959:
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741:. After the Battle of Es Sinn, the Anglo-Indian force controlled the Tigris and Euphrates rivers through much of what is now southern Iraq. Sensing that Baghdad was within their grasp, the commander of Force "D", supported by the Commander in Chief, India, in Simla, argued for permission to launch a final offensive to capture it. The situation looked promising. The nearest Ottoman reserves, according to British intelligence, were 400 miles (640 km) distant in the Caucasus or 250 miles (400 km) away at Aleppo in Syria. All that blocked the way to Baghdad were two demoralized, defeated divisions.
407:
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25:
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water to operate effectively. Although the Tigris was broad, during much of the year it was so shallow that many ships could not navigate it. Going out further from the track along the Tigris, there were marshlands which would flood, especially during the Spring thaw. This left the river as the primary means of long-distance transport. Despite the fact that the river was the primary means of transporting men and supplies in theater, the
British had insufficient river craft to adequately meet the Tigris Corps' supply needs.
882:
their German advisers, had become adept at camouflaging their positions, making it hard for the
British and Indian units to fix them properly. What was known was that Ottomans were in the process of constructing a redoubt at Dujaila. Since there was no way to cover a move across the river and through the Dujaila position, Aylmer and his staff put together a plan that called for a night assault by the majority of his force while a detachment would remain behind on the left bank as a diversion.
458:
326:
296:
311:
87:
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897:
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998:, was accompanied by Kearny, Aylmer and Gorringe. Despite finding that there a gap in the lines, the Corps and Column commander, as well as the Corps Chief of Staff, held the 37th Brigade back, ordering it to wait and follow the plan's timetable. The infantry assault, originally planned for 7:15 a.m. did not go in till later.
829:
known weather patterns of the region, the latest that the Anglo-Indian Tigris Corps could expect favourable weather to hold was the middle of March. After that, the spring thaw would be in full swing. Combined with the coming rainy season, it would turn the areas along the banks of the Tigris into a flooded quagmire.
1017:
succeeded in capturing the first two lines of trenches of the
Dujalia Redoubt. However, with no reserves left to exploit the success, the two battalions could do nothing more than hang on to their gains. Slowly but surely, the Ottoman battalions counter-attacked with bayonets and grenades, which were
1001:
The artillery, which should have started their bombardment earlier, did not get into action until almost 7 a.m. Paradoxically, once the barrage started, all hope of surprise was lost. Through the day, the Anglo-Indian battalions assaulted the
Ottoman positions, only to be pinned down and driven back
828:
The
British position at Kut was becoming more desperate. Food stocks were estimated to last only until the middle of April, even with the discovery of an additional store of grain in late January. Additionally, there was the concern that time was running out in another way: the weather. Based on the
775:
to the town after attempts to storm the Anglo-Indian positions failed. Failing to take the town by storm, the
Ottoman Sixth Army had adopted a passive siege, preferring to starve the Kut defenders into submission. The survival of the garrison became dependent on its food supply. Originally, forecast
1021:
In all, the Tigris Corps suffered almost 4,000 casualties. Through the night, the
British forces fell back to a rendezvous position approximately 8,000 yards from the Dujalia position. When no counter-attack materialized from the Dujalia, Aylmer ordered his troops back across the river, ending the
966:
Aylmer's plan split his force into three columns (A, B, and C). Columns A and B were grouped together and placed under the command of Major-General
Kemball. Column C, under the command of Major-General Kearny, would be the reserve force. On the night of 7 March 1916, the entire force began crossing
945:
Realizing that the
British might try to break the siege by advancing on the right bank, the Ottoman commander ordered the construction of the Dujaila redoubt. Aylmer later testified he chose to attack on the right bank because although the redoubt was sited atop the Dujaila depression, construction
912:
Not only did Lake lack faith in Aylmer's abilities, Aylmer himself had lost confidence in the abilities of his subordinates. Of his two divisional commanders, Major-General Henry D'Urban Kearny, GOC 3rd (Lahore) Division, and Major-General Sir George
Younghusband, GOC 7th (Meerut) Division, neither
1038:
began the annual re-supply of the rivers. The flooding the Mesopotamian plain began turning it into a sea of mud, flooded nullahs and mud islands. The morale of the Tigris Corps began to drop. When word of the defeat at Dujalia was announced to 6th (Poona) Division, Indian Muslim soldiers, already
941:
was able to move the bulk of his forces south, leaving only about 2,000 men to maintain the siege itself. On the left bank, the 52nd, 38th, and part of 35th Ottoman Divisions continued to occupy the Hanna line. 8,500 men, 1,500 cavalry and 32 artillery pieces of the 2nd and 35th Ottoman Divisions
920:
Like the British, the Ottoman Sixth Army was also stretched to the limit of logistical support. The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure (i.e. paved road capable of military transport or railways) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced. What the Ottoman
881:
Unwilling to leave the Tigris, which provided the British forces with an easy line of communication to Basra, Lieutenant-General Aylmer made the decision to attempt an advance along the right bank. Like the left bank, the terrain was mostly featureless and devoid of cover. The Ottoman units, with
832:
Many of battalions of the Tigris Corps remained understrength at the end of March 1916. The problem was particularly acute with the British battalions and the British officers of the Indian Army units. To deal with this, survivors of several units were amalgamated into battalions which approached
868:
In 1916, there were virtually no paved roads in Mesopotamia between Baghdad and Basra. No rail road had been constructed to connect to the cities. Beyond the port of Basra, transport options were limited to animal power, along unpaved tracks near the river, or river craft. Both required adequate
824:
had been dispatched as reinforcements from Egypt where it was being brought back to strength following its evacuation from Gallipoli. However, by the end of February, only the 13th Division's first battalions had reached the theatre, and only two of those had been transported up river by end of
812:
752:
was concerned that even if Baghdad could be captured, it would only be lost again because no other troops were available to reinforce Force "D". Eventually, the question of a further advance was taken up by Asquith's War Cabinet. Despite warnings from the Imperial General Staff, the decision to
936:
and the Sanniyat on the left bank of the river and the Dujaila along the right bank. Because Townshend had adopted a passive defensive stance, even more so since losing his ability to cross the river with the destruction of the pontoon bridge from Kut to the Woolpress village, his Ottoman army
989:
By the time Kemball allowed the attack to go in, all hope of surprise had been lost. As the artillery began its preparatory bombardment, Von Der Goltz began ferrying over the 52nd Division from his reserve on the left bank to reinforce the divisions which were now fully alert and manning the
917:, one of his brigade commanders. Aylmer made his decision claiming that Kemball was a more energetic commander. Major-General Younghusband, who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely, was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank.
985:
However, despite achieving total surprise, Kemball ordered his units to wait until the pre-planned H-Hour for the assault. He even ordered the Punjabis to withdraw from the Ottoman positions. Three hours would pass before Kemball would allow the 36th Brigade to attack the Dujalia redoubt.
970:
In the darkness, things started to go wrong. Columns A and B became separated, losing contact with each other, slowing the advance as they tried to find each other in the dark. The artillery became lost and was almost an hour and a half late reaching their assigned positions.
877:
for their communications, the force would break through the Ottoman lines and link up with the Kut garrison. The other option was to continue along Tigris River, but switching to the right bank. However, this would mean having to break through the Ottoman defenses at Dujaila.
872:
Given the strength of the Ottoman defences at the Hanna, the Anglo-Indian forces needed to find a way around them. On the left bank of the Tigris, this would mean swinging wide around the Ottoman defenses and marching at least 30 miles through the desert. Then, relying on
967:
the river in preparation for the night march to the Dujualia redoubt. Lacking any real terrain features to help with the night time navigation, each column would have navigate by compass, checking their progress by counting steps, bicycle tachometers, and walking sticks.
819:
Following the setbacks at the Hanna on 21 January 1916, Lieutenant-General Aylmer's Tigris Corps spent the month of February refitting and collecting reinforcements. Despite the pause, the Tigris Corps was still unable to be brought back up to full strength. The
889:. After the Battle of the Hanna, General Lake had begun to lose faith in Aylmer's abilities as commander of the Tigris Corps. In order to exert greater control over the coming battle, he had replaced Aylmer's chief of staff with his own man, Major-General
928:, had put their experience to good use. The Ottoman Sixth Army had invested Townshend's position with an elaborate trench network since December 1915. Downriver, the Field Marshal von der Goltz and his senior Ottoman commander,
1030:
The failure at Dujalia sealed Aylmer's fate. On 12 March 1916, he was relieved of command by Lake after the War Office received the report of the defeat. In his place, Gorringe would be elevated to command of the Tigris Corps.
937:
counterpart had been able to shift more and more of his troops south. In all, the Ottoman Sixth Army could muster approximately 25,000 men, 1,200 cavalry, and 80 artillery pieces. With Townshend's passivity, Field Marshal
993:
Although some of Aylmer's assault force was in position, some of it was still struggling to sort itself out from the night march as the barrage began. One unit which did reach its start position on time, the
776:
to be exhausted by the middle of February 1916, additional food stocks had been discovered in the town at the end of January 1916, which would extend the defender's rations until the middle of April 1916.
982:
attached to Column A) pushed forward, entering the Dujalia position to find them occupied only by a few unsuspecting soldiers. The news was reported back to Kemball that surprise had been achieved.
913:
were detailed to the principal commander for the planned operation. Major-General D'Urban Keary would be assigned to command one of the three columns, the other two being commanded by Major-General
1018:
in short supply on the British side, forcing the Manchester's and Rifles to retreat in the early evening. Of the 2,301 men of the 8th Brigade present, 1,174 were casualties by the end of the day.
990:
trenches. By the end of the battle, nearly 8,000 men were ferried across the river and brought into fighting positions, effectively doubling the strength of the Ottoman garrison on the right bank.
833:
full strength. Furthermore, replacement drafts meant for units besieged in Kut were formed into provisional units. These provisional units included the Highland Battalion (survivors of 2nd
1005:
Despite the missed opportunities, the fresh reinforcements, and the strong defensive entrenchments, by late afternoon, the British once again were on the verge of a breakthrough.
1233:
Report Of The Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War In Mesopotamia Together With a Separate Report by Commander J. Wedgwood, D.D.O.,MP
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had only begun a few days after the Hanna battle in January 1916. By the time of the assault, the Ottomans had significantly improved the position, complete with a
577:
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as well as replacements intended for the besieged Poona Division. The Tigris Corps' first drive to relieve Townshend and the Kut garrison ground to a halt at the
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expanded gradually as local commanders saw a chance for victories which would burnish the British Empire's prestige in the Muslim world. At the battles of
508:
1534:
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army did have going in its favor was time. They had recognized that for the time, they were at the extent of their supply line from Baghdad.
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Despite the two-hour delay, the assault elements of Column A and B were in position just before dawn on 8 March 1916. The lead elements of
243:
381:
331:
1103:
Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, Mesopotamia Commission Testimony, 21 December 1916 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), p. 796.
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However, prior to putting the plan into effect, Aylmer had to get approval of the new commander of I.E.F. D, Lieutenant-General Sir
151:
1301:
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969) p. 117
501:
123:
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1078:
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rivers. Originally dispatched to capture the Shatt al Arab and Basra, to protect the British oilfields in Iran, Force "D"'s
206:
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Lieutenant General Sir Fenton John Aylmer, 13th Baronet of Donadea VC KCB, commander of the Tigris Corps in March 1916
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1333:
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, Vol. II
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33:
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The Secrets of a Kuttie, An Authentic Story of Kut, Adventures in Captivity and Stamboul Intrigue,
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For the rest of March, the Tigris Corps would await reinforcements, including the all British
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194:
1475:
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918
1114:
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918
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757:
612:
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8:
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705:, attempted to relieve the city. The attempt failed, and Aylmer lost 3,500 men.
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London and The Invention of The Middle East: Money, Power, and War 1902–1922,
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The Ottomans, who had become adept at trench warfare during their victory at
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245:
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British infantry advancing through Mesopotamia near the Tigris river in 1916
764:, available for offensive operations. Although tactically successful at the
685:) was fought on 8 March 1916, between British and Ottoman forces during the
1239:"). London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917., 9 January 1917, p. 868.
1046:. Once they were reinforced and concentrated, they would attempt once more
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768:, it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. The Poona Division retreated to Kut.
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In London, the India Office was staunchly opposed to a further advance.
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With the Poona Division under siege, the high commands in London and
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During the second half of 1915, Force "D" had only one division, the
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1438:
Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War
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vol. I, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923) pp. 472–473.
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began scrambling to put together a relief force. Lieutenant-General
86:
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was appointed to command the relief expedition, designated as the
1039:
conflicted about fighting their coreligionists, began to desert.
713:
Throughout most of 1915, the Anglo-Indian expedition, designated
1419:
Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission
701:, when the Anglo-Indian relief force, led by Lieutenant-General
1034:
After the defeat, the annual floods began. Melted snow off the
947:
942:
defended the right bank of the Tigris at the Dujaila position.
1252:, (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 1927) p. 133.
1071:
Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study
932:, erected a series of well sited defensive positions at the
900:
Major-General Henry D'Urban Keary, GOC 3rd (Lahore) Division
237:
16:
1916 WWI battle between British and Ottoman forces in Iraq
1335:, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923) p. 524.
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233:
211:
A detailed map showing the attack on the Dujaila Redoubt
1383:
The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914–1918
1366:, (New York: The James A. McCann Company, 1920) p. 169.
1281:
The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914–1918
1180:
The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914–1918
1501:
Townshend, Major General Charles Vere Ferrers (1920).
1191:
Robert Barr Smith, "Britain's Bastard River War" in
1156:, (New York: Casells and Company Ltd., 1919) p. 139.
857:) and the Composite Territorials (remnants of 1/5th
1545:
Battles of World War I involving the United Kingdom
1540:
Battles of World War I involving the Ottoman Empire
1494:
In Kut and Captivity With the Sixth Indian Division
111:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1309:
1307:
1231:Testimony of Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Aylmer,
1094:(New London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 121.
1510:Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur T. (1969).
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1063:
1521:
771:The Ottoman Sixth Army, reinforced, pursued and
322:
1410:British Campaigns In The Nearer East, 1914–1918
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1550:Battles of World War I involving British India
1362:Major General Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend,
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849:regiments in Kut), Composite Dogra Battalion (
1050:before Townshend's garrison ran out of food.
950:estimated to be 25 feet high in some places.
502:
1466:The "D" Force (Mesopotamia) In The Great War
791:. Originally intended to be made up of the
509:
495:
205:
1500:
1283:, (New York: The Dial Press, 1967) p. 201
1169:(New York: John Lane Company, 1922) p. 53
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464:
171:Learn how and when to remove this message
69:Learn how and when to remove this message
1435:
957:
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32:This article includes a list of general
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1421:. Farleigh Dickinson University Press.
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841:), Norsets (replacement drafts for 2nd
307:
1522:
1509:
1491:
1454:
1380:
1182:, (New York: Dial Press, 1967) p. 211.
1416:
737:, Force "D" defeated elements of the
490:
1535:Battles of the Mesopotamian campaign
1407:
1401:The Navy in Mesopotamia 1914 to 1917
1398:
1248:Otto Viktor Karl Liman von Sanders,
1195:, October 2002, v. 19, n., 4, p. 40.
109:adding citations to reliable sources
80:
18:
1477:. His Majesty's Stationery Office.
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1007:59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force)
1002:by machine gun and artillery fire.
13:
38:it lacks sufficient corresponding
14:
1571:
1473:Moberly, Brig.-Gen. F.J. (1923).
1512:Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917
1154:The Long Road To Baghdad, Vol. I
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908:Major General George V. Kemball
96:needs additional citations for
1514:. Greenwood Press, Publishers.
1459:. Vintage Canada and colophon.
1440:. Greenwood Publishing Group.
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1:
1492:Sandes, Major E.W.C. (1920).
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695:Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz
412:Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz
1436:Erickson, Edward J. (2001).
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746:Secretary of State for India
715:Indian Expeditionary Force D
7:
1464:Lee, J. Fitzgerald (1927).
717:, had advanced up both the
10:
1576:
1505:. James A. McCann Company.
859:Buffs (East Kent Regiment)
806:
1468:. Wm. May & Co., Ltd.
1204:Moberly, vol. II, p. 310.
1143:Moberly, vol. II, p. 193.
1134:Moberly, vol. II, p. 193.
1112:Brig.-Gen. F.J. Moberly,
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1403:. Constable and Company.
1392:The Long Road To Baghdad
1390:Candler, Edmund (1919).
1417:Davis, Paul K. (1994).
1412:. Hodder and Stoughton.
1385:. New York: Dial Press.
1331:Brig.Gen. F.J.Moberly,
1165:Captain E. O. Mousley,
1044:13th (Western) Division
1015:8th (Jullundur) Brigade
822:13th (Western) Division
53:more precise citations.
1394:. Cassell and Company.
1237:Mesopotamia Commission
963:
909:
901:
816:
762:Charles V.F. Townshend
727:mission in Mesopotamia
681:
374:Commanders and leaders
1455:Keegan, John (2000).
1408:Dane, Edmund (1919).
1399:Cato, Conrad (1917).
1381:Barker, A.J. (1967).
961:
907:
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814:
797:7th (Meerut) Division
793:3rd (Lahore) Division
520:Mesopotamian campaign
439:Casualties and losses
366:(military commanders)
195:Mesopotamian Campaign
1530:1916 in Ottoman Iraq
1364:My Campaign, Vol. II
1250:Five Years in Turkey
1213:Candler, pp. 138–139
1069:Edward J. Erickson,
839:Seaforth Highlanders
803:on 21 January 1916.
760:under Major-General
758:6th (Poona) Division
477:Location within Iraq
474:class=notpageimage|
105:improve this article
1457:The First World War
1073:, Routledge, 2007,
1011:Manchester Regiment
996:37th Indian Brigade
980:36th Indian Brigade
766:Battle of Ctesiphon
753:advance was given.
434:32 artillery pieces
427:68 artillery pieces
255: /
120:"Battle of Dujaila"
1048:to break the siege
964:
910:
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817:
750:Austen Chamberlain
739:Ottoman Sixth Army
1560:March 1916 events
1447:978-0-313-31516-9
1079:978-0-415-77099-6
733:, Nasiriyeh, and
673:Battle of Dujaila
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623:Samarra offensive
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188:Battle of Dujaila
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682:Sâbis Muharebesi
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432:1,500 cavalry
429:
425:1,268 Cavalry
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387:Fenton Aylmer
383:
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363:German Empire
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122: –
121:
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116:Find sources:
110:
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100:
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94:This article
92:
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73:
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62:
52:
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42:
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1374:Bibliography
1363:
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1235:(hereafter "
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930:Khalil Pasha
923:
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789:Tigris Corps
778:
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755:
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676:
672:
670:
628:Jebel Hamlin
602:
588:Sheikh Sa'ad
578:Umm at Tubal
391:
339:
292:
287:Belligerents
223:8 March 1916
193:Part of the
167:
158:
148:
141:
134:
127:
115:
103:Please help
98:verification
95:
65:
56:
37:
1503:My Campaign
855:41st Dogras
851:37th Dogras
835:Black Watch
533:Fao Landing
262: /
199:World War I
161:August 2012
59:August 2012
51:introducing
1524:Categories
1054:References
887:Percy Lake
861:and 1/4th
825:February.
773:laid siege
709:Background
643:2nd Ramadi
638:1st Ramadi
250:45°57′14″E
247:32°29′17″N
131:newspapers
34:references
1026:Aftermath
978:(part of
926:Gallipoli
863:Hampshire
723:Euphrates
633:Istabulat
573:Ctesiphon
563:Nasiriyah
1081:, p. 93.
1022:battle.
1009:and 1st
845:and 2nd
837:and 1st
418:Strength
232:East of
228:Location
1013:of the
843:Norfolk
807:Prelude
735:Es Sinn
691:Ottoman
678:Turkish
658:Sharqat
618:Baghdad
613:2nd Kut
603:Dujaila
583:1st Kut
568:Es Sinn
558:Karbala
145:scholar
47:improve
1481:
1444:
1425:
1077:
954:Battle
948:glacis
847:Dorset
719:Tigris
689:. The
548:Shaiba
360:
346:
329:
314:
299:
275:Result
147:
140:
133:
126:
118:
36:, but
934:Hanna
781:Simla
731:Qurna
648:Najaf
608:Hilla
598:Hanna
553:Amara
543:Qurna
538:Basra
317:India
152:JSTOR
138:books
1479:ISBN
1442:ISBN
1423:ISBN
1075:ISBN
853:and
795:and
721:and
671:The
593:Wadi
238:Iraq
220:Date
124:news
865:).
699:Kut
234:Kut
197:of
107:by
1526::
1306:^
1062:^
893:.
748:,
680::
1487:.
1450:.
1431:.
675:(
510:e
503:t
496:v
174:)
168:(
163:)
159:(
149:·
142:·
135:·
128:·
101:.
72:)
66:(
61:)
57:(
43:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
