82:
839:(empirical, that is, matters of observation interpreted using terms from a framework). The "external" questions were also of two types: those that were confused pseudo-questions ("one disguised in the form of a theoretical question") and those that could be re-interpreted as practical, pragmatic questions about whether a framework under consideration was "more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended". The adjective "synthetic" was not used by Carnap in his 1950 work
4834:
5973:
3301:
5983:
554:. However, they did not believe that any complex metaphysics, such as the type Kant supplied, are necessary to explain our knowledge of mathematical truths. Instead, the logical positivists maintained that our knowledge of judgments like "all bachelors are unmarried" and our knowledge of mathematics (and logic) are in the basic sense the same: all proceeded from our knowledge of the meanings of terms or the conventions of language.
3311:
5998:
1022:, countered the arguments of "Two Dogmas" directly by trying to define analyticity non-circularly on the syntactical features of sentences. Chomsky himself critically discussed Quine's conclusion, arguing that it is possible to identify some analytic truths (truths of meaning, not truths of facts) which are determined by specific relations holding among some innate conceptual features of the mind or brain.
1012:. While the first four sections of Quine's paper concern analyticity, the last two concern a-priority. Putnam considers the argument in the two last sections as independent of the first four, and at the same time as Putnam criticizes Quine, he also emphasizes his historical importance as the first top-rank philosopher to both reject the notion of a-priority and sketch a methodology without it.
5260:
4822:
955:
question "What does it mean?" asked of one of them is the true answer to the same question asked of the other. They also draw the conclusion that discussion about correct or incorrect translations would be impossible given Quine's argument. Four years after Grice and
Strawson published their paper, Quine's book
369:
contradiction, the required predicate" (A7/B12). In analytic propositions, the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. Thus, to know an analytic proposition is true, one need merely examine the concept of the subject. If one finds the predicate contained in the subject, the judgment is true.
173:
As with the previous examples classified as analytic propositions, each of these new statements is an affirmative subject–predicate judgment. However, in none of these cases does the subject concept contain the predicate concept. The concept "bachelor" does not contain the concept "alone"; "alone" is
178:
of "bachelor". The same is true for "creatures with hearts" and "have kidneys"; even if every creature with a heart also has kidneys, the concept "creature with a heart" does not contain the concept "has kidneys". So the philosophical issue is: What kind of statement is "Language is used to transmit
910:
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. ... Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some
830:
was a strong proponent of the distinction between what he called "internal questions", questions entertained within a "framework" (like a mathematical theory), and "external questions", questions posed outside any framework – posed before the adoption of any framework. The "internal" questions
620:
These definitions applied to all propositions, regardless of whether they were of subject–predicate form. Thus, under these definitions, the proposition "It is raining or it is not raining" was classified as analytic, while for Kant it was analytic by virtue of its logical form. And the proposition
562:
knowledge is based on experience, this assertion had to include knowledge in mathematics. On the other hand, we believed that with respect to this problem the rationalists had been right in rejecting the old empiricist view that the truth of "2+2=4" is contingent on the observation of facts, a view
493:
and so on. He had a strong emphasis on formality, in particular formal definition, and also emphasized the idea of substitution of synonymous terms. "All bachelors are unmarried" can be expanded out with the formal definition of bachelor as "unmarried man" to form "All unmarried men are unmarried",
466:
propositions, and that we know them. That they are synthetic, he thought, is obvious: the concept "equal to 12" is not contained within the concept "7 + 5"; and the concept "straight line" is not contained within the concept "the shortest distance between two points". From this, Kant concluded that
1050:
It is only when these two theses are accepted that Quine's argument holds. It is not a problem that the notion of necessity is presupposed by the notion of analyticity if necessity can be explained without analyticity. According to Soames, both theses were accepted by most philosophers when Quine
976:
argues that from the difficulties encountered in trying to explicate analyticity by appeal to specific criteria, it does not follow that the notion itself is void. Considering the way that we would test any proposed list of criteria, which is by comparing their extension to the set of analytic
926:
To summarize Quine's argument, the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, but establishing synonymy inevitably leads to matters of fact – synthetic propositions. Thus, there is no non-circular (and so no tenable) way to ground the notion of analytic propositions.
372:
Thus, for example, one need not consult experience to determine whether "All bachelors are unmarried" is true. One need merely examine the subject concept ("bachelors") and see if the predicate concept "unmarried" is contained in it. And in fact, it is: "unmarried" is part of the definition of
954:
about synonyms leads to a skepticism about meaning. If statements can have meanings, then it would make sense to ask "What does it mean?". If it makes sense to ask "What does it mean?", then synonymy can be defined as follows: Two sentences are synonymous if and only if the true answer of the
567:'s conception, consisted in asserting the thesis of empiricism only for factual truth. By contrast, the truths of logic and mathematics are not in need of confirmation by observations, because they do not state anything about the world of facts, they hold for any possible combination of facts.
368:
involves arguing that there is no problem figuring out how knowledge of analytic propositions is possible. To know an analytic proposition, Kant argued, one need not consult experience. Instead, one needs merely to take the subject and "extract from it, in accordance with the principle of
69:) have questioned whether there is even a clear distinction to be made between propositions which are analytically true and propositions which are synthetically true. Debates regarding the nature and usefulness of the distinction continue to this day in contemporary
895:" in which he argued that the analytic–synthetic distinction is untenable. The argument at bottom is that there are no "analytic" truths, but all truths involve an empirical aspect. In the first paragraph, Quine takes the distinction to be the following:
337:
Kant posits the third type as obviously self-contradictory. Ruling it out, he discusses only the remaining three types as components of his epistemological framework—each, for brevity's sake, becoming, respectively, "analytic", "synthetic
1007:
by putting synonyms for synonyms is near Kant's account of analytic truth as a truth whose negation is a contradiction. Analytic truth defined as a truth confirmed no matter what, however, is closer to one of the traditional accounts of
606:(While the logical positivists believed that the only necessarily true propositions were analytic, they did not define "analytic proposition" as "necessarily true proposition" or "proposition that is true in all possible worlds".)
988:
It seems to me there is as gross a distinction between 'All bachelors are unmarried' and 'There is a book on this table' as between any two things in this world, or at any rate, between any two linguistic expressions in the
852:
The notion of a synthetic truth is of something that is true both because of what it means and because of the way the world is, whereas analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. Thus, what Carnap calls internal
150:
within the subject concept. The concept "bachelor" contains the concept "unmarried"; the concept "unmarried" is part of the definition of the concept "bachelor". Likewise, for "triangle" and "has three sides", and so on.
384:
analytic propositions. It follows, second: There is no problem understanding how we can know analytic propositions; we can know them because we only need to consult our concepts in order to determine that they are true.
915:
reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of
930:
While Quine's rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction is widely known, the precise argument for the rejection and its status is highly debated in contemporary philosophy. However, some (for example,
582:
Thus the logical positivists drew a new distinction, and, inheriting the terms from Kant, named it the "analytic-synthetic distinction". They provided many different definitions, such as the following:
106:(1781/1998, A6–7/B10–11). There, he restricts his attention to statements that are affirmative subject–predicate judgments and defines "analytic proposition" and "synthetic proposition" as follows:
1051:
published "Two Dogmas". Today, however, Soames holds both statements to be antiquated. He says: "Very few philosophers today would accept either , both of which now seem decidedly antique."
865:, but some external statements also could be "synthetic" statements and Carnap would be doubtful about their status. The analytic–synthetic argument therefore is not identical with the
5834:
409:
propositions is possible. This question is exceedingly important, Kant maintains, because all scientific knowledge (for him
Newtonian physics and mathematics) is made up of synthetic
58:. Analytic propositions are true or not true solely by virtue of their meaning, whereas synthetic propositions' truth, if any, derives from how their meaning relates to the world.
255:
The justification of these propositions does not depend upon experience: one need not consult experience to determine whether all bachelors are unmarried, nor whether
236:: a proposition whose justification does rely upon experience. The proposition is validated by, and grounded in, experience. Therefore, it is logically contingent.
726:. The thing picked out by the primary intension of "water" could have been otherwise. For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take "water" to mean
1475:
The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association
563:
that would lead to the unacceptable consequence that an arithmetical statement might possibly be refuted tomorrow by new experiences. Our solution, based upon
100:
uses the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" to divide propositions into two types. Kant introduces the analytic–synthetic distinction in the
Introduction to his
65:, it was revised considerably over time, and different philosophers have used the terms in very different ways. Furthermore, some philosophers (starting with
977:
statements, it would follow that any explication of what analyticity means presupposes that we already have at our disposal a working notion of analyticity.
538:'s extended sense of "analytic". Hence logical empiricists are not subject to Kant's criticism of Hume for throwing out mathematics along with metaphysics.
668:? Two-dimensionalism provides an analysis of the semantics of words and sentences that makes sense of this possibility. The theory was first developed by
230:
rely upon experience. Moreover, the proposition can be validated by experience, but is not grounded in experience. Therefore, it is logically necessary.
373:"bachelor" and so is contained within it. Thus the proposition "All bachelors are unmarried" can be known to be true without consulting experience.
259:. (Of course, as Kant would grant, experience is required to understand the concepts "bachelor", "unmarried", "7", "+" and so forth. However, the
3995:
878:
440:
Over a hundred years later, a group of philosophers took interest in Kant and his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions: the
3952:
2263:
1513:
Reprinted in W.V.O. Quine, From a
Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, 1953; second, revised, edition 1961) On-line versions at
660:. It is intended to resolve a puzzle that has plagued philosophy for some time, namely: How is it possible to discover empirically that a
2122:
550:
The logical positivists agreed with Kant that we have knowledge of mathematical truths, and further that mathematical propositions are
6011:
526:
Thanks to Frege's logical semantics, particularly his concept of analyticity, arithmetic truths like "7+5=12" are no longer synthetic
4614:
4051:
510:". Using this particular expanded idea of analyticity, Frege concluded that Kant's examples of arithmetical truths are analytical
5317:
4280:
1376:
3347:
882:
207:, Kant contrasts his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions with another distinction, the distinction between
5284:
722:, i.e., is the idea or method by which we find its referent. The primary intension of "water" might be a description, such as
4451:
3962:
3314:
2470:
1992:
1573:
849:: a sentence that is true, but not simply because "the semantical rules of the system suffice for establishing its truth".
1420:
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4916:
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935:) argue that Quine's rejection of the distinction is still widely accepted among philosophers, even if for poor reasons.
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pointed out that Quine's circularity argument needs two of the logical positivists' central theses to be effective:
6043:
6006:
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950:
criticized "Two Dogmas" in their 1956 article "In
Defense of a Dogma". Among other things, they argue that Quine's
811:
O, but given that it is true, it cannot be false. It would be absurd to claim that something that is water is not H
708:
494:
which is recognizable as tautologous and therefore analytic from its logical form: any statement of the form "All
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Each of these statements is an affirmative subject–predicate judgment, and, in each, the predicate concept is
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statements the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its
792:
If two-dimensionalism is workable it solves some very important problems in the philosophy of language.
346:" propositions. This triad accounts for all propositions possible. Examples of analytic and examples of
6058:
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5668:
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propositions are true, he argues, then metaphysics as a discipline is impossible. The remainder of the
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477:'s notion of analyticity included a number of logical properties and relations beyond containment:
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analytic propositions – propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact.
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This quote is found with a discussion of the differences between Carnap and
Wittgenstein in
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1993:
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/boghossian/papers/AnalyticityReconsidered.html
1487:
Willard v.O. Quine (1951). "Main Trends in Recent
Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism".
1077:
719:
645:
641:
482:
47:
5688:
2050:
1776:
Donald
Davidson; Gilbert Harman, eds. (1973). "Analytic/Synthetic and Semantic Theory".
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1103:
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world, whatever that world happens to be. So if we assign "water" the primary intension
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1298:"§51 A first sketch of the pragmatic roots of Carnap's analytic-synthetic distinction"
906:
Quine's position denying the analytic–synthetic distinction is summarized as follows:
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2006:
1939:
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1004:
43:
20:
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attempting to demonstrate that Kant's epistemology was compatible with
Lutheranism.
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of the propositions. Once we have the concepts, experience is no longer necessary.)
42:
to distinguish between propositions (in particular, statements that are affirmative
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602:: a proposition that is made true (or false) solely by the conventions of language
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1914:'Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis
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169:"All bodies are heavy": that is, they experience a gravitational force. (A7/B11)
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1027:
Philosophical
Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis
947:
861:
statements) could be taken as being also synthetic truths because they require
677:
673:
625:" was classified as analytic, while under Kant's definitions it was synthetic.
5588:
879:
Willard Van Orman Quine § Rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction
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1886:
Cipriani, Enrico (2017). "Chomsky on analytic and necessary propositions".
1740:
Leonard Linsky (October 1970). "Analytical/Synthetic and Semantic Theory".
1348:
1030:
1019:
1015:
564:
462:
Kant maintained that mathematical propositions such as these are synthetic
182:
113:: a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept
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propositions. That leaves only the question of how knowledge of synthetic
401:
propositions, Kant also explains how we can obtain knowledge of synthetic
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2059:"Chapter 14: Ontology, Analyticity and Meaning: The Quine-Carnap Dispute"
1363:
Supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic
973:
793:
696:
653:
451:
knowledge involved the examination of mathematical propositions, such as
3973:
1761:
1611:
H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson (April 1956). "In Defense of a Dogma".
376:
It follows from this, Kant argued, first: All analytic propositions are
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458:"The shortest distance between two points is a straight line." (B16–17)
39:
4833:
2241:
2137:
Sloman, Aaron (1965-10-01). "'Necessary', 'a priori' and 'analytic'".
672:, but it has been advocated by numerous philosophers since, including
590:: a proposition whose truth depends solely on the meaning of its terms
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5578:
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5149:
5010:
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1676:
Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume 3, Realism and Reason
715:
637:
545:
397:
propositions, and explaining how we can obtain knowledge of analytic
35:
1822:
1624:
1589:
1500:
1401:
1177:
1164:(1949-01-06). "A Proof That Synthetic A Priori Propositions Exist".
785:
O. When considered according to its secondary intension, "Water is H
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5070:
4466:
4184:
3682:
765:
in this world. The secondary intension of "water" in our world is H
542:(Here "logical empiricist" is a synonym for "logical positivist".)
490:
486:
478:
154:
Examples of synthetic propositions, on Kant's definition, include:
2183:
1976:
1846:"Where Things Stand Now with the Analytical/Synthetic Distinction"
1059:
This distinction was imported from philosophy into theology, with
127:
Examples of analytic propositions, on Kant's definition, include:
5924:
5513:
5134:
5065:
4164:
3662:
1809:
Willard v O Quine (February 2, 1967). "On a Suggestion of Katz".
5295:
2042:. Trans. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Cambridge University Press .
5906:
4972:
4231:
3776:
3325:
2064:. In David John Chalmers; David Manley; Ryan Wasserman (eds.).
535:
423:
is devoted to examining whether and how knowledge of synthetic
413:
propositions. If it is impossible to determine which synthetic
142:"All bodies are extended": that is, they occupy space. (A7/B11)
5164:
4879:
3876:
3522:
2184:"Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1775:
1108:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition)
665:
2045:
Rey, Georges. (2003). "The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction".
1003:
Analytic truth defined as a true statement derivable from a
902:
synthetic propositions – propositions grounded in fact.
745:
of "water" is whatever thing "water" happens to pick out in
357:
297:: any justification of them would require one's experience.
5663:
5124:
4110:
1726:
Putnam, Hilary, "'Two dogmas' revisited." In Gilbert Ryle,
1422:
Meaning and Necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic
883:
Two Dogmas of Empiricism § Analyticity and circularity
649:
447:
Part of Kant's examination of the possibility of synthetic
2066:
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology
1703:
Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Mind, Language and Reality
1046:
Analyticity is needed to explain and legitimate necessity.
730:, but, where the chemical make-up of watery stuff is not H
1610:
354:
propositions he gives those in mathematics and physics.
4848:
2020:
Glock, Hans-Johann; Gluer, Kathrin; Keil, Geert (2003).
961:
was released. In the book Quine presented his theory of
1365:, enlarged edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956).
1273:
Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein
435:
308:
distinction together yield four types of propositions:
267:
distinction as employed here by Kant refers not to the
1987:
Boghossian, Paul. (1996). "Analyticity Reconsidered".
984:
argues that Quine is attacking two different notions:
921:
Willard V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", p. 64
2113:(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). <
1571:
596:: a proposition that is true (or false) by definition
572:
Rudolf Carnap, "Autobiography": §10: Semantics, p. 64
2051:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic
1998:
843:. Carnap did define a "synthetic truth" in his work
1649:
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language
362:Part of Kant's argument in the Introduction to the
2123:"The return of the analytic-synthetic distinction"
1486:
546:The origin of the logical positivist's distinction
350:statements have already been given, for synthetic
2105:Quine, W. V. (1951). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".
1968:
1808:
1540:"Chapter 2: W.V. Quine: Two dogmas of empiricism"
1537:
577:
388:
219:propositions. He defines these terms as follows:
6030:
1928:There are several earlier versions of this work.
1258:
1974:
1645:
1374:
1198:
2019:
1843:
1739:
1679:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 87–97.
1328:For a fuller explanation see Chalmers, David.
5311:
4864:
3989:
3341:
2257:
2233:
2109:, Vol.60, No.1, pp. 20–43. Reprinted in
2056:
1699:
1672:
1449:
1418:
1346:
1237:. Open Court Publishing Company. p. 64.
609:Synthetic propositions were then defined as:
393:After ruling out the possibility of analytic
2120:
2082:
1907:
753:then the secondary intension of "water" is H
683:Any given sentence, for example, the words,
123:contained in its subject concept but related
61:While the distinction was first proposed by
2087:. In John Lachs; Robert B. Talisse (eds.).
1916:. Princeton University Press. p. 360.
1402:"Rudolf Carnap: §3. Analytic and Synthetic"
1399:
1149:
807:, since we had to discover that water was H
300:The analytic–synthetic distinction and the
119:: a proposition whose predicate concept is
5318:
5304:
4871:
4857:
3996:
3982:
3348:
3334:
2264:
2250:
1565:
1228:
558:Since empiricism had always asserted that
4652:
4615:Relationship between religion and science
4003:
1955:
1940:"Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?"
1937:
1903:
1901:
1652:. Cambridge University Press. p. 5.
1459:Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
1304:. Harvard University Press. pp. 101
1295:
644:. It is a theory of how to determine the
358:The ease of knowing analytic propositions
226:: a proposition whose justification does
161:"All creatures with hearts have kidneys."
91:
5835:Fundamental theory of Catholic canon law
1991:, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 360–391. <
1885:
1879:
1730:Stocksfield: Oriel Press, 1976, 202–213.
1706:. Harvard University Press. p. 36.
1342:
1340:
1338:
1332:. Oxford UP: 1996. Chapter 2, section 4.
1201:"The epistemic challenge to antirealism"
1160:
80:
2540:
2271:
2047:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1981:The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1720:
1693:
1604:
1425:(2nd ed.). University of Chicago.
1412:
1368:
1322:
1251:
822:
6031:
2136:
2115:http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
1898:
1733:
1666:
1639:
1531:
1480:
1221:
430:
5299:
4852:
3977:
3329:
2245:
2232:
1910:"Evaluating the circularity argument"
1837:
1802:
1572:Paul Artin Boghossian (August 1996).
1443:
1393:
1349:"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
1335:
1275:. Open Court Publishing. p. 29.
1126:
1124:
872:
835:(or analytic, or logically true) and
734:O, it is not the case that water is H
628:
2170:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
2091:. Psychology Press. pp. 36–39.
2089:American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia
1975:Baehr, Jason S. (October 18, 2006).
1452:"Does ontology rest upon a mistake?"
1132:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1104:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
616:: a proposition that is not analytic
436:Frege revision of Kantian definition
5997:
5763:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
5046:Analytic and synthetic propositions
4917:Formal semantics (natural language)
2215:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
2203:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2189:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2175:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2022:Fifty Years of Quine's "Two dogmas"
1728:Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy.
1406:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1353:Revue Internationale de Philosophie
1289:
1192:
1136:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
857:statements (as opposed to internal
841:Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
19:For the linguistic categories, see
13:
1979:. In J. Fieser; B. Dowden (eds.).
1780:(2nd ed.). pp. 473–482.
1546:. Hackett Publishing. p. 60.
1121:
1095:
1054:
50:judgments) that are of two types:
16:Semantic distinction in philosophy
14:
6085:
5325:
4635:Sociology of scientific knowledge
4630:Sociology of scientific ignorance
4583:History and philosophy of science
2164:
2158:
1562:, Harvard University Press (1953)
695:is taken to express two distinct
134:"All triangles have three sides."
5996:
5981:
5972:
5971:
5258:
4832:
4820:
3355:
3309:
3300:
3299:
2198:"Analytic–synthetic distinction"
1377:"Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1233:. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.).
773:O in every world because unlike
1999:Cory Juhl; Eric Loomis (2009).
1931:
1235:The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap
1101:
467:we have knowledge of synthetic
293:Both of these propositions are
5793:Natural Law and Natural Rights
4024:Analytic–synthetic distinction
3772:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2512:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2220:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2211:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2085:"Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic"
1969:References and further reading
1400:Mauro Murzi (April 12, 2001).
1375:Gillian Russell (2012-11-21).
578:Logical positivist definitions
389:The possibility of metaphysics
248:"All bachelors are unmarried."
131:"All bachelors are unmarried."
38:distinction used primarily in
32:analytic–synthetic distinction
1:
2038:Kant, Immanuel. (1781/1998).
1778:Semantics of natural language
1438:Google link to Midway reprint
980:In "'Two Dogmas' Revisited",
867:internal–external distinction
815:O, for these are known to be
718:of a word or sentence is its
707:, which together compose its
2111:From a Logical Point of View
1786:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_16
1560:From a Logical Point of View
1088:
963:indeterminacy of translation
938:
286:"All bachelors are unhappy."
7:
5870:Libertarian theories of law
4357:Hypothetico-deductive model
4332:Deductive-nomological model
4317:Constructivist epistemology
3817:Internalism and externalism
2068:. Oxford University Press.
2040:The Critique of Pure Reason
1977:"A Priori and A Posteriori"
1938:Palmquist, Stephen (1989).
1261:"Carnap and Wittgenstein's
1066:
796:has argued that "Water is H
789:O" is true in every world.
271:of the concepts but to the
201:In the Introduction to the
10:
6090:
5381:International legal theory
2411:Causal theory of reference
2049:, Edward Zalta (ed.). <
1574:"Analyticity Reconsidered"
1542:. In Harold Morick (ed.).
1538:Willard v O Quine (1980).
1524:February 28, 2013, at the
1302:Rule-Following and Realism
1159:(1949)'s ostensive proof:
1073:Holophrastic indeterminacy
1018:, a one-time associate of
876:
427:propositions is possible.
194:
158:"All bachelors are alone."
18:
5967:
5898:
5815:
5722:
5404:
5346:
5333:
5253:
5213:
5185:
5178:
5130:Necessity and sufficiency
5033:
4998:
4950:
4904:
4886:
4878:
4811:
4643:
4545:
4475:
4418:Semantic view of theories
4337:Epistemological anarchism
4289:
4274:dependent and independent
4011:
3943:
3892:
3741:
3648:Evolutionary epistemology
3618:
3363:
3295:
3270:
3232:
3206:
3180:
3152:
3096:
3068:
3005:
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2494:
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2322:
2286:
2279:
2239:
2234:Links to related articles
1811:The Journal of Philosophy
1515:http://www.calculemus.org
1259:Michael Friedman (1997).
1207:. MIT Press. p. 69.
1166:The Journal of Philosophy
699:, often referred to as a
197:A priori and a posteriori
6074:Definitions of knowledge
6054:Concepts in epistemology
5952:Rational-legal authority
5840:German historical school
5825:Analytical jurisprudence
4160:Intertheoretic reduction
4149:Ignoramus et ignorabimus
4126:Functional contextualism
3920:Philosophy of perception
3723:Representational realism
3693:Naturalized epistemology
2471:Scientific structuralism
1957:10.5840/faithphil1989619
1646:Searle, John R. (1969).
1613:The Philosophical Review
1544:Challenges to empiricism
1489:The Philosophical Review
1199:Jerrold J. Katz (2000).
893:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
800:O" is an example of the
234:a posteriori proposition
6044:Conceptual distinctions
5920:Judicial interpretation
4645:Philosophers of science
4423:Scientific essentialism
4372:Model-dependent realism
4307:Constructive empiricism
4200:Evidence-based practice
3900:Outline of epistemology
3733:Transcendental idealism
1844:Jerrold J Katz (1974).
1471:10.1111/1467-8349.00044
1037:All necessary (and all
889:Willard Van Orman Quine
831:could be of two types:
420:Critique of Pure Reason
365:Critique of Pure Reason
342:", and "empirical" or "
204:Critique of Pure Reason
183:Kant's version and the
165:Kant's own example is:
138:Kant's own example is:
103:Critique of Pure Reason
76:
67:Willard Van Orman Quine
6007:WikiProject Philosophy
5361:Critical legal studies
4728:Alfred North Whitehead
4718:Charles Sanders Peirce
3847:Problem of other minds
2527:Reflective equilibrium
2151:10.1093/analys/26.1.12
2057:Soames, Scott (2009).
1888:Phenomenology and Mind
1700:Hilary Putnam (1979).
1673:Hilary Putnam (1983).
1450:Stephen Yablo (1998).
1419:Rudolf Carnap (1947).
1347:Rudolf Carnap (1950).
1267:. In William W. Tait;
1157:Cooper Harold Langford
1041:) truths are analytic.
1001:
924:
777:it is impossible for H
575:
540:
455:"7 + 5 = 12." (B15–16)
282:propositions include:
244:propositions include:
92:Conceptual containment
88:
71:philosophy of language
56:synthetic propositions
5930:Law without the state
5265:Philosophy portal
4827:Philosophy portal
4578:Hard and soft science
4573:Faith and rationality
4442:Scientific skepticism
4222:Scientific Revolution
4005:Philosophy of science
3925:Philosophy of science
3905:Faith and rationality
3787:Descriptive knowledge
3658:Feminist epistemology
3598:Nicholas Wolterstorff
3198:Nicholas Wolterstorff
2653:David Malet Armstrong
2121:Robert Hanna (2012).
2083:Frank X Ryan (2004).
1908:Scott Soames (2009).
1558:Published earlier in
1381:Oxford Bibliographies
1205:Realistic Rationalism
986:
908:
891:published the essay "
846:Meaning and Necessity
614:synthetic proposition
556:
524:
117:synthetic proposition
84:
52:analytic propositions
5890:Virtue jurisprudence
5830:Deontological ethics
4553:Criticism of science
4428:Scientific formalism
4312:Constructive realism
4217:Scientific pluralism
4190:Problem of induction
3857:Procedural knowledge
3842:Problem of induction
2107:Philosophical Review
1944:Faith and Philosophy
1083:Failure to elucidate
996:Philosophical Papers
823:Carnap's distinction
781:O to be other than H
600:analytic proposition
594:analytic proposition
588:analytic proposition
224:a priori proposition
111:analytic proposition
6064:Philosophy of logic
6049:Analytic philosophy
6039:Philosophical logic
4927:Philosophy of logic
4620:Rhetoric of science
4558:Descriptive science
4302:Confirmation holism
4195:Scientific evidence
4155:Inductive reasoning
4084:Demarcation problem
3935:Virtue epistemology
3930:Social epistemology
3910:Formal epistemology
3797:Epistemic injustice
3792:Exploratory thought
3593:Ludwig Wittgenstein
3020:Patricia Churchland
2951:Christine Korsgaard
2837:Logical positivists
2729:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2506:paradox of analysis
2273:Analytic philosophy
1229:Carnap, R. (1999).
1078:Paradox of analysis
743:secondary intension
705:secondary intension
646:sense and reference
642:analytic philosophy
442:logical positivists
431:Logical positivists
5783:The Concept of Law
5773:Pure Theory of Law
5226:Rules of inference
5195:Mathematical logic
4937:Semantics of logic
4839:Science portal
4768:Carl Gustav Hempel
4723:Wilhelm Windelband
4610:Questionable cause
4433:Scientific realism
4254:Underdetermination
4089:Empirical evidence
4079:Creative synthesis
3588:Timothy Williamson
3378:Augustine of Hippo
3193:William Lane Craig
2911:Friedrich Waismann
2868:Carl Gustav Hempel
2827:Timothy Williamson
2787:Alasdair MacIntyre
2645:Australian realism
2625:Russ Shafer-Landau
2486:Analytical Thomism
2441:Logical positivism
1865:10.1007/BF00877579
1754:10.1007/BF00484810
1330:The Conscious Mind
1296:Gary Ebbs (2009).
873:Quine's criticisms
738:O for that world.
636:is an approach to
634:Two-dimensionalism
629:Two-dimensionalism
174:not a part of the
89:
25:Synthetic language
6059:Concepts in logic
6026:
6025:
6020:
6019:
5992:Philosophy portal
5753:The Spirit of Law
5391:Philosophy of law
5371:Economic analysis
5356:Constitutionalism
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5083:Deductive closure
5029:
5028:
4968:Critical thinking
4846:
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4688:
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4600:Normative science
4457:Uniformitarianism
4212:Scientific method
4106:Explanatory power
3971:
3970:
3837:Privileged access
3473:Søren Kierkegaard
3323:
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3007:Pittsburgh School
2997:Peter van Inwagen
2931:Roderick Chisholm
2919:
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2812:Richard Swinburne
2747:G. E. M. Anscombe
2583:
2582:
2481:Analytic theology
2456:Ordinary language
2394:
2393:
1361:Reprinted in the
701:primary intension
21:Analytic language
6081:
6000:
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5855:Legal positivism
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5396:Sociology of law
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4798:Bas van Fraassen
4753:Hans Reichenbach
4733:Bertrand Russell
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4476:Philosophy of...
4259:Unity of science
4052:Commensurability
3998:
3991:
3984:
3975:
3974:
3915:Metaepistemology
3893:Related articles
3867:Regress argument
3802:Epistemic virtue
3553:Bertrand Russell
3528:Duncan Pritchard
3488:Hilary Kornblith
3403:Laurence BonJour
3350:
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3242:Nancy Cartwright
3083:Nicholas Rescher
3060:Bas van Fraassen
3050:Nicholas Rescher
2873:Hans Reichenbach
2856:
2855:
2822:Bernard Williams
2719:Bertrand Russell
2641:
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2575:Rigid designator
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3518:Alvin Plantinga
3398:George Berkeley
3365:Epistemologists
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3278:Jan Łukasiewicz
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3202:
3188:Alvin Plantinga
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1605:
1590:10.2307/2216275
1570:
1566:
1554:
1536:
1532:
1526:Wayback Machine
1501:10.2307/2181906
1485:
1481:
1454:
1448:
1444:
1433:
1417:
1413:
1398:
1394:
1385:
1383:
1373:
1369:
1345:
1336:
1327:
1323:
1316:
1294:
1290:
1283:
1256:
1252:
1245:
1231:"Autobiography"
1226:
1222:
1215:
1197:
1193:
1178:10.2307/2019526
1162:Langford, C. H.
1154:
1150:
1140:
1138:
1130:
1129:
1122:
1112:
1110:
1100:
1096:
1091:
1069:
1057:
1055:In other fields
1000:
994:Hilary Putnam,
993:
958:Word and Object
941:
933:Paul Boghossian
923:
920:
885:
875:
825:
814:
810:
799:
788:
784:
780:
772:
768:
760:
756:
737:
733:
690:
662:necessary truth
631:
622:
580:
574:
571:
548:
530:but analytical
438:
433:
391:
380:; there are no
360:
289:"Tables exist."
256:
199:
193:
94:
79:
28:
17:
12:
11:
5:
6087:
6077:
6076:
6071:
6066:
6061:
6056:
6051:
6046:
6041:
6024:
6023:
6018:
6017:
6015:
6014:
6009:
6004:
5994:
5989:
5979:
5968:
5965:
5964:
5962:
5961:
5954:
5949:
5944:
5937:
5932:
5927:
5922:
5917:
5910:
5902:
5900:
5896:
5895:
5893:
5892:
5887:
5885:Utilitarianism
5882:
5877:
5872:
5867:
5862:
5857:
5852:
5850:Legal moralism
5847:
5845:Interpretivism
5842:
5837:
5832:
5827:
5821:
5819:
5813:
5812:
5810:
5809:
5799:
5789:
5779:
5769:
5759:
5749:
5739:
5728:
5726:
5720:
5719:
5717:
5716:
5711:
5706:
5701:
5696:
5691:
5686:
5681:
5676:
5671:
5666:
5661:
5656:
5651:
5646:
5641:
5636:
5631:
5626:
5621:
5616:
5611:
5606:
5601:
5596:
5591:
5586:
5581:
5576:
5571:
5566:
5561:
5556:
5551:
5546:
5541:
5536:
5531:
5526:
5521:
5516:
5511:
5506:
5501:
5496:
5491:
5486:
5481:
5476:
5471:
5466:
5461:
5456:
5451:
5446:
5441:
5436:
5431:
5426:
5421:
5416:
5410:
5408:
5402:
5401:
5399:
5398:
5393:
5388:
5383:
5378:
5373:
5368:
5363:
5358:
5352:
5350:
5344:
5343:
5341:
5340:
5334:
5331:
5330:
5323:
5322:
5315:
5308:
5300:
5291:
5290:
5288:
5287:
5282:
5272:
5267:
5254:
5251:
5250:
5247:
5246:
5244:
5243:
5238:
5233:
5228:
5223:
5217:
5215:
5211:
5210:
5208:
5207:
5202:
5197:
5191:
5189:
5180:
5176:
5175:
5173:
5172:
5167:
5162:
5157:
5152:
5147:
5142:
5137:
5132:
5127:
5122:
5117:
5112:
5107:
5106:
5105:
5095:
5090:
5085:
5080:
5075:
5074:
5073:
5068:
5058:
5053:
5048:
5043:
5037:
5035:
5031:
5030:
5027:
5026:
5024:
5023:
5018:
5013:
5008:
5002:
5000:
4996:
4995:
4993:
4992:
4987:
4982:
4977:
4976:
4975:
4970:
4960:
4954:
4952:
4945:
4944:
4939:
4934:
4929:
4924:
4919:
4914:
4908:
4906:
4902:
4901:
4899:
4898:
4893:
4887:
4884:
4883:
4876:
4875:
4868:
4861:
4853:
4844:
4843:
4841:
4829:
4817:
4812:
4809:
4808:
4806:
4805:
4800:
4795:
4790:
4785:
4780:
4775:
4773:W. V. O. Quine
4770:
4765:
4760:
4755:
4750:
4745:
4740:
4735:
4730:
4725:
4720:
4715:
4710:
4708:Rudolf Steiner
4705:
4700:
4698:Henri Poincaré
4695:
4689:
4686:
4685:
4683:
4682:
4677:
4672:
4667:
4662:
4656:
4654:
4647:
4641:
4640:
4638:
4637:
4632:
4627:
4622:
4617:
4612:
4607:
4602:
4597:
4596:
4595:
4585:
4580:
4575:
4570:
4568:Exact sciences
4565:
4560:
4555:
4549:
4547:
4546:Related topics
4543:
4542:
4540:
4539:
4538:
4537:
4532:
4527:
4522:
4517:
4512:
4505:Social science
4502:
4501:
4500:
4498:Space and time
4490:
4485:
4479:
4477:
4473:
4472:
4470:
4469:
4464:
4459:
4454:
4449:
4444:
4439:
4430:
4425:
4420:
4411:
4402:
4397:
4384:
4379:
4374:
4369:
4364:
4359:
4354:
4349:
4344:
4339:
4334:
4329:
4324:
4319:
4314:
4309:
4304:
4299:
4293:
4291:
4287:
4286:
4284:
4283:
4278:
4277:
4276:
4271:
4261:
4256:
4251:
4250:
4249:
4244:
4239:
4229:
4224:
4219:
4214:
4209:
4207:Scientific law
4204:
4203:
4202:
4192:
4187:
4182:
4177:
4172:
4167:
4162:
4157:
4152:
4145:
4144:
4143:
4138:
4128:
4123:
4118:
4116:Falsifiability
4113:
4108:
4103:
4102:
4101:
4091:
4086:
4081:
4076:
4075:
4074:
4064:
4059:
4054:
4049:
4048:
4047:
4045:Mill's Methods
4037:
4026:
4021:
4015:
4013:
4009:
4008:
4001:
4000:
3993:
3986:
3978:
3969:
3968:
3966:
3965:
3960:
3955:
3950:
3944:
3941:
3940:
3938:
3937:
3932:
3927:
3922:
3917:
3912:
3907:
3902:
3896:
3894:
3890:
3889:
3887:
3886:
3879:
3874:
3869:
3864:
3859:
3854:
3849:
3844:
3839:
3834:
3829:
3824:
3819:
3814:
3809:
3804:
3799:
3794:
3789:
3784:
3779:
3774:
3769:
3764:
3756:
3747:
3745:
3739:
3738:
3736:
3735:
3730:
3725:
3720:
3715:
3710:
3705:
3700:
3695:
3690:
3685:
3680:
3675:
3670:
3665:
3660:
3655:
3650:
3645:
3640:
3635:
3633:Constructivism
3630:
3624:
3622:
3616:
3615:
3613:
3612:
3605:
3600:
3595:
3590:
3585:
3583:Baruch Spinoza
3580:
3578:P. F. Strawson
3575:
3570:
3568:Susanna Siegel
3565:
3560:
3555:
3550:
3545:
3543:W. V. O. Quine
3540:
3535:
3530:
3525:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3505:
3500:
3495:
3490:
3485:
3480:
3475:
3470:
3465:
3460:
3455:
3450:
3445:
3443:Nelson Goodman
3440:
3435:
3433:Edmund Gettier
3430:
3425:
3420:
3418:René Descartes
3415:
3410:
3408:Gilles Deleuze
3405:
3400:
3395:
3390:
3385:
3383:William Alston
3380:
3375:
3373:Thomas Aquinas
3369:
3367:
3361:
3360:
3353:
3352:
3345:
3338:
3330:
3321:
3320:
3318:
3317:
3307:
3296:
3293:
3292:
3289:
3288:
3286:
3285:
3280:
3274:
3272:
3268:
3267:
3265:
3264:
3262:Patrick Suppes
3259:
3254:
3249:
3244:
3238:
3236:
3230:
3229:
3227:
3226:
3221:
3216:
3210:
3208:
3204:
3203:
3201:
3200:
3195:
3190:
3184:
3182:
3178:
3177:
3175:
3174:
3169:
3164:
3158:
3156:
3150:
3149:
3147:
3146:
3144:Michael Walzer
3141:
3136:
3131:
3126:
3121:
3116:
3111:
3106:
3100:
3098:
3094:
3093:
3091:
3090:
3085:
3080:
3074:
3072:
3066:
3065:
3063:
3062:
3057:
3052:
3047:
3042:
3037:
3032:
3030:Adolf Grünbaum
3027:
3022:
3017:
3015:Robert Brandom
3011:
3009:
3003:
3002:
3000:
2999:
2994:
2988:
2986:
2982:
2981:
2979:
2978:
2973:
2971:W. V. O. Quine
2968:
2963:
2958:
2953:
2948:
2946:Nelson Goodman
2943:
2941:Daniel Dennett
2938:
2933:
2927:
2925:
2921:
2920:
2917:
2916:
2914:
2913:
2908:
2906:Moritz Schlick
2903:
2898:
2893:
2887:
2885:
2879:
2878:
2876:
2875:
2870:
2864:
2862:
2853:
2852:
2847:
2841:
2839:
2833:
2832:
2830:
2829:
2824:
2819:
2817:Charles Taylor
2814:
2809:
2807:P. F. Strawson
2804:
2799:
2794:
2789:
2784:
2779:
2774:
2769:
2764:
2759:
2754:
2749:
2743:
2741:
2735:
2734:
2732:
2731:
2726:
2721:
2716:
2711:
2706:
2704:Norman Malcolm
2701:
2696:
2691:
2685:
2683:
2679:
2678:
2676:
2675:
2673:J. J. C. Smart
2670:
2665:
2660:
2658:David Chalmers
2655:
2649:
2647:
2638:
2637:
2632:
2627:
2622:
2620:Giuseppe Peano
2617:
2612:
2610:Edmund Gettier
2607:
2602:
2597:
2591:
2589:
2585:
2584:
2581:
2580:
2578:
2577:
2572:
2567:
2565:Possible world
2562:
2557:
2552:
2546:
2544:
2535:
2534:
2529:
2524:
2519:
2517:Counterfactual
2514:
2509:
2498:
2496:
2492:
2491:
2489:
2488:
2483:
2478:
2473:
2468:
2463:
2458:
2453:
2448:
2443:
2438:
2433:
2428:
2423:
2418:
2413:
2408:
2402:
2400:
2396:
2395:
2392:
2391:
2389:
2388:
2383:
2378:
2376:Paraconsistent
2373:
2368:
2363:
2358:
2352:
2350:
2346:
2345:
2343:
2342:
2337:
2332:
2326:
2324:
2320:
2319:
2317:
2316:
2311:
2306:
2301:
2296:
2290:
2288:
2287:Areas of focus
2281:
2277:
2276:
2269:
2268:
2261:
2254:
2246:
2240:
2237:
2236:
2227:
2226:
2217:
2208:
2194:
2180:
2160:
2159:External links
2157:
2156:
2155:
2134:
2118:
2103:
2098:978-0203492796
2097:
2080:
2075:978-0199546046
2074:
2054:
2043:
2036:
2031:978-9042009486
2030:
2017:
2012:978-0415773331
2011:
1996:
1985:
1970:
1967:
1964:
1963:
1930:
1923:978-1400825790
1922:
1897:
1878:
1836:
1801:
1795:978-9027703040
1794:
1732:
1719:
1713:978-0521295512
1712:
1692:
1685:
1665:
1659:978-0521096263
1658:
1638:
1603:
1584:(3): 360–391.
1564:
1553:978-0915144907
1552:
1530:
1479:
1465:(1): 229–262.
1442:
1432:978-0226093475
1431:
1411:
1392:
1367:
1334:
1321:
1315:978-0674034419
1314:
1288:
1282:978-0812693447
1281:
1269:Leonard Linsky
1250:
1244:978-0812691535
1243:
1227:Reprinted in:
1220:
1214:978-0262263290
1213:
1191:
1148:
1120:
1102:Rey, Georges.
1093:
1092:
1090:
1087:
1086:
1085:
1080:
1075:
1068:
1065:
1056:
1053:
1048:
1047:
1043:
1042:
991:
948:P. F. Strawson
940:
937:
918:
904:
903:
900:
874:
871:
824:
821:
812:
808:
797:
786:
782:
778:
770:
766:
758:
754:
735:
731:
693:
692:
688:
678:Berit Brogaard
674:David Chalmers
630:
627:
618:
617:
604:
603:
597:
591:
579:
576:
569:
547:
544:
471:propositions.
460:
459:
456:
437:
434:
432:
429:
390:
387:
359:
356:
335:
334:
328:
322:
316:
291:
290:
287:
253:
252:
249:
238:
237:
231:
195:Main article:
192:
181:
171:
170:
163:
162:
159:
144:
143:
136:
135:
132:
125:
124:
114:
93:
90:
78:
75:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
6086:
6075:
6072:
6070:
6067:
6065:
6062:
6060:
6057:
6055:
6052:
6050:
6047:
6045:
6042:
6040:
6037:
6036:
6034:
6013:
6010:
6008:
6005:
6003:
5995:
5993:
5990:
5988:
5984:
5980:
5978:
5970:
5969:
5966:
5960:
5959:
5955:
5953:
5950:
5948:
5945:
5943:
5942:
5938:
5936:
5933:
5931:
5928:
5926:
5923:
5921:
5918:
5916:
5915:
5911:
5909:
5908:
5904:
5903:
5901:
5897:
5891:
5888:
5886:
5883:
5881:
5878:
5876:
5873:
5871:
5868:
5866:
5863:
5861:
5860:Legal realism
5858:
5856:
5853:
5851:
5848:
5846:
5843:
5841:
5838:
5836:
5833:
5831:
5828:
5826:
5823:
5822:
5820:
5818:
5814:
5805:
5804:
5800:
5795:
5794:
5790:
5785:
5784:
5780:
5775:
5774:
5770:
5765:
5764:
5760:
5755:
5754:
5750:
5745:
5744:
5740:
5735:
5734:
5730:
5729:
5727:
5725:
5721:
5715:
5712:
5710:
5707:
5705:
5702:
5700:
5697:
5695:
5692:
5690:
5687:
5685:
5682:
5680:
5677:
5675:
5672:
5670:
5667:
5665:
5662:
5660:
5657:
5655:
5652:
5650:
5647:
5645:
5642:
5640:
5637:
5635:
5632:
5630:
5627:
5625:
5622:
5620:
5617:
5615:
5612:
5610:
5607:
5605:
5602:
5600:
5597:
5595:
5592:
5590:
5587:
5585:
5582:
5580:
5577:
5575:
5572:
5570:
5567:
5565:
5562:
5560:
5557:
5555:
5552:
5550:
5547:
5545:
5542:
5540:
5537:
5535:
5532:
5530:
5527:
5525:
5522:
5520:
5517:
5515:
5512:
5510:
5507:
5505:
5502:
5500:
5497:
5495:
5492:
5490:
5487:
5485:
5482:
5480:
5477:
5475:
5472:
5470:
5467:
5465:
5462:
5460:
5457:
5455:
5452:
5450:
5447:
5445:
5442:
5440:
5437:
5435:
5432:
5430:
5427:
5425:
5422:
5420:
5417:
5415:
5412:
5411:
5409:
5407:
5403:
5397:
5394:
5392:
5389:
5387:
5386:Legal history
5384:
5382:
5379:
5377:
5374:
5372:
5369:
5367:
5364:
5362:
5359:
5357:
5354:
5353:
5351:
5349:
5345:
5339:
5336:
5335:
5332:
5328:
5327:Jurisprudence
5321:
5316:
5314:
5309:
5307:
5302:
5301:
5298:
5286:
5283:
5280:
5276:
5273:
5271:
5268:
5266:
5256:
5255:
5252:
5242:
5241:Logic symbols
5239:
5237:
5234:
5232:
5229:
5227:
5224:
5222:
5219:
5218:
5216:
5212:
5206:
5203:
5201:
5198:
5196:
5193:
5192:
5190:
5188:
5184:
5181:
5177:
5171:
5168:
5166:
5163:
5161:
5158:
5156:
5153:
5151:
5148:
5146:
5143:
5141:
5138:
5136:
5133:
5131:
5128:
5126:
5123:
5121:
5120:Logical truth
5118:
5116:
5113:
5111:
5108:
5104:
5101:
5100:
5099:
5096:
5094:
5091:
5089:
5086:
5084:
5081:
5079:
5076:
5072:
5069:
5067:
5064:
5063:
5062:
5061:Contradiction
5059:
5057:
5054:
5052:
5049:
5047:
5044:
5042:
5039:
5038:
5036:
5032:
5022:
5019:
5017:
5014:
5012:
5009:
5007:
5006:Argumentation
5004:
5003:
5001:
4997:
4991:
4990:Philosophical
4988:
4986:
4985:Non-classical
4983:
4981:
4978:
4974:
4971:
4969:
4966:
4965:
4964:
4961:
4959:
4956:
4955:
4953:
4949:
4943:
4940:
4938:
4935:
4933:
4930:
4928:
4925:
4923:
4920:
4918:
4915:
4913:
4910:
4909:
4907:
4903:
4897:
4894:
4892:
4889:
4888:
4885:
4881:
4874:
4869:
4867:
4862:
4860:
4855:
4854:
4851:
4840:
4835:
4830:
4828:
4818:
4816:
4813:
4810:
4804:
4801:
4799:
4796:
4794:
4791:
4789:
4786:
4784:
4781:
4779:
4776:
4774:
4771:
4769:
4766:
4764:
4761:
4759:
4758:Rudolf Carnap
4756:
4754:
4751:
4749:
4746:
4744:
4741:
4739:
4736:
4734:
4731:
4729:
4726:
4724:
4721:
4719:
4716:
4714:
4711:
4709:
4706:
4704:
4701:
4699:
4696:
4694:
4693:Auguste Comte
4691:
4690:
4681:
4678:
4676:
4673:
4671:
4668:
4666:
4665:Francis Bacon
4663:
4661:
4658:
4657:
4655:
4651:
4648:
4646:
4642:
4636:
4633:
4631:
4628:
4626:
4623:
4621:
4618:
4616:
4613:
4611:
4608:
4606:
4603:
4601:
4598:
4594:
4593:Pseudoscience
4591:
4590:
4589:
4586:
4584:
4581:
4579:
4576:
4574:
4571:
4569:
4566:
4564:
4561:
4559:
4556:
4554:
4551:
4550:
4548:
4544:
4536:
4533:
4531:
4528:
4526:
4523:
4521:
4518:
4516:
4513:
4511:
4508:
4507:
4506:
4503:
4499:
4496:
4495:
4494:
4491:
4489:
4486:
4484:
4481:
4480:
4478:
4474:
4468:
4465:
4463:
4460:
4458:
4455:
4453:
4452:Structuralism
4450:
4448:
4445:
4443:
4440:
4438:
4434:
4431:
4429:
4426:
4424:
4421:
4419:
4415:
4414:Received view
4412:
4410:
4406:
4403:
4401:
4398:
4396:
4392:
4388:
4385:
4383:
4380:
4378:
4375:
4373:
4370:
4368:
4365:
4363:
4360:
4358:
4355:
4353:
4350:
4348:
4345:
4343:
4340:
4338:
4335:
4333:
4330:
4328:
4325:
4323:
4322:Contextualism
4320:
4318:
4315:
4313:
4310:
4308:
4305:
4303:
4300:
4298:
4295:
4294:
4292:
4288:
4282:
4279:
4275:
4272:
4270:
4267:
4266:
4265:
4262:
4260:
4257:
4255:
4252:
4248:
4245:
4243:
4240:
4238:
4235:
4234:
4233:
4230:
4228:
4225:
4223:
4220:
4218:
4215:
4213:
4210:
4208:
4205:
4201:
4198:
4197:
4196:
4193:
4191:
4188:
4186:
4183:
4181:
4178:
4176:
4173:
4171:
4168:
4166:
4163:
4161:
4158:
4156:
4153:
4151:
4150:
4146:
4142:
4139:
4137:
4134:
4133:
4132:
4129:
4127:
4124:
4122:
4119:
4117:
4114:
4112:
4109:
4107:
4104:
4100:
4097:
4096:
4095:
4092:
4090:
4087:
4085:
4082:
4080:
4077:
4073:
4070:
4069:
4068:
4065:
4063:
4060:
4058:
4055:
4053:
4050:
4046:
4043:
4042:
4041:
4038:
4036:
4035:
4031:
4027:
4025:
4022:
4020:
4017:
4016:
4014:
4010:
4006:
3999:
3994:
3992:
3987:
3985:
3980:
3979:
3976:
3964:
3961:
3959:
3956:
3954:
3951:
3949:
3946:
3945:
3942:
3936:
3933:
3931:
3928:
3926:
3923:
3921:
3918:
3916:
3913:
3911:
3908:
3906:
3903:
3901:
3898:
3897:
3895:
3891:
3885:
3884:
3880:
3878:
3875:
3873:
3870:
3868:
3865:
3863:
3860:
3858:
3855:
3853:
3850:
3848:
3845:
3843:
3840:
3838:
3835:
3833:
3830:
3828:
3825:
3823:
3822:Justification
3820:
3818:
3815:
3813:
3810:
3808:
3805:
3803:
3800:
3798:
3795:
3793:
3790:
3788:
3785:
3783:
3780:
3778:
3775:
3773:
3770:
3768:
3765:
3763:
3761:
3757:
3755:
3753:
3749:
3748:
3746:
3744:
3740:
3734:
3731:
3729:
3726:
3724:
3721:
3719:
3716:
3714:
3711:
3709:
3706:
3704:
3701:
3699:
3698:Phenomenalism
3696:
3694:
3691:
3689:
3688:Naïve realism
3686:
3684:
3681:
3679:
3676:
3674:
3671:
3669:
3666:
3664:
3661:
3659:
3656:
3654:
3651:
3649:
3646:
3644:
3641:
3639:
3638:Contextualism
3636:
3634:
3631:
3629:
3626:
3625:
3623:
3621:
3617:
3611:
3610:
3606:
3604:
3603:Vienna Circle
3601:
3599:
3596:
3594:
3591:
3589:
3586:
3584:
3581:
3579:
3576:
3574:
3571:
3569:
3566:
3564:
3561:
3559:
3556:
3554:
3551:
3549:
3546:
3544:
3541:
3539:
3538:Hilary Putnam
3536:
3534:
3531:
3529:
3526:
3524:
3521:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3513:Robert Nozick
3511:
3509:
3508:John McDowell
3506:
3504:
3501:
3499:
3496:
3494:
3491:
3489:
3486:
3484:
3481:
3479:
3476:
3474:
3471:
3469:
3468:Immanuel Kant
3466:
3464:
3461:
3459:
3456:
3454:
3451:
3449:
3446:
3444:
3441:
3439:
3438:Alvin Goldman
3436:
3434:
3431:
3429:
3426:
3424:
3421:
3419:
3416:
3414:
3411:
3409:
3406:
3404:
3401:
3399:
3396:
3394:
3391:
3389:
3386:
3384:
3381:
3379:
3376:
3374:
3371:
3370:
3368:
3366:
3362:
3358:
3351:
3346:
3344:
3339:
3337:
3332:
3331:
3328:
3316:
3308:
3306:
3298:
3297:
3294:
3284:
3283:Alfred Tarski
3281:
3279:
3276:
3275:
3273:
3269:
3263:
3260:
3258:
3255:
3253:
3252:Peter Galison
3250:
3248:
3245:
3243:
3240:
3239:
3237:
3235:
3231:
3225:
3222:
3220:
3217:
3215:
3212:
3211:
3209:
3205:
3199:
3196:
3194:
3191:
3189:
3186:
3185:
3183:
3179:
3173:
3170:
3168:
3165:
3163:
3160:
3159:
3157:
3155:
3151:
3145:
3142:
3140:
3139:Nathan Salmon
3137:
3135:
3134:Richard Rorty
3132:
3130:
3127:
3125:
3122:
3120:
3117:
3115:
3112:
3110:
3107:
3105:
3104:Alonzo Church
3102:
3101:
3099:
3095:
3089:
3086:
3084:
3081:
3079:
3076:
3075:
3073:
3071:
3067:
3061:
3058:
3056:
3053:
3051:
3048:
3046:
3043:
3041:
3040:Ruth Millikan
3038:
3036:
3035:John McDowell
3033:
3031:
3028:
3026:
3023:
3021:
3018:
3016:
3013:
3012:
3010:
3008:
3004:
2998:
2995:
2993:
2990:
2989:
2987:
2983:
2977:
2974:
2972:
2969:
2967:
2966:Hilary Putnam
2964:
2962:
2961:Robert Nozick
2959:
2957:
2954:
2952:
2949:
2947:
2944:
2942:
2939:
2937:
2934:
2932:
2929:
2928:
2926:
2922:
2912:
2909:
2907:
2904:
2902:
2899:
2897:
2894:
2892:
2891:Rudolf Carnap
2889:
2888:
2886:
2884:
2883:Vienna Circle
2880:
2874:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2865:
2863:
2861:
2860:Berlin Circle
2857:
2851:
2848:
2846:
2843:
2842:
2840:
2838:
2834:
2828:
2825:
2823:
2820:
2818:
2815:
2813:
2810:
2808:
2805:
2803:
2800:
2798:
2795:
2793:
2790:
2788:
2785:
2783:
2780:
2778:
2775:
2773:
2770:
2768:
2767:Philippa Foot
2765:
2763:
2760:
2758:
2755:
2753:
2750:
2748:
2745:
2744:
2742:
2740:
2736:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2717:
2715:
2714:Graham Priest
2712:
2710:
2707:
2705:
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2694:Charlie Broad
2692:
2690:
2687:
2686:
2684:
2680:
2674:
2671:
2669:
2666:
2664:
2661:
2659:
2656:
2654:
2651:
2650:
2648:
2646:
2642:
2636:
2633:
2631:
2628:
2626:
2623:
2621:
2618:
2616:
2613:
2611:
2608:
2606:
2605:Gottlob Frege
2603:
2601:
2598:
2596:
2593:
2592:
2590:
2586:
2576:
2573:
2571:
2568:
2566:
2563:
2561:
2558:
2556:
2553:
2551:
2548:
2547:
2545:
2543:
2539:
2533:
2532:Supervenience
2530:
2528:
2525:
2523:
2520:
2518:
2515:
2513:
2510:
2507:
2503:
2500:
2499:
2497:
2493:
2487:
2484:
2482:
2479:
2477:
2474:
2472:
2469:
2467:
2464:
2462:
2459:
2457:
2454:
2452:
2449:
2447:
2444:
2442:
2439:
2437:
2434:
2432:
2431:Functionalism
2429:
2427:
2424:
2422:
2419:
2417:
2416:Descriptivism
2414:
2412:
2409:
2407:
2404:
2403:
2401:
2397:
2387:
2384:
2382:
2381:Philosophical
2379:
2377:
2374:
2372:
2371:Non-classical
2369:
2367:
2364:
2362:
2359:
2357:
2354:
2353:
2351:
2347:
2341:
2338:
2336:
2333:
2331:
2328:
2327:
2325:
2321:
2315:
2312:
2310:
2307:
2305:
2302:
2300:
2297:
2295:
2292:
2291:
2289:
2285:
2282:
2278:
2274:
2267:
2262:
2260:
2255:
2253:
2248:
2247:
2244:
2238:
2231:
2225:
2221:
2218:
2216:
2212:
2209:
2205:
2204:
2199:
2195:
2191:
2190:
2185:
2181:
2177:
2176:
2171:
2167:
2163:
2162:
2152:
2148:
2144:
2140:
2135:
2131:
2124:
2119:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2104:
2100:
2094:
2090:
2086:
2081:
2077:
2071:
2067:
2060:
2055:
2052:
2048:
2044:
2041:
2037:
2033:
2027:
2023:
2018:
2014:
2008:
2005:. Routledge.
2004:
2003:
1997:
1994:
1990:
1986:
1982:
1978:
1973:
1972:
1958:
1953:
1949:
1945:
1941:
1934:
1925:
1919:
1915:
1911:
1904:
1902:
1893:
1889:
1882:
1874:
1870:
1866:
1862:
1858:
1854:
1847:
1840:
1832:
1828:
1824:
1820:
1816:
1812:
1805:
1797:
1791:
1787:
1783:
1779:
1774:Reprinted in
1771:
1767:
1763:
1759:
1755:
1751:
1747:
1743:
1736:
1729:
1723:
1715:
1709:
1705:
1704:
1696:
1688:
1686:9780521246729
1682:
1678:
1677:
1669:
1661:
1655:
1651:
1650:
1642:
1634:
1630:
1626:
1622:
1619:(2): 41–158.
1618:
1614:
1607:
1599:
1595:
1591:
1587:
1583:
1579:
1575:
1568:
1561:
1555:
1549:
1545:
1541:
1534:
1527:
1523:
1520:
1516:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1498:
1494:
1490:
1483:
1476:
1472:
1468:
1464:
1460:
1453:
1446:
1439:
1434:
1428:
1424:
1423:
1415:
1407:
1403:
1396:
1382:
1378:
1371:
1364:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1343:
1341:
1339:
1331:
1325:
1317:
1311:
1307:
1303:
1299:
1292:
1284:
1278:
1274:
1270:
1266:
1264:
1254:
1246:
1240:
1236:
1232:
1224:
1216:
1210:
1206:
1202:
1195:
1187:
1183:
1179:
1175:
1171:
1167:
1163:
1158:
1152:
1137:
1133:
1127:
1125:
1109:
1105:
1098:
1094:
1084:
1081:
1079:
1076:
1074:
1071:
1070:
1064:
1062:
1052:
1045:
1044:
1040:
1036:
1035:
1034:
1032:
1028:
1023:
1021:
1017:
1013:
1011:
1006:
997:
990:
985:
983:
982:Hilary Putnam
978:
975:
971:
966:
964:
960:
959:
953:
949:
945:
936:
934:
928:
917:
914:
907:
901:
898:
897:
896:
894:
890:
884:
880:
870:
868:
864:
860:
856:
850:
848:
847:
842:
838:
834:
829:
828:Rudolf Carnap
820:
818:
806:
805:
795:
790:
776:
769:O, which is H
764:
752:
748:
744:
739:
729:
725:
721:
717:
712:
710:
706:
702:
698:
686:
685:
684:
681:
679:
675:
671:
667:
663:
659:
655:
651:
647:
643:
639:
635:
626:
615:
612:
611:
610:
607:
601:
598:
595:
592:
589:
586:
585:
584:
568:
566:
561:
555:
553:
543:
539:
537:
533:
529:
523:
521:
517:
513:
509:
505:
501:
497:
492:
488:
484:
480:
476:
475:Gottlob Frege
472:
470:
465:
457:
454:
453:
452:
450:
445:
443:
428:
426:
422:
421:
416:
412:
408:
404:
400:
396:
386:
383:
379:
374:
370:
367:
366:
355:
353:
349:
345:
341:
333:
329:
327:
323:
321:
317:
315:
311:
310:
309:
307:
303:
298:
296:
288:
285:
284:
283:
281:
276:
274:
273:justification
270:
266:
262:
251:"7 + 5 = 12."
250:
247:
246:
245:
243:
235:
232:
229:
225:
222:
221:
220:
218:
217:
212:
211:
206:
205:
198:
190:
186:
180:
177:
168:
167:
166:
160:
157:
156:
155:
152:
149:
141:
140:
139:
133:
130:
129:
128:
122:
118:
115:
112:
109:
108:
107:
105:
104:
99:
98:Immanuel Kant
87:
86:Immanuel Kant
83:
74:
72:
68:
64:
63:Immanuel Kant
59:
57:
53:
49:
45:
41:
37:
33:
26:
22:
5958:Usul al-Fiqh
5956:
5939:
5935:Legal system
5912:
5905:
5803:Law's Empire
5801:
5791:
5781:
5771:
5761:
5751:
5741:
5731:
5406:Philosophers
5348:Legal theory
5160:Substitution
5045:
4980:Mathematical
4905:Major fields
4803:Larry Laudan
4783:Imre Lakatos
4738:Otto Neurath
4713:Karl Pearson
4703:Pierre Duhem
4675:Isaac Newton
4605:Protoscience
4563:Epistemology
4437:Anti-realism
4435: /
4416: /
4407: /
4393: /
4391:Reductionism
4389: /
4362:Inductionism
4342:Evolutionism
4147:
4034:a posteriori
4033:
4029:
4023:
3881:
3782:Common sense
3771:
3760:A posteriori
3759:
3751:
3713:Reductionism
3607:
3558:Gilbert Ryle
3428:Fred Dretske
3413:Keith DeRose
3357:Epistemology
3172:Cora Diamond
3088:Morton White
2956:Thomas Nagel
2901:Otto Neurath
2850:Ernest Nagel
2797:Gilbert Ryle
2792:Derek Parfit
2752:J. L. Austin
2699:Casimir Lewy
2668:Peter Singer
2663:J. L. Mackie
2635:Barry Stroud
2595:Noam Chomsky
2588:Philosophers
2522:Natural kind
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2406:Anti-realism
2366:Mathematical
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5875:Natural law
5737:(c. 355 BC)
5584:Montesquieu
5376:Legal norms
5275:WikiProject
5145:Proposition
5140:Probability
5093:Description
5034:Foundations
4793:Ian Hacking
4778:Thomas Kuhn
4763:Karl Popper
4743:C. D. Broad
4660:Roger Bacon
4588:Non-science
4530:Linguistics
4510:Archaeology
4405:Rationalism
4395:Determinism
4382:Physicalism
4347:Fallibilism
4297:Coherentism
4227:Testability
4180:Observation
4175:Objectivity
4136:alternative
4067:Correlation
4057:Consilience
3862:Proposition
3832:Objectivity
3718:Reliabilism
3708:Rationalism
3653:Fallibilism
3628:Coherentism
3573:Ernest Sosa
3548:Thomas Reid
3533:James Pryor
3503:G. E. Moore
3493:David Lewis
3483:Saul Kripke
3478:Peter Klein
3458:Susan Haack
3388:Robert Audi
3271:Lwow-Warsaw
3257:Ian Hacking
3224:Karl Popper
3219:Thomas Kuhn
3167:Alice Crary
3129:Saul Kripke
3124:Jaegwon Kim
3119:David Lewis
3109:Jerry Fodor
3078:Susan Haack
2992:Robert Audi
2802:John Searle
2772:Peter Geach
2762:Antony Flew
2709:G. E. Moore
2630:Ernest Sosa
2560:Possibility
2309:Mathematics
2294:Metaphysics
2002:Analyticity
974:John Searle
970:Speech Acts
794:Saul Kripke
687:"Water is H
654:truth-value
514:truths and
191:distinction
6069:Empiricism
6033:Categories
5987:Law portal
5614:Petrażycki
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5599:Olivecrona
5534:Hägerström
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5205:Set theory
5103:Linguistic
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5051:Antecedent
4680:David Hume
4653:Precursors
4535:Psychology
4515:Economics
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4400:Pragmatism
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4247:scientific
4131:Hypothesis
4094:Experiment
3963:Discussion
3953:Task Force
3872:Simplicity
3852:Perception
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3643:Empiricism
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3247:John Dupré
3114:Kurt Gödel
3070:Pragmatism
2985:Notre Dame
2976:John Rawls
2845:A. J. Ayer
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2777:Paul Grice
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1519:Woodbridge
1386:2013-05-16
952:skepticism
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877:See also:
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179:meaning"?
176:definition
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5231:Paradoxes
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4242:ladenness
4062:Construct
4040:Causality
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3762:knowledge
3754:knowledge
3097:Princeton
2896:Hans Hahn
2682:Cambridge
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817:identical
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638:semantics
324:analytic
312:analytic
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5865:Legalism
5817:Theories
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5674:Scaevola
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5609:Perelman
5594:Nussbaum
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4264:Variable
4185:Paradigm
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4030:A priori
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5434:Bastiat
5419:Aquinas
5285:changes
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4896:History
4891:Outline
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4281:more...
4269:control
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5684:Shang
5639:Rawls
5624:Pound
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5524:Hegel
5414:Alexy
5338:Index
5214:other
5179:Lists
5165:Truth
4932:Proof
4880:Logic
3958:Stubs
3877:Truth
3523:Plato
3315:Index
2349:Logic
2323:Turns
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