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mountains and fired at their own men,the "Chacaltaya" in front, whose end it had not yet exceeded. The
Bolivians retreated into the mountains and took advantage of the night to reorganize themselves. On March 12, the "Campos" regiment mounted on the road to Arce, which was its objective, and the "Illimani" did the same on his. On the 13th, two patrols from the "Chacaltaya" advanced cautiously before the silence of the defenders, finding that the Alihuatá fort had been vacated by the enemy, taking advantage of the darkness of the night.
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formed, which was placed under the command of
Captain Samaniego. In the Bolivian countryside, Colonel Victorino Gutiérrez, who had commanded the Bolivian 9th Division until the capture of Alihuatá, was replaced by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Bernardino Bilbao Rioja. On March 15 and 16, the "Campos" regiment and the "Chacaltaya" left wing stoically resisted the attacks of the Samaniego detachment.
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Colonel González Portal, placed itself as a stopper against the extreme right of the
Paraguayan trenches. However, upon detecting the presence of these enemy forces in that sector, the Paraguayan command sent a detachment of 100 men in that direction, under the command of Captain Kassianoff, to attack them.
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maneuver of the scale that was being planned. They assumed that the
Paraguayan units in "Kilometer 12" and in Alihuatá could be more numerous. Kundt argued that his strategy did not depend on numerical superiority over the enemy but on the greater mobility, thrust and striking force of the Bolivian troops.
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The
Bolivian 9th Division began its advance in late February. Its vanguard was made up of a squad of the "Lanza" regiment and the bulk of the "Campos", "Chacaltaya", "Illimani" regiments, part of the RI-36, plus the Mendivil battery with four Schneider 75 mm guns. As of March 1, the unit had advanced
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wanted to have a force as a general reserve with the assurance that the convergent action of the four front-line
Divisions towards Isla Poí would achieve their objective. Given that his offensive had been halted in its initial phase, after two months of intense fighting, Kundt accepted the suggestion
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Major
Alfredo Rivas carried out an exploration with the riders of the "Lanza", arriving smoothly as far as Charata, to the west and in the vicinity of the target. The "Campos" regiment took the lead for the attack, followed by "Chacaltaya" and "Illimani" while the RI-36 stayed in Charata to protect
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While the
Bolivian 4th Division tied up the enemy troops fighting in "Kilometer 7", the 9th Division was going to penetrate the road that was being opened, parallel to the Saavedra-Alihuatá road, and then make a diversion to the right and emerge by surprise near the Alihuarta fort. In this way, the
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The 9th and 4th
Divisions that were to participate in this operation came to report directly to Kundt, who visited the commandos to coordinate the tactical movements. Several chiefs pointed out to him that the 1,500 men of the 4th Division and the 1,500 men of the 9th were scarcely available for a
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With great haste, Estigarribia took some measures to dislodge the dangerous
Bolivian intrusion, drawing forces from Fernández (Herrera) and Pirizal. A unit of veterans was brought in from Nanawa, joined by a contingent of recruits recently arrived from Asunción. Thus a detachment of 1,300 men was
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The casualties in the Bolivian division were disproportionate to the objective achieved. The nervousness and lack of professional capacity with which an attack that lacked the surprise factor was conducted allowed the few defenders, who were already aware of the Bolivian presence, to produce 238
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On the 11th, when approaching the open field that surrounded the fort, the commander of the "Chacaltaya" paused the attack so that the "Illimani" could finish its movement to the right. At this time, he received an admonishment from the divisional command about his delay and, annoyed by this, he
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The infantrymen advanced trying to hide between the few bushes but without being able to evade the enemy fire. At four in the afternoon the combat reached its climax: the Bayá company was annihilated. The Bolivian "Illimani" regiment, which was receiving its baptism of fire, got confused in the
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With the greatest secrecy, work was carried out at night on the opening of the road to prevent the Paraguayan aeroplanes from detecting the sappers. To prevent the Paraguayan patrols that could leave "Kilometer 12" towards the Sosa post from discovering the arrangements, the RI-36, commanded by
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The surprise appearance of a new Bolivian division (not foreseen by the intelligence service) in the center of his defences was a setback for Colonel Estigarribia, who also did not expect such a daring attack, much less an attack on the Alihuatá fort. This fort was an important stopover in the
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After the reconquest of Alihuatá, pressure from the Bolivian 4th Division forced the 1st Division to withdraw from the trenches of 'Kilometer 12' towards Gondra, where a new fighting front was established. This fact frustrated the involvement that Estigarribia was preparing in Arce on the 9th
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The rest of the regiment barricaded themselves in front of the outpost facing east and north. The 250 defenders had left the fort, leaving 40 mules, 12 head of cattle, a cart with food, 4 boxes of ammunition, 100 saddles, sabers, several rifles and some medical supplies.
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by the Bolivian army and the withdrawal of the small Paraguayan unit that defended it, allowing the Bolivian 9th Division to cut the supply route from Arce to the Paraguayan 1st Division that was fighting in the area of "Kilometer 7" and Campo Jordán south of Alihuatá.
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Division stationed in Alihuatá. Once these maneuvers were completed, Lieutenant Colonel Bilbao Rioja objected to the excessive lengthening of the front,stretching from Corrales to Nanawa as a strategic weakness in the face of an enemy that had become defensive.
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Since January 1933, the 9th Bolivian Division had been forming at Puesto Sosa, 15 kilometers to the left of the "kilometer 7" positions. Originally,
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On March 10, an advanced Paraguayan patrol detected the Bolivian approach and gave the alarm to Captain Chircoff who was commanding the fort. The
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of the First Corps command to attack the Alihuatá fort by the same path that Captain Ustárez and Rivas had used before the war. .
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appeared at the command post of one of his companies and gave the absurd order: "Go ahead, the fort is unoccupied."
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Paraguayan supply line to the Paraguayan 1st Division, which at that time was fighting to the south, off Saavedra.
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the rear. The artillery personnel continued to work on the opening of the road as they approached with their guns.
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about 42 km, finding abundant water in a canyon that extended to the right in the direction of Alihuatá.
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1st Paraguayan Division, which was fighting in 'Kilometer 7', would be isolated from its supply base.
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casualties (including some officers) out of a total of 1000 that they had all three regiments.
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regiment deviated a bit to the north to cut off the Alihuatá-Arce road, the
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moved to the south side to cut the Alihuatá-Saavedra road.
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627:. Cochabamba-La Paz (Bolivia): Los Amigos del Libro.
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644:. La Paz (Bolivia): Lit. e Imprentas unidas.
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223:Commanders and leaders
179:Occupation of Alihuatá
313:Casualties and losses
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572:Querejazu Calvo 1981
448:was a battle of the
257:José F. Estigarribia
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246:Victorino Gutiérrez
691:March 1933 events
661:Conflicts in 1933
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411:2nd Alihuatá
406:Campo Grande
391:Campo Jordán
386:1st Alihuatá
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308:250 Infantry
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190:Belligerents
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156:Chaco Boreal
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41:Please help
36:verification
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517:Chacaltaya
431:Villamontes
376:Kilómetro 7
282:Chacaltaya
655:Categories
560:References
499:The Battle
469:Background
396:2nd Nanawa
381:1st Nanawa
236:Hans Kundt
160:Santa Cruz
69:newspapers
547:Aftermath
521:Illimani
450:Chaco War
426:El Carmen
416:Campo Vía
359:Chaco War
295:Battalion
289:regiments
278:Illimani
133:Chaco War
99:June 2021
486:The Plan
458:Paraguay
452:between
371:Boquerón
300:Strength
293:Chircoff
217:Paraguay
151:Location
131:Part of
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513:Campos
454:Bolivia
321:Unknown
287:Campos
204:Bolivia
164:Bolivia
83:scholar
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401:Gondra
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171:Result
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62:news
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