1136:
fight for the burning village ensued. While it was ultimately secured by a flanking manoeuvre of the 3rd battalion, the regiment suffered tremendous losses. In addition to that, the army's supplies failed to reach the fighting units and most of its companies were short of ammunition. Because of that, any further advance had to be halted. Meanwhile, the 1st
Regiment was threatened from a strong German position in the village of Trigubovo on its left flank. The village was to be secured by the Soviet 290th Infantry Division, which however failed to reach this objective. After heavy fighting the village was secured around noon, but then the logistics failed and ammunition supplies of the regiment were depleted as well.
1140:
after noon did the tanks start to cross the river. While improvised bridges were prepared by engineers, the paths leading towards the river were swampy. The 2nd tank company lost five tanks to malfunctions, two to enemy fire, while the remaining three could not reach the river crossings at all. The 1st tank company was to cross the river via a bridge in Lenino. Moreover, their advance was halted by German aerial bombardment, suffering further losses during the battles for
Polzukhi and Trigubovo. The swampy river valley proved to be a problem to artillery as well: light infantry guns and mortars had to be carried by foot soldiers as wheeled transport could not cross the obstacle.
207:
1237:
164:
195:
243:
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150:
218:
176:
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front line neutralized the Soviet advantage in artillery force. However, the Soviet commander V. N. Gordov still believed that they could go forward with an offensive effort. Zygmunt
Berling believed that with the number of casualties on both sides that Soviet advantage was lost and instead they should switch to a defensive mode; his suggestion was unilaterally rejected. So on the morning of 13 October Gordov continued the offensive.
1128:
allowed their forces to avoid losses. In the open fields between the German lines, the Polish infantry was being decimated by concentrated fire from German machine guns. While the second line was also captured, this victory came at a price: Soviet units that were to cover both flanks of the Polish infantry did not leave their initial positions and the Polish spearhead suffered heavy losses both from flanking machine guns and the
1103:
suppressed in front of the German lines. The battalion suffered over 50% casualties, but held out in its improvised defensive positions for three hours, until the main assault started. It failed to reconnoitre the enemy lines however, and only discovered that the German units were much stronger than expected. Moreover, the premature assault notified the German HQ of the planned strike in this area and gave them time to prepare.
956:
41:
1245:
1157:, a Soviet officer of Polish ancestry. The positions of the 2nd Regiment were also being attacked both head-on and from the flanks. A heavy barrage of Soviet howitzers prevented the unit from being completely surrounded and destroyed. The losses nevertheless, were heavy and the regiment lost the village of Polzukhi.
1290:
The German front line was not strong; however, they had considerable reserve forces and a deep system of defense. The bunkers, firepoints and trenches were organized carefully. Hence, the
Germans managed to quickly stabilise the situation and conduct effective counter-strikes. Furthermore, the German
1282:
In military aspect, the plan to capture the bridgehead base of Lenino was reasonable, but the timing of the offensive was not suitable. At the end of the
Smolensk Offensive, the Red Army at this sector was exhausted: total remaining manpower of two Soviet divisions at Lenino was only 9,126 personnel,
1135:
The 2nd
Regiment on the northern flank fared little better. It reached the first German line almost unopposed and by noon, it had managed to capture the village of Polzukhi, which was located between the German first and second lines of trenches. The German units counter-attacked and a close-quarters
1127:
The infantry assault started at 10 a.m. A steady line of Polish troops from the 1st
Regiment reached the lines of the 1st battalion, and then the first line of German trenches almost unopposed. However, the German forces had simply withdrawn to the second line due to the artillery barrage, which
1286:
V. N. Gordov's stubbornness also contributed to the high casualties of the Soviet and Polish troops. At the end of 12 October, casualties of the Soviet and Polish troops had already been unacceptable, and the important Hill 217.6 height could not be taken although the last reserved force had already
1186:
At this time, the situation became clearly unfavourable for the Soviet and Polish combatants. The expected German surprise Lenino offensive was lost, and the Polish and Soviet forces also suffered considerable losses. The artillery's ammunition was also insufficient, and the unstable and complicated
1169:
At 7:20 p.m., the 3rd
Regiment, supported by the remaining 16 tanks of the 1st Tank Regiment, recommenced the assault. However, by then, the German defences at the 2nd line were strengthened and proved impregnable. A series of attacks and counter-attacks proved costly to both sides, but changed
1165:
In the evening it became clear that the Polish lines would not be able to hold out for much longer. General
Berling decided to relieve the 1st Regiment and replace it with fresh troops from the 3rd Regiment, until then held in reserve. The 1st Regiment had started the battle with 2,800 soldiers, by
1139:
By noon, although the Polish 1st
Division had managed to strike a three kilometre deep wedge into the German lines, the assault had to be halted. Soviet tanks, that were to support the breakthrough, did not cross the Mereya river and both Soviet divisions were stopped near their initial lines. Only
1078:
By 11 October the plans for a joint Polish-Soviet assault were ready and dispatched to various sub-units operating in the area. The main force of the assault was to be constituted by the Polish 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments, with the 3rd Regiment following the 2nd in the northern sector. The enemy
1074:
assault on the German lines. The assault failed due to a heavy German artillery barrage, yet alarmed the German HQ of possible offensive actions in this sector of the front. In addition, the Germans reported no less than 1,000 Polish and Soviet soldiers who crossed the lines prior to the battle for
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and the German trenches located 200 metres further westwards. Supported by only a token force of divisional artillery, the battalion's forces were met with fierce German resistance from well-prepared positions. The unit managed to reach the first line of trenches, but was then counter-attacked and
1044:
The main task of the Polish 1st Infantry Division was to break through the German defences on a two kilometre front in the vicinity of the village of Polzukhi and Hill 215.5. The gap was then to be further widened by the Soviet 42nd and 290th Rifle Divisions. In the second stage of the operation,
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from the Polish citizens taken captive by the Soviets in 1939â1941 and released after the Soviets were attacked by their former German allies. However, due to differences in opinions and due to the reluctance of Anders to put his malnourished, untrained and unequipped troops into battle, these
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and reserves of the German 39th Corps, the formation stormed Polish positions at Trigubova, which were held by the 2nd battalion of the 1st Regiment. The initial attack was held off, but in the end German tanks and complete aerial superiority forced the Poles to abandon their positions. The 3rd
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rather than a military operation. The battle was depicted as a victory, a "great and meaningful event in Polish history", a "milestone in the Polish struggle against fascism" and a "seal on the Polish-Soviet brotherhood of arms" by Soviet propaganda. Owing to the heavy casualties of the Polish
1216:, the Polish 1st Division still had to fight. Despite sending two motorized brigades of 5th Motorized Corps to the battle field, the Polish and Soviet force could not make notable gains. They had to switch to defense in order to fend off the counter strikes of the German 25th Panzer Division.
979:, aided by tanks of the 1st Polish Tank Regiment, light artillery regiments from the Soviet 144th and 164th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 538th Mortar Regiment and the 67th Howitzer Brigade from the Army's reserves. Both flanks of the Polish division were to be secured by the Soviet
994:
However, the Polish division was seriously under-equipped and inadequately trained, having been formed only four months prior to the battle. In addition, the Soviet divisions had been reduced to 4,000 men each by the start of the operation and their combat value was seriously limited.
1332:, questioning the true reasons behind sending the barely trained 1st Division into battle without proper support and with no clear objectives. Some authors go as far as to suggest that the decision was a deliberate attempt to further exterminate Poles in the Soviet Union, akin to the
1255:
The Polish division had held its sector for two days, despite sustaining heavy losses, after which it was returned to the second echelon of the Front for rebuilding. Altogether, the 1st Division lost roughly 25-33% of its personnel in one day. Losses reached almost 3,000 men: 502
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battalion tried to retake the village but failed. The Germans also attacked Polish positions at Hill 215.5 and pushed them eastwards. The 1st Regiment started to lose cohesion, the chaos further increased when its commanding officer went missing and had to be replaced by Colonel
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about 2/3 of the 1st Polish Division's strength. The Polish force, despite their high morale and strong willpower, was poorly experienced and inadequately trained. Various Polish scouting actions also allowed the Germans to predict the targets and goals of the Lenino offensive.
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also recognized the importance of Hill 217.6: from this hill the Germans could cover a large area and directly strike the whole town of Lenino using artillery. Hill 217.6 would later give the Soviets many difficulties and hardships until its bombardment by a large
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been used up. At that time, Gordov should have suspended the offensive in order to reorganize and resupply his depleted troops, but he did not. Gordov's grave faults were violently criticized by the Berlingâcommander of the Polish forcesâand even by Stalin.
1308:
Although a tactical and strategic failure, the battle was presented as a success by Soviet propaganda, as it was the first battle of the Soviet-backed Polish forces. In fact, the battle, while bloody, proved a political victory to the Soviet-created
1173:
On the night of 12 October, the Polish scouting troops launched a surprise assault on the village of Tregubova and successfully destroyed the headquarters of the German 337th Infantry Division. The Germans reacted by sending some
1111:
During the eventual assault little went according to plan. The artillery barrage was due to start at 8:20 a.m., but was postponed because of thick fog. It was to last 100 minutes, but the commanding officer of the
903:
While the Polish and Soviet forces managed to break through the German defences and inflict heavy casualties on the Germans, they were unable to keep the advance. There was a failure in cooperation from other
1323:
took place that Polish units in the USSR could take an active role in the fight against the Germans. In this light, the use of a barely trained division in fruitless assaults was often described as a
1178:-speaking German troops to the Poles' formation in order to surprise and defeat the Polish troops. Some Polish officers and soldiers were killed in the action; so were all the German infiltrators.
920:
1223:
to replace the Polish troops at the battlefield. The Polish division was sent back to the General Staff to be supplemented and reinforced. The Lenino offensive was suspended permanently.
1219:
Finally, at 5:00 p.m., came the Stavka response. In the message, Stalin heavily criticized Gordov about his mistake and demanded that, by 17:00 on 14 October, Gordov had to send the
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1364:
to fight alongside the British forces in Europe. Many of those freed prisoners who were unable to join Anders in the evacuation, joined the Polish force formed under general
1913:
1091:
Although the plans were ready, on the evening of 11 October the Soviet command ordered the Poles to start the assault earlier than planned, with yet another attempt at a
919:
to the north of the 33rd Army. The division was forced to assume defensive positions, and was ordered to hold its ground due to the expected arrival in its sector of the
308:
1347:. In comparison, the circumstance of the Polish force was quite different from their Czechoslovak comrades. In mid-1941, the Soviet Union also agreed to help form
1376:
under Soviet command. This Polish force, sometimes called "Berling's Army", played an important role in the fight against Nazi Germany and the capture of Berlin.
1028:
The main German line of defences was stretched between hills 217.6 near Sukhino to the north and hill 215.5 north of the town of Lenino. The swampy valley of the
998:
In addition to that, the morale of the Polish division was seriously undermined by the fact that most of its soldiers were former prisoners of the Soviet
1095:
of the German lines at 6 a.m. the following day. The orders reached the 1st battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment only two hours prior to their assault.
1923:
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fear of being sent back to the Gulag when the war was over. The German forces were as a result aware of the Polish and Soviet preparations and plans.
972:
935:
257:
46:
1036:
in Polish historiography), lay in front of the German positions. While not much of an obstacle for infantry, it was uncrossable for Soviet tanks.
1943:
301:
1260:, 1,776 wounded and 663 captured or missing. It was not until spring of the following year that the division could be used in combat again.
1933:
475:
942:
suffered 25% casualties and had to be withdrawn, while the remaining Soviet forces were too weak to widen the achieved breakthrough.
1212:
about this, but he suggested that Berling should not tell Gordov about this telephone conversation. While awaiting the response of
1194:
No matter whether the reason was stupidity or any other motives, Gordov's deed of continuing the offensive was an act of craziness.
1046:
635:
630:
294:
1274:. The Wehrmacht also sustained heavy losses in equipment: 72 machine guns, 42 pieces of artillery, two tanks and five aeroplanes.
1002:
concentration camp system and joining the army for them was a way to escape the prisons rather than to fight for their homeland.
345:
1263:
Despite heavy losses, the Soviet-Polish troops managed to keep the Lenino bridgehead, which later played a considerable role in
1392:, the name-sake of the Polish division. On 7 October 1950, the anniversary of the battle was declared the official "Day of the
1208:âChief of the Soviet Staffâto inform about this situation. Vasilevsky agreed with Zygmunt Berling and promised to quickly tell
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74:
1500:
1845:
1820:
1749:
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1629:
613:
885:
1774:
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Polish forces did not take part in the fight on Soviet territory. Finally, in early 1942, Anders' troops were evacuated to
470:
335:
1568:
K. Sobczak. Lenina - Warsaw - Berlin. The fighting of the 1st Polish Division - Tadeusz Kosciuszko. Warsaw. 1988. p. 115.
1017:. As the Germans were aware of the Polish and Soviet plans, they reinforced their lines in the area with elements of the
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1006:
984:
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436:
340:
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84:
1918:
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little: despite all-night close-quarters fighting, the villages of Trigubovo and Polzukhi remained in German hands.
681:
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446:
369:
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916:
897:
180:
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1315:(ZPP) whose aim was to present itself as a true authority of a future Poland, an alternative to the legitimate
1148:
At 2 p.m. the fog lessened and the German 337th Infantry Division mounted a counter-assault. Aided by the
752:
596:
833:
823:
713:
465:
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German losses were heavy as well and were reported to reach 1,800, in addition to 326 German soldiers taken
1938:
1344:
786:
541:
504:
409:
318:
28:
1328:
forces, many authors described it as "carnage" or a "senseless bloodbath" or using the Polish soldiers as
1236:
1204:
Berling did not stand still. Using his authority of a foreign force's commander, Berling directly phoned
211:
1928:
1408:, the day was replaced by the pre-war Day of the Polish Army date of 15 August, which commemorates the
1316:
818:
780:
546:
1836:
Anna Kant; Norbert Kant (1991). "The Battle of Lenino, 11/12 October 1943". In Jerzy Samborski (ed.).
1120:, called it off after less than an hour, believing the German lines to be already destroyed by Soviet
896:. The battle is prominent in Polish military history, as it was one of the first major engagements of
1117:
813:
421:
389:
364:
1311:
1297:
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1113:
1071:
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253:
70:
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791:
608:
570:
558:
441:
426:
1678:
1668:
1590:
Cheslav Podgursky. Polish fighters in Battle of Lenino. Military Publisher. Warsaw. 1971. p. 109
1343:, this was the second time that a foreign force trained by the Soviet Union participated in the
1621:
1045:
Polish forces were to reach the line of the Pnevka river and then continue the assault towards
686:
659:
536:
379:
1741:
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1737:
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963:
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404:
1613:
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1022:
199:
1432:
1220:
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246:
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units, and a lack of artillery support or close air cover caused by the ongoing Wehrmacht
384:
8:
1465:
1264:
1080:
796:
762:
707:
1190:
Berling, in his memoir, was highly critical of Gordov's stubbornness in this situation:
1092:
242:
1664:
1373:
1340:
1098:
At 5:50 a.m. the 1st battalion left its positions and started to push towards the
928:
893:
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747:
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640:
415:
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1816:
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1707:
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1625:
1614:
1512:
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1320:
691:
519:
235:
1460:
971:
On the Soviet side of the front line, the main assault was to be carried out by the
1674:
1520:
1257:
881:
845:
839:
828:
801:
737:
498:
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619:
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222:
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1240:
Poland Medallion 1983: Commemoration of the World War II Battle of Lenino 1943
872:
engagement that took place on 12 and 13 October 1943, north of the village of
1907:
1516:
1329:
1129:
1050:
889:
99:
86:
1248:
A military decoration for Polish soldiers who fought in the battle of Lenino
1083:
lasting 100 minutes. The assault was to start at 9 a.m. on 12 October.
1609:
1545:
1099:
1029:
869:
514:
206:
194:
169:
155:
78:
32:
1405:
1401:
1670:
The spring will be ours: Poland and the Poles from occupation to freedom
1797:
1730:
Annamaria Orla-Bukowska (2006). Richard Ned Lebow; et al. (eds.).
1149:
1049:
and Churilov. Soviet forces were to assist the Poles in reaching the
530:
905:
1899:
Soviet 1:50,000 topographic map from 1927 showing the battle area
1244:
955:
877:
40:
286:
1213:
1209:
1070:, the commanding officer of the Polish 1st Division, ordered a
1013:. The German units were battle-hardened and, more importantly,
909:
1439:. Celina Wieniewska (trans.). London: Croom Helm. p. 28.
1066:
Three days prior to the actual battle, on 9 October, General
999:
1357:
1005:
The German side of the front was manned by elements of the
1767:
A Survey of Recent Developments in Nine Captive Countries
1701:
1729:
1644:
1368:, who had defected from Anders' Army. These became the
1813:
Night voices: heard in the shadow of Hitler and Stalin
1792:. Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny. p. 236.
1599:
Zygmunt Berling. Memoirs. Vol 2. Warsawa. 1991. p. 387
1498:
132:
Limited territorial gains for the Soviet-Polish forces
1835:
1765:
ACEN (1963). "Anniversary of the Battle of Lenino".
1431:
1384:
After the war, the village of Trigubovo was renamed
1339:
After the victory of the Czechoslovak troops at the
1543:
967:
The monument to the 1st Infantry Division in Warsaw
1663:
888:with the aims of clearing the eastern bank of the
884:. The battle itself was a part of a larger Soviet
1866:Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War
1638:
1905:
1787:
1914:Battles and operations of the SovietâGerman War
1838:Extermination: Killing Poles in Stalin's Empire
1025:just a day before the launch of the offensive.
258:Polish 1st Tadeusz KoĆciuszko Infantry Division
47:Polish 1st Tadeusz KoĆciuszko Infantry Division
1810:
1427:
1425:
1388:, a Russian language rendering of the name of
1829:
1494:
1492:
1458:
1319:. The ZPP leaders wanted to prove before the
934:The relief never arrived; after two days the
302:
1608:
1422:
278:
1815:. McGill-Queen's Press. pp. 138â139.
1706:(in Polish). Pruszkow: Ajaks. p. 42.
1657:
1645:Union of Soviet Writers (1952). "Lenino".
1553:ĐĄĐŒĐŸĐ»Đ”ĐœŃĐșĐ°Ń ĐœĐ°ŃŃŃпаŃДлŃĐœĐ°Ń ĐŸĐżĐ”ŃĐ°ŃĐžŃ 1943 Đł.
1489:
1086:
309:
295:
1924:Battles of World War II involving Germany
1781:
1695:
1616:Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966-1945
1539:
1537:
1231:
146:
1733:The politics of memory in postwar Europe
1725:
1723:
1454:
1452:
1450:
1448:
1446:
1243:
1235:
1166:that time it was reduced to merely 500.
983:(assaulting the village of Sukhino) and
962:
954:
1437:The Polish ordeal: the view from within
1944:Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
1906:
1804:
1602:
1534:
1351:, a Polish force formed under general
1720:
1499:MieczysĆaw SzczeciĆski (March 1997).
1443:
290:
1775:Assembly of Captive European Nations
1764:
1758:
945:
1551:Smolensk offensive operation 1943 (
13:
950:
892:of German forces and piercing the
16:World War II battle (October 1943)
14:
1955:
1887:
1702:Edward Kospath-PawĆowski (1997).
1558:(in Russian). Moscow: Voyenizdat.
1336:, but this time by German hands.
1160:
1143:
316:
1400:. In 1989, when Poland quit the
1379:
1079:lines were to be paralysed by a
1061:
886:Spas-Demensk offensive operation
385:Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
241:
216:
205:
193:
174:
162:
148:
39:
1673:. State College, Pennsylvania:
1362:Polish Armed Forces in the West
1106:
898:Polish Armed Forces in the East
1593:
1584:
1581:. Vol 2. Warsaw. 1991. p. 391.
1571:
1562:
1480:
1459:Maciej KorkuÄ (October 2008).
1039:
894:Panther-Wotan line of defences
120:
1:
1934:PolandâSoviet Union relations
1868:, Frank Cass, London (1989).
1840:. Unicorn. pp. 129â140.
1415:
1277:
1544:Vladimir P. Istomin (1973).
1396:" by the authorities of the
1303:
1226:
7:
1790:Historia Militaris Polonica
1469:(in Polish) (14.10.2008): 3
1398:People's Republic of Poland
959:Map of the battle of Lenino
212:Vasiliy Nikolayevich Gordov
10:
1960:
1858:
1406:Soviet sphere of influence
1317:Polish government in exile
1181:
1788:Witold BiegaĆski (1977).
1118:Vasili Nikolaevich Gordov
1056:
326:
276:
263:
228:
186:
140:
53:
38:
26:
21:
1919:Battles involving Poland
1312:Union of Polish Patriots
1011:337th Infantry Divisions
923:, which was tasked with
921:6th Guards Cavalry Corps
49:at the Battle of Lenino.
1811:Heather Laskey (2003).
1325:political demonstration
1093:reconnaissance in force
1087:Reconnaissance in force
1883:. Vol 2. Warsawa. 1991
1620:. Greenwood. pp.
1300:barrage in June 1944.
1249:
1241:
1232:Results and casualties
1202:
1019:36th Infantry division
968:
960:
187:Commanders and leaders
1738:Duke University Press
1247:
1239:
1192:
1132:of Soviet artillery.
985:290th Rifle Divisions
966:
958:
264:Casualties and losses
1704:Lenino, 12-13 X 1943
1501:"Bitwa "pod Lenino""
1433:Andrzej Szczypiorski
1221:164th Rifle Division
1206:Alexander Vasilevsky
281:for further details.
1939:October 1943 events
1546:"ĐпДŃДЎ, ĐœĐ° запаЎ!"
1466:Tygodnik Powszechny
1345:Soviet-German front
1265:Operation Bagration
1155:BolesĆaw Kieniewicz
592:OstrogozhskâRossosh
493:BarvenkovoâLozovaya
100:54.4114°N 31.1228°E
96: /
1665:Andrzej Paczkowski
1390:Tadeusz KoĆciuszko
1374:Polish Second Army
1341:Battle of Sokolovo
1250:
1242:
1124:rocket launchers.
1032:(often written as
1023:Gottfried Fröhlich
975:Tadeusz KoĆciuszko
969:
961:
938:Tadeusz KoĆciuszko
929:defensive position
787:Western Carpathian
727:2nd JassyâKishinev
697:1st JassyâKishinev
682:LeningradâNovgorod
677:DnieperâCarpathian
200:Gottfried Fröhlich
61:12â13 October 1943
1929:Conflicts in 1943
1894:map of the battle
1879:Zygmunt Berling.
1847:978-1-870886-07-9
1822:978-0-7735-2606-8
1751:978-0-8223-3817-8
1688:978-0-271-02308-3
1647:Soviet Literature
1631:978-0-313-26007-0
1577:Zygmunt Berling.
1370:Polish First Army
1321:Tehran conference
977:Infantry Division
946:Before the battle
940:Infantry Division
861:
860:
285:
284:
236:Army Group Centre
136:
135:
1951:
1852:
1851:
1833:
1827:
1826:
1808:
1802:
1801:
1785:
1779:
1778:
1773:(17). New York:
1762:
1756:
1755:
1727:
1718:
1717:
1699:
1693:
1692:
1675:Penn State Press
1661:
1655:
1654:
1642:
1636:
1635:
1619:
1606:
1600:
1597:
1591:
1588:
1582:
1575:
1569:
1566:
1560:
1559:
1541:
1532:
1531:
1529:
1528:
1519:. Archived from
1496:
1487:
1486:Glantz,p.189-190
1484:
1478:
1477:
1475:
1474:
1456:
1441:
1440:
1429:
1410:Battle of Warsaw
1353:WĆadysĆaw Anders
1258:killed in action
1200:
1114:Soviet 33rd Army
1081:creeping barrage
925:breaking through
917:10th Guards Army
866:Battle of Lenino
753:PetsamoâKirkenes
631:Belgorod-Kharkov
597:VoronezhâKharkov
321:
311:
304:
297:
288:
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254:33rd Soviet Army
245:
221:
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119:Indecisive, See
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75:Byelorussian SSR
55:
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22:Battle of Lenino
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1382:
1366:Zygmunt Berling
1360:, becoming the
1306:
1293:Robert Martinek
1280:
1234:
1229:
1201:
1199:Zygmunt Berling
1198:
1184:
1163:
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1109:
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1068:Zygmunt Berling
1064:
1059:
1042:
953:
951:Opposing forces
948:
868:was a tactical
862:
857:
851:Prague uprising
834:BratislavaâBrno
824:MoraviaâOstrava
714:LvovâSandomierz
542:RzhevâSychyovka
370:BiaĆystokâMinsk
322:
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277:See section on
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247:German 4th Army
223:Zygmunt Berling
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1896:
1889:
1888:External links
1886:
1885:
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1864:Glantz, D.M.,
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1523:on 2009-03-07
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1610:Jerzy Lerski
1604:
1595:
1586:
1578:
1573:
1564:
1554:
1550:
1525:. Retrieved
1521:the original
1508:
1504:
1482:
1471:. Retrieved
1464:
1436:
1385:
1383:
1349:Anders' Army
1338:
1324:
1310:
1307:
1289:
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1110:
1107:Main assault
1100:Mereya River
1097:
1090:
1077:
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1043:
1033:
1030:Mereya River
1027:
1004:
997:
993:
987:(assaulting
974:
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937:
933:
915:against the
902:
870:World War II
865:
863:
838:
819:Lake Balaton
807:
792:East Prussia
781:VistulaâOder
779:
725:
718:
706:
652:
645:
641:2nd Smolensk
618:
602:
585:
571:
564:
551:
529:
497:
476:Air war 1941
451:
414:
390:1st Smolensk
357:
346:Arctic Ocean
234:
170:Soviet Union
141:Belligerents
79:Soviet Union
33:World War II
27:Part of the
1740:. pp.
1677:. pp.
1402:Warsaw Pact
1394:Polish Army
1072:force recon
1040:Battle plan
973:Polish 1st
936:Polish 1st
927:the German
882:Byelorussia
614:Gorky Blitz
609:3rd Kharkov
525:2nd Kharkov
427:1st Kharkov
422:Sea of Azov
127:Territorial
103: /
1908:Categories
1798:B00325JH7W
1527:2010-03-15
1473:2010-03-15
1416:References
1386:Kostyushko
1291:commander
1278:Assessment
1116:, General
1015:entrenched
880:region of
738:2nd Baltic
733:Dukla Pass
720:Doppelkopf
692:2nd Crimea
636:2nd Donbas
626:1st Donbas
603:Polar Star
553:Stalingrad
437:Sevastopol
432:1st Crimea
375:1st Baltic
359:Barbarossa
336:Baltic Sea
279:casualties
91:31°07âČ22âłE
88:54°24âČ41âłN
1517:1496-6115
1412:in 1920.
1304:Influence
1227:Aftermath
1150:Luftwaffe
991:itself).
763:Gumbinnen
708:Bagration
547:Sinyavino
531:Case Blue
416:Leningrad
341:Black Sea
121:Aftermath
1777:: 56â57.
1667:(2003).
1653:: 31â46.
1612:(1996).
1435:(1982).
1298:Katyusha
1272:prisoner
1197:â
1122:Katyusha
906:Red Army
808:Solstice
768:Budapest
758:Courland
748:Debrecen
743:Belgrade
665:2nd Kiev
537:Caucasus
510:Demyansk
471:Chechnya
405:1st Kiev
66:Location
1881:Memoirs
1859:Sources
1579:Memoirs
1182:Day Two
1034:Miereja
878:Mogilev
876:in the
802:Breslau
797:Silesia
702:Karelia
654:Dnieper
520:Bamberg
461:Finland
410:Tallinn
272:c. 3000
269:c. 1800
156:Germany
129:changes
1872:
1844:
1819:
1796:
1748:
1710:
1685:
1628:
1515:
1214:Stavka
1210:Stalin
1176:Polish
1057:Battle
1053:line.
1047:Losiev
1021:under
989:Lenino
910:panzer
874:Lenino
846:Prague
840:Berlin
829:Vienna
646:Lenino
488:Lyuban
453:Moscow
442:Rostov
400:Odessa
181:Poland
167:
153:
116:Result
71:Lenino
1505:Zwoje
1007:113th
1000:Gulag
687:Narva
660:Nevel
620:Kursk
586:Iskra
515:Kholm
499:Rzhev
466:Kerch
447:Gorky
380:Brody
365:Brest
1870:ISBN
1842:ISBN
1817:ISBN
1794:ASIN
1746:ISBN
1708:ISBN
1683:ISBN
1626:ISBN
1513:ISSN
1404:and
1372:and
1358:Iran
1009:and
981:42nd
864:The
774:1945
671:1944
579:1943
565:Mars
482:1942
395:Uman
352:1941
58:Date
1742:186
1679:116
1622:297
31:of
1910::
1771:15
1769:.
1744:.
1736:.
1722:^
1681:.
1649:.
1624:.
1548:.
1536:^
1511:.
1503:.
1491:^
1463:.
1445:^
1424:^
1267:.
1252:.
931:.
900:.
77:,
73:,
1876:.
1850:.
1825:.
1800:.
1754:.
1716:.
1691:.
1651:2
1634:.
1555:)
1530:.
1509:3
1476:.
310:e
303:t
296:v
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
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