353:. Among else, they show under which conditions a principal can offer agents who collude under asymmetric information implementable collusion-proof contracts and how these contracts depend on their (non-)anonymity. They also show how the problem of collusion between agents in centralized organizations critically depends on the presence of limits to agents' communication, which creates a conflict between agents' participation and coalition incentive constraints, that "the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture", and how principals can design collusion-proof mechanisms when agents' valuations are correlated. Together with Antoine Faure-Grimaud, they also explore how the value of supervision with soft information depends on the tendency of supervisees and supervisors to collunder under asymmetric information, with centralized and decentralized settings resulting in the same outcome. Finally, Martimort and Denis Gromb study how to design optimal incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, with important implications for the organization of delegated expertise.
337:, Martimort, Bruno Biais and Jean-Charles Rochet develop a model that yields outcomes similar to those under imperfect competition, which however disappear as more competitors enter the market. Finally, in two studies with Lars Stole, Martimort shows that all common agency equilibria can be characterized by an extension of the taxation principle - the "delegation principle" - and how those equilibria are affected by direct externalities between principals under nonlinear price competition.
25:
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manufacturers' choice of common or exclusive retailers depends on the complementarity or substitutability of their brands, and government, where it is used to describe the shared control of entities by regulatory bodies as a set of competing contracts. Applying multi-principals and competing contracts to
361:
In his research on regulatory institutions, Martimort argues that they create a framework for the repeated interactions between an interest group and a regulatory agency, and may mitigate the risk of regulatory capture depending on their time preferences, information and transaction costs. These
382:
and the management of that infrastructure should be bundled or not, arguing that PPPs may be advantageous if there is a positive externality, the private benefits from asset ownership are not too large, and the risk of regulatory capture is limited. In subsequent research with
Elisabeth Iossa,
332:
fails to hold and only a weaker version - the equivalence principle - holds, with the results critically depending on the complementarity or substitutability of activities across principals. Martimort then applied multiprincipal incentive theory to supply chains, using it to explain why
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Martimort further extends the analysis of benefits and costs of public-private partnerships by allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard, and renegotiations as well as private or public financing.
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One key idea in
Martimort's research is the possibility of a common agent who contracts with multiple principals that each control one agent's activity. Martimort shows that in such a setting, the
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David
Martimort ranks 2nd out of 675 contract theorists registered on IDEAS/RePEc (after Jean Tirole). Retrieved January 2019.
100:
230:(PSE). Moreover, since 2012, Martimort has been the associated chair of the PSE. He has or has had editorial duties with the
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David
Martimort ranked 528th among 54192 economists registered on IDEAS/RePEc in January 2019. Retrieved January 20th, 2019.
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Estache, A., Martimort, D. (2000). Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions, and regulatory outcomes.
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268:
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Cercle des Ă©conomistes (May 25th, 2004). Prix du
Meilleur Jeune Économiste 2004. Retrieved January 20th, 2019.
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68:
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Profile of David
Martimort on the website of the Paris School of Economics. Retrieved January 20th, 2019.
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Martimort, D. (1999). The life cycle of regulatory agencies: Dynamic capture and transaction costs.
436:
CV of David
Martimort on the website of the Paris School of Economics. Retrieved January 20th, 2019.
378:(PPPs). Together with Jerome Pouyet, Martimort analyzes whether the construction of public service
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210:, of which he later became research director. After his agrégation, he held professorships at the
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989:"To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public–private partnerships"
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Martimort, D., Stole, L. (2003). Contractual externalities and common agency equilibria.
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316:. In terms of research output, he ranks among the top 1% of economists registered on
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general principles were then applied to the analysis of regulatory institutions in
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1020:"Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public-private partnerships"
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Profile of David
Martimort on the website of the Paris School of Economics
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Academic staff of the School for
Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences
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Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (2003).
554:"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory"
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146:. Martimort is one of the most highly cited researchers in the field of
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in economics. During his studies, he worked as a researcher at the
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655:"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games"
974:
Regulatory Policy in Latin
America: Post-Privatization Realities
889:"Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information"
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622:
Biais, Bruno; Martimort, David; Rochet, Jean-Charles (2000).
179:
374:
A more recent area in Martimort's research is the theory of
323:
1069:"The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships"
928:"Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise"
811:"Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior"
1127:
People associated with the Paris School of Economics
624:"Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment"
621:
394:
The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model.
850:"Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation"
1108:
993:International Journal of Industrial Organization
848:Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (2000).
847:
809:Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (1999).
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770:Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (1998).
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731:Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (1997).
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345:Another fertile area of Martimort's research is
251:International Journal of Industrial Organization
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300:David Martimort's research interests include
1147:Fellows of the European Economic Association
1067:Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David (2015).
1018:Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David (2012).
233:Journal of the European Economic Association
220:Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
198:. Later, in 1998, Martimort also earned his
166:on 8 May 1967. He originally studied at the
701:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (
182:in 1992; his Ph.D. thesis, an analysis of
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987:Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome (2008).
678:
593:"The multiprincipal nature of government"
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551:
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324:Multiprincipal and common agency settings
204:National Institute for Agronomic Research
120:Learn how and when to remove this message
733:"Collusion Under Asymmetric Information"
926:Gromb, Denis; Martimort, David (2007).
653:Martimort, David; Stole2, Lars (2002).
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519:"Multi-principaux avec anti-selection"
396:Princeton: Princeton University Press.
392:Laffont, J.-J., Martimort, D. (2009).
356:
718:B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
349:, which he extensively explored with
212:University of Pau and Pays de l'Adour
523:Annales d'Économie et de Statistique
150:. His research has been awarded the
18:
472:"Fellows | The Econometric Society"
13:
1142:Fellows of the Econometric Society
14:
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1095:
1073:Journal of Public Economic Theory
282:Best Young French Economist Award
152:Best Young French Economist Award
1036:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x
278:Institut Universitaire de France
226:(2007–10) and since 2010 at the
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284:(2004), and fellowships in the
170:(1986–89), but then obtained a
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893:The Review of Economic Studies
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218:(2000–07), before joining the
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776:The RAND Journal of Economics
671:10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345
558:The RAND Journal of Economics
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286:European Economic Association
50:secondary or tertiary sources
609:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00079-8
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224:Toulouse School of Economics
162:David Martimort was born in
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144:Toulouse School of Economics
56:, especially if potentially
34:biography of a living person
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376:public-private partnerships
370:Public-private partnerships
310:public-private partnerships
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54:must be removed immediately
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1137:École Polytechnique alumni
959:Review of Economic Studies
932:Journal of Economic Theory
772:"Collusion and Delegation"
476:www.econometricsociety.org
274:Revue d'Economie Politique
257:Journal of Economic Theory
239:Review of Economic Studies
944:10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.003
591:Martimort, David (1996).
552:Martimort, David (1996).
517:Martimort, David (1992).
263:RAND Journal of Economics
228:Paris School of Economics
905:10.1111/1467-937X.000244
597:European Economic Review
366:(with Antonio Estache).
866:10.1111/1468-0262.00111
640:10.1111/1468-0262.00138
222:(EHESS), first at the
216:University of Toulouse
192:asymmetric information
178:(1990), followed by a
176:University of Toulouse
48:Please help by adding
961:, 66(4), pp. 929-947.
269:Theoretical Economics
142:and Professor at the
351:Jean-Jacques Laffont
330:revelation principle
214:(1998-2000) and the
196:Jean-Jacques Laffont
194:, was written under
357:Regulatory agencies
290:Econometric Society
168:École Polytechnique
37:relies too much on
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314:public procurement
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335:financial markets
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481:2021-03-24
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401:References
272:, and the
200:agrégation
188:principals
80:newspapers
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347:collusion
341:Collusion
174:from the
158:Biography
154:in 2004.
140:economist
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296:Research
206:and the
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535:JSTOR
180:Ph.D.
135:is a
101:JSTOR
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304:and
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