558:, "marginal price system" (MPS), is a multiunit auction in which a fixed number of identical units of a homogenous commodity are sold for the same price. Each bidder in the auction may submit (possibly multiple) bids, designating both the number of units desired and the price he/she is willing to pay per unit. Typically these bids are sealed - not revealed to the other buyers until the auction closes. The auctioneer then serves the highest bidder first, giving them the number of units requested, then the second-highest bidder and so forth until the supply of the commodity is exhausted. All bidders then pay a per unit price equal to the lowest winning bid (the lowest bid out of the buyers who actually received one or more units of the commodity) - regardless of their actual bid. Some variations of this auction have the winners paying the highest losing bid rather than the lowest winning bid.
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570:, shares the characteristics of an open market mechanism in which all buyers and all sellers interested in trading a homogenous commodity may participate simultaneously. The clearing price mechanism is often utilised in a market context in order to establish a benchmark price index for that market in question. Examples include government bond auctions,
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In theory, the uniform-price auction provides an incentive for bidders to bid insincerely unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit. For multiple-unit demand, bidders have an incentive to shade their bids for units other than their first because those bids may influence the price the
606:, where a lot is allocated to (potentially) multiple buyers in different bidding rounds. To speed up this process, the initial auction price for any subsequent bidding round is set just slightly higher than the previous winning bid (around 15-20 cents, or 15-30% on average).
625:. The portions of the total amount, bidders can bid, are limited to lower numbers than the total amount. Therefore, only a portion of the total amount will be traded for the best price and the rest to the suboptimal prices like in the discriminatory price auction.
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is a special case of multiunit auction. OnSale.com has developed Yankee auction as its trademark in the 1990s. A Yankee auction is a single-attribute multiunit auction running like a
706:"Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity system with a high penetration of renewable energy sources – A comparison of marginal pricing and pay-as-bid"
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A uniform price auction may be utilised to aggregate a number of units offered by more than one seller to multiple buyers. This style of auction, sometimes referred to as a
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in which several homogeneous items are sold. The units can be sold each at the same price (a uniform price auction) or at different prices (a discriminatory price auction).
642:
Bowler, Ben; Asprou, Marcus; Hartmann, Balint; Mazidi, Peyman; Kyriakides, Elias (2020). "Enabling
Flexibility Through Wholesale Market Changes – A European Case Study".
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621:, where the bids are the portions of a total amount of identical units. The total amount of auctioned items is firm in a Yankee auction unlike a
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Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (2003). "Replicating Online Yankee
Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers' and Bidders' Strategies".
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Binmore, Ken; Swierzbinski, Joe (1 December 2000). "Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?".
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bidder pays. This demand reduction results in an inefficient equilibrium.
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Nielsen, Steffen; Sorknæs, Peter; Østergaard, Poul Alberg (July 2011).
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Hultmark, Christina; Ramberg, Christina; Kuner, Christopher (2002).
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A variation that preserves the incentive to bid truthfully is the
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Internet
Marketplaces: The Law of Auctions and Exchanges Online
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For a technical analysis of this type of auction see
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574:auctions and compliance certificate markets.
23:For an auction of heterogeneous items, see
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932:"E-Auctions in Sourcing: Yankee Auction"
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878:. Oxford University Press. p. 40.
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596:discriminatory price auction
590:Discriminatory price auction
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796:Review of Economic Design
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181:Generalized second-price
16:Not to be confused with
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18:Multi-attribute auction
556:marginal price auction
231:Simultaneous ascending
808:10.1007/s100580000026
778:Tierney, Susan, et al
604:Dutch Flower Auctions
548:uniform price auction
542:Uniform price auction
266:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
25:Combinatorial auction
146:Discriminatory price
456:Revenue equivalence
141:Deferred-acceptance
918:"Cigar Auctioneer"
600:pay-as-bid auction
572:electricity market
226:Sealed first-price
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491:Software
481:Ebidding
406:Spectrum
371:Children
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221:Scottish
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186:Japanese
116:Calcutta
43:Auctions
35:a series
33:Part of
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386:Flowers
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