509:'s Santa Monica facility, where he would write "Alchemy and AI", the first salvo of his attack. Armer had thought he was hiring an impartial critic and was surprised when Dreyfus produced a scathing paper intended to demolish the foundations of the field. (Armer stated he was unaware of Dreyfus' previous publication.) Armer delayed publishing it, but ultimately realized that "just because it came to a conclusion you didn't like was no reason not to publish it." It finally came out as RAND Memo and soon became a best seller.
457:) is a form of knowledge that is not stored in our brains symbolically, but intuitively in some way. It affects what we notice and what we don't notice, what we expect and what possibilities we don't consider: we discriminate between what is essential and inessential. The things that are inessential are relegated to our "fringe consciousness" (borrowing a phrase from
253:, Dreyfus identified four philosophical assumptions that supported the faith of early AI researchers that human intelligence depended on the manipulation of symbols. "In each case," Dreyfus writes, "the assumption is taken by workers in as an axiom, guaranteeing results, whereas it is, in fact, one hypothesis among others, to be tested by the success of such work."
516:: a misguided attempt to change metals to gold based on a theoretical foundation that was no more than mythology and wishful thinking. It ridiculed the grandiose predictions of leading AI researchers, predicting that there were limits beyond which AI would not progress and intimating that those limits would be reached soon.
31:
416:
Dreyfus argued that human problem solving and expertise depend on our background sense of the context, of what is important and interesting given the situation, rather than on the process of searching through combinations of possibilities to find what we need. Dreyfus would describe it in 1986 as the
906:
A more serious issue was the impression that
Dreyfus' critique was incorrigibly hostile. McCorduck wrote, "His derisiveness has been so provoking that he has estranged anyone he might have enlightened. And that's a pity." Daniel Crevier stated that "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of
444:
Knowing-how, on the other hand, is the way we deal with things normally. We take actions without using conscious symbolic reasoning at all, as when we recognize a face, drive ourselves to work or find the right thing to say. We seem to simply jump to the appropriate response, without considering any
432:
Knowing-that is our conscious, step-by-step problem solving abilities. We use these skills when we encounter a difficult problem that requires us to stop, step back and search through ideas one at time. At moments like this, the ideas become very precise and simple: they become context free symbols,
561:
magazine on June 11, 1966. The piece mentioned
Dreyfus' contention that, while computers may be able to play checkers, no computer could yet play a decent game of chess. It reported with wry humor (as Dreyfus had) about the victory of a ten-year-old over the leading chess program, with "even more
902:
Dreyfus did not anticipate that AI researchers would realize their mistake and begin to work towards new solutions, moving away from the symbolic methods that
Dreyfus criticized. In 1965, he did not imagine that such programs would one day be created, so he claimed AI was impossible. In 1965, AI
364:
also identified a subtler assumption about the world. AI researchers (and futurists and science fiction writers) often assume that there is no limit to formal, scientific knowledge, because they assume that any phenomenon in the universe can be described by symbols or scientific theories. This
744:
used techniques related to economics and statistics to allow machines to "guess" – to make inexact, probabilistic decisions and predictions based on experience and learning. These programs simulate the way our unconscious instincts are able to perceive, notice anomalies and make quick
898:"we cannot so easily convince ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour ... The only way we know of for finding such laws is scientific observation, and we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, 'We have searched enough. There are no such laws.'"
601:
replied: "You should recognize that some of those who are bitten by your sharp-toothed prose are likely, in their human weakness, to bite back ... may I be so bold as to suggest that you could well begin the cooling---a recovery of your sense of humor being a good first step."
551:
was unprofessional and childish. Although he was an outspoken critic of
Dreyfus' positions, he recalls "I became the only member of the AI community to be seen eating lunch with Dreyfus. And I deliberately made it plain that theirs was not the way to treat a human being."
347:
has) that it is possible for a symbol processing machine to represent all knowledge, regardless of whether human beings represent knowledge the same way. Dreyfus argued that there is no justification for this assumption, since so much of human knowledge is not symbolic.
628:) did not appear in the year 2001. "AI researchers", writes Nicolas Fearn, "clearly have some explaining to do." Today researchers are far more reluctant to make the kind of predictions that were made in the early days. (Although some futurists, such as
212:
A great misunderstanding accounts for public confusion about thinking machines, a misunderstanding perpetrated by the unrealistic claims researchers in AI have been making, claims that thinking machines are already here, or at any rate, just around the
745:
judgements, similar to what
Dreyfus called "sizing up the situation and reacting", but here the "situation" consists of vast amounts of numerical data. These techniques are highly successful and are currently widely used in both industry and academia.
140:
simulate the way that the brain uses unconscious process to perceive, notice anomalies and make quick judgements. These techniques are highly successful and are currently widely used in both industry and academia. Historian and AI researcher
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in 1972, no one from the AI community chose to respond (with the exception of a few critical reviews). McCorduck asks "If
Dreyfus is so wrong-headed, why haven't the artificial intelligence people made more effort to contradict him?"
664:. Many AI researchers have come to agree that human reasoning does not consist primarily of high-level symbol manipulation. In fact, since Dreyfus first published his critiques in the 60s, AI research in general has moved away from
295:
that suggested that the action and timing of neuron firing had analog components. But Daniel
Crevier observes that "few still held that belief in the early 1970s, and nobody argued against Dreyfus" about the biological assumption.
369:
can be understood as objects, properties of objects, classes of objects, relations of objects, and so on: precisely those things that can be described by logic, language and mathematics. The study of being or existence is called
233:. Believing that they had successfully simulated the essential process of human thought with simple programs, it seemed a short step to producing fully intelligent machines. However, Dreyfus argued that philosophy, especially
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in the spring of 1961. Dreyfus was especially bothered, as a philosopher, that AI researchers seemed to believe they were on the verge of solving many long standing philosophical problems within a few years, using computers.
448:
The human sense of the situation, according to
Dreyfus, is based on our goals, our bodies and our culture—all of our unconscious intuitions, attitudes and knowledge about the world. This “context” or "background" (related to
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and so on are mostly directed at simulated unconscious reasoning. Dreyfus himself agrees that these sub-symbolic methods can capture the kind of "tendencies" and "attitudes" that he considers essential for intelligence and
790:
Although clearly AI research has come to agree with
Dreyfus, McCorduck claimed that "my impression is that this progress has taken place piecemeal and in response to tough given problems, and owes nothing to Dreyfus."
286:
gates operate, and so could be imitated by electronic circuitry at the level of the neuron. When digital computers became widely used in the early 50s, this argument was extended to suggest that the brain was a vast
467:
does not believe that AI programs, as they were implemented in the 70s and 80s, could capture this "background" or do the kind of fast problem solving that it allows. He argued that our unconscious knowledge could
321:
and that without this background our symbols cease to mean anything. This background, in
Dreyfus' view, was not implemented in individual brains as explicit individual symbols with explicit individual meanings.
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would later explain), an argument of this form cannot be won: just because one cannot imagine formal rules that govern human intelligence and expertise, this does not mean that no such rules exist. They quote
119:
When Dreyfus' ideas were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were met with ridicule and outright hostility. By the 1980s, however, many of his perspectives were rediscovered by researchers working in
1761:
Hearst, Marti A.; Hirsh, Haym; Bundy, A.; Berliner, H.; Feigenbaum, E.A.; Buchanan, B.G.; Selfridge, O.; Michie, D.; Nilsson, N. (January–February 2000), "AI's Greatest Trends and Controversies",
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alternatives. This is the essence of expertise, Dreyfus argued: when our intuitions have been trained to the point that we forget the rules and simply "size up the situation" and react.
532:
accused Dreyfus of playing "politics" so that he could attach the prestigious RAND name to his ideas. Simon said, "what I resent about this was the RAND name attached to that garbage".
378:
calls this the ontological assumption. If this is false, then it raises doubts about what we can ultimately know and what intelligent machines will ultimately be able to help us to do.
762:
collected a vast amount of hard evidence that human beings use two very different methods to solve problems, which they named "system 1" and "system 2". System one, also known as the
81:, he presented a pessimistic assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field. Dreyfus' objections are discussed in most introductions to the
17:
650:), they don't assume that neurons are essentially digital, but rather that the action of analog neurons can be simulated by digital machines to a reasonable level of accuracy. (
754:. Research in psychology and economics has been able to show that Dreyfus' (and Heidegger's) speculation about the nature of human problem solving was essentially correct.
472:
be captured symbolically. If AI could not find a way to address these issues, then it was doomed to failure, an exercise in "tree climbing with one's eyes on the moon."
830:). AI researchers of the 1960s, by contrast, based their understanding of the human mind on engineering principles and efficient problem solving techniques related to
441:
had demonstrated with both psychological experiments and computer programs. Dreyfus agreed that their programs adequately imitated the skills he calls "knowing-that."
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research. It would take many years before artificial intelligence researchers were able to address the issues that were important to continental philosophy, such as
317:
that make us lean towards one interpretation over another. He argued that, even when we use explicit symbols, we are using them against an unconscious background of
208:
Dreyfus felt that this optimism was unwarranted and based on false assumptions about the nature of human intelligence. Pamela McCorduck explains Dreyfus' position:
145:
writes: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments." Dreyfus said in 2007, "I figure I won and it's over—they've given up."
237:, had discovered serious problems with this information processing viewpoint. The mind, according to modern philosophy, is nothing like a digital computer.
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The AI community, with a few exceptions, chose not to respond to Dreyfus directly. "He's too silly to take seriously" a researcher told Pamela McCorduck.
1988:
907:
some of Dreyfus's comments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they suggested might have been taken much earlier."
100:
manipulation, and that these unconscious skills can never be fully captured in formal rules. His critique was based on the insights of modern
616:. As Dreyfus had foreseen, the grandiose predictions of early AI researchers failed to come true. Fully intelligent machines (now known as "
502:
1918:
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writes that by 1993, unlike 1965, AI researchers "no longer made the psychological assumption", and had continued forward without it.
217:
These predictions were based on the success of an "information processing" model of the mind, articulated by Newell and Simon in their
484:, then a hotbed of artificial intelligence research. His first publication on the subject is a half-page objection to a talk given by
397:, Dreyfus analyzed the difference between human expertise and the programs that claimed to capture it. This expanded on ideas from
638:, although common in the forties and early fifties, was no longer assumed by most AI researchers by the time Dreyfus published
291:, manipulating the binary symbols of zero and one. Dreyfus was able to refute the biological assumption by citing research in
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642:. Although many still argue that it is essential to reverse-engineer the brain by simulating the action of neurons (such as
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Dreyfus was one of the only non-computer scientists asked for a comment in IEEE's survey of AI's greatest controversies. (
766:, is fast, intuitive and unconscious. System 2 is slow, logical and deliberate. Their research was collected in the book
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researchers did not imagine that such programs were necessary, so they claimed AI was almost complete. Both were wrong.
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were among the first to realize that unconscious skills would prove to be the most difficult to reverse engineer. (See
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dismissed one third of the paper as "gossip" and claimed that every quotation was deliberately taken out of context.
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Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on unconscious processes rather than conscious
724:.) Brooks would spearhead a movement in the late 80s that took direct aim at the use of high-level symbols, called
524:
The paper "caused an uproar", according to Pamela McCorduck. The AI community's response was derisive and personal.
842:! That ball of fluff. That cotton candy!" In 1965, there was simply too huge a gap between European philosophy and
624:(whose capabilities for natural language, perception and problem solving were based on the advice and opinions of
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570:
343:. Even if we agree that the psychological assumption is false, AI researchers could still argue (as AI founder
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be able to capture the human ability to understand context, situation or purpose in the form of rules. But (as
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The brain processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of on/off switches.
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The press reported these predictions in glowing reports of the imminent arrival of machine intelligence.
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The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions: A Philosophical Adventure with the World's Greatest Thinkers
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He refuted this assumption by showing that much of what we "know" about the world consists of complex
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1900:(1963), "GPS: A Program that Simulates Human Thought", in Feigenbaum, E.A.; Feldman, J. (eds.),
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132:" because they eschew early AI research's emphasis on high level symbols. In the 21st century,
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The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules.
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Horst, Steven (Fall 2005), "The Computational Theory of Mind", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
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1138:. The "knowing-how"/"knowing-that" terminology was introduced in the 1950s by philosopher
461:): the millions of things we're aware of, but we're not really thinking about right now.
8:
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The bulletin was for the Special Interest Group in Artificial Intelligence. (ACM SIGART).
539:, remembers that his colleagues working in AI "dared not be seen having lunch with me."
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Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer
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831:
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Dreyfus began to formulate his critique in the early 1960s while he was a professor at
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The world consists of independent facts that can be represented by independent symbols
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782:. As with AI, this research was entirely independent of both Dreyfus and Heidegger.
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research attempts to capture our unconscious skills at perception and attention.
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This research has gone forward without any direct connection to Dreyfus' work.
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By the early 1990s several of Dreyfus' radical opinions had become mainstream.
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to represent reality and tried to reduce intelligence to symbol manipulation.
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and ridiculed the unbridled optimism that permeated the field. For example,
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of philosophy that Dreyfus used in his critique. Dreyfus was an expert in
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A computer would discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem.
112:, and was directed at the first wave of AI research which used high level
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which we manipulate using logic and language. These are the skills that
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Another problem was that he claimed (or seemed to claim) that AI would
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has focused on reproducing the "background" or context of knowledge.
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Most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs.
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Dreyfus complained in print that he hadn't said a computer will
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difference between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how", based on
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Dreyfus' four assumptions of artificial intelligence research
27:
Overview of Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence
1506:, under "(8) The Argument from the Informality of Behavior".
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fire in all-or-nothing pulses. Several researchers, such as
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under "(7) Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System."
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program. Dreyfus lost, much to Papert's satisfaction. An
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1948:(October 1950), "Computing Machinery and Intelligence",
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In the 1990s and the early decades of the 21st century,
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The paper flatly ridiculed AI research, comparing it to
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Knowing-how vs. knowing-that: the primacy of intuition
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AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence
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said of Dreyfus (and the other critiques coming from
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research. In a series of papers and books, including
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282:, argued that neurons functioned similar to the way
1338:
654:had made this same observation as early as 1950.)
632:, are still given to the same kind of optimism.)
620:") did not appear in the mid-1970s as predicted.
154:The grandiose promises of artificial intelligence
18:Dreyfus' critique of artificial intelligence
1980:
1857:(2nd ed.), Natick, MA: A. K. Peters, Ltd.,
1736:
1371:
1040:
894:'s answer to all arguments similar to Dreyfus's:
742:statistics-based approaches to machine learning
585:"A Ten Year Old Can Beat the Machine— Dreyfus:
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390:
78:
1908:
1760:
1719:Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking
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497:In 1965, Dreyfus was hired (with his brother
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86:
195:A computer would be world champion in chess.
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569:arranged a chess match between Dreyfus and
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1919:Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
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335:This concerns the philosophical issue of
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555:The paper was the subject of a short in
34:Book cover of the 1979 paperback edition
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1981:
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846:, a gap that has since been filled by
565:In hope of restoring AI's reputation,
1989:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
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937:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
405:" school of AI research practiced by
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83:philosophy of artificial intelligence
838:complained, "What does he offer us?
547:, felt his colleagues' treatment of
148:
806:to book length and published it as
579:Association for Computing Machinery
266:In the early days of research into
24:
1922:(4th ed.). Hoboken: Pearson.
219:physical symbol systems hypothesis
178:history of artificial intelligence
25:
2000:
89:, a standard AI textbook, and in
587:But the Machine Can Beat Dreyfus
330:All knowledge can be formalized.
1531:Robotics and Autonomous Systems
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1136:From Socrates to Expert Systems
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393:, written during the heyday of
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666:high level symbol manipulation
326:The epistemological assumption
13:
1:
1553:10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9
1512:
605:
365:assumes that everything that
1878:, Harvard University Press,
1740:; Blakeslee, Sandra (2005),
1573:. New York, NY: BasicBooks.
1524:"Elephants Don't Play Chess"
1372:Hawkins & Blakeslee 2005
820:modern European philosophers
814:Part of the problem was the
752:Knowing-how and knowing-that
658:The psychological assumption
581:bulletin used the headline:
300:The psychological assumption
7:
1746:, New York, NY: Owl Books,
910:
519:
270:, scientists realized that
87:Russell & Norvig (2021)
10:
2005:
1835:, New York: Viking Press,
1132:Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986
785:
688:Computational intelligence
562:than its usual smugness."
475:
352:The ontological assumption
191:, predicted that by 1967:
1802:Farrar, Straus and Giroux
1722:, Boston: Little, Brown,
1698:, New York: Grove Press,
1659:, Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell
1091:Russell & Norvig 2021
1085:, pp. 51–57, 88–94;
679:In the 1980s, these new "
636:The biological assumption
257:The biological assumption
1964:10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433
1763:IEEE Intelligent Systems
1692:Fearn, Nicholas (2007),
942:
683:" approaches included:
225:by philosophers such as
128:—approaches now called "
102:continental philosophers
1904:, New York: McGraw-Hill
1832:The Singularity is Near
1798:Thinking, Fast and Slow
1678:, New York: MIT Press,
1633:, New York: MIT Press,
1631:What Computers Can't Do
1612:, New York: MIT Press,
1609:What Computers Can't Do
1020:Newell & Simon 1963
844:artificial intelligence
808:What Computers Can't Do
769:Thinking, Fast and Slow
696:evolutionary algorithms
640:What Computers Can't Do
535:Dreyfus, who taught at
505:to spend the summer at
399:What Computers Can't Do
251:What Computers Can't Do
235:20th-century philosophy
167:What Computers Can't Do
57:What Computers Can't Do
43:artificial intelligence
1175:Paul Armer, quoted in
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289:physical symbol system
215:
186:General Problem Solver
35:
1902:Computers and Thought
896:
704:commonsense knowledge
597:play chess, to which
319:commonsense knowledge
210:
124:and the new field of
33:
922:Church–Turing thesis
917:Adaptive unconscious
764:adaptive unconscious
403:cognitive simulation
1775:10.1109/5254.820322
1494:, pp. 229–230)
1398:, pp. xiv–xvi.
1230:, pp. 227–228.
982:, pp. 120–132.
970:, pp. 211–243.
690:paradigms, such as
1910:Russell, Stuart J.
1855:Machines Who Think
1296:, p. 230-232.
1191:, p. 225-227.
1105:, pp. 158–62.
956:Hearst et al. 2000
832:management science
662:unconscious skills
614:Failed predictions
571:Richard Greenblatt
421:'s distinction of
339:, or the study of
36:
1885:978-0-674-57616-2
1851:McCorduck, Pamela
1842:978-0-670-03384-3
1753:978-0-8050-7853-4
1729:978-0-316-17232-5
1714:Gladwell, Malcolm
1685:978-0-262-54067-4
1640:978-0-06-090624-5
1619:978-0-06-090613-9
1278:Joseph Weizenbaum
848:cognitive science
836:Edward Feigenbaum
722:Moravec's paradox
712:researchers like
541:Joseph Weizenbaum
388:Mind Over Machine
149:Dreyfus' critique
75:Mind over Machine
16:(Redirected from
1996:
1974:
1958:(236): 433–460,
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1237:
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1219:
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1204:
1198:
1192:
1186:
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1173:
1167:
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1155:
1149:
1143:
1129:
1123:
1117:
1106:
1100:
1094:
1080:
1074:
1068:
1062:
1056:
1050:
1044:
1038:
1032:
1023:
1017:
1011:
1004:
998:
992:
983:
977:
971:
965:
959:
952:
776:'s popular book
774:Malcolm Gladwell
756:Daniel Kahnemann
599:Herbert A. Simon
543:, the author of
530:Herbert A. Simon
507:RAND Corporation
493:"Alchemy and AI"
486:Herbert A. Simon
411:Herbert A. Simon
280:Warren McCulloch
223:computationalism
182:Herbert A. Simon
138:machine learning
134:statistics-based
41:was a critic of
21:
2004:
2003:
1999:
1998:
1997:
1995:
1994:
1993:
1979:
1978:
1930:
1886:
1865:
1843:
1812:
1754:
1743:On Intelligence
1730:
1706:
1686:
1671:What Computers
1666:Dreyfus, Hubert
1653:Dreyfus, Stuart
1649:Dreyfus, Hubert
1641:
1627:Dreyfus, Hubert
1620:
1604:Dreyfus, Hubert
1589:Dreyfus, Hubert
1581:
1567:Crevier, Daniel
1557:
1555:
1544:10.1.1.588.7539
1526:
1515:
1510:
1502:
1498:
1492:McCorduck (2004
1489:
1485:
1477:
1473:
1465:
1461:
1453:
1449:
1441:
1437:
1429:
1418:
1406:
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1394:
1390:
1382:
1378:
1370:
1366:
1358:
1351:
1343:
1339:
1331:
1322:
1316:McCorduck (2004
1313:
1309:
1304:
1300:
1292:
1288:
1276:
1272:
1263:
1259:
1253:McCorduck (2004
1250:
1246:
1238:
1234:
1226:
1222:
1214:
1207:
1199:
1195:
1187:
1183:
1177:McCorduck (2004
1174:
1170:
1162:
1158:
1150:
1146:
1130:
1126:
1118:
1109:
1101:
1097:
1081:
1077:
1069:
1065:
1057:
1053:
1045:
1041:
1033:
1026:
1018:
1014:
1005:
1001:
993:
986:
978:
974:
966:
962:
953:
949:
945:
913:
788:
772:, and inspired
608:
522:
495:
478:
423:present-at-hand
384:
243:
176:summarized the
156:
151:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2002:
1992:
1991:
1977:
1976:
1942:
1928:
1914:Norvig, Peter.
1906:
1890:
1884:
1868:
1863:
1847:
1841:
1823:
1811:978-0374275631
1810:
1790:
1779:
1758:
1752:
1734:
1728:
1710:
1704:
1689:
1684:
1662:
1645:
1639:
1623:
1618:
1600:
1593:Alchemy and AI
1585:
1579:
1563:
1520:Brooks, Rodney
1514:
1511:
1509:
1508:
1496:
1483:
1481:, p. 213.
1479:McCorduck 2004
1471:
1469:, p. 143.
1459:
1447:
1435:
1433:, p. 236.
1431:McCorduck 2004
1416:
1400:
1388:
1376:
1364:
1349:
1337:
1335:, p. 233.
1333:McCorduck 2004
1320:
1318:, p. 232)
1307:
1298:
1294:McCorduck 2004
1286:
1284:, p. 123.
1270:
1257:
1255:, p. 226)
1244:
1242:, p. 228.
1240:McCorduck 2004
1232:
1228:McCorduck 2004
1220:
1218:, p. 230.
1216:McCorduck 2004
1205:
1203:, p. 238.
1201:McCorduck 2004
1193:
1189:McCorduck 2004
1181:
1179:, p. 226)
1168:
1166:, p. 225.
1164:McCorduck 2004
1156:
1154:, p. 119.
1144:
1124:
1122:, p. 126.
1107:
1095:
1089:, p. 30;
1083:McCorduck 2004
1075:
1073:, p. 157.
1063:
1061:, p. 211.
1059:McCorduck 2004
1051:
1039:
1037:, p. 212.
1035:McCorduck 2004
1024:
1012:
999:
997:, p. 125.
984:
972:
968:McCorduck 2004
960:
946:
944:
941:
940:
939:
934:
932:Hubert Dreyfus
929:
927:Computer chess
924:
919:
912:
909:
887:Stuart Russell
804:Alchemy and AI
787:
784:
738:
737:
707:
702:Research into
700:
674:Daniel Crevier
607:
604:
591:
590:
567:Seymour Papert
558:The New Yorker
526:Seymour Papert
521:
518:
499:Stuart Dreyfus
494:
491:
477:
474:
413:in the 1960s.
395:expert systems
383:
380:
359:
358:
353:
333:
332:
327:
307:
306:
301:
264:
263:
258:
247:Alchemy and AI
242:
239:
203:
202:
199:
196:
160:Alchemy and AI
155:
152:
150:
147:
143:Daniel Crevier
136:approaches to
114:formal symbols
48:Alchemy and AI
39:Hubert Dreyfus
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2001:
1990:
1987:
1986:
1984:
1973:
1969:
1965:
1961:
1957:
1953:
1952:
1947:
1943:
1939:
1935:
1931:
1929:9780134610993
1925:
1921:
1920:
1915:
1911:
1907:
1903:
1899:
1895:
1894:Newell, Allen
1891:
1887:
1881:
1877:
1876:Mind Children
1873:
1872:Moravec, Hans
1869:
1866:
1864:1-56881-205-1
1860:
1856:
1852:
1848:
1844:
1838:
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1827:Kurzweil, Ray
1824:
1821:
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1735:
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1455:Gladwell 2005
1451:
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1439:
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1356:
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1347:, p. 40.
1346:
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1295:
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1267:
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875:
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852:connectionism
849:
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840:Phenomenology
837:
833:
829:
828:Merleau-Ponty
825:
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817:
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796:Marvin Minsky
792:
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456:
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430:
428:
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424:
420:
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325:
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320:
316:
312:
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285:
284:Boolean logic
281:
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273:
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254:
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238:
236:
232:
231:Hilary Putnam
228:
224:
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190:
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179:
175:
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161:
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126:connectionism
123:
117:
115:
111:
107:
106:Merleau-Ponty
103:
99:
94:
92:
88:
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80:
77:
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71:
67:
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59:
58:
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50:
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40:
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19:
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1949:
1946:Turing, Alan
1917:
1901:
1898:Simon, H. A.
1875:
1854:
1831:
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1766:
1762:
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1718:
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1674:
1670:
1656:
1630:
1608:
1592:
1570:
1556:, retrieved
1534:
1530:
1499:
1486:
1474:
1467:Crevier 1993
1462:
1450:
1438:
1413:Moravec 1988
1403:
1396:Dreyfus 1992
1391:
1379:
1367:
1340:
1310:
1301:
1289:
1282:Crevier 1993
1280:, quoted in
1273:
1266:Crevier 1993
1260:
1247:
1235:
1223:
1196:
1184:
1171:
1159:
1152:Dreyfus 1992
1147:
1140:Gilbert Ryle
1127:
1120:Crevier 1993
1103:Dreyfus 1992
1098:
1093:, p. 17
1087:Crevier 1993
1078:
1071:Dreyfus 1979
1066:
1054:
1042:
1015:
1010:, p. 51
1002:
995:Crevier 1993
980:Crevier 1993
975:
963:
950:
905:
901:
897:
883:Peter Norvig
878:
876:
860:situatedness
815:
813:
807:
803:
793:
789:
777:
767:
760:Amos Tversky
751:
750:
747:
739:
732:movement in
714:Hans Moravec
681:sub-symbolic
678:
669:
661:
657:
656:
648:Jeff Hawkins
644:Ray Kurzweil
639:
635:
634:
630:Ray Kurzweil
613:
612:
609:
594:
592:
586:
564:
556:
554:
534:
523:
511:
496:
479:
469:
463:
447:
443:
431:
415:
407:Allen Newell
398:
387:
385:
366:
360:
355:
337:epistemology
334:
329:
314:
310:
308:
303:
276:Walter Pitts
265:
260:
250:
246:
244:
216:
211:
207:
204:
166:
159:
157:
130:sub-symbolic
118:
95:
91:Fearn (2007)
85:, including
74:
73:
56:
55:
47:
46:
37:
1769:(1): 8–17,
1504:Turing 1950
1409:Brooks 1990
1384:Turing 1950
892:Alan Turing
726:Nouvelle AI
692:neural nets
672:reasoning.
670:unconscious
652:Alan Turing
501:' help) by
227:Jerry Fodor
1513:References
1490:Quoted in
1345:Fearn 2007
1314:Quoted in
1264:Quoted in
1251:Quoted in
1047:Horst 2005
1008:Fearn 2007
1006:Quoted in
868:perception
864:embodiment
800:philosophy
699:expertise.
606:Vindicated
503:Paul Armer
315:tendencies
1972:0026-4423
1820:706020998
1558:30 August
1539:CiteSeerX
824:Heidegger
618:strong AI
451:Heidegger
419:Heidegger
374:, and so
341:knowledge
311:attitudes
293:neurology
268:neurology
110:Heidegger
1983:Category
1938:20190474
1916:(2021).
1874:(1988),
1853:(2004),
1829:(2005),
1796:(2011),
1716:(2005),
1675:Can't Do
1668:(1992),
1655:(1986),
1629:(1979),
1606:(1972),
1591:(1965),
1569:(1993).
1522:(1990),
1134:and see
911:See also
856:robotics
734:robotics
730:situated
710:Robotics
622:HAL 9000
575:Mac Hack
520:Reaction
372:ontology
122:robotics
104:such as
98:symbolic
872:gestalt
786:Ignored
549:Dreyfus
514:alchemy
476:History
465:Dreyfus
376:Dreyfus
362:Dreyfus
272:neurons
213:corner.
174:Dreyfus
1970:
1936:
1926:
1882:
1861:
1839:
1818:
1808:
1750:
1726:
1702:
1682:
1637:
1616:
1577:
1541:
822:(like
728:. The
455:Dasein
435:Newell
391:(1986)
367:exists
189:(1957)
170:(1972)
163:(1965)
79:(1986)
72:) and
52:(1965)
1673:Still
1527:(PDF)
943:Notes
879:never
779:Blink
595:never
545:ELIZA
470:never
439:Simon
1968:ISSN
1951:Mind
1934:LCCN
1924:ISBN
1880:ISBN
1859:ISBN
1837:ISBN
1816:OCLC
1806:ISBN
1748:ISBN
1724:ISBN
1700:ISBN
1680:ISBN
1635:ISBN
1614:ISBN
1575:ISBN
1560:2007
1407:See
885:and
870:and
854:and
826:and
816:kind
758:and
716:and
660:and
437:and
425:and
409:and
278:and
249:and
229:and
165:and
108:and
70:1992
66:1979
62:1972
1960:doi
1956:LIX
1771:doi
1549:doi
1411:or
646:or
573:'s
537:MIT
482:MIT
453:'s
386:In
313:or
245:In
158:In
1985::
1966:,
1954:,
1932:.
1912:;
1896:;
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1800:,
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1352:^
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1457:.
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1362:.
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958:)
589:"
60:(
20:)
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