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Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence

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529:(R-UT) and Christopher Bond (R-MO), presents two conclusions that Democratic members of the Committee were unwilling to include in the report, even though, according to Roberts, "there was no dispute with the underlying facts." Those two conclusions related to the actions of Joseph Wilson, the former ambassador who was sent to Niger in 2002 to investigate allegations that the Iraqi government was attempting to purchase "yellowcake" uranium, presumably as part of an attempt to revive Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The two conclusions were that the plan to send Wilson to investigate the Niger allegation was suggested by Wilson's wife, a CIA employee, and that in his later public statements criticizing the Bush administration, Wilson included information he had learned from press accounts, misrepresenting it as firsthand knowledge. 681:". This volume of the report includes seven pages of conclusions regarding assessments provided by the intelligence community to U.S. government leaders prior to the Iraq war. The report concludes that the intelligence community had assessed that establishing a stable government in Iraq would be a "long, difficult, and probably turbulent challenge," that Iraqi society was deeply divided and would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power took steps to prevent it, and that the war would increase the threat of terrorism, at least temporarily. The intelligence community also assessed that a U.S. defeat and occupation of Iraq would lead to a surge in political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups, and that the war would not cause other countries in the region to abandon their WMD programs. 446:
alter their assessments to speak with the Committee about their experiences. The Committee also attempted to identify and interview several individuals who had described such pressure in media reports and government documents. The report says that the Committee did not find any evidence that administration officials tried to pressure analysts to change their judgments; however, an evaluation of the Bush Administration's use of intelligence was put off until "phase two" of the investigation. (Several Democratic committee members, although they voted to approve the report's conclusions, expressed reservations on this issue and Republicans also acknowledged that the issue of "pressure" would be examined during phase two; see below, in the discussion of the report's "additional views", for details.)
707:"It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa'ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa'ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses. While the report highlights many of the problems with the intelligence and criticizes the Bush Administration for its handling of the lead up to the war and its reasons for doing so, the report also supports in many cases that claims made by the Bush Administration about Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction programs were "generally substantiated by the intelligence". 493:. An initial version of this document was distributed to senior Bush administration officials in September, 2002; an updated version of the document was provided to Congress in January, 2003. The conclusion of CIA analysts was that although Saddam Hussein's government had likely had several contacts with al Qaeda during the 1990s, "those contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship." The CIA also attempted to determine the attitudes that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leadership held toward the possibility of working cooperatively with each other. The available intelligence in this area suggested that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leaders would be wary of working together. 437:
worked to expand the speech with additional material, especially regarding Iraq's nuclear program. The report also describes the subsequent review made by Colin Powell and analysts from the State Department with analysts from the CIA. In the speech, Powell said that "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." Despite this, the Committee concluded that "uch of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect."
94:, the U.S. government increased its attention on Iraq. In the first half of 2002, a series of public statements by President Bush and senior members of his administration indicated a willingness to use force, if necessary, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On October 1, 2002, the CIA delivered a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessing the threat represented by Iraq's WMD activities. Three days later, CIA Director George Tenet published an unclassified white paper on the subject of Iraq's WMD capabilities. Over the next two weeks, a 71:, Iraq agreed to destroy its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and dismantle its WMD programs. To verify compliance, UN inspection teams were to be given free access to the country. Over the next seven years, inspectors sometimes complained about non-cooperation and evasiveness by the Iraqi government. Iraqi officials in turn complained that some weapons inspectors were acting as spies for foreign intelligence agencies. In 1998, after a critical report on the Iraqi government's noncompliance was issued by UN weapons inspector 467:
unclassified version of the information in the NIE, since that document was available only to a small group of lawmakers due to its classified nature. The white paper, although shorter and less-detailed than the NIE, was very similar to it in format and major conclusions. The Committee found that the white paper presented a significantly stronger characterization of the threat represented by Iraqi WMD than did the NIE, and that that stronger characterization was not supported by the underlying intelligence.
696:"repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed." These included President Bush's statements of a partnership between Iraq and Al Qa'ida, that Saddam Hussein was preparing to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, and Iraq's capability to produce chemical weapons. 5145: 138:(ISG), consisting of investigators from the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA. Although scattered remnants of Iraq's WMD stockpiles from the time of the 1991 Gulf War were found, the ISG's final report concluded that Iraq did not possess significant WMD capabilities at the time of the invasion of Iraq. The ISG also stated that Iraq had intended to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped. 149:, announced that the Committee, as part of its regular oversight responsibility, would conduct a "thorough and bipartisan review" of Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorist groups. On June 20, 2003, Senator Roberts and Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), the Committee's vice chairman, issued a joint press release announcing that the committee would conduct a detailed review of the Iraqi WMD intelligence process, including the following areas: 5136: 5154: 405:," an Iraqi defector who provided much of the information regarding Iraq's alleged mobile bioweapons labs, although much of the material in this part of the report has been redacted. The report concludes that the October 2002 NIE and other statements regarding Iraq's biological and chemical WMD and associated delivery systems were for the most part not supported by the underlying intelligence data supplied to the Committee. 369:
the extent of Iraq's WMD stockpiles and programs. The committee identified a failure to adequately supervise analysts and collectors, and a failure to develop human sources of intelligence (HUMINT) inside Iraq after the departure of international weapons inspectors in 1998. It also cited the post-9/11 environment as having led to an increase in the intensity with which policymakers review and question threat information.
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intelligence community. It also discusses the process whereby references to Iraq's uranium-procurement efforts were removed from some speeches at the behest of intelligence officials, but left in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address. The report concludes that prior to October, 2002, it was reasonable for the intelligence community to assess Iraq may have been attempting to obtain uranium from Africa.
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intelligence on Iraq was used or misused by Administration officials in public statements and reports." Because of this, they said, "the Committee's phase one report fails to fully explain the environment of intense pressure in which Intelligence Community officials were asked to render judgments on matters relating to Iraq when policy officials had already forcefully stated their own conclusions in public."
5163: 504:, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization that identified itself as the "sworn enemy" of Saddam Hussein had operated in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control. There was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al Qaeda attack. The report criticized the CIA for its lack of human intelligence resources in Iraq to assess the country's ties with terrorism during the time prior to 2002. 508:
were "bold and assertive in pointing out potential terrorist links," and that this pressure was more the result of analysts' own desire to be as thorough as possible, than of any undue influence by the administration, for which the Committee said they found no evidence. Several Democratic members of the Committee said in the report's "additional views" that the question had not been adequately explored.
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and ties to terrorism, and the use by US intelligence of information supplied by the Iraqi National Congress. Two components of the report would be delayed: whether public statements before the war by senior government officials were supported by the underlying intelligence, and the role played by the Department of Defense's Office of Special Plans in developing the prewar intelligence.
455: 116: 728:"After four years of making unsubstantiated allegations of unlawful activities, the calculus appears to be that proclamations of "inappropriate" behavior will generate the desired headlines focusing only on the caustic words, rather than the lack of substance behind them. We hope that these additional views will help redirect that focus to the evidence, or lack thereof." 462:, October 2, 2002. Lawmakers debated and passed the resolution during the following two weeks, basing their votes in part on the information in the classified National Intelligence Estimate and the unclassified white paper on Iraqi WMD – documents that the Senate report on pre-war intelligence found to have been deeply flawed. 55:
investigation, addressing the way senior policymakers used the intelligence, was published on May 25, 2007. Portions of the phase II report not released at that time include the review of public statements by U.S. government leaders prior to the war, and the assessment of the activities of Douglas Feith and the Pentagon's
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expressed as an "alternative view" in the NIE, that the available intelligence did not make "a compelling case for reconstitution" of the Iraqi nuclear program. The committee reached several conclusions critical of poor communications between the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community concerning this issue.
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Iraq's development of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), however, the Committee found that the reporting generally was not well-supported by the underlying intelligence, and overstated what was known concerning the likelihood that the Iraqi UAVs were intended for use as a delivery means for biological weapons.
123:. "The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder." The Senate committee found that many of the administration's pre-war statements about Iraqi WMD were not supported by the underlying intelligence. 684:
This volume of the report includes an appendix containing two previously classified reports by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) titled, "Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq" and "Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq", as well as a long list of recipients within the government of
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On November 1, 2005, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), the Senate minority leader, invoked a seldom-used provision of the Senate rules to place the body in a closed session. During a three-and-a-half hour discussion, agreement was reached on the creation of a six-member Senate panel to report by November 14
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Moderator Tim Russert then asked Senator Rockefeller if he believed phase two would be completed, and he replied, "I hope so. Pat and I have agreed to do it. We've shaken hands on it, and we agreed to do it after the elections so it wouldn't be any sort of sense of a political attack. I mean that was
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A white paper titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction" was released by CIA Director George Tenet on October 4, 2002, three days after the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD was released. In part, the white paper was a response to Congressional requests for an
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Section VII of the Committee's report focuses on the intelligence behind Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN on February 5, 2003. The report describes the process whereby the CIA provided a draft of the speech to the National Security Council (NSC), and then, at the request of the NSC,
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Subsequent conclusions fault the intelligence community for failing to adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties that underlay the NIE's conclusions, and for succumbing to "group think," in which the intelligence community adopted untested (and, in hindsight, unwarranted) assumptions about
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This was a bi-partisan majority report (10-5) and "details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department." It concludes that the US Administration
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Senator John Warner (R-VA) used his additional view to defend the integrity and professionalism of front-line intelligence analysts, and to emphasize that "there was no evidence that anyone involved in reaching intelligence judgments for this NIE was subjected to any pressure from their superiors or
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The third additional view in the report is by Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), with Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Trent Lott (R-MS), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Christopher Bond (R-MO). It focuses on the issues of information sharing and Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and rebuts the allegation of "pressure"
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The report partially looks at the question of whether pressure was brought to bear on intelligence analysts to get them to shape their assessments to support particular policy objectives. It recounts how Sen. Roberts made repeated public calls for any analysts who believed they had been pressured to
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The previous year, the chairman released a press statement claiming that it appeared that the office's were "not in compliance with the law." Yet, rather than pursue these allegations, Rockfeller decided to pursue an issue unrelated to the intelligence, and unrelated to Iraq. He pursued and inquiry
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reported that Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) was seeking to further divide the phase two report. Under Roberts' new approach, the following components of the report would be released relatively quickly: pre-war intelligence assessments of post-war Iraq, postwar findings in Iraq regarding WMD
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program. In response to a question about the completion of phase two of the investigation, Roberts said, "I'm perfectly willing to do it, and that's what we agreed to do, and that door is still open. And I don't want to quarrel with Jay, because we both agreed that we would get it done. But we do
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The Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted unanimously to approve the finished report. There were, however, significant areas of disagreement, with those disagreements being expressed in the form of "additional views" attached at the end of the report
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In terms of pressure on analysts, the Committee said that after 9/11, "analysts were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence failure on the scale of 9/11." The Committee concluded that this resulted in assessments that
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gave a presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003, in which he detailed false intelligence gatherings provided by the Israeli government regarding Iraqi WMD. The USA was faced with the opposition of a majority of the Security Council's members, including Germany, France, and Russia, and afterwards
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after a speech he had given at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Senator Roberts said of the failure to complete phase two, "hat is basically on the back burner." Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), vice chairman of the Committee, made a statement later that day in which he said, "The Chairman agreed to
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on November 8, 2002, calling on Iraq to make "an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure" of its WMD programs, and threatening "serious consequences" if it did not comply. In the wake of resolution 1441, Iraq allowed UN weapons inspectors to return to the country. While the inspections were
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The Committee's nine Republicans and eight Democrats agreed on the report's major conclusions and unanimously endorsed its findings. They disagreed, though, on the impact that statements on Iraq by senior members of the Bush administration had on the intelligence process. The second phase of the
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The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq appeared to be reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The Committee's report concluded that this view was not supported by the underlying intelligence, and the report agreed with the opinion of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
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Section III of the report discusses assessments of Iraq's domestic nuclear program. It focuses a significant amount of attention on the intelligence process that took place in the spring of 2001 regarding Iraq's attempts to purchase 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes. The CIA concluded that the
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Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in
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In the course of the investigation, Committee staff reviewed more than 30,000 pages of documentation provided by the intelligence community. The Committee requested that it be supplied copies of the President's Daily Briefs (PDBs) concerning Iraq's WMD capabilities and ties to terrorism, but the
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One area where the Committee found that the intelligence community's reporting accurately reflected the underlying intelligence concerned Iraq's retention of Scud-type ballistic missiles, and its development of new types of short- and medium-range missiles. In the case of the NIE's reporting on
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Section II of the report discussed the handling of intelligence indicating that Iraq might be attempting to purchase uranium from Niger. The report examined the role played by former ambassador Joseph Wilson in investigating the issue, and the way Wilson's assessment was communicated within the
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has described a specific controversy over the PDB for September 21, 2001, which allegedly said that the US intelligence community had "no evidence" linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11 attacks, and "scant credible evidence" that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with al Qaeda.
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Senators John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) (the Committee's vice-chairman), Carl Levin (D-MI), and Richard Durbin (D-IL), used their additional view to say that the report painted an incomplete picture, because the Committee had put off until phase two of the investigation the key question of "how
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NIC assessments on Iraq. The appendix also contains a number of "Additional Views" in which different members of the committee comment on the history of the committee's work in this area, and criticize what they characterize as the politicization of that work by members of the other party.
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that "phase two" of the investigation, which was to include an assessment of how the Iraqi WMD intelligence was used by senior policymakers, would be completed quickly. Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) said of phase two, "It is a priority. I made my commitment and it will get done."
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Several sections in the report examine topics relating to allegations of links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee said that the intelligence community produced reasonable conclusions on this topic, although the Committee found gaps in the intelligence-gathering methods used
723:"found nothing to substantiate that claim; nothing unlawful about the "alleged" rogue intelligence operation in the PCTEG , nothing unlawful about the Office of Special Plans, and nothing unlawful about the so-called failure to inform Congress of alleged intelligence activities." 51:. The report, which was released on July 9, 2004, identified numerous failures in the intelligence-gathering and -analysis process. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and the American public. 400:
The sections of the report concerned with assessments of Iraq's biological weapons programs, chemical weapons programs, and delivery systems contain extensive discussion of the problem of inadequate "human intelligence" for intelligence gathering in Iraq. There is discussion of
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Committee Chairman Pat Roberts told NBC's Tim Russert that "Curveball really provided 98 percent of the assessment as to whether or not the Iraqis had a biological weapon." This was in despite the fact that "nobody inside the U.S. government had ever actually spoken to the
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Over the next several months the U.S. conducted a diplomatic effort at the United Nations, seeking to obtain that body's approval for a new WMD inspection regime, and, potentially, for the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government. The UN Security Council passed
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After learning the intelligence provided by Curveball was going to be used as the "backbone" of the case for war, the Pentagon analyst wrote a letter to the CIA expressing his concerns. The Deputy of the CIA Counter Proliferation Unit quickly responded by saying:
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she had sent to Senator Roberts, saying, in part, "I am increasingly dismayed by the delay in completing the Committee's 'Phase II' investigation into intelligence prior to the Iraq War.... I stand ready to participate in this investigation in any way possible."
1184:, Washington Post, September 7, 2006. Article discussing the current status of phase two, with two parts due to be released soon (and in fact, those two parts were released September 8), and other portions not to be released before the November, 2006 election. 31:, February 5, 2003. CIA Director George Tenet (left) and UN Ambassador John Negroponte look on from behind. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that many of the allegations in the speech were not supported by the underlying intelligence. 328:
on July 9, 2004. The report did not cover most of the new topics announced in the February 12, 2004, press release; instead, those topics were now to be covered in a separate report, to be completed later, covering "phase two" of the investigation.
1177:, New York Times, August 3, 2006. Article describing the current status of phase two of the report, including a complaint by Sen. Pat Roberts that the White House is taking too long to declassify portions of the report that have been completed. 597:
this investigation and I fully expect him to fulfill his commitment.... While the completion of phase two is long overdue, the committee has continued this important work, and I expect that we will finish the review in the very near future."
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tubes could be intended for constructing centrifuges for a uranium-enrichment program (i.e., for a restarted Iraqi nuclear weapons program); analysts in the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense considered that to be unlikely.
710:"There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate." 1121: 1111:(November 28, 2003) An article defending the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD. The article is by Stuart A. Cohen, who was acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time the NIE was prepared. 325: 569:
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) was also critical of the Bush administration in his additional view, giving a list of public statements by senior members of the administration that misstated and exaggerated the underlying intelligence on Iraq.
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reported that the part of the phase two report comparing the Bush administration's public statements about Saddam Hussein with the evidence senior officials reviewed in private would not be released before the November 2006 election.
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that the completed report had been unanimously approved by the Committee's members, and that they were working with the CIA on the issue of declassification. The completed report, with blacked-out text ("redactions") made by the CIA,
417:"Let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say. The Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about." 1000:"Senate Report on Intelligence Activities Relating To Iraq Conducted By The Policy of Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy" 153:
the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own
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whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence
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any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
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Senator Olympia Snow (R-ME) wrote in her additional view that the Committee's report revealed poor management and a lack of accountability in the intelligence community, and she called for strong reforms.
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taking place, the U.S. continued to lobby the members of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq. As part of that effort U.S. Secretary of State
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Over the ensuing year, U.S. and allied forces searched for evidence supporting the pre-invasion claims about Iraqi WMD stockpiles and programs. The lead role in this search was played by the
1533: 431: 28: 275:, and other federal entities involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The Committee also held a series of hearings on the intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorism. 616:
have – we have Ambassador Negroponte next week, we have General Mike Hayden next week. We have other hot-spot hearings or other things going on that are very important."
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The "most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons."
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of an exploratory meeting held in Rome in 2001 between two DOD officials and two Iranians. Writing for the Minority Opinion as part of the report it was stated that
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The report's first conclusion points to widespread flaws in the October 2002 NIE, and attributes those flaws to failure by analysts in the intelligence community:
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Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) used her additional view to argue for a number of specific structural and procedural reforms in the intelligence community.
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The additional view by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), was critical of the Bush administration, saying it "did not fairly represent the intelligence."
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This additional view also discusses the question of pressure on analysts, and recommends caution in implementing reforms in the intelligence community.
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the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments;
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Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) focused on the need for greater accountability for the intelligence failures identified in the report.
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After Democrats gained a majority in the Senate during the 2006 midterm election, chairmanship of the committee passed to Sen.
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on "the intelligence committee's progress of the phase two review of the prewar intelligence and its schedule for completion."
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informant – except Pentagon analyst, who concluded the man was an alcoholic and utterly useless as a source."
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The following nine Republicans were members of the Committee at the time the investigation was launched: Committee Chairman
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Much of the Committee's investigation in this area concerned the CIA's preparation and distribution of a document titled
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Committee staff also interviewed more than 200 people, including intelligence analysts and senior officials with the
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the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
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the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;
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President George W. Bush addresses the nation from the Oval Office, March 19, 2003, to announce the beginning of
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Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments
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whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and
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focuses much of its attention on the October, 2002, classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled
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whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;
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In the first "additional view" attached to the report, Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS), joined by Senators
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the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
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All attacks listed in this group were either committed by insurgents, or have unknown perpetrators
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twice alleged that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or its former head
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The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress
5087: 4861: 4369: 4064: 4049: 3826: 3780: 3552: 3512: 3419: 2994: 2723: 2673: 2551: 2470: 2266: 2261: 2256: 2119: 1980: 1516: 1451: 1407: 1390: 1363: 1134:(July 9, 2004) Article on the controversy regarding CIA redactions of the Committee report. 497: 91: 80: 4281: 635:
On April 26, 2006, an article by journalist Alexander Bolton in the Congressional journal
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whether statements by US Government officials were substantiated by intelligence reports
584:
At the time of the report's release (July 9, 2004), Democratic members of the committee
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Analysts' Warnings of Iraq Chaos Detailed, Senate Panel Releases Assessments From 2003
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of the scope of the investigation. The new elements added to the investigation were:
135: 1006: 458:
President George Bush, surrounded by leaders of the House and Senate, announces the
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Transcript from NBC's Meet the Press appearance by Senators Roberts and Rockefeller
1100:
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
243: 223: 112:
abandoned the effort to obtain an explicit use-of-force authorization from the UN.
1055:"Kucinich Calls for Impeachment In Final Stage of Presidency – The Hilltop Online" 5067: 5013: 5008: 4768: 3315: 3055: 2556: 2444: 2299: 2284: 2072: 1131: 975: 957: 939: 921: 904: 898: 883: 865: 737: 714: 700: 677:
On May 25, 2007, the committee released a volume of the phase II report titled, "
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Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq
349:
General conclusions on intelligence relating to Iraq's WMD and ties to terrorism
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On April 10, 2005, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller appeared together on NBC's
214:
The following eight Democrats made up the rest of the Committee: Vice-Chairman
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contained in the additional view by Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin.
395: 196: 838: 605: 320: 279: 4971: 4966: 4961: 4956: 4951: 4946: 4941: 4936: 4931: 4668: 4408: 4321: 1656: 733: 239: 131:, an action that led to the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein. 108: 76: 24: 623:
On August 2, 2005, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) released the text of a
379:
Iraqi aluminum tubes § Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
166:
other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review.
5072: 4441: 2042: 1150: 1102:(July 9, 2004). United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence. 753: 667: 612: 526: 256: 231: 208: 200: 184: 180: 176: 142: 1115:
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council
651:
Two volumes of the phase II report were released on September 8, 2006: "
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Phase II of the report was publicly released on Thursday June 5, 2008
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A September 7, 2006, article by journalist Jonathon Weisman in the
544: 188: 68: 1103: 807:. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. March 19, 2003. 432:
Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council
713:
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.
699:
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.
721:
may have engaged in unlawful activities, Phase II of the report
563:
from policymakers to alter any of their judgments or analyses."
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announced that he would launch airstrikes on Iraqi targets (see
1368: 16:
2004 report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1138:
Appearance by Senator Pat Roberts at the Woodrow Wilson Center
877:
Pentagon's prewar intelligence role questioned – Jul 11, 2004
579: 511: 978:. Washingtonpost.com (2006-09-07). Retrieved on 2013-08-16. 942:. Washingtonpost.com (2005-11-02). Retrieved on 2013-08-16. 90:
became president in January 2001, and especially after the
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Latest Intelligence Report Yet Another Smoking Gun on Bush
600:
In a statement regarding the release of the report of the
535: 396:
Biological weapons, chemical weapons, and delivery systems
343:
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
255:
White House denied that request. An article by journalist
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Panel Set to Release Just Part of Report On Run-Up to War
969:
Panel Set to Release Just Part of Report On Run-Up to War
47:'s assessments of Iraq during the time leading up to the 141:
As these facts were emerging in June 2003, U.S. Senator
1122:
News Conference on Senate Intelligence Committee Report
1109:
Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths
278:
On February 12, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller
5094:
The Iraq War: A Historiography of Knowledge Changelogs
4815:"The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time" 372: 1940: 363:, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence. 170: 41:
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
520: 1140:(March 10, 2005) (includes link to streaming video) 470: 319:On June 17, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller 303:
prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
4122:United States and the International Criminal Court 1080:"House waves off impeachment measure against Bush" 679:Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq 425: 5177: 3235: 894: 892: 786:United Nations Security Council and the Iraq War 545:Senators Chambliss, Hatch, Lott, Hagel, and Bond 449: 4836:Afghan–Iraqi Freedom Memorial (Salem, Oregon) 4391: 1215: 1175:Senator Faults Bid to Classify Report on Iraq 889: 740:D-Ohio introduced a formal resolution to the 96:joint resolution authorizing the use of force 3377:Use of white phosphorus by the United States 835:U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 5201:Works about the Central Intelligence Agency 886:. Edition.cnn.com. Retrieved on 2013-08-16. 620:my view; it shouldn't be viewed that way." 127:On March 20, 2003, the U.S. and its allies 2335: 1222: 1208: 1145:Roberts calls for constant change in intel 1124:(transcript). (The Washington Post has an 1025:"Democrats Won't Try To Impeach President" 994: 992: 990: 988: 986: 984: 4511:A Responsible Plan to End the War in Iraq 1022: 553: 2310:Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation 1229: 453: 114: 18: 5206:Reports of the United States government 4796: 2802: 2305:Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order 1158:Plame's Input is Cited on Niger Mission 981: 536:Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin 440: 147:Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 98:was passed by both houses of Congress. 37:Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence 29:presentation to the UN Security Council 5178: 5110:U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East 4904:Iraqi security forces fatality reports 4851:Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial 4846:Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial (London) 4498:Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan 4428: 2135:Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance 332: 27:displays a vial of anthrax during his 4992: 4649: 4192: 3224: 3187:Turkish incursions into northern Iraq 2334: 2012: 1682: 1252: 1203: 1126:alternate URL for the same transcript 1035:from the original on January 14, 2021 805:"President Bush Addresses the Nation" 705:press release of report's publication 5196:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction 5162: 2440:Capture of Saddam Hussein (Red Dawn) 1560:UK parliament's support for invasion 1168:GOP Angered by Closed Senate Session 1166:Charles Babington and Dafna Linzer, 933:GOP Angered by Closed Senate Session 771:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction 5024:"Enhanced interrogation techniques" 1023:Babington, Charles (May 12, 2006). 604:on March 31, 2005, Senator Roberts 373:Niger and the Iraqi nuclear program 13: 4359:Scott Thomas Beauchamp controversy 1082:. Associated Press. Archived from 811:from the original on June 29, 2019 171:Investigation committee membership 14: 5222: 5019:Efforts to impeach George W. Bush 4884:Aviation shootdowns and accidents 4650: 4399:Senate Report on WMD Intelligence 4134:Prosecution for the 2003 invasion 3280:Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre 1479:Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory 1093: 521:Senators Roberts, Hatch, and Bond 500:had been present in Baghdad, and 477:Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory 5161: 5152: 5144: 5143: 5134: 4289:Violence against Iraqi academics 3286:Haifa Street helicopter incident 2734:Valiant Guardian (Harris Ba'sil) 2013: 1156:Schmidt, Susan (July 9, 2004). 1143:Shaun Waterman (March 10, 2005) 580:"Phase two" of the investigation 471:Iraq's alleged links to al-Qaeda 5135: 4909:Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards 4436:Pre-war international reactions 2242:Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 1952:Coalition Provisional Authority 1607:Saddam Hussein and human rights 1120:New York Times (July 9, 2004). 1072: 1047: 1016: 666:(D-WV). The former chair, Sen. 512:The report's "additional views" 426:Colin Powell's speech to the UN 4758:"Smoking gun / mushroom cloud" 4344:Kidnapping of Angelo dela Cruz 3847:Attacks on Christians in Mosul 3275:Murder of Muhamad Husain Kadir 3225: 1534:Colin Powell's UN presentation 1104:http://intelligence.senate.gov 962: 945: 926: 909: 870: 853: 823: 797: 1: 5046:Guantanamo Bay detention camp 5004:Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 4894:Coalition military operations 4622:U.S.-led intervention in Iraq 2940:Baghdad International Airport 1932:U.S. kill or capture strategy 1759:2006 al-Askari mosque bombing 1309:Chemical attacks against Iran 791: 249: 62: 5029:Torture in the United States 4775:"There are unknown unknowns" 4307:Post-invasion WMD conjecture 3736:2007 Karbala mosque bombings 3438:Killing of Manadel al-Jamadi 3432:Death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush 3310:Mahmudiyah rape and killings 3257:U.S. killings of journalists 2750:Defeat Al Qaeda in the North 1969:2005 parliamentary elections 1683: 781:Iraq Intelligence Commission 592:On March 10, 2005, during a 450:The October 2002 white paper 7: 5211:Defense Intelligence Agency 5063:Military–industrial complex 4993: 4105:Torture by the Wolf Brigade 2182:Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan 2172:Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 2165:Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah 1843:Mission Accomplished speech 1501:Oil as a possible rationale 1253: 759: 602:presidential WMD commission 594:question-and-answer session 491:Iraqi Support for Terrorism 269:Defense Intelligence Agency 265:Central Intelligence Agency 45:U.S. intelligence community 10: 5227: 5078:Petrodollar warfare theory 4193: 4090:Raid on Camp Ashraf (2011) 3548:Karbala and Najaf bombings 3269:Killing of Nadhem Abdullah 1786:Status of forces agreement 1575:Legitimacy of the invasion 1132:CIA whites out controversy 474: 429: 376: 5132: 4999: 4988: 4922: 4914:Private contractor deaths 4871: 4856:Old North Memorial Garden 4828: 4737:Old Europe and New Europe 4660: 4656: 4645: 4591: 4525: 4421: 4364:MoveOn.org ad controversy 4297: 4243:Al-Aimmah Bridge disaster 4221:Iraq Family Health Survey 4203: 4199: 4188: 4168: 4114: 4082: 3992: 3921: 3855: 3794: 3771:Al-Khilani mosque bombing 3663: 3617: 3566: 3500: 3469: 3457: 3386: 3367: 3322:Baghdad detainee killings 3242: 3231: 3220: 3179: 3158: 3120: 3064: 3023: 2982: 2901: 2795: 2788: 2768: 2742: 2631: 2575: 2509: 2453: 2355: 2348: 2344: 2330: 2275: 2216: 2187:Black Banner Organization 2110: 2101: 2025: 2021: 2008: 1927:Al Qa'qaa high explosives 1856: 1813:Preparations for invasion 1796: 1733:Capture of Saddam Hussein 1693: 1689: 1678: 1615: 1595:Saddam's alleged shredder 1509: 1432: 1329: 1272: 1265: 1261: 1248: 1238: 5105:Unitary executive theory 4809:Inverted totalitarianism 4699:Coalition of the willing 4549:Bring Them Home Now Tour 4448:Saddam Hussein interview 3252:During the 2003 invasion 2192:Wakefulness and Holy War 2150:Mujahideen Shura Council 2125:1920 Revolution Brigades 1590:Rapid response operation 1585:Military analyst program 1551:Failed peace initiatives 742:House of Representatives 145:(R-KS), chairman of the 23:U.S. Secretary of State 5051:Gulf of Tonkin incident 5036:Extraordinary rendition 4764:Star Spangled Ice Cream 4488:Oprah's Anti-war series 4354:Al Jazeera bombing memo 4312:Iraq scandal in Finland 3984:Baghdad church massacre 3671:Mustansiriya University 3487:Imam Ali mosque bombing 3444:Death of Fashad Mohamed 3334:Iraqi bodyguard killing 2203:Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army 1976:Transitional Government 1957:Iraqi Governing Council 1413:U.S. War in Afghanistan 1290:1979 Ba'ath Party Purge 776:Iraq disarmament crisis 121:Operation Iraqi Freedom 57:Office of Special Plans 4095:Archaeological looting 3655:Hayy Al-Jihad massacre 3635:Buratha mosque bombing 3352:Nisour Square massacre 1833:Battle of Debecka Pass 1706:Occupation (2003–2011) 1565:Iraqi–Kurdish conflict 1379:Oil-for-Food Programme 1354:Sanctions against Iraq 903:June 14, 2007, at the 732:Despite House Speaker 554:Other additional views 463: 280:announced an expansion 124: 32: 5191:2003 invasion of Iraq 5120:Ba'ath Party archives 4725:"Mother of All Bombs" 4517:Bush shoeing incident 4461:Views on the invasion 4317:Dixie Chicks comments 4260:2007 cholera outbreak 3766:Al-Askari mosque 2007 3740:Massacres of Yazidis 3630:Al-Askari mosque 2006 3426:Killing of Baha Mousa 3340:Iron Triangle Murders 3298:Basra prison incident 3077:Karbala provincial HQ 2177:Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna 2155:Islamic State of Iraq 1769:2007 U.S. troop surge 1304:U.S. support for Iraq 956:May 13, 2006, at the 882:May 16, 2021, at the 864:May 16, 2008, at the 475:Further information: 457: 377:Further information: 273:Department of Defense 118: 49:2003 invasion of Iraq 22: 5088:Special Relationship 4862:Saving Iraqi Culture 4370:Six Days in Fallujah 4332:Death of David Kelly 4055:Al Diwaniyah bombing 3528:2004 church bombings 3492:Baghdad October 2003 3420:Death of Nagem Hatab 2755:Augurs of Prosperity 2262:Promised Day Brigade 2120:Islamic Army in Iraq 1868:Occupation of Ramadi 1838:Firdos Square statue 1818:Multi-National Force 1652:Bush–Blair 2003 memo 1517:American imperialism 1408:2001 anthrax attacks 1391:September 11 attacks 920:May 6, 2005, at the 498:Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 441:Pressure on analysts 361:analytic trade craft 92:September 11 attacks 81:Operation Desert Fox 4841:Al-Shaheed Monument 4710:Embedded journalism 4676:Outposts of tyranny 4574:2007 Port of Tacoma 4466:U.S. public opinion 4255:Humanitarian crisis 4140:Abtan v. Blackwater 3999:Nationwide attacks 3928:Nationwide attacks 3749:Qahtaniyah bombings 3639:Sadr City bombings 3558:Kufa mosque bombing 3135:Iraqi Day of Ashura 1895:U.S. military bases 1823:Battle of Nasiriyah 1764:Civil war (2006–08) 1646:Letter of the eight 1630:Downing Street memo 1374:Arms-to-Iraq affair 1029:The Washington Post 333:Phase I conclusions 5186:Iraq War documents 4579:September 15, 2007 4559:September 24, 2005 4349:2004 document leak 4147:Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 4127:Hague Invasion Act 3898:Baghdad–Miqdadiyah 3786:Al Amarah bombings 3625:Karbala and Ramadi 3292:Tal Afar shootings 3150:Al-Qaeda offensive 2935:Good Friday ambush 2925:Siege of Sadr City 2486:Phantom Linebacker 2476:New Dawn (Al Fajr) 2252:Soldiers of Heaven 2130:Jaish al-Rashideen 1964:Interim Government 1873:De-Ba'athification 1539:Disarmament crisis 1527:Wolfowitz Doctrine 1472:Mobile weapon labs 1457:Biological weapons 1447:Yellowcake uranium 1342:Invasion of Kuwait 1321:Iran–Contra affair 1285:Iranian Revolution 1280:17 July Revolution 1180:Jonathon Weisman, 1161:washingtonpost.com 1147:(Washington Times) 974:2019-09-23 at the 938:2021-08-04 at the 586:expressed the hope 464: 125: 33: 5173: 5172: 5128: 5127: 4984: 4983: 4980: 4979: 4824: 4823: 4781:Triangle of Death 4641: 4640: 4637: 4636: 4592:Aftermath in Iraq 4539:February 15, 2003 4493:Iraqi map pendant 4456: 4455: 4417: 4416: 4238:Damage to Baghdad 4184: 4183: 4180: 4179: 4100:Chlorine bombings 4078: 4077: 4035:Arba'een bombings 3842:Balad Ruz bombing 3675:Baghdad bombings 3609:Khanaqin bombings 3588:Baghdad bombings 3532:Baghdad bombings 3477:Jordanian embassy 3453: 3452: 3396:Abu Ghraib prison 3346:Baghdad airstrike 3328:Hamdania incident 3262:Fallujah killings 3236:Occupation forces 3216: 3215: 3212: 3211: 3175: 3174: 2915:Karbala City Hall 2893:Ramadan Offensive 2883: 2882: 2784: 2783: 2517:Able Rising Force 2368:Bayonet Lightning 2326: 2325: 2322: 2321: 2318: 2317: 2267:Kata'ib Hezbollah 2257:Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq 2237:Badr Organization 2004: 2003: 2000: 1999: 1996: 1995: 1848:US public opinion 1674: 1673: 1670: 1669: 1635:September Dossier 1428: 1427: 1347:Nayirah testimony 1240:Beginning of the 1086:on June 13, 2008. 833:(Press release). 744:in an attempt to 136:Iraq Survey Group 75:, U.S. President 5218: 5165: 5164: 5156: 5147: 5146: 5138: 5137: 4990: 4989: 4804:Global arrogance 4794: 4793: 4658: 4657: 4647: 4646: 4616:War against ISIL 4599:The rise of ISIL 4564:January 27, 2007 4554:January 20, 2005 4426: 4425: 4389: 4388: 4277:Iraqi Christians 4201: 4200: 4190: 4189: 4083:Other war crimes 4014:Bagdad bombings 3943:Bagdad bombings 3862:Bagdad bombings 3801:Bagdad bombings 3731:Iraqi Parliament 3584:Musayyib bombing 3467: 3466: 3304:Haditha massacre 3240: 3239: 3233: 3232: 3222: 3221: 2800: 2799: 2793: 2792: 2623:Together Forward 2496:Vigilant Resolve 2430:Peninsula Strike 2353: 2352: 2346: 2345: 2332: 2331: 2247:Sheibani Network 2160:Al-Qaeda in Iraq 2108: 2107: 2023: 2022: 2010: 2009: 1938: 1937: 1910:Development Fund 1691: 1690: 1680: 1679: 1657:February Dossier 1462:Chemical weapons 1270: 1269: 1263: 1262: 1250: 1249: 1224: 1217: 1210: 1201: 1200: 1153:(April 10, 2005) 1088: 1087: 1076: 1070: 1069: 1067: 1066: 1057:. Archived from 1051: 1045: 1044: 1042: 1040: 1020: 1014: 1013: 1011: 1005:. Archived from 1004: 996: 979: 966: 960: 949: 943: 930: 924: 913: 907: 896: 887: 874: 868: 857: 851: 850: 848: 846: 837:. Archived from 827: 821: 820: 818: 816: 801: 244:Barbara Mikulski 224:Dianne Feinstein 5226: 5225: 5221: 5220: 5219: 5217: 5216: 5215: 5176: 5175: 5174: 5169: 5124: 5068:Neoconservatism 5014:CIA black sites 5009:Chelsea Manning 4995: 4976: 4918: 4867: 4820: 4792: 4769:Strategic reset 4752:"Sixteen Words" 4652: 4633: 4587: 4521: 4452: 4413: 4409:Chilcot Inquiry 4387: 4299: 4293: 4216:Iraq Body Count 4195: 4176: 4164: 4110: 4074: 4050:Samarra bombing 3988: 3917: 3851: 3790: 3659: 3613: 3562: 3513:Ashura massacre 3496: 3461: 3449: 3388: 3382: 3369: 3363: 3316:Ishaqi massacre 3244: 3227: 3208: 3171: 3154: 3129:Spring fighting 3116: 3060: 3019: 2978: 2909:Spring fighting 2897: 2879: 2780: 2764: 2760:Phantom Phoenix 2738: 2699:Phantom Thunder 2679:Marne Avalanche 2627: 2571: 2505: 2466:Bulldog Mammoth 2449: 2425:Panther Squeeze 2418:Airborne Dragon 2383:Desert Scorpion 2373:Bulldog Mammoth 2363:Ancient Babylon 2340: 2314: 2300:Al-Abud Network 2285:Fedayeen Saddam 2277: 2271: 2218: 2212: 2208:Mujahideen Army 2112: 2103: 2097: 2017: 1992: 1943: 1936: 1917:Economic reform 1859: 1852: 1828:Fall of Baghdad 1799: 1792: 1781:U.S. withdrawal 1701:Invasion (2003) 1685: 1666: 1662:Bush–Aznar memo 1617: 1611: 1556:Iraq resolution 1505: 1424: 1325: 1257: 1244: 1234: 1228: 1173:Mark Mazzetti, 1096: 1091: 1078: 1077: 1073: 1064: 1062: 1053: 1052: 1048: 1038: 1036: 1021: 1017: 1009: 1002: 998: 997: 982: 976:Wayback Machine 967: 963: 958:Wayback Machine 950: 946: 940:Wayback Machine 931: 927: 922:Wayback Machine 914: 910: 905:Wayback Machine 897: 890: 884:Wayback Machine 875: 871: 866:Wayback Machine 858: 854: 844: 842: 841:on 27 June 2003 831:"Press Release" 829: 828: 824: 814: 812: 803: 802: 798: 794: 762: 738:Dennis Kucinich 715:Jay Rockefeller 701:Jay Rockefeller 664:Jay Rockefeller 645:Washington Post 582: 556: 547: 538: 523: 514: 479: 473: 452: 443: 434: 428: 398: 381: 375: 351: 339:511-page report 335: 252: 216:Jay Rockefeller 205:Saxby Chambliss 173: 104:resolution 1441 67:After the 1991 65: 43:concerning the 17: 12: 11: 5: 5224: 5214: 5213: 5208: 5203: 5198: 5193: 5188: 5171: 5170: 5133: 5130: 5129: 5126: 5125: 5123: 5122: 5117: 5112: 5107: 5102: 5097: 5090: 5085: 5080: 5075: 5070: 5065: 5060: 5059: 5058: 5048: 5043: 5038: 5033: 5032: 5031: 5021: 5016: 5011: 5006: 5000: 4997: 4996: 4986: 4985: 4982: 4981: 4978: 4977: 4975: 4974: 4969: 4964: 4959: 4954: 4949: 4944: 4939: 4934: 4928: 4926: 4920: 4919: 4917: 4916: 4911: 4906: 4901: 4896: 4891: 4886: 4881: 4879:Assassinations 4875: 4873: 4869: 4868: 4866: 4865: 4858: 4853: 4848: 4843: 4838: 4832: 4830: 4826: 4825: 4822: 4821: 4819: 4818: 4811: 4806: 4800: 4798: 4791: 4790: 4783: 4778: 4771: 4766: 4761: 4754: 4749: 4744: 4739: 4734: 4731:"Mrs. Anthrax" 4727: 4722: 4717: 4712: 4707: 4702: 4695: 4692:"Chemical Ali" 4688: 4681: 4680: 4679: 4664: 4662: 4654: 4653: 4643: 4642: 4639: 4638: 4635: 4634: 4632: 4631: 4630:(2017–present) 4625: 4619: 4618:(2014–present) 4613: 4607: 4601: 4595: 4593: 4589: 4588: 4586: 4584:March 19, 2008 4581: 4576: 4571: 4569:March 17, 2007 4566: 4561: 4556: 4551: 4546: 4544:March 20, 2003 4541: 4536: 4534:Halloween 2002 4531: 4529: 4523: 4522: 4520: 4519: 4514: 4507: 4500: 4495: 4490: 4485: 4483:United Nations 4480: 4475: 4470: 4469: 4468: 4457: 4454: 4453: 4451: 4450: 4445: 4438: 4432: 4430: 4423: 4419: 4418: 4415: 4414: 4412: 4411: 4406: 4404:Duelfer Report 4401: 4395: 4393: 4392:Investigations 4386: 4385: 4384: 4383: 4376:Role of Canada 4373: 4366: 4361: 4356: 4351: 4346: 4341: 4340: 4339: 4337:Hutton Inquiry 4329: 4324: 4319: 4314: 4309: 4303: 4301: 4295: 4294: 4292: 4291: 4286: 4285: 4284: 4279: 4269: 4267:Financial cost 4264: 4263: 4262: 4252: 4247: 4246: 4245: 4235: 4234: 4233: 4228: 4226:Lancet surveys 4223: 4218: 4207: 4205: 4197: 4196: 4186: 4185: 4182: 4181: 4178: 4177: 4169: 4166: 4165: 4163: 4162: 4157: 4150: 4143: 4136: 4131: 4130: 4129: 4118: 4116: 4112: 4111: 4109: 4108: 4102: 4097: 4092: 4086: 4084: 4080: 4079: 4076: 4075: 4073: 4072: 4067: 4062: 4057: 4052: 4047: 4045:Al Hillah 2011 4042: 4040:Tikrit assault 4037: 4032: 4031: 4030: 4025: 4020: 4012: 4011: 4010: 4005: 3996: 3994: 3990: 3989: 3987: 3986: 3981: 3976: 3975: 3974: 3969: 3964: 3959: 3954: 3949: 3941: 3940: 3939: 3934: 3925: 3923: 3919: 3918: 3916: 3915: 3910: 3905: 3900: 3895: 3894: 3893: 3888: 3883: 3878: 3873: 3868: 3859: 3857: 3853: 3852: 3850: 3849: 3844: 3839: 3837:Dujail bombing 3834: 3829: 3824: 3819: 3818: 3817: 3812: 3807: 3798: 3796: 3792: 3791: 3789: 3788: 3783: 3778: 3776:Amirli bombing 3773: 3768: 3763: 3758: 3753: 3752: 3751: 3746: 3744:April massacre 3738: 3733: 3728: 3723: 3721:Al Hillah 2007 3718: 3717: 3716: 3711: 3706: 3701: 3696: 3691: 3686: 3681: 3673: 3667: 3665: 3661: 3660: 3658: 3657: 3652: 3651: 3650: 3645: 3637: 3632: 3627: 3621: 3619: 3615: 3614: 3612: 3611: 3606: 3601: 3600: 3599: 3594: 3586: 3581: 3576: 3574:Al Hillah 2005 3570: 3568: 3564: 3563: 3561: 3560: 3555: 3550: 3545: 3544: 3543: 3538: 3530: 3525: 3520: 3515: 3510: 3504: 3502: 3498: 3497: 3495: 3494: 3489: 3484: 3479: 3473: 3471: 3464: 3460:Other killings 3455: 3454: 3451: 3450: 3448: 3447: 3441: 3435: 3429: 3423: 3417: 3414:Balad Air Base 3411: 3405: 3399: 3392: 3390: 3384: 3383: 3381: 3380: 3373: 3371: 3365: 3364: 3362: 3361: 3355: 3349: 3343: 3337: 3331: 3325: 3319: 3313: 3307: 3301: 3295: 3289: 3283: 3277: 3272: 3266: 3265: 3264: 3259: 3248: 3246: 3237: 3229: 3228: 3218: 3217: 3214: 3213: 3210: 3209: 3207: 3206: 3204:Abu Kamal raid 3201: 3200: 3199: 3194: 3183: 3181: 3180:Related events 3177: 3176: 3173: 3172: 3170: 3169: 3162: 3160: 3156: 3155: 3153: 3152: 3147: 3142: 3137: 3132: 3124: 3122: 3118: 3117: 3115: 3114: 3109: 3104: 3102:Route Bismarck 3099: 3094: 3089: 3084: 3079: 3074: 3068: 3066: 3062: 3061: 3059: 3058: 3053: 3048: 3043: 3038: 3033: 3027: 3025: 3021: 3020: 3018: 3017: 3012: 3007: 3002: 2997: 2992: 2986: 2984: 2980: 2979: 2977: 2972: 2967: 2962: 2957: 2952: 2947: 2942: 2937: 2932: 2927: 2922: 2917: 2912: 2905: 2903: 2899: 2898: 2896: 2895: 2890: 2888:Majar al-Kabir 2884: 2881: 2880: 2878: 2877: 2872: 2867: 2862: 2857: 2852: 2847: 2842: 2837: 2832: 2827: 2822: 2817: 2812: 2806: 2804: 2797: 2790: 2786: 2785: 2782: 2781: 2779: 2778: 2772: 2770: 2766: 2765: 2763: 2762: 2757: 2752: 2746: 2744: 2740: 2739: 2737: 2736: 2731: 2726: 2721: 2716: 2714:Saber Guardian 2711: 2706: 2701: 2696: 2694:Phantom Strike 2691: 2686: 2681: 2676: 2671: 2666: 2661: 2659:Commando Eagle 2656: 2651: 2646: 2641: 2635: 2633: 2629: 2628: 2626: 2625: 2620: 2615: 2610: 2605: 2600: 2595: 2593:Guardian Tiger 2590: 2585: 2579: 2577: 2573: 2572: 2570: 2569: 2564: 2559: 2554: 2549: 2544: 2539: 2534: 2529: 2524: 2519: 2513: 2511: 2507: 2506: 2504: 2503: 2501:Warrior's Rage 2498: 2493: 2488: 2483: 2478: 2473: 2468: 2463: 2457: 2455: 2451: 2450: 2448: 2447: 2442: 2437: 2432: 2427: 2422: 2421: 2420: 2413:Northern Delay 2410: 2405: 2400: 2395: 2390: 2385: 2380: 2375: 2370: 2365: 2359: 2357: 2350: 2342: 2341: 2328: 2327: 2324: 2323: 2320: 2319: 2316: 2315: 2313: 2312: 2307: 2302: 2297: 2292: 2287: 2281: 2279: 2273: 2272: 2270: 2269: 2264: 2259: 2254: 2249: 2244: 2239: 2234: 2228: 2222: 2220: 2214: 2213: 2211: 2210: 2205: 2200: 2194: 2189: 2184: 2179: 2174: 2169: 2168: 2167: 2162: 2152: 2147: 2145:Jeish Muhammad 2142: 2137: 2132: 2127: 2122: 2116: 2114: 2105: 2099: 2098: 2096: 2095: 2090: 2088:United Kingdom 2085: 2080: 2075: 2070: 2065: 2060: 2055: 2050: 2045: 2040: 2038:Ba'athist Iraq 2035: 2029: 2027: 2019: 2018: 2006: 2005: 2002: 2001: 1998: 1997: 1994: 1993: 1991: 1990: 1989: 1988: 1978: 1973: 1972: 1971: 1961: 1960: 1959: 1948: 1946: 1935: 1934: 1929: 1924: 1919: 1914: 1913: 1912: 1905:Reconstruction 1902: 1897: 1892: 1891: 1890: 1885: 1880: 1870: 1864: 1862: 1854: 1853: 1851: 1850: 1845: 1840: 1835: 1830: 1825: 1820: 1815: 1810: 1804: 1802: 1794: 1793: 1791: 1790: 1789: 1788: 1778: 1777: 1776: 1766: 1761: 1756: 1755: 1754: 1745: 1740: 1730: 1725: 1723:Anbar campaign 1720: 1719: 1718: 1716:2003–06 period 1708: 1703: 1697: 1695: 1687: 1686: 1676: 1675: 1672: 1671: 1668: 1667: 1665: 1664: 1659: 1654: 1649: 1642: 1640:Vilnius letter 1637: 1632: 1627: 1625:Habbush letter 1621: 1619: 1613: 1612: 1610: 1609: 1604: 1602:Preemptive war 1599: 1598: 1597: 1592: 1587: 1580:Media coverage 1577: 1572: 1567: 1562: 1553: 1548: 1547: 1546: 1536: 1531: 1530: 1529: 1524: 1513: 1511: 1507: 1506: 1504: 1503: 1498: 1497: 1496: 1491: 1486: 1484:Anthrax claims 1476: 1475: 1474: 1469: 1464: 1459: 1454: 1452:Aluminum tubes 1449: 1438: 1436: 1430: 1429: 1426: 1425: 1423: 1422: 1421: 1420: 1410: 1405: 1400: 1399: 1398: 1388: 1387: 1386: 1384:Investigations 1376: 1371: 1366: 1364:1991 uprisings 1361: 1356: 1351: 1350: 1349: 1344: 1333: 1331: 1327: 1326: 1324: 1323: 1318: 1317: 1316: 1314:Anfal campaign 1311: 1306: 1292: 1287: 1282: 1276: 1274: 1267: 1259: 1258: 1246: 1245: 1242:Iraqi conflict 1239: 1236: 1235: 1227: 1226: 1219: 1212: 1204: 1198: 1197: 1191: 1190:(May 26, 2007) 1185: 1178: 1171: 1164: 1154: 1148: 1141: 1135: 1129: 1118: 1112: 1106: 1095: 1094:External links 1092: 1090: 1089: 1071: 1046: 1015: 1012:on 2008-06-11. 980: 961: 944: 925: 908: 888: 869: 852: 822: 795: 793: 790: 789: 788: 783: 778: 773: 768: 761: 758: 750:George W. Bush 613:Meet the Press 581: 578: 555: 552: 546: 543: 537: 534: 522: 519: 513: 510: 502:Ansar al-Islam 472: 469: 451: 448: 442: 439: 430:Main article: 427: 424: 397: 394: 374: 371: 366: 365: 350: 347: 334: 331: 317: 316: 311: 305: 300: 295: 289: 251: 248: 185:Michael DeWine 172: 169: 168: 167: 164: 161: 158: 155: 88:George W. Bush 73:Richard Butler 64: 61: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 5223: 5212: 5209: 5207: 5204: 5202: 5199: 5197: 5194: 5192: 5189: 5187: 5184: 5183: 5181: 5168: 5159: 5155: 5150: 5141: 5131: 5121: 5118: 5116: 5113: 5111: 5108: 5106: 5103: 5101: 5100:Unilateralism 5098: 5096: 5095: 5091: 5089: 5086: 5084: 5081: 5079: 5076: 5074: 5071: 5069: 5066: 5064: 5061: 5057: 5054: 5053: 5052: 5049: 5047: 5044: 5042: 5039: 5037: 5034: 5030: 5027: 5026: 5025: 5022: 5020: 5017: 5015: 5012: 5010: 5007: 5005: 5002: 5001: 4998: 4991: 4987: 4973: 4970: 4968: 4965: 4963: 4960: 4958: 4955: 4953: 4950: 4948: 4945: 4943: 4940: 4938: 4935: 4933: 4930: 4929: 4927: 4925: 4921: 4915: 4912: 4910: 4907: 4905: 4902: 4900: 4899:Documentaries 4897: 4895: 4892: 4890: 4887: 4885: 4882: 4880: 4877: 4876: 4874: 4870: 4864: 4863: 4859: 4857: 4854: 4852: 4849: 4847: 4844: 4842: 4839: 4837: 4834: 4833: 4831: 4827: 4817: 4816: 4812: 4810: 4807: 4805: 4802: 4801: 4799: 4795: 4789: 4788: 4784: 4782: 4779: 4777: 4776: 4772: 4770: 4767: 4765: 4762: 4760: 4759: 4755: 4753: 4750: 4748: 4747:Shock and awe 4745: 4743: 4742:Regime change 4740: 4738: 4735: 4733: 4732: 4728: 4726: 4723: 4721: 4720:Friedman Unit 4718: 4716: 4715:Freedom fries 4713: 4711: 4708: 4706: 4705:Dead checking 4703: 4701: 4700: 4696: 4694: 4693: 4689: 4687: 4686: 4685:"Baghdad Bob" 4682: 4678: 4677: 4673: 4672: 4671: 4670: 4666: 4665: 4663: 4659: 4655: 4651:Miscellaneous 4648: 4644: 4629: 4626: 4623: 4620: 4617: 4614: 4611: 4608: 4605: 4602: 4600: 4597: 4596: 4594: 4590: 4585: 4582: 4580: 4577: 4575: 4572: 4570: 4567: 4565: 4562: 4560: 4557: 4555: 4552: 4550: 4547: 4545: 4542: 4540: 4537: 4535: 4532: 4530: 4528: 4524: 4518: 4515: 4513: 4512: 4508: 4506: 4505: 4501: 4499: 4496: 4494: 4491: 4489: 4486: 4484: 4481: 4479: 4476: 4474: 4471: 4467: 4464: 4463: 4462: 4459: 4458: 4449: 4446: 4444: 4443: 4439: 4437: 4434: 4433: 4431: 4427: 4424: 4420: 4410: 4407: 4405: 4402: 4400: 4397: 4396: 4394: 4390: 4382: 4381:War resisters 4379: 4378: 4377: 4374: 4372: 4371: 4367: 4365: 4362: 4360: 4357: 4355: 4352: 4350: 4347: 4345: 4342: 4338: 4335: 4334: 4333: 4330: 4328: 4325: 4323: 4320: 4318: 4315: 4313: 4310: 4308: 4305: 4304: 4302: 4300:controversies 4296: 4290: 4287: 4283: 4280: 4278: 4275: 4274: 4273: 4270: 4268: 4265: 4261: 4258: 4257: 4256: 4253: 4251: 4248: 4244: 4241: 4240: 4239: 4236: 4232: 4229: 4227: 4224: 4222: 4219: 4217: 4214: 4213: 4212: 4209: 4208: 4206: 4202: 4198: 4191: 4187: 4175: 4173: 4167: 4161: 4160:Taguba Report 4158: 4156: 4155: 4154:Saleh v. Bush 4151: 4149: 4148: 4144: 4142: 4141: 4137: 4135: 4132: 4128: 4125: 4124: 4123: 4120: 4119: 4117: 4113: 4106: 4103: 4101: 4098: 4096: 4093: 4091: 4088: 4087: 4085: 4081: 4071: 4068: 4066: 4063: 4061: 4060:Taji bombings 4058: 4056: 4053: 4051: 4048: 4046: 4043: 4041: 4038: 4036: 4033: 4029: 4026: 4024: 4021: 4019: 4016: 4015: 4013: 4009: 4006: 4004: 4001: 4000: 3998: 3997: 3995: 3991: 3985: 3982: 3980: 3977: 3973: 3970: 3968: 3965: 3963: 3960: 3958: 3955: 3953: 3950: 3948: 3945: 3944: 3942: 3938: 3935: 3933: 3930: 3929: 3927: 3926: 3924: 3920: 3914: 3913:Tal Afar 2009 3911: 3909: 3906: 3904: 3901: 3899: 3896: 3892: 3889: 3887: 3884: 3882: 3879: 3877: 3874: 3872: 3869: 3867: 3864: 3863: 3861: 3860: 3858: 3854: 3848: 3845: 3843: 3840: 3838: 3835: 3833: 3830: 3828: 3825: 3823: 3820: 3816: 3813: 3811: 3808: 3806: 3803: 3802: 3800: 3799: 3797: 3793: 3787: 3784: 3782: 3779: 3777: 3774: 3772: 3769: 3767: 3764: 3762: 3759: 3757: 3754: 3750: 3747: 3745: 3742: 3741: 3739: 3737: 3734: 3732: 3729: 3727: 3726:Tal Afar 2007 3724: 3722: 3719: 3715: 3712: 3710: 3707: 3705: 3702: 3700: 3697: 3695: 3692: 3690: 3687: 3685: 3682: 3680: 3677: 3676: 3674: 3672: 3669: 3668: 3666: 3662: 3656: 3653: 3649: 3646: 3644: 3641: 3640: 3638: 3636: 3633: 3631: 3628: 3626: 3623: 3622: 3620: 3616: 3610: 3607: 3605: 3602: 3598: 3595: 3593: 3590: 3589: 3587: 3585: 3582: 3580: 3577: 3575: 3572: 3571: 3569: 3565: 3559: 3556: 3554: 3551: 3549: 3546: 3542: 3539: 3537: 3534: 3533: 3531: 3529: 3526: 3524: 3521: 3519: 3516: 3514: 3511: 3509: 3506: 3505: 3503: 3499: 3493: 3490: 3488: 3485: 3483: 3480: 3478: 3475: 3474: 3472: 3468: 3465: 3463: 3456: 3445: 3442: 3439: 3436: 3433: 3430: 3427: 3424: 3421: 3418: 3415: 3412: 3409: 3406: 3403: 3400: 3397: 3394: 3393: 3391: 3385: 3378: 3375: 3374: 3372: 3366: 3359: 3358:Iraq War Logs 3356: 3353: 3350: 3347: 3344: 3341: 3338: 3335: 3332: 3329: 3326: 3323: 3320: 3317: 3314: 3311: 3308: 3305: 3302: 3299: 3296: 3293: 3290: 3287: 3284: 3281: 3278: 3276: 3273: 3270: 3267: 3263: 3260: 3258: 3255: 3254: 3253: 3250: 3249: 3247: 3241: 3238: 3234: 3230: 3223: 3219: 3205: 3202: 3198: 3195: 3193: 3190: 3189: 3188: 3185: 3184: 3182: 3178: 3167: 3164: 3163: 3161: 3157: 3151: 3148: 3146: 3143: 3141: 3138: 3136: 3133: 3131: 3130: 3126: 3125: 3123: 3119: 3113: 3110: 3108: 3107:Donkey Island 3105: 3103: 3100: 3098: 3095: 3093: 3090: 3088: 3085: 3083: 3080: 3078: 3075: 3073: 3070: 3069: 3067: 3063: 3057: 3054: 3052: 3049: 3047: 3044: 3042: 3039: 3037: 3034: 3032: 3029: 3028: 3026: 3022: 3016: 3013: 3011: 3008: 3006: 3003: 3001: 2998: 2996: 2993: 2991: 2990:Lake Tharthar 2988: 2987: 2985: 2981: 2976: 2973: 2971: 2968: 2966: 2963: 2961: 2958: 2956: 2953: 2951: 2948: 2946: 2943: 2941: 2938: 2936: 2933: 2931: 2928: 2926: 2923: 2921: 2918: 2916: 2913: 2911: 2910: 2906: 2904: 2900: 2894: 2891: 2889: 2886: 2885: 2876: 2873: 2871: 2868: 2866: 2863: 2861: 2858: 2856: 2853: 2851: 2848: 2846: 2843: 2841: 2838: 2836: 2833: 2831: 2828: 2826: 2823: 2821: 2818: 2816: 2813: 2811: 2808: 2807: 2805: 2801: 2798: 2794: 2791: 2787: 2777: 2774: 2773: 2771: 2767: 2761: 2758: 2756: 2753: 2751: 2748: 2747: 2745: 2741: 2735: 2732: 2730: 2727: 2725: 2722: 2720: 2717: 2715: 2712: 2710: 2707: 2705: 2704:Polar Tempest 2702: 2700: 2697: 2695: 2692: 2690: 2687: 2685: 2682: 2680: 2677: 2675: 2672: 2670: 2667: 2665: 2664:Forsythe Park 2662: 2660: 2657: 2655: 2652: 2650: 2647: 2645: 2642: 2640: 2637: 2636: 2634: 2630: 2624: 2621: 2619: 2616: 2614: 2611: 2609: 2606: 2604: 2601: 2599: 2598:Iron Triangle 2596: 2594: 2591: 2589: 2586: 2584: 2581: 2580: 2578: 2574: 2568: 2567:Steel Curtain 2565: 2563: 2560: 2558: 2557:Spear (Romhe) 2555: 2553: 2550: 2548: 2545: 2543: 2540: 2538: 2535: 2533: 2530: 2528: 2525: 2523: 2520: 2518: 2515: 2514: 2512: 2508: 2502: 2499: 2497: 2494: 2492: 2491:Plymouth Rock 2489: 2487: 2484: 2482: 2479: 2477: 2474: 2472: 2469: 2467: 2464: 2462: 2459: 2458: 2456: 2452: 2446: 2443: 2441: 2438: 2436: 2433: 2431: 2428: 2426: 2423: 2419: 2416: 2415: 2414: 2411: 2409: 2406: 2404: 2401: 2399: 2396: 2394: 2391: 2389: 2388:Desert Thrust 2386: 2384: 2381: 2379: 2376: 2374: 2371: 2369: 2366: 2364: 2361: 2360: 2358: 2354: 2351: 2347: 2343: 2339: 2333: 2329: 2311: 2308: 2306: 2303: 2301: 2298: 2296: 2293: 2291: 2288: 2286: 2283: 2282: 2280: 2274: 2268: 2265: 2263: 2260: 2258: 2255: 2253: 2250: 2248: 2245: 2243: 2240: 2238: 2235: 2232: 2229: 2227: 2224: 2223: 2221: 2215: 2209: 2206: 2204: 2201: 2198: 2195: 2193: 2190: 2188: 2185: 2183: 2180: 2178: 2175: 2173: 2170: 2166: 2163: 2161: 2158: 2157: 2156: 2153: 2151: 2148: 2146: 2143: 2141: 2140:Hamas of Iraq 2138: 2136: 2133: 2131: 2128: 2126: 2123: 2121: 2118: 2117: 2115: 2109: 2106: 2100: 2094: 2093:United States 2091: 2089: 2086: 2084: 2081: 2079: 2076: 2074: 2071: 2069: 2066: 2064: 2061: 2059: 2056: 2054: 2051: 2049: 2046: 2044: 2041: 2039: 2036: 2034: 2031: 2030: 2028: 2024: 2020: 2016: 2011: 2007: 1987: 1984: 1983: 1982: 1979: 1977: 1974: 1970: 1967: 1966: 1965: 1962: 1958: 1955: 1954: 1953: 1950: 1949: 1947: 1945: 1939: 1933: 1930: 1928: 1925: 1923: 1920: 1918: 1915: 1911: 1908: 1907: 1906: 1903: 1901: 1898: 1896: 1893: 1889: 1886: 1884: 1881: 1879: 1876: 1875: 1874: 1871: 1869: 1866: 1865: 1863: 1861: 1855: 1849: 1846: 1844: 1841: 1839: 1836: 1834: 1831: 1829: 1826: 1824: 1821: 1819: 1816: 1814: 1811: 1809: 1806: 1805: 1803: 1801: 1795: 1787: 1784: 1783: 1782: 1779: 1775: 1772: 1771: 1770: 1767: 1765: 1762: 1760: 1757: 1753: 1749: 1746: 1744: 1741: 1739: 1738:Interrogation 1736: 1735: 1734: 1731: 1729: 1726: 1724: 1721: 1717: 1714: 1713: 1712: 1709: 1707: 1704: 1702: 1699: 1698: 1696: 1692: 1688: 1681: 1677: 1663: 1660: 1658: 1655: 1653: 1650: 1648: 1647: 1643: 1641: 1638: 1636: 1633: 1631: 1628: 1626: 1623: 1622: 1620: 1614: 1608: 1605: 1603: 1600: 1596: 1593: 1591: 1588: 1586: 1583: 1582: 1581: 1578: 1576: 1573: 1571: 1568: 1566: 1563: 1561: 1557: 1554: 1552: 1549: 1545: 1542: 1541: 1540: 1537: 1535: 1532: 1528: 1525: 1523: 1522:Bush Doctrine 1520: 1519: 1518: 1515: 1514: 1512: 1508: 1502: 1499: 1495: 1492: 1490: 1487: 1485: 1482: 1481: 1480: 1477: 1473: 1470: 1468: 1465: 1463: 1460: 1458: 1455: 1453: 1450: 1448: 1445: 1444: 1443: 1440: 1439: 1437: 1435: 1431: 1419: 1416: 1415: 1414: 1411: 1409: 1406: 1404: 1403:War on terror 1401: 1397: 1394: 1393: 1392: 1389: 1385: 1382: 1381: 1380: 1377: 1375: 1372: 1370: 1367: 1365: 1362: 1360: 1357: 1355: 1352: 1348: 1345: 1343: 1340: 1339: 1338: 1335: 1334: 1332: 1328: 1322: 1319: 1315: 1312: 1310: 1307: 1305: 1301: 1298: 1297: 1296: 1295:Iran–Iraq War 1293: 1291: 1288: 1286: 1283: 1281: 1278: 1277: 1275: 1271: 1268: 1264: 1260: 1256: 1251: 1247: 1243: 1237: 1232: 1225: 1220: 1218: 1213: 1211: 1206: 1205: 1202: 1195: 1192: 1189: 1186: 1183: 1179: 1176: 1172: 1169: 1165: 1162: 1159: 1155: 1152: 1149: 1146: 1142: 1139: 1136: 1133: 1130: 1127: 1123: 1119: 1116: 1113: 1110: 1107: 1105: 1101: 1098: 1097: 1085: 1081: 1075: 1061:on 2008-06-26 1060: 1056: 1050: 1034: 1030: 1026: 1019: 1008: 1001: 995: 993: 991: 989: 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Retrieved 799: 734:Nancy Pelosi 731: 727: 722: 712: 709: 703:, stated in 698: 694: 687: 683: 676: 661: 650: 644: 642: 636: 634: 630: 622: 618: 610: 599: 591: 583: 575: 572: 568: 565: 561: 557: 548: 539: 531: 524: 515: 506: 495: 490: 488: 480: 465: 444: 435: 420: 416: 415: 411: 407: 399: 390: 386: 382: 367: 357: 352: 342: 336: 326:was released 318: 313: 307: 302: 297: 293:information; 291: 286: 277: 262: 253: 240:John Edwards 228:Ronald Wyden 213: 207:(R-GA), and 174: 140: 133: 129:invaded Iraq 126: 109:Colin Powell 100: 85: 77:Bill Clinton 66: 53: 36: 34: 25:Colin Powell 5073:Patriot Act 4787:"Yo, Blair" 4661:Terminology 4624:(2014–2021) 4610:War in Iraq 4442:Khuy Voyne! 4115:Prosecution 4107:(2004–2011) 3908:Kirkuk 2009 3781:Kirkuk 2007 3694:18 February 3689:12 February 3482:Canal Hotel 3416:(2003–2011) 3112:Karbala III 2970:Fallujah II 2960:CIMIC House 2865:Karbala Gap 2835:Haditha Dam 2709:Purple Haze 2684:Marne Torch 2654:Black Eagle 2542:Iron Hammer 2461:Baton Rouge 2398:Iron Hammer 2073:South Korea 1944:governments 1942:Replacement 1883:CPA Order 2 1860:(2003–2011) 1467:"Curveball" 1233:(2003–2011) 754:White House 668:Pat Roberts 527:Orrin Hatch 257:Murray Waas 232:Dick Durbin 209:John Warner 201:Chuck Hagel 181:Orrin Hatch 177:Pat Roberts 143:Pat Roberts 5180:Categories 5167:Multimedia 5056:Resolution 5041:Green Zone 4628:Insurgency 4604:Insurgency 4473:Opposition 4327:Hood event 4231:ORB survey 4211:Casualties 4070:Basra 2011 3822:Balad 2008 3684:3 February 3679:22 January 3604:Balad 2005 3579:Erbil 2005 3523:Mosul 2004 3518:Basra 2004 3508:Erbil 2004 3402:Camp Bucca 3226:War crimes 3166:Palm Grove 3031:Baghdad II 3005:Hit convoy 2995:Abu Ghraib 2920:Fallujah I 2850:Karbala II 2724:Stampede 3 2674:Leyte Gulf 2552:New Market 2471:Iron Saber 2349:Operations 2338:operations 2233:'s militia 2226:Mahdi Army 1900:Blackwater 1878:100 Orders 1858:Occupation 1711:Insurgency 1694:Key events 1442:WMD claims 1266:Background 1065:2008-06-22 792:References 748:President 484:(Page 350) 250:Chronology 220:Carl Levin 193:Trent Lott 63:Background 5115:WikiLeaks 5083:Post-9/11 4829:Memorials 4612:(2013–17) 4606:(2011–13) 4478:Criticism 4422:Reactions 4298:Political 4282:Mandaeans 3967:September 3937:25 August 3832:Al-Karmah 3761:Abu Sayda 3597:September 3410:(2003–04) 3408:Camp Nama 3404:(2003–09) 3398:(2003–06) 3389:and abuse 3379:(2004–05) 3245:massacres 3159:2009–2011 3145:Basra III 3092:Basra II 3082:Najaf III 3036:Ramadi II 2950:Danny Boy 2875:Baghdad I 2845:Samawah I 2830:Karbala I 2825:Nasiriyah 2769:2009–2011 2644:Arbead II 2588:Gaugamela 2278:loyalists 2231:Abu Deraa 2197:Abu Theeb 2102:Insurgent 2033:Australia 2026:Countries 1752:Reactions 1748:Execution 1618:and memos 1434:Rationale 1396:Aftermath 1330:1990–2003 1163:, p. A09 752:from the 403:CURVEBALL 321:announced 236:Evan Bayh 218:(D-WV), 5158:Wikinews 5149:Category 4924:Timeline 4889:Bombings 4797:Critical 4527:Protests 4504:Photo Op 4272:Refugees 3972:November 3952:February 3891:December 3805:February 3756:Makhmour 3714:1 August 3704:18 April 3699:29 March 3648:November 3368:Chemical 3041:Diwaniya 3015:Tal Afar 3000:Al-Qa'im 2955:Najaf II 2945:Husaybah 2930:Ramadi I 2810:Umm Qasr 2803:Invasion 2776:New Dawn 2649:Ardennes 2608:Scorpion 2583:Al Majid 2527:Badlands 2435:Planet X 2393:Falconer 2378:Catalyst 2199:'s group 2078:Thailand 1808:Timeline 1798:Invasion 1774:timeline 1728:Fallujah 1684:Overview 1616:Dossiers 1570:Legality 1418:Invasion 1337:Gulf War 1273:Pre-1990 1231:Iraq War 1033:Archived 972:Archived 954:Archived 936:Archived 918:Archived 901:Archived 880:Archived 862:Archived 809:Archived 760:See also 674:(R-MO). 672:Kit Bond 637:The Hill 517:proper. 246:(D-MD). 238:(D-IN), 234:(D-IL), 230:(D-OR), 226:(D-CA), 222:(D-MI), 211:(R-VA). 203:(R-NE), 199:(R-ME), 195:(R-MS), 191:(R-MO), 189:Kit Bond 187:(R-OH), 183:(R-UT), 179:(R-KS), 69:Gulf War 5140:Outline 4994:Related 4429:Pre-war 4204:General 4028:October 4018:January 4003:January 3947:January 3886:October 3871:6 April 3709:26 July 3387:Torture 3370:weapons 3140:Nineveh 3097:Baqubah 3010:Haditha 2965:Samarra 2840:Najaf I 2820:Basra I 2789:Battles 2689:Mawtini 2618:Swarmer 2547:Matador 2532:Cyclone 2290:Al-Awda 2083:Ukraine 2048:Georgia 2043:Denmark 1544:UNMOVIC 1300:British 1255:Prelude 1039:May 23, 746:impeach 655:" and " 267:(CIA), 154:people; 4194:Impact 4023:August 4008:August 3962:August 3932:10 May 3881:August 3592:August 3446:(2004) 3440:(2003) 3434:(2003) 3428:(2003) 3422:(2003) 3360:(2010) 3354:(2007) 3348:(2007) 3342:(2006) 3336:(2006) 3330:(2006) 3324:(2006) 3318:(2006) 3312:(2006) 3306:(2005) 3300:(2005) 3294:(2005) 3288:(2005) 3282:(2004) 3271:(2003) 3168:(2010) 3051:Amarah 2860:Hillah 2855:Al Kut 2815:Al Faw 2639:Alljah 2613:Sinbad 2537:Dagger 2276:Ba'ath 2219:groups 2113:groups 2104:groups 2068:Poland 1800:(2003) 1510:Issues 1489:Prague 1369:UNSCOM 845:8 July 625:letter 271:, the 86:After 4872:Lists 3957:April 3866:March 3810:March 3056:Turki 2975:Mosul 2445:Telic 2111:Sunni 2063:Japan 2058:Italy 1922:UNAMI 1743:Trial 1010:(PDF) 1003:(PDF) 606:wrote 4972:2011 4967:2010 4962:2009 4957:2008 4952:2007 4947:2006 4942:2005 4937:2004 4932:2003 3993:2011 3922:2010 3876:June 3856:2009 3815:June 3795:2008 3664:2007 3643:July 3618:2006 3567:2005 3501:2004 3470:2003 3197:2008 3192:2007 3121:2008 3065:2007 3024:2006 2983:2005 2902:2004 2796:2003 2743:2008 2632:2007 2576:2006 2510:2005 2454:2004 2356:2003 2217:Shia 2053:Iran 1041:2010 847:2018 817:2017 337:The 35:The 659:." 309:and 5182:: 3458:§ 1128:.) 1031:. 1027:. 983:^ 891:^ 692:. 486:. 59:. 4172:§ 1223:e 1216:t 1209:v 1068:. 1043:. 849:. 819:. 401:"

Index


Colin Powell
presentation to the UN Security Council
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. intelligence community
2003 invasion of Iraq
Office of Special Plans
Gulf War
Richard Butler
Bill Clinton
Operation Desert Fox
George W. Bush
September 11 attacks
joint resolution authorizing the use of force
resolution 1441
Colin Powell

Operation Iraqi Freedom
invaded Iraq
Iraq Survey Group
Pat Roberts
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Pat Roberts
Orrin Hatch
Michael DeWine
Kit Bond
Trent Lott
Olympia Snowe
Chuck Hagel
Saxby Chambliss

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