482:. Meanwhile, media speculation focused on the inability of controllers to stop the train, and the possibility that a brake fault reported on 31 January had contributed to the accident. However, the police investigation quickly ruled out criminal involvement in the accident, and the Rail Safety Regulator, an independent government body, issued immediate instructions to drivers to ensure trains were properly secured with the park brake when left unattended or during a change of ends. As questions were raised about the failure of authorities to warn passengers and staff at Spencer Street, opposition parties criticised the state government for failing to act on recommendations made following previous accidents caused by communications failures.
358:
another stopping-all-stations train, number 5262, was ahead of the runaway and unaware of the danger; after a minute's discussion, Electrol isolated a section of power behind 5262 and ahead of the runaway. The second call was made to signallers at
Spencer Street No. 1 Box, warning them that Metrol was considering routing the runaway 5264 into the station precinct on an empty platform. The signallers advised Metrol that all the dead-end platforms at Spencer Street were occupied, but Metrol ended the call abruptly without any clear plan of action. The later report into the accident found that the contents of the call suggested neither Metrol nor the Spencer Street staff understood the gravity of the situation at this point in time.
402:. As soon as officers at Metrol received an indication that the rear of the train had cleared the junction, the points were reversed for 5264. Briefly, however, it appeared that the diversion had been unsuccessful and a major collision had occurred: the signallers' indications showed the two trains on the same path, and controllers could not raise the driver of 5262 on the radio. Eventually, the driver contacted Metrol and told the controllers the runaway had sped past him and continued into North Melbourne station. Later calculations showed that disaster had been averted by less than a second.
192:. Train controllers attempted several times to stop or redirect the train, but were limited in their ability to intervene, instead being forced to alter the route of other trains to avert a more serious collision. Eleven people on board the stationary train were injured; authorities did not know until after the crash if any passengers were on board the runaway. An investigation identified driver error as the cause of the accident, but the runaway event prompted significant debate about the role of government authorities and private operators in ensuring safety and reliability on the
291:
542:
439:
no warning was made to passengers on or near the
Bacchus Marsh train. The driver of the Bacchus Marsh train, Michael McCormack, did not initially realise the severity of the situation when the runaway approached, assuming that it was performing a normal shunting move; he jumped clear only at the last second when he realised that the train was well over normal speed and not going to stop.
424:
were occupied, some by empty services and others by services preparing to depart the station. The signallers had pre-set points and signals for the trains which were nearing their departure time. In order of departure, these trains were: a V/Line service to
Bacchus Marsh, in platform 2; a service to Geelong in platform 4; a service to Kyneton in platform 6; and lastly
435:
points on the East
Country line had been set for the departure of the Bacchus Marsh train. At 9.31, a Spencer Street signaller spotted the runaway and told Metrol "I've got him, I see him, fucking hell he's coming up hard", and urgently tried to force the points away from the Bacchus Marsh train, but was prevented by a safety timer on the signal box equipment.
328:
driver re-entered the cab to enter the new train number into the train's computer terminal, in order to display the correct onboard passenger information. At the same time, the signaller at
Broadmeadows set the train's route for its return journey and cleared the necessary signals. The driver then isolated the train's
485:
Some months after the accident, with the ATSB report and other investigations not finalised, Victorian authorities were criticised for their apparent lack of transparency, and compared unfavourably to NSW regulators responding to the
Waterfall accident. Then, in mid-November, when a shunting accident
386:
Metrol officers opted to reroute 5262 from the "east suburban line" to the adjacent tracks of the "main suburban line", with the intention of immediately switching back the points so that 5264 continued on the east suburban line towards
Spencer Street. The driver of 5262 was informed of the emergency
522:
report observed that the runaway, along with the
Waterfall accident, had focused political attention on the regulatory frameworks intended to govern safety on the disaggregated and privatised rail transport system. The NTC report found that the runaway incident highlighted the need for a legislation
493:
praised the signal and control staff who had managed to avert a collision with 5262 at North
Melbourne, and said that disciplinary action against the driver of 5264 would be considered. The state government promised to implement all 22 recommendations made by the report, including the implementation
327:
pm, where the service terminated. The driver of 5859 was rostered to also drive the return service to
Flinders Street as train number 5264. After a short delay where he left the driving cab of 393M due to confusion about whether the train needed to be clear of the platform for a through service, the
438:
About 45 seconds prior to the impact, Metrol desperately attempted to contact platform staff at the station to warn them of the impending collision. However, platform staff were confused by the simultaneous arrival of a train on platform 14 and incorrectly assumed this was the runaway. As a result,
374:
at 9:30 p.m. it was only 113 seconds behind 5262, putting both trains in grave danger. Asking the driver of 5262 to attempt to outrun the runaway would have placed the passenger-carrying train at great risk of a derailment, meaning Metrol's only option was to divert the runaway before it could
286:
along the route. Metrol was responsible for trains up to the station boundary, from where it was possible to access all 8 dead-end platforms. However, final access to platforms 1 through 6 at Spencer Street was controlled by V/Line staff at Spencer Street No.1 signal box, and platforms 7 and 8 were
415:
that could have allowed the body of the derailed train to "spear" over the top and into the passenger area of the station; sidings beyond platform 8 which were too complicated to access in the short time-frame available; and through tracks 10, 10A and 11, which would have directed the runaway into
344:
The driver ran out onto the platform where another passenger told him it’s in the direction of the city, the driver jumped in the truck and began to chase the train down the line on foot but, as the train had now been rolling for some 3 minutes, he was unable to catch it, and rang the Broadmeadows
340:
that 5264 had departed early. The stationmaster attempted to contact the driver via the Broadmeadows signaller, but was not able to work out why the train had departed early. As he returned to the station building, the stationmaster saw the driver coming out and warned him that the train had left.
497:
The runaway train again received media coverage in 2007 when Connex – by then the sole franchisee for the metropolitan rail network and thus the operator of Metrol – conceded that no improvements had been made since the accident to Metrol's train monitoring ability. Public transport advocates and
423:
A hasty agreement had been reached at 9:29 p.m. between Metrol and the Spencer Street staff that the runaway would thus be routed off the East Suburban line and onto the Country line in order to access the remainder of the dead-end platform area. All six platforms controlled by the No. 1 Box
434:
would depart before the arrival of the runaway, because it was set to use the Country line out of the station. At 9:30 p.m. however, Metrol advised the No. 1 Box that the runaway was extremely close; in response, the signallers told Metrol to route it onto the East Country line instead. The
357:
At 9:26 p.m., Metrol made two calls to other control centres. The first was to Electrol, the electricity control centre for the suburban railway network, asking officers to turn off power to the overhead lines in the hope that this might help slow the train but this did not work. However,
410:
Meanwhile, Metrol officers had again contacted the Spencer Street signallers to confirm their intention to route the runaway into the dead-end platforms. Allowing the train to continue on Metrol-operated tracks was not a desirable option. The East Suburban line led to a number of routes which
361:
Seconds later, the Essendon stationmaster reported that the train had passed through his station at speed, making it clear that the lack of power was not going to stop the train. Metrol officers began to realise that a rear-end collision with 5262 was likely unless immediate action was taken.
335:
The driver walked into the station building, intending to use the staff toilet facilities before returning to the train. As he did so, the train began to roll down the very slight slope at the Broadmeadows platform back towards the city, passing the end of the platform at around 3 km/h
420:, the main suburban terminus. Dead-end platform 7 was also accessible from the East Suburban line, and was occupied only by empty carriages stabled overnight for a service the following morning, but Metrol officers did not come to know this in the short decision-making time available.
601:
The train describer number, or train number, uniquely identifies scheduled and unscheduled services on the Victorian railway system. It is used by Metrol and signallers to track and manage services, especially where multiple services are operating on the same line
212:
had killed seven people as a result of the train entering a curve too quickly due to incapacitation of the train's driver. The trains deadman's system was revealed to be faulty thus not automatically stopping the train when the driver became unresponsive.
345:
signaller from a phone box on a signal post raising the alarm. The signaller made an emergency call to Metrol and advised them of the runaway at 9:21 p.m. Metrol immediately contacted the Broadmeadows stationmaster and asked him to monitor the
514:
that the automatic park brake had been installed across the metropolitan train fleet. However, they stated that further indications for Metrol officers would not be possible until the underlying architecture of the Metrol system was replaced.
336:(1.9 mph) undetected by the driver or station staff. The doors to the passenger area were open, and interior lights remained on. While the driver was inside the station building, a passenger complained to the Broadmeadows
353:
and asked him to switch his station from Metrol operation to local control, and to provide updates from his own CCTV feed. The train was by now travelling at a speed of more than 102 km/h (63 mph).
494:
of an automatic park brake activated by the isolation of the driver's controls, and improvements to Metrol systems that would provide controllers with visual indications of trains across the network.
530:
Ten years later, with the ageing train control systems at Metrol still overdue for replacement, the accident was again cited as an example of the significant limitations of the existing arrangement.
502:
representatives argued that the accident could have been dealt with more swiftly had Metrol been able to access more information on the train's position. In May 2007, Minister for Public Transport
1439:
379:, with the possibility of it falling onto other active lines below; another route into goods sidings was blocked by a train in the opposite direction; and diversion into the underground
1273:
1167:
332:
according to normal procedure, but did not apply the park brake before once again leaving the cab of 393M to change ends as it was policy not to apply it if changing ends.
1724:
486:
at Spencer Street injured 13 people in circumstances compared by passengers and media organisations to the runaway, concerns were repeated that no findings had been made.
1432:
489:
The ATSB report was released in December 2003, with the driver's failure to apply the park brake identified as the major cause of the accident. Transport Minister
224:
line on the Melbourne rail network, running from the city centre to the northern suburbs. In February 2003, electric train services on the line were operated by
1719:
1425:
1266:
1123:
387:
and told to run through North Melbourne station as quickly as possible when the signal cleared. Had the driver of 5262 attempted to pass the red signal, the
255:
on the Victorian rail network, and, in 2003, was the interchange for trains run by a number of operators, including M>Train, its fellow suburban operator
61:
188:, Australia, before it ran for nearly 17 kilometres (11 mi) out of control without a driver and eventually crashed into another train about to depart
362:
Consequently, the route set for 5262 was cancelled at 9:28 p.m., causing the driver to pull up at a red signal just outside North Melbourne station.
442:
Finally, at 9:33 p.m., the runaway collided with the locomotive of the Bacchus Marsh train, at a speed of approximately 75 km/h (47 mph).
1099:
527:, which implemented a complete rail safety framework in Victoria for the first time, was prioritised and passed in direct response to the incident.
1408:
1404:
1259:
1202:
467:
were deployed throughout the night along the Broadmeadows line to search for bodies of potential victims struck by the train, but none were found.
375:
collide with 5262. Even then, the options open to the controllers were limited: one possible route would have sent the speeding train onto a
1464:
1739:
1179:
302:
electric multiple unit, and consisted of motor car 393M, unpowered trailer 1048T, and second motor car 394M. The country train was 4
1287:
905:
274:
Given the number of operators on the Broadmeadows line (now the Craigieburn line) and in the central area, a complex control and
181:
1754:
1489:
1448:
1032:
349:
feed at stations under his control to provide updates on the train's progress. Next, the controllers rang the stationmaster at
371:
1749:
1474:
1459:
323:
The electric train 393M-1048T-394M arrived at Broadmeadows station as train number 5859 from Flinders Street around 9.14
1729:
471:
450:
Eight passengers on the Bacchus Marsh train suffered minor injuries. Four required hospitalisation and were treated at
1074:
394:
At 9:30 p.m. the points were set and the signal cleared for 5262; at the same moment, the driver saw 5264 in his
1714:
1641:
1505:
1233:
Runaway of Suburban Electric Passenger Train 5264 and collision with Diesel Locomotive Hauled Passenger Train 8141
1142:
1469:
417:
1744:
1594:
1570:
1531:
1136:
189:
45:
1231:
1484:
1479:
555:
519:
260:
1659:
1392:
507:
383:
was prevented by both oncoming trains and the arrangement of tracks near the entrance at North Melbourne.
1546:
589:
1104:. Melbourne: Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria. 9 May 2007. pp. 20–22
1734:
1612:
1606:
1564:
1365:
1671:
1576:
1552:
1175:
346:
217:
96:
880:
683:
499:
457:
350:
470:
Within a few days of the accident, investigations had been launched by M>Train and V/Line, the
1647:
1624:
1618:
1582:
1374:
1320:
1283:
1251:
411:
presented the risk of catastrophic outcomes: the empty dead-end platform 8, which had only short
205:
1006:
1558:
1522:
1417:
1311:
303:
221:
193:
173:
391:
device would have applied the emergency brake, trapping his train in the path of the runaway.
1665:
1537:
1383:
524:
511:
237:
294:
N463, the locomotive involved in the accident, pictured in 2007 after returning to service
8:
1600:
1356:
451:
282:, the main suburban control centre managed by Connex, either directly or through local
275:
523:
demanding independent investigation of major rail safety incidents and accidents. The
1677:
1347:
1132:
479:
329:
1329:
547:
395:
256:
252:
229:
290:
490:
475:
464:
376:
209:
307:
299:
268:
245:
170:
510:
Jim Betts gave evidence at the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee of the
1708:
1692:
indicates railway accidents and incidents resulting in at least 20 fatalities
337:
271:. The station consisted of 14 platforms including dead-end platforms 1 to 8.
177:
116:
76:
63:
976:
Crawford, Barclay (6 February 2003). "Long wait for runaway train answers".
240:. The line was shared with diesel-hauled country train services operated by
426:
399:
946:
Heasley, Andrew (5 February 2003). "Brake fault report on runaway train".
931:
Masanauskas, John (5 February 2003). "Ghost train on brink of disaster".
503:
264:
233:
1058:
Heasley, Andrew (2 December 2003). "Runaway-train driver forgot brake".
460:
412:
388:
283:
380:
278:
system was in place. Most of the Broadmeadows line was controlled by
185:
49:
1131:. National Transport Commission. December 2004. pp. 27, 74–75.
864:
Berry, Jamie (5 February 2003). "Five seconds to run for his life".
251:
Spencer Street station (now Southern Cross) is one of the two main
1281:
961:
Heasley, Andrew (7 February 2003). "Don't forget the park brake".
225:
106:
1447:
1125:
Improving the Regulatory Framework for Rail Safety in Australia
279:
241:
1697:
indicates the deadliest railway accident in Australian history
579:
Spencer Street station has since been renamed Southern Cross.
398:
and accelerated rapidly through the points, far beyond their
298:
The electric train involved in the accident was a 3-carriage
1239:. Canberra: Australian Transport Safety Bureau. October 2003
1203:"30-year-old railway computers take a byte out of the past"
259:, and country and interstate train operators V/Line, Hoys,
430:, waiting in platform 1. The signallers were hopeful that
924:
857:
454:, but all had been discharged by the following morning.
1033:"Inquiry finds driver error caused runaway train crash"
847:
845:
772:
770:
757:
755:
753:
714:
676:
664:
537:
1725:
Railway accidents and incidents in Victoria (state)
872:
1101:Inquiry into budget estimates 2007–08 (Transcript)
842:
830:
806:
794:
782:
767:
750:
738:
726:
702:
640:
616:
818:
244:(then also a subsidiary of National Express) and
1706:
652:
628:
1066:
1013:. Australian Associated Press. 12 November 2003
1092:
1051:
1025:
984:
969:
954:
939:
912:. Australian Associated Press. 4 February 2003
898:
690:. Australian Associated Press. 4 February 2003
405:
1433:
1267:
906:"Runaway train almost caught passenger train"
204:Three days prior to the Melbourne crash, the
1449:Railway accidents and incidents in Australia
1194:
1160:
1116:
999:
287:jointly managed by the two control centres.
228:, a subsidiary of British transport company
930:
588:The electrified line was later extended to
1440:
1426:
1274:
1260:
1720:Rail accidents caused by a driver's error
1178:. October 2011. p. 6. Archived from
1007:"Thirteen hurt in Melbourne train crash"
975:
289:
1057:
960:
945:
881:"Eleven injured in runaway train drama"
1707:
1072:
684:"Driver chased runaway train: witness"
1421:
1255:
1200:
878:
863:
1230:
991:"Melbourne train safety off track".
851:
836:
824:
812:
800:
788:
776:
761:
744:
732:
720:
708:
670:
658:
646:
634:
622:
566:
1168:"Exploring a just culture approach"
248:, and occasional freight services.
13:
1339:Melbourne runaway train, Australia
1321:Waterfall rail accident, Australia
472:Australian Transport Safety Bureau
318:
14:
1766:
1740:February 2003 events in Australia
1366:Chinchilla train collision, Spain
1073:Sexton, Reid (21 January 2007).
879:Adams, David (4 February 2003).
540:
1393:Stavropol train bombing, Russia
1284:Railway accidents and incidents
1224:
1201:Carey, Adam (14 October 2013).
995:. 2 September 2003. p. 14.
416:the extremely busy area around
1375:Vaibhavwadi train crash, India
1348:Daegu subway fire, South Korea
1075:"City of lost, delayed trains"
595:
582:
573:
1:
1755:Train collisions in Australia
1312:Ghatnandur train crash, India
609:
556:Railway accidents in Victoria
520:National Transport Commission
199:
561:
508:Director of Public Transport
445:
370:By the time 5264 arrived at
365:
24:2003 Melbourne runaway train
7:
1750:2003 disasters in Australia
1384:Warangal train crash, India
533:
406:Collision at Spencer Street
313:
10:
1771:
1357:Ladhowal train fire, India
1330:Dete train crash, Zimbabwe
518:In the following years, a
1730:Railway accidents in 2003
1687:
1634:
1515:
1498:
1455:
1402:
1302:
1176:Transport Safety Victoria
910:The Sydney Morning Herald
347:closed-circuit television
306:hauled by diesel-powered
218:Broadmeadows railway line
159:
151:
143:
135:
130:
122:
112:
102:
92:
55:
41:
33:
28:
23:
500:Rail, Tram and Bus Union
458:Victoria Police Air Wing
147:22 (on stationary train)
1715:Runaway train disasters
1409:2004 ►
1405:◄ 2002
418:Flinders Street station
206:Waterfall rail accident
155:1 (on stationary train)
980:. Canberra. p. 4.
295:
194:Melbourne rail network
190:Spencer Street station
174:electric multiple unit
169:On 3 February 2003, a
46:Spencer Street station
1745:Melbourne City Centre
1011:Sydney Morning Herald
293:
236:arrangement with the
525:Rail Safety Act 2006
512:Victorian Parliament
238:Victorian Government
182:Broadmeadows station
77:37.8183°S 144.9528°E
269:Great Southern Rail
73: /
1465:Northern Territory
452:Footscray Hospital
308:N class locomotive
296:
82:-37.8183; 144.9528
1735:2003 in Australia
1702:
1701:
1490:Western Australia
1415:
1414:
1039:. 1 December 2003
723:, pp. 12–13.
673:, pp. 11–12.
567:Explanatory notes
480:WorkSafe Victoria
253:terminal stations
167:
166:
97:Broadmeadows line
1762:
1442:
1435:
1428:
1419:
1418:
1390:
1381:
1372:
1363:
1354:
1345:
1336:
1327:
1318:
1309:
1297:
1295:
1293:
1276:
1269:
1262:
1253:
1252:
1248:
1246:
1244:
1238:
1218:
1217:
1215:
1213:
1198:
1192:
1191:
1189:
1187:
1172:Rail Safety News
1164:
1158:
1157:
1155:
1153:
1148:on 24 March 2019
1147:
1141:. Archived from
1130:
1120:
1114:
1113:
1111:
1109:
1096:
1090:
1089:
1087:
1085:
1070:
1064:
1063:
1055:
1049:
1048:
1046:
1044:
1029:
1023:
1022:
1020:
1018:
1003:
997:
996:
988:
982:
981:
973:
967:
966:
958:
952:
951:
943:
937:
936:
928:
922:
921:
919:
917:
902:
896:
895:
893:
891:
876:
870:
869:
861:
855:
849:
840:
834:
828:
822:
816:
810:
804:
798:
792:
786:
780:
774:
765:
759:
748:
742:
736:
730:
724:
718:
712:
706:
700:
699:
697:
695:
680:
674:
668:
662:
656:
650:
644:
638:
632:
626:
620:
603:
599:
593:
586:
580:
577:
550:
548:Australia portal
545:
544:
543:
465:infrared cameras
396:rear-view mirror
326:
304:H type carriages
257:Connex Melbourne
230:National Express
88:
87:
85:
84:
83:
78:
74:
71:
70:
69:
66:
21:
20:
1770:
1769:
1765:
1764:
1763:
1761:
1760:
1759:
1705:
1704:
1703:
1698:
1693:
1683:
1630:
1511:
1506:Salt Clay Creek
1494:
1475:South Australia
1460:New South Wales
1451:
1446:
1416:
1411:
1398:
1397:
1388:
1379:
1370:
1361:
1352:
1343:
1334:
1325:
1316:
1307:
1298:
1291:
1289:
1282:
1280:
1242:
1240:
1236:
1227:
1222:
1221:
1211:
1209:
1199:
1195:
1185:
1183:
1182:on 6 March 2019
1166:
1165:
1161:
1151:
1149:
1145:
1139:
1128:
1122:
1121:
1117:
1107:
1105:
1098:
1097:
1093:
1083:
1081:
1071:
1067:
1056:
1052:
1042:
1040:
1031:
1030:
1026:
1016:
1014:
1005:
1004:
1000:
990:
989:
985:
974:
970:
959:
955:
944:
940:
929:
925:
915:
913:
904:
903:
899:
889:
887:
877:
873:
862:
858:
850:
843:
835:
831:
823:
819:
811:
807:
799:
795:
787:
783:
775:
768:
760:
751:
743:
739:
731:
727:
719:
715:
707:
703:
693:
691:
682:
681:
677:
669:
665:
657:
653:
649:, pp. 8–9.
645:
641:
633:
629:
625:, pp. 5–6.
621:
617:
612:
607:
606:
602:simultaneously.
600:
596:
587:
583:
578:
574:
569:
564:
546:
541:
539:
536:
491:Peter Batchelor
476:Victoria Police
448:
408:
377:flying junction
368:
324:
321:
319:Initial runaway
316:
261:West Coast Rail
210:New South Wales
202:
81:
79:
75:
72:
67:
64:
62:
60:
59:
37:3 February 2003
17:
12:
11:
5:
1768:
1758:
1757:
1752:
1747:
1742:
1737:
1732:
1727:
1722:
1717:
1700:
1699:
1688:
1685:
1684:
1682:
1681:
1675:
1669:
1663:
1657:
1651:
1645:
1638:
1636:
1632:
1631:
1629:
1628:
1622:
1616:
1610:
1604:
1598:
1595:Valley Heights
1592:
1580:
1574:
1568:
1562:
1556:
1550:
1544:
1535:
1529:
1519:
1517:
1513:
1512:
1510:
1509:
1502:
1500:
1496:
1495:
1493:
1492:
1487:
1482:
1477:
1472:
1467:
1462:
1456:
1453:
1452:
1445:
1444:
1437:
1430:
1422:
1413:
1412:
1403:
1400:
1399:
1396:
1395:
1386:
1377:
1368:
1359:
1350:
1341:
1332:
1323:
1314:
1304:
1303:
1300:
1299:
1279:
1278:
1271:
1264:
1256:
1250:
1249:
1226:
1223:
1220:
1219:
1193:
1174:. No. 6.
1159:
1137:
1115:
1091:
1065:
1050:
1024:
998:
993:The Australian
983:
978:The Australian
968:
953:
938:
923:
897:
871:
856:
841:
829:
817:
805:
793:
781:
766:
749:
737:
725:
713:
701:
675:
663:
651:
639:
627:
614:
613:
611:
608:
605:
604:
594:
581:
571:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
559:
558:
552:
551:
535:
532:
463:equipped with
447:
444:
407:
404:
367:
364:
320:
317:
315:
312:
246:Hoys Roadlines
201:
198:
165:
164:
161:
157:
156:
153:
149:
148:
145:
141:
140:
137:
133:
132:
128:
127:
124:
120:
119:
114:
110:
109:
104:
100:
99:
94:
90:
89:
57:
53:
52:
43:
39:
38:
35:
31:
30:
26:
25:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1767:
1756:
1753:
1751:
1748:
1746:
1743:
1741:
1738:
1736:
1733:
1731:
1728:
1726:
1723:
1721:
1718:
1716:
1713:
1712:
1710:
1696:
1691:
1686:
1679:
1676:
1673:
1670:
1667:
1664:
1661:
1658:
1655:
1652:
1649:
1646:
1643:
1640:
1639:
1637:
1633:
1626:
1623:
1620:
1617:
1614:
1611:
1608:
1605:
1602:
1599:
1596:
1593:
1591:
1588:
1584:
1581:
1578:
1575:
1572:
1569:
1566:
1563:
1560:
1557:
1554:
1551:
1548:
1547:Camp Mountain
1545:
1543:
1539:
1536:
1533:
1530:
1528:
1524:
1521:
1520:
1518:
1514:
1507:
1504:
1503:
1501:
1497:
1491:
1488:
1486:
1483:
1481:
1478:
1476:
1473:
1471:
1468:
1466:
1463:
1461:
1458:
1457:
1454:
1450:
1443:
1438:
1436:
1431:
1429:
1424:
1423:
1420:
1410:
1406:
1401:
1394:
1387:
1385:
1378:
1376:
1369:
1367:
1360:
1358:
1351:
1349:
1342:
1340:
1333:
1331:
1324:
1322:
1315:
1313:
1306:
1305:
1301:
1296:
1285:
1277:
1272:
1270:
1265:
1263:
1258:
1257:
1254:
1235:
1234:
1229:
1228:
1208:
1204:
1197:
1181:
1177:
1173:
1169:
1163:
1144:
1140:
1134:
1127:
1126:
1119:
1103:
1102:
1095:
1080:
1076:
1069:
1061:
1054:
1038:
1034:
1028:
1012:
1008:
1002:
994:
987:
979:
972:
964:
957:
949:
942:
934:
927:
911:
907:
901:
886:
882:
875:
867:
860:
854:, p. 16.
853:
848:
846:
839:, p. 45.
838:
833:
826:
821:
815:, p. 43.
814:
809:
803:, p. 15.
802:
797:
791:, p. 42.
790:
785:
779:, p. 14.
778:
773:
771:
764:, p. 44.
763:
758:
756:
754:
747:, p. 13.
746:
741:
735:, p. 41.
734:
729:
722:
717:
711:, p. 12.
710:
705:
689:
685:
679:
672:
667:
660:
655:
648:
643:
636:
631:
624:
619:
615:
598:
591:
585:
576:
572:
557:
554:
553:
549:
538:
531:
528:
526:
521:
516:
513:
509:
505:
501:
495:
492:
487:
483:
481:
477:
473:
468:
466:
462:
459:
455:
453:
443:
440:
436:
433:
429:
428:
421:
419:
414:
403:
401:
397:
392:
390:
384:
382:
378:
373:
363:
359:
355:
352:
348:
342:
339:
338:stationmaster
333:
331:
311:
309:
305:
301:
292:
288:
285:
281:
277:
272:
270:
266:
262:
258:
254:
249:
247:
243:
239:
235:
231:
227:
223:
219:
214:
211:
207:
197:
195:
191:
187:
183:
179:
175:
172:
162:
158:
154:
150:
146:
142:
138:
134:
129:
125:
121:
118:
117:Runaway train
115:
113:Incident type
111:
108:
105:
101:
98:
95:
91:
86:
58:
54:
51:
47:
44:
40:
36:
32:
27:
22:
19:
16:Rail accident
1694:
1689:
1653:
1635:21st century
1589:
1586:
1565:Medway Creek
1541:
1526:
1516:20th century
1499:19th century
1338:
1241:. Retrieved
1232:
1225:Bibliography
1210:. Retrieved
1206:
1196:
1184:. Retrieved
1180:the original
1171:
1162:
1150:. Retrieved
1143:the original
1124:
1118:
1106:. Retrieved
1100:
1094:
1082:. Retrieved
1078:
1068:
1062:. p. 2.
1059:
1053:
1041:. Retrieved
1036:
1027:
1015:. Retrieved
1010:
1001:
992:
986:
977:
971:
965:. p. 3.
962:
956:
950:. p. 2.
947:
941:
935:. p. 7.
932:
926:
914:. Retrieved
909:
900:
888:. Retrieved
884:
874:
868:. p. 2.
865:
859:
832:
827:, p. 9.
820:
808:
796:
784:
740:
728:
716:
704:
692:. Retrieved
687:
678:
666:
661:, p. 5.
654:
642:
637:, p. 8.
630:
618:
597:
584:
575:
529:
517:
496:
488:
484:
469:
456:
449:
441:
437:
432:The Overland
431:
427:The Overland
425:
422:
409:
400:design speed
393:
385:
369:
360:
356:
343:
334:
322:
297:
284:signal boxes
273:
250:
215:
203:
168:
126:Driver error
18:
1668:(June 2007)
1577:Violet Town
590:Craigieburn
504:Lynne Kosky
461:helicopters
413:stop blocks
265:CountryLink
222:electrified
178:rolled away
80: /
68:144°57′10″E
56:Coordinates
1709:Categories
1680:(Feb 2020)
1674:(Jan 2013)
1662:(Nov 2004)
1656:(Feb 2003)
1650:(Jan 2003)
1644:(Jan 2001)
1627:(Dec 1999)
1621:(Aug 1999)
1615:(Oct 1997)
1613:Beresfield
1609:(Jan 1996)
1607:Hines Hill
1603:(May 1990)
1597:(Jul 1982)
1585:(Jan 1977)
1579:(Feb 1969)
1573:(Aug 1963)
1567:(Feb 1960)
1561:(Dec 1953)
1555:(Jul 1950)
1549:(May 1947)
1540:(Sep 1926)
1534:(Mar 1914)
1525:(Apr 1908)
1508:(Jan 1885)
1470:Queensland
1186:28 January
1152:28 January
1138:1877093785
1108:28 January
1084:2 February
1043:2 February
933:Herald Sun
916:2 February
610:References
389:train stop
372:Kensington
276:signalling
232:, under a
226:M>Train
200:Background
144:Passengers
131:Statistics
107:M>Train
65:37°49′06″S
1672:Cleveland
1654:Melbourne
1648:Waterfall
1625:Glenbrook
1583:Granville
1553:Roseville
852:ATSB 2003
837:ATSB 2003
825:ATSB 2003
813:ATSB 2003
801:ATSB 2003
789:ATSB 2003
777:ATSB 2003
762:ATSB 2003
745:ATSB 2003
733:ATSB 2003
721:ATSB 2003
709:ATSB 2003
671:ATSB 2003
659:ATSB 2003
647:ATSB 2003
635:ATSB 2003
623:ATSB 2003
562:Footnotes
446:Aftermath
381:City Loop
366:Near miss
330:air brake
234:franchise
186:Melbourne
50:Melbourne
1642:Gerogery
1559:Sydenham
1523:Sunshine
1485:Victoria
1480:Tasmania
1037:ABC News
534:See also
474:(ATSB),
351:Essendon
314:Accident
103:Operator
42:Location
1619:Zanthus
1538:Murulla
1407:
1391:
1382:
1373:
1364:
1355:
1346:
1337:
1328:
1319:
1310:
1290: (
1207:The Age
1079:The Age
1060:The Age
963:The Age
948:The Age
885:The Age
866:The Age
688:The Age
160:Injured
29:Details
1678:Wallan
1666:Kerang
1660:Cairns
1571:Geurie
1532:Exeter
1389:Dec 5
1380:Jul 2
1371:Jun 23
1362:Jun 3
1353:May 23
1344:Feb 18
1335:Feb 3
1326:Feb 1
1317:Jan 31
1308:Jan 3
1243:22 May
1212:26 May
1135:
1017:22 May
890:26 May
694:26 May
325:
300:Comeng
280:Metrol
242:V/Line
220:is an
176:train
171:Comeng
136:Trains
1601:Cowan
1237:(PDF)
1146:(PDF)
1129:(PDF)
310:463.
180:from
123:Cause
1292:2003
1288:2003
1245:2018
1214:2018
1188:2019
1154:2019
1133:ISBN
1110:2019
1086:2019
1045:2019
1019:2018
918:2019
892:2018
696:2018
506:and
478:and
267:and
216:The
152:Crew
93:Line
34:Date
1286:in
208:in
184:in
1711::
1205:.
1170:.
1077:.
1035:.
1009:.
908:.
883:.
844:^
769:^
752:^
686:.
263:,
196:.
48:,
1695:§
1690:‡
1590:§
1587:‡
1542:‡
1527:‡
1441:e
1434:t
1427:v
1294:)
1275:e
1268:t
1261:v
1247:.
1216:.
1190:.
1156:.
1112:.
1088:.
1047:.
1021:.
920:.
894:.
698:.
592:.
163:8
139:2
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.