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Global game

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99:(1998) considered a stylized currency crises model, in which traders observe the relevant fundamentals with small noise, and show that this leads to the selection of a unique equilibrium. This result overturns the result in models of 106:
One concern with the robustness of this result is that the introduction of a theory of prices in global coordination games may reintroduce multiplicity of equilibria. This concern was addressed in
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are games of incomplete information where players receive possibly-correlated signals of the underlying state of the world. Global games were originally defined by Carlsson and
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and coauthors (2006). They show that equilibrium multiplicity may be restored by the existence of prices acting as an endogenous public signal, provided that
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Angeletos, George-Marios; Werning, Ivan (2006). "Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility".
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Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song (1998). "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks".
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Atkeson, Andrew G. (2001). "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling: Comment". In
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Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun S. (2001). "Global Games: Theory and Applications".
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The most important practical application of global games has been the study of
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Hellwig, Christian; Mukherji, Arijit; Tsyvinski, Aleh (2006).
851: 277:"Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates" 87: 274: 80:, and any other economic situation which displays 138: 1440: 237: 380: 201: 387: 373: 347: 312: 180: 394: 330: 259: 88:Global games in models of currency crises 141:"Global Games and Equilibrium Selection" 139:Carlsson, Hans; van Damme, Eric (1993). 207: 14: 1441: 368: 103:, which feature multiple equilibria. 24: 436:First-player and second-player win 350:Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 313:Jorge, JosĂ©; Rocha, Joana (2015). 306: 25: 1460: 543:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 553:Evolutionarily stable strategy 268: 231: 174: 132: 13: 1: 481:Simultaneous action selection 125: 1413:List of games in game theory 593:Quantal response equilibrium 583:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 518:Bayes correlated equilibrium 7: 882:Optional prisoner's dilemma 613:Self-confirming equilibrium 319:Journal of Economic Surveys 54:crises in financial markets 10: 1465: 1347:Principal variation search 1063:Aumann's agreement theorem 726:Strategy-stealing argument 638:Trembling hand equilibrium 568:Markov perfect equilibrium 563:Mertens-stable equilibrium 221:Macroeconomics Annual 2000 26: 1383:Combinatorial game theory 1370: 1329: 1111: 1055: 1042:Princess and monster game 837: 739: 646: 598:Quasi-perfect equilibrium 523:Bayesian Nash equilibrium 504: 403: 122:is sufficiently precise. 82:strategic complementarity 1449:Game theory game classes 1398:Evolutionary game theory 1131:Antoine Augustin Cournot 1017:Guess 2/3 of the average 814:Strictly determined game 608:Satisfaction equilibrium 426:Escalation of commitment 284:American Economic Review 240:American Economic Review 183:American Economic Review 1403:Glossary of game theory 1002:Stackelberg competition 628:Strong Nash equilibrium 1428:Tragedy of the commons 1408:List of game theorists 1388:Confrontation analysis 1098:Sprague–Grundy theorem 618:Sequential equilibrium 538:Correlated equilibrium 1201:Jean-François Mertens 296:10.1257/aer.96.5.1769 252:10.1257/aer.96.5.1720 1330:Search optimizations 1206:Jennifer Tour Chayes 1093:Revelation principle 1088:Purification theorem 1027:Nash bargaining game 992:Bertrand competition 977:El Farol Bar problem 942:Electronic mail game 907:Lewis signaling game 451:Hierarchy of beliefs 101:complete information 1378:Bounded rationality 997:Cournot competition 947:Rock paper scissors 922:Battle of the sexes 912:Volunteer's dilemma 784:Perfect information 711:Dominant strategies 548:Epsilon-equilibrium 431:Extensive-form game 120:private information 1357:Paranoid algorithm 1337:Alpha–beta pruning 1216:John Maynard Smith 1047:Rendezvous problem 887:Traveler's dilemma 877:Gift-exchange game 872:Prisoner's dilemma 789:Large Poisson game 756:Bargaining problem 661:Backward induction 633:Subgame perfection 588:Proper equilibrium 332:10.1111/joes.12071 227:. pp. 162–71. 114:(2006) as well as 1436: 1435: 1342:Aspiration window 1311:Suzanne Scotchmer 1266:Oskar Morgenstern 1161:Donald B. Gillies 1103:Zermelo's theorem 1032:Induction puzzles 987:Fair cake-cutting 962:Public goods game 892:Coordination game 766:Intransitive game 696:Forward induction 578:Pareto efficiency 558:Gibbs equilibrium 528:Berge equilibrium 476:Simultaneous game 223:. Cambridge, MA: 16:(Redirected from 1456: 1423:Topological game 1418:No-win situation 1316:Thomas Schelling 1296:Robert B. Wilson 1256:Merrill M. Flood 1226:John von Neumann 1136:Ariel Rubinstein 1121:Albert W. Tucker 972:War of attrition 932:Matching pennies 573:Nash equilibrium 496:Mechanism design 461:Normal-form game 416:Cooperative game 389: 382: 375: 366: 365: 361: 344: 334: 300: 299: 290:(5): 1769–1787. 281: 272: 266: 265: 263: 235: 229: 228: 210:Bernanke, Ben S. 205: 199: 198: 178: 172: 171: 145: 136: 21: 1464: 1463: 1459: 1458: 1457: 1455: 1454: 1453: 1439: 1438: 1437: 1432: 1366: 1352:max^n algorithm 1325: 1321:William Vickrey 1281:Reinhard Selten 1236:Kenneth Binmore 1151:David K. Levine 1146:Daniel Kahneman 1113: 1107: 1083:Negamax theorem 1073:Minimax theorem 1051: 1012:Diner's dilemma 867:All-pay auction 833: 819:Stochastic game 771:Mean-field game 742: 735: 706:Markov strategy 642: 508: 500: 471:Sequential game 456:Information set 441:Game complexity 411:Congestion game 399: 393: 309: 307:Further reading 304: 303: 279: 273: 269: 236: 232: 214:Rogoff, Kenneth 206: 202: 179: 175: 160:10.2307/2951491 154:(5): 989–1018. 143: 137: 133: 128: 90: 74:political riots 70:beauty contests 62:currency crises 31: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 1462: 1452: 1451: 1434: 1433: 1431: 1430: 1425: 1420: 1415: 1410: 1405: 1400: 1395: 1390: 1385: 1380: 1374: 1372: 1368: 1367: 1365: 1364: 1359: 1354: 1349: 1344: 1339: 1333: 1331: 1327: 1326: 1324: 1323: 1318: 1313: 1308: 1303: 1298: 1293: 1288: 1286:Robert Axelrod 1283: 1278: 1273: 1268: 1263: 1261:Olga Bondareva 1258: 1253: 1251:Melvin Dresher 1248: 1243: 1241:Leonid Hurwicz 1238: 1233: 1228: 1223: 1218: 1213: 1208: 1203: 1198: 1193: 1188: 1183: 1178: 1176:Harold W. Kuhn 1173: 1168: 1166:Drew Fudenberg 1163: 1158: 1156:David M. Kreps 1153: 1148: 1143: 1141:Claude Shannon 1138: 1133: 1128: 1123: 1117: 1115: 1109: 1108: 1106: 1105: 1100: 1095: 1090: 1085: 1080: 1078:Nash's theorem 1075: 1070: 1065: 1059: 1057: 1053: 1052: 1050: 1049: 1044: 1039: 1034: 1029: 1024: 1019: 1014: 1009: 1004: 999: 994: 989: 984: 979: 974: 969: 964: 959: 954: 949: 944: 939: 937:Ultimatum game 934: 929: 924: 919: 917:Dollar auction 914: 909: 904: 902:Centipede game 899: 894: 889: 884: 879: 874: 869: 864: 859: 857:Infinite chess 854: 849: 843: 841: 835: 834: 832: 831: 826: 824:Symmetric game 821: 816: 811: 809:Signaling game 806: 804:Screening game 801: 796: 794:Potential game 791: 786: 781: 773: 768: 763: 758: 753: 747: 745: 737: 736: 734: 733: 728: 723: 721:Mixed strategy 718: 713: 708: 703: 698: 693: 688: 683: 678: 673: 668: 663: 658: 652: 650: 644: 643: 641: 640: 635: 630: 625: 620: 615: 610: 605: 603:Risk dominance 600: 595: 590: 585: 580: 575: 570: 565: 560: 555: 550: 545: 540: 535: 530: 525: 520: 514: 512: 502: 501: 499: 498: 493: 488: 483: 478: 473: 468: 463: 458: 453: 448: 446:Graphical game 443: 438: 433: 428: 423: 418: 413: 407: 405: 401: 400: 392: 391: 384: 377: 369: 363: 362: 345: 325:(5): 869–886. 308: 305: 302: 301: 267: 246:(5): 1720–36. 230: 200: 173: 130: 129: 127: 124: 97:Hyun Song Shin 93:Stephen Morris 89: 86: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1461: 1450: 1447: 1446: 1444: 1429: 1426: 1424: 1421: 1419: 1416: 1414: 1411: 1409: 1406: 1404: 1401: 1399: 1396: 1394: 1391: 1389: 1386: 1384: 1381: 1379: 1376: 1375: 1373: 1371:Miscellaneous 1369: 1363: 1360: 1358: 1355: 1353: 1350: 1348: 1345: 1343: 1340: 1338: 1335: 1334: 1332: 1328: 1322: 1319: 1317: 1314: 1312: 1309: 1307: 1306:Samuel Bowles 1304: 1302: 1301:Roger Myerson 1299: 1297: 1294: 1292: 1291:Robert Aumann 1289: 1287: 1284: 1282: 1279: 1277: 1274: 1272: 1269: 1267: 1264: 1262: 1259: 1257: 1254: 1252: 1249: 1247: 1246:Lloyd Shapley 1244: 1242: 1239: 1237: 1234: 1232: 1231:Kenneth Arrow 1229: 1227: 1224: 1222: 1219: 1217: 1214: 1212: 1211:John Harsanyi 1209: 1207: 1204: 1202: 1199: 1197: 1194: 1192: 1189: 1187: 1184: 1182: 1181:Herbert Simon 1179: 1177: 1174: 1172: 1169: 1167: 1164: 1162: 1159: 1157: 1154: 1152: 1149: 1147: 1144: 1142: 1139: 1137: 1134: 1132: 1129: 1127: 1124: 1122: 1119: 1118: 1116: 1110: 1104: 1101: 1099: 1096: 1094: 1091: 1089: 1086: 1084: 1081: 1079: 1076: 1074: 1071: 1069: 1066: 1064: 1061: 1060: 1058: 1054: 1048: 1045: 1043: 1040: 1038: 1035: 1033: 1030: 1028: 1025: 1023: 1020: 1018: 1015: 1013: 1010: 1008: 1005: 1003: 1000: 998: 995: 993: 990: 988: 985: 983: 982:Fair division 980: 978: 975: 973: 970: 968: 965: 963: 960: 958: 957:Dictator game 955: 953: 950: 948: 945: 943: 940: 938: 935: 933: 930: 928: 925: 923: 920: 918: 915: 913: 910: 908: 905: 903: 900: 898: 895: 893: 890: 888: 885: 883: 880: 878: 875: 873: 870: 868: 865: 863: 860: 858: 855: 853: 850: 848: 845: 844: 842: 840: 836: 830: 829:Zero-sum game 827: 825: 822: 820: 817: 815: 812: 810: 807: 805: 802: 800: 799:Repeated game 797: 795: 792: 790: 787: 785: 782: 780: 778: 774: 772: 769: 767: 764: 762: 759: 757: 754: 752: 749: 748: 746: 744: 738: 732: 729: 727: 724: 722: 719: 717: 716:Pure strategy 714: 712: 709: 707: 704: 702: 699: 697: 694: 692: 689: 687: 684: 682: 681:De-escalation 679: 677: 674: 672: 669: 667: 664: 662: 659: 657: 654: 653: 651: 649: 645: 639: 636: 634: 631: 629: 626: 624: 623:Shapley value 621: 619: 616: 614: 611: 609: 606: 604: 601: 599: 596: 594: 591: 589: 586: 584: 581: 579: 576: 574: 571: 569: 566: 564: 561: 559: 556: 554: 551: 549: 546: 544: 541: 539: 536: 534: 531: 529: 526: 524: 521: 519: 516: 515: 513: 511: 507: 503: 497: 494: 492: 491:Succinct game 489: 487: 484: 482: 479: 477: 474: 472: 469: 467: 464: 462: 459: 457: 454: 452: 449: 447: 444: 442: 439: 437: 434: 432: 429: 427: 424: 422: 419: 417: 414: 412: 409: 408: 406: 402: 398: 390: 385: 383: 378: 376: 371: 370: 367: 359: 355: 351: 346: 342: 338: 333: 328: 324: 320: 316: 311: 310: 297: 293: 289: 285: 278: 271: 262: 257: 253: 249: 245: 241: 234: 226: 222: 220: 215: 211: 204: 196: 192: 189:(3): 587–97. 188: 184: 177: 169: 165: 161: 157: 153: 149: 142: 135: 131: 123: 121: 117: 113: 109: 104: 102: 98: 94: 85: 83: 79: 75: 71: 67: 63: 59: 55: 50: 48: 44: 40: 36: 30: 29:Globle (game) 19: 1276:Peyton Young 1271:Paul Milgrom 1186:HervĂ© Moulin 1126:Amos Tversky 1068:Folk theorem 779:-player game 776: 760: 701:Grim trigger 349: 322: 318: 287: 283: 270: 261:1721.1/63311 243: 239: 233: 217: 203: 186: 182: 176: 151: 148:Econometrica 147: 134: 105: 91: 51: 43:global games 42: 32: 18:Global games 1393:Coopetition 1196:Jean Tirole 1191:John Conway 1171:Eric Maskin 967:Blotto game 952:Pirate game 761:Global game 731:Tit for tat 666:Bid shading 656:Appeasement 506:Equilibrium 486:Solved game 421:Determinacy 404:Definitions 397:game theory 78:revolutions 39:game theory 1037:Trust game 1022:Kuhn poker 691:Escalation 686:Deterrence 676:Cheap talk 648:Strategies 466:Preference 395:Topics of 126:References 27:See also: 1221:John Nash 927:Stag hunt 671:Collusion 352:. 1275R. 341:154093787 225:MIT Press 108:Angeletos 58:bank runs 47:van Damme 35:economics 1443:Category 1362:Lazy SMP 1056:Theorems 1007:Deadlock 862:Checkers 743:of games 510:concepts 216:(eds.). 56:such as 49:(1993). 1114:figures 897:Chicken 751:Auction 741:Classes 168:2951491 116:Hellwig 112:Werning 66:bubbles 358:284813 356:  339:  195:116850 193:  166:  64:, and 852:Chess 839:Games 337:S2CID 280:(PDF) 191:JSTOR 164:JSTOR 144:(PDF) 533:Core 354:SSRN 219:NBER 110:and 95:and 76:and 37:and 1112:Key 327:doi 292:doi 256:hdl 248:doi 156:doi 33:In 1445:: 847:Go 335:. 323:29 321:. 317:. 288:96 286:. 282:. 254:. 244:96 242:. 212:; 187:88 185:. 162:. 152:61 150:. 146:. 84:. 72:, 60:, 41:, 777:n 388:e 381:t 374:v 360:. 343:. 329:: 298:. 294:: 264:. 258:: 250:: 197:. 170:. 158:: 20:)

Index

Global games
Globle (game)
economics
game theory
van Damme
crises in financial markets
bank runs
currency crises
bubbles
beauty contests
political riots
revolutions
strategic complementarity
Stephen Morris
Hyun Song Shin
complete information
Angeletos
Werning
Hellwig
private information
"Global Games and Equilibrium Selection"
doi
10.2307/2951491
JSTOR
2951491
JSTOR
116850
Bernanke, Ben S.
Rogoff, Kenneth
NBER

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