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Henry E. Kyburg Jr.

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statements. This is like a level of confidence, except that Neyman–Pearson theory is prohibited from retrospective calculation and post-observational acceptance, while Kyburg's epistemological interpretation of probability licenses both. At a level of acceptance, any statement that is more probable
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if those senses have often been fooled in the past. Similarly, if a measurement device reports within an interval of error at a rate of .95, then no measurable statements are acceptable at a level above .95, unless the interval of error is widened. Meanwhile, at lower levels of acceptance, so many
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provides additional inferences at all acceptance levels. In some cases, the addition of an axiom produces predictions that are not refuted by experience. These are the adoptable theoretical postulates (and they must still be ordered by some kind of simplicity). In other cases, the theoretical
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There is no disagreement over the probability once there is agreement on the relevant knowledge; this is an objectivism relativized to an evidential state (i.e., relativized to a set of observed frequencies of properties in a class, and a set of asserted properties of
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categorically, at any level of acceptance lower than .9 (assuming also that the calculation was performed at an acceptance level above .9). The interesting tension is that very high levels of acceptance contain few evidentiary statements. They do not even include
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All probability inferences are based on knowledge of frequencies and properties, not ignorance of frequencies; however, randomness is essentially the lack of knowledge of bias (Kyburg especially rejects the maximum entropist methods of
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All probability statements can be traced to direct inference of frequency in a reference class (there can be Bayes-rule calculations upon direct-inference conclusions, but there is nothing like a prior distribution in Kyburg's
291:, but Kyburg firmly rejects their rule of combination; his work remained closer to confidence intervals, and was often interpreted by Bayesians as a commitment to a set of distributions, which Kyburg did not repudiate) 596: 97:), and neutral with respect to Bayesian confirmational conditionalization. On the latter subject, Kyburg had extended discussion in the literature with lifelong friend and colleague 298:
The reference class is the most specific class with suitable frequency knowledge (this is the Reichenbach rule, which Kyburg made precise; his framework was later reinterpreted as a
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postulate is in conflict with the evidence and measurement-based observations, so the postulate must be rejected. In this way, Kyburg provides a probability-mediated model of
201:, Bulent Murtezaoglu, and Choh Man Teng, and postdoctoral visitor Fahiem Bacchus. His philosophy students included daughter Alice Kyburg, Mariam Thalos, 140: 496:, and linguistic variation. The theory of acceptance mediates the tension between linguistic categorical assertion and probability-based epistemology. 441:
than the level of acceptance can be adopted as if it were a certainty. This can create logical inconsistency, which Kyburg illustrated in his famous
144: 556: 27: 571: 576: 581: 513: 586: 69:(in turn, a work closely related to his doctoral thesis). Kyburg describes his theory as Keynesian and Fisherian (see 262: 244: 591: 229: 288: 22:(1928–2007) was Gideon Burbank Professor of Moral Philosophy and Professor of Computer Science at the 323: 330:
who believes that chance must be positively asserted upon knowledge of relevant physical symmetries)
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for a logical probability based on reference classes, a reaction to Neyman–Pearson statistics (see
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contradictory statements are acceptable that nothing useful can be derived without inconsistency.
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Several full professors of philosophy today were once undergraduates of Henry Kyburg, including
61:, Kyburg is often misunderstood to be a Bayesian. His own theory of probability is outlined in 43: 31: 236: 205:, William Harper, Abhaya Nayak, Prashanta Bandyopadhaya, in addition to those listed above. 566: 561: 299: 58: 35: 8: 307: 306:, but Kyburg never intended the calculation of objective probabilities to be shortcut by 148: 70: 475: 160: 489: 191: 125: 82: 39: 541: 442: 315: 303: 202: 167: 156: 143:(1982), Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science (1995), Fellow of the 50: 517: 424:
Kyburg's rules apply to conflict and subsumption in complicated partial orders.
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Kyburg's treatment of universally quantified sentences is to add them to the
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Probability is measured by an interval (some mistake this as an affinity to
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Fellows of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
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Kyburg worked in probability and logic, and is known for his
194:, Rich Thomason, Teddy Seidenfeld, and William L. Harper. 65:(1974), a theory that first found form in his 1961 book 30:, Pensacola, Florida. His first faculty posts were at 141:
American Association for the Advancement of Science
112:(1984), a response to Krantz–Luce–Suppes–Tversky's 414:With this universal statement of class inclusion, 548: 432:Kyburg's inferences are always relativized to a 145:American Association for Artificial Intelligence 155:as his advisor. Kyburg was also a graduate of 428:Acceptance and principles of rational belief 67:Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief 63:Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference 26:, New York, and Pace Eminent Scholar at the 448:In the example above, the calculation that 479:of the language. There, a statement like 181: 174:cattle with his wife, Sarah, and promoted 346:Contained in this corpus are statements, 263:Learn how and when to remove this message 28:Institute for Human and Machine Cognition 208: 178:systems for energy-independent farmers. 549: 404:most specific relevant reference class 326:here; and Kyburg disagrees here with 212: 492:, scientific theory-formation, the 275:Several ideas distinguish Kyburg's 104:Kyburg's later major works include 13: 557:20th-century American philosophers 310:due to computational imperfection) 197:His AI dissertation students were 14: 608: 535: 151:, where he received his PhD with 77:), a delivery on the promises of 55:Studies in Subjective Probability 452:with probability .9 permits the 217: 108:(1983), a collection of essays; 572:University of Rochester faculty 283:interpretation of probability: 577:Wayne State University faculty 506: 463:raw observations of the senses 412:interfering reference classes. 386:conflicting reference classes, 1: 499: 388:so the probability is either 120:(1990), which seeks to allay 582:University of Denver faculty 53:(1961). Kyburg also edited 7: 243:the claims made and adding 10: 613: 587:Columbia University alumni 114:Foundations of Measurement 106:Epistemology and Inference 436:that defines a corpus of 379:probability that e is a P 324:Principle of Indifference 139:Kyburg was Fellow of the 485:preference is transitive 419:direct inference from T1 417:the probability is , by 372:frequency of P among T2 363:frequency of P among T1 182:Philosophical relatives 166:Kyburg owned a farm in 24:University of Rochester 592:Yale University alumni 322:and other uses of the 289:Dempster–Shafer theory 110:Theory and Measurement 44:Wayne State University 209:Theory of probability 32:Rockefeller Institute 384:Here, there are two 344:level of acceptance. 338:Example: Suppose a 300:defeasible reasoning 95:Neyman–Pearson lemma 59:Bayesian probability 36:University of Denver 16:American philosopher 434:level of acceptance 340:corpus of Knowledge 308:bounded rationality 149:Columbia University 71:John Maynard Keynes 20:Henry E. Kyburg Jr. 476:meaning postulates 228:possibly contains 118:Science and Reason 542:Official Obituary 456:of the statement 402:now makes T1 the 398:All T1's are T2's 273: 272: 265: 230:original research 161:Guggenheim Fellow 604: 529: 528: 526: 525: 516:. Archived from 510: 490:predictive power 268: 261: 257: 254: 248: 245:inline citations 221: 220: 213: 192:Robert Stalnaker 170:where he raised 126:Bruno de Finetti 83:Hans Reichenbach 40:Wesleyan College 612: 611: 607: 606: 605: 603: 602: 601: 547: 546: 538: 533: 532: 523: 521: 512: 511: 507: 502: 443:lottery paradox 438:morally certain 430: 422: 400: 375: 366: 357: 316:Harold Jeffreys 304:John L. Pollock 281:epistemological 269: 258: 252: 249: 234: 222: 218: 211: 203:Gregory Wheeler 184: 168:Lyons, New York 157:Yale University 51:Lottery Paradox 17: 12: 11: 5: 610: 600: 599: 594: 589: 584: 579: 574: 569: 564: 559: 545: 544: 537: 536:External links 534: 531: 530: 504: 503: 501: 498: 429: 426: 416: 396: 370: 361: 348: 336: 335: 331: 311: 296: 292: 271: 270: 225: 223: 216: 210: 207: 188:Daniel Dennett 183: 180: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 609: 598: 595: 593: 590: 588: 585: 583: 580: 578: 575: 573: 570: 568: 565: 563: 560: 558: 555: 554: 552: 543: 540: 539: 520:on 2011-06-04 519: 515: 509: 505: 497: 495: 494:Web of Belief 491: 486: 482: 478: 477: 472: 467: 464: 459: 455: 451: 446: 444: 439: 435: 425: 420: 415: 413: 409: 405: 399: 395: 393: 390: 387: 382: 380: 373: 369: 368:The observed 364: 360: 359:The observed 355: 351: 347: 345: 341: 332: 329: 325: 321: 317: 312: 309: 305: 301: 297: 293: 290: 286: 285: 284: 282: 278: 267: 264: 256: 246: 242: 238: 232: 231: 226:This section 224: 215: 214: 206: 204: 200: 195: 193: 189: 179: 177: 173: 169: 164: 162: 158: 154: 150: 146: 142: 137: 135: 131: 127: 123: 119: 115: 111: 107: 102: 100: 96: 92: 88: 84: 80: 79:Rudolf Carnap 76: 75:Ronald Fisher 72: 68: 64: 60: 56: 52: 47: 45: 41: 37: 33: 29: 25: 21: 522:. Retrieved 518:the original 508: 493: 484: 480: 474: 470: 468: 462: 457: 453: 449: 447: 437: 433: 431: 423: 418: 411: 407: 403: 401: 397: 392: 389: 385: 383: 378: 377:What is the 376: 371: 367: 362: 358: 353: 349: 343: 339: 337: 280: 276: 274: 259: 253:January 2014 250: 227: 196: 185: 176:wind turbine 165: 153:Ernest Nagel 138: 133: 129: 117: 113: 109: 105: 103: 91:Karl Pearson 87:Jerzy Neyman 66: 62: 54: 48: 19: 18: 567:2007 deaths 562:1928 births 320:E.T. Jaynes 199:Ronald Loui 159:and a 1980 122:Karl Popper 551:Categories 524:2009-08-15 500:References 454:acceptance 328:Isaac Levi 302:system by 237:improve it 99:Isaac Levi 471:Ur-corpus 408:dominator 354:e is a T2 350:e is a T1 277:Kyburgian 241:verifying 458:e is a P 450:e is a P 410:of all 374:is .4. 365:is .9. 334:events) 295:theory) 235:Please 124:'s and 481:F = ma 406:and a 116:; and 93:, and 42:, and 342:at a 172:Angus 352:and 81:and 73:and 483:or 473:or 279:or 239:by 136:). 553:: 445:. 421:. 381:? 356:. 318:, 190:, 163:. 134:ma 132:= 101:. 89:, 46:. 38:, 34:, 527:. 266:) 260:( 255:) 251:( 233:. 130:F

Index

University of Rochester
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition
Rockefeller Institute
University of Denver
Wesleyan College
Wayne State University
Lottery Paradox
Bayesian probability
John Maynard Keynes
Ronald Fisher
Rudolf Carnap
Hans Reichenbach
Jerzy Neyman
Karl Pearson
Neyman–Pearson lemma
Isaac Levi
Karl Popper
Bruno de Finetti
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Association for Artificial Intelligence
Columbia University
Ernest Nagel
Yale University
Guggenheim Fellow
Lyons, New York
Angus
wind turbine
Daniel Dennett
Robert Stalnaker
Ronald Loui

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