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favourable aspect. After an undetermined time, the signal changed to a single yellow 'caution' aspect. The train proceeded forward to Signal No. 110 and was again held. The signal post telephone was not working on either slow or fast up line signals. The fireman eventually contacted
Signalman Sutton via down slow line's telephone, and was again instructed to wait for a favourable aspect. The signal had changed to single yellow and the driver had released the brakes when the collision occurred.
311:
explained, to understand the seriousness and severity of the accident. At 6:19 PM Porter Leigh at
Winsford Station called Coppenhall Junction signal box about the overdue local train. Signalman Sutton told the porter about the accident and that wasn't sure of the location beyond it being near a former station, Minshull Vernon, and that he didn't think the accident was serious. After completing the call, Porter Leigh called emergency services at 6:34 PM.
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his speed, as had been common practice on steam locomotives. It was noted that various differences in how steam locomotives and diesel locomotives that would make doing this in practice much trickier and that efforts should be made to improve driver usage of speedometers. The report recommended that the 10 mile per hour marking be labeled on speedometers.
213:, D215, with 13 coaches and 500 passengers, was stopped at a signal but the driver found the telephone to Coppenhall Junction, the next signal box ahead, out of order. Seeing the next signal ahead he decided to proceed down towards it and use the telephone there, but too fast. In the darkness he failed to notice the 16:45 express from
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Junction signal box, and placed another call to emergency services at 6:45 PM to clarify the location of the accident, and request the full emergency procedure be implemented. He was not aware of the severity of the accident at the time, and only became aware when he arrived at the accident scene shortly after 7:00 PM.
371:"can see or ascertain that the line is clear". It was the opinion of the investigation that a driver can't see the line is clear in darkness or fog. At the time of the accident it was dark. It was recommended that the rule be expanded and clarified the circumstances where it was permissible to pass the signal.
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The report was troubled by the length of time between the initial report of the accident at 6:05 PM and the first call to emergency services at 6:34 PM, which failed to convey the severity of the incident, followed by a subsequent call at 6:45 to clarify the location of the accident. Fire service and
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At the time, British Rail was still utilizing oil tail lamps, which while visible from a distance of up to 400 yards (370 m) was also difficult to observe in the bright light of newly installed colour light signals. It was remarked on how despite the developments in locomotives, and illumination
357:
The investigation suspected that Driver
Russell either misread the speedometer, which did not have an marks between 0 and 10 miles per hour and the 10 mile per hour mark was not labelled, with the first labelled mark being at 20 miles per hour, or did not use the speedometer and attempted to estimate
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Station Master Staley was made aware of the accident by a track worker, sent by
Signalman Sutton at his house near the station. The Station Master Staley went to the station attempted to contact the Traffic Control Office by telephone, but was unable as their line was busy. He proceeded to Coppenhall
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The other issue was the vagueness of the rule which allowed a driver to pass a red signal, when the driver can't communicate with the signalman and the driver can "can see or ascertain that the line is clear to the next stop signal". The wording of the rule left interpretation as to what constituted
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At 5:51 PM, the Mid-day Scot passed
Winsford Station Box. Signal No. 114 was displayed 'Danger' due to the Birmingham train being held ahead at Signal No. 110. Fireman McCallum attempted to use the telephone on Signal No. 114 and No. 116 but found they were not working. Driver Russell then attempted
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Driver
Hedgcock of the Birmingham train called the signalman via the signal post telephone at Down Fast signal No. 101 and requested ambulances, stating there were "bodies and injured people on the line" and for help to be urgently sent to the scene. Signalman Sutton failed, for reasons never fully
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The report also noted that two staff failed to identify an electrification telephone beside the crash scene. The telephone automatically calls the railway electrical control room and is intended for electric staff, Both train crew members walked past it in search of a telephone, a third knew of it
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At 6:01 the Mid-day Scot rear-ended the stationary
Birmingham train. The inquest estimated based on damage to rail vehicles, time taken to travel between known points such as Winsford Signal Box, and track circuit activation, to be travelling at 20 miles per hour (32 km/h). Driver Russell was
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The investigation also put focus on railway rules and tail lamps. Rule 55 contained two sets of language that the investigation identified as leaving the door open to this accident occurring. The first was driver training be improved with more emphasis on using speedometers in diesel and electric
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The report considered but ultimately did recommended against the inclusion of powerful headlamps on locomotives to illuminate obstructions. This was not recommended due to issues lights blinding drivers of passing trains, and excessive curves on the railway network reducing the effectiveness of
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Emergency services had difficulty in locating the accident site. Signalman Sutton while informed of what signal the train accident occurred at had no way of knowing the actual location of that signal. With distances between signal boxes was increasing as railway signal modernisation; the report
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At 5:26 PM, the
Birmingham train passed Winsford Station signal box. The signalman observed the tail lamp illuminated and average intensity. The train was first held at Signal No. 114, and the driver made contact via signal post telephone with Signalman Sutton, who required him to wait until a
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Driver
Russell recalled a supplemental instruction on electrified lines that required them to make contact with the signalman. Russell later stated that the line ahead looked clear to Signal No. 110, the next signal, so he elected to proceed forward at 5–6 miles per hour (8.0–9.7 km/h).
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The location consisted of a pair of fast and slow main lines, two in the 'Up' direction (towards Crewe) and 'Down' direction (towards
Liverpool). The signals in the area were mainly automatic four aspect colour light signals, and all lines were equipped with
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technology including railway signals, the oil tail lamp had changed little in a century and that it was time to move on to an electric tail lamp, given the fact the tail lamp was the last line of defence against a rear end collision.
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headlamps. Also considered was the inclusion of wireless telephone or radio to enable a driver to contact the signalman from the cab, owing to rareness of failure of telephones, and the cost of implementing the system.
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The collision killed 18 passengers; 33 other passengers and one railwayman, the guard of the Birmingham train, were seriously injured. All these casualties were in the two rear coaches of the Liverpool train, which were
66:
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At the time of this accident, headlamps on trains were intended to communicate information about the type of train (slow freight, express passenger, local freight, etc) and not intended to illuminate the tracks
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locomotives, instead of attempting to estimate speeds. Drivers also should be trained in 'stop and proceed', with hands on driving of a train under 'stop and proceed' rules to better instill the skill and rule.
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insistent through the inquiry, in multiple interviews, that the train never reached this speed, even when presented with evidence agreeing with the roughly 20 miles per hour (32 km/h) speed.
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recommended that either signal boxes should have diagrams with all signals in their territory marked or maps with signal locations and numbers be provided to emergency service control centers.
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The fire and ambulance had located the scene due to a phone call placed by Ticket Collector Mulhearn of the Mid-day Scot, who had gone to a farm and placed a call via their telephone.
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Passing motorists aligned their cars so that their headlights illuminated the scene, to aid rescuers. The cattle-shed at a nearby farm was used as a temporary mortuary.
221:, hauled by an electric locomotive with eight coaches with 300 passengers, standing on the line ahead and collided with it at about 20 mph (32 km/h).
497:
Report on the Collision that occurred on 26th December 1962 between Winsford station and Coppenhall Junction in the London Midland Region of British Railways
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ambulance that had arrived on the scene around 7:00 PM had been made aware of the location by telephone call placed by ticket collector at a local farm.
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272:. The area was overseen by Coppenhall Junction Signal Box, staffed by Signalman Sutton at the time of the collision. The area also had
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had caused points to become frozen and trains were being detained at signals. About midway between Winsford and Crewe, the 13:30
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256:, D215, with air brakes on the locomotive and vacuum brakes on the thirteen coaches. All coaches were connected with
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but elected to not use it. The report suggested that train staff be instructed to use these phones in an emergency.
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investigation in to the accident was led by colonel D. McMullen, who submitted his report in June 1963.
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The report does not specify what locomotive type this was beyond an 'electric locomotive'.
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The accident had been cleared away and all lines reopened at 2:10 on 27 December.
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The report doesn't provide any further information on the coaches of this train.
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233:. The final two cars of this train telescoped. The seventh carriage was a 1959
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The 4:45 PM Birmingham train consisted of an electric locomotive hauling eight
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260:. The train was operated by Driver Russell, with fireman McCallum.
245:. The train was operated by Driver Hedgcock, with fireman Kelly.
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289:to use the telephones with no success either.
503:. London: HMSO for the Ministry of Transport.
567:Railway accidents and incidents in Cheshire
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582:December 1962 events in the United Kingdom
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577:1962 disasters in the United Kingdom
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188:On the evening of 26 December 1962,
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16:1962 disaster in the United Kingdom
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572:Railway accident deaths in England
241:. All coaches were connected with
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248:The 1:30 PM Glasgow-Euston was a
181:List of UK rail accidents by year
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276:and electrification telephones.
353:Driver conduct and speedometers
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517:. 24 February 2022. Channel 5.
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429:
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254:English Electric type 4 diesel
211:English Electric type 4 diesel
94:Coppenhall Junction rail crash
24:Coppenhall Junction rail crash
1:
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56:Coppenhall Junction, Cheshire
337:after a coupling fractured.
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562:Train collisions in England
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515:The Big Freeze: Winter '63
237:and the eighth was a 1960
557:Railway accidents in 1962
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494:McMullen, Col D (1963).
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280:Lead up to the collision
270:Automatic Warning System
274:overhead line equipment
137:Signal passed at danger
306:Post accident response
347:Ministry of Transport
239:Corridor Second Brake
219:Birmingham New Street
215:Liverpool Lime Street
190:cold weather and snow
118:West Coast Main Line
539:. pp. 275–277.
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83:53.1684°N 2.4778°W
258:buckeye couplings
243:buckeye couplings
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46:26 December 1962
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127:British Railways
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235:Open Second
86: /
61:Coordinates
551:Categories
535:. London:
444:References
375:Tail lamps
335:telescoped
328:Casualties
200:to London
156:Passengers
143:Statistics
92: (
70:53°10′06″N
537:Pan Books
531:(1976) .
529:Rolt, LTC
73:2°28′40″W
123:Operator
53:Location
172:Injured
110:England
107:Country
38:Details
436:ahead.
202:Euston
164:Deaths
148:Trains
501:(PDF)
405:Notes
194:Crewe
133:Cause
48:18:01
268:and
159:~800
115:Line
43:Date
217:to
553::
452:^
175:34
167:18
151:2
96:)
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