529:(R-UT) and Christopher Bond (R-MO), presents two conclusions that Democratic members of the Committee were unwilling to include in the report, even though, according to Roberts, "there was no dispute with the underlying facts." Those two conclusions related to the actions of Joseph Wilson, the former ambassador who was sent to Niger in 2002 to investigate allegations that the Iraqi government was attempting to purchase "yellowcake" uranium, presumably as part of an attempt to revive Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The two conclusions were that the plan to send Wilson to investigate the Niger allegation was suggested by Wilson's wife, a CIA employee, and that in his later public statements criticizing the Bush administration, Wilson included information he had learned from press accounts, misrepresenting it as firsthand knowledge.
681:". This volume of the report includes seven pages of conclusions regarding assessments provided by the intelligence community to U.S. government leaders prior to the Iraq war. The report concludes that the intelligence community had assessed that establishing a stable government in Iraq would be a "long, difficult, and probably turbulent challenge," that Iraqi society was deeply divided and would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power took steps to prevent it, and that the war would increase the threat of terrorism, at least temporarily. The intelligence community also assessed that a U.S. defeat and occupation of Iraq would lead to a surge in political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups, and that the war would not cause other countries in the region to abandon their WMD programs.
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alter their assessments to speak with the
Committee about their experiences. The Committee also attempted to identify and interview several individuals who had described such pressure in media reports and government documents. The report says that the Committee did not find any evidence that administration officials tried to pressure analysts to change their judgments; however, an evaluation of the Bush Administration's use of intelligence was put off until "phase two" of the investigation. (Several Democratic committee members, although they voted to approve the report's conclusions, expressed reservations on this issue and Republicans also acknowledged that the issue of "pressure" would be examined during phase two; see below, in the discussion of the report's "additional views", for details.)
707:"It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa'ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa'ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses. While the report highlights many of the problems with the intelligence and criticizes the Bush Administration for its handling of the lead up to the war and its reasons for doing so, the report also supports in many cases that claims made by the Bush Administration about Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction programs were "generally substantiated by the intelligence".
493:. An initial version of this document was distributed to senior Bush administration officials in September, 2002; an updated version of the document was provided to Congress in January, 2003. The conclusion of CIA analysts was that although Saddam Hussein's government had likely had several contacts with al Qaeda during the 1990s, "those contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship." The CIA also attempted to determine the attitudes that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leadership held toward the possibility of working cooperatively with each other. The available intelligence in this area suggested that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leaders would be wary of working together.
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worked to expand the speech with additional material, especially regarding Iraq's nuclear program. The report also describes the subsequent review made by Colin Powell and analysts from the State
Department with analysts from the CIA. In the speech, Powell said that "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." Despite this, the Committee concluded that "uch of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect."
94:, the U.S. government increased its attention on Iraq. In the first half of 2002, a series of public statements by President Bush and senior members of his administration indicated a willingness to use force, if necessary, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On October 1, 2002, the CIA delivered a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessing the threat represented by Iraq's WMD activities. Three days later, CIA Director George Tenet published an unclassified white paper on the subject of Iraq's WMD capabilities. Over the next two weeks, a
71:, Iraq agreed to destroy its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and dismantle its WMD programs. To verify compliance, UN inspection teams were to be given free access to the country. Over the next seven years, inspectors sometimes complained about non-cooperation and evasiveness by the Iraqi government. Iraqi officials in turn complained that some weapons inspectors were acting as spies for foreign intelligence agencies. In 1998, after a critical report on the Iraqi government's noncompliance was issued by UN weapons inspector
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unclassified version of the information in the NIE, since that document was available only to a small group of lawmakers due to its classified nature. The white paper, although shorter and less-detailed than the NIE, was very similar to it in format and major conclusions. The
Committee found that the white paper presented a significantly stronger characterization of the threat represented by Iraqi WMD than did the NIE, and that that stronger characterization was not supported by the underlying intelligence.
696:"repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed." These included President Bush's statements of a partnership between Iraq and Al Qa'ida, that Saddam Hussein was preparing to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, and Iraq's capability to produce chemical weapons.
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138:(ISG), consisting of investigators from the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA. Although scattered remnants of Iraq's WMD stockpiles from the time of the 1991 Gulf War were found, the ISG's final report concluded that Iraq did not possess significant WMD capabilities at the time of the invasion of Iraq. The ISG also stated that Iraq had intended to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped.
149:, announced that the Committee, as part of its regular oversight responsibility, would conduct a "thorough and bipartisan review" of Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorist groups. On June 20, 2003, Senator Roberts and Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), the Committee's vice chairman, issued a joint press release announcing that the committee would conduct a detailed review of the Iraqi WMD intelligence process, including the following areas:
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405:," an Iraqi defector who provided much of the information regarding Iraq's alleged mobile bioweapons labs, although much of the material in this part of the report has been redacted. The report concludes that the October 2002 NIE and other statements regarding Iraq's biological and chemical WMD and associated delivery systems were for the most part not supported by the underlying intelligence data supplied to the Committee.
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the extent of Iraq's WMD stockpiles and programs. The committee identified a failure to adequately supervise analysts and collectors, and a failure to develop human sources of intelligence (HUMINT) inside Iraq after the departure of international weapons inspectors in 1998. It also cited the post-9/11 environment as having led to an increase in the intensity with which policymakers review and question threat information.
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intelligence community. It also discusses the process whereby references to Iraq's uranium-procurement efforts were removed from some speeches at the behest of intelligence officials, but left in
President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address. The report concludes that prior to October, 2002, it was reasonable for the intelligence community to assess Iraq may have been attempting to obtain uranium from Africa.
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intelligence on Iraq was used or misused by
Administration officials in public statements and reports." Because of this, they said, "the Committee's phase one report fails to fully explain the environment of intense pressure in which Intelligence Community officials were asked to render judgments on matters relating to Iraq when policy officials had already forcefully stated their own conclusions in public."
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504:, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization that identified itself as the "sworn enemy" of Saddam Hussein had operated in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control. There was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al Qaeda attack. The report criticized the CIA for its lack of human intelligence resources in Iraq to assess the country's ties with terrorism during the time prior to 2002.
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were "bold and assertive in pointing out potential terrorist links," and that this pressure was more the result of analysts' own desire to be as thorough as possible, than of any undue influence by the administration, for which the
Committee said they found no evidence. Several Democratic members of the Committee said in the report's "additional views" that the question had not been adequately explored.
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and ties to terrorism, and the use by US intelligence of information supplied by the Iraqi
National Congress. Two components of the report would be delayed: whether public statements before the war by senior government officials were supported by the underlying intelligence, and the role played by the Department of Defense's Office of Special Plans in developing the prewar intelligence.
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728:"After four years of making unsubstantiated allegations of unlawful activities, the calculus appears to be that proclamations of "inappropriate" behavior will generate the desired headlines focusing only on the caustic words, rather than the lack of substance behind them. We hope that these additional views will help redirect that focus to the evidence, or lack thereof."
462:, October 2, 2002. Lawmakers debated and passed the resolution during the following two weeks, basing their votes in part on the information in the classified National Intelligence Estimate and the unclassified white paper on Iraqi WMD – documents that the Senate report on pre-war intelligence found to have been deeply flawed.
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investigation, addressing the way senior policymakers used the intelligence, was published on May 25, 2007. Portions of the phase II report not released at that time include the review of public statements by U.S. government leaders prior to the war, and the assessment of the activities of
Douglas Feith and the Pentagon's
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expressed as an "alternative view" in the NIE, that the available intelligence did not make "a compelling case for reconstitution" of the Iraqi nuclear program. The committee reached several conclusions critical of poor communications between the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community concerning this issue.
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Iraq's development of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), however, the
Committee found that the reporting generally was not well-supported by the underlying intelligence, and overstated what was known concerning the likelihood that the Iraqi UAVs were intended for use as a delivery means for biological weapons.
123:. "The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder." The Senate committee found that many of the administration's pre-war statements about Iraqi WMD were not supported by the underlying intelligence.
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This volume of the report includes an appendix containing two previously classified reports by the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) titled, "Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq" and "Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq", as well as a long list of recipients within the government of
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On November 1, 2005, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), the Senate minority leader, invoked a seldom-used provision of the Senate rules to place the body in a closed session. During a three-and-a-half hour discussion, agreement was reached on the creation of a six-member Senate panel to report by November 14
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Moderator Tim Russert then asked Senator Rockefeller if he believed phase two would be completed, and he replied, "I hope so. Pat and I have agreed to do it. We've shaken hands on it, and we agreed to do it after the elections so it wouldn't be any sort of sense of a political attack. I mean that was
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A white paper titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction" was released by CIA Director George Tenet on October 4, 2002, three days after the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD was released. In part, the white paper was a response to Congressional requests for an
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Section VII of the Committee's report focuses on the intelligence behind Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN on February 5, 2003. The report describes the process whereby the CIA provided a draft of the speech to the National Security Council (NSC), and then, at the request of the NSC,
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Subsequent conclusions fault the intelligence community for failing to adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties that underlay the NIE's conclusions, and for succumbing to "group think," in which the intelligence community adopted untested (and, in hindsight, unwarranted) assumptions about
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This was a bi-partisan majority report (10-5) and "details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department." It concludes that the US Administration
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Senator John Warner (R-VA) used his additional view to defend the integrity and professionalism of front-line intelligence analysts, and to emphasize that "there was no evidence that anyone involved in reaching intelligence judgments for this NIE was subjected to any pressure from their superiors or
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The third additional view in the report is by Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), with Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Trent Lott (R-MS), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Christopher Bond (R-MO). It focuses on the issues of information sharing and Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and rebuts the allegation of "pressure"
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The report partially looks at the question of whether pressure was brought to bear on intelligence analysts to get them to shape their assessments to support particular policy objectives. It recounts how Sen. Roberts made repeated public calls for any analysts who believed they had been pressured to
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The previous year, the chairman released a press statement claiming that it appeared that the office's were "not in compliance with the law." Yet, rather than pursue these allegations, Rockfeller decided to pursue an issue unrelated to the intelligence, and unrelated to Iraq. He pursued and inquiry
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reported that Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) was seeking to further divide the phase two report. Under Roberts' new approach, the following components of the report would be released relatively quickly: pre-war intelligence assessments of post-war Iraq, postwar findings in Iraq regarding WMD
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program. In response to a question about the completion of phase two of the investigation, Roberts said, "I'm perfectly willing to do it, and that's what we agreed to do, and that door is still open. And I don't want to quarrel with Jay, because we both agreed that we would get it done. But we do
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The Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted unanimously to approve the finished report. There were, however, significant areas of disagreement, with those disagreements being expressed in the form of "additional views" attached at the end of the report
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In terms of pressure on analysts, the Committee said that after 9/11, "analysts were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence failure on the scale of 9/11." The Committee concluded that this resulted in assessments that
111:
gave a presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003, in which he detailed false intelligence gatherings provided by the Israeli government regarding Iraqi WMD. The USA was faced with the opposition of a majority of the Security Council's members, including Germany, France, and Russia, and afterwards
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after a speech he had given at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Senator Roberts said of the failure to complete phase two, "hat is basically on the back burner." Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), vice chairman of the Committee, made a statement later that day in which he said, "The Chairman agreed to
106:
on November 8, 2002, calling on Iraq to make "an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure" of its WMD programs, and threatening "serious consequences" if it did not comply. In the wake of resolution 1441, Iraq allowed UN weapons inspectors to return to the country. While the inspections were
54:
The Committee's nine Republicans and eight Democrats agreed on the report's major conclusions and unanimously endorsed its findings. They disagreed, though, on the impact that statements on Iraq by senior members of the Bush administration had on the intelligence process. The second phase of the
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The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq appeared to be reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The Committee's report concluded that this view was not supported by the underlying intelligence, and the report agreed with the opinion of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
387:
Section III of the report discusses assessments of Iraq's domestic nuclear program. It focuses a significant amount of attention on the intelligence process that took place in the spring of 2001 regarding Iraq's attempts to purchase 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes. The CIA concluded that the
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Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in
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In the course of the investigation, Committee staff reviewed more than 30,000 pages of documentation provided by the intelligence community. The Committee requested that it be supplied copies of the President's Daily Briefs (PDBs) concerning Iraq's WMD capabilities and ties to terrorism, but the
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One area where the Committee found that the intelligence community's reporting accurately reflected the underlying intelligence concerned Iraq's retention of Scud-type ballistic missiles, and its development of new types of short- and medium-range missiles. In the case of the NIE's reporting on
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Section II of the report discussed the handling of intelligence indicating that Iraq might be attempting to purchase uranium from Niger. The report examined the role played by former ambassador Joseph Wilson in investigating the issue, and the way Wilson's assessment was communicated within the
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has described a specific controversy over the PDB for September 21, 2001, which allegedly said that the US intelligence community had "no evidence" linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11 attacks, and "scant credible evidence" that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with al Qaeda.
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Senators John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) (the Committee's vice-chairman), Carl Levin (D-MI), and Richard Durbin (D-IL), used their additional view to say that the report painted an incomplete picture, because the Committee had put off until phase two of the investigation the key question of "how
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NIC assessments on Iraq. The appendix also contains a number of "Additional Views" in which different members of the committee comment on the history of the committee's work in this area, and criticize what they characterize as the politicization of that work by members of the other party.
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that "phase two" of the investigation, which was to include an assessment of how the Iraqi WMD intelligence was used by senior policymakers, would be completed quickly. Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) said of phase two, "It is a priority. I made my commitment and it will get done."
481:
Several sections in the report examine topics relating to allegations of links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee said that the intelligence community produced reasonable conclusions on this topic, although the Committee found gaps in the intelligence-gathering methods used
723:"found nothing to substantiate that claim; nothing unlawful about the "alleged" rogue intelligence operation in the PCTEG , nothing unlawful about the Office of Special Plans, and nothing unlawful about the so-called failure to inform Congress of alleged intelligence activities."
51:. The report, which was released on July 9, 2004, identified numerous failures in the intelligence-gathering and -analysis process. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and the American public.
400:
The sections of the report concerned with assessments of Iraq's biological weapons programs, chemical weapons programs, and delivery systems contain extensive discussion of the problem of inadequate "human intelligence" for intelligence gathering in Iraq. There is discussion of
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Committee Chairman Pat Roberts told NBC's Tim Russert that "Curveball really provided 98 percent of the assessment as to whether or not the Iraqis had a biological weapon." This was in despite the fact that "nobody inside the U.S. government had ever actually spoken to the
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Over the next several months the U.S. conducted a diplomatic effort at the United Nations, seeking to obtain that body's approval for a new WMD inspection regime, and, potentially, for the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government. The UN Security Council passed
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After learning the intelligence provided by Curveball was going to be used as the "backbone" of the case for war, the Pentagon analyst wrote a letter to the CIA expressing his concerns. The Deputy of the CIA Counter Proliferation Unit quickly responded by saying:
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she had sent to Senator Roberts, saying, in part, "I am increasingly dismayed by the delay in completing the Committee's 'Phase II' investigation into intelligence prior to the Iraq War.... I stand ready to participate in this investigation in any way possible."
1184:, Washington Post, September 7, 2006. Article discussing the current status of phase two, with two parts due to be released soon (and in fact, those two parts were released September 8), and other portions not to be released before the November, 2006 election.
31:, February 5, 2003. CIA Director George Tenet (left) and UN Ambassador John Negroponte look on from behind. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that many of the allegations in the speech were not supported by the underlying intelligence.
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on July 9, 2004. The report did not cover most of the new topics announced in the February 12, 2004, press release; instead, those topics were now to be covered in a separate report, to be completed later, covering "phase two" of the investigation.
1177:, New York Times, August 3, 2006. Article describing the current status of phase two of the report, including a complaint by Sen. Pat Roberts that the White House is taking too long to declassify portions of the report that have been completed.
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this investigation and I fully expect him to fulfill his commitment.... While the completion of phase two is long overdue, the committee has continued this important work, and I expect that we will finish the review in the very near future."
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tubes could be intended for constructing centrifuges for a uranium-enrichment program (i.e., for a restarted Iraqi nuclear weapons program); analysts in the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense considered that to be unlikely.
710:"There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate."
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1111:(November 28, 2003) An article defending the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD. The article is by Stuart A. Cohen, who was acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time the NIE was prepared.
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Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) was also critical of the Bush administration in his additional view, giving a list of public statements by senior members of the administration that misstated and exaggerated the underlying intelligence on Iraq.
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reported that the part of the phase two report comparing the Bush administration's public statements about Saddam Hussein with the evidence senior officials reviewed in private would not be released before the November 2006 election.
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that the completed report had been unanimously approved by the Committee's members, and that they were working with the CIA on the issue of declassification. The completed report, with blacked-out text ("redactions") made by the CIA,
417:"Let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say. The Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about."
1000:"Senate Report on Intelligence Activities Relating To Iraq Conducted By The Policy of Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy"
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the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own
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whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence
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any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
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Senator Olympia Snow (R-ME) wrote in her additional view that the Committee's report revealed poor management and a lack of accountability in the intelligence community, and she called for strong reforms.
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taking place, the U.S. continued to lobby the members of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq. As part of that effort U.S. Secretary of State
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608:, "I don't think there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all regarding prewar intelligence. I think that it would be a monumental waste of time to replow this ground any further."
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Over the ensuing year, U.S. and allied forces searched for evidence supporting the pre-invasion claims about Iraqi WMD stockpiles and programs. The lead role in this search was played by the
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275:, and other federal entities involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The Committee also held a series of hearings on the intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorism.
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have – we have Ambassador Negroponte next week, we have General Mike Hayden next week. We have other hot-spot hearings or other things going on that are very important."
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The "most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons."
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of an exploratory meeting held in Rome in 2001 between two DOD officials and two Iranians. Writing for the Minority Opinion as part of the report it was stated that
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The report's first conclusion points to widespread flaws in the October 2002 NIE, and attributes those flaws to failure by analysts in the intelligence community:
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39:(formally, the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq) was the report by the
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Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) used her additional view to argue for a number of specific structural and procedural reforms in the intelligence community.
83:). Butler evacuated his inspectors and the bombing proceeded. After the bombing campaign, Iraq refused to allow weapons inspectors to re-enter the country.
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The additional view by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), was critical of the Bush administration, saying it "did not fairly represent the intelligence."
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This additional view also discusses the question of pressure on analysts, and recommends caution in implementing reforms in the intelligence community.
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the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments;
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1170:, The Washington Post. Article describing the closed Senate session called on November 1, 2005, by Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV).
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Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) focused on the need for greater accountability for the intelligence failures identified in the report.
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After Democrats gained a majority in the Senate during the 2006 midterm election, chairmanship of the committee passed to Sen.
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on "the intelligence committee's progress of the phase two review of the prewar intelligence and its schedule for completion."
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informant – except Pentagon analyst, who concluded the man was an alcoholic and utterly useless as a source."
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The following nine Republicans were members of the Committee at the time the investigation was launched: Committee Chairman
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Much of the Committee's investigation in this area concerned the CIA's preparation and distribution of a document titled
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756:. House Democrats unanimously voted to send it to a committee; a maneuver that essentially killed Kucinich's efforts.
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Committee staff also interviewed more than 200 people, including intelligence analysts and senior officials with the
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the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
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the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;
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President George W. Bush addresses the nation from the Oval Office, March 19, 2003, to announce the beginning of
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1117:– whitehouse.gov transcript of Powell's February 5, 2003, presentation to the UN, with links to audio and video.
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Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments
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whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and
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345:. The report includes 117 formal conclusions, as well as supporting discussion and background information.
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focuses much of its attention on the October, 2002, classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled
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2516:
2500:
2367:
2181:
1842:
1747:
1358:
736:'s telling her caucus members "that impeachment is off the table; she is not interested in pursuing it,"
501:
268:
264:
160:
whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;
1144:
593:
4774:
4487:
4472:
4259:
4210:
3743:
3268:
2733:
2622:
2429:
2014:
1564:
1433:
1289:
525:
In the first "additional view" attached to the report, Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS), joined by Senators
1125:
585:
5166:
5055:
4855:
4736:
4477:
4363:
4220:
4099:
4054:
3875:
3333:
3128:
3014:
2969:
2959:
2944:
2908:
2759:
2698:
2678:
2480:
2475:
2465:
2439:
2424:
2417:
2372:
2362:
2186:
1909:
1732:
859:
72:
4276:
5119:
5104:
4923:
4808:
4780:
4684:
4548:
4089:
3931:
3557:
3165:
3111:
3101:
2964:
2919:
2892:
2887:
2874:
2849:
2844:
2713:
2693:
2658:
2495:
2460:
2412:
2191:
2124:
1963:
1827:
1569:
1341:
348:
314:
the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
4174:
All attacks listed in this group were either committed by insurgents, or have unknown perpetrators
5139:
5050:
5035:
4763:
4730:
4502:
4375:
4353:
4348:
4215:
3785:
3720:
3486:
3443:
3357:
3339:
3106:
3035:
2934:
2929:
2859:
2854:
2814:
2703:
2663:
2597:
2566:
2490:
2387:
2202:
1956:
1916:
1742:
1645:
1538:
1446:
1254:
876:
775:
670:(R-KS) left the committee; the ranking Republican and vice chairman of the committee is now Sen.
56:
4044:
3841:
3654:
3634:
3608:
3573:
3351:
3144:
3091:
3086:
3081:
3071:
3045:
3004:
2974:
2954:
2869:
2839:
2829:
2819:
2728:
2668:
2602:
2561:
2521:
2407:
2402:
2207:
1832:
1378:
1353:
1320:
1214:
717:
twice alleged that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or its former head
115:
3978:
3912:
3870:
3755:
3583:
3425:
3297:
3139:
2834:
2708:
2683:
2653:
2176:
2154:
1872:
1797:
1700:
1493:
1466:
402:
128:
120:
48:
704:
657:
The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress
5087:
4861:
4369:
4064:
4049:
3826:
3780:
3552:
3512:
3419:
2994:
2723:
2673:
2551:
2470:
2266:
2261:
2256:
2119:
1980:
1516:
1451:
1407:
1390:
1363:
1134:(July 9, 2004) Article on the controversy regarding CIA redactions of the Committee report.
497:
91:
80:
4281:
635:
On April 26, 2006, an article by journalist Alexander Bolton in the Congressional journal
8:
4840:
4709:
4691:
4675:
4139:
4069:
4039:
3907:
3836:
3831:
3775:
3748:
3603:
3522:
3507:
3481:
3413:
3203:
2949:
2824:
2643:
2587:
2294:
1822:
1661:
1629:
1373:
690:
whether statements by US Government officials were substantiated by intelligence reports
584:
At the time of the report's release (July 9, 2004), Democratic members of the committee
4146:
4059:
3821:
3578:
3040:
2989:
2924:
2809:
2648:
2607:
2582:
2526:
2434:
2251:
2129:
1526:
1284:
1279:
5153:
1188:
Analysts' Warnings of Iraq Chaos Detailed, Senate Panel Releases Assessments From 2003
915:
5148:
4492:
4403:
3902:
3760:
3327:
3096:
3009:
2688:
2617:
2531:
2236:
2037:
1634:
1346:
1294:
1207:
282:
of the scope of the investigation. The new elements added to the investigation were:
135:
1006:
458:
President George Bush, surrounded by leaders of the House and Senate, announces the
4803:
4271:
3303:
3050:
2638:
2612:
2536:
2246:
2159:
1151:
Transcript from NBC's Meet the Press appearance by Senators Roberts and Rockefeller
1100:
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
243:
223:
112:
abandoned the effort to obtain an explicit use-of-force authorization from the UN.
1055:"Kucinich Calls for Impeachment In Final Stage of Presidency – The Hilltop Online"
5067:
5013:
5008:
4768:
3315:
3055:
2556:
2444:
2299:
2284:
2072:
1131:
975:
957:
939:
921:
904:
898:
883:
865:
737:
714:
700:
677:
On May 25, 2007, the committee released a volume of the phase II report titled, "
663:
215:
204:
95:
678:
460:
Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq
349:
General conclusions on intelligence relating to Iraq's WMD and ties to terrorism
4336:
2144:
1639:
1624:
1601:
1313:
1241:
749:
611:
On April 10, 2005, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller appeared together on NBC's
214:
The following eight Democrats made up the rest of the Committee: Vice-Chairman
87:
5179:
5099:
4746:
4741:
4724:
4719:
4714:
4704:
4159:
4153:
2139:
1521:
1402:
765:
718:
550:
contained in the additional view by Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin.
395:
196:
838:
605:
320:
279:
4971:
4966:
4961:
4956:
4951:
4946:
4941:
4936:
4931:
4668:
4408:
4321:
1656:
733:
239:
131:, an action that led to the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein.
108:
76:
24:
623:
On August 2, 2005, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) released the text of a
379:
Iraqi aluminum tubes § Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
166:
other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review.
5072:
4441:
2042:
1150:
1102:(July 9, 2004). United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence.
753:
667:
612:
526:
256:
231:
208:
200:
184:
180:
176:
142:
1115:
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council
651:
Two volumes of the phase II report were released on September 8, 2006: "
5157:
5040:
4326:
3401:
2225:
1877:
1199:
219:
192:
688:
Phase II of the report was publicly released on Thursday June 5, 2008
5114:
5082:
4786:
4311:
3407:
2230:
2196:
235:
227:
19:
1336:
1230:
671:
643:
A September 7, 2006, article by journalist Jonathon Weisman in the
544:
188:
68:
1103:
807:. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. March 19, 2003.
432:
Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council
713:
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.
699:
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.
721:
may have engaged in unlawful activities, Phase II of the report
563:
from policymakers to alter any of their judgments or analyses."
454:
79:
announced that he would launch airstrikes on Iraqi targets (see
1368:
16:
2004 report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1138:
Appearance by Senator Pat Roberts at the Woodrow Wilson Center
877:
Pentagon's prewar intelligence role questioned – Jul 11, 2004
579:
511:
978:. Washingtonpost.com (2006-09-07). Retrieved on 2013-08-16.
942:. Washingtonpost.com (2005-11-02). Retrieved on 2013-08-16.
90:
became president in January 2001, and especially after the
1194:
Latest Intelligence Report Yet Another Smoking Gun on Bush
600:
In a statement regarding the release of the report of the
535:
396:
Biological weapons, chemical weapons, and delivery systems
343:
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
255:
White House denied that request. An article by journalist
1182:
Panel Set to Release Just Part of Report On Run-Up to War
969:
Panel Set to Release Just Part of Report On Run-Up to War
47:'s assessments of Iraq during the time leading up to the
141:
As these facts were emerging in June 2003, U.S. Senator
1122:
News Conference on Senate Intelligence Committee Report
1109:
Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths
278:
On February 12, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller
5094:
The Iraq War: A Historiography of Knowledge Changelogs
4815:"The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time"
372:
1940:
363:, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
170:
41:
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
520:
1140:(March 10, 2005) (includes link to streaming video)
470:
319:On June 17, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller
303:
prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
4122:United States and the International Criminal Court
1080:"House waves off impeachment measure against Bush"
679:Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq
425:
5177:
3235:
894:
892:
786:United Nations Security Council and the Iraq War
545:Senators Chambliss, Hatch, Lott, Hagel, and Bond
449:
4836:Afghan–Iraqi Freedom Memorial (Salem, Oregon)
4391:
1215:
1175:Senator Faults Bid to Classify Report on Iraq
889:
740:D-Ohio introduced a formal resolution to the
96:joint resolution authorizing the use of force
3377:Use of white phosphorus by the United States
835:U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
5201:Works about the Central Intelligence Agency
886:. Edition.cnn.com. Retrieved on 2013-08-16.
620:my view; it shouldn't be viewed that way."
127:On March 20, 2003, the U.S. and its allies
2335:
1222:
1208:
1145:Roberts calls for constant change in intel
1124:(transcript). (The Washington Post has an
1025:"Democrats Won't Try To Impeach President"
994:
992:
990:
988:
986:
984:
4511:A Responsible Plan to End the War in Iraq
1022:
553:
2310:Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
1229:
453:
114:
18:
5206:Reports of the United States government
4796:
2802:
2305:Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order
1158:Plame's Input is Cited on Niger Mission
981:
536:Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin
440:
147:Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
98:was passed by both houses of Congress.
37:Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence
29:presentation to the UN Security Council
5178:
5110:U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East
4904:Iraqi security forces fatality reports
4851:Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial
4846:Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial (London)
4498:Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan
4428:
2135:Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance
332:
27:displays a vial of anthrax during his
4992:
4649:
4192:
3224:
3187:Turkish incursions into northern Iraq
2334:
2012:
1682:
1252:
1203:
1126:alternate URL for the same transcript
1035:from the original on January 14, 2021
805:"President Bush Addresses the Nation"
705:press release of report's publication
5196:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
5162:
2440:Capture of Saddam Hussein (Red Dawn)
1560:UK parliament's support for invasion
1168:GOP Angered by Closed Senate Session
1166:Charles Babington and Dafna Linzer,
933:GOP Angered by Closed Senate Session
771:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
5024:"Enhanced interrogation techniques"
1023:Babington, Charles (May 12, 2006).
604:on March 31, 2005, Senator Roberts
373:Niger and the Iraqi nuclear program
13:
4359:Scott Thomas Beauchamp controversy
1082:. Associated Press. Archived from
811:from the original on June 29, 2019
171:Investigation committee membership
14:
5222:
5019:Efforts to impeach George W. Bush
4884:Aviation shootdowns and accidents
4650:
4399:Senate Report on WMD Intelligence
4134:Prosecution for the 2003 invasion
3280:Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre
1479:Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory
1093:
521:Senators Roberts, Hatch, and Bond
500:had been present in Baghdad, and
477:Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory
5161:
5152:
5144:
5143:
5134:
4289:Violence against Iraqi academics
3286:Haifa Street helicopter incident
2734:Valiant Guardian (Harris Ba'sil)
2013:
1156:Schmidt, Susan (July 9, 2004).
1143:Shaun Waterman (March 10, 2005)
580:"Phase two" of the investigation
471:Iraq's alleged links to al-Qaeda
5135:
4909:Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards
4436:Pre-war international reactions
2242:Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
1952:Coalition Provisional Authority
1607:Saddam Hussein and human rights
1120:New York Times (July 9, 2004).
1072:
1047:
1016:
666:(D-WV). The former chair, Sen.
512:The report's "additional views"
426:Colin Powell's speech to the UN
4758:"Smoking gun / mushroom cloud"
4344:Kidnapping of Angelo dela Cruz
3847:Attacks on Christians in Mosul
3275:Murder of Muhamad Husain Kadir
3225:
1534:Colin Powell's UN presentation
1104:http://intelligence.senate.gov
962:
945:
926:
909:
870:
853:
823:
797:
1:
5046:Guantanamo Bay detention camp
5004:Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
4894:Coalition military operations
4622:U.S.-led intervention in Iraq
2940:Baghdad International Airport
1932:U.S. kill or capture strategy
1759:2006 al-Askari mosque bombing
1309:Chemical attacks against Iran
791:
249:
62:
5029:Torture in the United States
4775:"There are unknown unknowns"
4307:Post-invasion WMD conjecture
3736:2007 Karbala mosque bombings
3438:Killing of Manadel al-Jamadi
3432:Death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush
3310:Mahmudiyah rape and killings
3257:U.S. killings of journalists
2750:Defeat Al Qaeda in the North
1969:2005 parliamentary elections
1683:
781:Iraq Intelligence Commission
592:On March 10, 2005, during a
450:The October 2002 white paper
7:
5211:Defense Intelligence Agency
5063:Military–industrial complex
4993:
4105:Torture by the Wolf Brigade
2182:Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan
2172:Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
2165:Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah
1843:Mission Accomplished speech
1501:Oil as a possible rationale
1253:
759:
602:presidential WMD commission
594:question-and-answer session
491:Iraqi Support for Terrorism
269:Defense Intelligence Agency
265:Central Intelligence Agency
45:U.S. intelligence community
10:
5227:
5078:Petrodollar warfare theory
4193:
4090:Raid on Camp Ashraf (2011)
3548:Karbala and Najaf bombings
3269:Killing of Nadhem Abdullah
1786:Status of forces agreement
1575:Legitimacy of the invasion
1132:CIA whites out controversy
474:
429:
376:
5132:
4999:
4988:
4922:
4914:Private contractor deaths
4871:
4856:Old North Memorial Garden
4828:
4737:Old Europe and New Europe
4660:
4656:
4645:
4591:
4525:
4421:
4364:MoveOn.org ad controversy
4297:
4243:Al-Aimmah Bridge disaster
4221:Iraq Family Health Survey
4203:
4199:
4188:
4168:
4114:
4082:
3992:
3921:
3855:
3794:
3771:Al-Khilani mosque bombing
3663:
3617:
3566:
3500:
3469:
3457:
3386:
3367:
3322:Baghdad detainee killings
3242:
3231:
3220:
3179:
3158:
3120:
3064:
3023:
2982:
2901:
2795:
2788:
2768:
2742:
2631:
2575:
2509:
2453:
2355:
2348:
2344:
2330:
2275:
2216:
2187:Black Banner Organization
2110:
2101:
2025:
2021:
2008:
1927:Al Qa'qaa high explosives
1856:
1813:Preparations for invasion
1796:
1733:Capture of Saddam Hussein
1693:
1689:
1678:
1615:
1595:Saddam's alleged shredder
1509:
1432:
1329:
1272:
1265:
1261:
1248:
1238:
5105:Unitary executive theory
4809:Inverted totalitarianism
4699:Coalition of the willing
4549:Bring Them Home Now Tour
4448:Saddam Hussein interview
3252:During the 2003 invasion
2192:Wakefulness and Holy War
2150:Mujahideen Shura Council
2125:1920 Revolution Brigades
1590:Rapid response operation
1585:Military analyst program
1551:Failed peace initiatives
742:House of Representatives
145:(R-KS), chairman of the
23:U.S. Secretary of State
5051:Gulf of Tonkin incident
5036:Extraordinary rendition
4764:Star Spangled Ice Cream
4488:Oprah's Anti-war series
4354:Al Jazeera bombing memo
4312:Iraq scandal in Finland
3984:Baghdad church massacre
3671:Mustansiriya University
3487:Imam Ali mosque bombing
3444:Death of Fashad Mohamed
3334:Iraqi bodyguard killing
2203:Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army
1976:Transitional Government
1957:Iraqi Governing Council
1413:U.S. War in Afghanistan
1290:1979 Ba'ath Party Purge
776:Iraq disarmament crisis
121:Operation Iraqi Freedom
57:Office of Special Plans
4095:Archaeological looting
3655:Hayy Al-Jihad massacre
3635:Buratha mosque bombing
3352:Nisour Square massacre
1833:Battle of Debecka Pass
1706:Occupation (2003–2011)
1565:Iraqi–Kurdish conflict
1379:Oil-for-Food Programme
1354:Sanctions against Iraq
903:June 14, 2007, at the
732:Despite House Speaker
554:Other additional views
463:
280:announced an expansion
124:
32:
5191:2003 invasion of Iraq
5120:Ba'ath Party archives
4725:"Mother of All Bombs"
4517:Bush shoeing incident
4461:Views on the invasion
4317:Dixie Chicks comments
4260:2007 cholera outbreak
3766:Al-Askari mosque 2007
3740:Massacres of Yazidis
3630:Al-Askari mosque 2006
3426:Killing of Baha Mousa
3340:Iron Triangle Murders
3298:Basra prison incident
3077:Karbala provincial HQ
2177:Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna
2155:Islamic State of Iraq
1769:2007 U.S. troop surge
1304:U.S. support for Iraq
956:May 13, 2006, at the
882:May 16, 2021, at the
864:May 16, 2008, at the
475:Further information:
457:
377:Further information:
273:Department of Defense
118:
49:2003 invasion of Iraq
22:
5088:Special Relationship
4862:Saving Iraqi Culture
4370:Six Days in Fallujah
4332:Death of David Kelly
4055:Al Diwaniyah bombing
3528:2004 church bombings
3492:Baghdad October 2003
3420:Death of Nagem Hatab
2755:Augurs of Prosperity
2262:Promised Day Brigade
2120:Islamic Army in Iraq
1868:Occupation of Ramadi
1838:Firdos Square statue
1818:Multi-National Force
1652:Bush–Blair 2003 memo
1517:American imperialism
1408:2001 anthrax attacks
1391:September 11 attacks
920:May 6, 2005, at the
498:Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
441:Pressure on analysts
361:analytic trade craft
92:September 11 attacks
81:Operation Desert Fox
4841:Al-Shaheed Monument
4710:Embedded journalism
4676:Outposts of tyranny
4574:2007 Port of Tacoma
4466:U.S. public opinion
4255:Humanitarian crisis
4140:Abtan v. Blackwater
3999:Nationwide attacks
3928:Nationwide attacks
3749:Qahtaniyah bombings
3639:Sadr City bombings
3558:Kufa mosque bombing
3135:Iraqi Day of Ashura
1895:U.S. military bases
1823:Battle of Nasiriyah
1764:Civil war (2006–08)
1646:Letter of the eight
1630:Downing Street memo
1374:Arms-to-Iraq affair
1029:The Washington Post
333:Phase I conclusions
5186:Iraq War documents
4579:September 15, 2007
4559:September 24, 2005
4349:2004 document leak
4147:Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
4127:Hague Invasion Act
3898:Baghdad–Miqdadiyah
3786:Al Amarah bombings
3625:Karbala and Ramadi
3292:Tal Afar shootings
3150:Al-Qaeda offensive
2935:Good Friday ambush
2925:Siege of Sadr City
2486:Phantom Linebacker
2476:New Dawn (Al Fajr)
2252:Soldiers of Heaven
2130:Jaish al-Rashideen
1964:Interim Government
1873:De-Ba'athification
1539:Disarmament crisis
1527:Wolfowitz Doctrine
1472:Mobile weapon labs
1457:Biological weapons
1447:Yellowcake uranium
1342:Invasion of Kuwait
1321:Iran–Contra affair
1285:Iranian Revolution
1280:17 July Revolution
1180:Jonathon Weisman,
1161:washingtonpost.com
1147:(Washington Times)
974:2019-09-23 at the
938:2021-08-04 at the
586:expressed the hope
464:
125:
33:
5173:
5172:
5128:
5127:
4984:
4983:
4980:
4979:
4824:
4823:
4781:Triangle of Death
4641:
4640:
4637:
4636:
4592:Aftermath in Iraq
4539:February 15, 2003
4493:Iraqi map pendant
4456:
4455:
4417:
4416:
4238:Damage to Baghdad
4184:
4183:
4180:
4179:
4100:Chlorine bombings
4078:
4077:
4035:Arba'een bombings
3842:Balad Ruz bombing
3675:Baghdad bombings
3609:Khanaqin bombings
3588:Baghdad bombings
3532:Baghdad bombings
3477:Jordanian embassy
3453:
3452:
3396:Abu Ghraib prison
3346:Baghdad airstrike
3328:Hamdania incident
3262:Fallujah killings
3236:Occupation forces
3216:
3215:
3212:
3211:
3175:
3174:
2915:Karbala City Hall
2893:Ramadan Offensive
2883:
2882:
2784:
2783:
2517:Able Rising Force
2368:Bayonet Lightning
2326:
2325:
2322:
2321:
2318:
2317:
2267:Kata'ib Hezbollah
2257:Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
2237:Badr Organization
2004:
2003:
2000:
1999:
1996:
1995:
1848:US public opinion
1674:
1673:
1670:
1669:
1635:September Dossier
1428:
1427:
1347:Nayirah testimony
1240:Beginning of the
1086:on June 13, 2008.
833:(Press release).
744:in an attempt to
136:Iraq Survey Group
75:, U.S. President
5218:
5165:
5164:
5156:
5147:
5146:
5138:
5137:
4990:
4989:
4804:Global arrogance
4794:
4793:
4658:
4657:
4647:
4646:
4616:War against ISIL
4599:The rise of ISIL
4564:January 27, 2007
4554:January 20, 2005
4426:
4425:
4389:
4388:
4277:Iraqi Christians
4201:
4200:
4190:
4189:
4083:Other war crimes
4014:Bagdad bombings
3943:Bagdad bombings
3862:Bagdad bombings
3801:Bagdad bombings
3731:Iraqi Parliament
3584:Musayyib bombing
3467:
3466:
3304:Haditha massacre
3240:
3239:
3233:
3232:
3222:
3221:
2800:
2799:
2793:
2792:
2623:Together Forward
2496:Vigilant Resolve
2430:Peninsula Strike
2353:
2352:
2346:
2345:
2332:
2331:
2247:Sheibani Network
2160:Al-Qaeda in Iraq
2108:
2107:
2023:
2022:
2010:
2009:
1938:
1937:
1910:Development Fund
1691:
1690:
1680:
1679:
1657:February Dossier
1462:Chemical weapons
1270:
1269:
1263:
1262:
1250:
1249:
1224:
1217:
1210:
1201:
1200:
1153:(April 10, 2005)
1088:
1087:
1076:
1070:
1069:
1067:
1066:
1057:. Archived from
1051:
1045:
1044:
1042:
1040:
1020:
1014:
1013:
1011:
1005:. Archived from
1004:
996:
979:
966:
960:
949:
943:
930:
924:
913:
907:
896:
887:
874:
868:
857:
851:
850:
848:
846:
837:. Archived from
827:
821:
820:
818:
816:
801:
244:Barbara Mikulski
224:Dianne Feinstein
5226:
5225:
5221:
5220:
5219:
5217:
5216:
5215:
5176:
5175:
5174:
5169:
5124:
5068:Neoconservatism
5014:CIA black sites
5009:Chelsea Manning
4995:
4976:
4918:
4867:
4820:
4792:
4769:Strategic reset
4752:"Sixteen Words"
4652:
4633:
4587:
4521:
4452:
4413:
4409:Chilcot Inquiry
4387:
4299:
4293:
4216:Iraq Body Count
4195:
4176:
4164:
4110:
4074:
4050:Samarra bombing
3988:
3917:
3851:
3790:
3659:
3613:
3562:
3513:Ashura massacre
3496:
3461:
3449:
3388:
3382:
3369:
3363:
3316:Ishaqi massacre
3244:
3227:
3208:
3171:
3154:
3129:Spring fighting
3116:
3060:
3019:
2978:
2909:Spring fighting
2897:
2879:
2780:
2764:
2760:Phantom Phoenix
2738:
2699:Phantom Thunder
2679:Marne Avalanche
2627:
2571:
2505:
2466:Bulldog Mammoth
2449:
2425:Panther Squeeze
2418:Airborne Dragon
2383:Desert Scorpion
2373:Bulldog Mammoth
2363:Ancient Babylon
2340:
2314:
2300:Al-Abud Network
2285:Fedayeen Saddam
2277:
2271:
2218:
2212:
2208:Mujahideen Army
2112:
2103:
2097:
2017:
1992:
1943:
1936:
1917:Economic reform
1859:
1852:
1828:Fall of Baghdad
1799:
1792:
1781:U.S. withdrawal
1701:Invasion (2003)
1685:
1666:
1662:Bush–Aznar memo
1617:
1611:
1556:Iraq resolution
1505:
1424:
1325:
1257:
1244:
1234:
1228:
1173:Mark Mazzetti,
1096:
1091:
1078:
1077:
1073:
1064:
1062:
1053:
1052:
1048:
1038:
1036:
1021:
1017:
1009:
1002:
998:
997:
982:
976:Wayback Machine
967:
963:
958:Wayback Machine
950:
946:
940:Wayback Machine
931:
927:
922:Wayback Machine
914:
910:
905:Wayback Machine
897:
890:
884:Wayback Machine
875:
871:
866:Wayback Machine
858:
854:
844:
842:
841:on 27 June 2003
831:"Press Release"
829:
828:
824:
814:
812:
803:
802:
798:
794:
762:
738:Dennis Kucinich
715:Jay Rockefeller
701:Jay Rockefeller
664:Jay Rockefeller
645:Washington Post
582:
556:
547:
538:
523:
514:
479:
473:
452:
443:
434:
428:
398:
381:
375:
351:
339:511-page report
335:
252:
216:Jay Rockefeller
205:Saxby Chambliss
173:
104:resolution 1441
67:After the 1991
65:
43:concerning the
17:
12:
11:
5:
5224:
5214:
5213:
5208:
5203:
5198:
5193:
5188:
5171:
5170:
5133:
5130:
5129:
5126:
5125:
5123:
5122:
5117:
5112:
5107:
5102:
5097:
5090:
5085:
5080:
5075:
5070:
5065:
5060:
5059:
5058:
5048:
5043:
5038:
5033:
5032:
5031:
5021:
5016:
5011:
5006:
5000:
4997:
4996:
4986:
4985:
4982:
4981:
4978:
4977:
4975:
4974:
4969:
4964:
4959:
4954:
4949:
4944:
4939:
4934:
4928:
4926:
4920:
4919:
4917:
4916:
4911:
4906:
4901:
4896:
4891:
4886:
4881:
4879:Assassinations
4875:
4873:
4869:
4868:
4866:
4865:
4858:
4853:
4848:
4843:
4838:
4832:
4830:
4826:
4825:
4822:
4821:
4819:
4818:
4811:
4806:
4800:
4798:
4791:
4790:
4783:
4778:
4771:
4766:
4761:
4754:
4749:
4744:
4739:
4734:
4731:"Mrs. Anthrax"
4727:
4722:
4717:
4712:
4707:
4702:
4695:
4692:"Chemical Ali"
4688:
4681:
4680:
4679:
4664:
4662:
4654:
4653:
4643:
4642:
4639:
4638:
4635:
4634:
4632:
4631:
4630:(2017–present)
4625:
4619:
4618:(2014–present)
4613:
4607:
4601:
4595:
4593:
4589:
4588:
4586:
4584:March 19, 2008
4581:
4576:
4571:
4569:March 17, 2007
4566:
4561:
4556:
4551:
4546:
4544:March 20, 2003
4541:
4536:
4534:Halloween 2002
4531:
4529:
4523:
4522:
4520:
4519:
4514:
4507:
4500:
4495:
4490:
4485:
4483:United Nations
4480:
4475:
4470:
4469:
4468:
4457:
4454:
4453:
4451:
4450:
4445:
4438:
4432:
4430:
4423:
4419:
4418:
4415:
4414:
4412:
4411:
4406:
4404:Duelfer Report
4401:
4395:
4393:
4392:Investigations
4386:
4385:
4384:
4383:
4376:Role of Canada
4373:
4366:
4361:
4356:
4351:
4346:
4341:
4340:
4339:
4337:Hutton Inquiry
4329:
4324:
4319:
4314:
4309:
4303:
4301:
4295:
4294:
4292:
4291:
4286:
4285:
4284:
4279:
4269:
4267:Financial cost
4264:
4263:
4262:
4252:
4247:
4246:
4245:
4235:
4234:
4233:
4228:
4226:Lancet surveys
4223:
4218:
4207:
4205:
4197:
4196:
4186:
4185:
4182:
4181:
4178:
4177:
4169:
4166:
4165:
4163:
4162:
4157:
4150:
4143:
4136:
4131:
4130:
4129:
4118:
4116:
4112:
4111:
4109:
4108:
4102:
4097:
4092:
4086:
4084:
4080:
4079:
4076:
4075:
4073:
4072:
4067:
4062:
4057:
4052:
4047:
4045:Al Hillah 2011
4042:
4040:Tikrit assault
4037:
4032:
4031:
4030:
4025:
4020:
4012:
4011:
4010:
4005:
3996:
3994:
3990:
3989:
3987:
3986:
3981:
3976:
3975:
3974:
3969:
3964:
3959:
3954:
3949:
3941:
3940:
3939:
3934:
3925:
3923:
3919:
3918:
3916:
3915:
3910:
3905:
3900:
3895:
3894:
3893:
3888:
3883:
3878:
3873:
3868:
3859:
3857:
3853:
3852:
3850:
3849:
3844:
3839:
3837:Dujail bombing
3834:
3829:
3824:
3819:
3818:
3817:
3812:
3807:
3798:
3796:
3792:
3791:
3789:
3788:
3783:
3778:
3776:Amirli bombing
3773:
3768:
3763:
3758:
3753:
3752:
3751:
3746:
3744:April massacre
3738:
3733:
3728:
3723:
3721:Al Hillah 2007
3718:
3717:
3716:
3711:
3706:
3701:
3696:
3691:
3686:
3681:
3673:
3667:
3665:
3661:
3660:
3658:
3657:
3652:
3651:
3650:
3645:
3637:
3632:
3627:
3621:
3619:
3615:
3614:
3612:
3611:
3606:
3601:
3600:
3599:
3594:
3586:
3581:
3576:
3574:Al Hillah 2005
3570:
3568:
3564:
3563:
3561:
3560:
3555:
3550:
3545:
3544:
3543:
3538:
3530:
3525:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3504:
3502:
3498:
3497:
3495:
3494:
3489:
3484:
3479:
3473:
3471:
3464:
3460:Other killings
3455:
3454:
3451:
3450:
3448:
3447:
3441:
3435:
3429:
3423:
3417:
3414:Balad Air Base
3411:
3405:
3399:
3392:
3390:
3384:
3383:
3381:
3380:
3373:
3371:
3365:
3364:
3362:
3361:
3355:
3349:
3343:
3337:
3331:
3325:
3319:
3313:
3307:
3301:
3295:
3289:
3283:
3277:
3272:
3266:
3265:
3264:
3259:
3248:
3246:
3237:
3229:
3228:
3218:
3217:
3214:
3213:
3210:
3209:
3207:
3206:
3204:Abu Kamal raid
3201:
3200:
3199:
3194:
3183:
3181:
3180:Related events
3177:
3176:
3173:
3172:
3170:
3169:
3162:
3160:
3156:
3155:
3153:
3152:
3147:
3142:
3137:
3132:
3124:
3122:
3118:
3117:
3115:
3114:
3109:
3104:
3102:Route Bismarck
3099:
3094:
3089:
3084:
3079:
3074:
3068:
3066:
3062:
3061:
3059:
3058:
3053:
3048:
3043:
3038:
3033:
3027:
3025:
3021:
3020:
3018:
3017:
3012:
3007:
3002:
2997:
2992:
2986:
2984:
2980:
2979:
2977:
2972:
2967:
2962:
2957:
2952:
2947:
2942:
2937:
2932:
2927:
2922:
2917:
2912:
2905:
2903:
2899:
2898:
2896:
2895:
2890:
2888:Majar al-Kabir
2884:
2881:
2880:
2878:
2877:
2872:
2867:
2862:
2857:
2852:
2847:
2842:
2837:
2832:
2827:
2822:
2817:
2812:
2806:
2804:
2797:
2790:
2786:
2785:
2782:
2781:
2779:
2778:
2772:
2770:
2766:
2765:
2763:
2762:
2757:
2752:
2746:
2744:
2740:
2739:
2737:
2736:
2731:
2726:
2721:
2716:
2714:Saber Guardian
2711:
2706:
2701:
2696:
2694:Phantom Strike
2691:
2686:
2681:
2676:
2671:
2666:
2661:
2659:Commando Eagle
2656:
2651:
2646:
2641:
2635:
2633:
2629:
2628:
2626:
2625:
2620:
2615:
2610:
2605:
2600:
2595:
2593:Guardian Tiger
2590:
2585:
2579:
2577:
2573:
2572:
2570:
2569:
2564:
2559:
2554:
2549:
2544:
2539:
2534:
2529:
2524:
2519:
2513:
2511:
2507:
2506:
2504:
2503:
2501:Warrior's Rage
2498:
2493:
2488:
2483:
2478:
2473:
2468:
2463:
2457:
2455:
2451:
2450:
2448:
2447:
2442:
2437:
2432:
2427:
2422:
2421:
2420:
2413:Northern Delay
2410:
2405:
2400:
2395:
2390:
2385:
2380:
2375:
2370:
2365:
2359:
2357:
2350:
2342:
2341:
2328:
2327:
2324:
2323:
2320:
2319:
2316:
2315:
2313:
2312:
2307:
2302:
2297:
2292:
2287:
2281:
2279:
2273:
2272:
2270:
2269:
2264:
2259:
2254:
2249:
2244:
2239:
2234:
2228:
2222:
2220:
2214:
2213:
2211:
2210:
2205:
2200:
2194:
2189:
2184:
2179:
2174:
2169:
2168:
2167:
2162:
2152:
2147:
2145:Jeish Muhammad
2142:
2137:
2132:
2127:
2122:
2116:
2114:
2105:
2099:
2098:
2096:
2095:
2090:
2088:United Kingdom
2085:
2080:
2075:
2070:
2065:
2060:
2055:
2050:
2045:
2040:
2038:Ba'athist Iraq
2035:
2029:
2027:
2019:
2018:
2006:
2005:
2002:
2001:
1998:
1997:
1994:
1993:
1991:
1990:
1989:
1988:
1978:
1973:
1972:
1971:
1961:
1960:
1959:
1948:
1946:
1935:
1934:
1929:
1924:
1919:
1914:
1913:
1912:
1905:Reconstruction
1902:
1897:
1892:
1891:
1890:
1885:
1880:
1870:
1864:
1862:
1854:
1853:
1851:
1850:
1845:
1840:
1835:
1830:
1825:
1820:
1815:
1810:
1804:
1802:
1794:
1793:
1791:
1790:
1789:
1788:
1778:
1777:
1776:
1766:
1761:
1756:
1755:
1754:
1745:
1740:
1730:
1725:
1723:Anbar campaign
1720:
1719:
1718:
1716:2003–06 period
1708:
1703:
1697:
1695:
1687:
1686:
1676:
1675:
1672:
1671:
1668:
1667:
1665:
1664:
1659:
1654:
1649:
1642:
1640:Vilnius letter
1637:
1632:
1627:
1625:Habbush letter
1621:
1619:
1613:
1612:
1610:
1609:
1604:
1602:Preemptive war
1599:
1598:
1597:
1592:
1587:
1580:Media coverage
1577:
1572:
1567:
1562:
1553:
1548:
1547:
1546:
1536:
1531:
1530:
1529:
1524:
1513:
1511:
1507:
1506:
1504:
1503:
1498:
1497:
1496:
1491:
1486:
1484:Anthrax claims
1476:
1475:
1474:
1469:
1464:
1459:
1454:
1452:Aluminum tubes
1449:
1438:
1436:
1430:
1429:
1426:
1425:
1423:
1422:
1421:
1420:
1410:
1405:
1400:
1399:
1398:
1388:
1387:
1386:
1384:Investigations
1376:
1371:
1366:
1364:1991 uprisings
1361:
1356:
1351:
1350:
1349:
1344:
1333:
1331:
1327:
1326:
1324:
1323:
1318:
1317:
1316:
1314:Anfal campaign
1311:
1306:
1292:
1287:
1282:
1276:
1274:
1267:
1259:
1258:
1246:
1245:
1242:Iraqi conflict
1239:
1236:
1235:
1227:
1226:
1219:
1212:
1204:
1198:
1197:
1191:
1190:(May 26, 2007)
1185:
1178:
1171:
1164:
1154:
1148:
1141:
1135:
1129:
1118:
1112:
1106:
1095:
1094:External links
1092:
1090:
1089:
1071:
1046:
1015:
1012:on 2008-06-11.
980:
961:
944:
925:
908:
888:
869:
852:
822:
795:
793:
790:
789:
788:
783:
778:
773:
768:
761:
758:
750:George W. Bush
613:Meet the Press
581:
578:
555:
552:
546:
543:
537:
534:
522:
519:
513:
510:
502:Ansar al-Islam
472:
469:
451:
448:
442:
439:
430:Main article:
427:
424:
397:
394:
374:
371:
366:
365:
350:
347:
334:
331:
317:
316:
311:
305:
300:
295:
289:
251:
248:
185:Michael DeWine
172:
169:
168:
167:
164:
161:
158:
155:
88:George W. Bush
73:Richard Butler
64:
61:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
5223:
5212:
5209:
5207:
5204:
5202:
5199:
5197:
5194:
5192:
5189:
5187:
5184:
5183:
5181:
5168:
5159:
5155:
5150:
5141:
5131:
5121:
5118:
5116:
5113:
5111:
5108:
5106:
5103:
5101:
5100:Unilateralism
5098:
5096:
5095:
5091:
5089:
5086:
5084:
5081:
5079:
5076:
5074:
5071:
5069:
5066:
5064:
5061:
5057:
5054:
5053:
5052:
5049:
5047:
5044:
5042:
5039:
5037:
5034:
5030:
5027:
5026:
5025:
5022:
5020:
5017:
5015:
5012:
5010:
5007:
5005:
5002:
5001:
4998:
4991:
4987:
4973:
4970:
4968:
4965:
4963:
4960:
4958:
4955:
4953:
4950:
4948:
4945:
4943:
4940:
4938:
4935:
4933:
4930:
4929:
4927:
4925:
4921:
4915:
4912:
4910:
4907:
4905:
4902:
4900:
4899:Documentaries
4897:
4895:
4892:
4890:
4887:
4885:
4882:
4880:
4877:
4876:
4874:
4870:
4864:
4863:
4859:
4857:
4854:
4852:
4849:
4847:
4844:
4842:
4839:
4837:
4834:
4833:
4831:
4827:
4817:
4816:
4812:
4810:
4807:
4805:
4802:
4801:
4799:
4795:
4789:
4788:
4784:
4782:
4779:
4777:
4776:
4772:
4770:
4767:
4765:
4762:
4760:
4759:
4755:
4753:
4750:
4748:
4747:Shock and awe
4745:
4743:
4742:Regime change
4740:
4738:
4735:
4733:
4732:
4728:
4726:
4723:
4721:
4720:Friedman Unit
4718:
4716:
4715:Freedom fries
4713:
4711:
4708:
4706:
4705:Dead checking
4703:
4701:
4700:
4696:
4694:
4693:
4689:
4687:
4686:
4685:"Baghdad Bob"
4682:
4678:
4677:
4673:
4672:
4671:
4670:
4666:
4665:
4663:
4659:
4655:
4651:Miscellaneous
4648:
4644:
4629:
4626:
4623:
4620:
4617:
4614:
4611:
4608:
4605:
4602:
4600:
4597:
4596:
4594:
4590:
4585:
4582:
4580:
4577:
4575:
4572:
4570:
4567:
4565:
4562:
4560:
4557:
4555:
4552:
4550:
4547:
4545:
4542:
4540:
4537:
4535:
4532:
4530:
4528:
4524:
4518:
4515:
4513:
4512:
4508:
4506:
4505:
4501:
4499:
4496:
4494:
4491:
4489:
4486:
4484:
4481:
4479:
4476:
4474:
4471:
4467:
4464:
4463:
4462:
4459:
4458:
4449:
4446:
4444:
4443:
4439:
4437:
4434:
4433:
4431:
4427:
4424:
4420:
4410:
4407:
4405:
4402:
4400:
4397:
4396:
4394:
4390:
4382:
4381:War resisters
4379:
4378:
4377:
4374:
4372:
4371:
4367:
4365:
4362:
4360:
4357:
4355:
4352:
4350:
4347:
4345:
4342:
4338:
4335:
4334:
4333:
4330:
4328:
4325:
4323:
4320:
4318:
4315:
4313:
4310:
4308:
4305:
4304:
4302:
4300:controversies
4296:
4290:
4287:
4283:
4280:
4278:
4275:
4274:
4273:
4270:
4268:
4265:
4261:
4258:
4257:
4256:
4253:
4251:
4248:
4244:
4241:
4240:
4239:
4236:
4232:
4229:
4227:
4224:
4222:
4219:
4217:
4214:
4213:
4212:
4209:
4208:
4206:
4202:
4198:
4191:
4187:
4175:
4173:
4167:
4161:
4160:Taguba Report
4158:
4156:
4155:
4154:Saleh v. Bush
4151:
4149:
4148:
4144:
4142:
4141:
4137:
4135:
4132:
4128:
4125:
4124:
4123:
4120:
4119:
4117:
4113:
4106:
4103:
4101:
4098:
4096:
4093:
4091:
4088:
4087:
4085:
4081:
4071:
4068:
4066:
4063:
4061:
4060:Taji bombings
4058:
4056:
4053:
4051:
4048:
4046:
4043:
4041:
4038:
4036:
4033:
4029:
4026:
4024:
4021:
4019:
4016:
4015:
4013:
4009:
4006:
4004:
4001:
4000:
3998:
3997:
3995:
3991:
3985:
3982:
3980:
3977:
3973:
3970:
3968:
3965:
3963:
3960:
3958:
3955:
3953:
3950:
3948:
3945:
3944:
3942:
3938:
3935:
3933:
3930:
3929:
3927:
3926:
3924:
3920:
3914:
3913:Tal Afar 2009
3911:
3909:
3906:
3904:
3901:
3899:
3896:
3892:
3889:
3887:
3884:
3882:
3879:
3877:
3874:
3872:
3869:
3867:
3864:
3863:
3861:
3860:
3858:
3854:
3848:
3845:
3843:
3840:
3838:
3835:
3833:
3830:
3828:
3825:
3823:
3820:
3816:
3813:
3811:
3808:
3806:
3803:
3802:
3800:
3799:
3797:
3793:
3787:
3784:
3782:
3779:
3777:
3774:
3772:
3769:
3767:
3764:
3762:
3759:
3757:
3754:
3750:
3747:
3745:
3742:
3741:
3739:
3737:
3734:
3732:
3729:
3727:
3726:Tal Afar 2007
3724:
3722:
3719:
3715:
3712:
3710:
3707:
3705:
3702:
3700:
3697:
3695:
3692:
3690:
3687:
3685:
3682:
3680:
3677:
3676:
3674:
3672:
3669:
3668:
3666:
3662:
3656:
3653:
3649:
3646:
3644:
3641:
3640:
3638:
3636:
3633:
3631:
3628:
3626:
3623:
3622:
3620:
3616:
3610:
3607:
3605:
3602:
3598:
3595:
3593:
3590:
3589:
3587:
3585:
3582:
3580:
3577:
3575:
3572:
3571:
3569:
3565:
3559:
3556:
3554:
3551:
3549:
3546:
3542:
3539:
3537:
3534:
3533:
3531:
3529:
3526:
3524:
3521:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3511:
3509:
3506:
3505:
3503:
3499:
3493:
3490:
3488:
3485:
3483:
3480:
3478:
3475:
3474:
3472:
3468:
3465:
3463:
3456:
3445:
3442:
3439:
3436:
3433:
3430:
3427:
3424:
3421:
3418:
3415:
3412:
3409:
3406:
3403:
3400:
3397:
3394:
3393:
3391:
3385:
3378:
3375:
3374:
3372:
3366:
3359:
3358:Iraq War Logs
3356:
3353:
3350:
3347:
3344:
3341:
3338:
3335:
3332:
3329:
3326:
3323:
3320:
3317:
3314:
3311:
3308:
3305:
3302:
3299:
3296:
3293:
3290:
3287:
3284:
3281:
3278:
3276:
3273:
3270:
3267:
3263:
3260:
3258:
3255:
3254:
3253:
3250:
3249:
3247:
3241:
3238:
3234:
3230:
3223:
3219:
3205:
3202:
3198:
3195:
3193:
3190:
3189:
3188:
3185:
3184:
3182:
3178:
3167:
3164:
3163:
3161:
3157:
3151:
3148:
3146:
3143:
3141:
3138:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3130:
3126:
3125:
3123:
3119:
3113:
3110:
3108:
3107:Donkey Island
3105:
3103:
3100:
3098:
3095:
3093:
3090:
3088:
3085:
3083:
3080:
3078:
3075:
3073:
3070:
3069:
3067:
3063:
3057:
3054:
3052:
3049:
3047:
3044:
3042:
3039:
3037:
3034:
3032:
3029:
3028:
3026:
3022:
3016:
3013:
3011:
3008:
3006:
3003:
3001:
2998:
2996:
2993:
2991:
2990:Lake Tharthar
2988:
2987:
2985:
2981:
2976:
2973:
2971:
2968:
2966:
2963:
2961:
2958:
2956:
2953:
2951:
2948:
2946:
2943:
2941:
2938:
2936:
2933:
2931:
2928:
2926:
2923:
2921:
2918:
2916:
2913:
2911:
2910:
2906:
2904:
2900:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2886:
2885:
2876:
2873:
2871:
2868:
2866:
2863:
2861:
2858:
2856:
2853:
2851:
2848:
2846:
2843:
2841:
2838:
2836:
2833:
2831:
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2807:
2805:
2801:
2798:
2794:
2791:
2787:
2777:
2774:
2773:
2771:
2767:
2761:
2758:
2756:
2753:
2751:
2748:
2747:
2745:
2741:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2717:
2715:
2712:
2710:
2707:
2705:
2704:Polar Tempest
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2675:
2672:
2670:
2667:
2665:
2664:Forsythe Park
2662:
2660:
2657:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2645:
2642:
2640:
2637:
2636:
2634:
2630:
2624:
2621:
2619:
2616:
2614:
2611:
2609:
2606:
2604:
2601:
2599:
2598:Iron Triangle
2596:
2594:
2591:
2589:
2586:
2584:
2581:
2580:
2578:
2574:
2568:
2567:Steel Curtain
2565:
2563:
2560:
2558:
2557:Spear (Romhe)
2555:
2553:
2550:
2548:
2545:
2543:
2540:
2538:
2535:
2533:
2530:
2528:
2525:
2523:
2520:
2518:
2515:
2514:
2512:
2508:
2502:
2499:
2497:
2494:
2492:
2491:Plymouth Rock
2489:
2487:
2484:
2482:
2479:
2477:
2474:
2472:
2469:
2467:
2464:
2462:
2459:
2458:
2456:
2452:
2446:
2443:
2441:
2438:
2436:
2433:
2431:
2428:
2426:
2423:
2419:
2416:
2415:
2414:
2411:
2409:
2406:
2404:
2401:
2399:
2396:
2394:
2391:
2389:
2388:Desert Thrust
2386:
2384:
2381:
2379:
2376:
2374:
2371:
2369:
2366:
2364:
2361:
2360:
2358:
2354:
2351:
2347:
2343:
2339:
2333:
2329:
2311:
2308:
2306:
2303:
2301:
2298:
2296:
2293:
2291:
2288:
2286:
2283:
2282:
2280:
2274:
2268:
2265:
2263:
2260:
2258:
2255:
2253:
2250:
2248:
2245:
2243:
2240:
2238:
2235:
2232:
2229:
2227:
2224:
2223:
2221:
2215:
2209:
2206:
2204:
2201:
2198:
2195:
2193:
2190:
2188:
2185:
2183:
2180:
2178:
2175:
2173:
2170:
2166:
2163:
2161:
2158:
2157:
2156:
2153:
2151:
2148:
2146:
2143:
2141:
2140:Hamas of Iraq
2138:
2136:
2133:
2131:
2128:
2126:
2123:
2121:
2118:
2117:
2115:
2109:
2106:
2100:
2094:
2093:United States
2091:
2089:
2086:
2084:
2081:
2079:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2069:
2066:
2064:
2061:
2059:
2056:
2054:
2051:
2049:
2046:
2044:
2041:
2039:
2036:
2034:
2031:
2030:
2028:
2024:
2020:
2016:
2011:
2007:
1987:
1984:
1983:
1982:
1979:
1977:
1974:
1970:
1967:
1966:
1965:
1962:
1958:
1955:
1954:
1953:
1950:
1949:
1947:
1945:
1939:
1933:
1930:
1928:
1925:
1923:
1920:
1918:
1915:
1911:
1908:
1907:
1906:
1903:
1901:
1898:
1896:
1893:
1889:
1886:
1884:
1881:
1879:
1876:
1875:
1874:
1871:
1869:
1866:
1865:
1863:
1861:
1855:
1849:
1846:
1844:
1841:
1839:
1836:
1834:
1831:
1829:
1826:
1824:
1821:
1819:
1816:
1814:
1811:
1809:
1806:
1805:
1803:
1801:
1795:
1787:
1784:
1783:
1782:
1779:
1775:
1772:
1771:
1770:
1767:
1765:
1762:
1760:
1757:
1753:
1749:
1746:
1744:
1741:
1739:
1738:Interrogation
1736:
1735:
1734:
1731:
1729:
1726:
1724:
1721:
1717:
1714:
1713:
1712:
1709:
1707:
1704:
1702:
1699:
1698:
1696:
1692:
1688:
1681:
1677:
1663:
1660:
1658:
1655:
1653:
1650:
1648:
1647:
1643:
1641:
1638:
1636:
1633:
1631:
1628:
1626:
1623:
1622:
1620:
1614:
1608:
1605:
1603:
1600:
1596:
1593:
1591:
1588:
1586:
1583:
1582:
1581:
1578:
1576:
1573:
1571:
1568:
1566:
1563:
1561:
1557:
1554:
1552:
1549:
1545:
1542:
1541:
1540:
1537:
1535:
1532:
1528:
1525:
1523:
1522:Bush Doctrine
1520:
1519:
1518:
1515:
1514:
1512:
1508:
1502:
1499:
1495:
1492:
1490:
1487:
1485:
1482:
1481:
1480:
1477:
1473:
1470:
1468:
1465:
1463:
1460:
1458:
1455:
1453:
1450:
1448:
1445:
1444:
1443:
1440:
1439:
1437:
1435:
1431:
1419:
1416:
1415:
1414:
1411:
1409:
1406:
1404:
1403:War on terror
1401:
1397:
1394:
1393:
1392:
1389:
1385:
1382:
1381:
1380:
1377:
1375:
1372:
1370:
1367:
1365:
1362:
1360:
1357:
1355:
1352:
1348:
1345:
1343:
1340:
1339:
1338:
1335:
1334:
1332:
1328:
1322:
1319:
1315:
1312:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1301:
1298:
1297:
1296:
1295:Iran–Iraq War
1293:
1291:
1288:
1286:
1283:
1281:
1278:
1277:
1275:
1271:
1268:
1264:
1260:
1256:
1251:
1247:
1243:
1237:
1232:
1225:
1220:
1218:
1213:
1211:
1206:
1205:
1202:
1195:
1192:
1189:
1186:
1183:
1179:
1176:
1172:
1169:
1165:
1162:
1159:
1155:
1152:
1149:
1146:
1142:
1139:
1136:
1133:
1130:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1116:
1113:
1110:
1107:
1105:
1101:
1098:
1097:
1085:
1081:
1075:
1061:on 2008-06-26
1060:
1056:
1050:
1034:
1030:
1026:
1019:
1008:
1001:
995:
993:
991:
989:
987:
985:
977:
973:
970:
965:
959:
955:
952:
948:
941:
937:
934:
929:
923:
919:
916:
912:
906:
902:
899:
895:
893:
885:
881:
878:
873:
867:
863:
860:
856:
840:
836:
832:
826:
815:September 11,
810:
806:
800:
796:
787:
784:
782:
779:
777:
774:
772:
769:
767:
766:Butler Review
764:
763:
757:
755:
751:
747:
743:
739:
735:
730:
729:
724:
720:
719:Douglas Feith
716:
711:
708:
706:
702:
697:
693:
691:
686:
682:
680:
675:
673:
669:
665:
660:
658:
654:
649:
646:
641:
638:
633:
629:
626:
621:
617:
614:
609:
607:
603:
598:
595:
590:
587:
577:
574:
571:
567:
564:
560:
551:
542:
533:
530:
528:
518:
509:
505:
503:
499:
494:
492:
487:
485:
478:
468:
461:
456:
447:
438:
433:
423:
419:
418:
414:
410:
406:
404:
393:
389:
385:
380:
370:
364:
362:
356:
355:
354:
346:
344:
340:
330:
327:
322:
315:
312:
310:
306:
304:
301:
299:
296:
294:
290:
288:
285:
284:
283:
281:
276:
274:
270:
266:
261:
258:
247:
245:
242:(D-NC), and
241:
237:
233:
229:
225:
221:
217:
212:
210:
206:
202:
198:
197:Olympia Snowe
194:
190:
186:
182:
178:
165:
162:
159:
156:
152:
151:
150:
148:
144:
139:
137:
132:
130:
122:
117:
113:
110:
105:
99:
97:
93:
89:
84:
82:
78:
74:
70:
60:
58:
52:
50:
46:
42:
38:
30:
26:
21:
5160: /
5151: /
5142: /
5092:
4860:
4813:
4785:
4773:
4756:
4729:
4697:
4690:
4683:
4674:
4669:Axis of evil
4667:
4509:
4503:
4440:
4398:
4368:
4322:Plame affair
4250:Human rights
4171:
4170:
4152:
4145:
4138:
4065:Karbala 2011
3979:Baqubah 2010
3903:Taza bombing
3827:Karbala 2008
3553:Baqubah 2004
3541:30 September
3536:14 September
3462:and bombings
3243:Killings and
3127:
3087:Shurta Nasir
3072:Haifa Street
3046:Al Rumaythah
2907:
2870:Debecka Pass
2729:Tiger Hammer
2719:Sledgehammer
2669:Imposing Law
2603:River Falcon
2562:Squeeze Play
2522:Able Warrior
2481:Phantom Fury
2408:Ivy Blizzard
2403:Iron Justice
2336:Battles and
2295:Popular Army
2015:Participants
1986:Ratification
1981:Constitution
1888:CPA Order 17
1750: /
1644:
1558: /
1494:Ricin claims
1359:No-fly zones
1302: /
1196:June 6, 2007
1160:
1084:the original
1074:
1063:. Retrieved
1059:the original
1049:
1037:. Retrieved
1028:
1018:
1007:the original
964:
947:
928:
911:
872:
855:
843:. Retrieved
839:the original
825:
813:. Retrieved
799:
734:Nancy Pelosi
731:
727:
722:
712:
709:
703:, stated in
698:
694:
687:
683:
676:
661:
650:
644:
642:
636:
634:
630:
622:
618:
610:
599:
591:
583:
575:
572:
568:
565:
561:
557:
548:
539:
531:
524:
515:
506:
495:
490:
488:
480:
465:
444:
435:
420:
416:
415:
411:
407:
399:
390:
386:
382:
367:
357:
352:
342:
336:
326:was released
318:
313:
307:
302:
297:
293:information;
291:
286:
277:
262:
253:
240:John Edwards
228:Ronald Wyden
213:
207:(R-GA), and
174:
140:
133:
129:invaded Iraq
126:
109:Colin Powell
100:
85:
77:Bill Clinton
66:
53:
36:
34:
25:Colin Powell
5073:Patriot Act
4787:"Yo, Blair"
4661:Terminology
4624:(2014–2021)
4610:War in Iraq
4442:Khuy Voyne!
4115:Prosecution
4107:(2004–2011)
3908:Kirkuk 2009
3781:Kirkuk 2007
3694:18 February
3689:12 February
3482:Canal Hotel
3416:(2003–2011)
3112:Karbala III
2970:Fallujah II
2960:CIMIC House
2865:Karbala Gap
2835:Haditha Dam
2709:Purple Haze
2684:Marne Torch
2654:Black Eagle
2542:Iron Hammer
2461:Baton Rouge
2398:Iron Hammer
2073:South Korea
1944:governments
1942:Replacement
1883:CPA Order 2
1860:(2003–2011)
1467:"Curveball"
1233:(2003–2011)
754:White House
668:Pat Roberts
527:Orrin Hatch
257:Murray Waas
232:Dick Durbin
209:John Warner
201:Chuck Hagel
181:Orrin Hatch
177:Pat Roberts
143:Pat Roberts
5180:Categories
5167:Multimedia
5056:Resolution
5041:Green Zone
4628:Insurgency
4604:Insurgency
4473:Opposition
4327:Hood event
4231:ORB survey
4211:Casualties
4070:Basra 2011
3822:Balad 2008
3684:3 February
3679:22 January
3604:Balad 2005
3579:Erbil 2005
3523:Mosul 2004
3518:Basra 2004
3508:Erbil 2004
3402:Camp Bucca
3226:War crimes
3166:Palm Grove
3031:Baghdad II
3005:Hit convoy
2995:Abu Ghraib
2920:Fallujah I
2850:Karbala II
2724:Stampede 3
2674:Leyte Gulf
2552:New Market
2471:Iron Saber
2349:Operations
2338:operations
2233:'s militia
2226:Mahdi Army
1900:Blackwater
1878:100 Orders
1858:Occupation
1711:Insurgency
1694:Key events
1442:WMD claims
1266:Background
1065:2008-06-22
792:References
748:President
484:(Page 350)
250:Chronology
220:Carl Levin
193:Trent Lott
63:Background
5115:WikiLeaks
5083:Post-9/11
4829:Memorials
4612:(2013–17)
4606:(2011–13)
4478:Criticism
4422:Reactions
4298:Political
4282:Mandaeans
3967:September
3937:25 August
3832:Al-Karmah
3761:Abu Sayda
3597:September
3410:(2003–04)
3408:Camp Nama
3404:(2003–09)
3398:(2003–06)
3389:and abuse
3379:(2004–05)
3245:massacres
3159:2009–2011
3145:Basra III
3092:Basra II
3082:Najaf III
3036:Ramadi II
2950:Danny Boy
2875:Baghdad I
2845:Samawah I
2830:Karbala I
2825:Nasiriyah
2769:2009–2011
2644:Arbead II
2588:Gaugamela
2278:loyalists
2231:Abu Deraa
2197:Abu Theeb
2102:Insurgent
2033:Australia
2026:Countries
1752:Reactions
1748:Execution
1618:and memos
1434:Rationale
1396:Aftermath
1330:1990–2003
1163:, p. A09
752:from the
403:CURVEBALL
321:announced
236:Evan Bayh
218:(D-WV),
5158:Wikinews
5149:Category
4924:Timeline
4889:Bombings
4797:Critical
4527:Protests
4504:Photo Op
4272:Refugees
3972:November
3952:February
3891:December
3805:February
3756:Makhmour
3714:1 August
3704:18 April
3699:29 March
3648:November
3368:Chemical
3041:Diwaniya
3015:Tal Afar
3000:Al-Qa'im
2955:Najaf II
2945:Husaybah
2930:Ramadi I
2810:Umm Qasr
2803:Invasion
2776:New Dawn
2649:Ardennes
2608:Scorpion
2583:Al Majid
2527:Badlands
2435:Planet X
2393:Falconer
2378:Catalyst
2199:'s group
2078:Thailand
1808:Timeline
1798:Invasion
1774:timeline
1728:Fallujah
1684:Overview
1616:Dossiers
1570:Legality
1418:Invasion
1337:Gulf War
1273:Pre-1990
1231:Iraq War
1033:Archived
972:Archived
954:Archived
936:Archived
918:Archived
901:Archived
880:Archived
862:Archived
809:Archived
760:See also
674:(R-MO).
672:Kit Bond
637:The Hill
517:proper.
246:(D-MD).
238:(D-IN),
234:(D-IL),
230:(D-OR),
226:(D-CA),
222:(D-MI),
211:(R-VA).
203:(R-NE),
199:(R-ME),
195:(R-MS),
191:(R-MO),
189:Kit Bond
187:(R-OH),
183:(R-UT),
179:(R-KS),
69:Gulf War
5140:Outline
4994:Related
4429:Pre-war
4204:General
4028:October
4018:January
4003:January
3947:January
3886:October
3871:6 April
3709:26 July
3387:Torture
3370:weapons
3140:Nineveh
3097:Baqubah
3010:Haditha
2965:Samarra
2840:Najaf I
2820:Basra I
2789:Battles
2689:Mawtini
2618:Swarmer
2547:Matador
2532:Cyclone
2290:Al-Awda
2083:Ukraine
2048:Georgia
2043:Denmark
1544:UNMOVIC
1300:British
1255:Prelude
1039:May 23,
746:impeach
655:" and "
267:(CIA),
154:people;
4194:Impact
4023:August
4008:August
3962:August
3932:10 May
3881:August
3592:August
3446:(2004)
3440:(2003)
3434:(2003)
3428:(2003)
3422:(2003)
3360:(2010)
3354:(2007)
3348:(2007)
3342:(2006)
3336:(2006)
3330:(2006)
3324:(2006)
3318:(2006)
3312:(2006)
3306:(2005)
3300:(2005)
3294:(2005)
3288:(2005)
3282:(2004)
3271:(2003)
3168:(2010)
3051:Amarah
2860:Hillah
2855:Al Kut
2815:Al Faw
2639:Alljah
2613:Sinbad
2537:Dagger
2276:Ba'ath
2219:groups
2113:groups
2104:groups
2068:Poland
1800:(2003)
1510:Issues
1489:Prague
1369:UNSCOM
845:8 July
625:letter
271:, the
86:After
4872:Lists
3957:April
3866:March
3810:March
3056:Turki
2975:Mosul
2445:Telic
2111:Sunni
2063:Japan
2058:Italy
1922:UNAMI
1743:Trial
1010:(PDF)
1003:(PDF)
606:wrote
4972:2011
4967:2010
4962:2009
4957:2008
4952:2007
4947:2006
4942:2005
4937:2004
4932:2003
3993:2011
3922:2010
3876:June
3856:2009
3815:June
3795:2008
3664:2007
3643:July
3618:2006
3567:2005
3501:2004
3470:2003
3197:2008
3192:2007
3121:2008
3065:2007
3024:2006
2983:2005
2902:2004
2796:2003
2743:2008
2632:2007
2576:2006
2510:2005
2454:2004
2356:2003
2217:Shia
2053:Iran
1041:2010
847:2018
817:2017
337:The
35:The
659:."
309:and
5182::
3458:§
1128:.)
1031:.
1027:.
983:^
891:^
692:.
486:.
59:.
4172:§
1223:e
1216:t
1209:v
1068:.
1043:.
849:.
819:.
401:"
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