vol. 1. pp. 61â133.
1966:The Journal of Law and Economics
1211:Journal of Economic Perspectives
1183:(2008). "corporate governance,"
1167:. "The Theory of the Firm", pp.
1134:Journal of Economic Perspectives
199:themselves. R. L. Hall and
23:
2501:
2462:
2429:
2390:
2361:
2315:
1992:
1957:
1841:
1773:
1722:
1568:
1445:The Economic Nature of the Firm
1408:
1239:
758:
654:Firm as a Sociotechnical System
549:, because of the difficulty of
37:may be too short to adequately
2650:Accounting, Economics, and Law
2593:Foss, Nicolai J., ed. (2000).
2403:Journal of Economic Literature
1731:Journal of Accounting Research
1513:Journal of Financial Economics
1174:
1154:
1121:
1027:
992:
957:
907:
622:Economic theory of outsourcing
429:Behavioural theory of the firm
137:or organizations to engage in
96:behavioural theory of the firm
47:provide an accessible overview
1:
2627:10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01005-8
2547:
2397:Hart, Oliver (1 March 2011).
1611:Behavioral Theory of the Firm
1013:10.1080/09638199.2019.1660396
795:commons-based peer production
771:environment, the latter to a
697:
157:
2041:Journal of Political Economy
1880:Strategic Management Journal
1850:The American Economic Review
1681:. New York: The Free Press.
1644:The American Economic Review
1577:The American Economic Review
1525:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
1342:; Gardiner C. Means (1933).
1296:Journal of Political Economy
1248:Nobel lecture. Reprinted in
914:Kantarelis, Demetri (2007).
890:Organizational effectiveness
7:
3304:Civil engineering economics
3289:Statistical decision theory
2929:Income elasticity of demand
2510:Journal of Economic Surveys
2440:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2003:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
862:
266:increasing returns to scale
101:
10:
3489:
2939:Price elasticity of supply
2934:Price elasticity of demand
2924:Cross elasticity of demand
2167:10.1177/001872675100400101
2131:10.1257/000282806776157722
1470:Richardson, George Barclay
1224:10.1257/089533002760278776
827:GrossmanâHartâMoore theory
634:have been discussed since
426:
362:between the firms are the
218:
3415:
3382:
3261:
2818:
2576:The Economics of the Firm
2554:Crew, Michael A. (1975).
2204:Schumpeter, J.A. (2012).
1442:Putterman, Louis (1996).
966:Southern Economic Journal
356:George Barclay Richardson
307:, may be considerable.
264:, rather than relying on
262:constant returns to scale
150:or maximize the value of
2995:Incomeâconsumption curve
2685:American Economic Review
2579:. Cambridge: Blackwell.
2436:Hart, Oliver D. (1995).
2351:Benkler, Yochai (2006).
2337:10.17493/nmr/2016/118221
2119:American Economic Review
1999:Hart, Oliver D. (1995).
1919:American Economic Review
1827:10.1177/0149206320912296
1557:American Economic Review
1381:10.1093/oxepap/os-2.1.12
1252:American Economic Review
918:. Geneve: Inderscience.
901:
613:Importance of boundaries
70:consists of a number of
3329:Industrial organization
2487:10.1162/003355300555448
2328:Nitte Management Review
2101:10.1162/003355398555621
1346:. New York: Macmillan.
875:Industrial organization
663:Sociotechnical Approach
630:, the pros and cons of
215:Transaction cost theory
3473:Management cybernetics
2663:10.2202/2152-2820.1001
1369:Oxford Economic Papers
1072:10.2202/1469-3569.1210
940:The Theory of the Firm
885:Organizational capital
849:incomplete contracting
648:incomplete contracting
607:The Nature of the Firm
577:Boundaries of the firm
301:asymmetric information
240:The Nature of the Firm
231:
3299:Engineering economics
2894:Costâbenefit analysis
1815:Journal of Management
1671:Williamson, Oliver E.
1613:. Oxford: Blackwell.
1264:10.1257/aer.100.3.673
1059:Business and Politics
950:, and "Introduction"
681:Symbiotic Perspective
561:to be opportunistic.
483:marginal productivity
228:
3463:Production economics
3116:Price discrimination
3010:Intertemporal choice
2757:10.1257/jep.25.2.181
2698:10.1257/aer.20130232
2415:10.1257/jel.49.1.101
2259:Luhmann, N. (1995).
1932:10.1257/aer.20130232
1474:The Economic Journal
916:Theories of the Firm
870:Dynamic capabilities
799:open source software
605:'s understanding of
500:Oliver E. Williamson
423:Behavioural approach
396:Oliver E. Williamson
92:managerial economics
3427:Business portal
3364:Operations research
3191:Substitution effect
1704:Virginia Law Review
1147:10.1257/jep.12.4.73
837:Sanford J. Grossman
451:bounded rationality
207:rather than in the
168:perfect competition
3468:Business economics
3005:Indifference curve
2973:Goods and services
2914:Economies of scope
2909:Economies of scale
2556:Theory of the Firm
2522:10.1111/joes.12135
2193:. New York: 83â97.
1783:(2010). Edited by
797:â systems such as
592:economies of scale
588:economies of scope
232:
68:theory of the firm
3445:
3444:
3407:Political economy
3206:Supply and demand
3086:Pareto efficiency
2691:(11): 3439â3479.
2586:978-0-631-14075-7
2565:978-0-582-44042-5
2383:978-0-262-02576-8
2309:10.1002/sres.2567
2246:10.1002/sres.2379
1925:(11): 3439â3479.
1688:978-0-02-935360-8
1635:Alchian, Armen A.
1620:978-0-631-17451-6
1455:978-0-521-47092-6
1353:978-0-88738-887-3
925:978-0-907776-34-5
716:Social Attractors
640:Oliver Williamson
545:(rather than the
520:transaction costs
494:Asset specificity
390:(1959 and 1962),
364:transaction costs
305:asset specificity
278:economic planning
72:economic theories
64:
63:
3480:
3435:
3434:
3425:
3424:
3167:Returns to scale
3025:Market structure
2805:
2798:
2791:
2782:
2781:
2777:
2759:
2720:
2710:
2700:
2675:
2665:
2640:
2590:
2569:
2542:
2541:
2505:
2499:
2498:
2481:(4): 1127â1161.
2466:
2460:
2459:
2433:
2427:
2426:
2394:
2388:
2387:
2375:
2365:
2359:
2358:
2348:
2342:
2341:
2339:
2319:
2313:
2312:
2292:
2265:
2264:
2256:
2250:
2249:
2229:
2210:
2209:
2201:
2195:
2194:
2182:
2171:
2170:
2149:
2143:
2142:
2114:
2105:
2104:
2084:
2075:
2074:
2064:
2032:
2023:
2022:
1996:
1990:
1989:
1961:
1955:
1954:
1944:
1934:
1910:
1904:
1903:
1875:
1866:
1865:
1845:
1839:
1838:
1821:(5): 1219â1254.
1812:
1803:
1792:
1789:Robert Dahlstrom
1777:
1771:
1770:
1726:
1720:
1719:
1710:(8): 1787â1867.
1699:
1693:
1692:
1680:
1667:
1661:
1660:
1631:
1625:
1624:
1599:
1593:
1592:
1572:
1566:
1565:
1551:
1545:
1544:
1504:
1498:
1497:
1480:(327): 883â896.
1466:
1460:
1459:
1439:
1433:
1432:
1412:
1406:
1399:
1393:
1392:
1364:
1358:
1357:
1340:Berle, Adolph A.
1336:
1330:
1329:
1319:
1302:(6): 1119â1158.
1287:
1276:
1275:
1243:
1237:
1236:
1226:
1202:
1193:
1178:
1172:
1158:
1152:
1151:
1149:
1125:
1119:
1118:
1098:
1085:
1084:
1074:
1050:
1041:
1031:
1025:
1024:
996:
990:
989:
961:
955:
929:
911:
895:Transaction cost
811:Creative Commons
508:gains from trade
447:Herbert A. Simon
284:as unimportant:
254:transaction cost
244:transaction cost
221:Transaction cost
201:Charles J. Hitch
88:transaction cost
59:
56:
50:
27:
19:
3488:
3487:
3483:
3482:
3481:
3479:
3478:
3477:
3448:
3447:
3446:
3441:
3419:
3411:
3378:
3257:
2899:Deadweight loss
2836:Consumer choice
2814:
2809:
2727:
2725:Further reading
2637:
2603:Bengt Holmström
2587:
2566:
2550:
2545:
2506:
2502:
2467:
2463:
2448:
2434:
2430:
2395:
2391:
2384:
2372:Contract theory
2366:
2362:
2349:
2345:
2320:
2316:
2293:
2268:
2257:
2253:
2230:
2213:
2202:
2198:
2183:
2174:
2155:Human Relations
2150:
2146:
2115:
2108:
2085:
2078:
2033:
2026:
2011:
1997:
1993:
1962:
1958:
1911:
1907:
1892:10.1002/smj.340
1876:
1869:
1846:
1842:
1810:
1804:
1795:
1778:
1774:
1743:10.2307/2491006
1727:
1723:
1700:
1696:
1689:
1668:
1664:
1639:Demsetz, Harold
1632:
1628:
1621:
1600:
1596:
1573:
1569:
1552:
1548:
1505:
1501:
1486:10.2307/2230256
1467:
1463:
1456:
1440:
1436:
1413:
1409:
1405:, v. 2, p. 357.
1400:
1396:
1365:
1361:
1354:
1337:
1333:
1288:
1279:
1244:
1240:
1203:
1196:
1189:, 2nd Edition.
1179:
1175:
1159:
1155:
1126:
1122:
1109:(16): 386â405.
1099:
1088:
1051:
1044:
1037:, 2nd Edition.
1032:
1028:
997:
993:
978:10.2307/1057429
962:
958:
937:
926:
912:
908:
904:
899:
865:
833:contract theory
829:
764:Efficiency wage
761:
748:
735:
718:
709:
700:
683:
674:
665:
656:
628:economic theory
624:
615:
579:
524:hold-up problem
506:concerning the
496:
478:team production
476:'s analysis of
467:
465:Team production
443:Carnegie School
431:
425:
405:principalâagent
384:
352:Louis Putterman
348:
274:price mechanism
223:
217:
160:
152:property rights
104:
60:
54:
51:
44:
32:This article's
28:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3486:
3476:
3475:
3470:
3465:
3460:
3443:
3442:
3440:
3439:
3429:
3416:
3413:
3412:
3410:
3409:
3404:
3402:Macroeconomics
3399:
3398:
3397:
3386:
3384:
3380:
3379:
3377:
3376:
3371:
3366:
3361:
3356:
3351:
3346:
3341:
3336:
3331:
3326:
3321:
3316:
3311:
3306:
3301:
3296:
3291:
3286:
3281:
3276:
3271:
3265:
3263:
3259:
3258:
3256:
3255:
3250:
3249:
3248:
3243:
3233:
3228:
3227:
3226:
3217:
3203:
3198:
3193:
3188:
3179:
3174:
3169:
3164:
3159:
3154:
3149:
3144:
3139:
3138:
3137:
3132:
3123:
3118:
3113:
3108:
3103:
3101:Price controls
3093:
3088:
3083:
3082:
3081:
3076:
3071:
3066:
3065:
3064:
3059:
3049:
3044:
3043:
3042:
3037:
3022:
3020:Market failure
3017:
3012:
3007:
3002:
2997:
2992:
2987:
2986:
2985:
2980:
2970:
2965:
2960:
2955:
2954:
2953:
2943:
2942:
2941:
2936:
2931:
2926:
2916:
2911:
2906:
2901:
2896:
2891:
2890:
2889:
2884:
2879:
2874:
2873:
2872:
2862:
2857:
2847:
2838:
2833:
2828:
2822:
2820:
2816:
2815:
2812:Microeconomics
2808:
2807:
2800:
2793:
2785:
2779:
2778:
2750:(2): 181â197.
2735:
2726:
2723:
2722:
2721:
2676:
2641:
2635:
2614:
2591:
2585:
2570:
2564:
2549:
2546:
2544:
2543:
2516:(1): 281â302.
2500:
2461:
2446:
2428:
2409:(1): 101â113.
2389:
2382:
2360:
2343:
2314:
2303:(4): 514â531.
2266:
2261:Social Systems
2251:
2240:(2): 235â248.
2211:
2196:
2172:
2144:
2125:(1): 422â434.
2106:
2095:(2): 361â386.
2076:
2053:10.1086/261404
2047:(4): 691â719.
2024:
2009:
1991:
1978:10.1086/466942
1972:(2): 233â261.
1956:
1905:
1886:(9): 839â859.
1867:
1856:(2): 268â272.
1840:
1793:
1772:
1721:
1694:
1687:
1662:
1651:(5): 777â795.
1626:
1619:
1603:Cyert, Richard
1594:
1583:(2): 134â139.
1567:
1546:
1519:(4): 305â360.
1499:
1461:
1454:
1434:
1407:
1394:
1359:
1352:
1331:
1308:10.1086/261729
1277:
1258:(3): 673â690.
1238:
1217:(3): 171â195.
1194:
1181:Luigi Zingales
1173:
1153:
1120:
1086:
1042:
1026:
1007:(3): 272â288.
991:
972:(2): 580â590.
956:
924:
905:
903:
900:
898:
897:
892:
887:
882:
877:
872:
866:
864:
861:
841:Oliver D. Hart
828:
825:
791:Yochai Benkler
780:George Akerlof
760:
757:
747:
744:
734:
731:
717:
714:
708:
707:Viable Contour
705:
699:
696:
682:
679:
673:
670:
664:
661:
655:
652:
623:
620:
614:
611:
578:
575:
495:
492:
474:Harold Demsetz
466:
463:
459:X-inefficiency
439:James G. March
427:Main article:
424:
421:
388:William Baumol
383:
380:
347:
344:
328:price controls
296:
295:
292:
289:
219:Main article:
216:
213:
185:Gardiner Means
159:
156:
124:
123:
120:
117:
114:
111:
103:
100:
62:
61:
41:the key points
31:
29:
22:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3485:
3474:
3471:
3469:
3466:
3464:
3461:
3459:
3456:
3455:
3453:
3438:
3430:
3428:
3423:
3418:
3417:
3414:
3408:
3405:
3403:
3400:
3396:
3393:
3392:
3391:
3388:
3387:
3385:
3381:
3375:
3372:
3370:
3367:
3365:
3362:
3360:
3357:
3355:
3352:
3350:
3347:
3345:
3342:
3340:
3337:
3335:
3334:Institutional
3332:
3330:
3327:
3325:
3322:
3320:
3317:
3315:
3312:
3310:
3307:
3305:
3302:
3300:
3297:
3295:
3292:
3290:
3287:
3285:
3282:
3280:
3279:Computational
3277:
3275:
3272:
3270:
3267:
3266:
3264:
3260:
3254:
3251:
3247:
3244:
3242:
3239:
3238:
3237:
3234:
3232:
3229:
3225:
3224:Law of supply
3221:
3218:
3216:
3215:Law of demand
3212:
3209:
3208:
3207:
3204:
3202:
3201:Social choice
3199:
3197:
3194:
3192:
3189:
3187:
3186:Excess supply
3183:
3180:
3178:
3175:
3173:
3172:Risk aversion
3170:
3168:
3165:
3163:
3160:
3158:
3155:
3153:
3150:
3148:
3145:
3143:
3140:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3127:
3124:
3122:
3119:
3117:
3114:
3112:
3109:
3107:
3106:Price ceiling
3104:
3102:
3099:
3098:
3097:
3094:
3092:
3089:
3087:
3084:
3080:
3077:
3075:
3072:
3070:
3067:
3063:
3062:Complementary
3060:
3058:
3055:
3054:
3053:
3050:
3048:
3045:
3041:
3038:
3036:
3033:
3032:
3031:
3028:
3027:
3026:
3023:
3021:
3018:
3016:
3013:
3011:
3008:
3006:
3003:
3001:
2998:
2996:
2993:
2991:
2988:
2984:
2981:
2979:
2976:
2975:
2974:
2971:
2969:
2966:
2964:
2961:
2959:
2956:
2952:
2949:
2948:
2947:
2944:
2940:
2937:
2935:
2932:
2930:
2927:
2925:
2922:
2921:
2920:
2917:
2915:
2912:
2910:
2907:
2905:
2902:
2900:
2897:
2895:
2892:
2888:
2885:
2883:
2880:
2878:
2875:
2871:
2868:
2867:
2866:
2863:
2861:
2858:
2856:
2853:
2852:
2851:
2848:
2846:
2845:non-convexity
2842:
2839:
2837:
2834:
2832:
2829:
2827:
2824:
2823:
2821:
2817:
2813:
2806:
2801:
2799:
2794:
2792:
2787:
2786:
2783:
2775:
2771:
2767:
2763:
2758:
2753:
2749:
2745:
2741:
2736:
2733:
2729:
2728:
2718:
2714:
2709:
2704:
2699:
2694:
2690:
2686:
2682:
2677:
2673:
2669:
2664:
2659:
2655:
2651:
2647:
2642:
2638:
2636:9780444704344
2632:
2628:
2624:
2620:
2615:
2612:
2608:
2604:
2600:
2596:
2592:
2588:
2582:
2578:
2577:
2571:
2567:
2561:
2557:
2552:
2551:
2539:
2535:
2531:
2527:
2523:
2519:
2515:
2511:
2504:
2496:
2492:
2488:
2484:
2480:
2476:
2472:
2465:
2457:
2453:
2449:
2447:0-19-828881-6
2443:
2439:
2432:
2424:
2420:
2416:
2412:
2408:
2404:
2400:
2393:
2385:
2379:
2376:. MIT Press.
2374:
2373:
2364:
2356:
2355:
2347:
2338:
2333:
2329:
2325:
2318:
2310:
2306:
2302:
2298:
2291:
2289:
2287:
2285:
2283:
2281:
2279:
2277:
2275:
2273:
2271:
2262:
2255:
2247:
2243:
2239:
2235:
2228:
2226:
2224:
2222:
2220:
2218:
2216:
2207:
2200:
2192:
2188:
2181:
2179:
2177:
2168:
2164:
2160:
2156:
2148:
2140:
2136:
2132:
2128:
2124:
2120:
2113:
2111:
2102:
2098:
2094:
2090:
2083:
2081:
2072:
2068:
2063:
2058:
2054:
2050:
2046:
2042:
2038:
2031:
2029:
2020:
2016:
2012:
2010:0-19-828881-6
2006:
2002:
1995:
1987:
1983:
1979:
1975:
1971:
1967:
1960:
1952:
1948:
1943:
1938:
1933:
1928:
1924:
1920:
1916:
1909:
1901:
1897:
1893:
1889:
1885:
1881:
1874:
1872:
1863:
1859:
1855:
1851:
1844:
1836:
1832:
1828:
1824:
1820:
1816:
1809:
1802:
1800:
1798:
1790:
1786:
1782:
1776:
1768:
1764:
1760:
1756:
1752:
1748:
1744:
1740:
1736:
1732:
1725:
1717:
1713:
1709:
1705:
1698:
1690:
1684:
1679:
1678:
1672:
1666:
1658:
1654:
1650:
1646:
1645:
1640:
1636:
1630:
1622:
1616:
1612:
1608:
1604:
1598:
1590:
1586:
1582:
1578:
1571:
1564:(2): 380â387.
1563:
1559:
1558:
1550:
1542:
1538:
1534:
1530:
1526:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1503:
1495:
1491:
1487:
1483:
1479:
1475:
1471:
1465:
1457:
1451:
1447:
1446:
1438:
1430:
1426:
1422:
1418:
1411:
1404:
1398:
1390:
1386:
1382:
1378:
1374:
1370:
1363:
1355:
1349:
1345:
1341:
1335:
1327:
1323:
1318:
1313:
1309:
1305:
1301:
1297:
1293:
1286:
1284:
1282:
1273:
1269:
1265:
1261:
1257:
1253:
1247:
1242:
1234:
1230:
1225:
1220:
1216:
1212:
1208:
1201:
1199:
1192:
1188:
1187:
1182:
1177:
1170:
1166:
1162:
1157:
1148:
1143:
1139:
1135:
1131:
1124:
1116:
1112:
1108:
1104:
1097:
1095:
1093:
1091:
1082:
1078:
1073:
1068:
1064:
1060:
1056:
1049:
1047:
1040:
1036:
1030:
1022:
1018:
1014:
1010:
1006:
1002:
995:
987:
983:
979:
975:
971:
967:
960:
953:
949:
945:
942:, Cambridge.
941:
936:
932:
927:
921:
917:
910:
906:
896:
893:
891:
888:
886:
883:
881:
878:
876:
873:
871:
868:
867:
860:
858:
857:privatization
853:
850:
846:
845:John H. Moore
842:
838:
834:
824:
822:
818:
817:
812:
808:
804:
800:
796:
792:
787:
785:
781:
777:
774:
770:
765:
756:
752:
743:
739:
730:
726:
722:
713:
704:
695:
691:
687:
678:
669:
660:
651:
649:
645:
641:
637:
633:
629:
619:
610:
608:
604:
599:
595:
593:
589:
583:
574:
571:
567:
562:
560:
556:
552:
548:
544:
539:
537:
536:human capital
533:
529:
525:
521:
516:
513:
509:
505:
501:
491:
487:
484:
479:
475:
471:
470:Armen Alchian
462:
460:
456:
452:
448:
444:
440:
436:
435:Richard Cyert
430:
420:
418:
414:
410:
406:
401:
397:
393:
389:
379:
377:
373:
367:
365:
359:
357:
353:
350:According to
343:
339:
337:
331:
329:
325:
321:
316:
314:
308:
306:
302:
293:
290:
287:
286:
285:
281:
279:
275:
271:
267:
263:
259:
258:neo-classical
255:
251:
247:
245:
241:
237:
234:According to
227:
222:
212:
210:
206:
205:rule of thumb
202:
198:
194:
190:
186:
182:
178:
174:
169:
165:
155:
153:
149:
144:
140:
136:
132:
129:
121:
118:
115:
112:
109:
108:
107:
99:
97:
93:
89:
85:
81:
77:
73:
69:
58:
48:
42:
40:
35:
30:
26:
21:
20:
3369:Optimization
3354:Mathematical
3314:Experimental
3309:Evolutionary
3294:Econometrics
3152:Public goods
3126:Price system
3121:Price signal
3035:Monopolistic
2967:
2904:Distribution
2819:Major topics
2747:
2743:
2731:
2688:
2684:
2653:
2649:
2618:
2601:, including
2594:
2575:
2555:
2513:
2509:
2503:
2478:
2474:
2464:
2437:
2431:
2406:
2402:
2392:
2371:
2363:
2353:
2346:
2327:
2317:
2300:
2296:
2260:
2254:
2237:
2233:
2205:
2199:
2190:
2186:
2158:
2154:
2147:
2122:
2118:
2092:
2088:
2062:1721.1/63378
2044:
2040:
2000:
1994:
1969:
1965:
1959:
1922:
1918:
1908:
1883:
1879:
1853:
1849:
1843:
1818:
1814:
1785:Arne Nygaard
1775:
1734:
1730:
1724:
1707:
1703:
1697:
1676:
1665:
1648:
1642:
1629:
1610:
1607:March, James
1597:
1580:
1576:
1570:
1561:
1555:
1549:
1516:
1512:
1502:
1477:
1473:
1464:
1444:
1437:
1423:(1): 33â47.
1420:
1416:
1410:
1402:
1397:
1375:(1): 12â45.
1372:
1368:
1362:
1343:
1334:
1317:1721.1/64099
1299:
1295:
1255:
1251:
1241:
1214:
1210:
1184:
1176:
1164:
1156:
1140:(4): 73â94.
1137:
1133:
1123:
1106:
1102:
1062:
1058:
1034:
1029:
1004:
1000:
994:
969:
965:
959:
948:front matter
939:
915:
909:
854:
830:
814:
788:
778:
773:white-collar
762:
759:Other models
753:
749:
740:
736:
727:
723:
719:
710:
701:
692:
688:
684:
675:
666:
657:
636:Ronald Coase
625:
616:
600:
596:
584:
580:
563:
540:
517:
497:
488:
468:
432:
409:moral hazard
392:Robin Marris
385:
368:
360:
349:
340:
336:conglomerate
332:
317:
309:
297:
282:
270:entrepreneur
252:set out his
250:Ronald Coase
248:
236:Ronald Coase
233:
193:shareholders
161:
125:
105:
67:
65:
55:October 2021
52:
36:
34:lead section
3319:Game theory
3284:Development
3231:Uncertainty
3111:Price floor
3091:Preferences
3030:Competition
3000:Information
2963:Externality
2946:Equilibrium
2887:Transaction
2865:Opportunity
2826:Aggregation
2708:10419/71683
2607:Jean Tirole
2161:(1): 3â38.
1942:10419/71683
1737:: 107â142.
1161:Jean Tirole
1065:(1): 1â63.
944:Description
931:Description
821:share-alike
784:reciprocity
769:blue-collar
644:Oliver Hart
632:outsourcing
570:bureaucracy
551:negotiation
417:satisficing
394:(1964) and
320:sales taxes
209:marginalist
181:Adolf Berle
179:studies by
80:corporation
3458:Management
3452:Categories
3349:Managerial
3269:Behavioral
3142:Production
3079:Oligopsony
2919:Elasticity
2831:Budget set
2548:References
1171:MIT Press.
831:In modern
789:Recently,
698:Boundaries
566:delegation
559:incentives
543:reputation
504:bargaining
238:'s essay "
158:Background
139:production
3390:Economics
3262:Subfields
3157:Rationing
3074:Oligopoly
3069:Monopsony
3057:Bilateral
2990:Household
2841:Convexity
2672:167919558
2530:154323121
2423:154638241
2330:: 27â43.
2139:154717219
2071:215807368
1900:225003014
1835:204776573
1759:154656682
1191:Abstract.
1103:Economica
1039:Abstract.
1021:203225756
823:license.
807:Knowledge
555:contracts
512:competing
455:satisfice
324:rationing
177:empirical
143:employees
39:summarize
3437:Category
3383:See also
3274:Business
3246:Marginal
3241:Expected
3182:Shortage
3177:Scarcity
3052:Monopoly
2958:Exchange
2870:Implicit
2860:Marginal
2774:55679839
2766:23049459
2495:16270301
2456:32703648
2019:32703648
1896:ProQuest
1716:25470605
1673:(1975).
1609:(1963).
1326:15892859
1272:47680121
1233:52232613
1163:(1988).
863:See also
528:takeover
376:Meckling
189:American
102:Overview
90:theory,
3395:Applied
3374:Welfare
3236:Utility
3196:Surplus
3135:Pricing
3047:Duopoly
3040:Perfect
2983:Service
2951:General
2855:Average
2717:4929270
2538:2907161
1986:8559551
1951:4929270
1862:1815729
1767:1175102
1751:2491006
1657:1815199
1589:1817064
1533:4994526
1494:2230256
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