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dishonest. While both sides agree that the thin concepts are more general and the thick more specific, centralists hold that the thin concepts are antecedent to the thick ones and that the latter are therefore dependent on the former. That is, centralists argue that one must understand words like "right" and "ought" before understanding words like "just" and "unkind." Non-centralism rejects this view, holding that thin and thick concepts are on par with one another and even that the thick concepts are a sufficient starting point for understanding the thin ones.
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36:
1991:, the view that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural fact. However, neither moral realism nor ethical non-naturalism are essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists simply happen to hold those views as well. Ethical intuitionism comes in both a "rationalist" variety, and a more "empiricist" variety known as
1491:
have argued in favor of the fact/norm distinction, meanwhile, with
Gibbard going so far as to argue that, even if conventional English has only mixed normative terms (that is, terms that are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative), we could develop a nominally English metalanguage that still
1478:
Non-centralism has been of particular importance to ethical naturalists in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as part of their argument that normativity is a non-excisable aspect of language and that there is no way of analyzing thick moral concepts into a purely descriptive element attached to a
1474:
moral theories. The debate between centralism and non-centralism revolves around the relationship between the so-called "thin" and "thick" concepts of morality: thin moral concepts are those such as good, bad, right, and wrong; thick moral concepts are those such as courageous, inequitable, just, or
1743:
maintains that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single standard exists by which one can objectively assess the truth of a moral proposition. Metaethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as
1616:
contends that there are two or more genuine scales of value, knowable as such, yet incommensurable, so that any prioritization of these values is either non-cognitive or subjective. A value pluralist might, for example, contend that both a life as a nun and a life as a mother realize genuine values
1142:
theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ethical
1823:
If one presupposes a cognitivist interpretation of moral sentences, morality is justified by the moralist's knowledge of moral facts, and the theories to justify moral judgements are epistemological theories. Most moral epistemologies posit that moral knowledge is somehow possible (including
1326:
would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal
Observer Theory still purports to provide
1060:?" and "How can we tell what is good from what is bad?", seeking to understand the assumptions underlying normative theories. Another distinction often made is that normative ethics involves first-order or substantive questions; metaethics involves second-order or formal questions.
1793:, also known as ethical nihilism, is the metaethical view that nothing has intrinsic moral value. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is intrinsically neither morally right nor morally wrong. Moral nihilism must be distinguished from
1302:
is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are
1367:, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false. Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally permissible" are false, according to error theory.
1071:
is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.
1206:
or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Metaethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of
1797:, which does allow for moral statements to be intrinsically true or false in a non-universal sense, but does not assign any static truth-values to moral statements. Insofar as only true statements can be known, moral nihilists are
1413:, holds that ethical sentences serve merely to express emotions. Ayer argues that ethical sentences are expressions of approval or disapproval, not assertions. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Boo on killing!".
1759:, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation. The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing
1137:
Garner and Rosen say that answers to the three basic questions "are not unrelated, and sometimes an answer to one will strongly suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer to another." A metaethical theory, unlike a
1000:
1337:
holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the
1575:(although it can be argued that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may distinguish between Gods and mortals). Moral universalism is the opposing position to various forms of
1751:
conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one
1423:, holds that ethical statements behave linguistically like factual claims and can be appropriately called "true" or "false", even though there are no ethical facts for them to correspond to.
1617:(in a universalist sense), yet they are incompatible (nuns may not have children), and there is no purely rational way to measure which is preferable. A notable proponent of this view is
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While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, metaethics addresses questions such as "What
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1398:, however some such as Mark Timmons and Terrence Horgan distinguish the two and allow the possibility of cognitivist forms of expressivism. Non-cognitivism includes:
1154:
attempts to answer the question, "What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?" Answers may have implications for answers to the other two questions as well.
1820:
is the study of moral knowledge. It attempts to answer such questions as, "How may moral judgments be supported or defended?" and "Is moral knowledge possible?"
1828:. Amongst them, there are those who hold that moral knowledge is gained inferentially on the basis of some sort of non-moral epistemic process, as opposed to
1007:
1862:, which hold that moral facts reduce to facts about individual opinions or cultural conventions and thus are knowable by observation of those conventions.
1848:
is the doctrine that knowledge is gained primarily through observation and experience. Metaethical theories that imply an empirical epistemology include:
1874:, which holds that moral facts are merely personal opinions and so may be known only through introspection. Empirical arguments for ethics run into the
974:
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sentences. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Don't kill!" Hare's version of prescriptivism requires that moral prescriptions be
1680:
1179:. Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such propositions are true (including moral realism and ethical subjectivism), as opposed to
2010:
of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger,
1899:, also called ethical rationalism, is the view according to which moral truths (or at least general moral principles) are knowable
1687:
1975:
about moral beliefs. Such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies
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867:
1371:
is probably the best-known proponent of this view. Since error theory denies that there are moral truths, error theory entails
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According to
Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, there are three kinds of metaethical problems, or three general questions:
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17:
1563:, or other distinguishing feature. The source or justification of this system may be thought to be, for instance,
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86:
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882:
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1394:. Non-cognitivism is another form of moral anti-realism. Most forms of non-cognitivism are also forms of
53:
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2014:, claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Forms of moral skepticism include, but are not limited to,
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1901:
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887:
1855:, which holds moral facts to be reducible to non-moral facts and thus knowable in the same ways; and
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theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine
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46:
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2186:
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1988:
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1351:, Philip Quinn, and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be
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allowed us to maintain the division between factual descriptions and normative evaluations.
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thin moral evaluation, thus undermining any fundamental division between facts and norms.
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8:
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2447:
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2007:
1992:
1944:. A moral rationalist may adhere to any number of different semantic theories as well;
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1778:
1560:
1532:
1514:
1446:
1428:
1379:; however, neither moral nihilism nor moral skepticism conversely entail error theory.
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1535:(or universal morality) is the metaethical position that some system of ethics, or a
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1517:, who hold that the same moral facts or principles apply to everyone everywhere; and
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1050:(practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).
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are two figures in the history of philosophy who have rejected moral rationalism.
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Amongst those who believe there to be some standard(s) of morality (as opposed to
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moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have
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2019:
1972:
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1240:) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have
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Asks such questions as how we can know if something is right or wrong, if at all.
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Asks about the meanings of such words as 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' (see
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612:
582:
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Value monism is the common form of universalism, which holds that all goods are
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2110:
Moral
Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics
1790:
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Yet another way of categorizing metaethical theories is to distinguish between
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216:
1870:, which implies that moral facts may be known through a rational process, and
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was largely responsible for the birth of metaethical research in contemporary
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holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are
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3162:
3102:
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1980:
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1910:
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knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many
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2015:
1937:
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1424:
1395:
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1216:
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1125:
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attempts to answer the question, "What is the nature of moral judgments?"
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2011:
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3097:
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2764:
2457:
2235:
1929:
1918:
1845:
1571:, what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of
1539:, applies universally, that is to all intelligent beings regardless of
1484:
1450:
1438:
1406:
1241:
978:
782:
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471:
363:
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191:
1449:, and hence actually have objective values, in spite of failing to be
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35:
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1809:(which is semantically non-cognitive but substantially universal).
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1101:
1068:
952:
513:
508:
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211:
2222:. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 52–59.
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for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about
1038:. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by
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343:
333:
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1967:
is the view according to which some moral truths can be known
1567:, shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal
3037:
3027:
1906:
1748:
777:
742:
2193:. 1995. "Introduction: The Ages of Metaethics." Pp. 1–30 in
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and vice versa, though there are notable exceptions such as
1744:"good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject to
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3077:
2993:
2839:
2834:
2794:
1928:
Recent philosophers who defended moral rationalism include
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535:
393:
388:
353:
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There are exceptions within subjectivism however, such as
1781:, although not all subjectivist theories are relativistic.
1441:, holds that moral statements function like universalized
1278:
awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's
3003:
2312:
1769:
Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism entails
1548:
1124:
How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral
552:
27:
Branch of ethics seeking to understand ethical properties
2195:
On the
Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays in Metaethics
2169:
1084:
What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral
1835:
1167:
theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express
2177:(ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 54–97.
1948:
is compatible with rationalism, and the subjectivist
1586:, though exceptions exists, such as the subjectivist
1777:. Some but not all relativist theories are forms of
2107:
981:. In order to explore related topics, please visit
60:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
2103:
2101:
1175:', capable of being true or false), as opposed to
1034:is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of
2214:(1993). E. Villanueva (ed.). "Reply to Railton".
1824:empiricism and moral rationalism), as opposed to
3521:
2197:, edited by J. Couture and K. Nielsen. Calgary:
1461:
1236:or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as
2098:
1046:(questions of how one ought to be and act) and
1971:inference. That is, the view is at its core a
1880:problem, which asserts that the way the world
1318:holds that what is right is determined by the
1107:Asks questions of whether moral judgments are
1100:What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral
2328:
1582:Universalist theories are generally forms of
1001:
3275:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
1987:facts of morality and, to be more specific,
1664:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
1382:
2335:
2321:
2108:Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967).
1008:
994:
1979:. Ethical intuitionism commonly suggests
1728:Learn how and when to remove this message
120:Learn how and when to remove this message
2252:
1183:, which asserts that all are erroneous.
1075:
3307:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
2301:on meta-ethics, especially intuitionism
2292:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
2210:
2154:Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity
1959:
1602:. Forms of moral universalism include:
1307:, but there are notable forms that are
1294:
1223:. Realism comes in two main varieties:
1157:
868:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
14:
3522:
1884:cannot alone instruct people how they
1755:to do based on societal or individual
2316:
1812:
1773:, while others consider it a form of
1527:
1347:) but retains some modern defenders (
1264:, holds that there are objective and
2299:Essays by philosopher Michael Huemer
1891:
1662:adding citations to reliable sources
1629:
58:adding citations to reliable sources
29:
3323:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
2277:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2264:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1998:
1836:Moral knowledge gained by inference
1801:. Most forms of moral nihilism are
1625:
853:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
24:
2140:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1872:individualist ethical subjectivism
1677:"metaethics" moral relativism
1594:theories, and the non-cognitivist
1146:
25:
3551:
2246:
1785:
1495:
3504:
3503:
1634:
1248:ethical theorists, particularly
1186:
1171:(i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or '
34:
1359:
1282:against what he considered the
45:needs additional citations for
3291:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
2661:Value monism – Value pluralism
2204:
2180:
2163:
2146:
2128:
2018:and most but not all forms of
1917:, defended moral rationalism.
908:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
13:
1:
2091:
1840:
1462:Centralism and non-centralism
3355:On the Genealogy of Morality
3315:Critique of Practical Reason
1510:), there are two divisions:
1063:Some theorists argue that a
883:On the Genealogy of Morality
843:Critique of Practical Reason
7:
2306:Relativity theory of ethics
2199:University of Calgary Press
2137:. 1992. "Critical Notice."
2025:
1913:, prominent figures in the
1331:answers to moral questions.
10:
3556:
3283:A Treatise of Human Nature
2342:
2216:Naturalism and Normativity
1983:, the view that there are
913:A Treatise of Human Nature
3499:
3406:
3251:
3017:
2742:
2671:
2533:
2408:
2350:
1355:despite its subjectivism.
1211:" regarding moral facts:
888:The Philosophy of Freedom
2634:Universal prescriptivism
2171:Morality and Objectivity
1954:universal prescriptivism
1807:universal prescriptivism
1610:on a single value scale.
1596:universal prescriptivism
1435:Universal prescriptivism
1383:Non-cognitivist theories
2423:Artificial intelligence
2158:Oxford University Press
2284:The Language of Morals
2085:The Right and the Good
2053:Fact–value distinction
1989:ethical non-naturalism
1280:open question argument
1257:Ethical non-naturalism
3347:The Methods of Ethics
2585:Divine command theory
2580:Ideal observer theory
2253:Sayre-McCord, Geoff.
2152:Hurley, S.L. (1989).
1950:ideal observer theory
1915:history of philosophy
1868:ideal observer theory
1858:most common forms of
1431:are related theories.
1335:Divine command theory
1316:Ideal observer theory
1076:Metaethical questions
494:Social responsibility
421:Intellectual humility
3464:Political philosophy
2287:(1952) by R. M. Hare
2048:Ethical subjectivism
1965:Ethical intuitionism
1960:Ethical intuitionism
1952:and non-cognitivist
1860:ethical subjectivism
1830:ethical intuitionism
1658:improve this section
1322:that a hypothetical
1300:Ethical subjectivism
1295:Ethical subjectivism
1284:naturalistic fallacy
1260:, as put forward by
1213:ethical subjectivism
1158:Cognitivist theories
838:Beyond Good and Evil
54:improve this article
3434:Evolutionary ethics
3395:Reasons and Persons
3371:A Theory of Justice
2525:Uncertain sentience
2033:Anthropic principle
1934:Christine Korsgaard
1923:Friedrich Nietzsche
1905:, by reason alone.
1765:mathematical truths
1763:or for determining
1288:analytic philosophy
1042:, the others being
903:A Theory of Justice
873:The Moral Landscape
135:Part of a series on
3429:Ethics in religion
3424:Descriptive ethics
3259:Nicomachean Ethics
1993:moral sense theory
1853:ethical naturalism
1818:Moral epistemology
1813:Moral epistemology
1779:moral subjectivism
1533:Moral universalism
1528:Moral universalism
1429:moral fictionalism
1229:Ethical naturalism
1200:moral universalism
943:Ethics in religion
878:Nicomachean Ethics
3517:
3516:
3484:Social philosophy
3469:Population ethics
3459:Philosophy of law
3439:History of ethics
2922:Political freedom
2599:Euthyphro dilemma
2390:Suffering-focused
2187:Couture, Jocelyne
1897:Moral rationalism
1892:Moral rationalism
1738:
1737:
1730:
1712:
1411:Charles Stevenson
1345:Euthyphro problem
1140:normative ethical
1115:, of one kind or
1018:
1017:
963:Social philosophy
948:History of ethics
833:Animal Liberation
663:Suffering-focused
130:
129:
122:
104:
16:(Redirected from
3547:
3535:Ethical theories
3507:
3506:
3454:Moral psychology
3399:
3391:
3383:
3379:Practical Ethics
3375:
3367:
3363:Principia Ethica
3359:
3351:
3343:
3335:
3327:
3319:
3311:
3303:
3295:
3287:
3279:
3271:
3267:Ethics (Spinoza)
3263:
2902:Moral imperative
2360:Consequentialism
2337:
2330:
2323:
2314:
2313:
2309:by J. J. Mittler
2295:by Immanuel Kant
2268:
2259:Zalta, Edward N.
2240:
2239:
2208:
2202:
2184:
2178:
2167:
2161:
2150:
2144:
2132:
2126:
2125:
2105:
2079:Principia Ethica
2073:Normative ethics
2058:Is–ought problem
2004:Moral skepticism
1999:Moral skepticism
1956:both entail it.
1826:moral skepticism
1795:moral relativism
1782:
1741:Moral relativism
1733:
1726:
1722:
1719:
1713:
1711:
1670:
1638:
1630:
1626:Moral relativism
1577:moral relativism
1453:statements with
1377:moral skepticism
1044:normative ethics
1010:
1003:
996:
958:Moral psychology
898:Principia Ethica
893:Practical Ethics
863:Ethics (Spinoza)
462:Moral imperative
426:Is–ought problem
279:Transcognitivism
143:
132:
131:
125:
118:
114:
111:
105:
103:
62:
38:
30:
21:
18:Moral centralism
3555:
3554:
3550:
3549:
3548:
3546:
3545:
3544:
3520:
3519:
3518:
3513:
3495:
3402:
3397:
3389:
3381:
3373:
3365:
3357:
3349:
3341:
3333:
3325:
3317:
3309:
3301:
3293:
3285:
3277:
3269:
3261:
3247:
3020:
3013:
2937:Self-discipline
2897:Moral hierarchy
2845:Problem of evil
2790:Double standard
2780:Culture of life
2738:
2667:
2614:Non-cognitivism
2529:
2404:
2346:
2341:
2274:– entry in the
2249:
2244:
2243:
2228:10.2307/1522826
2209:
2205:
2185:
2181:
2168:
2164:
2151:
2147:
2133:
2129:
2116:. p. 215.
2106:
2099:
2094:
2089:
2028:
2020:non-cognitivism
2001:
1973:foundationalism
1962:
1894:
1843:
1838:
1815:
1803:non-cognitivist
1788:
1771:non-cognitivism
1768:
1734:
1723:
1717:
1714:
1671:
1669:
1655:
1639:
1628:
1614:Value pluralism
1537:universal ethic
1530:
1508:moral nihilists
1498:
1489:Simon Blackburn
1464:
1447:universalizable
1421:Simon Blackburn
1388:Non-cognitivist
1385:
1362:
1297:
1221:non-cognitivism
1189:
1177:non-cognitivism
1160:
1152:Moral semantics
1149:
1147:Moral semantics
1078:
1014:
968:
967:
933:
932:
923:
922:
823:
822:
813:
812:
683:
682:
673:
672:
568:
567:
558:
557:
489:Self-discipline
456:Moral hierarchy
399:Problem of evil
349:Double standard
339:Culture of life
304:
303:
294:
293:
222:Non-cognitivism
177:
176:
167:
141:
126:
115:
109:
106:
63:
61:
51:
39:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3553:
3543:
3542:
3540:Metaphilosophy
3537:
3532:
3515:
3514:
3512:
3511:
3500:
3497:
3496:
3494:
3493:
3486:
3481:
3479:Secular ethics
3476:
3474:Rehabilitation
3471:
3466:
3461:
3456:
3451:
3446:
3441:
3436:
3431:
3426:
3421:
3416:
3410:
3408:
3404:
3403:
3401:
3400:
3392:
3384:
3376:
3368:
3360:
3352:
3344:
3339:Utilitarianism
3336:
3328:
3320:
3312:
3304:
3296:
3288:
3280:
3272:
3264:
3255:
3253:
3249:
3248:
3246:
3245:
3240:
3235:
3230:
3225:
3220:
3215:
3210:
3205:
3200:
3195:
3190:
3185:
3180:
3175:
3170:
3165:
3160:
3155:
3150:
3145:
3140:
3135:
3130:
3125:
3120:
3115:
3110:
3105:
3100:
3095:
3090:
3085:
3080:
3075:
3070:
3065:
3060:
3055:
3050:
3045:
3040:
3035:
3030:
3024:
3022:
3015:
3014:
3012:
3011:
3006:
3001:
2996:
2991:
2990:
2989:
2984:
2979:
2969:
2964:
2959:
2954:
2949:
2944:
2939:
2934:
2929:
2924:
2919:
2914:
2909:
2904:
2899:
2894:
2889:
2884:
2879:
2874:
2869:
2864:
2859:
2854:
2849:
2848:
2847:
2842:
2837:
2827:
2822:
2817:
2812:
2807:
2802:
2797:
2792:
2787:
2782:
2777:
2772:
2767:
2762:
2757:
2752:
2746:
2744:
2740:
2739:
2737:
2736:
2731:
2726:
2721:
2716:
2711:
2706:
2701:
2699:Existentialist
2696:
2691:
2686:
2681:
2675:
2673:
2669:
2668:
2666:
2665:
2664:
2663:
2653:
2648:
2643:
2638:
2637:
2636:
2631:
2626:
2621:
2611:
2606:
2601:
2596:
2594:Constructivism
2591:
2590:
2589:
2588:
2587:
2582:
2572:
2571:
2570:
2568:Non-naturalism
2565:
2550:
2545:
2539:
2537:
2531:
2530:
2528:
2527:
2522:
2517:
2512:
2507:
2502:
2497:
2492:
2487:
2482:
2477:
2472:
2467:
2462:
2461:
2460:
2450:
2445:
2440:
2435:
2430:
2425:
2420:
2414:
2412:
2406:
2405:
2403:
2402:
2397:
2395:Utilitarianism
2392:
2387:
2382:
2377:
2372:
2367:
2362:
2356:
2354:
2348:
2347:
2340:
2339:
2332:
2325:
2317:
2311:
2310:
2302:
2296:
2288:
2280:
2269:
2248:
2247:External links
2245:
2242:
2241:
2212:Gibbard, Allan
2203:
2179:
2162:
2145:
2143:70(4):475–488.
2135:Jackson, Frank
2127:
2096:
2095:
2093:
2090:
2088:
2087:
2082:
2075:
2070:
2065:
2060:
2055:
2050:
2045:
2040:
2035:
2029:
2027:
2024:
2000:
1997:
1961:
1958:
1893:
1890:
1864:
1863:
1856:
1842:
1839:
1837:
1834:
1814:
1811:
1799:moral skeptics
1791:Moral nihilism
1787:
1786:Moral nihilism
1784:
1736:
1735:
1642:
1640:
1633:
1627:
1624:
1623:
1622:
1611:
1592:divine command
1588:ideal observer
1529:
1526:
1525:
1524:
1518:
1501:Moral ontology
1497:
1496:Moral ontology
1494:
1472:non-centralist
1463:
1460:
1459:
1458:
1437:, defended by
1432:
1419:, defended by
1414:
1405:, defended by
1384:
1381:
1373:moral nihilism
1361:
1358:
1357:
1356:
1332:
1324:ideal observer
1296:
1293:
1292:
1291:
1253:
1188:
1185:
1159:
1156:
1148:
1145:
1135:
1134:
1133:
1132:
1122:
1121:
1120:
1098:
1097:
1096:
1077:
1074:
1048:applied ethics
1036:moral judgment
1024:metaphilosophy
1016:
1015:
1013:
1012:
1005:
998:
990:
987:
986:
970:
969:
966:
965:
960:
955:
950:
945:
940:
934:
930:
929:
928:
925:
924:
921:
920:
918:Utilitarianism
915:
910:
905:
900:
895:
890:
885:
880:
875:
870:
865:
860:
858:Ethics (Moore)
855:
850:
845:
840:
835:
830:
824:
820:
819:
818:
815:
814:
811:
810:
805:
800:
795:
790:
785:
780:
775:
770:
765:
760:
755:
750:
745:
740:
735:
730:
725:
720:
715:
710:
705:
700:
695:
690:
684:
680:
679:
678:
675:
674:
671:
670:
665:
660:
655:
650:
645:
640:
635:
630:
625:
620:
615:
610:
608:Existentialist
605:
600:
595:
590:
585:
580:
575:
569:
565:
564:
563:
560:
559:
556:
555:
550:
549:
548:
538:
533:
532:
531:
521:
516:
511:
506:
501:
496:
491:
486:
481:
476:
475:
474:
464:
458:
453:
448:
443:
438:
433:
428:
423:
418:
413:
408:
403:
402:
401:
396:
391:
381:
376:
371:
366:
361:
356:
351:
346:
341:
336:
331:
326:
321:
316:
311:
305:
301:
300:
299:
296:
295:
292:
291:
289:Utilitarianism
286:
281:
276:
271:
266:
261:
256:
251:
250:
249:
239:
234:
229:
224:
219:
214:
209:
204:
199:
194:
189:
184:
178:
174:
173:
172:
169:
168:
166:
165:
160:
155:
149:
146:
145:
137:
136:
128:
127:
42:
40:
33:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3552:
3541:
3538:
3536:
3533:
3531:
3528:
3527:
3525:
3510:
3502:
3501:
3498:
3492:
3491:
3487:
3485:
3482:
3480:
3477:
3475:
3472:
3470:
3467:
3465:
3462:
3460:
3457:
3455:
3452:
3450:
3447:
3445:
3442:
3440:
3437:
3435:
3432:
3430:
3427:
3425:
3422:
3420:
3417:
3415:
3412:
3411:
3409:
3405:
3396:
3393:
3388:
3385:
3380:
3377:
3372:
3369:
3364:
3361:
3356:
3353:
3348:
3345:
3340:
3337:
3332:
3329:
3324:
3321:
3316:
3313:
3308:
3305:
3300:
3297:
3292:
3289:
3284:
3281:
3276:
3273:
3268:
3265:
3260:
3257:
3256:
3254:
3250:
3244:
3241:
3239:
3236:
3234:
3231:
3229:
3226:
3224:
3221:
3219:
3216:
3214:
3211:
3209:
3206:
3204:
3201:
3199:
3196:
3194:
3191:
3189:
3186:
3184:
3181:
3179:
3176:
3174:
3171:
3169:
3166:
3164:
3161:
3159:
3156:
3154:
3151:
3149:
3146:
3144:
3141:
3139:
3136:
3134:
3131:
3129:
3126:
3124:
3121:
3119:
3116:
3114:
3111:
3109:
3106:
3104:
3101:
3099:
3096:
3094:
3091:
3089:
3086:
3084:
3081:
3079:
3076:
3074:
3071:
3069:
3066:
3064:
3061:
3059:
3056:
3054:
3051:
3049:
3046:
3044:
3041:
3039:
3036:
3034:
3031:
3029:
3026:
3025:
3023:
3021:
3016:
3010:
3007:
3005:
3002:
3000:
2997:
2995:
2992:
2988:
2985:
2983:
2980:
2978:
2975:
2974:
2973:
2970:
2968:
2965:
2963:
2960:
2958:
2955:
2953:
2950:
2948:
2945:
2943:
2940:
2938:
2935:
2933:
2930:
2928:
2925:
2923:
2920:
2918:
2915:
2913:
2910:
2908:
2905:
2903:
2900:
2898:
2895:
2893:
2892:Moral courage
2890:
2888:
2885:
2883:
2880:
2878:
2875:
2873:
2870:
2868:
2865:
2863:
2860:
2858:
2855:
2853:
2850:
2846:
2843:
2841:
2838:
2836:
2833:
2832:
2831:
2830:Good and evil
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2815:Family values
2813:
2811:
2808:
2806:
2803:
2801:
2798:
2796:
2793:
2791:
2788:
2786:
2783:
2781:
2778:
2776:
2773:
2771:
2768:
2766:
2763:
2761:
2758:
2756:
2753:
2751:
2748:
2747:
2745:
2741:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2717:
2715:
2712:
2710:
2707:
2705:
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2676:
2674:
2670:
2662:
2659:
2658:
2657:
2654:
2652:
2649:
2647:
2644:
2642:
2639:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2629:Quasi-realism
2627:
2625:
2622:
2620:
2617:
2616:
2615:
2612:
2610:
2607:
2605:
2602:
2600:
2597:
2595:
2592:
2586:
2583:
2581:
2578:
2577:
2576:
2573:
2569:
2566:
2564:
2561:
2560:
2559:
2556:
2555:
2554:
2551:
2549:
2546:
2544:
2541:
2540:
2538:
2536:
2532:
2526:
2523:
2521:
2518:
2516:
2513:
2511:
2508:
2506:
2503:
2501:
2498:
2496:
2493:
2491:
2488:
2486:
2483:
2481:
2478:
2476:
2473:
2471:
2468:
2466:
2463:
2459:
2456:
2455:
2454:
2453:Environmental
2451:
2449:
2446:
2444:
2441:
2439:
2436:
2434:
2431:
2429:
2426:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2416:
2415:
2413:
2411:
2407:
2401:
2398:
2396:
2393:
2391:
2388:
2386:
2383:
2381:
2378:
2376:
2375:Particularism
2373:
2371:
2368:
2366:
2363:
2361:
2358:
2357:
2355:
2353:
2349:
2345:
2338:
2333:
2331:
2326:
2324:
2319:
2318:
2315:
2308:
2307:
2303:
2300:
2297:
2294:
2293:
2289:
2286:
2285:
2281:
2279:
2278:
2273:
2270:
2266:
2265:
2260:
2256:
2251:
2250:
2237:
2233:
2229:
2225:
2221:
2217:
2213:
2207:
2200:
2196:
2192:
2188:
2183:
2176:
2175:Ted Honderich
2172:
2166:
2159:
2155:
2149:
2142:
2141:
2136:
2131:
2123:
2119:
2115:
2111:
2104:
2102:
2097:
2086:
2083:
2081:
2080:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2069:
2068:Moral realism
2066:
2064:
2061:
2059:
2056:
2054:
2051:
2049:
2046:
2044:
2043:Deontic logic
2041:
2039:
2036:
2034:
2031:
2030:
2023:
2021:
2017:
2013:
2009:
2005:
1996:
1994:
1990:
1986:
1982:
1981:moral realism
1978:
1974:
1970:
1966:
1957:
1955:
1951:
1947:
1946:moral realism
1943:
1942:Michael Smith
1939:
1935:
1931:
1926:
1924:
1920:
1916:
1912:
1911:Immanuel Kant
1908:
1904:
1903:
1898:
1889:
1887:
1883:
1879:
1878:
1873:
1869:
1861:
1857:
1854:
1851:
1850:
1849:
1847:
1833:
1831:
1827:
1821:
1819:
1810:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1796:
1792:
1783:
1780:
1776:
1772:
1766:
1762:
1758:
1754:
1750:
1747:
1742:
1732:
1729:
1721:
1710:
1707:
1703:
1700:
1696:
1693:
1689:
1686:
1682:
1679: –
1678:
1674:
1673:Find sources:
1667:
1663:
1659:
1653:
1652:
1648:
1643:This section
1641:
1637:
1632:
1631:
1620:
1619:Isaiah Berlin
1615:
1612:
1609:
1608:commensurable
1605:
1604:
1603:
1601:
1597:
1593:
1589:
1585:
1584:moral realism
1580:
1578:
1574:
1570:
1566:
1562:
1558:
1554:
1550:
1546:
1542:
1538:
1534:
1522:
1519:
1516:
1515:universalists
1513:
1512:
1511:
1509:
1504:
1502:
1493:
1490:
1486:
1482:
1481:Allan Gibbard
1476:
1473:
1469:
1456:
1452:
1448:
1444:
1440:
1436:
1433:
1430:
1426:
1422:
1418:
1417:Quasi-realism
1415:
1412:
1408:
1404:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1397:
1393:
1389:
1380:
1378:
1374:
1370:
1366:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1341:
1336:
1333:
1330:
1325:
1321:
1317:
1314:
1313:
1312:
1310:
1306:
1301:
1289:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1276:
1272:or otherwise
1271:
1267:
1263:
1259:
1258:
1254:
1251:
1247:
1243:
1239:
1238:supervenience
1235:
1231:
1230:
1226:
1225:
1224:
1222:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1205:
1201:
1197:
1193:
1192:Moral realism
1187:Moral realism
1184:
1182:
1178:
1174:
1173:truth bearers
1170:
1166:
1165:
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451:Moral courage
449:
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417:
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387:
386:
385:
384:Good and evil
382:
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377:
375:
372:
370:
369:Family values
367:
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238:
235:
233:
232:Perspectivism
230:
228:
227:Particularism
225:
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74:
71: –
70:
66:
65:Find sources:
59:
55:
49:
48:
43:This article
41:
37:
32:
31:
19:
3488:
3444:Human rights
3387:After Virtue
3113:Schopenhauer
2887:Moral agency
2760:Common sense
2656:Universalism
2624:Expressivism
2604:Intuitionism
2575:Subjectivism
2534:
2520:Terraforming
2495:Professional
2305:
2291:
2283:
2275:
2262:
2255:"Metaethics"
2219:
2215:
2206:
2194:
2182:
2170:
2165:
2153:
2148:
2138:
2130:
2112:. New York:
2109:
2077:
2016:error theory
2002:
1968:
1963:
1938:Alan Gewirth
1927:
1900:
1895:
1885:
1881:
1875:
1865:
1844:
1822:
1817:
1816:
1789:
1752:
1739:
1724:
1718:October 2023
1715:
1705:
1698:
1691:
1684:
1672:
1656:Please help
1644:
1581:
1565:human nature
1531:
1505:
1500:
1499:
1477:
1471:
1467:
1465:
1455:truth-values
1425:Projectivism
1396:expressivism
1392:propositions
1386:
1369:J. L. Mackie
1365:Error theory
1363:
1360:Error theory
1353:universalist
1349:Robert Adams
1338:
1323:
1309:universalist
1298:
1273:
1265:
1255:
1250:utilitarians
1227:
1217:error theory
1209:anti-realism
1203:
1195:
1190:
1181:error theory
1169:propositions
1162:
1161:
1151:
1150:
1136:
1126:epistemology
1093:value theory
1079:
1065:metaphysical
1062:
1054:
1052:
1040:philosophers
1031:
1021:
1019:
828:After Virtue
788:Schopenhauer
627:
603:Evolutionary
446:Moral agency
319:Common sense
284:Universalism
269:Subjectivism
247:Anti-realism
237:Projectivism
207:Intuitionism
202:Error theory
197:Epicureanism
187:Confucianism
116:
107:
97:
90:
83:
76:
69:"Metaethics"
64:
52:Please help
47:verification
44:
3262:(c. 322 BC)
3128:Kierkegaard
2947:Stewardship
2724:Rousseauian
2641:Rationalism
2553:Cognitivism
2500:Programming
2475:Meat eating
2448:Engineering
2191:Kai Nielsen
2063:Meta-rights
1977:cognitivism
1775:cognitivism
1761:temperature
1557:nationality
1521:relativists
1375:and, thus,
1266:irreducible
1262:G. E. Moore
1198:sense; see
1164:Cognitivist
1143:statement.
1067:account of
738:Kierkegaard
658:Situational
598:Descriptive
578:Axiological
504:Stewardship
259:Rousseauism
3530:Metaethics
3524:Categories
3158:Bonhoeffer
2867:Immorality
2810:Eudaimonia
2770:Conscience
2765:Compassion
2651:Skepticism
2646:Relativism
2563:Naturalism
2543:Absolutism
2515:Technology
2365:Deontology
2272:Metaethics
2156:. Oxford:
2092:References
1930:R. M. Hare
1919:David Hume
1846:Empiricism
1841:Empiricism
1688:newspapers
1600:R. M. Hare
1485:R. M. Hare
1468:centralist
1451:indicative
1443:imperative
1439:R. M. Hare
1407:A. J. Ayer
1305:relativist
1117:many kinds
1032:metaethics
983:navigation
979:philosophy
973:This is a
638:Population
472:Immorality
364:Eudaimonia
329:Conscience
324:Compassion
254:Relativism
192:Deontology
182:Absolutism
110:March 2024
80:newspapers
3419:Casuistry
3331:Either/Or
3238:Korsgaard
3233:Azurmendi
3198:MacIntyre
3138:Nietzsche
3068:Augustine
3063:Confucius
3043:Aristotle
3019:Ethicists
2977:Intrinsic
2942:Suffering
2852:Happiness
2825:Free will
2805:Etiquette
2750:Authority
2694:Epicurean
2689:Confucian
2684:Christian
2619:Emotivism
2443:Discourse
2380:Pragmatic
2352:Normative
2114:Macmillan
1985:objective
1746:universal
1645:does not
1561:sexuality
1403:Emotivism
1343:(see the
1340:Euthyphro
1329:universal
1320:attitudes
1270:intuitive
1242:empirical
1234:reducible
1086:semantics
975:subseries
938:Casuistry
848:Either/Or
763:Nietzsche
748:MacIntyre
713:Confucius
698:Augustine
693:Aristotle
681:Ethicists
643:Pragmatic
633:Normative
593:Christian
529:Intrinsic
499:Suffering
406:Happiness
379:Free will
359:Etiquette
309:Authority
3509:Category
3449:Ideology
3414:Axiology
3243:Nussbaum
3193:Frankena
3188:Anscombe
3178:Williams
3133:Sidgwick
3053:Valluvar
3048:Diogenes
3033:Socrates
2957:Theodicy
2952:Sympathy
2917:Pacifism
2907:Morality
2820:Fidelity
2800:Equality
2755:Autonomy
2743:Concepts
2704:Feminist
2679:Buddhist
2609:Nihilism
2548:Axiology
2505:Research
2438:Computer
2433:Business
2122:67-18887
2038:Axiology
2026:See also
1902:a priori
1888:to act.
1877:is-ought
1573:religion
1553:religion
1275:a priori
1194:(in the
1113:relative
1109:absolute
1102:ontology
1069:morality
1058:goodness
953:Ideology
793:Sidgwick
768:Nussbaum
613:Feminist
583:Buddhist
546:Cardinal
514:Theodicy
509:Sympathy
467:Morality
374:Fidelity
314:Autonomy
302:Concepts
264:Stoicism
217:Nihilism
212:Moralism
158:Category
3407:Related
3153:Tillich
3118:Bentham
3093:Spinoza
3088:Aquinas
3073:Mencius
2987:Western
2962:Torture
2927:Precept
2882:Loyalty
2877:Liberty
2872:Justice
2785:Dignity
2775:Consent
2719:Kantian
2709:Islamic
2672:Schools
2558:Realism
2490:Nursing
2485:Medical
2470:Machine
2410:Applied
2261:(ed.).
2236:1522826
2006:is the
1969:without
1702:scholar
1666:removed
1651:sources
1541:culture
1457:per se.
931:Related
803:Spinoza
703:Bentham
688:Aquinas
653:Secular
618:Islamic
573:Applied
566:Domains
541:Virtues
441:Loyalty
436:Liberty
431:Justice
344:Dignity
334:Consent
242:Realism
175:Schools
153:Outline
94:scholar
3398:(1984)
3390:(1981)
3382:(1979)
3374:(1971)
3366:(1903)
3358:(1887)
3350:(1874)
3342:(1861)
3334:(1843)
3326:(1820)
3318:(1788)
3310:(1785)
3302:(1780)
3294:(1759)
3286:(1740)
3278:(1726)
3270:(1677)
3228:Taylor
3213:Parfit
3208:Singer
3183:Mackie
3058:Cicero
2999:Virtue
2932:Rights
2857:Honour
2714:Jewish
2510:Sexual
2418:Animal
2400:Virtue
2344:Ethics
2234:
2189:, and
2120:
1940:, and
1704:
1697:
1690:
1683:
1675:
1569:reason
1487:, and
1246:modern
1204:robust
1196:robust
1119:, etc.
1028:ethics
808:Taylor
798:Singer
773:Parfit
753:Mackie
708:Cicero
668:Virtue
623:Jewish
524:Values
484:Rights
460:
411:Honour
274:Taoism
142:Ethics
96:
89:
82:
75:
67:
3490:Index
3252:Works
3223:Adams
3218:Nagel
3173:Dewey
3168:Rawls
3148:Barth
3143:Moore
3108:Hegel
3083:Xunzi
3038:Plato
3028:Laozi
3009:Wrong
2982:Japan
2972:Value
2967:Trust
2862:Ideal
2729:Stoic
2480:Media
2465:Legal
2257:. In
2232:JSTOR
2012:modal
2008:class
1907:Plato
1886:ought
1757:norms
1753:ought
1749:truth
1709:JSTOR
1695:books
1219:, or
821:Works
783:Rawls
778:Plato
758:Moore
743:Laozi
723:Hegel
536:Vices
519:Trust
479:Norms
416:Ideal
163:Index
101:JSTOR
87:books
3203:Hare
3163:Foot
3123:Mill
3103:Kant
3098:Hume
3078:Mozi
2994:Vice
2912:Norm
2840:Evil
2835:Good
2795:Duty
2535:Meta
2458:Land
2385:Role
2370:Care
2118:LCCN
1921:and
1909:and
1681:news
1649:any
1647:cite
1590:and
1545:race
1470:and
1427:and
1409:and
1026:and
733:Kant
728:Hume
718:Foot
648:Role
628:Meta
588:Care
394:Evil
389:Good
354:Duty
73:news
3004:Vow
2734:Tao
2428:Bio
2224:doi
1660:by
1598:of
1549:sex
1111:or
1022:In
977:on
553:Vow
56:by
3526::
2230:.
2218:.
2173:,
2100:^
2022:.
1995:.
1936:,
1932:,
1882:is
1832:.
1767:.
1579:.
1559:,
1555:,
1551:,
1547:,
1543:,
1483:,
1311::
1215:,
1128:)
1104:)
1088:)
1055:is
1030:,
2336:e
2329:t
2322:v
2267:.
2238:.
2226::
2220:4
2201:.
2160:.
2124:.
1731:)
1725:(
1720:)
1716:(
1706:·
1699:·
1692:·
1685:·
1668:.
1654:.
1621:.
1290:.
1252:.
1207:"
1095:)
1009:e
1002:t
995:v
985:.
123:)
117:(
112:)
108:(
98:·
91:·
84:·
77:·
50:.
20:)
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