Personnel economics

1172:. The theory addresses how pay raises are associated with promotions. The theory’s main point is that promotions are a relative gain. Regarding compensation, the level of compensation must be strong enough to motivate all employees below the level of compensation who aim to be promoted. If the pay spread between promotions is larger, the incentive of employees to put in effort will also be larger. The desired outcome from this would be to see employees performing at a quality and producing a quantity of output that the organization deems desirable. Compensation is also not necessarily determined by the conception of productivity. Employees are promoted based on their relative position within the organization and not by their productivity. However, productivity does hold some weight when considering promotion. 1256:. However, it also has some disadvantages, such as monitoring costs, adverse selection, and the possibility of an inequitable pay system. The cost of monitoring the agent's work can be expensive, and this may not be feasible for some firms. Additionally, adverse selection may occur as agents may choose to work in firms where their performance is not as heavily monitored. In terms of inequitable pay, fixed payment with monitoring may not always be reasonable as it does not take into account delays or interruptions that may be outside of the agent's control. 42: 1020:, a British economist, suggested that within the labor market equilibrium, a trade-off between a worker's wages and non-monetary working conditions could exist. However, Personnel Economics did not gain prominence until 1987, when the Journal of Labor Economics published 10 articles on the field. During the 1990s, Personnel Economics gradually became more empirical-based, whereas previously the field was more heavily theoretical. Personnel Economics is now considered a branch of 1843: 869: 1206:: Workplaces that are based around a tournament structure are prone to creating an unequal working environment. If workers are paid based on their performance, it has the potential to leave some employees worse off than others. This type environment could also be more demotivating for under-performing workers and more motivating for over-achieving workers which results in a bigger payoff gap between the two types of workers over time. 857: 1301:: Fixed payment with monitoring can be prone to delays and interruptions, making it unreasonable to punish agents for issues outside of their control. This can lead to inequitable pay and compensation for agents who are performing well but face delays or interruptions. Additionally, incentive pay without monitoring can lead to inequitable pay if the correlation between output and pay is not properly calibrated. 1307:: Compensation is an approach where the principal may have to provide agents with a risk premium as they bear a risk with payment. This approach acknowledges that agents take on some risk in their work and may need to be compensated accordingly. However, this approach may not always be feasible as it may increase the costs for the principal/firm. 1214:: A problem with competition in a workplace is that it is prone to promoting unethical behavior within employees. As they are competing against each other, they may succumb to inappropriate actions that can hurt another employee's standing within the company. For example, employees may sabotage each other or take credit for others' work. 1295:: If the principal heavily monitors and controls agent behavior, highly skilled agents may choose to work elsewhere where their skills are better appreciated and they have more autonomy. This can result in the principal being left with lower quality agents who are willing to work under these conditions. 1287:: Monitoring and measuring agent performance can be costly for the principal, as it requires additional resources and time. The costs associated with monitoring can also be a disincentive for the principal to invest in monitoring, leading to a lack of oversight and potential issues with agent behavior. 1407:

Human Resource Practices in Personnel Economics refer to the methods and techniques that firms use to manage their workforce. Over time, the HR practices have evolved to focus more on teamwork and incentive pay. However, not all firms have been successful in implementing these changes. The success of

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The model also predicts that there is a negative trade-off between wages and "positive" job attributes, such as a desirable work location or enjoyable working environment. Each firm offers the benefits that attract its most valued type of worker, and while these benefits are costly for the firm, they

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In conclusion, the success of HR practices depends on their complementarity with other practices. Firms that adopt a complementary set of practices are likely to be more productive than those that adopt only one or two practices. This emphasises the need for firms to consider a set of practices over

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Skill-enhancing HR practices refer to policies, practices, and procedures used to enhance the knowledge, skills, and competencies of employees. Organisations use skill-enhancing practices to increase the productivity and effectiveness of their employees. Here are some examples of skill-enhancing HR

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Complementary practices refer to a set of HR practices that work in tandem with each other to produce better results. For instance, a firm that adopts a system of teamwork, incentive pay, and training is likely to perform better than a firm that only adopts one or two of these practices. Economists

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Organisations with a team-based work environment may consider a certain degree of pay compression. This would make equity more relevant in close comparisons, boost morale and worker efficiency, and provide insurance to employees during uncertain outcomes, such as bad market conditions. However, pay

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Teamwork offers different perspectives, and each member may have a different way of handling the project. By sharing ideas, teams can produce better quality work than if the project was done by an individual. Furthermore, it is easier for firms to hire people with less skill, each specialising in a

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One of the key advantages of team production is that it can be more productive than individual production. Work can be distributed between employees based on each of their specific skill sets, which makes the overall process more efficient. Many projects require a wide variety of skill sets, and it

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Fixed salaries are provided to agents while their performance is under observation. Fixed payment with monitoring is an approach where fixed salaries are given to agents while their performance is being observed. The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the risk of shirking by the agent as

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is based on the relationship between an employer (principal) and an employee (agent). In this case, the employer relies on their employees to maximize the firm’s utility. In practice, incentives are sometimes misaligned between the principal and the agent. This occurs due to differing goals between

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Pay Compression refers to a situation where wage or salary levels are indistinguishable between long-term employees and newly hired employees, and this issue develops over time. If left unresolved, organisations run the risk of turnover as long-term employees may feel undervalued and start looking

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Disadvantages: Inequitable pay and compensation. However, without monitoring, there is a risk of shirking, where the agent may not act in the best interest of the principal/firm. Additionally, an inequitable pay system may arise if delays or interruptions occur, and the agent is still expected to

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Older workers tend to favour health insurance or pension benefits more than younger workers, and the Hedonic Model can help firms to design compensation packages that cater to the preferences of different employee segments. By understanding what employees value beyond just their wage or salary,

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The Hedonic Model helps firms to strike a balance between costs and benefits, with the goal of offering the best mixed package of pay and benefits to entice workers. The final package is determined by the preferences of the employees, the cost structure of the firm, and the firm's desire to hire

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of Compensation is a method used to estimate the value of compensation for a worker beyond just their wage or salary. This model is based on the revealed preference theory, which states that individuals reveal their preferences through their choices. Employees value aspects such as flexible work

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Pay compression is not a one-size-fits-all solution, and organisations must carefully consider the potential benefits and drawbacks before implementing it. In some cases, pay compression may lead to turnover or reduced effort, while in others, it may lead to increased morale and productivity. By

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According to the Tournament Theory, employees may improve their image not only by making themselves look better but also by making their rivals look worse. Pay being based on relative performance may cause some issues within the workplace, as co-workers will be less likely to cooperate with each

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In 1993, a laboratory experiment was conducted to test the effects that the Gift Exchange Theory had on employee effectiveness. Contrary to predictions, it was found that most employers were offering higher (sometimes by more than 100%) than market clearing wages. On average, the higher wage was

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described it as "the use of economics to understand the internal workings of the firm." With the availability of new data, the field has evolved to have more practical use. Econometric techniques have played a significant role in the field's development, with data being used to analyze personnel

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In conclusion, even though free-riding is an issue when working as a team, the benefits may outweigh the potential disadvantages. Team production is suitable for many projects that require a variety of skill sets, and it enables firms to produce high-quality work while remaining cost-effective.

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requited by a higher output, often making it very profitable for employers to offer high wage contracts. Paying for an employee's performance can lead to increased productivity and higher competition surrounding highly skilled workers who will want to work for employers who pay for performance.

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allocating risk and monitoring the performance of the production team and its members. Many questions about wage determination and the relationship between wages and productivity in a firm or government enterprise were raised as a result. The subject was developed in addressing those questions,

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Studies have shown that firms that adopt a complementary set of practices are more productive than those that adopt a limited set. For example, a study conducted by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi in 1997 found that steel mills that used a complementary set of practices were substantially more

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Payment is correlated with output and performance is not monitored. Incentive pay without monitoring is an approach where payment is correlated with output, and performance is not monitored. This approach allows for greater flexibility, but it also has some disadvantages, such as shirking and

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Under Tournament Theory, workers are matched to their appropriate job. Firms with a tournament structure in the workplace are more likely to hire more competitive and highly-skilled workers, and firms with a workplace based structured around equity are more likely to hire less competitive and

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However, free-riding can be eliminated by organising set protocols. This allows for easier communication and decision-making, giving each member of the team responsibilities and requirements that are agreed upon. Punishing free-riders is another way to deter them from repeating the offence.

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traded within a firm are determined. An early difficulty that the subject addressed is possible differences between the interests of an employer considered as wanting cost-free output and employees as wanting cost-free income. The relationship is represented at a general level in the

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In human resource management, organisations use two types of practices: skill-enhancing practices and motivation-enhancing practices. Motivation-enhancing practices are designed to motivate and engage employees in order to improve their performance and productivity.

1108:, including generation of data to test the theories in the field. Other empirical studies conducted then utilized data from sports (e.g. golf tournaments and horse racing). and company records on their suppliers' performances (e.g. raising broiler chickens). 1281:: If agents are guaranteed pay, they may lack the motivation to act in the best interest of the principal/firm. This can lead to the agent not performing at the expected level or engaging in behavior that is not aligned with the principal's goals. 1592:: Organisations can choose to promote diversity or focus on merit when hiring new employees. Promoting diversity involves expanding the scope of the company in terms of individual differences such as race, gender, age, religion, and nationality. 1111:

From the 1990s, there was a further surge of empirical tests of the theory from wider availability of personnel records of large companies to researchers and interest in the relation between compensation and productivity and the implications of

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Because of the relevance and newly found rigor of personnel analysis, personnel economics should and will become a more important part of the educational curriculum. The field is growing and has a large potential audience, of both students and

1184:: Workplaces that promote competition among employees may benefit from incentivized performance. Studies have shown that competition within the workplace helps boost performance because employees value the idea of being better than the rest. 965:, which may be used for prescriptive purposes as to improving performance of the firm. For example, an alternate compensation package that provided a risk-free benefit might elicit more work effort, consistent with psychologically-oriented 1329:

is unlikely that one individual will have all the required skills to complete the project by themselves. By working in a team, members with complementary skill sets can benefit from each other, allowing for more efficiency in the project.

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instead of pursuing individual production. Team production is a form of production where a group of individuals with complementary skills work together to produce a final product. This approach offers several advantages and disadvantages.

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in various ways. It analyzes labor use, which accounts for the largest part of production costs for most firms, by formulation of relatively simple but generalizable and testable relationships. It also situates analysis in the context of

1502:: Workers compete for jobs, under-performing workers are likely to be let go and over-achieving workers stay. This is where workers compete for jobs and those who underperform are likely to be let go, while those who overachieve stay. 1575:: When hiring new employees, organisations can either focus on talent or experience. Hiring for talent involves selecting new employees based on their innate ability, interest, and motivation towards a particular type of work. 1476:: Benefits for staying with a company in the long-term.This is where benefits are given to employees who have been with the company for a long time. The longer they have worked for the company, the more benefits they receive. 1370:

other if there is an opportunity to outshine each other. Pay compression can help in this case by closing the salary gap between job levels, which in turn gives less incentive for employees to sabotage their co-workers.

1442:: Pay based on the performance of the worker. This is a type of compensation that is based on the performance of the worker. Employees receive pay based on how well they perform their duties and responsibilities. 1558:: Staff development programs refer to policies and practices used to develop the knowledge, skills, and competencies of staff. These programs can be in the form of workshops, seminars, and training sessions. 1530:: Compensation in the form of non-monetary payment, e.g., insurance, pension, etc. This is where compensation is given to employees in the form of non-monetary payment, such as insurance or pension plans. 1148:

The Gift Exchange Theory, also referred to as the fair-wage theory, applies when employees are provided with better wages than they could receive at another firm in exchange for a higher work standard.

2517: • Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," 1341:

Despite the benefits, team production has its disadvantages. The time it takes to organise teams and have them cooperate can be time-consuming. Additionally, there is a potential risk of having a

1513:: Appreciation of the work employees produce, motivation to work harder.This is where employees are motivated by their own interest and enjoyment in their work, rather than by external rewards. 1564:: Peer training is a process of enhancing skills through interactions with peers. Peer training can be formal or informal, and it involves learning from colleagues who have the desired skills. 984: 2746:, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," 2507: • Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," 1465:: Workers are less monitored and have more freedom. This is where workers are given more freedom to work on their own and are trusted to complete their tasks without close supervision. 998:

compensation and compensation methods and their effects, including stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, and seniority issues related to compensation

1482:: Rewarded on the basis of performance, rather than seniority. This is where employees are rewarded based on their performance and achievements, rather than their seniority. 1333:

few skills than hiring an individual with a wide variety of skills. This approach is more cost-effective as individuals with a high skill set are more expensive to hire.

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a new practice depends on its complementarity with other practices. Firms run the risk of not reaching optimal output if they choose to adopt only one or two practices.

2286: 2572: • Sue Fernie and David Metcalf, 1999. "It's Not What You Pay It's the Way that You Pay it and That's What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance," 3187:"James N. Baron/David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York et al. 1999, 602 pages, $ 71.00" 1387:

hours, a comfortable working environment, health insurance and pension benefits, and recognition and mentoring from bosses, in addition to monetary compensation.

2613: 2345: 2040: 1764: 1713: 1649: 1536:: Compensation in the form of monetary payment. This is where compensation is given to employees in the form of monetary payment, such as bonuses or pay raises. 2776: • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," 941:

as such, whether external or internal. In addition, personnel economics deals with issues related to both managerial-supervisory and non-supervisory workers.

2149: • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., 995:

firm employment decisions and promotions, including hiring, firing, turnover, part-time and temporary workers, and seniority issues related to promotions

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Additionally, teamwork offers a chance for individuals to learn from each other and develop new skills, leading to better job satisfaction and morale.

1082:, that is contributions to output, both when output is easily measured or when only the worker knows the difficulty of the job and his own contribution, 988: 1374:

analysing their specific situation and goals, organisations can determine whether pay compression is a viable solution for their compensation issues.

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Personnel economics began to emerge as a distinct field from a flurry of research in the 1970s that sought to answer the questions of how prices of

3349: 2728: • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," 3301: 2512: 1496:: Insured a secure long-term job regardless of performance. This is where employees are guaranteed job security regardless of their performance. 3363:

A Piggott, Damani; Cariaga-Lo, Liza. "Promoting Inclusion, Diversity, Access, and Equity Through Enhanced Institutional Culture and Climate".

1943:"Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998" 1519:: Monetary rewards for producing high quality work. This is where employees are motivated by external rewards, such as bonuses or promotions. 2670: • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," 2110: 1448:: Pay that is fixed for all workers. This is a type of compensation where the pay is fixed for all workers, regardless of their performance. 3234:"Competitive advantage through people unleashing the power of the work force. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994" 2822: 1345:, where individuals within a team can get away with no contribution to the work and still be compensated the same amount as their peers. 2718:, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," 2281: 1268:

inequitable pay. As the agent's pay is directly correlated with their output, there is a greater incentive for the agent to perform well.

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labor management, including team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, work arrangements, and job satisfaction

2541:, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," 2723: 1838:

Stephen J. Deery and Roderick D. Iverson, 2005. "Labor-Management Cooperation: Antecedents and Impact on Organizational Performance,"

2608: 1644: 926:, but there are a few key distinctions. One distinction, not always clearcut, is that studies in personnel economics deal with the 2589:

Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production,"

1993:. Gibbons, Robert, 1958-, Roberts, John, 1945 February 11-. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2013. pp. 263–312. 1679: 1134:

Two millennial articles by a contributor to the subject argued in the course of review and assessment to the conclusions that:

2647: 1998: 3390: 2546: 1889:

Grund, Christian; Bryson, Alex; Dur, Robert; Harbring, Christine; Koch, Alexander K.; Lazear, Edward P. (16 January 2017).

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The subject has been described as significant and different from sociological and psychological approaches to the study of

1459:: Work is monitored and closely reviewed. This is where work is closely monitored and reviewed by managers or supervisors. 1399:

firms can create more tailored and attractive compensation packages that help to attract and retain high-quality talent.

2363: • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," 2075: 3010: 3320: 2475: 2704: • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," 2406: • _____, 1986a. "The Theory of Equalizing Differences," ch. 12, O. C. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, ed. 1581:: Hiring for experience involves selecting new employees based on their previous experience in a similar position. 3403: 892: 2812: 2709: 2637: 2567: 2527: • Bruce Sheare, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," 1654: • _____ and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," 1366:

compression leaves employees vulnerable to moral hazard problems, and they may put less effort into their work.

2455: 2206: 2817: • Canice Prendergast and Robert H. Topel, 1993. "Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation," 2642: • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2497:• Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," 2186: 2335: 2230: 1671:

Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2004. "Internal and External Labor Markets: A Personnel Economics Approach,"

230: 2756: • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," 2325: 492: 3433: 2139: • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," 1362:

for work elsewhere. However, a certain degree of pay compression may lead to an efficient market outcome.

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and statistical methods to traditional questions in human resources management". It is an area of applied

2691: 2657: 2618: • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, 841: 61: 51: 2176: 2022: 885: 835: 365: 355: 2694:, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," 2216: 1747: 2623: 2411: 2154: 1860: 1809: 1598:: Focusing on merit involves selecting individuals who are most deserving based on their performance. 1056: 970: 949: 245: 3335: 2627: 2225:, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," 2124: 1821:

Filipe Almeida-Santos and Karen Mumford, 2005. "Employee Training and Wage Compression in Britain,"

2134: 2053: 980: 814: 552: 507: 360: 129: 73: 567: 2470:• Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," 1788:

Jed DeVaro, 2005. "Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires,"

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and non-economists alike acknowledge the importance of complementary practices in HR management.

1224: 1047: 945: 517: 325: 315: 275: 265: 172: 95: 1793: 2766: • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" 2259: • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," 2129: • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," 1826: 1105: 969:. But a personnel-economics analysis in its efficiency aspect would evaluate the package as to 958: 687: 532: 270: 210: 167: 114: 3302:"The Pros & Cons of Employee Pay Being Fixed Vs. Variable & Dependent on Performance" 2802: 2751: 2665: 2296: 1623: 1113: 934: 821: 502: 477: 462: 320: 260: 240: 235: 2502: 927: 572: 394: 345: 310: 250: 215: 119: 109: 56: 3416:, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," 8: 2559: 2480: • Sherwin Rosen, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," 2368: 1855:

Axel Engellandt and Regina T. Riphahn, 2005. "Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort,"

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for the principal when hiring an agent, they cannot fully evaluate an agent's skills and

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Major theories of the subject developed in the late 1970s and 1980s from the research of

1042: 962: 798: 607: 429: 295: 285: 255: 182: 90: 467: 3214: 3135: 3107: 2971: 2374: 2300: • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," 2088: 2016: 1970: 1920: 1873: 1432:

The following are some motivation-enhancing practices that organisations commonly use:

1383: 1342: 954: 826: 782: 587: 424: 419: 399: 350: 290: 280: 225: 220: 192: 187: 157: 25: 2315: 1723: 1063: 3396:

Hutchens, Robert M., 1989. "Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade,"

3382: 3343: 3253: 3218: 3206: 3139: 3127: 3088: 3006: 2963: 2653: 2305: 2102: 2004: 1994: 1974: 1962: 1924: 1912: 1290: 1253: 1229: 1161: 1097: 1038: 717: 692: 602: 482: 439: 375: 340: 330: 162: 124: 80: 2577: 2396: • _____, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," 2201: • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," 1676: 1085:

efficiency-improving contracts as constrained by noise in production contributions,

642: 3280: 3245: 3198: 3165: 3119: 3080: 3044: 2998: 2955: 2922: 2890: 2857: 2781: 2771: 2733: 2061: 1954: 1902: 1021: 767: 712: 697: 682: 667: 597: 577: 557: 512: 385: 335: 305: 300: 3406:, 1991. "Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis," 2091:, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," 1776: 1696: 647: 2807: • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," 2798: 2761: 2715: 2632: • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," 2538: 2416: • _____, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," 2358: 2354: 2237: 2105:, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization," 1735: 1683: 1613: 1316: 1131:, Elgar, with 43 articles dating from 1962 to 2000 (link to contents link here). 1007:

labor contracting devices, including outsourcing, franchising, and other options.

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has been defined as "the application of economic and mathematical approaches and

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German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung

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A retrospective collection of the personnel economics-literature is in Lazear

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records and other human resource data. This is known as Insider Econometrics.

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Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert; Hwang, Sung-Ha (2009).

41: 3413: 3249: 2222: 1739: 1487: 1233: 1117: 1086: 938: 873: 787: 732: 627: 617: 612: 537: 85: 2373: • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," 1988: 1872:

Above text and footnoted examples are from JEL Classification Codes Guide

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and Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?"

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Harald Dale-Olsen, 2006. "Wages, Fringe Benefits and Worker Turnover,"

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for the agent when presented with more information than the principal.

1079: 1017: 672: 472: 2975: 2191: • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," 2834:

Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future

1261: 522: 453: 33: 3273:"The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity" 2943: 2699: 2685: 2675: 2594: 2532: 2522: 2485: 2438: 2421: 2401: 2274: 2264: 2254: 2196: 2144: 2096: 1942: 1100:

as a possibly more efficient substitute for piece-rate compensation.

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From the later 1980s, researchers began to forge closer links with

3285: 3272: 2330: • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," 2320: • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," 2151:

The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science

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of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,

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1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem,"

2211: • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," 1742:, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," 856: 3271:

Ichniowski, Casey; Shaw, Kathryn; Prennushi, Giovanna (1997).

3158:"Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources" 3037:"Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources" 2915:"Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources" 2119:, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," 3069:"Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence" 2390:• Sherwin Rosen 1978. "Substitution and Division of Labour," 1055:

including examination of pay structure and promotions within

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whose solution is the firm modeled as a set of contracts for

991:. Subjects treated (with footnoted examples below) include: 2503:"Tournaments-and-Piece-Rates-An-Experimental-Study".pdf 1–33 2308:. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.) 2249:• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" 2171:• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," 1420:

an individual practice when implementing new HR practices.

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to name but a few. Research threads included analysis of:

3066: 2879:""Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"" 2846:""Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"" 2680: • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," 2660:, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," 2997:, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 349–370, 2269: • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," 987:

but overlaps with such labor economics subcategories as

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Robert Gibbons, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes,"

2349: • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. 2070:, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," 1888: 1470:

Reward seniority vs. reward (comparative) performance

2310: • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," 2181: • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," 1718: • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," 1032: 1891:"Personnel economics: A research field comes of age" 1423: 2340: • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," 2279: • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," 1239: 3333: 2433:Edward Lazear, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," 1315:In modern times, firms have increasingly adopted 1011: 3425: 2991:"Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms" 1416:productive than those that used a limited set. 1377: 3362: 3073:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2795:Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets 1542: 1403:Human Resource Practices in Personnel Economics 3334:McNamara, MBA, PHD, Carter (18 January 2022). 3318: 2606:• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," 1708:• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," 1642:• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," 1252:Disadvantages: Shirking, monitoring costs and 3387:The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel 1552:Staff development programs vs. Peer training 1524:Benefits and entitlements vs. additional pay 893: 3348:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 2167: 2165: 2163: 2035:Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," 1759:Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," 1586:Promoting diversity vs. Focusing on 'merit' 1569:Hiring for talent vs. Hiring for experience 2876: 2843: 2282:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 2227:Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1507:Intrinsic motivation vs. extrinsic rewards 937:, while those in labor economics deal with 3155: 3034: 2941: 2912: 1218: 1016:The field can be traced back to 1776 when 973:, rather than work-effort benefits alone. 900: 886: 3284: 3169: 3048: 2944:"Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review" 2926: 2894: 2861: 2160: 1906: 2609:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2342:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2037:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 1990:The handbook of organizational economics 1761:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 1710:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 1645:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 1453:Close supervision vs. freedom and trust 3184: 2995:Handbook of New Institutional Economics 1143: 3426: 3231: 3156:Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). 3151: 3149: 3108:"Pay Equality and Industrial Politics" 3105: 3062: 3060: 3035:Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). 3030: 3028: 2988: 2913:Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). 2285:, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents 1940: 1722:, 115(1), pp. 99–100 & 119–22 pp. 2908: 2906: 2466: 2464: 1936: 1934: 1884: 1882: 1840:Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2883:The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2850:The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2690: • Andrew D. Foster and 2379:Handbook of Organizational Economics 1156: 1096:compensation based on principles of 1001:training, especially within the firm 16:Economics of labour within companies 3146: 3057: 3025: 2758:Scandinavian Journal of Management 1712:, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 381, 383. 1490:(tenure) vs. competitive selection 13: 3365:The Journal of Infectious Diseases 3238:Journal of Organizational Behavior 2903: 2696:Review of Economics and Statistics 2461: 1931: 1879: 1356: 1310: 1272:produce the same amount of output. 1033:Theory, Testing, and Possible Uses 14: 3445: 3393:& UMI. Chapter-preview links. 3299: 2714: • Casey Ichniowski, 2612:, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. 1777:JEL Classification Codes Guide: M 1697:JEL Classification Codes Guide: M 1424:Motivation-enhancing HR practices 1337:Disadvantages of Team Production: 1198:Disadvantages of Team Production: 3398:Journal of Economic Perspectives 3162:Journal of Economic Perspectives 3041:Journal of Economic Perspectives 2948:The Academy of Management Review 2942:Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). 2919:Journal of Economic Perspectives 2365:Journal of Economic Perspectives 2131:Human Resource Management Review 2121:Journal of Comparative Economics 1656:Journal of Economic Perspectives 1240:Approaches to Resolving Conflict 1176:Advantages of Tournament Theory: 976:Personnel economics has its own 867: 855: 40: 3356: 3327: 3312: 3293: 3264: 3225: 3178: 3099: 2982: 2935: 2870: 2837: 2828: 2787: 2600: 2583: 2552: 2491: 2444: 2427: 2384: 2351:Personnel Economics in Practice 2297:Arrow-page searchable contents. 2243: 2081: 2046: 2029: 1981: 1866: 1849: 1832: 1815: 1204:Inequality within the Workplace 142:Concepts, theory and techniques 2809:Journal of Economic Literature 2778:Journal of Financial Economics 2748:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2682:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2672:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2634:Journal of Economic Literature 2543:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2312:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2193:Quarterly Journal of Economics 2039:, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 381 . 1798: 1782: 1770: 1753: 1729: 1720:Quarterly Journal of Economics 1702: 1689: 1665: 1648:, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 380 . 1636: 1436:Performance pay vs. fixed pay 1395:can also boost productivity. 1324:Advantages of Team Production: 1249:their work is being monitored. 1245:Fixed payment with monitoring 1012:History of Personnel Economics 978:Journal of Economic Literature 1: 3375: 3185:Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2000). 2811:, 37(1), pp. 31–32, 39. [pp. 2381:, Princeton University Press. 1763:, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 381. 1378:Hedonic Model of Compensation 3277:The American Economic Review 3191:Schmalenbach Business Review 3112:Journal of Political Economy 2877:Fehr, E; Gächter, S (1990). 2844:Fehr, E; Gächter, S (1990). 2821:, vol. 37, issue 2–3, pages 2662:Journal of Political Economy 2564:Journal of Political Economy 2499:Journal of Political Economy 2472:Journal of Political Economy 2251:Journal of Political Economy 2072:Journal of Political Economy 1543:Skill-enhancing HR practices 959:rational maximizing behavior 7: 2620:Handbook of Labor Economics 2408:Handbook of Labor Economics 2291: • _____ 1995. 1607: 10: 3450: 3420:, 74(3), pp. 433–444. 3410:81(5), pp. 1408–1418. 3106:Lazear, Edward P. (1989). 3085:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.011 2793:• Pietro Garibaldi, 2006. 2730:Journal of Labor Economics 2706:Journal of Labor Economics 2591:Journal of Labor Economics 2529:Review of Economic Studies 2452:Journal of Labor Economics 2314:, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 2302:Journal of Labor Economics 2203:Review of Economic Studies 1947:Journal of Labor Economics 1556:Staff development programs 1228:the two, this can lead to 1190:Matching Workers and Jobs: 1120:behavior for the subject. 1078:Compensation according to 1057:hierarchical organizations 2622:, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. 2398:Bell Journal of Economics 2221: • _____ and 2183:Bell Journal of Economics 2173:Bell Journal of Economics 2107:Bell Journal of Economics 2093:Bell Journal of Economics 1528:Benefits and Entitlements 950:human resource management 3418:American Economic Review 3408:American Economic Review 3336:"What is Peer Learning?" 3232:Austin, Barbara (1994). 3003:10.1007/0-387-25092-1_15 2989:Miller, Gary J. (2005), 2819:European Economic Review 2720:American Economic Review 2519:American Economic Review 2482:American Economic Review 2418:American Economic Review 2332:American Economic Review 2261:American Economic Review 2213:American Economic Review 2141:American Economic Review 2058:American Economic Review 1908:10.1177/2397002216684998 1695:Above text adapted from 1629: 130:JEL classification codes 3400:, 3(4), pp. 49–64. 2410:, v. 1 , Elsevier, pp. 2394:, 45(179), pp. 235–250. 1941:Lazear, Edward (1999). 1682:1 February 2014 at the 1264:pay without monitoring 1225:Principal-Agent Problem 1219:Principal-Agent Problem 1048:principal-agent problem 989:JEL: J2, J3, J4, and J5 946:organizational behavior 316:Industrial organization 173:Computational economics 3250:10.1002/job.4030150608 2732:, 25(4), pp. 613–650. 2509:Psychological Bulletin 2195:, 98(Supplement), pp. 2021:: CS1 maint: others ( 1193:lower-skilled workers. 1106:experimental economics 1089:, and distribution of 935:internal labor markets 168:Experimental economics 3381:Blank, David M., and 2236:25 April 2012 at the 2123:, 2(3), pp. 211–225. 1859:, 12(3), pp. 281–99. 1808:, 13(1), pp. 87–105. 1792:, 43(2), pp. 263–82. 1624:Internal labor market 1579:Hiring for experience 1500:Competitive Selection 1182:Incentive Performance 971:cost–benefit analysis 3404:Montgomery, James D. 3319:University of York. 2896:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 2863:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 2454:, 5(4, Part 1), pp. 2229:, 7(special issue), 1511:Intrinsic Motivation 1144:Gift Exchange Theory 928:personnel management 395:Social choice theory 3434:Personnel economics 3321:"Staff Development" 2560:Ronald G. Ehrenberg 2435:Journal of Business 2293:Personnel Economics 2271:Journal of Business 2153:, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 1590:Promoting diversity 1129:Personnel Economics 981:classification code 963:economic efficiency 913:Personnel economics 862:Business portal 183:Operations research 163:National accounting 3203:10.1007/BF03396627 2768:Journal of Finance 2692:Mark R. Rosenzweig 2089:Joseph E. Stiglitz 1480:Reward Performance 1343:free-rider problem 1212:Unethical Behavior 1116:labor markets and 955:market equilibrium 193:Industrial complex 188:Middle income trap 3383:George J. Stigler 3279:. Cambridge, MA. 3164:. Cambridge, MA. 3043:. Cambridge, MA. 2921:. Cambridge, MA. 2654:Michael C. Jensen 2103:James A. Mirrlees 2000:978-1-4008-4535-4 1823:Manchester School 1573:Hiring for talent 1517:Extrinsic Rewards 1463:Freedom and Trust 1457:Close Supervision 1292:Adverse Selection 1254:adverse selection 1230:adverse selection 1162:Tournament Theory 1157:Tournament Theory 1098:tournament theory 910: 909: 3441: 3369: 3368: 3360: 3354: 3353: 3347: 3339: 3331: 3325: 3324: 3316: 3310: 3309: 3300:Hamel, Gregory. 3297: 3291: 3290: 3288: 3268: 3262: 3261: 3229: 3223: 3222: 3182: 3176: 3175: 3173: 3153: 3144: 3143: 3103: 3097: 3096: 3064: 3055: 3054: 3052: 3032: 3023: 3022: 3021: 3019: 2986: 2980: 2979: 2939: 2933: 2932: 2930: 2910: 2901: 2900: 2898: 2874: 2868: 2867: 2865: 2841: 2835: 2832: 2826: 2791: 2785: 2604: 2598: 2587: 2581: 2556: 2550: 2495: 2489: 2468: 2459: 2448: 2442: 2431: 2425: 2388: 2382: 2324:, 110(467), pp. 2322:Economic Journal 2247: 2241: 2169: 2158: 2085: 2079: 2050: 2044: 2033: 2027: 2026: 2020: 2012: 1985: 1979: 1978: 1938: 1929: 1928: 1910: 1886: 1877: 1870: 1864: 1857:Labour Economics 1853: 1847: 1836: 1830: 1819: 1813: 1806:Labour Economics 1802: 1796: 1790:Economic Inquiry 1786: 1780: 1774: 1768: 1757: 1751: 1733: 1727: 1706: 1700: 1693: 1687: 1673:Labour Economics 1669: 1663: 1640: 1474:Reward Seniority 1285:Monitoring Costs 1164:was proposed by 933:firms, and thus 902: 895: 888: 874:Money portal 872: 871: 870: 860: 859: 356:Natural resource 148:Economic systems 44: 21: 20: 3449: 3448: 3444: 3443: 3442: 3440: 3439: 3438: 3424: 3423: 3378: 3373: 3372: 3361: 3357: 3341: 3340: 3332: 3328: 3317: 3313: 3298: 3294: 3269: 3265: 3230: 3226: 3183: 3179: 3154: 3147: 3104: 3100: 3065: 3058: 3033: 3026: 3017: 3015: 3013: 2987: 2983: 2940: 2936: 2911: 2904: 2875: 2871: 2842: 2838: 2833: 2829: 2816: 2806: 2792: 2788: 2775: 2765: 2755: 2742: • 2741: 2727: 2716:Kathryn L. 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Ross 2051: 2047: 2034: 2030: 2014: 2013: 2001: 1987: 1986: 1982: 1939: 1932: 1887: 1880: 1871: 1867: 1854: 1850: 1837: 1833: 1820: 1816: 1803: 1799: 1787: 1783: 1775: 1771: 1758: 1754: 1736:Daniel Kahneman 1734: 1730: 1717: 1707: 1703: 1694: 1690: 1684:Wayback Machine 1670: 1666: 1653: 1641: 1637: 1632: 1614:Efficiency wage 1610: 1604: 1545: 1440:Performance Pay 1426: 1405: 1380: 1359: 1357:Pay Compression 1317:team production 1313: 1311:Team Production 1299:Inequitable Pay 1242: 1221: 1159: 1146: 1064:Bengt Holmström 1035: 1022:Labor Economics 1014: 967:prospect theory 924:labor economics 906: 868: 866: 854: 847: 846: 817: 807: 806: 805: 804: 568:von Böhm-Bawerk 456: 445: 444: 206: 198: 197: 153:Economic growth 143: 135: 134: 76: 74:classifications 17: 12: 11: 5: 3447: 3437: 3436: 3422: 3421: 3411: 3401: 3394: 3377: 3374: 3371: 3370: 3355: 3326: 3311: 3292: 3263: 3244:(6): 575–576. 3224: 3197:(4): 406–407. 3177: 3171:10.3386/w13653 3145: 3124:10.1086/261616 3118:(3): 561–580. 3098: 3079:(2): 221–232. 3056: 3050:10.3386/w13653 3024: 3011: 2981: 2960:10.2307/258191 2934: 2928:10.3386/w13653 2902: 2889:(3): 159–182. 2869: 2856:(3): 159–182. 2836: 2827: 2786: 2750:, 122(4), pp. 2738:10.1086/519539 2684:, 109(4), pp. 2674:, 109(4), pp. 2599: 2582: 2551: 2545:, 122(2), pp. 2511:, 125(6), pp. 2490: 2460: 2443: 2426: 2383: 2242: 2159: 2080: 2068:Eugene F. 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In 1998, 917:econometric 668:von Neumann 321:Information 261:Engineering 241:Development 236:Demographic 178:Game theory 120:Methodology 3376:References 3018:1 November 2797:, Oxford. 2744:Ann Bartel 2353:, Wiley. 1080:piece rate 1018:Adam Smith 827:Economists 698:Schumacher 603:Schumpeter 573:von Wieser 493:von Thünen 454:economists 430:Statistics 425:Solidarity 346:Managerial 311:Humanistic 306:Historical 251:Ecological 216:Behavioral 110:Mainstream 3258:0894-3796 3219:165855142 3211:1439-2917 3140:153565764 3132:0022-3808 3093:0167-2681 2968:0363-7425 2772:1619–1650 2752:1721–1758 2568:1307–1324 2392:Economica 2346:Abstract. 2336:1346–1361 2326:F611-F639 2295:. MIT. 2205:, 66(1), 2185:, 13(2), 2017:cite book 2009:892969634 1975:154386072 1967:0734-306X 1925:115407646 1917:2397-0022 1794:Abstract. 1446:Fixed Pay 1262:Incentive 1114:imperfect 743:Greenspan 708:Samuelson 688:Galbraith 658:Tinbergen 598:von Mises 593:Heckscher 553:Edgeworth 371:Personnel 331:Knowledge 296:Happiness 286:Financial 256:Education 231:Democracy 125:Political 91:Heterodox 34:Economics 3428:Category 3385:, 1957. 3344:cite web 2644:Abstract 2624:Abstract 2614:Abstract 2234:Archived 2125:Abstract 2041:Abstract 1861:Abstract 1810:Abstract 1765:Abstract 1714:Abstract 1680:Archived 1650:Abstract 1608:See also 1279:Shirking 1043:services 836:journals 822:Glossary 773:Stiglitz 738:Rothbard 718:Buchanan 703:Friedman 693:Koopmans 683:Leontief 663:Robinson 548:Marshall 452:Notable 400:Regional 376:Planning 351:Monetary 281:Feminist 226:Cultural 221:Business 26:a series 24:Part of 2823:355–365 2803:preview 2762:269–286 2724:291–313 2666:225–264 2578:385–411 2547:729–773 2523:850–873 2513:627–668 2476:841–864 2456:413–429 2359:preview 2306:199–236 2217:972–991 2207:169–182 2187:324–340 2135:431–452 2111:105–131 2076:288–307 2062:134–139 1844:588–609 1748:263–292 1677:527–554 985:JEL: M5 842:Schools 834: ( 793:Piketty 788:Krugman 653:Kuznets 643:Kalecki 618:Polanyi 508:Cournot 503:Bastiat 488:Ricardo 478:Malthus 468:Quesnay 440:Welfare 410:Service 81:Applied 57:Outline 52:History 3256: 3217: 3209: 3138: 3130: 3091: 3009: 2976:258191 2974: 2966: 2782:99–133 2656:, and 2574:LABOUR 2369:91–114 2316:99–146 2257:-1284. 2007: 1997: 1973: 1965: 1923: 1915: 1827:321-42 1724:99–146 1660:91–114 1125:et al. 1070:, and 961:, and 931:within 778:Thaler 758:Ostrom 753:Becker 748:Sowell 728:Baumol 633:Myrdal 628:Sraffa 623:Frisch 613:Knight 608:Keynes 583:Fisher 578:Veblen 563:Pareto 543:Menger 538:George 533:Jevons 528:Walras 518:Gossen 386:Public 381:Policy 336:Labour 301:Health 158:Market 3306:Chron 3215:S2CID 3136:S2CID 2972:JSTOR 2702:-227. 2688:-955. 2678:-919. 2597:-179. 2535:–534. 2488:-715. 2441:-431. 2424:-715. 2414:-692. 2404:-323. 2375:draft 2277:-431. 2267:-620. 2231:24–52 2177:74–91 2099:-579. 1971:S2CID 1921:S2CID 1630:Notes 1039:goods 921:micro 815:Lists 783:Hoppe 768:Lucas 733:Solow 723:Arrow 713:Simon 678:Lange 673:Hicks 648:Röpke 638:Hayek 588:Pigou 558:Clark 473:Smith 435:Urban 415:Socio 405:Rural 105:Macro 101:Micro 62:Index 3391:NBER 3350:link 3254:ISSN 3207:ISSN 3128:ISSN 3089:ISSN 3020:2020 3007:ISBN 2964:ISSN 2813:7–63 2801:and 2710:1–25 2638:7–63 2357:and 2287:link 2255:1261 2199:-54. 2157:133. 2147:-27. 2023:link 2005:OCLC 1995:ISBN 1963:ISSN 1913:ISSN 1738:and 1382:The 1223:The 1168:and 1041:and 948:and 799:more 523:Marx 513:Mill 498:List 3281:doi 3246:doi 3199:doi 3166:doi 3120:doi 3081:doi 3045:doi 2999:doi 2956:doi 2923:doi 2891:doi 2858:doi 2734:doi 2700:213 2686:921 2676:881 2648:PDF 2628:PDF 2595:155 2533:513 2486:701 2439:405 2422:701 2412:641 2402:311 2275:405 2265:606 2155:99- 2097:552 1955:doi 1903:doi 763:Sen 483:Say 341:Law 3430:: 3389:, 3346:}} 3342:{{ 3304:. 3275:. 3252:. 3242:15 3240:. 3236:. 3213:. 3205:. 3195:52 3193:. 3189:. 3160:. 3148:^ 3134:. 3126:. 3116:97 3114:. 3110:. 3087:. 3077:71 3075:. 3071:. 3059:^ 3039:. 3027:^ 3005:, 2993:, 2970:. 2962:. 2952:14 2950:. 2946:. 2917:. 2905:^ 2887:14 2885:. 2881:. 2854:14 2852:. 2848:. 2740:. 2580:. 2558:• 2463:^ 2197:23 2162:^ 2145:23 2087:• 2052:• 2019:}} 2015:{{ 2003:. 1969:. 1961:. 1951:17 1949:. 1945:. 1933:^ 1919:. 1911:. 1899:31 1897:. 1893:. 1881:^ 1874:M5 1066:, 1059:. 983:, 957:, 103:/ 28:on 3367:. 3352:) 3338:. 3323:. 3308:. 3289:. 3283:: 3260:. 3248:: 3221:. 3201:: 3174:. 3168:: 3142:. 3122:: 3095:. 3083:: 3053:. 3047:: 3001:: 2978:. 2958:: 2931:. 2925:: 2899:. 2893:: 2866:. 2860:: 2825:. 2815:. 2805:. 2784:. 2774:. 2764:. 2754:. 2736:: 2726:. 2712:. 2668:. 2650:. 2640:. 2630:. 2616:. 2570:. 2549:. 2525:. 2515:. 2505:. 2478:. 2458:. 2371:. 2361:. 2338:. 2328:. 2318:. 2289:. 2240:. 2219:. 2209:. 2189:. 2179:. 2137:. 2127:. 2113:. 2078:. 2064:. 2043:. 2025:) 2011:. 1977:. 1957:: 1927:. 1905:: 1876:. 1863:. 1846:. 1829:. 1812:. 1767:. 1750:. 1726:. 1716:. 1686:. 1662:. 1652:. 1093:, 901:e 894:t 887:v 838:)

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