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Security of automated teller machines

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passive means or direct means where a device is inserted to retrieve the data. The second component is computer security. There are different techniques that can be used to acquire access to a computer such as accessing it via a remote terminal or other peripheral devices such as the card reader. The hacker had gained unauthorized access to the system, so programs or data can be manipulated and altered by the hacker. Terminal security is a significant component in cases where cipher keys reside in terminals. In the absence of physical security, an abuser may probe for a key that substitutes its value.
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a personal key (PK). Personal identification processes can be done by the authentication parameter (AP). It is capable of operating in two ways. The first option is where an AP can be time-invariant. The second option is where an AP can be time-variant. There is the case where there is an IP which is based on both time-variant information and on the transaction request message. In such a case where an AP can be used as a
124:. Within it, the PIN is decrypted. With a cryptographic key used for interchange, the decrypted key is immediately re-encrypted and is routed to the issuer's system over normal communications channels. Lastly, the routed PIN is decrypted in the issuer's security module and then validated on the basis of the techniques for on-line local PIN validation. 40:(ATMs) are targets for fraud, robberies and other security breaches. In the past, the main purpose of ATMs was to deliver cash in the form of banknotes, and to debit a corresponding bank account. However, ATMs are becoming more complicated and they now serve numerous functions, thus becoming a high priority target for robbers and hackers. 170:(MAC), the use of message authentication is made recourse to find out stale or bogus messages which might be routed both into the communication path and the detection of modified messages which are fraudulent and which can traverse non-secure communication systems. In such cases, the AP serves two purposes. 165:
The personal verification process begins with the user's supply of personal verification information. This information includes a PIN and the provided customer's information which is recorded on the bank account. In cases where there is a storage of a cryptographic key on the bank card, it is called
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There are different transaction methods used in shared ATMs with regards to the encipherment of PIN, and message authentication among them is so-called "zone encryption". In this method, a trusted authority is appointed to operate on behalf of a group of banks so they could interchange messages for
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The validation of on-line PIN occurs if the terminal in question is connected to the central database. The PIN supplied by the customer is always compared with the recorded reference PIN in the financial institutions. However, one disadvantage is that any malfunction of the network renders the ATM
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methods to acquire control of the user's credit card account. Credit card fraud can be done by inserting discreet skimming devices over the keypad or credit card reader. The alternative way to credit card fraud is to identify the PIN directly with devices such as cameras concealed near the keypad.
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Security breaches in electronic funds transfer systems can be done without delimiting their components. Electronic funds transfer systems have three components; which are communication links, computers, and terminals (ATMs). First, communication links are prone to attacks. Data can be exposed by
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Modern ATMs are implemented with high-security protection measures. They work under complex systems and networks to perform transactions. The data processed by ATMs are usually encrypted, but hackers can employ discreet hacking devices to hack accounts and withdraw the account's balance. As an
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and message authentication. The use of PIN in interchanges is causing concerns in security as the PIN can be translated by the security module to the format used for interchange. Moreover, the security module is to generate, protect and maintaining all keys associated with the user's network.
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There are three PIN procedures for the operation of a high-security interchange transaction. The supplied PIN is encrypted at the entry terminal, during this step, a secret cryptographic key is used. In addition to other transaction elements, the encrypted PIN is transmitted to the
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For successful communication between banks and ATMs, the incorporation of a cryptographic module, usually called a security module is a critical component in maintaining proper connections between banks and the machines. The security module is designed to be
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In off-line PIN validation, the ATM is not connected to the central database. A condition for off-line PIN validation is that the ATM should be able to compare the customer's entered PIN against the PIN of reference. the terminal must be able to perform
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The offline validation scheme is extremely slow and inefficient. Offline PIN validation is now obsolete, as the ATMs are connected to the central server over protected networks.
17: 322: 152:. The security module performs a plethora of functions, and among them is PIN verification, PIN translation in interchange, 363: 235: 211:
Security for computer networks : an introduction to data security in teleprocessing and electronic funds transfer
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alternative, unskilled robbers threaten bank patrons with a weapon to loot their withdrawn money or account.
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ATM vandals can either physically tamper with the ATM to obtain cash, or employ
153: 101: 352: 120:'s system. Then, the encrypted PIN is routed from the acquirer's system to a 97: 248: 29: 339: 301: 117: 76: 110: 208: 265: 243:. NoWires Research Group, Department of Informatics, 160: 33:
Automated Teller Machine In Dezfull, Southwest Iran
350: 289: 77:PIN validation schemes for local transactions 71: 136: 111:PIN validation for interchange transactions 321:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher ( 90: 52: 342:- Security Research, Computer Laboratory 100:operations and it must have the required 81: 293:Perspectives - Automatic Teller Machines 28: 14: 351: 209:D.W. Davies & W. L. Price (1984). 59:Automated teller machine § Fraud 18:Security of Automated Teller Machines 340:https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/ 233: 24: 25: 375: 333: 161:Authentication and data integrity 43: 283: 227: 202: 127: 13: 1: 273:"What Triggers an ATM Alarm?" 195: 87:unusable until it is fixed. 7: 182: 173: 168:message authentication code 10: 380: 140: 56: 364:Automated teller machines 237:Automatic Teller Machines 72:Security measures of ATMs 38:Automated teller machines 189:ATM Industry Association 143:Hardware security module 137:Hardware security module 122:hardware security module 344:University of Cambridge 234:Hole, Kjell J. (2007). 133:ATM payment approvals. 91:Off-Line PIN validation 53:Methods of looting ATMs 290:Ross Anderson (1992). 82:On-Line PIN validation 34: 32: 298:Cambridge University 245:University of Bergen 65:credit card skimming 104:at its disposal. 35: 16:(Redirected from 371: 327: 326: 320: 312: 310: 309: 300:. Archived from 287: 281: 280: 269: 263: 262: 260: 259: 253: 247:. Archived from 242: 231: 225: 224: 206: 150:tamper resistant 21: 379: 378: 374: 373: 372: 370: 369: 368: 349: 348: 336: 331: 330: 314: 313: 307: 305: 288: 284: 271: 270: 266: 257: 255: 251: 240: 232: 228: 221: 207: 203: 198: 185: 176: 163: 145: 139: 130: 113: 102:encryption keys 93: 84: 79: 74: 61: 55: 46: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 377: 367: 366: 361: 347: 346: 335: 334:External links 332: 329: 328: 282: 264: 226: 219: 200: 199: 197: 194: 193: 192: 184: 181: 175: 172: 162: 159: 154:key management 141:Main article: 138: 135: 129: 126: 112: 109: 92: 89: 83: 80: 78: 75: 73: 70: 57:Main article: 54: 51: 45: 42: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 376: 365: 362: 360: 359:Data security 357: 356: 354: 345: 341: 338: 337: 324: 318: 304:on 2008-03-27 303: 299: 295: 294: 286: 279:. ATM Alarms. 278: 277:ATMAlarms.com 274: 268: 254:on 2008-11-19 250: 246: 239: 238: 230: 222: 220:0-471-90063-X 216: 212: 205: 201: 190: 187: 186: 180: 171: 169: 158: 155: 151: 144: 134: 125: 123: 119: 108: 105: 103: 99: 98:cryptographic 88: 69: 66: 60: 50: 41: 39: 31: 27: 19: 306:. Retrieved 302:the original 292: 285: 276: 267: 256:. Retrieved 249:the original 236: 229: 210: 204: 177: 164: 146: 131: 114: 106: 94: 85: 62: 47: 44:Introduction 36: 26: 128:Shared ATMs 353:Categories 308:2008-03-16 258:2009-03-16 196:References 317:cite book 183:See also 174:Security 118:acquirer 191:(ATMIA) 217:  252:(PDF) 241:(PDF) 323:link 215:ISBN 355:: 319:}} 315:{{ 296:. 275:. 213:. 325:) 311:. 261:. 223:. 20:)

Index

Security of Automated Teller Machines

Automated teller machines
Automated teller machine § Fraud
credit card skimming
cryptographic
encryption keys
acquirer
hardware security module
Hardware security module
tamper resistant
key management
message authentication code
ATM Industry Association
ISBN
0-471-90063-X
Automatic Teller Machines
University of Bergen
the original
"What Triggers an ATM Alarm?"
Perspectives - Automatic Teller Machines
Cambridge University
the original
cite book
link
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/
University of Cambridge
Categories
Data security
Automated teller machines

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