Battle of Es Sinn - Knowledge

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triage and stabilize the wounded before sending them back to field hospital units. Line of communication troops had to donate their own supplies to the medical units that were overrun with casualties. With Townshend's offensive, there was only one river boat equipped as a hospital ship. With the ambulances full, many of the wounded were placed on A.T. carts, which were nothing more than simple carts pulled by animals that performed most of the land hauling at this point in the campaign. In some cases, the wounded were simply laid atop boxes of ammunition or other supplies. With animal transport limited by short-sighted decisions of Nixon and his predecessors, the Poona Division only 330 animal pulled carts and 740 animals to pull them.

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discovering, the Tigris was a shallow river. For the first 10 months of the campaign, this had not been a problem for two reasons. First, the distance from the front to Force "D"'s base in Basra prior to the Battle of Es Sinn had been comparatively shorter. The transit from the front to the logistical hub at Basra were manageable. Now, the Poona Division was 115 miles, and 180 miles by river, from its supply dumps at Amarrah. It was 380 miles from Basra. Second, the river had been unseasonably high, making passage of river traffic easier. For the remainder of the year, and into 1916, the river would drop, except during the spring thaws, to levels making it more difficult for many of the ships to navigate the Tigris.

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The Suwada and Ataba marshes were considered impassable swamps. Their size, even in the dry months of late summer and early autumn were thought to make them effective barriers to any large scale enveloping maneuver. To the south of the Tigris, Nureddin constructed another series of trench-works, extending from the river to a strong redoubt. Although the southern trench lines were not anchored by impassable obstacles, the position was on some of the only elevated ground around, giving it an excellent field of fire. What reserves Nureddin did have, he would retain five miles upriver. A floating bridge would allow him to shift forces rapidly, but they would have to make a five-mile march to the fighting to be of use.

167: 135: 666: 155: 542:. Although Nixon now commanded the equivalent of a corps of infantry, Force D's area of responsibility had grown as well. In addition to the area around Basra, Force D now also laid claim as far north along the Tigris as Ali Gharbi, and to Nasiryeh along the Euphrates. In the absence of effective roads or any sort of a rail network, long-distance travel in the region could only be effected along the rivers. To effectively maintain control, the 12th Division broke into detachments to guard communication lines. 707: 119: 89: 755:

ability to finally draw upon other units needed to garrison the Baghdad vilayet, would allow Nureddin to mass a force capable of defeating the Force "D". Although his troops had suffered in open field combat, especially when his reserves had run into Delamain's troops while moving up to reinforce the 38th Division, they had shown themselves effective in a positional defense. At Cteshipon, he would construct another series of trenches and redoubts and wait for the British advance.

104: 472:. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Ottoman divisions could expect much support from local populations. Soldiers in the Ottoman Divisions were conscripts, rarely paid and generally under-supplied. The conscripts from the Anatolian provinces were looked on as occupiers, while conscripts from the Kurdish and Arab provinces were likely to be more sympathetic to Arab or Kurdish national movements that were starting, and their morale suffered correspondingly. 600: 441: 557:. However, the transport available to him was only adequate. Despite lobbying for an advance, Nixon had refused anything that would ease Force D's logistical situation. Not only had Nixon not accepted additional logistical support, he had failed to ask for the return of animals that his predecessor had sent back to India, which were required to haul Townshend's supplies. 496: 715:

their cooking equipment and forage for their horses. The former was the more difficult problem because the 6th Cavalry Brigades regiments were made up primarily of Sikh and Hindus, both of whom would refuse to eat their food if it was cooked using local requisitioned or captured pots as their dietary laws conflicted with the native Muslim population.

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now, spotted the Ottoman units first and took them under fire. Once they had stopped the Ottoman advance, Delamain ordered a bayonet charge that threw Ottoman reserves into retreat. But while dealing with the reserves, Delamain could not spare troops to help Fry's attack, which remained bogged down in front of the Ottoman trenches.

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force was now supposed to attack more of the Ottoman positions than envisioned. Attacking the northern end of the Ottoman defenses, the 117th Maharattas and 22 Company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners, suffering heavy casualties. The Maharattas lost all of their British officers, leaving the battalion under the command of its

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bogged down. Despite the enfilading fire from the gunboats along the river, Fry's forces could not break through the Ottoman defenders. Fry sent word requesting Delamain's help. Although still engaged in clearing out the Ottoman northern positions, he shifted his forces south, trying to bring them to support Fry's brigade.

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By about 8:45 a.m., almost three hours after the initial start time for the attack, Delamain still had no word that Houghton was any closer to clearing the marshes. Rather than wait any longer, he ordered his column to attack the Ottoman positions. However, without Houghton's support, Delamain's

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Starting out at 2 a.m. on 28 September 1915, the two columns advanced in the darkness trying to arrive at their destinations in time to be supported by a bombardment at dawn. However, things went wrong. Houghton's column became lost and entered the Suwaikiya marsh. Attempts by Delamain to warn him of

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under Brigadier General Fry, would make a demonstration along the Ottoman front, fixing the defenders in position. Brigadier General Delamain would oversee the flanking maneuver. The Cavalry Brigade would circle around and set up astride the anticipated lines of retreat on the left side of the river.

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Nureddin chose to set his defenses at the Es Sinn, a bend along the Tigris south of Kut al Amarra. On the north or left bank, he dug in the troops of the 38th Division in a series of two networks. Both were anchored on the Tigris River, one extended to Suwada Marsh and the other ended in Ataba Marsh.

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Despite these orders, Nureddin's resources were limited. On paper, an Ottoman division was authorized between thirty and forty thousand men. However, it was rare that an Ottoman division was ever supplied to its authorized strength. On average, Ottoman divisions could muster approximately 17,500 men.

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From the perspective of the Indian Army officers on the ground in Basra, it was time to strike. Their intelligence reports showed that the only troops blocking their advance upriver were the battered and demoralized remnants of the two divisions I.E.F. "D" had defeated at the battles of Nasiriyeh and

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and Admiralty Naval War Staff for study. After considering the problem, the chiefs of the military services issued a report to the War Cabinet. They warned that even though Force "D" might prevail, Nixon's command had only 9,000 men available for combat. Intelligence estimates indicated that as many

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Lieutenant Commander Cookson accepted the order. Steaming up river with his gun boats, the RN/RIM units passed through the Ottoman lines under heavy fire. However, just short of Kut, they found the river blocked by a combination of sunken river boats and steel cables. Stopped by the obstruction, the

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Receiving news of the success along the northern set of Ottoman defenses, Brigadier General Fry attempted to convert his feint into a full assault on the Ottoman positions between the river and Suwada marsh. However, the Ottoman defenders put up a stiff resistance, and the attack by the 18th Brigade

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deserted from the Poona Division. They made their way to the Ottoman position, carrying with them the entire plan. However, Nureddin refused to believe that the British would take such a risk. Instead, he remained convinced that any attack would be delivered along the ground nearest the banks of the

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The engagement took place just south of the town of Kut-al-Amara, along the banks of the Tigris River. Following a night march, the British and Indian troops defeated the Ottoman forces, driving them from their defensive positions along the Tigris. The capture of the Es Sinn position allowed for the

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The Poona Division's had planned on a maximum of 6 percent of the division becoming casualties. In addition to each battalion's surgeons, there were the field ambulance units assigned to each of the brigades. However, these units were not intended to function as hospitals, and were only supposed to

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As Delamain began this maneuver, Nureddin's reinforcements began to arrive from their position upriver. Four battalions of Ottoman infantry, supported by two cavalry brigades and artillery, were racing to try to recapture the Ottoman lines. Elements of Columns A and B, both under Delamain's control

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Nureddin was able to extract his battered divisions. Although defeated, they had not been routed despite suffering heavy casualties. With the pause in operations, Nureddin was able to reorganize his Army. Reinforcements dispatched earlier finally began to arrive in theater. This, combined with his

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On 27 September 1915, Townshend's forces approached the Ottoman positions at the Es Sinn. Over the previous days, air and cavalry reconnaissance had scouted the area and located the camouflaged Ottoman defenses as best they could. Scouts had discovered that the area between the Ataba and Suwaikiya

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The British government in London wanted the campaign kept to an absolute minimum. Their primary concern was the defense of Basra and the Shatt al Arab. They had to hold those to ensure that oil from Abadan, needed to fuel the Royal Navy, would not be disrupted. The Viceroy and Indian government at

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As Nureddin's men fell back upriver, Townshend's forces entered Kut on 29 September 1915. The pause was necessitated for a few reasons. First, Townshend force had reached the limit of their orders once they occupied Kut. Any further advance would require permission from Simla. Second, Townshend's

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Although Townshend's cavalry had reached their assigned positions, they failed to attack the retreating Ottoman forces. The commanders failed to do more than follow the beaten Ottoman forces to Kut. It was later explained that charging the Ottoman infantry would have required them to leave behind

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Once the operation began, Townshend was left essentially without a job. The only un-engaged infantry units were the two battalions of the 30th Brigade holding the Ottoman forces on the right bank in place with a feint. His cavalry was trying to position itself along the anticipated retreat routes

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On the right bank of the river, Townshend deployed the two battalions of the 30th Brigade as a demonstration. Shifting the bulk of his forces across to the left bank of the Tigris, he then split his remaining troops into three elements. Two columns were to march around the marshes and attack the

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A three-sided debate would erupt between Chamberlain in London, the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief for India, and Nixon. The Indian government argued for an advance, conditioned on the Home Government returning the two Indian infantry divisions serving in France. The expedition's political

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By the end of the day, the British and Indian troops had captured most of the northern trench network on the left bank of the Tigris. With his reserves driven back, Nureddin realized that continuing to try to hold the position at the Es Sinn would result in the destruction of the 38th Division.

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Anglo-Indian riverboats attempted to cut their way through. Cookson himself, with most of his crew wounded, attempted to cut through the cables to allow the rest of his boats to pass through. However, he was shot and killed in the attempt. Cookson was awarded the Victoria Cross for his attempt.

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Artist's illustration in a popular war-time magazine depicting an idealized view of the attack of the Dorsets against the left flank of the Ottoman trenches on 28 September 1915. Mixed in with the Dorset figures are turbaned Sikh sepoys, despite the fact that the other unit participating in the

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The victory at the Es Sinn was seen as proof by Nixon that Baghdad would fall easily. Despite the fact that his two divisions were stretched logistically, medically, and operationally by the advance to Kut, Nixon and his staff believed that the Ottoman forces in the region were on the verge of

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Unknown to Delamain, Houghton's column had already been engaged, stumbling into a previously undiscovered Ottoman redoubt near the marsh. When Houghton's column finally arrived at the battle, he immediately committed his battalions to support the attacks on the redoubts. Eventually, the entire

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Not only was land transport straining to meet Townshend and Nixon's demands, there was also a growing problem with the river transport. I.E.F. "D", in the absence of adequate animal transport, needed to rely on the river traffic managed by the RN/RIM flotilla. However, as the British were

515:, began putting together a plan to capture Kut. By this time, from its beginning as a reinforced brigade that had landed to protect the British oil interests, I.E.F. "D" had expanded to a force of approximately two divisions, the 6th (Poona) Division and the 565:. The Ottoman Sixth Army was composed of the remnants of 35th and 38th Divisions. Although promised reinforcements, there was no guarantee that they would arrive anytime soon due to the lack of an effective rail network. Furthermore, with the campaign at 596:

The Sixth Army's available manpower for defending against Force D totaled about 10,000 men and 32 artillery pieces. Not only were his battalions severely understrength, Nuruddin's force was composed primarily at this time of unreliable Arab conscripts.

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along the Tigris. The only units still under his control, such as they were, was the RN/RIM flotilla. Ordering them forward, Townshend hoped that they would be able to capture the Ottoman river boats anchored in Kut, as well as the town, unsupported.

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this failed and Column B spending an hour retracing its steps before getting back on track. Delamain's Column A reached its position on time, but then had to wait, in the hopes that Houghton's force would reach their jumping off point soon.

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logistics and medical establishments were straining under the costs of his victory at the Es Sinn. These logistical and medical support issues foreshadowed problems that Force "D" and its successors suffered for the rest of 1915 and 1916.

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was of the opinion that capturing Baghdad would boost the British Empire's flagging reputation in the region. Nixon was all for driving on Baghdad at any cost. Chamberlain strongly opposed any further advance. In the

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Townshend's forces held the battle field as Nureddin's Sixth Army retreated north of Kut. Eventually, Nureddin's army would stop at Ctesiphon and make preparations for another stand against the Anglo-Indian force.

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Simla viewed the problem differently. They saw a chance to demonstrate that British Empire was still pre-eminent in the region, despite the stalemate on the Western Front and deteriorating situation in

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as 60,000 fresh troops would be arriving in the region by January at the latest. Even with this report, the Asquith government gave the approval for an advance on Baghdad, setting the stage for the

772:'s opinion, even if Baghdad could be captured, it was unlikely that forces in the region and those that could be transferred there in the near future could withstand an Ottoman counter-offensive. 487:, warned Simla that while its actions were approved, they would have to achieve victory with forces already in theater. They could expect no reinforcements from other theatres of the war. 617:

Marshes, north of the Ottoman lines, was passable for a heavy formation. Rather than attacking the position head on, Townshend opted for a complicated plan to envelop Nureddin's forces.

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Not only had the 35th and 38th Divisions been gutted in the fighting early in 1915, they were undergoing a change in command. The previous commander for the Iraq Area Command, Colonel

538:, as well as four horse-drawn and two motor launches. The river boats were each armed with a 12-pounder (approximately 76.2 mm), while the horse-drawn barges were equipped with 448:

After consolidating their hold over the Basra Vilayet, a debate began over what to do with Indian Expeditionary Force "D". While originally only envisioned as a limited campaign to

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Captain Richard Alan Lechowich, Against All Odds: The Turks and The Mesopotamian Campaign: 1914–1918 (Master's Thesis, Department of History, University of Virginia, 1992), p. 72.

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During the night, the remnants of the 38th Division retreated back to Nureddin's headquarters. On the right bank, the 35th Division abandoned its positions on the right bank.

420:. The British and Indian governments also viewed it as a test of the Ottoman forces, and whether a further advance to capture Baghdad was possible. The Anglo-Indian forces of 479:. The high command of I.E.F. "D" lobbied Simla for orders that allowed it to advance further north, which were approved by Secretary of State for India in London. However, 1524: 1519: 679:. As the Maharattas and sappers attacked the northern end of the line, 2nd Dorsets struck at the center and southern end of the line, encountering stiff resistance. 475:

While the British Government sought to keep the campaign to a minimum to conserve resources for the Western Front, control over the campaign was still vested in the

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at Abadan, the success of the British and Indian troops in late 1914 and early 1915 caused the planners in Simla and in the field to re-evaluate the mission.

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By 11 September 1915, Townshend had concentrated his forces at Ali Gharbi along the Tigris river. At his disposal he had the Poona Division, as well the

413: 230: 645:, under the command of Brigadier General Hoghton, were assigned to strike at the rear trench line of the Ottoman positions. The third element, the 409: 846: 1514: 522:

Supporting Townshend's offensive would be the combined Royal Navy/Royal Indian Marine flotilla, under the command of Lieutenant Commander

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Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 21 December 1916 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), p. 796.

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However, all of this would hinge upon the Anglo-Indian forces executing a night march across the desert and around the marshes.

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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur T. Wilson, Loyalties' Mesopotamia 1914–1917, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969) p. 82.

223: 1428: 874: 364: 460:. The best way to ensure Indian security, as well as those of the Abadan oil supply was to advance at least as far as the 359: 780: 580:, after the defeats of Qurna and Shaiba, had killed himself while recuperating from wounds. His successor was Colonel 1458: 1409: 676: 633:, was given the job of clearing the Ottoman positions between the Suwada and Ataba marshes. Column B, comprising the 432:

capture of Kut, and with it control over the lower Tigris and Euphrates rivers, by British forces the following day.

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Photograph of the covered Ottoman trenches, part of the defensive network at Es Sinn along the Tigris river in 1915

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Indian Expeditionary Force "D" (GOC Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon) present at Es Sinn, 28 September 1915

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The History of the Great War Based On Official Documents: The Campaign In Mesopotamia 1914–1918, Vol. 1

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The entire plan almost failed before it started. At dusk on 27 September 1915, two sepoys and a

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collapse. Townshend, however, would later write he was more hesitant about a further advance.

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History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918

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Approval from higher authorities secured, the commander of Indian Expeditionary Force "D",

334: 183: 526:, operating along the Tigris. During the drive to Kut, this would include the river boats 495: 8: 1390: 1379: 889: 826: 550: 549:, 10th Royal Field Artillery Brigade, as well as two battalions from the 12th Division's 464:, the canal connecting the Tigris and Euphrates River, and ideally by capturing Baghdad. 354: 1368: 1228:

Brevet-Colonel S. H. Climo, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 28 September 1916, p. 178.

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General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 5 December 1916, p. 712.

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Eventually, the question was not decided by the India Office or Simla. Prime Minister

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with defending every inch of the Baghdad vilayet with an eye towards to recapturing

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Commander A. Hamilton, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 30 October 1916, p. 392.

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6th (Poona) Indian Infantry Division (GOC Major-General Charles V.F. Townshend)

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London and The Invention of The Middle East: Money, Power, and War 1902–1922

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Indian Cavalry advancing in the Mesopotamian desert near the Tigris River.

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Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.Donegan, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, p.230.

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Moberly, vol. 1, p. 301; Major General Charles Verre Ferrers Townshend,

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Major-General Charles V.F. Townshend, GOC 6th (Poona) Division in 1915.

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Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War

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Ordered to Die: A history of the Ottoman Army in the First World War

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Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission

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network of trenches and redoubts were cleared at bayonet point.

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Ottoman positions from the rear. Column A, composed of the 2nd

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military engagement between Anglo-Indian and Ottoman forces.

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Private A. Shaw, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, p. 918.

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The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914–1918

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Townshend, Major General Charles Vere Ferrers (1920).

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Preparing for the coming Anglo-Indian advance was the

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Battles of World War I involving the United Kingdom

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Battles of World War I involving the Ottoman Empire

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In Kut and Captivity With the Sixth Indian Division

1304:(New York: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1919), p. 21. 1100:(Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 2001), 110. 507:, and his principal field commander, Major-General 1355: 670:initial attack was the non-Sikh, 117th Maharattas. 1488:Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur T. (1969). 629:, and a company of sappers, under the command of 1501: 1152: 1150: 779:intervened, having the question referred to the 115: 1392:British Campaigns In The Nearer East, 1914–1918 1000:35th Infantry Division (6 infantry battalions) 997:38th Infantry Division (6 infantry battalions) 404:It took place on 28 September 1915, during the 1530:Battles of World War I involving British India 428:, and the Ottoman forces by Colonel Nureddin. 1147: 224: 1440:The "D" Force (Mesopotamia) In The Great War 740: 1142:The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign 231: 217: 1476: 238: 1418: 1144:(New York: Dial Press, 1967), pp. 86–87. 705: 664: 598: 494: 439: 424:were under the command of Major-General 1446: 1404:. Farleigh Dickinson University Press. 1366: 915:33rd Queen Victoria's Own Light Cavalry 749: 100: 1502: 1487: 1467: 1353: 444:Situation at Kut on 28 September 1915. 1399: 929:7th (Duke of Connaught's Own) Rajputs 875:119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment) 212: 1515:Battles of the Mesopotamian campaign 1388: 1381:The Navy in Mesopotamia 1914 to 1917 1377: 1453:. His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1437: 815:reinforced, GOC Brig.Gen. Hoghton) 791: 781:Chief of the Imperial General Staff 732:Inadequacies of the medical support 13: 14: 1551: 1447:Moberly, Brig.-Gen. F.J. (1923). 1076:The Navy In Mesopotamia 1914–1917 505:Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon 1490:Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917 1078:(London: Constable, 1917), p. 65 165: 153: 133: 117: 102: 87: 1334: 1325: 1316: 1307: 1294: 1285: 1276: 1267: 1258: 1249: 1240: 1231: 1222: 1213: 1204: 1195: 1186: 1177: 1168: 1159: 1134: 1125: 677:Viceroy's Commissioned Officers 1492:. Greenwood Press, Publishers. 1423:. Greenwood Publishing Group. 1112: 1103: 1090: 1081: 1068: 1059: 1050: 1037: 1024: 1: 1468:Sandes, Major E.W.C. (1920). 1346: 1131:Moberly, vol. 1, pp. 316–317. 960:(detached from 16th Brigade) 944:(detached from 16th Brigade) 903:103rd Mahratta Light Infantry 880:110th Mahratta Light Infantry 829:, GOC Brig.Gen. C.J. Mellis) 477:Viceroy's government in Simla 435: 426:Charles Vere Ferres Townshend 1419:Erickson, Edward J. (2001). 1340:Moberly, vol. I, p. 472–473. 1183:Moberly, vol.1, pp. 333–334. 718: 567:Gallipoli nearing its climax 485:Secretary of State for India 422:Indian Expeditionary Force D 7: 1438:Lee, J. Fitzgerald (1927). 10: 1556: 1483:. James A. McCann Company. 1313:Townshend, Vol. 1, p. 201. 1273:Townshend, vol. 1, p. 201. 1264:Townshend, vol. 1, p. 158. 1237:Townshend, vol. I, p. 157. 1219:Townshend, vol. 1, p. 199. 833:6th Indian Cavalry Brigade 808:, GOC Brig.Gen. Delamain) 631:Brigadier General Delamain 547:6th Indian Cavalry Brigade 490: 1442:. Wm. May & Co., Ltd. 1003:4 battalions of infantry 898:Bombay Sappers and Miners 813:17th (Ahmednagar) Brigade 635:17th (Ahmednagar) Brigade 611: 250: 194: 177: 146: 79: 37: 25: 20: 1384:. Constable and Company. 1370:The Long Road To Baghdad 1367:Candler, Edmund (1919). 1302:The Long Road to Baghdad 1174:Moberly, vol. 1, p. 325. 1043:Brig.Gen. F.J. Moberly, 1018: 958:104th Wellesley's Rifles 908:120th Rajputana Infantry 741:River transport problems 643:104th Wellesley's Rifles 1400:Davis, Paul K. (1994). 1395:. Hodder and Stoughton. 1362:. New York: Dial Press. 1210:Moberly, vol. 1, p.334. 450:secure the oil pipeline 416:rivers, in what is now 1373:. Cassell and Company. 1012:2 brigades of cavalry 825:Forces On Right Bank ( 820:18th (Belgaum) Brigade 711: 671: 647:18th (Belgaum) Brigade 604: 500: 445: 147:Commanders and leaders 71:British–Indian victory 1540:September 1915 events 1389:Dane, Edmund (1919). 1378:Cato, Conrad (1917). 1354:Barker, A.J. (1967). 980:) (Colonel Nureddin) 822:, GOC Brig.Gen. Fry) 709: 668: 602: 498: 443: 406:Mesopotamian Campaign 242:Mesopotamian campaign 195:Casualties and losses 28:Mesopotamian Campaign 1510:1915 in Ottoman Iraq 1096:Edward J. Erickson, 841:Dorsetshire Regiment 806:16th (Poona) Brigade 750:Effect of the battle 517:12th Indian Division 513:6th (Poona) Division 184:6th (Poona) Division 890:7th Hariana Lancers 863:14th King's Hussars 827:30th Indian Brigade 786:Battle of Ctesiphon 578:Süleyman Askeri Bey 555:Royal Indian Marine 551:30th Indian Brigade 712: 672: 605: 563:Ottoman Sixth Army 501: 481:Austen Chamberlain 446: 1535:Conflicts in 1915 1430:978-0-313-31516-9 1192:Townshend, p. 194 1109:Lechowich, p. 79. 1016: 1015: 978:Iraq Area Command 970: 969: 395:Battle of Es Sinn 388: 387: 345:Samarra offensive 207: 206: 160:Charles Townshend 75: 74: 45:28 September 1915 21:Battle of Es Sinn 1547: 1493: 1484: 1473: 1464: 1443: 1434: 1415: 1396: 1385: 1374: 1363: 1361: 1341: 1338: 1332: 1329: 1323: 1320: 1314: 1311: 1305: 1300:Edmund Candler, 1298: 1292: 1289: 1283: 1280: 1274: 1271: 1265: 1262: 1256: 1253: 1247: 1244: 1238: 1235: 1229: 1226: 1220: 1217: 1211: 1208: 1202: 1201:Cato, pp. 66–71. 1199: 1193: 1190: 1184: 1181: 1175: 1172: 1166: 1165:Mobberly, p. 320 1163: 1157: 1154: 1145: 1138: 1132: 1129: 1123: 1116: 1110: 1107: 1101: 1094: 1088: 1085: 1079: 1072: 1066: 1063: 1057: 1054: 1048: 1041: 1035: 1028: 983: 982: 870:117th Maharattas 853:Norfolk Regiment 801: 800: 792:Orders of Battle 524:Edgar C. Cookson 245: 243: 233: 226: 219: 210: 209: 172:Nur-ud Din Pasha 170: 169: 168: 158: 157: 139: 137: 136: 127: 123: 121: 120: 112: 108: 106: 105: 93: 91: 90: 39: 38: 18: 17: 1555: 1554: 1550: 1549: 1548: 1546: 1545: 1544: 1500: 1499: 1496: 1461: 1431: 1412: 1349: 1344: 1339: 1335: 1331:Candler, p. 22. 1330: 1326: 1321: 1317: 1312: 1308: 1299: 1295: 1290: 1286: 1281: 1277: 1272: 1268: 1263: 1259: 1254: 1250: 1245: 1241: 1236: 1232: 1227: 1223: 1218: 1214: 1209: 1205: 1200: 1196: 1191: 1187: 1182: 1178: 1173: 1169: 1164: 1160: 1155: 1148: 1139: 1135: 1130: 1126: 1117: 1113: 1108: 1104: 1095: 1091: 1086: 1082: 1073: 1069: 1064: 1060: 1055: 1051: 1042: 1038: 1030:Roger Adelson, 1029: 1025: 1021: 797: 794: 752: 743: 734: 721: 627:117th Mahrattas 614: 560: 493: 438: 391: 390: 389: 384: 246: 241: 239: 237: 189: 166: 164: 152: 134: 132: 118: 116: 103: 101: 88: 86: 63: 57: 12: 11: 5: 1553: 1543: 1542: 1537: 1532: 1527: 1522: 1517: 1512: 1495: 1494: 1485: 1474: 1472:. John Murray. 1465: 1459: 1444: 1435: 1429: 1416: 1410: 1397: 1386: 1375: 1364: 1350: 1348: 1345: 1343: 1342: 1333: 1324: 1315: 1306: 1293: 1284: 1282:Barker, p. 93. 1275: 1266: 1257: 1248: 1239: 1230: 1221: 1212: 1203: 1194: 1185: 1176: 1167: 1158: 1156:Barker, p. 87. 1146: 1133: 1124: 1111: 1102: 1089: 1080: 1067: 1058: 1049: 1036: 1022: 1020: 1017: 1014: 1013: 1010: 1008: 1005: 1004: 1001: 998: 994: 993: 990: 987: 968: 967: 965: 963: 961: 955: 952: 951: 949: 947: 945: 939: 936: 935: 933: 931: 926: 921: 918: 917: 912: 910: 905: 900: 893: 892: 887: 882: 877: 872: 866: 865: 860: 855: 849: 847:Ox & Bucks 843: 836: 835: 830: 823: 816: 809: 793: 790: 751: 748: 742: 739: 733: 730: 720: 717: 613: 610: 492: 489: 437: 434: 386: 385: 383: 382: 377: 372: 367: 362: 357: 352: 347: 342: 337: 332: 327: 322: 317: 312: 307: 302: 297: 292: 287: 282: 277: 272: 267: 262: 257: 251: 248: 247: 236: 235: 228: 221: 213: 205: 204: 201: 197: 196: 192: 191: 186: 180: 179: 175: 174: 162: 149: 148: 144: 143: 141:Ottoman Empire 130: 129: 128: 125:United Kingdom 113: 95:British Empire 82: 81: 77: 76: 73: 72: 69: 65: 64: 53: 51: 47: 46: 43: 35: 34: 23: 22: 16: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1552: 1541: 1538: 1536: 1533: 1531: 1528: 1526: 1523: 1521: 1518: 1516: 1513: 1511: 1508: 1507: 1505: 1498: 1491: 1486: 1482: 1481: 1475: 1471: 1466: 1462: 1460:0-89839-268-3 1456: 1452: 1451: 1445: 1441: 1436: 1432: 1426: 1422: 1417: 1413: 1411:0-8386-3530-X 1407: 1403: 1398: 1394: 1393: 1387: 1383: 1382: 1376: 1372: 1371: 1365: 1360: 1359: 1352: 1351: 1337: 1328: 1319: 1310: 1303: 1297: 1288: 1279: 1270: 1261: 1252: 1243: 1234: 1225: 1216: 1207: 1198: 1189: 1180: 1171: 1162: 1153: 1151: 1143: 1140:A.J. Barker, 1137: 1128: 1121: 1115: 1106: 1099: 1093: 1084: 1077: 1074:Conrad Cato, 1071: 1062: 1053: 1046: 1040: 1033: 1027: 1023: 1011: 1009: 1007: 1006: 1002: 999: 996: 995: 991: 988: 985: 984: 981: 979: 975: 966: 964: 962: 959: 956: 954: 953: 950: 948: 946: 943: 942:20th Punjabis 940: 938: 937: 934: 932: 930: 927: 925: 924:22nd Punjabis 922: 920: 919: 916: 913: 911: 909: 906: 904: 901: 899: 895: 894: 891: 888: 886: 885:76th Punjabis 883: 881: 878: 876: 873: 871: 868: 867: 864: 861: 859: 858:24th Punjabis 856: 854: 850: 848: 844: 842: 838: 837: 834: 831: 828: 824: 821: 817: 814: 810: 807: 803: 802: 799: 789: 787: 782: 778: 773: 771: 766: 763:officer, Sir 760: 756: 747: 738: 729: 725: 716: 708: 704: 700: 696: 692: 688: 684: 680: 678: 667: 663: 659: 656: 651: 648: 644: 640: 639:20th Punjabis 636: 632: 628: 624: 618: 609: 601: 597: 593: 591: 587: 583: 579: 574: 572: 568: 564: 558: 556: 552: 548: 543: 541: 540:4.7 inch guns 537: 533: 529: 525: 520: 518: 514: 510: 506: 497: 488: 486: 482: 478: 473: 471: 465: 463: 459: 453: 451: 442: 433: 429: 427: 423: 419: 415: 411: 407: 402: 400: 396: 381: 378: 376: 375:Khan Baghdadi 373: 371: 368: 366: 363: 361: 358: 356: 353: 351: 348: 346: 343: 341: 338: 336: 333: 331: 328: 326: 323: 321: 318: 316: 313: 311: 308: 306: 303: 301: 298: 296: 293: 291: 288: 286: 283: 281: 278: 276: 273: 271: 268: 266: 263: 261: 258: 256: 253: 252: 249: 244: 234: 229: 227: 222: 220: 215: 214: 211: 202: 199: 198: 193: 187: 185: 182: 181: 176: 173: 163: 161: 156: 151: 150: 145: 142: 131: 126: 114: 111: 99: 98: 97: 96: 84: 83: 78: 70: 67: 66: 61: 58:(present-day 56: 52: 49: 48: 44: 41: 40: 36: 33: 29: 24: 19: 1497: 1489: 1479: 1469: 1449: 1439: 1420: 1401: 1391: 1380: 1369: 1357: 1336: 1327: 1318: 1309: 1301: 1296: 1287: 1278: 1269: 1260: 1251: 1242: 1233: 1224: 1215: 1206: 1197: 1188: 1179: 1170: 1161: 1141: 1136: 1127: 1119: 1114: 1105: 1097: 1092: 1083: 1075: 1070: 1061: 1052: 1044: 1039: 1031: 1026: 971: 795: 774: 770:India Office 761: 757: 753: 744: 735: 726: 722: 713: 701: 697: 693: 689: 685: 681: 673: 660: 652: 619: 615: 606: 594: 575: 559: 544: 535: 531: 527: 521: 502: 474: 466: 462:Shatt al Hai 454: 447: 430: 403: 394: 392: 350:Jebel Hamlin 310:Sheikh Sa'ad 300:Umm at Tubal 289: 85: 80:Belligerents 26:Part of the 1480:My Campaign 1120:My Campaign 986:Right Bank 586:Enver Pasha 573:Mountains. 399:World War I 255:Fao Landing 55:Mesopotamia 32:World War I 1504:Categories 1347:References 989:Left Bank 974:Sixth Army 818:Column C ( 811:Column B ( 804:Column A ( 436:Background 365:2nd Ramadi 360:1st Ramadi 765:Percy Cox 719:Aftermath 637:with the 509:Townshend 458:Gallipoli 414:Euphrates 355:Istabulat 295:Ctesiphon 285:Nasiriyah 992:Reserve 972:Ottoman 896:22 Coy, 851:2nd bn. 845:1st bn. 839:2nd bn. 655:havildar 582:Nureddin 571:Caucasus 178:Strength 50:Location 777:Asquith 658:river. 623:Dorsets 528:Shaitan 511:of the 491:Prelude 380:Sharqat 340:Baghdad 335:2nd Kut 325:Dujaila 305:1st Kut 290:Es Sinn 280:Karbala 203:Unknown 200:Unknown 190:13 guns 1457: 1427: 1408: 612:Battle 536:Sumana 534:, and 483:, the 410:Tigres 397:was a 270:Shaiba 188:10,500 138: 122: 107: 92: 68:Result 1019:Notes 590:Basra 532:Comet 470:Qurna 370:Najaf 330:Hilla 320:Hanna 275:Amara 265:Qurna 260:Basra 110:India 1455:ISBN 1425:ISBN 1406:ISBN 641:and 418:Iraq 412:and 393:The 315:Wadi 60:Iraq 42:Date 30:of 1506:: 1149:^ 788:. 625:, 592:. 530:, 1463:. 1433:. 1414:. 976:( 232:e 225:t 218:v 62:)

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Index