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RSA problem

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Just as there are no proofs that integer factorization is computationally difficult, there are also no proofs that the RSA problem is similarly difficult. By the above method, the RSA problem is at least as easy as factoring, but it might well be easier. Indeed, there is strong evidence pointing to
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this conclusion: that a method to break the RSA method cannot be converted necessarily into a method for factoring large semiprimes. This is perhaps easiest to see by the sheer overkill of the factoring approach: the RSA problem asks us to decrypt
375:, David Naccache and Emmanuel Thomé, 2007. This Asiacrypt 2007 paper (link is to a preprint version) proves that solving the RSA problem using an oracle to some certain other special cases of the RSA problem is easier than factoring. 68:(in excess of 1024 bits), no efficient method for solving this problem is known; if an efficient method is ever developed, it would threaten the current or eventual security of RSA-based cryptosystems—both for 1298: 346: 1238: 1068: 698: 210:
arbitrary ciphertexts, and it also allows one to perform arbitrary RSA private-key encryptions. Along these same lines, finding the decryption exponent
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solving the RSA problem directly. To achieve the full strength of the RSA problem, an RSA-based cryptosystem must also use a
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In addition to the RSA problem, RSA also has a particular mathematical structure that can potentially be exploited
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is chosen randomly within that range; to specify the problem with complete precision, one must also specify how
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Boneh, Dan; Venkatesan, Ramarathnam (1998). "Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring".
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are generated, which will depend on the precise means of RSA random keypair generation in use.
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arbitrary ciphertext, whereas the factoring method reveals the private key: thus decrypting
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The most efficient method known to solve the RSA problem is by first factoring the modulus
345:, D. Brown, 2005. This unrefereed preprint purports that solving the RSA problem using a 8: 986: 735: 362: 1438: 1428: 316: 1092: 1076: 1023: 582: 505: 485: 480: 460: 260: 73: 46: 1276: 1152: 1142: 1013: 842: 785: 713: 599: 294: 1403: 1087: 688: 286: 50: 28: 1480: 1398: 1162: 1082: 1043: 991: 976: 285:. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 1403. Springer. pp. 59–71. 1495: 1243: 1198: 1157: 1137: 1033: 996: 971: 1193: 1038: 1028: 1018: 981: 930: 882: 862: 372: 116: 57: 20: 1172: 657: 1132: 1102: 1097: 1058: 806: 538: 290: 60:
are not known. Thus, the task can be neatly described as finding the
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More specifically, the RSA problem is to efficiently compute
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Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
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roots of an arbitrary number, modulo N. For large RSA
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Breaking RSA Generically is Equivalent to Factoring
1493: 313:An algorithm for this is, for example, given in 280: 222:, even though the RSA problem does not ask for 1292: 915: 402: 342:Breaking RSA may be as difficult as factoring 369:When e-th Roots Become Easier Than Factoring 198:can then be decrypted with the private key. 416: 1299: 1285: 922: 908: 409: 395: 263:, whose equivalency to factoring is known 315:Menezes; van Oorschot; Vanstone (2001). 218:computationally equivalent to factoring 1494: 349:is as difficult as factoring provided 1280: 903: 390: 283:Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT'98 170:a task believed to be impractical if 31:private-key operation given only the 27:summarizes the task of performing an 730:Naccache–Stern knapsack cryptosystem 13: 1502:Computational hardness assumptions 1308:Computational hardness assumptions 334: 14: 1518: 1347:Decisional composite residuosity 1257: 1256: 929: 324:Handbook of Applied Cryptography 16:Unsolved problem in cryptography 761:Discrete logarithm cryptography 1118:Information-theoretic security 307: 274: 115:(i.e., a product of two large 1: 365:is as difficult as factoring. 267: 35:. The RSA algorithm raises a 1383:Computational Diffie–Hellman 776:Non-commutative cryptography 7: 1471:Exponential time hypothesis 1234:Message authentication code 1189:Cryptographic hash function 1002:Cryptographic hash function 873:Identity-based cryptography 766:Elliptic-curve cryptography 244: 174:is sufficiently large (see 10: 1523: 1113:Harvest now, decrypt later 143:), and that 0 â‰¤  1481:Planted clique conjecture 1463: 1450:Ring learning with errors 1417: 1391: 1378:Decisional Diffie–Hellman 1360: 1314: 1252: 1229:Post-quantum cryptography 1181: 937: 899: 878:Post-quantum cryptography 835: 827:Post-Quantum Cryptography 794: 753: 681: 623: 504: 431: 424: 386: 382: 119:), that 2 <  83:given an RSA public key ( 1219:Quantum key distribution 1209:Authenticated encryption 1064:Random number generation 1507:Public-key cryptography 1476:Unique games conjecture 1425:Shortest vector problem 1399:External Diffie–Hellman 1214:Public-key cryptography 1204:Symmetric-key algorithm 1007:Key derivation function 967:Cryptographic primitive 960:Authentication protocol 950:Outline of cryptography 945:History of cryptography 771:Hash-based cryptography 418:Public-key cryptography 317:"Public-Key Encryption" 256:RSA Factoring Challenge 1455:Short integer solution 1435:Closest vector problem 955:Cryptographic protocol 363:generic ring algorithm 1342:Quadratic residuosity 1322:Integer factorization 1108:End-to-end encryption 1054:Cryptojacking malware 433:Integer factorization 347:Straight line program 251:Strong RSA assumption 176:integer factorization 70:public-key encryption 1445:Learning with errors 1224:Quantum cryptography 1148:Trusted timestamping 987:Cryptographic nonce 736:Three-pass protocol 353:has a small factor. 91:) and a ciphertext 1368:Discrete logarithm 1352:Higher residuosity 1093:Subliminal channel 1077:Pseudorandom noise 1024:Key (cryptography) 506:Discrete logarithm 291:10.1007/BFb0054117 261:Rabin cryptosystem 74:digital signatures 1489: 1488: 1464:Non-cryptographic 1274: 1273: 1270: 1269: 1153:Key-based routing 1143:Trapdoor function 1014:Digital signature 895: 894: 891: 890: 843:Digital signature 786:Trapdoor function 749: 748: 466:Goldwasser–Micali 300:978-3-540-64518-4 1514: 1404:Sub-group hiding 1315:Number theoretic 1301: 1294: 1287: 1278: 1277: 1260: 1259: 1088:Insecure channel 924: 917: 910: 901: 900: 732: 633: 628: 588:signature scheme 491:Okamoto–Uchiyama 429: 428: 411: 404: 397: 388: 387: 384: 383: 380: 379: 328: 327: 321: 311: 305: 304: 278: 147: <  123: <  51:composite number 1522: 1521: 1517: 1516: 1515: 1513: 1512: 1511: 1492: 1491: 1490: 1485: 1459: 1413: 1409:Decision linear 1387: 1361:Group theoretic 1356: 1310: 1305: 1275: 1266: 1248: 1177: 933: 928: 887: 831: 795:Standardization 790: 745: 728: 677: 625:Lattice/SVP/CVP 619: 500: 446:Blum–Goldwasser 420: 415: 337: 335:Further reading 332: 331: 319: 312: 308: 301: 279: 275: 270: 247: 17: 12: 11: 5: 1520: 1510: 1509: 1504: 1487: 1486: 1484: 1483: 1478: 1473: 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853:Fingerprint 817:NSA Suite B 781:RSA problem 658:NTRUEncrypt 192:private key 111:be a large 25:RSA problem 1496:Categories 1337:Strong RSA 1327:Phi-hiding 1133:Ciphertext 1103:Decryption 1098:Encryption 1059:Ransomware 807:IEEE P1363 425:Algorithms 268:References 33:public key 1123:Plaintext 113:semiprime 66:key sizes 1418:Lattices 1392:Pairings 1262:Category 1168:Kademlia 1128:Codetext 1071:(CSPRNG) 868:Key size 802:CRYPTREC 719:McEliece 673:RLWE-SIG 668:RLWE-KEX 663:NTRUSign 476:Paillier 245:See also 42:exponent 938:General 714:Lamport 694:CEILIDH 653:NewHope 600:Schnorr 583:ElGamal 561:Ed25519 441:Benaloh 231:without 214:indeed 133:coprime 127:, that 58:factors 37:message 1049:Keygen 836:Topics 812:NESSIE 754:Theory 682:Others 539:X25519 297:  194:. Any 103:  56:whose 47:modulo 39:to an 23:, the 1079:(PRN) 648:Kyber 643:BLISS 605:SPEKE 573:ECMQV 566:Ed448 556:EdDSA 551:ECDSA 481:Rabin 320:(PDF) 237:like 848:OAEP 822:CNSA 699:EPOC 544:X448 534:ECDH 295:ISBN 239:OAEP 159:and 72:and 1439:gap 1429:gap 858:PKI 741:XTR 709:IES 704:HFE 635:SIS 630:LWE 615:STS 610:SRP 595:MQV 578:EKE 529:DSA 514:BLS 486:RSA 461:GMR 287:doi 208:all 204:one 151:. 135:to 131:be 101:mod 29:RSA 19:In 1498:: 689:AE 524:DH 371:, 322:. 293:. 226:. 216:is 168:N, 95:≡ 87:, 76:. 49:a 45:, 1441:) 1437:( 1431:) 1427:( 1300:e 1293:t 1286:v 923:e 916:t 909:v 632:/ 627:/ 410:e 403:t 396:v 351:e 326:. 303:. 289:: 224:d 220:N 212:d 196:C 188:N 184:d 180:e 172:N 161:e 157:N 153:C 149:N 145:C 141:N 139:( 137:φ 129:e 125:N 121:e 109:N 105:N 99:( 97:P 93:C 89:e 85:N 81:P 62:e 54:N

Index

cryptography
RSA
public key
exponent
modulo
composite number
factors
key sizes
public-key encryption
digital signatures
semiprime
prime numbers
coprime
φ
integer factorization
padding scheme
OAEP
Strong RSA assumption
RSA Factoring Challenge
Rabin cryptosystem
doi
10.1007/BFb0054117
ISBN
978-3-540-64518-4
"Public-Key Encryption"
Breaking RSA may be as difficult as factoring
Straight line program
Breaking RSA Generically is Equivalent to Factoring
generic ring algorithm
Antoine Joux

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