Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

458:, the acting administrator of the FAA, testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, saying that on January 21, "Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. ... the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures." After a series of delays, the updated MCAS software was released to the FAA in May 2019. On May 16, Boeing announced that the completed software update was awaiting approval from the FAA. The flight software underwent 360 hours of testing on 207 flights. Boeing also updated existing crew procedures. 79: 408: 874: 343: 1141: 375: 5343: 37: 291: 495: 397: 1132:

software was not implemented to their specifications as a "standard, standalone feature." Boeing stated, "...MAX production aircraft will have an activated and operable AoA Disagree alert and an optional angle of attack indicator. All customers with previously delivered MAX airplanes will have the ability to activate the AoA Disagree alert." Boeing CEO Muilenburg said the company's communication about the alert "was not consistent. And that's unacceptable."

527:. According to an international Civil Aviation Authorities team review (JATR) commissioned by the FAA, MCAS may be a stall identification or protection system, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft. Boeing considered MCAS part of the flight control system, and elected to not describe it in the flight manual or in training materials, based on the fundamental design philosophy of retaining commonality with the 359: 1116:(SRB) corroborated Boeing's prior assessment and its initial plan to update the aircraft in 2020. Boeing did not disclose the defect to the FAA until November 2018, in the wake of the Lion Air crash. Consequently, Southwest had informed pilots that its entire fleet of MAX 8 aircraft will receive the optional upgrades. In March 2019, after the second accident of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, a Boeing representative told 773:(NTSB) released the results of its review of potential lapses in the design and approval of the 737 MAX. The NTSB report concludes that assumptions "that Boeing used in its functional hazard assessment of uncommanded MCAS function for the 737 MAX did not adequately consider and account for the impact that multiple flight deck alerts and indications could have on pilots' responses to the hazard". When Boeing induced a 678:

been used. MCAS used the stabilizer to change the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the FAA. If an issue paper had been required, the JATR team believes it likely would have identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator."

5104: 4629: 3144: 237:(FAA) referred pilots to a revised trim runaway checklist that must be performed in case of a malfunction. Boeing then received many requests for more information and revealed the existence of MCAS in another message, and that it could intervene without pilot input. According to Boeing, MCAS was implemented to compensate for an excessive angle of attack by adjusting the 835:

The EASA document said that after flight testing, because the thumb switches could not always control trim on their own, the FAA was concerned by whether the 737 MAX system complied with regulations. The American Airlines flight manual contains a similar notice regarding the thumb switches but does not specify conditions where the manual wheel may be needed.

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proposed revisions to flight-control computers due to its concerns about portions of proposed fixes to MCAS. The necessary changes to improve redundancy between the two flight control computers have proved more complex and time-consuming than the fixes for the original MCAS issue, delaying any re-introduction to service beyond the date originally envisaged.

822:. Furthermore, the problem had not been disclosed to the FAA until 13 months after the fact. Although it is unclear whether the indicator could have changed the outcome for the ill-fated flights, American Airlines said the disagree indicator provided the assurance in continued operations of the airplane. "As it turned out, that wasn't true." 839:

pilots. Mike Sinnett, vice president and general manager for the Boeing New Mid-Market Airplane (NMA) since July 2019, repeatedly described the procedure as a "memory item". However, some airlines view it as an item for the quick reference card. The FAA issued a recommendation about memory items in an Advisory Circular,

1040:(AoA) is an aerodynamic parameter that is key to understanding the limits of airplane performance. Recent accidents and incidents have resulted in new flight crew training programs, which in turn have raised interest in AoA in commercial aviation. Awareness of AOA is vitally important as the airplane nears stall." 1227:

runaway stabilizer checklist steps. Boeing initially classified this as a "major" hazard, and the FAA upgraded it to a much more severe "catastrophic" rating. Boeing stated that the issue can be fixed in software. The software change will not be ready for evaluation until at least September 2019. EASA director

1082:, Andrew Kornecki, who is an expert in redundancy systems, said operating with one or two sensors "would be fine if all the pilots were sufficiently trained in how to assess and handle the plane in the event of a problem". But, he would much prefer building the plane with three sensors, as Airbus does. 1200:

In early April 2019, Boeing reported a problem with software affecting flaps and other flight-control hardware, unrelated to MCAS; classified as critical to flight safety, the FAA has ordered Boeing to fix the problem correspondingly. In October 2019, the EASA has suggested to conduct more testing on

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said AoA indicators might have helped in these two crashes. "It is ironic that most modern aircraft measure (angle of attack) and that information is often used in many aircraft systems, but it is not displayed to pilots. Instead, pilots must infer (angle of attack) from other parameters, deducing it

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cutoff switches, located on the center console, operate differently on the MAX than on the earlier 737 NG. On previous aircraft, one cutoff switch deactivates the thumb buttons on the control yoke that pilots use to move the horizontal stabilizer; the other cutoff switch disables automatic control of

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would be required to trim the plane, i.e. adjust the angle of the nose; however, the original flight manual did not mention those situations. The EASA certification document referred to simulations whereby the electric thumb switches were ineffective to properly trim the MAX under certain conditions.

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The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), a team commissioned by the FAA for 737 MAX investigation, concluded that FAA failed to properly review MCAS. Boeing failed to provide adequate and updated technical information regarding the MCAS system to FAA during Boeing 737 Max certification process,

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has stated that there was "no surprise, or gap, or unknown here or something that somehow slipped through a certification process." On April 29, 2019, he stated the design of the aircraft was not flawed and reiterated that it was designed per Boeing's standards. In a May 29 interview with CBS, Boeing

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for the remainder of the flight, and trim manually instead. Until Boeing supplemented the manuals and training, pilots were unaware of the existence of MCAS due to its omission from the crew manual and no coverage in training. Boeing first publicly named and revealed the existence of MCAS on the 737

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in the nose-down direction. Boeing did this to meet the company's objective of minimizing training requirements for pilots already qualified on the 737NG, which Boeing felt would make the new variant more appealing to aircraft customers that would prefer not to bear the costs of differences training.

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The failure scenario was known before the MAX entered service in 2017: it had been assessed in a safety analysis when the plane was certified. Boeing had concluded that pilots could perform a procedure to shut off the motor driving the stabilizer to overcome the nose-down movement. The scenario also

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in aircraft safety. The NTSB expressed concerns that the process used to evaluate the original design needs improvement because that process is still in use to certify current and future aircraft and system designs. The FAA could, for example, randomly sample pools from the worldwide pilot community

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On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight

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The NTSB also stated about another accident in 1997, that "a display of angle of attack on the flight deck would have maintained the flightcrew's awareness of the stall condition and it would have provided direct indication of the pitch attitudes required for recovery throughout the attempted stall

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Clint Balog, a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, said after the Lion Air crash: "In retrospect, clearly it would have been wise to include the warning as standard equipment and fully inform and train operators on MCAS". According to Bjorn Fehrm, Aeronautical and Economic Analyst at

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the specific failure modes that could lead to unintended MCAS activation (such as an erroneous high AOA input to the MCAS) were not simulated as part of these functional hazard assessment validation tests. As a result, additional flight deck effects (such as IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE alerts and

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approved design changes for each MAX aircraft, which would prevent MCAS activation unless both AoA sensors register similar readings, eliminate MCAS's ability to repeatedly activate, and allow pilots to override the system if necessary. The FAA began requiring all MAX pilots to undergo MCAS-related

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engine used on the 737 MAX was larger and mounted further forward from the wing and higher off the ground than on previous generations of the 737, Boeing discovered that the aircraft had a tendency to push the nose up when operating in a specific portion of the flight envelope (flaps up, high angle

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system, with each computer using an independent set of sensors, is a radical change from the architecture used on 737s since the introduction on the older model 737-300 in the 1980s. Up to the MAX in its prior-to-grounding-version, the system alternates between computers after each flight. The two

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input, but this function is bypassed on the MAX to avoid negating the purpose of MCAS. Boeing also said that it agreed with additional requirements that the FAA required it to fulfill, and added that it was working toward resolving the safety risk. It will not offer the MAX for certification until

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reported that Boeing had known of existing problems with the flight control system a year before the Lion Air accident. Boeing defended that "Neither the angle of attack indicator nor the AoA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane." Boeing recognized that the defective

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testified, "The logic was that if MCAS activated, it had to be because it was needed, and pulling back on the control wheel shouldn't stop it." In October, Sullenberger wrote, "These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed

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noted that while the new software fix Boeing proposed "will likely prevent this situation recurring, if the preliminary investigation confirms that the Ethiopian pilots did cut off the automatic flight-control system, this is still a nightmarish outcome for Boeing and the FAA. It would suggest the

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As an automated corrective measure, the MCAS was given full authority to bring the aircraft nose down, and could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the control wheel as on previous versions of the 737. Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) on

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The JATR said, "MCAS used the stabilizer to change the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the FAA. If the FAA technical staff had

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slipped, and then slipped again as the aircraft accelerated and dove. Primeau noted that this deflection was an order of magnitude larger than what would ordinarily be permitted, and they concluded that these deflections were disallowed by FAA regulation 395A. These experts are concerned that the

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An MCAS failure is not like a runaway stabilizer. A runaway stabilizer has continuous un-commanded movement of the tail, whereas MCAS is not continuous and pilots (theoretically) can counter the nose-down movement, after which MCAS would move the aircraft tail down again. Moreover, unlike runaway

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The Joint Authorities Technical Review found the technology unprecedented: "If the FAA technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function, the JATR team believes the agency likely would have required an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it had not previously

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The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew's ability to control the airplane's pitch by

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In September 2019, the EASA said it prefers triple-redundant AoA sensors rather than the dual redundancy in Boeing's proposed upgrade to the MAX. Installation of a third sensor could be expensive and take a long time. The change, if mandated, could be extended to thousands of older model 737s in

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Boeing's CEO Muilenburg, when asked about the non-disclosure of MCAS, cited the "runaway stabilizer trim" procedure as part of the training manual. He added that Boeing's bulletin pointed to that existing flight procedure. Boeing views the "runaway stabilizer trim" checklist as a memory item for

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As of 2019, the two flight control computers of Boeing 737 never cross-checked each other's operations; i.e., each was a single non-redundant channel. This lack of robustness existed since the early implementation and persisted for decades. The updated flight control system will use both flight

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after the MCAS update was implemented – for evaluating the effect of a fault in a microprocessor: as expected from the scenario, the horizontal stabilizer pointed the nose downward. Although the test pilot ultimately recovered control, the system was slow to respond to the proper

1003:, observed anomalies in the data recorded during the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes: a progressive shift of the horizontal stabilizer by 0.2°, before the crash. In reference to the Ethiopian Airlines flight, Alarie noted that without receiving a command from the MCAS or the pilots, the 945:

For the 737-200, a workaround called the "roller coaster" technique was developed. Counter-intuitively, to correct an excessive deflection causing a dive the pilot first pushes the nose down further, before easing back to gently raise the nose again. During this easing back period, the elevator

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In November 2018, Boeing told airlines that MCAS could not be overcome by pulling back on the control column to stop a runaway trim as on previous generation 737s. Nevertheless, confusion continued: the safety committee of a major U.S. airline misled its pilots by telling that the MCAS could be

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The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA sensors in order to activate MCAS. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which

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Boeing and the FAA decided that the AoA display and an AoA disagree light, which signals if the sensors give different readings, were not critical features for safe operation. Boeing charged extra for the addition of the AoA indicator to the primary display. In November 2017, Boeing engineers

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With the MCAS implemented, new test pilot Ed Wilson said the "MAX wasn't handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds" and recommended MCAS to apply across a broader range of flight conditions. This required the MCAS to function under normal g-forces and, at stalling speeds, deflect the

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The software depended on the presence of the visual indicator software, a paid option that was not selected by most airlines. For example, Air Canada, American Airlines and Westjet had purchased the disagree alert, while Air Canada and American Airlines also purchased, in addition, the

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Reports of a single point of failure were not always acknowledged by Boeing. Addressing American Airlines pilots, Boeing vice-president Mike Sinnett contradicted reports that the MCAS had a single-point failure, because the pilots themselves are the backup. Reporter Useem said in

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discovered that the standard AoA disagree light cannot independently function without the optional AoA indicator software, a problem affecting 80% of the global fleet that had not ordered the option. The software remedy was scheduled to coincide with the roll out of the elongated

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been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function, the JATR team believes the agency likely would have required an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it had not previously been used; this identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator."

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In January 2020, during flight testing, Boeing discovered a problem with an indicator light; the defect was traced to the "redesign of the two flight computers that control the 737 MAX to make them more resilient to failure". The indicator, which signals a problem with the

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back to neutral from the nose-down trim input caused by MCAS. Note that in the Ethiopian flight, the autothrottle was not disengaged and the aircraft entered overspeed conditions at low altitude which resulted in extraneous aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces.

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the system applies to the horizontal stabilizer, aerodynamic forces resist pilot control effort to raise the nose. As long as the faulty AOA readings persist, a human pilot "can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back". In addition, switches for the

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test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures. The FAA's ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX.

580:(AOA). The MCAS is intended to compensate in such cases, modeling the pitching behavior of previous models, and meet a certain certification requirement, in order to enhance handling characteristics and thus minimizing the need for significant pilot retraining. 760:

Boeing's own internal design guidelines related to the 737 MAX's development stated that the system should "not have any objectionable interaction with the piloting of the airplane" and "not interfere with dive recovery". The operation of MCAS violated those.

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The FAA did not conduct a safety analysis on the changes. It had already approved the previous version of MCAS, and the agency's rules did not require it to take a second look because the changes did not affect how the plane operated in extreme situations.

923:. The problem was encountered on earlier 737 versions, and a "roller coaster" emergency technique for handling the flight condition was documented in 1982 for the 737-200 but did not appear in training documentation for later versions (including the MAX). 439:

On March 11, 2019, after China had grounded the aircraft, Boeing published some details of new system requirements for the MCAS software and for the cockpit displays, which it began implementing in the wake of the prior accident five months earlier:

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that allowed false data to trigger MCAS to pitch the nose downward and force the aircraft into a dive. "Inadvertently, the door was now opened to serious system misbehavior during the busy and stressful moments right after takeoff", said Jenkins of

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extended to circumvent MCAS activation, rather than using the recovery procedure after the fact. Such flights required a certain pilot qualification as well as permission from corresponding regulators, and with no other cabin crew or passengers.

616:. MCAS was designated a "hazardous failure" system. This classification corresponds to failures causing "a large reduction in safety margins" or "serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants", but nothing "catastrophic". 2984: 635:

routinely push aircraft to such extremes, as the FAA requires airplanes to perform as expected. Before the MCAS, test pilot Ray Craig determined the plane did not fly smoothly, in part due to the larger engines. Craig would have preferred an

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aviation regulator's National Aircraft Certification Branch questioned the readiness of MCAS. Because new problems kept emerging, he suggested to his peers at FAA, ANAC and EASA to consider the safety benefits of removing MCAS from the MAX.

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criticized Boeing's inadequate testing of the 737 MAX, and pointed out that Boeing made erroneous assumptions on pilots' response to alerts in 737 MAX, triggered by activation of MCAS due to a faulty signal from an angle-of-attack sensor.

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computers' architecture allowed switching in-flight if the operating computer failed, thus increasing availability. In the revised architecture, Boeing required the two computers to monitor each other so that each one can vet the other.

3030: 843:: "Memory items should be avoided whenever possible. If the procedure must include memory items, they should be clearly identified, emphasized in training, less than three items, and should not contain conditional decision steps." 334:

However, according to interviews with agency directors describing assessments undertaken after the MCAS-induced crashes had occurred, both the FAA and EASA felt that the aircraft would have had acceptable stability without MCAS.

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system, which Boeing asserted it is distinctly not and instead a system that's designed to provide handling qualities for the pilot that meet pilot preferences. The aircraft had to perform well in a low-speed stall test. The

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and artificially induce MCAS activation by manipulating these signals. Such a fault occurs when memory bits change from 0 to 1 or vice versa, which is something that can be caused by cosmic rays striking the microprocessor.

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The MAX systems are integrated in the "e-cab" test flight deck, a simulator built for developing the MAX. In June 2019, "in a special Boeing simulator that is designed for engineering reviews," FAA pilots performed a

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was "impossible" to move when one of the pilots would instinctively pull up following an automatic nose-down trim input. It takes 15 turns to manually trim the aircraft one degree, and up to 40 turns to bring the

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Another MCAS implementation was developed for the Boeing 737 MAX, because its larger, repositioned engines changed the aircraft's flight characteristics compared to the preceding 737 generations. When a single

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Require that all transport-category aircraft present pilots with angle-of-attack info in a visual format, and that all air carriers train their pilots to use the info to obtain maximum possible airplane climb

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for the flights showed that the planes struggled to gain altitude. Pilots reported difficulty controlling the airplane and asked to return to the airport. The implementation of MCAS has been found to disrupt

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While the 737 MAX has a similar jackscrew mechanism, the "roller coaster" technique has been dropped from the pilot information. During the events leading to the two MAX crashes, the stiffness of the manual

482:/MCAS and elevator feel shift (EFS) functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft". 1204:

In January 2020, new software issues were discovered, affecting monitoring of the flight computer start-up process and verifying readiness for flight. In April 2020, Boeing identified new risks where the

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in 2019, Ethiopian authorities stated that the procedure did not enable the crew to prevent the accident, however further investigation revealed that the pilots did not follow the procedure properly. The

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deflection reduces or even reverses, its force on the jackscrew does likewise and the manual trim eases up. The workaround was included in the pilot's emergency procedures and in the training schedule.

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stick shaker activation) resulting from the same underlying failure (for example, erroneous AOA) were not simulated and were not in the stabilizer trim safety assessment report reviewed by the NTSB."

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The NTSB questioned the long-held industry and FAA practice of assuming the nearly instantaneous responses of highly trained test pilots as opposed to pilots of all levels of experience to verify

5108: 321:, requires MCAS because the weight and balance shifts when the tanker redistributes and offloads fuel. On that aircraft, the MCAS is overridden and disengaged when a pilot makes a stick input. 896:/MCAS. On the MAX, both switches are wired in series and perform the same function: they cut off all electric power to the stabilizer, both from the yoke buttons and from an automatic system. 423:, investigators determined that MCAS was triggered by falsely high AoA inputs, as if the plane had pitched up excessively. On both flights, shortly after takeoff, MCAS repeatedly actuated the 2664: 1833: 4315: 3338: 803:

cutout switches to pre-MAX configuration. A veteran software engineer and experienced pilot suggested that software changes may not be enough to counter the 737 MAX's engine placement. The

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repeatedly prevented manual trim adjustment to correct the MCAS-induced nose-down pitching. The issue has been brought to the notice of the DoJ criminal inquiry into the 737 MAX crashes.

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Though there are two sensors on the MAX only one of them is used at a time to trigger MCAS activation on the 737 MAX. Any fault in this sensor, perhaps due to physical damage, creates a

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has been reported or described as an anti-stall system, which it is not. It's a system that's designed to provide handling qualities for the pilot that meet pilot preferences."

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In February 2016, the EASA certified the MAX with the expectation that pilot procedures and training would clearly explain unusual situations in which the seldom used manual

277:(EASA) evaluated flight test results with MCAS disabled, and suggested that the MAX might not have needed MCAS to conform to certification standards. Later that year, an FAA 726:, whereas in previous 737 models each could be switched off independently. In simulator sessions, pilots were stunned by the substantial effort needed to manually crank the 2028: 1068:

Problems with the AoA sensor had been reported in over 200 incident reports submitted to the FAA; however, Boeing did not flight test a scenario in which it malfunctioned.

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magazine, "Customers have been informed that AoA Disagree alert will become a standard feature on the 737 MAX. It can be retrofitted on previously delivered airplanes."

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As with any other equipment on board an aircraft, the FAA approves a functional "development assurance level" corresponding to the consequences of a failure, using the

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The test scenario simulated an event toggling five bits in the flight control computer. The bits represent status flags such as whether MCAS is active, or whether the

3563: 3311: 2048: 2824: 4930: 4517: 1176:) about the MAX corrective work, "With the software update, customers are not charged for the AoA Disagree feature or their selection of the AoA indicator option." 5782: 2301: 2097: 1192:

recovery sequence." The NTSB also believed that the accident may have been prevented if a direct indication of AoA was presented to the flightcrew (NTSB, 1997)."

1895: 249:, and stressed that it was intended to improve the handling of the aircraft while operating in a specific portion of the flight envelope. Following the crash of 5246: 1065:

it was "showing both a misunderstanding of the term and a sharp break from Boeing's long-standing practice of having multiple backups for every flight system".

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The updates proposed by Boeing focus mostly on MCAS software. In particular, there have been no public statements regarding reverting the functionality of the

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Later, a similar system to avoid stalling, in this case specifically called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), was implemented on the

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In November 2020, an Airworthiness Directive required corrective actions to the airplane's flight control laws (embodied in the Speed Trim System software):

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As pilots pull on the 737 controls to raise the nose of the aircraft, aerodynamic forces on the elevator create an opposing force, effectively paralyzing the

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loads on the jackscrew have potentially increased since the creation of the 737, modern versions of which are considerably larger than the original design.

4831: 58: 4679: 5113: 4549: 3161:"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" 3120:"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" 2927:"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" 2903:"Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance" 1455: 5152:

MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two sensor system without level D training

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emergency procedure laid out by Boeing and passed along by the FAA after the Lion Air crash is wholly inadequate and failed the Ethiopian flight crew."

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stabilizer, MCAS disables the control column response that 737 pilots have grown accustomed to and relied upon in earlier generations of 737 aircraft.

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Sur les courbes, Sylvain Alarie et Gilles Primeau observent un glissement progressif de 0,2 degré du stabilisateur horizontal. Ça peut sembler peu,

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November 6, 2018, to outline the many indications and effects resulting from erroneous AOA data and provided instructions to turn off the motorized

4886: 4788: 938:, exerting enough hand force to overcome the force exerted by the elevator became increasingly difficult as speed and deflection increased and the 3858: 4792: 2634: 1807: 1652: 1267:

microprocessor overwhelmed with data, though as of April 2020 the concern remains that the MCAS software is overloading the 737 MAX's computers.

531:. Minimizing the functional differences between the Boeing 737 MAX and Next Generation aircraft variants allowed both variants to share the same 2528: 3234: 2327: 4024: 2805: 899:

Thus, on previous aircraft it is possible to disable automatic control of the stabilizer yet to employ electric power assist by operating the

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for flight control. However, it is itself all-moving about a single pivot and can be trimmed to adjust its angle. The trim is actuated via a

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The MCAS deflects the horizontal stabilizer four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document. Due to the amount of

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Leeham News and Analysis, "A major contributor to the ultimate loss of JT610 is the missing AoA DISAGREE display on the pilots' displays."

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The 737 MAX uses an adjustable stabilizer, moved by a jackscrew, to provide the required pitch trim forces. Generic stabilizer illustrated.

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using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual

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The sensors themselves are under scrutiny. Sensors on the Lion air aircraft were supplied by United Technologies' Rosemount Aerospace.

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The MCAS was designed with the assumption, approved by FAA, that pilots would react to an unexpected activation within three seconds.

535:. Thus, airlines can save money by employing and training one pool of pilots to fly both variants of the Boeing 737 interchangeably. 1868: 1397: 1112:, and Lion Air had neither. Boeing had determined that the defect was not critical to aircraft safety or operation, and an internal 2786: 181: 1750:"FAA's emergency order grounding Boeing jets came after the agency identified similarities between crashes in Ethiopia, Indonesia" 5034: 3696: 2476: 2129:"Boeing's CEO explains why the company didn't tell 737 Max pilots about the software system that contributed to 2 fatal crashes" 757:

On October 18, Boeing turned over a discussion from 2016 between two employees that revealed prior issues with the MCAS system.

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that opposed any corrective force from the control systems. When attempting to correct an unwanted deflection using the manual

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MAX in a message to airline operators and other aviation interests on November 10, 2018, twelve days after the Lion Air crash.

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includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck.

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During the groundings, special flights to reposition MAX aircraft to storage locations, as per 14 CFR § 21.197, flew at lower

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The software code for the MCAS function and the computer for executing the software are built to Boeing's specifications by

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integrity monitoring of each FCC's performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated

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If the two AoA sensors disagree with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate and an indicator will alert the pilots.

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mais c'est un ordre de grandeur supérieur à ce qui est normalement permis quand on conçoit des systèmes comme ceux-ci,

2181: 1864: 1223: 149: 78: 5757: 5299: 4764:"Stop us if you've heard this before: Boeing's working on 737 Max software fixes for autopilot, stabilization bugs" 2423: 2203: 627:

The MCAS design parameters originally envisioned automated corrective actions to be taken in cases of high AoA and

3185:"NTSB Issues 7 Safety Recommendations to FAA related to Ongoing Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines Crash Investigations" 3009: 2748: 5838: 5119: 4806: 4429: 3917:

Ces mouvements sont facilement observables, et, selon nous, selon le règlement 395A, ne devraient pas avoir lieu.

3636: 3383: 1951: 246: 234: 4393: 3411: 2451:"Crash: Lion B38M near Jakarta on Oct 29th 2018, aircraft lost height and crashed into Java Sea, wrong AoA data" 1700: 4907: 4078: 710: 4211: 2029:"Boeing CEO apologizes for lives lost and acknowledges role of company's flight-control system in two crashes" 847:

overcome by "applying opposite control-column input to activate the column cutout switches". Former pilot and

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If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only "provide one input for each elevated AoA event."

5656: 2665:"Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing and FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system" 2245: 1777: 1379: 873: 174: 105: 26: 4763: 3126: 3031:"After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX" 2902: 5752: 5322: 5190: 3168: 3050: 3033:(Press release). House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. September 16, 2020. Archived from 2934: 2573: 1630: 131: 4264: 2601: 1834:"Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system" 568:

engines are fitted farther forward and higher up than in previous models. The aerodynamic effect of its

1248: 524: 219: 3264:"Boeing Failed to Predict That Slew of 737 Max Warning Alarms Would Confuse Pilots, Investigators Say" 2006:"Boeing says it has completed a software update for 737 Max anti-stall system linked to fatal crashes" 5762: 5387: 3671: 3538:"Regulators knew before crashes that 737 MAX trim control was confusing in some conditions: document" 1219: 703: 259: 138: 49: 22: 4955:"Newly stringent FAA tests spur a fundamental software redesign of Boeing's 737 MAX flight controls" 4370: 2401: 1168:

or static ports and may provide additional situation and configuration awareness to the flight crew.

1164:

The AoA indicator can be used to assist with unreliable airspeed indications as a result of blocked

903:. On the MAX, with all power to the stabilizer cut, pilots have no choice but to use the mechanical 5767: 1281: 1256: 888: 539: 238: 5260:"Boeing Fires its CEO at Last. And Before Anybody Flies on a 737 MAX, 10 Questions Need Answering" 5213:"Engineers say Boeing pushed to limit safety testing in race to certify planes, including 737 MAX" 3211: 2951: 1160:

magazine about AoA systems, "Operational use of Angle of Attack on modern commercial jet planes":

5556: 4685: 4614: 4595: 4555: 3240: 3184: 2578: 1127: 1054: 666: 660: 573: 520: 278: 167: 3979: 265:

Boeing admitted MCAS played a role in both accidents, when it acted on false data from a single

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might unintentionally command nose down during flight or prematurely disconnect the autopilot.

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admitted that it had botched the software implementation and lamented the poor communications.

718:

assist now serve a shared purpose of turning off automated systems such as MCAS as well as the

547: 470: 381: 303: 242: 214: 1558:"Must Reads: How a 50-year-old design came back to haunt Boeing with its troubled 737 Max jet" 5591: 5502: 5497: 5473: 4648:"Additional software problem detected in Boeing 737 Max flight control system, officials say" 2529:"WSJ News Exclusive | Before 737 MAX, Boeing's Flight-Control System Included Key Safeguards" 1140: 980: 424: 330: 4518:"Boeing CEO Says Safety Is Highest Priority. The Company's Pricing Says Something Different" 999:

Engineers Sylvain Alarie and Gilles Primeau, experts on horizontal stabilizers consulted by

919:

mechanism that moves the stabilizer. It becomes very difficult for pilots to hand crank the

5382: 5292: 4159:"Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX system baffles some involved in developing the jet" 2985:"Messages show Boeing employees knew in 2016 of problems that turned deadly on the 737 Max" 2555:"Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX system baffles some involved in developing the jet" 1583: 1057:: the flight control system lacks any basis for rejecting its input as faulty information. 1041: 852: 512: 310: 4931:"FAA and Boeing initially disagreed on severity of "catastrophic" 737 Max software glitch" 4131:"European regulator plans its own test flights of Boeing 737 MAX in sign of rift with FAA" 3358:"Crashed jets reportedly lacked key safety features because Boeing charged extra for them" 3148: 461:

On April 4, 2019, Boeing publicly acknowledged that MCAS played a role in both accidents.

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of attack, manual flight). MCAS was intended to mimic the flight behavior of the previous

8: 5691: 5651: 5616: 5468: 4652: 4111: 4003: 3063: 2033: 1982: 1754: 1404: 819: 695: 416: 411:

The vertical airspeeds of the Boeing 737 MAX 8s involved in the JT 610 and ET 302 crashes

230: 121: 2502:"The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing's 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards" 2450: 1011:

These experts have raised concerns about the motors possibly overheating in April 2019.

681:

In November 2019, Jim Marko, a manager of aircraft integration and safety assessment at

5742: 5706: 5611: 5463: 4434: 4398: 3641: 3388: 3083: 2332: 2183:

Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System : Observations, Findings, and Recommendations

1782: 1380:"Exclusive: Boeing kept FAA in the dark on key 737 MAX design changes - U.S. IG report" 1252: 1239: 1024: 900: 723: 546:, which physically moves the pilot's control column forward and engages the airplane's 223: 3470: 3291: 1924:"Boeing big cheese repeats pledge of 737 Max software updates following fatal crashes" 926:

This problem was originally found in the early 1980s with the 737-200 model. When the

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more rapidly and to a greater extent—but now it reads a single AoA sensor, creating a

5737: 5701: 5666: 5631: 5571: 5545: 5458: 5448: 5412: 5247:"New document in 737 Max investigation points to chaos, pressure in MCAS development" 4959: 4863: 4782: 4439: 4403: 4342: 4272: 4163: 4135: 4029: 3767: 3646: 3618:

Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers

3568: 3419: 3088: 2958: 2877: 2709: 2669: 2609: 1900: 1838: 1562: 1113: 1090:

In November 2017, after several months of MAX deliveries, Boeing discovered that the

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In a legal complaint against Boeing, the Southwest Airlines Pilot Association states:

841:

Standard Operating Procedures and Pilot Monitoring Duties for Flight Deck Crewmembers

805: 734: 605: 584: 554: 4298:"Air Canada says their 737 Max jets have all safety features Boeing sells as extras" 3263: 523:, designed to help the aircraft emulate the handling characteristics of the earlier 5641: 5606: 5596: 5397: 5367: 5158: 4618: 4581: 4079:"Boeing relied on single sensor for 737 Max that had been flagged 216 times to FAA" 3763:"Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit, limiting ability to shut off MCAS" 2768:"Boeing altered key switches in 737 MAX cockpit, limiting ability to shut off MCAS" 682: 374: 314: 270: 4680:"Friction Between U.S., European Regulators Could Delay 737 MAX Return to Service" 4316:"Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts" 4212:"Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts" 3339:"Optional warning light could have aided Lion Air engineers before crash: experts" 3017:

The boeing 737 MAX: examining the design development and marketing of the aircraft

1152:

display on the upper right; the AoA Disagree alert would appear as a text message.

5828: 5721: 5716: 5285: 4610: 4522: 3954: 3635:

Glanz, James; Creswell, Julie; Kaplan, Thomas; Wichter, Zach (February 3, 2019).

3268: 2705:"Live coverage: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg testifies to Congress about 737 MAX" 2217: 2149: 1350: 1328: 1317: 1295: 1206: 1149: 1118: 1037: 848: 800: 774: 719: 715: 592: 577: 499: 326: 266: 4550:"Boeing Knew About Safety-Alert Problem for a Year Before Telling FAA, Airlines" 222:. The company indicated that this change eliminated the need for pilots to have 210:

in 2018 and 2019, which killed all 346 passengers and crew among both flights.

5676: 5661: 5601: 5527: 5522: 5377: 3379: 2843:"Boeing CEO says he would put his family in a 737 Max "without any hesitation"" 751: 648: 516: 207: 90: 5200:"'Safety was just a given': Inside Boeing's boardroom amid the 737 Max crisis" 5173: 5162: 5145: 4430:"Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras" 3932: 3637:"After a Lion Air 737 Max Crashed in October, Questions About the Plane Arose" 3384:"Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras" 1251:

aircraft, though it presents less risk than on the MAX; on the NG, moving the

777:

input that simulated the stabilizer moving consistent with the MCAS function,

706:

by all airlines and operators, and a number of functional issues were raised.

5822: 5696: 5681: 5636: 5566: 5561: 5551: 5372: 5342: 4633: 4443: 4407: 4276: 3935:[Was Boeing negligent?] (in French). Radio-Canada info. April 1, 2019 3650: 3423: 3092: 2962: 2881: 2825:"Facing sharp questions, Boeing CEO refuses to admit flaws in 737 MAX design" 2613: 2602:"Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change" 1829: 787: 656: 455: 401: 258:

then ordered the grounding of all 737 MAX planes in China, which led to more

4622: 3832: 2600:

Nicas, Jack; Kitroeff, Natalie; Gelles, David; Glanz, James (June 1, 2019).

2302:"What is the Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System" 2246:"FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet anti-stall system: JATR findings" 2098:"What is the Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System" 1748:

Lazo, Luz; Laris, Michael; Aratani, Lori; Paletta, Damian (March 13, 2019).

651:

tanker, which includes an MCAS function, suggested MCAS to the design team.

5747: 5711: 5686: 5671: 5586: 5581: 5514: 5453: 4674: 4544: 3229: 1928: 1062: 1020: 1000: 637: 543: 299: 5015: 1231:

said that retrofitting additional hardware is an option to be considered.

930:

operated to raise or lower the nose, it set up a strong force on the trim

450:

Flight crew will be able to counteract MCAS by pulling back on the column.

36: 5576: 4465:"Southwest is adding new Angle of Attack indicators to its 737 Max fleet" 1896:"Boeing's software fix for 737 MAX still weeks away from delivery to FAA" 1539:"Boeing's automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots" 1324: 1264: 532: 494: 4859:"Boeing needs up to three months to fix newly discovered 737 Max glitch" 2348:"Boeing's 737 Max design contains fingerprints of hundreds of suppliers" 329:(AoA) sensor indicated that the angle was too high, MCAS would trim the 290: 5626: 5422: 5417: 4004:"Operational use of Angle of attack on modern commercial jet airplanes" 3445:"FAA considered grounding some Boeing 737 Max planes last year: source" 2806:"Boeing CEO: Nothing slipped through in original 737 MAX certification" 1861:"The State of Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation" 1228: 1172:

Boeing announced a change in policy in the Frequently Asked Questions (

1165: 962: 951: 935: 920: 904: 831: 815: 727: 632: 318: 4025:"Did Boeing, aviation industry heed lessons of 2009 Air France crash?" 3235:"Plane Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 MAX Crashes" 1509:"USAF Reviewing Training After MAX 8 Crashes; KC-46 Uses Similar MCAS" 396: 5621: 5432: 5392: 2635:"Transport Canada safety official urges removal of MCAS from 737 Max" 1398:"Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community" 1277: 1004: 988: 939: 931: 916: 640:

solution, but Boeing decided to implement a control law in software.

469:

The FAA and Boeing both disputed media reports describing MCAS as an

433: 3117: 2952:"Review of 737 Max Certification Finds Fault With Boeing and F.A.A." 1479:"A Basic "MCAS" System was installed in the Boeing 707 in the 1960s" 1263:

Early news reports were inaccurate in attributing the problem to an

5646: 5407: 5357: 4297: 4107:"Sensor cited as potential factor in Boeing crashes draws scrutiny" 3564:"Why Boeing's emergency directions may have failed to save 737 MAX" 3312:"Why Boeing's emergency directions may have failed to save 737 MAX" 3296: 3010:"Hearing before the committee on transportation and infrastructure" 2376:"My Testimony Today Before the 𝐇𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐞 Subcommittee on Aviation" 2053: 1235: 1222:

scenario – an abnormal condition identified through

967: 877:

The trim wheel and cutoff switches in a previous generation cockpit

730:

out of its nose down setting when the trim assist was deactivated.

565: 358: 5035:"The ancient computers in the Boeing 737 Max are holding up a fix" 4982:"Latest 737 Max Fault That Alarmed Test Pilots Rooted in Software" 4491:"Lion Air Report Analyzes Pilot Struggle With 737 MAX Trim System" 4338:"Boeing wanted to wait three years to fix safety alert on 737 Max" 1808:"Boeing 737 Max's Autopilot Has Problem, European Regulators Find" 1724:"Clue Linking Mysterious Boeing 737 Max Disasters Came From Space" 1675:"The Boeing 737 MAX: Is the problem with the plane or the pilots?" 791:

to obtain a more representative assessment of cockpit situations.

4887:"New pitch trim issue forces further changes to 737 MAX software" 4632:

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the

4394:"Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn't" 3947: 3412:"Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn't" 3212:"Boeing Report Highlights Human Factors No Company Should Ignore" 1096:

message, which is indicative of potential sensor mismatch on the

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that became notorious for its role in two fatal accidents of the

4712:"Delays in Boeing Max Return Began With Near-Crash in Simulator" 2075:

Broderick, Sean; Norris, Guy; Warwick, Graham (March 20, 2019).

511:

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a

5402: 5308: 4857:

Levin, Alan; Johnsson, Julie; Courtney, Shaun (June 27, 2019).

3079:"Boeing Underestimated Cockpit Chaos on 737 Max, N.T.S.B. Says" 2870:"Boeing Underestimated Cockpit Chaos on 737 Max, N.T.S.B. Says" 2726:"How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer" 384:

engine, further forward from the wing and higher off the ground

203: 5060:"Boeing Fixing New Software Bug on Max; Key Test Flight Nears" 4578:"Boeing CEO Admits Mistake in Handling Warning-System Problem" 3859:"Simulator tests demonstrate 737 Max manual trim difficulties" 3697:"My Testimony Today Before the House Subcommittee on Aviation" 3591:"Checklists come into focus as pace-setter for 737 Max return" 3471:"Boeing wanted to wait 3 years to fix safety alert on 737 Max" 2328:"Control system under scrutiny after Ethiopian Airlines crash" 1978:"Boeing says 737 Max update is being held up by FAA questions" 1602:"Boeing's MCAS may not have been needed on the 737 Max at all" 1422:"Boeing's MCAS may not have been needed on the 737 Max at all" 1276:

control computers and compare their outputs. This switch to a

4611:

Review of Research On Angle-of-Attack Indicator Effectiveness

4365: 4363: 4361: 528: 365: 4239:"Bjorn's Corner: Analysing the Lion Air JT610 crash, Part 3" 2765: 2759: 2477:"The many human errors that brought down the Boeing 737 Max" 2049:"Congress holds fiery hearings on Boeing 737 Max 8 approval" 694:

The MCAS came under scrutiny following the fatal crashes of

18:

Boeing's aircraft control system involved in fatal accidents

5175:

Boeing 737 Unable to Trim!! Cockpit video (Full flight sim)

4902: 4900: 3796:"Vestigal design issue clouds 737 MAX crash investigations" 3118:

National Transportation Safety Board (September 19, 2019).

2122: 2120: 2118: 1778:"Confusion, Then Prayer, in Cockpit of Doomed Lion Air Jet" 349: 5225:"Bjorn's Corner: Fly by steel or electrical wire, Part 11" 4948: 4946: 4944: 4646:

Davis, Aaron C.; Lazo, Luz; Schemm, Paul (April 4, 2019).

4358: 4187:"Boeing presents MCAS fix to pilots, regulators and media" 3815:

Vestigial design issue clouds 737 Max crash investigations

3634: 2198: 2196: 5277: 4570: 4083: 1955: 1179:

In 1996, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-96-094.

1173: 5783:

List of accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737

4897: 3691: 3689: 3624:. Advisory Circulars. FAA. January 10, 2017. AC 120-71B. 2686:"Bjorn's Corner: ET302 crash report, the first analysis" 2599: 2115: 1645:"Boeing flies first 737 MAX 7 with MCAS software update" 1448:"Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes" 702:

soon after takeoff. The Boeing 737 MAX global fleet was

542:, which is distinct from an anti-stall device such as a 298:

In the 1960s, a basic pitch control system known as the

5210: 4941: 4667: 4076: 4053:"The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course" 2193: 1747: 1507:

Tirpak, John A.; Everstine, Brian W. (March 22, 2019),

1014: 868: 764: 599: 475: 5115:

Airworthiness directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

5079:"Boeing finds another software problem on the 737 Max" 2527:

Tangel, Alison Sider and Andrew (September 29, 2019).

2074: 1701:"Change to 737 MAX controls may have imperiled planes" 5147:

Rogue Boeing 737 Max planes 'with minds of their own'

4856: 3885:"Des révélations troublantes sur le Boeing 737 MAX 8" 3686: 2950:

Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (October 11, 2019).

2816: 2787:"Ethiopian MAX Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots" 1950:

Rappard, Anna-Maja; Wallace, Gregory (May 16, 2019).

1802: 1800: 825: 5143: 3723:"My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine" 1776:

Beech, Hannah; Suhartono, Muktita (March 20, 2019).

1584:"Your 737 MAX Questions. Answered: 5. What is MCAS?" 1288: 1238:

motor is energized. Engineers were able to simulate

4922: 3070: 1952:"Boeing says it has completed 737 Max software fix" 750:and had not carried out a thorough verification by 368:

engine, forward of the wing, with flat bottom shape

5510:Future of Flight Aviation Center & Boeing Tour 4678: 4548: 4543: 3233: 3019:. 𝐇𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐞 of representatives. October 30, 2019. 2424:"FAA Issues Emergency AD Against Boeing 737 Max 8" 1797: 5197: 4997:"Software Fix Will Address Most Recent MAX Issue" 4737:"Boeing finds yet another 737 MAX software issue" 4428:Tabuchi, Hiroko; Gelles, David (March 21, 2019). 3337:Freed, Jamie; Johnson, Eric (November 30, 2018). 2370: 2368: 974: 5820: 5241:Design of a pitch stability augmentation system. 5164:The real reason Boeing's new plane crashed twice 4392:Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (May 5, 2019). 3496:"Explanatory Note to TCDS IM.A.120 – Boeing 737" 3410:Gelles, David; Kitroeff, Natalie (May 5, 2019). 3372: 3330: 3283: 2494: 2402:"Boeing Statement on Operations Manual Bulletin" 2020: 1822: 1549: 1301: 1298:, can remain on longer than intended by design. 1212: 5788:Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System 4645: 4547:; Tangel, Andrew; Sider, Alison (May 5, 2019). 3878: 3876: 3874: 3872: 3749:PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION, SWAPA vs. Boeing 3292:"Software Won't Fix Boeing's 'Faulty' Airframe" 2778: 2295: 2293: 1506: 1195: 1148:of a Boeing 737-800 aircraft with a functional 202:) is a flight stabilizing feature developed by 196:Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System 111:Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System 4580:. Associated Press. June 16, 2019 – via 4391: 4157:Baker, Mike; Gates, Dominic (March 26, 2019). 3974: 3972: 3821:, April 4, 2019. (retrieved November 21, 2019) 3672:"Boeing 737 MAX: What Happened, And What Now?" 3409: 3289: 2949: 2784: 2749:"ET302 used the Cut-Out switches to stop MCAS" 2696: 2553:Baker, Mike; Gates, Dominic (March 26, 2019). 2365: 1949: 1775: 1595: 1593: 1502: 1500: 1498: 1476: 1183:TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA): 893: 479: 465:Purpose of MCAS and the stabilizer trim system 400:The tracking data of Lion Air Flight 610 from 5293: 5171: 4673: 4427: 3833:"The Boeing 737 Runaway Stabilizer Procedure" 3468: 3378: 2822: 2766:Mike Baker and Dominic Gates (May 10, 2019). 2717: 175: 5244: 4787:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 4077:Curt Devine; Drew Griffin (April 30, 2019). 3869: 3856: 3469:Koenig, David; Krisher, Tom (June 7, 2019). 3336: 2861: 2803: 2290: 585:Collins Aerospace, formerly Rockwell Collins 391: 82:Movable horizontal stabilizer of the 737 MAX 3969: 3809: 3807: 3805: 2572:Jenkins, Holman W. jr. (November 5, 2019). 1590: 1555: 1495: 1477:Stuart-Menteth, Oliver (November 1, 2019), 89:This article is part of a series about the 5300: 5286: 5157: 5076: 4807:"Boeing: The "e-cab" – a test flight deck" 4791:) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 4156: 4022: 3955:"14 CFR § 21.197 - Special flight permits" 3933:"Boeing a-t-il fait preuve de négligence?" 2552: 2144: 2142: 1470: 1036:As per Boeing technical description: "the 892:the horizontal stabilizer by autopilot or 572:contributes to the aircraft's tendency to 550:when the airplane is approaching a stall. 538:When activated, MCAS directly engages the 182: 168: 5211:Dominic Gates; Mike Baker (May 5, 2019). 4994: 4762:at 00:43, Gareth Corfield April 9, 2020. 4705: 4703: 4262: 3790: 3788: 3786: 3355: 2150:"14 CFR § 25.203 - Stall characteristics" 1975: 1530: 1323:The new flight control laws also include 1109: 302:was installed in the Boeing 707 to avoid 5032: 4928: 4371:"Boeing Statement on AOA Disagree Alert" 3802: 3077:Kitroeff, Natalie (September 26, 2019). 3076: 2868:Kitroeff, Natalie (September 26, 2019). 2867: 2658: 2656: 2474: 2448: 2442: 2299: 2095: 1921: 1599: 1139: 910: 872: 856:and altitude situations, masking MCAS." 493: 406: 395: 289: 77: 5191:"The 737 MAX MCAS Software Enhancement" 4124: 4122: 4104: 3228: 2571: 2270: 2139: 2003: 1360:. The Boeing Company. November 10, 2018 1135: 818:in 2020, only to be accelerated by the 622: 282:training in flight simulators by 2021. 5821: 5257: 5016:"MAX's computer has reached its limit" 5013: 4910:(Press release). Boeing. June 26, 2019 4908:"Boeing Statement on 737 MAX software" 4700: 4608: 4515: 4023:Leinfelder, Andrea (August 22, 2019). 3895:from the original on November 11, 2019 3882: 3783: 3532: 3530: 3403: 3113: 3111: 3109: 2723: 2526: 2325: 2175: 2173: 2171: 2154:Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 1625: 1623: 1621: 1619: 1270: 1260:all requirements have been satisfied. 427:motor to push down the airplane nose. 256:Civil Aviation Administration of China 241:before the aircraft would potentially 5778:Competition between Airbus and Boeing 5281: 4952: 4884: 4709: 4263:MacGillis, Alec (November 11, 2019). 4236: 4184: 4129:Gates, Dominic (September 10, 2019). 4128: 4050: 3883:Vu Van, Binh An (November 10, 2019), 3561: 3504:European Union Aviation Safety Agency 3261: 2982: 2746: 2702: 2683: 2662: 2653: 2546: 2240: 2238: 2126: 2026: 1893: 1867:(DOT). March 27, 2019. Archived from 1828: 1556:Vartabedian, Ralph (March 15, 2019), 1536: 1403:. FAA. March 11, 2019. Archived from 1085: 794: 275:European Union Aviation Safety Agency 5773:2013 Boeing 787 Dreamliner grounding 5328:Boeing Defense, Space & Security 5144:60 Minutes Australia (May 5, 2019). 5001:Aviation Week & Space Technology 4824: 4799: 4761: 4677:; Tangel, Andrew (October 8, 2019). 4373:(Press release). Boeing. May 5, 2019 4256: 4119: 3209: 3167:. September 19, 2019. Archived from 3165:National Transportation Safety Board 3153:National Transportation Safety Board 2933:. September 19, 2019. Archived from 2931:National Transportation Safety Board 2736:from the original on April 24, 2019. 2449:Hradecky, Simon (January 14, 2019). 2179: 2082:Aviation Week & Space Technology 1080:Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 1015:MCAS circumvention for ferry flights 869:Stabilizer cutoff switches re-wiring 771:National Transportation Safety Board 765:National Transportation Safety Board 743:National Transportation Safety Board 600:Safety engineering and human factors 30: 5258:Irving, Clive (December 23, 2019). 4105:Frankel, Todd C. (March 17, 2019). 3957:. LII / Legal Information Institute 3857:Hemmerdinger, Jon (April 2, 2020). 3609: 3583: 3555: 3527: 3255: 3106: 2983:Laris, Michael (October 18, 2019). 2976: 2703:Gates, Dominic (October 29, 2019). 2300:Ostrower, Jon (November 13, 2018). 2273:"The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Explained" 2168: 2096:Ostrower, Jon (November 13, 2018). 2089: 2077:"The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Explained" 1976:MacMillan, Douglas (May 16, 2019). 1922:Corfield, Gareth (March 19, 2019). 1616: 1454:. November 20, 2020. Archived from 994: 317:. The KC-46, which is based on the 13: 5183: 5033:Campbell, Darryl (April 9, 2020). 4995:Broderick, Sean (August 1, 2019). 4832:"The "e-cab" – A Test Flight Deck" 4609:Le Vie, Lisa R. (August 1, 2014). 4237:Fehrm, Bjorn (November 15, 2019). 4051:Useem, Jerry (November 20, 2019). 3382:; Gelles, David (March 21, 2019). 3356:Newburger, Emma (March 21, 2019). 3262:Levin, Alan (September 26, 2019). 3151:from websites or documents of the 2724:Travis, Gregory (April 18, 2019). 2271:Warwick, Graham (March 20, 2019). 2235: 2127:Zhang, Benjamin (April 29, 2019). 1741: 1600:Ostrower, Jon (January 10, 2021), 1537:Fehrm, Bjorn (November 14, 2018). 1519:from the original on July 23, 2021 1031: 826:Runaway stabilizer and manual trim 647:, engineers who had worked on the 643:According to a news report in the 476:Joint Authorities Technical Review 14: 5855: 5245:Jon Ostrower (October 18, 2019). 5198:Douglas MacMillan (May 5, 2019). 5137: 5077:O'Kane, Sean (February 6, 2020). 4953:Gates, Dominic (August 1, 2019). 3830: 3290:George Leopold (March 27, 2019). 2663:Gates, Dominic (March 17, 2019). 1865:U.S. Department of Transportation 1721: 1289:Trim system malfunction indicator 631:beyond normal flight conditions. 245:. Boeing denied that MCAS was an 5341: 5172:Mentour Pilot (April 19, 2019). 5107: This article incorporates 5102: 5096: 5070: 5052: 5026: 5007: 4988: 4974: 4878: 4850: 4755: 4729: 4710:Levin, Alan (November 8, 2019). 4639: 4627: 4602: 4588: 4537: 4516:Zetlin, Minda (March 24, 2019). 4509: 4483: 4457: 4421: 4385: 4346:. Associated Press. June 7, 2019 4330: 4308: 4290: 4230: 4204: 4178: 4150: 4098: 4070: 4044: 4016: 3562:Gates, Dominic (April 3, 2019). 3210:Hill, Andrew (October 6, 2019). 3147: This article incorporates 3142: 2823:Dominic Gates (April 29, 2019). 2574:"Boeing vs. Technological Chaos" 2475:Campbell, Darryl (May 2, 2019). 2326:Bazley, Tarek (March 11, 2019). 2004:Josephs, Leslie (May 16, 2019). 1894:Gates, Dominic (April 1, 2019). 1100:, was unintentionally disabled. 373: 357: 341: 269:(AoA) sensor. In 2020, the FAA, 35: 5120:Federal Aviation Administration 4929:Ostrower, Jon (June 27, 2019). 4185:Fehrm, Bjorn (March 27, 2019). 3925: 3850: 3824: 3755: 3741: 3715: 3664: 3628: 3488: 3462: 3437: 3349: 3304: 3222: 3202: 3177: 3023: 3002: 2943: 2895: 2835: 2804:Daniel McCoy (April 24, 2019). 2797: 2785:Sean Broderick (May 10, 2019). 2740: 2677: 2627: 2593: 2565: 2520: 2468: 2416: 2394: 2340: 2319: 2264: 2218:"FAA Updates on Boeing 737 MAX" 2210: 2068: 2041: 1997: 1969: 1943: 1915: 1887: 1853: 1769: 1715: 1693: 1667: 1637: 1576: 1156:Boeing published an article in 506: 352:engine, entirely under the wing 235:Federal Aviation Administration 5489:Commercial Airplane Factories 5014:Allard, André (July 3, 2019). 4885:Fehrm, Bjorn (June 28, 2019). 3508:. May 24, 2019. Archived from 2747:Bjorn, Fehrm (April 3, 2019). 2684:Fehrm, Bjorn (April 5, 2019). 2027:Gregg, Aaron (April 4, 2019). 1810:. Bloomberg News. July 5, 2019 1440: 1414: 1390: 1372: 1343: 1048: 983:is fitted with a conventional 975:Horizontal stabilizer actuator 489: 145:Financial impact of groundings 1: 3837:The Boeing 737 Technical Site 2156:. Legal Information Institute 1336: 1325:Flight Control Computer (FCC) 1302:Updates for return to service 1213:Microprocessor stress testing 959:Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 942:effectively jammed in place. 851:aviation & safety expert 700:Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 421:Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 285: 251:Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 127:Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 5758:Boeing–Embraer joint venture 4596:"Frequently Asked Questions" 4318:. Reuters. November 30, 2018 1196:Flight computer architecture 27:Boeing 737 MAX certification 7: 5753:Boeing Technical Fellowship 5323:Boeing Commercial Airplanes 4838:. Boeing. November 30, 2015 769:On September 26, 2019, the 689: 478:(JATR) "considers that the 260:groundings across the globe 132:Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 48:to comply with Knowledge's 10: 5860: 5307: 2912:. NTSB. September 19, 2019 2404:. Boeing. November 6, 2018 1513:Air Force Magazine website 1075:service around the world. 716:horizontal stabilizer trim 525:Boeing 737 Next Generation 425:horizontal stabilizer trim 364:737-800 (Next Generation) 220:Boeing 737 Next Generation 20: 5797:Boeing machinists strike 5763:Boeing 737 MAX groundings 5730: 5538: 5482: 5441: 5388:Boeing Rotorcraft Systems 5350: 5339: 5315: 4265:"The Case Against Boeing" 2204:"737 MAX SOFTWARE UPDATE" 1631:"737 MAX software update" 1331:commands (including MCAS) 1255:counters any uncommanded 392:Role of MCAS in accidents 229:After the fatal crash of 23:Boeing 737 MAX groundings 5768:Boeing 737 rudder issues 5229:Leeham News and Analysis 4891:Leeham News and Analysis 4243:Leeham News and Analysis 4191:Leeham News and Analysis 2810:Wichita Business Journal 2753:Leeham News and Analysis 2690:Leeham News and Analysis 1543:Leeham News and Analysis 1483:Leeham News and Analysis 1351:"Multi Operator Message" 233:in 2018, Boeing and the 61:may contain suggestions. 46:may need to be rewritten 4686:The Wall Street Journal 4615:Langley Research Center 4556:The Wall Street Journal 3913:ajoute Gilles Primeau. 3674:. Aviation Week Network 3241:The Wall Street Journal 2579:The Wall Street Journal 1128:The Wall Street Journal 907:in the center console. 667:The Wall Street Journal 661:single point of failure 521:flight control computer 315:aerial refueling tanker 279:Airworthiness Directive 155:Reactions to groundings 5839:Flight control systems 5428:United Launch Alliance 5363:Aurora Flight Sciences 5333:Boeing Global Services 5109:public domain material 4836:players.brightcove.net 4625:. NASA/TM–2014-218514. 4598:. Boeing: 737 MAX FAQ. 3891:(in Canadian French), 3232:(September 26, 2019). 3171:on September 26, 2019. 3149:public domain material 2937:on September 26, 2019. 1334: 1189: 1170: 1153: 1146:primary flight display 1098:primary flight display 1078:A former professor at 957:In simulator tests of 887:reported that the two 878: 866: 784: 503: 412: 404: 295: 215:CFM International LEAP 83: 5592:Arthur D. Collins Jr. 5474:Future Combat Systems 5150:– via YouTube. 4768:www.theregister.co.uk 3132:on September 14, 2021 2791:Aviation Week Network 1679:Intelligent Aerospace 1308: 1181: 1162: 1143: 981:horizontal stabilizer 961:flight scenario, the 911:Manual trim stiffness 876: 861: 779: 741:On September 26, the 564:The 737 MAX's larger 540:horizontal stabilizer 497: 410: 399: 331:horizontal stabilizer 293: 239:horizontal stabilizer 226:on the new aircraft. 101:Orders and deliveries 81: 21:Further information: 5834:Engineering failures 5793:Manufacturing issues 5383:Boeing Phantom Works 5178:– via Youtube. 5167:– via Youtube. 3889:Radio-Canada website 1136:Visual AoA indicator 1055:single point failure 1042:Chesley Sullenberger 853:Chesley Sullenberger 754:of the MCAS system. 623:Technology readiness 553:Boeing's former CEO 311:Boeing KC-46 Pegasus 5692:Patrick M. Shanahan 5652:Kevin G. McAllister 5617:Edmund Giambastiani 5469:Connexion by Boeing 5066:. February 6, 2020. 4653:The Washington Post 4497:. November 30, 2018 4471:. November 30, 2018 4218:. November 30, 2018 4112:The Washington Post 2989:The Washington Post 2641:. November 23, 2019 2533:Wall Street Journal 2455:The Aviation Herald 2034:The Washington Post 1983:The Washington Post 1755:The Washington Post 1655:on October 25, 2020 1612:on January 10, 2021 1358:MOM MOM 18 0664 01B 1271:Computer redundancy 1240:single event upsets 1114:safety review board 1110:AoA value indicator 696:Lion Air Flight 610 645:Wall Street Journal 417:Lion Air Flight 610 348:737-200 (original) 231:Lion Air Flight 610 122:Lion Air Flight 610 5743:1948 Boeing strike 5707:Malcolm T. Stamper 5612:Kenneth Duberstein 5161:(April 15, 2019). 4743:. January 19, 2020 4435:The New York Times 4399:The New York Times 3729:. October 13, 2019 3727:Sully Sullenberger 3701:Sully Sullenberger 3642:The New York Times 3416:The New York Times 3389:The New York Times 3084:The New York Times 3051:cite press release 2955:The New York Times 2874:The New York Times 2606:The New York Times 2430:. November 8, 2018 2380:Sully Sullenberger 2252:. October 11, 2019 1832:(March 18, 2019). 1783:The New York Times 1649:saemobilus.sae.org 1428:. January 10, 2021 1154: 1086:AoA Disagree alert 879: 795:Supporting systems 513:flight control law 504: 413: 405: 296: 224:simulator training 150:List of groundings 139:737 MAX groundings 84: 5816: 5815: 5738:History of Boeing 5702:Harry Stonecipher 5667:Dennis Muilenburg 5632:Philip G. Johnson 5572:Robert A. Bradway 5546:William E. Boeing 5459:Boeing hydrofoils 5449:BCT Modernization 5413:McDonnell Douglas 5231:. October 4, 2019 5217:The Seattle Times 5020:Wings Over Québec 4984:. Bloomberg News. 4960:The Seattle Times 4864:Los Angeles Times 4343:Los Angeles Times 4304:. March 21, 2019. 4164:The Seattle Times 4136:The Seattle Times 4030:Houston Chronicle 3980:"Angle of attack" 3768:The Seattle Times 3597:. October 9, 2019 3569:The Seattle Times 3316:The Seattle Times 2772:The Seattle Times 2710:The Seattle Times 2670:The Seattle Times 2559:The Seattle Times 2506:The Seattle Times 1901:The Seattle Times 1839:The Seattle Times 1563:Los Angeles Times 1458:on April 18, 2022 884:The Seattle Times 820:Lion Air accident 735:Dennis Muilenburg 606:SAE International 555:Dennis Muilenburg 247:anti-stall system 192: 191: 76: 75: 50:quality standards 5851: 5642:Caroline Kennedy 5607:William M. Daley 5597:Philip M. Condit 5557:William M. Allen 5398:HRL Laboratories 5368:Boeing Australia 5345: 5302: 5295: 5288: 5279: 5278: 5274: 5272: 5270: 5254: 5240: 5238: 5236: 5220: 5207: 5194: 5179: 5168: 5154: 5131: 5130: 5128: 5126: 5106: 5105: 5100: 5094: 5093: 5091: 5089: 5074: 5068: 5067: 5056: 5050: 5049: 5047: 5045: 5030: 5024: 5023: 5011: 5005: 5004: 4992: 4986: 4985: 4978: 4972: 4971: 4969: 4967: 4950: 4939: 4938: 4926: 4920: 4919: 4917: 4915: 4904: 4895: 4894: 4882: 4876: 4875: 4873: 4871: 4854: 4848: 4847: 4845: 4843: 4828: 4822: 4821: 4819: 4817: 4803: 4797: 4796: 4786: 4778: 4776: 4774: 4759: 4753: 4752: 4750: 4748: 4733: 4727: 4726: 4724: 4722: 4707: 4698: 4697: 4695: 4693: 4682: 4671: 4665: 4664: 4662: 4660: 4643: 4637: 4631: 4630: 4626: 4623:2060/20140011419 4606: 4600: 4599: 4592: 4586: 4585: 4574: 4568: 4567: 4565: 4563: 4552: 4541: 4535: 4534: 4532: 4530: 4513: 4507: 4506: 4504: 4502: 4487: 4481: 4480: 4478: 4476: 4461: 4455: 4454: 4452: 4450: 4425: 4419: 4418: 4416: 4414: 4389: 4383: 4382: 4380: 4378: 4367: 4356: 4355: 4353: 4351: 4334: 4328: 4327: 4325: 4323: 4312: 4306: 4305: 4294: 4288: 4287: 4285: 4283: 4260: 4254: 4253: 4251: 4249: 4234: 4228: 4227: 4225: 4223: 4208: 4202: 4201: 4199: 4197: 4182: 4176: 4175: 4173: 4171: 4154: 4148: 4147: 4145: 4143: 4126: 4117: 4116: 4102: 4096: 4095: 4093: 4091: 4074: 4068: 4067: 4065: 4063: 4048: 4042: 4041: 4039: 4037: 4020: 4014: 4011: 4001:Lay summary in: 3998: 3996: 3994: 3984: 3976: 3967: 3966: 3964: 3962: 3951: 3945: 3944: 3942: 3940: 3929: 3923: 3922: 3920: 3916: 3912: 3908: 3902: 3900: 3880: 3867: 3866: 3854: 3848: 3847: 3845: 3843: 3828: 3822: 3811: 3800: 3799: 3798:. April 4, 2019. 3792: 3781: 3780: 3778: 3776: 3759: 3753: 3752: 3745: 3739: 3738: 3736: 3734: 3719: 3713: 3712: 3710: 3708: 3693: 3684: 3683: 3681: 3679: 3668: 3662: 3661: 3659: 3657: 3632: 3626: 3625: 3623: 3613: 3607: 3606: 3604: 3602: 3587: 3581: 3580: 3578: 3576: 3559: 3553: 3552: 3550: 3548: 3534: 3525: 3524: 3522: 3520: 3514: 3500: 3492: 3486: 3485: 3483: 3481: 3466: 3460: 3459: 3457: 3455: 3441: 3435: 3434: 3432: 3430: 3407: 3401: 3400: 3398: 3396: 3376: 3370: 3369: 3367: 3365: 3353: 3347: 3346: 3334: 3328: 3327: 3325: 3323: 3308: 3302: 3301: 3287: 3281: 3280: 3278: 3276: 3259: 3253: 3252: 3250: 3248: 3237: 3226: 3220: 3219: 3206: 3200: 3199: 3197: 3195: 3181: 3175: 3172: 3158:Lay summary in: 3146: 3145: 3141: 3139: 3137: 3131: 3125:. Archived from 3124: 3115: 3104: 3103: 3101: 3099: 3074: 3068: 3067: 3061: 3056: 3054: 3046: 3044: 3042: 3037:on July 14, 2022 3027: 3021: 3020: 3014: 3006: 3000: 2999: 2997: 2995: 2980: 2974: 2973: 2971: 2969: 2947: 2941: 2938: 2924:Lay summary in: 2921: 2919: 2917: 2907: 2899: 2893: 2892: 2890: 2888: 2865: 2859: 2858: 2856: 2854: 2839: 2833: 2832: 2820: 2814: 2813: 2801: 2795: 2794: 2782: 2776: 2775: 2763: 2757: 2756: 2744: 2738: 2737: 2721: 2715: 2714: 2700: 2694: 2693: 2681: 2675: 2674: 2660: 2651: 2650: 2648: 2646: 2631: 2625: 2624: 2622: 2620: 2597: 2591: 2590: 2588: 2586: 2569: 2563: 2562: 2550: 2544: 2543: 2541: 2539: 2524: 2518: 2517: 2515: 2513: 2498: 2492: 2491: 2489: 2487: 2472: 2466: 2465: 2463: 2461: 2446: 2440: 2439: 2437: 2435: 2420: 2414: 2413: 2411: 2409: 2398: 2392: 2391: 2389: 2387: 2372: 2363: 2362: 2360: 2358: 2344: 2338: 2337: 2323: 2317: 2316: 2314: 2312: 2297: 2288: 2287: 2285: 2283: 2268: 2262: 2261: 2259: 2257: 2242: 2233: 2232: 2230: 2228: 2214: 2208: 2207: 2200: 2191: 2190: 2188: 2177: 2166: 2165: 2163: 2161: 2146: 2137: 2136: 2133:Business Insider 2124: 2113: 2112: 2110: 2108: 2093: 2087: 2086: 2072: 2066: 2065: 2063: 2061: 2045: 2039: 2038: 2024: 2018: 2017: 2015: 2013: 2001: 1995: 1994: 1992: 1990: 1973: 1967: 1966: 1964: 1962: 1947: 1941: 1940: 1938: 1936: 1919: 1913: 1912: 1910: 1908: 1891: 1885: 1884: 1878: 1876: 1871:on July 27, 2019 1857: 1851: 1850: 1848: 1846: 1826: 1820: 1819: 1817: 1815: 1804: 1795: 1794: 1792: 1790: 1773: 1767: 1766: 1764: 1762: 1745: 1739: 1738: 1736: 1734: 1719: 1713: 1712: 1710: 1708: 1697: 1691: 1690: 1688: 1686: 1681:. March 12, 2019 1671: 1665: 1664: 1662: 1660: 1651:. Archived from 1641: 1635: 1634: 1627: 1614: 1613: 1608:, archived from 1597: 1588: 1587: 1580: 1574: 1573: 1572: 1570: 1553: 1547: 1546: 1534: 1528: 1527: 1526: 1524: 1504: 1493: 1492: 1491: 1489: 1474: 1468: 1467: 1465: 1463: 1444: 1438: 1437: 1435: 1433: 1418: 1412: 1411: 1410:on May 13, 2023. 1409: 1402: 1394: 1388: 1387: 1376: 1370: 1369: 1367: 1365: 1355: 1347: 1125:On May 5, 2019, 1095: 995:Slippage concern 895: 683:Transport Canada 578:angles of attack 560: 481: 377: 361: 345: 271:Transport Canada 184: 177: 170: 86: 85: 71: 68: 62: 39: 31: 5859: 5858: 5854: 5853: 5852: 5850: 5849: 5848: 5819: 5818: 5817: 5812: 5726: 5722:Mike Zafirovski 5717:Thornton Wilson 5534: 5478: 5464:Boeing Jetfoils 5437: 5346: 5337: 5311: 5306: 5268: 5266: 5264:The Daily Beast 5251:The Air Current 5234: 5232: 5223: 5204:Washington Post 5189: 5186: 5184:Further reading 5140: 5135: 5134: 5124: 5122: 5112: 5103: 5101: 5097: 5087: 5085: 5075: 5071: 5058: 5057: 5053: 5043: 5041: 5031: 5027: 5012: 5008: 4993: 4989: 4980: 4979: 4975: 4965: 4963: 4951: 4942: 4935:The Air Current 4927: 4923: 4913: 4911: 4906: 4905: 4898: 4883: 4879: 4869: 4867: 4855: 4851: 4841: 4839: 4830: 4829: 4825: 4815: 4813: 4805: 4804: 4800: 4780: 4779: 4772: 4770: 4760: 4756: 4746: 4744: 4735: 4734: 4730: 4720: 4718: 4708: 4701: 4691: 4689: 4672: 4668: 4658: 4656: 4644: 4640: 4628: 4613:(Report). NASA 4607: 4603: 4594: 4593: 4589: 4576: 4575: 4571: 4561: 4559: 4542: 4538: 4528: 4526: 4514: 4510: 4500: 4498: 4489: 4488: 4484: 4474: 4472: 4469:The Air Current 4463: 4462: 4458: 4448: 4446: 4426: 4422: 4412: 4410: 4390: 4386: 4376: 4374: 4369: 4368: 4359: 4349: 4347: 4336: 4335: 4331: 4321: 4319: 4314: 4313: 4309: 4296: 4295: 4291: 4281: 4279: 4261: 4257: 4247: 4245: 4235: 4231: 4221: 4219: 4210: 4209: 4205: 4195: 4193: 4183: 4179: 4169: 4167: 4155: 4151: 4141: 4139: 4127: 4120: 4103: 4099: 4089: 4087: 4075: 4071: 4061: 4059: 4049: 4045: 4035: 4033: 4021: 4017: 4010:. October 2000. 4002: 3992: 3990: 3982: 3978: 3977: 3970: 3960: 3958: 3953: 3952: 3948: 3938: 3936: 3931: 3930: 3926: 3918: 3914: 3910: 3906: 3898: 3896: 3881: 3870: 3855: 3851: 3841: 3839: 3829: 3825: 3819:The Air Current 3813:Jon Ostrower; " 3812: 3803: 3794: 3793: 3784: 3774: 3772: 3761: 3760: 3756: 3747: 3746: 3742: 3732: 3730: 3721: 3720: 3716: 3706: 3704: 3703:. June 19, 2019 3695: 3694: 3687: 3677: 3675: 3670: 3669: 3665: 3655: 3653: 3633: 3629: 3621: 3615: 3614: 3610: 3600: 3598: 3595:The Air Current 3589: 3588: 3584: 3574: 3572: 3560: 3556: 3546: 3544: 3536: 3535: 3528: 3518: 3516: 3515:on June 2, 2022 3512: 3498: 3494: 3493: 3489: 3479: 3477: 3467: 3463: 3453: 3451: 3443: 3442: 3438: 3428: 3426: 3408: 3404: 3394: 3392: 3380:Tabucho, Hiroko 3377: 3373: 3363: 3361: 3354: 3350: 3335: 3331: 3321: 3319: 3318:. April 3, 2019 3310: 3309: 3305: 3288: 3284: 3274: 3272: 3260: 3256: 3246: 3244: 3227: 3223: 3216:Financial Times 3207: 3203: 3193: 3191: 3183: 3182: 3178: 3159: 3143: 3135: 3133: 3129: 3122: 3116: 3107: 3097: 3095: 3075: 3071: 3059: 3057: 3048: 3047: 3040: 3038: 3029: 3028: 3024: 3012: 3008: 3007: 3003: 2993: 2991: 2981: 2977: 2967: 2965: 2948: 2944: 2925: 2915: 2913: 2905: 2901: 2900: 2896: 2886: 2884: 2866: 2862: 2852: 2850: 2841: 2840: 2836: 2821: 2817: 2802: 2798: 2783: 2779: 2764: 2760: 2745: 2741: 2722: 2718: 2701: 2697: 2682: 2678: 2661: 2654: 2644: 2642: 2639:The Air Current 2633: 2632: 2628: 2618: 2616: 2598: 2594: 2584: 2582: 2570: 2566: 2551: 2547: 2537: 2535: 2525: 2521: 2511: 2509: 2508:. June 22, 2019 2500: 2499: 2495: 2485: 2483: 2473: 2469: 2459: 2457: 2447: 2443: 2433: 2431: 2422: 2421: 2417: 2407: 2405: 2400: 2399: 2395: 2385: 2383: 2382:. June 19, 2019 2374: 2373: 2366: 2356: 2354: 2352:Washington Post 2346: 2345: 2341: 2324: 2320: 2310: 2308: 2306:The Air Current 2298: 2291: 2281: 2279: 2269: 2265: 2255: 2253: 2244: 2243: 2236: 2226: 2224: 2216: 2215: 2211: 2202: 2201: 2194: 2186: 2178: 2169: 2159: 2157: 2148: 2147: 2140: 2125: 2116: 2106: 2104: 2102:The Air Current 2094: 2090: 2073: 2069: 2059: 2057: 2047: 2046: 2042: 2025: 2021: 2011: 2009: 2002: 1998: 1988: 1986: 1974: 1970: 1960: 1958: 1948: 1944: 1934: 1932: 1920: 1916: 1906: 1904: 1892: 1888: 1874: 1872: 1859: 1858: 1854: 1844: 1842: 1827: 1823: 1813: 1811: 1806: 1805: 1798: 1788: 1786: 1774: 1770: 1760: 1758: 1746: 1742: 1732: 1730: 1720: 1716: 1706: 1704: 1699: 1698: 1694: 1684: 1682: 1673: 1672: 1668: 1658: 1656: 1643: 1642: 1638: 1629: 1628: 1617: 1606:The Air Current 1598: 1591: 1582: 1581: 1577: 1568: 1566: 1554: 1550: 1535: 1531: 1522: 1520: 1505: 1496: 1487: 1485: 1475: 1471: 1461: 1459: 1446: 1445: 1441: 1431: 1429: 1426:The Air Current 1420: 1419: 1415: 1407: 1400: 1396: 1395: 1391: 1386:. July 1, 2020. 1378: 1377: 1373: 1363: 1361: 1353: 1349: 1348: 1344: 1339: 1329:stabilizer trim 1318:stabilizer trim 1304: 1291: 1273: 1215: 1198: 1150:angle of attack 1138: 1091: 1088: 1051: 1038:Angle of Attack 1034: 1032:Angle of attack 1017: 997: 977: 913: 871: 828: 801:stabilizer trim 797: 775:stabilizer trim 767: 722:buttons on the 692: 625: 602: 558: 515:built into the 509: 500:angle of attack 492: 467: 394: 389: 388: 387: 386: 385: 378: 370: 369: 362: 354: 353: 346: 327:angle of attack 288: 267:angle of attack 188: 159: 141: 136: 118: 115: 97: 72: 66: 63: 53: 40: 29: 19: 12: 11: 5: 5857: 5847: 5846: 5841: 5836: 5831: 5814: 5813: 5811: 5810: 5809: 5808: 5803: 5795: 5790: 5785: 5780: 5775: 5770: 5765: 5760: 5755: 5750: 5745: 5740: 5734: 5732: 5728: 5727: 5725: 5724: 5719: 5714: 5709: 5704: 5699: 5694: 5689: 5684: 5679: 5677:Brendan Nelson 5674: 5669: 5664: 5662:James McNerney 5659: 5657:John McDonnell 5654: 5649: 5644: 5639: 5634: 5629: 5624: 5619: 5614: 5609: 5604: 5602:Raymond Conner 5599: 5594: 5589: 5584: 5579: 5574: 5569: 5564: 5559: 5554: 5549: 5542: 5540: 5536: 5535: 5533: 5532: 5531: 5530: 5525: 5517: 5512: 5507: 5506: 5505: 5503:South Carolina 5500: 5495: 5486: 5484: 5480: 5479: 5477: 5476: 5471: 5466: 5461: 5456: 5451: 5445: 5443: 5439: 5438: 5436: 5435: 5430: 5425: 5420: 5415: 5410: 5405: 5400: 5395: 5390: 5385: 5380: 5378:Boeing Capital 5375: 5370: 5365: 5360: 5354: 5352: 5348: 5347: 5340: 5338: 5336: 5335: 5330: 5325: 5319: 5317: 5313: 5312: 5305: 5304: 5297: 5290: 5282: 5276: 5275: 5255: 5242: 5221: 5208: 5195: 5185: 5182: 5181: 5180: 5169: 5155: 5139: 5138:External links 5136: 5133: 5132: 5095: 5069: 5051: 5025: 5006: 4987: 4973: 4940: 4921: 4896: 4877: 4849: 4823: 4811:www.boeing.com 4798: 4754: 4728: 4699: 4666: 4638: 4601: 4587: 4569: 4536: 4508: 4482: 4456: 4420: 4384: 4357: 4329: 4307: 4289: 4269:The New Yorker 4255: 4229: 4203: 4177: 4149: 4118: 4097: 4069: 4043: 4015: 4013: 4012: 3989:. Boeing. 2000 3968: 3946: 3924: 3868: 3849: 3831:Brady, Chris. 3823: 3801: 3782: 3771:. May 10, 2019 3754: 3740: 3714: 3685: 3663: 3627: 3608: 3582: 3554: 3526: 3487: 3461: 3449:news.yahoo.com 3436: 3402: 3371: 3348: 3329: 3303: 3282: 3254: 3221: 3201: 3176: 3174: 3173: 3105: 3069: 3022: 3001: 2975: 2942: 2940: 2939: 2894: 2860: 2849:. May 29, 2019 2834: 2815: 2796: 2777: 2758: 2739: 2716: 2695: 2676: 2652: 2626: 2592: 2564: 2545: 2519: 2493: 2467: 2441: 2415: 2393: 2364: 2339: 2318: 2289: 2263: 2234: 2209: 2192: 2167: 2138: 2114: 2088: 2067: 2040: 2019: 1996: 1968: 1942: 1914: 1886: 1852: 1830:Gates, Dominic 1821: 1796: 1768: 1740: 1728:Bloomberg News 1714: 1692: 1666: 1636: 1615: 1589: 1575: 1548: 1529: 1494: 1469: 1439: 1413: 1389: 1371: 1341: 1340: 1338: 1335: 1333: 1332: 1321: 1313: 1303: 1300: 1290: 1287: 1272: 1269: 1220:stress testing 1214: 1211: 1197: 1194: 1137: 1134: 1087: 1084: 1050: 1047: 1033: 1030: 1016: 1013: 996: 993: 976: 973: 912: 909: 870: 867: 827: 824: 796: 793: 766: 763: 752:stress-testing 691: 688: 649:KC-46A Pegasus 624: 621: 601: 598: 517:Boeing 737 MAX 508: 505: 491: 488: 466: 463: 452: 451: 448: 445: 429:Satellite data 393: 390: 379: 372: 371: 363: 356: 355: 347: 340: 339: 338: 337: 336: 287: 284: 190: 189: 187: 186: 179: 172: 164: 161: 160: 158: 157: 152: 147: 137: 135: 134: 129: 124: 116: 114: 113: 108: 103: 94: 93: 91:Boeing 737 MAX 74: 73: 43: 41: 34: 17: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 5856: 5845: 5844:Software bugs 5842: 5840: 5837: 5835: 5832: 5830: 5827: 5826: 5824: 5807: 5804: 5802: 5799: 5798: 5796: 5794: 5791: 5789: 5786: 5784: 5781: 5779: 5776: 5774: 5771: 5769: 5766: 5764: 5761: 5759: 5756: 5754: 5751: 5749: 5746: 5744: 5741: 5739: 5736: 5735: 5733: 5729: 5723: 5720: 5718: 5715: 5713: 5710: 5708: 5705: 5703: 5700: 5698: 5697:Frank Shrontz 5695: 5693: 5690: 5688: 5685: 5683: 5682:Kelly Ortberg 5680: 5678: 5675: 5673: 5670: 5668: 5665: 5663: 5660: 5658: 5655: 5653: 5650: 5648: 5645: 5643: 5640: 5638: 5637:Larry Kellner 5635: 5633: 5630: 5628: 5625: 5623: 5620: 5618: 5615: 5613: 5610: 5608: 5605: 5603: 5600: 5598: 5595: 5593: 5590: 5588: 5585: 5583: 5580: 5578: 5575: 5573: 5570: 5568: 5567:John H. Biggs 5565: 5563: 5562:James A. Bell 5560: 5558: 5555: 5553: 5552:James Albaugh 5550: 5547: 5544: 5543: 5541: 5537: 5529: 5526: 5524: 5521: 5520: 5518: 5516: 5513: 5511: 5508: 5504: 5501: 5499: 5496: 5494: 5491: 5490: 5488: 5487: 5485: 5481: 5475: 5472: 5470: 5467: 5465: 5462: 5460: 5457: 5455: 5452: 5450: 5447: 5446: 5444: 5440: 5434: 5431: 5429: 5426: 5424: 5421: 5419: 5416: 5414: 5411: 5409: 5406: 5404: 5401: 5399: 5396: 5394: 5391: 5389: 5386: 5384: 5381: 5379: 5376: 5374: 5373:Boeing Canada 5371: 5369: 5366: 5364: 5361: 5359: 5356: 5355: 5353: 5349: 5344: 5334: 5331: 5329: 5326: 5324: 5321: 5320: 5318: 5314: 5310: 5303: 5298: 5296: 5291: 5289: 5284: 5283: 5280: 5265: 5261: 5256: 5252: 5248: 5243: 5230: 5226: 5222: 5218: 5214: 5209: 5205: 5201: 5196: 5192: 5188: 5187: 5177: 5176: 5170: 5166: 5165: 5160: 5156: 5153: 5149: 5148: 5142: 5141: 5121: 5117: 5116: 5110: 5099: 5084: 5080: 5073: 5065: 5061: 5055: 5040: 5036: 5029: 5021: 5017: 5010: 5002: 4998: 4991: 4983: 4977: 4962: 4961: 4956: 4949: 4947: 4945: 4936: 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Retrieved 1357: 1345: 1305: 1292: 1280:two-channel 1274: 1262: 1245: 1233: 1216: 1203: 1199: 1190: 1186:performance. 1184: 1182: 1178: 1171: 1163: 1157: 1155: 1126: 1124: 1117: 1106: 1102: 1093:AoA Disagree 1092: 1089: 1077: 1073: 1070: 1067: 1063:The Atlantic 1059: 1052: 1035: 1018: 1010: 1001:Radio-Canada 998: 978: 956: 948: 944: 925: 914: 898: 882: 880: 862: 858: 845: 840: 837: 829: 812: 804: 798: 785: 780: 768: 759: 756: 748: 740: 732: 708: 693: 680: 676: 672: 665: 653: 644: 642: 626: 618: 603: 589: 582: 563: 552: 544:stick pusher 537: 510: 484: 468: 460: 453: 438: 436:operations. 414: 323: 308: 300:stick shaker 297: 264: 228: 213:Because the 212: 199: 195: 193: 110: 64: 55:You can help 45: 15: 5577:John Bryson 5088:February 7, 4842:October 22, 4816:October 22, 4747:January 20, 4721:November 9, 3842:January 23, 3775:October 15, 3733:October 14, 2994:October 18, 2968:October 11, 2585:November 9, 2256:October 11, 2227:October 19, 2222:www.faa.gov 1452:rgl.faa.gov 1296:trim system 1207:trim system 1049:AoA sensors 991:mechanism. 733:Boeing CEO 638:aerodynamic 633:Test pilots 593:trim system 566:CFM LEAP-1B 533:type rating 490:Description 382:CFM LEAP-1B 5823:Categories 5627:Edgar Gott 5483:Facilities 5423:Spectrolab 5235:October 7, 5159:Vox Videos 4692:October 8, 4527:Retrieved 4449:August 27, 4413:August 27, 3678:August 22, 3601:October 9, 3060:|url= 2333:Al Jazeera 1488:January 3, 1337:References 1257:stabilizer 1229:Patrick Ky 963:trim wheel 952:trim wheel 936:trim wheel 921:trim wheel 905:trim wheel 889:stabilizer 832:trim wheel 816:737 MAX 10 728:trim wheel 608:standards 507:Background 471:anti-stall 380:737 MAX 9 319:Boeing 767 286:Background 67:April 2021 5622:Lynn Good 5548:(founder) 5519:Historic 5433:Wisk Aero 5393:Boeing UK 5316:Divisions 5193:. Boeing. 5083:The Verge 5064:Bloomberg 5039:The Verge 4966:August 2, 4741:SlashGear 4444:0362-4331 4408:0362-4331 4350:August 3, 4277:0028-792X 4170:August 4, 3961:March 14, 3651:0362-4331 3424:0362-4331 3395:March 21, 3364:March 26, 3208:See also 3093:0362-4331 2963:0362-4331 2882:0362-4331 2614:0362-4331 2481:The Verge 2311:March 14, 2206:. Boeing. 2107:March 14, 1845:March 19, 1789:March 21, 1761:March 13, 1703:. Reuters 1633:. Boeing. 1586:. 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