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Ambient authority

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148:) than they need for their task, but that they are unable to determine the source or the number and types of permission that they have. A program executing under an ambient authority access control model has little option but to designate permissions and try to exercise them, hoping for the best. This property requires an excess of permissions to be granted to users or roles, in order for programs to execute without error. 110:. So, if the program should be able to access an object when acting on its own behalf but not when acting on behalf of one of its clients (or, on behalf of one client but not another), it has no way to express that intention. This inevitably leads to such programs being subject to the 133:. However, since there are additional requirements for a system to be considered a capability system besides avoiding ambient authority, "non-ambient authority system" is not just a synonym for "capability system". 56:
The authority is "ambient" in the sense that it exists in a broadly visible environment (often, but not necessarily a global environment) where any subject can request it by name.
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The desired file is designated by its name on the filesystem, which does not by itself include authorising information, so the program is exercising ambient authority.
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if it only needs to specify the names of the involved object(s) and the operation to be performed on them in order for a permitted action to succeed.
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When ambient authority is requested, permissions are granted or denied based on one or more global properties of the executing program, such as its
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model of access control as used in Unix and in Windows systems is an ambient authority model because programs execute with the authorities of the
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a "name" is any way of referring to an object that does not itself include authorising information, and could potentially be used by any subject;
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Stories of the Development of Large Scale Scientific Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; An Oral and Pictorial History
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that started them. This not only means that executing programs are inevitably given more permissions (see
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references. This allows them to determine where the permissions came from, and thus avoid the
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Ambient authority is the dominant form of access control in computer systems today. The
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For example, suppose a C program opens a file for read access by executing the call:
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request that that subject could make that would cause the action to be carried out.
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is handled separately from explicit communication to the executing program or
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The term "ambient authority" is used primarily to contrast with
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the permissions that it was granted for a specific purpose as
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A subject, such as a computer program, is said to be using
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Miller, Mark S.; Yee, Ka-Ping; Shapiro, Jonathan (2003).
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an action is "permitted" for a subject if there exists
102:mechanisms. The executing program has no means to 575: 164: 16:Term used in the study of access control systems 319: 305: 261: 312: 298: 203: 234: 576: 293: 255: 98:associated with objects or through 86:. In such cases, the management of 13: 14: 595: 235:Tribble, Dean (5 December 2002). 204:Donnelley, Jed (6 October 2004). 22:is a term used in the study of 264:"Capability Computing at LLNL" 228: 212:(Mailing list). Archived from 197: 158: 67:open("filename", O_RDONLY, 0) 1: 262:Jed Donnelley (May 4, 2005). 167:"Capability Myths Demolished" 151: 29: 336:Principle of least privilege 146:Principle of least privilege 7: 372:Capability-based addressing 10: 600: 59: 530: 512: 479: 390: 367:Capability-based security 328: 119:capability-based security 100:Role-Based Access Control 123:object-capability models 94:, through means such as 362:Object-capability model 342:Confused deputy problem 131:Confused deputy problem 112:confused deputy problem 73: 185:Cite journal requires 481:Programming languages 531:Specialised hardware 96:access control lists 41:In this definition, 563:Plessey System 250 127:first-class object 108:first-class values 571: 570: 392:Operating systems 347:Ambient authority 321:Object-capability 268:George A. Michael 36:ambient authority 20:Ambient authority 591: 377:Zooko's triangle 314: 307: 300: 291: 290: 284: 283: 281: 280: 259: 253: 252: 250: 248: 232: 226: 225: 223: 221: 201: 195: 194: 188: 183: 181: 173: 171: 162: 599: 598: 594: 593: 592: 590: 589: 588: 574: 573: 572: 567: 526: 508: 475: 386: 352:File descriptor 324: 318: 288: 287: 278: 276: 260: 256: 246: 244: 233: 229: 219: 217: 202: 198: 186: 184: 175: 174: 169: 163: 159: 154: 76: 68: 62: 32: 17: 12: 11: 5: 597: 587: 586: 584:Access control 569: 568: 566: 565: 560: 558:Intel iAPX 432 555: 550: 545: 540: 534: 532: 528: 527: 525: 524: 518: 516: 510: 509: 507: 506: 501: 496: 491: 485: 483: 477: 476: 474: 473: 468: 465:HarmonyOS NEXT 458: 453: 448: 443: 438: 433: 416: 411: 406: 400: 398: 388: 387: 385: 384: 379: 374: 369: 364: 359: 354: 349: 344: 339: 332: 330: 326: 325: 317: 316: 309: 302: 294: 286: 285: 254: 243:(Mailing list) 227: 196: 187:|journal= 156: 155: 153: 150: 88:access control 75: 72: 66: 61: 58: 54: 53: 46: 31: 28: 24:access control 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 596: 585: 582: 581: 579: 564: 561: 559: 556: 554: 553:IBM System/38 551: 549: 546: 544: 543:Cambridge CAP 541: 539: 536: 535: 533: 529: 523: 520: 519: 517: 515: 511: 505: 502: 500: 497: 495: 492: 490: 487: 486: 484: 482: 478: 472: 469: 466: 462: 459: 457: 454: 452: 449: 447: 444: 442: 439: 437: 434: 432: 428: 424: 420: 417: 415: 412: 410: 407: 405: 402: 401: 399: 397: 393: 389: 383: 380: 378: 375: 373: 370: 368: 365: 363: 360: 358: 355: 353: 350: 348: 345: 343: 340: 337: 334: 333: 331: 327: 322: 315: 310: 308: 303: 301: 296: 295: 292: 275: 274: 269: 265: 258: 242: 238: 231: 216:on 2013-04-14 215: 211: 207: 200: 192: 179: 168: 161: 157: 149: 147: 143: 139: 134: 132: 128: 124: 120: 115: 113: 109: 105: 101: 97: 93: 89: 85: 81: 71: 65: 57: 51: 47: 44: 43: 42: 39: 37: 27: 25: 21: 514:File systems 346: 277:. Retrieved 272: 257: 245:. Retrieved 240: 230: 218:. Retrieved 214:the original 209: 199: 178:cite journal 160: 141: 137: 135: 116: 83: 79: 77: 69: 63: 55: 49: 40: 35: 33: 19: 18: 121:(including 522:Tahoe-LAFS 471:Phantom OS 279:2022-12-06 152:References 30:Definition 461:HarmonyOS 26:systems. 578:Category 441:iMAX 432 404:Capsicum 382:Petnames 329:Concepts 323:security 247:June 28, 220:June 28, 210:cap-talk 80:identity 409:Fuchsia 396:kernels 270:(ed.). 92:process 82:or its 60:Example 489:Cajita 446:Midori 431:CapROS 423:KeyKOS 419:GNOSIS 414:Genode 357:C-list 338:(PoLP) 241:e-lang 504:Joule 499:Joe-E 451:NLTSS 436:Hydra 266:. In 170:(PDF) 104:reify 548:Flex 538:BiiN 456:seL4 427:EROS 249:2012 222:2012 191:help 142:user 138:user 84:role 74:Uses 50:any 580:: 429:→ 425:→ 421:→ 394:, 239:. 208:. 182:: 180:}} 176:{{ 114:. 494:E 467:) 463:( 313:e 306:t 299:v 282:. 251:. 224:. 193:) 189:( 172:.

Index

access control
access control
process
access control lists
Role-Based Access Control
reify
first-class values
confused deputy problem
capability-based security
object-capability models
first-class object
Confused deputy problem
Principle of least privilege
"Capability Myths Demolished"
cite journal
help
"[cap-talk] ... enforcement - ambient authority - definition?"
the original
"Re: [e-lang] "Capability Myths Demolished" => ambient authority revisited"
"Capability Computing at LLNL"
George A. Michael
Stories of the Development of Large Scale Scientific Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; An Oral and Pictorial History
v
t
e
Object-capability
Principle of least privilege
Confused deputy problem
Ambient authority
File descriptor

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