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153:) view normative reasons as the same as "explanations of ought facts". Just as explanatory reasons explain why some descriptive fact obtains (or came to obtain), normative reasons on this view explain why some normative facts obtain, i.e., they explain why some state of affairs ought to come to obtain (e.g., why someone should act or why some event ought to take place).
189:) are considerations which count in favor of believing some proposition to be true. Practical reasons are considerations which count in favor of some action or the having of some attitude (or at least, count in favor of wanting or trying to bring those actions or attitudes about).
141:—e.g., the reason Bill went to college was to learn; i.e., that he would learn was his motivating reason. At least where a rational agent is acting rationally, her motivating reasons are those considerations which she believes count in favor of her so acting.
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about what people should do or believe. For example, that a doctor's patient is grimacing is a reason to believe the patient is in pain. That the patient is in pain is a reason for the doctor to do things to alleviate the pain.
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are considerations which serve to explain why things have happened or why states of affairs are the way they are. In other words, "reason" can also be a synonym for "
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are explanations of why things happened. For example, the reason the patient is in pain is that her nerves are sending signals from her tissues to her brain.
133:". For example, a reason a car starts is that its ignition is turned. In the context of explaining the actions of beings who act for reasons (i.e.,
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This article is about normative factors favoring a belief or action. For other related topics, see
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something is or could be true, but does not directly convince one
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Philosophers, when discussing reasoning that is influenced by
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