Sino-Indian War - Knowledge

568: 3111:'s report of 1889: "In the former Chinese occupation the Kuen-Lun Mountains (that is the branch of them over which are the Kilian and Sanju Passes) were always recognised as the frontier, and the country to the south belonged to no one in particular. When the Chinese revolt took place and they were driven from Yarkand, the Kashmir State sent a detachment of troops to Shahidullah and built a fort there. Yakub Beg when he came into power at Yarkand sent some troops, who built a fort at Ali Nazar on the Karakash River at the junction of the roads from the Kilian and Sanju Passes. Shortly afterwards the Kashmiris evacuated the Shahidullah fort after occupying it for about three years, and the Andijanis then took possession of it and occupied it till Yakub Beg's death." 1810:, on the McMahon line. Flares launched by Indian troops the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley. The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bush fire, causing confusion among the Indians. Some 400 PLA troops attacked the Indian position. The initial Chinese assault was halted by accurate Indian mortar fire. The Chinese were then reinforced and launched a second assault. The Indians managed to hold them back for four hours, but the Chinese used weight of numbers to break through. Most Indian forces were withdrawn to established positions in Walong, while a company supported by mortars and medium machine guns remained to cover the retreat. 131: 1659:

Conference advanced the argument that the era of classical colonialism is gone and dead...contrary to facts." This was a distortion of Nehru's remarks but appeared close enough to be credible. On the same day, Chen Yi referred to Nehru by implication at the Bulgarian embassy reception: "Those who attempted to deny history, ignore reality, and distort the truth and who attempted to divert the Conference from its important object have failed to gain support and were isolated." On 10 September, they dropped all circumlocutions and criticised him by name in a China Youth article and NCNA report—the first time in almost two years that they had commented extensively on the Prime Minister.

3095:, p. 48, 83: An India Office (London) memorandum in 1893 stated: "Shahidulla has hitherto been regarded as the frontier post on the road from Leh to Yarkand. Lord Kimberley the secretary of state would suggest that the Chinese Government at Peking ... should be intimated...that the Indian authorities, acting on behalf of the Kashmir State, will gladly co-operate with the Chinese authorities in Kashgaria in determining the frontier on the road from Leh to Kashgar. Her Majesty’s Government would, however, demur to any attempt being made by the Kashgarian officials to fix the boundary of the Ladakh State on this road without their previous concurrence being obtained." 1607:

by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War. P. B. Sinha suggests that China waited until October to attack because the timing of the war was exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. Although American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola Post, and China's buildup between 10 and 20 October appeared to coincide exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October, the Chinese probably prepared for this before they could anticipate what would happen in Cuba.

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were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s. It was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. He argues that while the Chinese perception of Indian border actions were "substantially accurate", Chinese perceptions of the supposed Indian policy towards Tibet were "substantially inaccurate".

8023: 2223: 212: 580: 636: 1836: 355: 2061:. This was further triggered by Mao's statement that: "the way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra and Calcutta". The United States was unequivocal in its recognition of the Indian boundary claims in the eastern sector, while not supporting the claims of either side in the western sector. Britain, on the other hand, agreed with the Indian position completely, with the foreign secretary stating, 'we have taken the view of the government of India on the present frontiers and the disputed territories belong to India.' 720: 1039:, which the Chinese governments regarded as still part of China. Later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67 and placing border posts in Aksai Chin. India protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border. To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border. The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement. 1967: 890: 8524: 1471: 1306: 1181:

response to Indian outposts encircling Chinese positions, Chinese forces would build more outposts to counter-encircle these Indian positions. This pattern of encirclement and counter-encirclement resulted in an interlocking, chessboard-like deployment of Chinese and Indian forces. Despite the leapfrogging encirclements by both sides, no hostile fire occurred from either side as troops from both sides were under orders to fire only in defense. On the situation, Mao commented,

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Indians to leave their trenches. The Chinese overwhelmed the Indian troops in a series of flanking manoeuvres south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu. Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops retreated into Bhutan. Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue. Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thagla Ridge confrontation, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.

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7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometres (12 miles) back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometres (12 miles) from the line of actual control.

1262: 8498: 1269: 9557: 8435: 1330: 8481: 735: 4318:: ".. with the growth of commercial interests (mainly tea plantation and Umber), in the second half of the nineteenth century, the British Government became apprehensive of uncontrolled expansion of commercial activities by British merchants, because that could bring them into conflict with the tribal people. To prevent that possibility, the government decided, in 1873, to draw a line—the 'Inner Line'—that could not be crossed without a proper permit." 1483: 1766:

be cleared by anyone from their own territory ... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict ... At this critical moment ... we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."

3134:, which was theoretically a vassal state of both China and Kashmir. In 1890, the British invaded Hunza and replaced its ruler, and the Chinese remonstrated. The British wanted the Chinese to cede their suzerainty over Hunza and yet grant rights to cultivate lands outside its boundary. In return for this largesse, they were prepared to cede the Aksai Chin plains, but not Lingzi Tang plains, to China. Scholar Parshotam Mehra has termed it a 'barter'. 2402: 1318: 2239:

erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China. Indian President

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NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet. Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.

8033: 1732:, reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thagla Ridge on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India. In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict. 1557:, assigned some troops to secure regions south of the Thagla Ridge. Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola Post. Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop an escalation into all-out war. Indian troops marching to Thagla Ridge had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions; two 225: 1290: 1457: 1397: 1445: 1495: 1433: 1581:

second assault. In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties and the Chinese 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honours, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.

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and actions as clear signs that Nehru wanted to talk only about a Chinese withdrawal. Regarding the hope, they were willing to negotiate and tried to prod Nehru into a similar attitude. Regarding Indian intentions, they began to act politically and to build a rationale based on the assumption that Nehru already had become a lackey of imperialism; for this reason he opposed border talks.

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punish the Indians for trying to take that ground". In general terms, they tried to show the Indians once and for all that China would not acquiesce in a military "reoccupation" policy. Secondary reasons for the attack were to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing Indian weakness and to expose as traitorous Khrushchev's policy of supporting Nehru against a Communist country.

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international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated its willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognised the serious weaknesses in its army. It would more than double its military manpower in the next two years and it would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems to later become

1622:', causing fear of invasion from Taiwan among Chinese Communist leadership and the shift of concern to the Southeast. Reluctant to divert resources to the hostitlies in the Himalayas, Chinese leadership thought a two-front war undesirable. From July on, after receiving American assurances that KMT government would not invade, China began to focus on the Indian border. 3083:

occupied by the Andijani (Kokandi) troops of the late Amir Yakub Beg. In 1873–74 Sir D. Forsyth recognised the Amir’s ownership, and recommended the Maharaja’s boundary to be drawn to the north of the Karakash valley as shown in the map accompanying the mission report. This I believe has never been accepted by Kashmir, and the boundary has been left an open question."

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forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings. The PLA bypassed the defenders by fording the river, which was shallow at that time of year, instead. They formed up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river under cover of darkness, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.

2179:, says: "I think Mao created the Sino-Indian conflict precisely in order to draw the Soviet Union into it. He wanted to put us in the position of having to no choice but to support him. He wanted to be the one who decided what we should do. But Mao made a mistake in thinking we would agree to sacrifice our independence in foreign policy." 1626:

humans "to attribute others' behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived Indian aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalysing the Chinese reaction.

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and he resigned from the Survey. Others state that Johnson's bold explorations were highly commended, and he was rehired a year later at a higher salary. The "invitation" from the Khotanese ruler was likely a forcible removal, and the ruler was merely seeking British help in warding off Yakub Beg and the Russian Empire.

1702:, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike. On 22 September 1962, the 972:, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government". The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921. It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region. 2011:, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La. The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. The Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed. 1721:

troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thagla Ridge, Maj. General J. S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away." Because of this, the Indian Army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.

2322:, permitting the "apprehension and detention in custody of any person of being of hostile origin." The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname, Chinese ancestry or a Chinese spouse. The Indian government incarcerated thousands of Chinese-Indians in an 1203:, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops. In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war. 847:, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation. From 1917 to 1933, the "Postal Atlas of China", published by the Government of China in Peking had shown the boundary in Aksai Chin as per the Johnson line, which runs along the 1894:

Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations, but the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc. According

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Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual 20 kilometres (12 mi) withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometres (25 or 40 miles) of blatant

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Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be

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to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied

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Chinese policy toward India, therefore, operated on two seemingly contradictory assumptions in the first half of 1961. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders continued to entertain a hope, although a shrinking one, that some opening for talks would appear. On the other hand, they read Indian statements

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Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of

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The CIA's declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration — their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to

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Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which

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who commanded the forces at Thagla Ridge, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours". According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of

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The operation to occupy Thagla Ridge was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear, delaying it. In addition, each man had to carry 35 kilograms (77 lb) over the long trek, greatly slowing the reaction. By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled

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Indian leaders believed, based on previous diplomacy, that the Chinese would not react with force. According to the Indian Official History, Indian posts and Chinese posts were separated by a narrow stretch of land. China had been steadily spreading into those lands and India reacted with the Forward

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By 1892, the British settled on the policy that their preferred boundary for Kashmir was the "Indus watershed", i.e., the water-parting from which waters flow into the Indus river system on one side and into the Tarim basin on the other. In the north, this water-parting was along the Karakoram range.

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Some commentators state that Johnson's work was "severely criticised" as inaccurate. His boundary line was described as "patently absurd", and extending further north than the Indian claim. Johnson is said to have been reprimanded by the British Government for crossing into Khotan without permission

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In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the

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as it lacked the defence equipments to counter Chinese retaliation. Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question the once popular "Hindi-Chini

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meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed and nuclear options were considered. After listening to advisers, Kennedy stated "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India." By 1964, China had developed its

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Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres (12 miles) behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on

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By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) south of the control line prior to the conflict. Four days of fighting were followed by a

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On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops. Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre. By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been

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Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October. The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river. The Indians expected Chinese

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issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale. ... It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never

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commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death." The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that

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Another factor which might have affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-U.S.-India encirclement and isolation of China. India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets (and Americans) were preoccupied

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patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers. Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops. The Chinese troops opened fire

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On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker. On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory. Whereas

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We are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border as recognized by us. This will be done with a view to establishing additional posts located to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established

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In 1954, Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated; in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, assured India that China had no claims

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On 20 November 2006, Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962. Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan

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made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas. But, after the war, Pakistan improved its relations with China. It began border negotiations on 13 October 1962, concluding them in December. In 1963, the China-Pakistan Border Treaty was

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Indian forces suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. The Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line – many

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The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off the superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area

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After Zhou received Nehru's letter (rejecting Zhou's proposal), the fighting resumed on the eastern theatre on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese

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The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict. In August 1962, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out. Even in September 1962, when Indian

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This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October, it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack, with a massive troop buildup. A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions

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valley, facing the southern slopes of Thagla Ridge. Clearly, the Dhola Post lay north of the map-marked McMahon Line which straight across Tsangdhar Range but south of Thagla Ridge along which India interpreted the McMahon Line to run. In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying

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In 1960, based on an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, officials from India and China held discussions in order to settle the boundary dispute. China and India disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the western sector. The Chinese statements with respect to their border

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India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet". India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin

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According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian. The McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims. India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient

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official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. In 1873, the British drew an "Inner Line" as an administrative line to inhibit their subjects from encroaching into the tribal territory within its control. The British boundary, also called the "Outer Line", was defined to mark the limits

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In 1956–57, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places. Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was much more difficult. The road came

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in 1885: "He wants the Maharaja to re-occupy Shahidulla in the Karakash valley. Previous to the rebellions in Eastern Turkistan which broke up Chinese rule there in 1863, the Kashmiris had occupied Shahidulla for nearly 20 years. About 1865 they abandoned it, and in 1868 Shaw and Hayward found it

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on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment. Neville Maxwell claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was

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The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close

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Over the following days, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at Walong as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On 25 October, the Chinese made a probe, which was met with resistance from the 4th Sikhs. The following day, a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled, and after being

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Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened. In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and fuel.

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On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley and Pangong Lake. Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner.

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Declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth. It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to

1646:. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that’s great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up . Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation. 1580:

At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a

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As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory. In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over

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stated that he had no claims over Indian-controlled territory. He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction and that the McCartney-MacDonald Line was the line China could accept. Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty

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The old soldier broke in. "All the time they were quarreling with us these last two years over the boundary lines, they were planning. 'Our line is five thousand years old,' we said. 'Ours is eight thousand,' they said. Bitterness on both sides! But we never thought then that they would attack."

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At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the

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Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United

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In September, the Chinese took a step toward criticising Nehru openly in their commentary. After citing Indonesian and Burmese press criticism of Nehru by name, the Chinese critiqued his moderate remarks on colonialism (People's Daily Editorial, 9 September): "Somebody at the Non-Aligned Nations

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In the summer of 1961, China began patrolling along the McMahon Line. They entered parts of Indian administered regions and much angered the Indians in doing so. The Chinese, however, did not believe they were intruding upon Indian territory. In response the Indians launched a policy of creating

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was commissioned to survey the Aksai Chin region. While in the course of his work, he was "invited" by the Khotanese ruler to visit his capital. After returning, Johnson noted that Khotan's border was at Brinjga, in the Kunlun mountains, and the entire Karakash Valley was within the territory of

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According to James Calvin, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000 km) of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided

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Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November (before India's request for United States air support), but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire, and thus, American intervention on

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Krishna Menon is reported to have said that when he arrived in Geneva on 6 June 1961 for an international conference in Laos, Chinese officials in Chen Yi's delegation indicated that Chen might be interested in discussing the border dispute with him. At several private meetings with Menon, Chen

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In the 1950s, India began patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line. Given India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these

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was disappointed that Pakistan's decision not to take advantage of Indian vulnerabilities during its war with China was not rewarded with serious United States efforts in negotiations to settle the Kashmir dispute. Convinced that diplomatic solutions would not favor Pakistan, Pakistan launched

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The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were

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as well as for Soviet technical assistance in the manufacture of these aircraft in India. According to P.R. Chari, "The intended Indian production of these relatively sophisticated aircraft could only have incensed Peking so soon after the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China." In 1964,

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At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the

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On 20 October 1962, the PLA launched two attacks, 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) apart. In the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Gurkha rifles

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argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory that was legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation. Mao Zedong himself compared the

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On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Namka Chu. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru told the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given

1180:

The initial reaction of the Chinese forces was to withdraw when Indian outposts advanced towards them. However, this appeared to encourage the Indian forces to accelerate their Forward Policy even further. In response, the Central Military Commission adopted a policy of "armed coexistence". In

715:

to join the first route at Shahidulla. The Maharaja regarded Shahidulla as his northern outpost, in effect treating the Kunlun mountains as the boundary of his domains. His British suzerains were sceptical of such an extended boundary because Shahidulla was 79 miles (127 km) away from the

675:

region including Ladakh to the British, who then installed Gulab Singh as the Maharaja under their suzerainty. British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border, who did not show any interest. The British boundary commissioners fixed the southern end of the boundary at

2136:

During the conflict, Nehru wrote two letters on 19 November 1962 to U.S. President Kennedy, asking for 12 squadrons of fighter jets and a modern radar system. These jets were seen as necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that air-to-air combat could be initiated safely from the Indian

1855:

After realising the magnitude of the attack, the Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to

2137:

perspective. Bombing troops was seen as unwise for fear of Chinese retaliatory action. Nehru also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to replace them. These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration, which was involved in the

1883:

military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin.

2206:

Lora Saalman opined in a 2011 study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much blame, debates and acted as catalyst for the military modernisation of India, the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.

1655:

avoided any discussion of the dispute and Menon surmised that the Chinese wanted him to broach the matter first. He did not, as he was under instructions from Nehru to avoid taking the initiative, leaving the Chinese with the impression that Nehru was unwilling to show any flexibility.

1185:

Nehru wants to move forward and we won't let him. Originally, we tried to guard against this, but now it seems we cannot prevent it. If he wants to advance, we might as well adopt armed coexistence. You wave a gun, and I'll wave a gun. We'll stand face to face and can each practice our

2037:

India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles, but for the most part, the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The

1077:, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India. 777:

After the Chinese reconquered Turkestan in 1878, renaming it Xinjiang, they again reverted to their traditional boundary. By now, the Russian Empire was entrenched in Central Asia, and the British were anxious to avoid a common border with the Russians. After creating the

1865:

three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bomdi La which would be difficult to assault. Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing

975:

China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule. For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of

2175:, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence." India's favored relationship with Moscow continued into the 1980s, but ended after the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991. In his memoirs, the then Soviet leader, 2109:

on 10 December 1962. The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 kilometres (12 mi) from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf. The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.

2044:

Toward the end of the war India increased its support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained

2296:

also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered. The Indian government has attempted to keep the Hendersen-Brooks-Bhagat Report secret for decades, although portions of it have recently been leaked by Neville Maxwell.

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Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming, as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison. Following the 20 October attack, nothing was heard from Galwan.

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in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC.

1740:, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military, would be portrayed as an aggressor. He said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs. 984:, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border. 1054:

on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres (46,000 sq mi) of territory claimed by India as Chinese. They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.

2113:

Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India, citing nonalignment. In 1962, Pakistani president

2518:

In October 2011, it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the Line of Actual Control and resume the bilateral army exercises between the Indian and Chinese army from early 2012.

548:

Most combat took place at high elevations. The Aksai Chin region is a desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres (16,000 feet) above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7,000 metres (23,000 feet). The

1206:

During June–July 1962, Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:

913:

of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham,

1978:

On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack two

6836: 1998:

The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 123 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.

2123:

to China in favour of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range. The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line. India's military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the

782:

as the buffer in the northwest of Kashmir, they wanted the Chinese to fill out the "no man's land" between the Karakoram and Kunlun ranges. Under British (and possibly Russian) encouragement, the Chinese occupied the area up to the

567: 2064:

The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract both its own population and international opinion from its

2288:. The attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure. In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 India won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan). 447:

in the eastern theatre. The conflict ended when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal to its pre-war position, the effective China–India border (also known as the

2255:

than in actually waging war. Menon's favouritism weakened the Indian Army, and national morale dimmed. The public saw the war as a political and military debacle. Though the demand to deploy air force was raised, American envoy

1839:

The map shows the Indian and Chinese claims of the border in the Aksai Chin region, the Macartney-MacDonald line, the Foreign Office Line, as well as the progress of Chinese forces as they occupied areas during the Sino-Indian

842:

in 1917 and the end of World War I in 1918, the British officially used the Johnson Line but had lost the urgency to enforce this boundary. They took no steps to establish outposts or assert control on the ground. According to

1662:

By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to believe that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war. In 1961, the Indian Army had been sent into

3699:, p. 57: "The southern frontier of Chinese Turkestan was similarly undefined... the Chinese 'considered the Kuen-lun mountains (i.e. the branch of them over which are the Kilian and Sanju passes) as their frontier'..." 7181: 6993: 8298: 1683:. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces", while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end aggression on Indian soil just as it ended Portuguese aggression in Goa". 965:, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India, while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times. 867:, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed". 3303: 956:

later objected to the proposed boundary and did not ratify it. McMahon decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.

858:, the British left the government of India with high ambiguity about the settled border to the North. The Indian government choose to lay claim to Aksai Chin after 1947. On 1 July 1954, India's first Prime Minister 2168:

further Indian requests for American jets were rejected. However, Moscow offered loans, low prices and technical help in upgrading India's armaments industry. By 1964, India was a major purchaser of Soviet arms.

6168: 2015:

Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. The war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the number of casualties.

862:

definitively stated the Indian position, claiming that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable. According to

988:

locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.

2269:

bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the

2234:

conferring at the time of the conflict. This photograph was taken by the United States Information Service (USIS) and sent to President John F. Kennedy with a letter from Galbraith dated 9 November 1962.

791:), including Shahidulla, by 1890. They also erected a boundary pillar at the Karakoram pass by about 1892. These efforts appear half-hearted. A map provided by Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese official at 613:

and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.

4338:: "The tribal peoples, notably the Abors, Daflas, Mishmis, Monpas, Akas and Miris, apart from some occasional episodes of subordination to Assam or Tibet, were for all practical purposes independent." 1777:

to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self-defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.

6833: 6742: 6712: 1944:, a major frontier town nearly 50 kilometres (31 mi) from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the 1773:

headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on

7989: 3827:, pp. 73, 78: "Clarke added that a Chinese map drawn by Hung Ta-chen, Minister in St. Petersburg, confirmed the Johnson alignment showing West Aksai Chin as within British (Kashmir) territory." 1107:

Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the PLA took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line, and two months later in Aksai Chin, a

431:. Chinese military action grew increasingly aggressive after India rejected proposed Chinese diplomatic settlements throughout 1960–1962, with China resuming previously banned "forward patrols" in 6641: 933:

which were mostly removed by the British by 1910. Such aggression from the Chinese conveyed to the Colonial administration that the Tawang tract could serve as a route of invasion in the future.

1508: 8174: 6501: 2192:

According to China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China continued its de facto control of the Aksai Chin.

3440: 1538:

both banks of the Namka Chu River. On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.

8179: 2243:

said that Nehru's government was naive and negligent about preparations, and Nehru admitted "We had been living in a world of our own making". According to Inder Malhotra, a former editor of

2057:

According to James Calvin, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China–India border war, and saw the war as part of a monolithic communist objective for a world

3401: 1887:

Kingdom supported India's response. The Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other

8293: 2472:. The United States did not provide advance notice to Pakistan of the arms' shipment and ignored Pakistan's concerns that these arms might be used by India against Pakistan. Additionally, 2364:

India has also had some military conflicts with China after the 1962 war. In late 1967, there were two conflicts in which both countries clashed in Sikkim. These conflicts were dubbed the

2902:

has an account of the war and the predicament of the Indian government and the army in the face of the better-equipped and organised Chinese forces. The central character in the novel, a

561:, harsh conditions have caused more casualties than have enemy actions. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides succumbing to the freezing cold temperatures. 742:

Chinese Turkestan regarded the "northern branch" of the Kunlun range with the Kilian and Sanju passes as its southern boundary. Thus the Maharaja's claim was uncontested. After the 1862

553:

had possession of one of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions caused logistical and welfare difficulties. In past similar conflicts, such as the

439:, China abandoned all attempts towards a peaceful resolution on 20 October 1962, invading disputed territory along the 3,225-kilometre (2,004 mi) border in Ladakh and across the 459:, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (13,000 feet). Notably, the war took place entirely on land, without the use of naval or air assets by either side. 7943:, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War. 5805: 9956: 7173: 6985: 4369: 3335:, pp. 340–341. The source says Indian wounded were 1,047 and attributes it to Indian Defence Ministry's 1965 report, but this report also included a lower estimate of killed. 2368:

respectively, in which advancing Chinese forces were forced to withdraw from Sikkim, then a protectorate of India and later a state of India after its annexation in 1975. In the

1686:

By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as

6229: 1534:

discretion to use force. On 11 September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".

2003:

battle was over. Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops. The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral. The battles also saw the death of

5399:"The Himalayan Border Crisis. – Chinese Offensive in Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency. – 100-Mile Chinese Advance in N.E.F.A. – Unilateral Cease-Fire by Chinese Forces" 4613: 922:

By 1873, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India.

6613: 3998: 3560: 1115: 639:

1878 British map, with trade routes between Ladakh and Tarim Basin marked. The border preferred by British Indian Empire, shown in two-toned purple and pink, included the

7057: 6268: 5070: 6131: 746:, which saw the expulsion of the Chinese from Turkestan, the Maharaja of Kashmir constructed a small fort at Shahidulla in 1864. The fort was most likely supplied from 8019: 5572: 9951: 9619: 8288: 8169: 6789: 1125:

designs on China. The PLA went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan. Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.

9645: 9481: 6386: 5099: 1042:

At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956,

443:

in the northeastern frontier. Chinese troops pushed Indian forces back in both theatres, capturing all of their claimed territory in the western theatre and the

5012: 1930:. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops. 8600: 6196: 5413: 4502:

History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.

8127: 5287: 2319: 6585: 1133:

caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.

738:

The map of Hung Ta-chen handed to the British consul at Kashgar in 1893. The boundary, marked with a thin dot-dashed line, agrees with the 1878 British map.

716:

Karakoram Pass and the intervening area was uninhabited. Nevertheless, the Maharaja was allowed to treat Shahidulla as his outpost for more than 20 years.

1173:

This has been referred to as the "Forward Policy". There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 along the Chinese-claimed frontier in Aksai Chin.

9451: 9253: 8251: 8011: 7121: 6509: 5857: 6633: 5346: 9752: 9456: 9163: 9158: 5148: 2264:

had advised against the use of air force believing that the Chinese would bomb Indian cities in retaliation. India ultimately refrained from using the

5741: 1948:, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance. 1736:

expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal, followed by a return to the negotiating table. India led the

579: 9000: 4737: 7025: 1142:

claims often misrepresented the cited sources. The failure of these negotiations was compounded by successful Chinese border agreements with Nepal (

811:

flow into the Indus whereas the Karakash River flows into the Tarim basin. A boundary alignment along this water-parting was defined by the Viceroy

631:

Traditional borders of Jammu and Kashmir (CIA map). The northern boundary is along the Karakash valley. Aksai Chin is the shaded region in the east.

8615: 8268: 5492: 5377: 3385: 5646: 4544: 4517: 1061:, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the slogan 795:, in 1893 showed the boundary of Xinjiang up to Raskam. In the east, it was similar to the Johnson line, placing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. 9214: 8727: 5048: 7151: 1233:, Mao was able to persuade Khrushchev to reverse the Russian policy of backing India, at least temporarily. In mid-October, the Communist organ 4770: 67: 7639: 4931: 3631:

The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan. 1960), pp. 96–125,

2195:

According to James Calvin, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image. China's first nuclear weapon

9368: 8650: 8122: 1080:

This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the

3755: 3280: 1177:

Policy to demonstrate that those lands were not unoccupied. Neville Maxwell traces this confidence to the Intelligence Bureau chief Mullik.

534:, which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965. The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of 8739: 8273: 3424: 2663: 1143: 1121:

defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had

1043: 4568:"Constructing Peaceful Coexistence: Nehru's Approach to Regional Security and India's Rapprochement with Communist China in the Mid-1950s" 1195:

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the

9982: 9675: 9341: 8610: 8605: 8470: 8421: 8416: 5802: 4283: 3222: 3183: 2141:

during most of the Sino-Indian War. The U.S. nonetheless provided non-combat assistance to Indian forces and planned to send the carrier

5542: 3304:"'Nobody believed we had killed so many Chinese at Rezang La. Our commander called me crazy and warned that I could be court-martialed'" 1069:, the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister 6605: 1709: 7211:"From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' to 'international class struggle' against Nehru: China's India policy and the frontier dispute, 1950–62" 6533: 6252: 929:. This treaty alarmed the Chinese which started displaying power by crushing rebellions and erecting flags and boundary stones in the 754:, the Maharaja was forced to abandon his post in 1867. It was then occupied by Yakub Beg's forces until the end of the Dungan Revolt. 750:, whose ruler was now independent and on friendly terms with Kashmir. When the Khotanese ruler was deposed by the Kashgaria strongman 9904: 9168: 9153: 9140: 6219: 3598: 2805: 2301: 730:

and back (1865). Johnson's proposed boundary ran along the "northern branch" of the Kunlun Mountains. (Its curvature is exaggerated.)

7208: 6963: 4403: 9207: 8771: 8717: 8164: 6165:

Leaked 1962 report reveals India's still-unresolved military weaknesses, Lowy Interpreter, 2 April 2014. Retrieved 1 September 2014

2355: 550: 43: 6866: 5517: 4621: 1239:

encouraged peace between India and China. When the Cuban Missile Crisis ended and Mao's rhetoric changed, Russia reversed course.

9610: 9446: 9148: 8089: 8004: 3975: 3544: 1093: 1058: 9219: 6111: 854:

The use of Johnson line or Macartney-MacDonald line was neglected by the colonial administrators and by 1947, when India gained

9997: 9992: 6462: 5621:

Anand Giridharadas (26 August 2005). "'63 Tapes Reveal Kennedy and Aides Discussed Using Nuclear Arms in a China-India Clash".

5259: 4190: 1630: 8993: 7047: 5596: 9383: 8978: 8672: 8132: 8063: 8053: 7931: 7841: 7820: 7658: 7615: 7593: 7571: 7551: 7531: 7511: 7477: 7394: 7298: 7275: 7242: 7222: 6905: 6698: 6679: 6660: 6396: 6369: 6333: 6262: 6141: 6068: 6043: 6016: 5468: 5323: 4458: 4353: 4333: 4313: 4207: 4090: 3554: 3434: 3395: 3274: 3177: 1155: 6931: 5867: 4958: 4712: 4547: 4213: 3362: 9399: 9292: 9202: 9010: 8283: 8159: 2469: 2377: 2351: 1573:

on the Indians, thinking they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions, which used

1066: 17: 5568: 5200: 4771:"Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question – Part 2" 4358:: "It followed the line of 'the foot of the hills' a few miles to the north of what became the course of the Inner Line." 1852:

On 24 October, Indian forces fought hard to hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling.

9227: 9062: 9030: 8692: 8655: 6563: 6323: 5916:

Blank, Stephen; Levitzky, Edward (2015). "Geostrategic aims of the Russian arms trade in East Asia and the Middle East".

4984: 2073:

administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963

1813:

Elsewhere, Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.

6773: 9716: 9346: 8574: 8438: 7997: 7801: 5234: 3356: 3216: 2292: 672: 2997:(2018) is based on the later 1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes along the Sikkim border and is set just after 1962 war. 1712:

over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not 'now say that warning was not served in advance'."

944:

to settle the borders between Tibet, China and British India. The foreign secretary of the British Indian government,

651:

The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the conquest of Ladakh by the armies of Raja

9425: 9025: 8973: 8682: 8662: 8595: 8565: 8341: 8256: 7980: 7903: 7604:"India's gateway to Central Asia: trans-Himalayan trade and cultural movements through Kashmir and Ladakh, 1846–1947" 6095: 4852: 2501: 2473: 2444: 2027:. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated, 1036: 368: 96: 9588: 6188: 5398: 3889: 1050:

between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.

9862: 9512: 9420: 9415: 9378: 9057: 8968: 8746: 8585: 5973: 5719: 2539:

awardees. Indian Air Force personnel to get the award include 1 Maha Vir Chakra awardee and 8 Vir Chakra awardees.

2304:. India's efforts to improve its military posture significantly enhanced its army's capabilities and preparedness. 2078:

own nuclear weapon which would have likely caused any American nuclear policy in defense of India to be reviewed.

2023:

China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November, it declared a unilateral

969: 609:

of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to

130: 5594:

Abstract of "Fighting to Make a Point: Policy-Making by Aggressive War on the Chinese Borders" by Jr Pettis Roy C.

5279: 3529: 1817:

unable to break the encirclement, an Indian unit was able to flank the Chinese, allowing the Sikhs to break free.

9868: 9336: 9232: 8751: 8580: 8463: 7681: 6844: 3022: 2973: 2411: 2381: 2074: 2058: 1699: 5352: 5095: 9527: 9461: 8645: 8590: 8570: 8303: 8117: 5154: 2891: 1081: 997: 554: 401: 7111: 2203:

tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.

10002: 9892: 9856: 9734: 9651: 9537: 9308: 8809: 8667: 8357: 8137: 6090:. Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology. Springer International Publishing. p. 105. 5971:

Saalman, Lora (Spring–Summer 2011). "Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions".

2982: 2313: 1218: 1085: 1024: 7174:"Abhay Deol-Mahesh Manjrekar's web series on Indo-China war preponed to cash in on the anti-China sentiment" 5489: 5435: 5374: 2468:

In the aftermath of India's defeat the United States shipped arms to India, which prompted a cooling off in

2214:

crisis, when the Chinese official media served up a daily vitriol of teaching a "bitter lesson" as in 1962.

925:

In 1904, in order to skew Tibet away from Russian influence, an Anglo-Tibetan treaty was written called the

9740: 8988: 8925: 8920: 8875: 8079: 7700: 6296: 3052: 2458: 1927: 855: 820: 691:

The Maharaja of Kashmir and his officials were keenly aware of the trade routes from Ladakh. Starting from

482:

refused to sell advanced weaponry to India, further compelling it to turn to the Soviets for military aid.

6402: 3462:

Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English language: Chronology of Major Dates in History

2557:

in 1962, by the Government of India, in the Civil Service category, for his contributions during the war.

2384:

for the first time since the war ended. In 2022, dozens of Chinese and Indian soldiers were injured after

1895:

to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.

9987: 9928: 9791: 9746: 9603: 9507: 9497: 9197: 8960: 8885: 8870: 8865: 8722: 8640: 8555: 8144: 8048: 7650: 7015: 5992: 5961:; Jerrold L Schecter. Khrushchev remembers (volume 2): the last testament. London: Deutsch, 1974, p. 364. 2967: 2365: 2343: 2291:

As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified

1971: 1750:

On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the

1032: 743: 39: 6627: 6625: 6623: 2119:

signed, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties. Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in

1786:

travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three

1268: 815:

and communicated to London. The British government in due course proposed it to China via its envoy Sir

573:

A pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so-called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary.

9764: 9560: 9052: 9035: 8677: 8456: 8362: 8191: 8096: 8084: 6291: 5636: 4641: 3047: 3001: 2750: 2667: 2484: 2285: 1261: 915: 758: 723: 600: 539: 405: 166: 118: 5040: 2844: 1872:

That both sides disengage and withdraw 20 kilometres (12 mi) from present lines of actual control

9850: 9575: 9502: 9430: 8983: 8940: 8880: 8560: 8367: 8058: 8027: 7205:

Calvin, James Bernard, "The China – India Border War" (Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984).

7143: 6620: 5749: 3032: 2550: 2369: 2347: 2281: 1690:

increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines. Foreign Minister

596: 4777: 4734: 4567: 4016: 3726: 1161:

outposts behind the Chinese troops so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China.

968:

The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the

919:

of British jurisdiction. But it was not significantly different from the Inner Line in this region.

9977: 9728: 9072: 8935: 8890: 8804: 8799: 8756: 8734: 8687: 8261: 7319:(45). Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies: 157–163. 6484: 5503: 4939: 4807: 4795: 4751: 4636: 2988: 2542: 1933:

Se La occupied high ground, and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured

78: 7469: 3830: 9710: 9269: 8930: 8814: 8794: 8789: 8550: 8394: 8239: 7089: 3763: 3687:, p. 57: "Shahidulla was occupied by the Dogras almost from the time they conquered Ladakh." 3057: 2462: 2200: 2070: 2038: 1755: 1751: 910: 771: 7711:

Brecher, Michael (1979). "Non-alignment under stress: The West and the India-China border war".

7252: 4424:

The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Foreign Language Press of the People's Republic of China, 1961

9722: 9686: 9596: 9373: 9287: 9192: 9187: 9173: 9080: 8847: 8336: 8246: 8149: 7789: 6192: 3144: 3131: 3042: 2928: 2763: 2415: 2257: 2227: 2142: 2046: 828: 751: 449: 192: 7541: 6357: 6085: 6033: 5313: 4877: 3262: 3206: 3167: 2222: 948:

was the driving force in this conference. After carrying out surveys, the conference drew the

897:

In 1826, British India gained a common border with Tibet after the British wrested control of

9663: 9532: 9522: 9517: 9245: 8842: 8837: 8819: 8372: 8234: 8154: 7850:

Li, Mingjiang (2011). "Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63".

7581: 7263: 7210: 5538: 5458: 3606: 3037: 3027: 2639: 2041:

flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.

1961: 1089: 824: 424: 7603: 7579: 7355:

Mehra, Parshotham (1991), ""John Lall, Aksai Chin and Sino-Indian Conflict" (Book review)",

6006: 4261: 2934:(literally, "Oh, the People of My Country") in the presence of Nehru. The song, composed by 9922: 9570: 9565: 9313: 9040: 8766: 8761: 7749:"'Cartographic Aggression': Media Politics, Propaganda, and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute" 6523: 5604: 3666: 3108: 2951: 2373: 2138: 2082: 1830: 1737: 1230: 1108: 668: 436: 7627:

Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries

5523: 2426: 1667:, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after 8: 9898: 9704: 9318: 9088: 8895: 8484: 7539: 6953: 6705: 4637:"Cold War co-operation: New Chinese evidence on Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 visit to Beijing" 4395: 3868: 3712: 3006: 2978: 2916: 2721: 2479: 2278: 1957: 1790:

of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.

1774: 1691: 1252: 962: 926: 884: 864: 711:, passed the Lingzi Tang Plains in the Aksai Chin region, and followed the course of the 708: 695:, there were two main routes into Central Asia: one passed through the Karakoram Pass to 635: 423:

There had been a series of violent border skirmishes between the two countries after the

306: 255: 74: 6117: 3842: 667:

agreeing to stick to the "old, established frontiers", which were left unspecified. The

9910: 9758: 9326: 9045: 8915: 8545: 7867: 7770: 7728: 7443: 7435: 7372: 7336: 7328: 7052: 7020: 6861: 6436: 5933: 5898: 5862: 5839: 5785: 5688: 5004: 4658: 4587: 4438: 3942: 3934: 3632: 3521: 2385: 2359: 2125: 2066: 1101: 1008: 953: 839: 808: 7695: 3917:

Maxwell, Neville (July–September 1970), "China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute",

3790: 2500:

as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public, as the two sides have engaged in

1217:

Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after

851:. The "Peking University Atlas", published in 1925, also put the Aksai Chin in India. 827:

in the north. In return, the British wanted China to cede its 'shadowy suzerainty' on

9916: 9669: 9639: 9618: 9278: 8399: 7976: 7951: 7927: 7899: 7871: 7837: 7816: 7813:

The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962

7797: 7782: 7774: 7654: 7611: 7589: 7567: 7547: 7527: 7507: 7473: 7447: 7390: 7376: 7340: 7294: 7271: 7250: 7238: 7218: 6901: 6889: 6781: 6440: 6392: 6365: 6329: 6258: 6091: 6064: 6039: 6012: 5950: 5937: 5464: 5319: 5183: 5008: 4870: 4848: 4813: 4801: 4757: 4662: 4591: 4203: 4086: 4079: 4022: 3990: 3946: 3872: 3732: 3716: 3550: 3430: 3391: 3352: 3270: 3212: 3173: 2903: 2261: 2176: 2156: 1945: 1704: 1611: 1200: 1118: 1065:(Indians and Chinese are brothers) was popularised. Nehru in 1958 had privately told 1020: 835: 664: 535: 495: 463: 7664: 6454: 5318:. Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy. Taylor & Francis. p. 160. 5315:

The Socioeconomics of Nationalism in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

5256: 1835: 893:

The McMahon Line is the red line marking the northern boundary of the disputed area.

9657: 9542: 9237: 9130: 9120: 8857: 8529: 7859: 7760: 7720: 7465: 7427: 7364: 7320: 6428: 5954: 5925: 5890: 5831: 5777: 5680: 5593: 4996: 4650: 4579: 4254: 3926: 3513: 3474: 2685: 2644: 2604: 2599: 2528: 2515:

pass was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.

2327: 2265: 2231: 2172: 2081:

The non-aligned nations remained mostly uninvolved, and only Egypt (officially the

1904: 1826: 1577:. They managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties. 1554: 1196: 1070: 1002: 941: 906: 859: 848: 816: 700: 491: 456: 400:

that took place from October to November 1962. It was a military escalation of the

251: 7563:

Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives

6038:. Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy. Taylor & Francis. pp. 177–178. 5929: 5768:

Dobell, W. M. (Autumn 1964). "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty".

4583: 4454: 1856:

consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.

9135: 9067: 8331: 8299:

Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs

7970: 7863: 7831: 7640:"Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA lessons from the Sino-Indian War" 7625: 7561: 7521: 7501: 7459: 7384: 7288: 7284: 7232: 6921: 6893: 6301: 5809: 5600: 5496: 5381: 5263: 4954: 4842: 4741: 4720: 4654: 4551: 4462: 4197: 4074: 3346: 2946: 2924: 2898: 2882: 2799: 2773: 2768: 2726: 2690: 2609: 2532: 2008: 1680: 1615: 1562: 1550: 937: 844: 800: 792: 779: 766:

Kashmir. The boundary of Kashmir that he drew, stretching from Sanju Pass to the

762: 719: 428: 362: 259: 6818: 5209: 5170:

The Origins of the Cultural Revolution- 3. The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966

1966: 1910:

resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.

1743:

China also reportedly bought a significant amount of Indian rupee currency from

1214:

Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.

889: 518:. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the 30:"Indo-Chinese War" redirects here. For the war in the area named Indochina, see 9844: 9631: 8389: 7908: 7368: 7085: 6432: 5958: 5499: 5240: 4332:

harvp error: no target: CITEREFLin,_Boundary,_sovereignty_and_imagination2004 (

3642: 3130:

The so-called Macartney-MacDonald proposal was precipitated by the crisis over

3013:, with its release being advanced due to the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes. 2957: 2794: 2784: 2746: 2732: 1619: 712: 704: 681: 479: 35: 7487: 7431: 7324: 7079: 6856: 6555: 6087:

A Technological History of Cold-War India, 1947–⁠1969: Autarky and Foreign Aid

5000: 3930: 1073:

since his communist background clouded his thinking about China. According to

9971: 9880: 9803: 8709: 8214: 8209: 7635: 7455: 7403: 6840: 6814: 6785: 6416: 5460:

Armed Coexistence: The Dynamics of the Intractable Sino-Indian Border Dispute

3994: 3778: 3351:(paperback ed.). HarperCollins Publishers India. p. 343, note 134. 3265:. In Ryan, Mark A.; Finkelstein, David Michael; McDevitt, Michael A. (eds.). 2992: 2935: 2877: 2680: 2649: 2252: 2240: 2149: 2004: 1941: 1329: 945: 784: 660: 644: 515: 475: 31: 7601: 7519: 7489:

Losing Face: the British foreign service and the question of Tibet 1904–1922

6035:

India-America Relations (1942-62): Rooted in the Liberal International Order

3672: 3654: 3613: 3169:

War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet

1747:, supposedly to distribute amongst its soldiers in preparation for the war. 9182: 8448: 8404: 7919: 6224: 5641: 2939: 2622: 2160: 1122: 981: 949: 880: 804: 677: 499: 470:

made a major effort to support India, especially with the sale of advanced

467: 440: 136: 6251:

Bajpai, Kanti; Ho, Selina; Miller, Manjari Chatterjee (25 February 2020).

4327: 4112:

George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963

1891:, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal. 9818: 8829: 8781: 8516: 8503: 8204: 7765: 7748: 6362:

The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform

3976:"Sino-Indian Border Dispute at Aksai Chin – A Middle Path For Resolution" 2380:, in which several troops were injured. In 2020, soldiers were killed in 2196: 1992: 1984: 1888: 1770: 1574: 930: 656: 652: 606: 558: 523: 7386:

An "agreed" frontier: Ladakh and India's northernmost borders, 1846–1947

6865:. Australian Capital Territory, Australia. 3 December 1966. p. 10. 5711: 3952: 2906:, has his son fighting the Chinese in the war and dies in the battle of 2832: 2422: 2284:

and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965 and

1698:

Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's

490:

China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches by

9812: 9125: 9095: 8199: 7732: 7261: 6926: 6599: 6597: 6595: 5902: 5843: 5789: 5692: 3525: 3501: 2911: 2554: 2536: 2323: 2251:, Indian politicians invested more effort in removing Defence Minister 2024: 1970:

The disputed areas in the western sector, shown in a 1988 map from the

1643: 1542: 1522: 1248: 1097: 1046: 812: 734: 696: 640: 622: 519: 413: 246: 242: 162: 8480: 7963:

The History of Counterattack Action on Sino-Indian Border(中印边境自卫反击作战史）

7439: 7332: 7308: 6634:"21 Param Vir Chakra Winners Every Indian Should Know and Be Proud of" 4442: 3938: 3636: 2459:

Pakistan established close military and strategic relations with China

2378:

2017 the two countries once again were involved in a military standoff

1878:

That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.

1728:

On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Defence minister,

8294:

Special Representative mechanism on the India-China boundary question

7454: 7382: 6986:"Dibrugarh lad's film 1962: My Country Land to be screened at Cannes" 6528: 4249: 3860: 3848: 3836: 3812: 3808: 3796: 3708: 3696: 3684: 3104: 3092: 3079: 3075: 2704: 2569: This along with the *, indicates posthumously presented awards. 2508: 2331: 2115: 2102: 2094: 1919: 1744: 1526: 507: 7724: 7408:

Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962

6592: 5894: 5835: 5781: 5684: 5671:

Retzlaff, Ralph J. (1963). "India: A Year of Stability and Change".

3762:. Vol. 26, no. 18. Madras: The Hindu group. Archived from 3517: 1695:

a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.

980:, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction. Up until 542:. Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict. 8411: 6959: 6388:

Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History

6164: 4352:

harvp error: no target: CITEREFLamb,_The_McMahon_Line,_Vol._21966 (

2512: 2270: 2090: 1934: 1787: 1729: 1668: 1164:

On 5 December 1961 orders went to the Eastern and Western commands:

1016: 767: 527: 372: 122: 8279:

Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, 2005

7647:

The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75

5822:

Chari, P.R. (1979). "Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review".

5569:"What did China Gain at the End of the Fighting in November 1962?" 4433:

Gupta, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy",

3546:

India-USSR Relations, 1947–1971: From Ambivalence to Steadfastness

3475:"Sino-Indian War | Causes, Summary, & Casualties | Britannica" 627: 375:, misplaced vowels or missing conjuncts instead of Indic text. 9884: 8379: 8229: 7251:

Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963),

5463:. Politics of South Asia. Springer Nature Singapore. p. 47. 5431: 4985:"1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power" 3010: 2907: 2120: 2106: 1980: 1923: 1708:

published an article which claimed that "the Chinese people were

1672: 1635: 1136: 898: 823:, ceded to China the Aksai Chin plains in the northeast, and the 707:

through the Kilian and Sanju passes; the other went east via the

585:

A postal map of China, published by the Government of China, 1917

471: 7833:

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century

6485:"india-china bilateral relations – Ministry of External Affairs" 6061:

The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte

5277: 3869:

Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (2013)

2318:

Soon after the end of the war, the Indian government passed the

2307: 1525:

on the northern slopes of Tsangdhar Range, in the right-side of

1003:

Border dispute after Partition of India and formation of the PRC

404:. Fighting occurred along India's border with China, in India's 9691: 8384: 8219: 7924:

JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War

7645:, in Laurie Burkitt; Andrew Scobell; Larry M. Wortzel. (eds.), 6502:"India-China to resume annual defence dialogue early next year" 2708: 2626: 2337: 2211: 2164: 1807: 1725:

have been ready for the threat of a counter-attack from China.

1675: 1569: 1558: 1235: 1104:

to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.

977: 788: 747: 727: 610: 503: 444: 432: 409: 7881:

The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries

7354: 7283: 6881: 4917: 4347: 3784: 3713:

Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute 2013

3660: 3648: 3619: 3338: 2277:

ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by

1521:

In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost called the

9957:

Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China

9830: 9623: 8319: 8224: 8032: 8022: 7794:

Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years

7461:

India–China Boundary Problem 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy

6686: 6667: 6648: 5881:

Singh, S. Nihal (1984). "Why India goes to Moscow for arms".

4884: 2754: 2712: 2671: 2630: 2098: 2086: 1687: 1012: 902: 531: 511: 417: 397: 393: 230: 217: 170: 42:. For the recent border dispute between China and India, see 7972:

1962 Border War: Sino-Indian Territorial Disputes and Beyond

7896:

Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

7889:

China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World

7623: 6586:"Extraordinary Gazette of India, 1965-10-27, Extra Ordinary" 5858:"Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for US help against China in 1962" 4260:. New York and London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3958: 3912: 3910: 3873:

Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963)

3824: 1918:

In the eastern theatre, the PLA attacked Indian forces near

952:. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, 9783: 8324: 7499: 7116: 6391:. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press. p. 408. 6136: 4776:. Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1961. Archived from 3864: 3720: 3455: 2546: 2085:) openly supported India. Of the non-aligned nations, six, 7829: 4814: